Part 20

NOTE 61, p. 268.—This statement is not quite justified by the facts. At the conclusion of the Civil War, intense feeling of indignation pervaded the United States against Great Britain, for three reasons: first, for a premature recognition of the belligerency of the Southern States; secondly, for the direct aid and supplies furnished the Southern States in British ports; and thirdly, for allowing the fitting out of cruisers in British ports to prey upon Northern commerce. The people of the United States held that Great Britain through her government had disregarded the obligations of neutrality imposed upon her by the law of nations. The United States Government remonstrated with the British Government, demanding reparation for past wrong, and cessation from a continuance of the wrong. But so long as Lord John Russell was in power (through whose negligence or misjudgment the wrong had been done) no progress was made toward a settlement. The Derby-Disraeli government succeeded that of Russell in 1866, with Lord Stanley as Minister of Foreign Affairs. About the end of 1866 Lord Stanley, through Sir Frederick Bruce, offered to submit the Alabama Claims to arbitration. To this Mr. Seward assented “on condition that the whole controversy between the two governments should be deferred.” Lord Stanley asked for information as to what was meant by the expression “the whole controversy,” but the answer was not free from ambiguity, and was supposed to refer to damages for “premature recognition of the Confederacy.” As Lord Stanley had refused to submit this subject to arbitration, negotiations were broken off. The matter rested till March 6, 1868, when it was brought up in the House of Commons, and was fully debated. This was followed by a debate March 20th in the House of Lords, both in excellent spirit. It was in the following November that negotiations were again opened with a view to submitting the differences to arbitration. A preliminary agreement was reached and signed November 10th, by Lord Stanley and Mr. Johnson, the American minister. It was not, however, acceptable to Mr. Seward, who telegraphed November 26th: “Claims Convention unless amended is useless.” In a long despatch of the same date sent by mail the objections were duly pointed out, the most important of which were in regard to Article IV. of the Protocol, and were stated in these words: “While the Convention provides that the United States claims and the British claims shall be settled and determined by a majority of the Commissioners, this Article IV. _requires entire unanimity of the Commissioners for a derision upon any of the Alabama Claims_.” Other objections were given, but this was the most important one why, as Mr. Seward said, “the United States are obliged to disallow this Article IV.” On November 28th Mr. Johnson had an interview with Lord Stanley, when the latter said he had received a despatch from the British minister at Washington, which stated “that it was understood that all the cabinet disapprove of it.” On the 5th of December Mr. Johnson wrote to Mr. Seward that he just had an interview with Lord Stanley, who “expressed no willingness to change the mode of appointing the arbitrator who is to decide the question of the liability of this government for the Alabama Claims.” In the same letter Mr. Johnson announced the resignation of the Disraeli government, and the necessity of postponing all further negotiations. On the whole subject see “Diplomatic Correspondence,” 3d Sess., 40th Cong., vol. i., pp. 361–391. Soon after the Gladstone-Clarendon government came into power the subject was again taken up, and a Protocol was agreed upon between Mr. Johnson and Lord Clarendon, providing that “_all claims_ should be submitted to arbitration.” This treaty was submitted to the Senate of the United States, and April 19, 1869, was rejected with but one dissenting voice. The grounds of objection were that the Alabama Claims were so obscured by minor matters that they would not receive due attention. The Johnson-Clarendon treaty is given in the “Diplomatic Correspondence” and in “Ann. Reg. for 1869,” p. 282. The subject was not again renewed till the outbreak of the Franco-German War, in regard to which see note 63.

NOTE 62, p. 270.—At the conclusion of the Crimean War the great powers in the Treaty of Paris agreed to impose and enforce the neutrality of the Black Sea. The waters and the ports were “perpetually interdicted to the flag of war of either of the powers possessing its coasts,” excepting certain small armed vessels to act as a sort of maritime police. As was not unnatural, Russia chafed under this interdiction. The Franco-German War broke out in July of 1870. In October of that year, when France and Germany were so occupied as scarcely to be able to protest, Prince Gortschakoff addressed a circular despatch to the European powers, stating that Russia no longer recognized the obligations of the Treaty of 1856. This despatch called forth a courteous but firm reply from Lord Granville, in which the obligatory nature of the treaty was insisted upon. It was feared that Prussia had secretly assented to the claims now put forward by Russia, in compensation for grants made to Prussia on the Baltic. Accordingly Mr. Odo Russell was sent to the German head-quarters at Versailles to ascertain the attitude of the Prussian Government. Count Bismarck assured the English ambassador that Prussia had given no sanction to the step, and proposed that the whole question should be submitted to a conference of the powers, to be held at London. This proposal of Prussia was assented to by England and Russia, and the conference took place in January of 1871. The result was the neutralization of the Black Sea was abrogated. The prediction of Beaconsfield, that “the entire command of the Black Sea will soon be in the possession of Russia,” has been amply justified by subsequent history.—“Ann. Reg., 1870,” 109; 1871, 3–17.

NOTE 63, p. 271.—The Washington Treaty of June 17, 1871, provided for referring five important questions in dispute to a Committee of Arbitration, consisting of one member appointed by the Queen of England, one by the President of the United States, one by the King of Italy, one by the President of the Swiss Confederation, and one by the Emperor of Brazil. The sixth article of the treaty provided that the Arbitrators should be guided in their decision of the “Alabama Claims” by “three rules” which were given in the article, and which virtually acknowledged the responsibility of England for allowing the “Alabama” to be fitted up in a British port, and allowing her to escape. The adoption of these “three rules” unquestionably gave the United States great advantage and made, it nearly certain that the case would be adjudicated in their favor. But the opposition in England steadily held that the “three rules” that were made the basis of the arbitration were not justified by the requirements of international law. This view has since been held by many prominent publicists, American as well as European. The rules are of at least questionable advantage, and have not been assented to by any other powers than England and the United States. The result of the arbitration, which was held at Geneva in 1871 and 1872, was to award “the sum of $15,500,000 in gold as the indemnity to be paid by Great Britain to the United States for the satisfaction of all claims referred to the consideration of the tribunal.” The treaty and the award are printed at length in Cushing’s “Treaty of Washington,” pp. 257–280. What made England willing to adopt the “three rules” for the sake of speedily reaching a final settlement, was the condition of affairs in Europe. In case England had become involved in war, her commerce would have been at the mercy of American privateers. But the treaty and the award were very unpopular in England. Mr. McCarthy (iv., 347) says: “What most of the English people saw was that England had been compelled, in homely phrase, to ‘knuckle down’ to America.” This unpopularity of the measure and the good use made of it by Lord Beaconsfield had not a little to do with bringing on the downfall of Gladstone’s government.

NOTE 64, p. 272.—Reference is here made to the so-called “indirect claims” which the United States Government insisted on having considered by the Arbitrators, but which the English as strenuously refused to submit. The claim was in substance that the “Alabama” and other cruisers had not only directly destroyed much of our commerce, but had indirectly prolonged the war, and that for this prolongation the United States should be paid. Though this doctrine was presented in the so-called “American Case,” which, as Beaconsfield amusingly says, was translated into all languages and sent into all European courts, it was not formally objected to until the Arbitrators met at Geneva. The question there seemed likely to bring arbitration abruptly to an end. But finally the Arbitrators, in an informal manner, declared that “in case the indirect claims _should_ come before them, they should be obliged to reject them,” whereupon the Americans said that all they insisted on was a _decision_, not necessarily a decision in their favor. The difficult question thus happily disposed of, other matters were settled with substantial unanimity.

NOTE 65, p. 275.—It is not difficult to understand the great influence of passages like this in stirring the national feeling of Great Britain. Lord Beaconsfield knew how to move the British heart as no other modern statesman except Palmerston has done.

NOTE 66, p. 288.—In 1879 the people of England were confronted with problems which a long succession of good harvests had caused them to forget. The failure of four successive crops had brought about unexampled distress. The cry for protection was revived, and in the spring of 1879 was brought in various forms before Parliament. Lord Beaconsfield, the Prime-Minister, in a succession of quite remarkable speeches, took the ground that “the country had settled the question in another generation,” and that the distress was not to be relieved by a return to the former policy. Among other interesting things shown by the Prime-Minister, was the fact that the loss to the nation from bad harvests had been in four years not less than about 80,000,000 pounds sterling.—Beaconsfield’s “Speeches,” i., 327.

NOTE 67, p. 289.—Mr. Gladstone’s praise of Mr. Playfair’s qualifications was not extravagant. Playfair first became eminent as a chemist, having been a successful student under Liebig at Giessen, and subsequently Professor of Chemistry in the Royal Institution at Manchester and in the University of Edinburgh. In 1844 he was appointed chairman of a commission to examine into the sanitary condition of English towns, and in 1851 was sent by the government into the manufacturing districts to prepare a classification of the various objects of industry. At the World’s Exposition he was placed in charge of the department of jurors, and so well did he perform his work that at the next World’s Exposition, in 1862, he was entrusted with the selection of the jurors, some six hundred in number, to be drawn from the most eminent men of all countries. In 1874 he prepared the elaborate scheme for the reorganization of the English civil service, a work which he was well fitted to perform by reason of his labors in 1873–4 as Postmaster-General. During his visit to the United States he delivered an important address in Boston on the civil service in England as compared with that in the United States.

NOTE 68, p. 293.—The development of Manitoba has quite justified the predictions of Beaconsfield, which Mr. Gladstone seemed to make light of.

NOTE 69, p. 297.—In the second Mid-Lothian speech, Mr. Gladstone had spoken at length on the tenure of land and the land laws. Among other statements, he said concerning the law of entail and settlement: “I believe that you view that law with disapproval, as being itself one of the most serious restraints upon the effective prosecution of the agriculture of the country. Gentlemen, I need not dwell upon that matter. I heartily agree with you on the point at issue. I am for the alteration of that law. I disapprove of it on economic grounds. I disapprove of it on social and moral grounds. I disapprove of the relation which it creates between father and son. I disapprove of the manner in which it makes provision for the interests of children to be born. Was there ever in the history of legislation a stranger expedient? * * * The law of England is wiser than the Almighty; it improves upon Divine Providence.”—Gladstone, “Speeches in Scotland,” 83.

NOTE 70, p. 306.—In the preceding April, Lord Bateman had moved in Parliament “That, this House fully recognizing the benefits which would result to the community if a system of free trade were universally adopted, it is expedient, in all future commercial negotiations with other countries, to advocate a policy of reciprocity between all inter-trading nations.” The policy was opposed by Lord Beaconsfield, because, as he said, he was convinced it was “a proposition which can lead to no public benefit.” Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the course of the summer appeared to favor it.

NOTE 71, p. 315.—The first census of Great Britain was taken in 1801, when the population was found to be as follows: England, 8,331,434; Wales, 541,546; Scotland, 1,599,068; army and navy, 470,598; total in Great Britain, 10,942,646. The first census in Ireland was taken in 1813, but the returns were so imperfect as to be valueless. In 1821 Ireland had a population of 6,801,827.—Porter, “Progress of the Nation,” 8.

NOTE 72, p. 327.—The events alluded to in this and in following passages may be thus summarized. The war between Russia and Turkey terminated in the treaty of San Stefano, in the spring of 1878. Turkey had been overwhelmed by the war, and was now practically reduced to a cipher by the treaty. In the opinion of the English Government, Lord Beaconsfield being then in power, the interests of England in the eastern Mediterranean were imperilled by this aggrandizement of Russia. Russia was required by the British Government to submit the treaty of San Stefano to a European Congress. This Russia at first declined to do, whereupon the English Government at once moved an address requesting the Queen to call out the Reserves. This vigorous measure was at once followed by the still more decisive step of bringing up a division of the British army in India to the island of Malta. The right of the crown to employ Indian troops in European war was questioned, and gave rise to animated debate; but the measure was at least successful on diplomatic grounds. Russia at once lowered her pretensions, and arrangements were soon made for a General Congress at Berlin, in June of 1878, where the interests of Great Britain were represented by Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury. The result of the Congress was a modification of the treaty of San Stefano, by which the independence of Turkey was once more restored, and the dependent provinces were put on a substantial footing. The outcome was regarded as a great diplomatic triumph of Lord Beaconsfield. The agreement between Lord Salisbury and Count Schouvaloff is treated more fully later in the speech.

NOTE 73, p. 332.—This statement, while substantially correct, is a little misleading. The provinces alluded to were all more or less dependent on Turkey, and England was at no time quite willing to adopt a military policy in their defence. Neither was any other government of Europe, excepting Russia, and Russia was willing simply because it opened the way for her own advance toward the south.

NOTE 74, p. 335.—In 1877, Lord Derby had resigned the post of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and had been succeeded by Lord Salisbury.

NOTE 75, p. 337.—The “needless and mischievous armaments” were the calling out of the Reserves, and the bringing to Malta of the Indian army. Mr. Gladstone’s adjectives can only mean that in his opinion the Berlin Treaty was not desirable, since without the military movements the treaty would have been impossible. The statement of the orator as to the agreement between Salisbury and Schouvaloff is not quite correct. There was no pretence to making a treaty or settling any question whatever, but simply an understanding as to what England demanded, and what she desired to submit to a Congress. After this conference, which Mr. Gladstone criticises with so much severity, Count Schouvaloff went to St. Petersburg, pausing at Berlin for an interview with Prince Bismarck. At St. Petersburg he appears to have convinced the Czar that nothing short of a submission of the question at issue to a General Congress would satisfy England. Soon after the Count’s return to London, the Prussian Government invited the powers to a Congress at Berlin; and Russia not only accepted the invitation, but agreed to submit to the powers, all the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano. During the whole of these negotiations English public opinion was wrought up to the most intense excitement and anxiety. The course of the government was assailed and defended with the utmost vigor, everybody supposing, meanwhile, that peace or war between the two great nations hung upon the issue. In the “Ann. Reg. for 1878,” all the official papers are given, and on pp. 40–64 is to be found an abstract of the discussions in Parliament.

NOTE 76, p. 339.—The reader perhaps hardly needs to be reminded that the cases were not parallel. Russia had overwhelmed her weak foe, and now proposed to dismember her fallen enemy as a reward for her trouble. This was not only in clear violation of the principles set down by the Treaty of Paris in 1856, but also obnoxious to the traditional policy of Great Britain, as held by Pitt. But neither international obligation nor British usage offered any objection to a peaceful and voluntary treaty between England and Turkey, by which for a just consideration the one should cede a bit of territory to the other.

NOTE 77, p. 341.—On the 9th of November, 1879, Lord Beaconsfield, at the Lord Mayor’s banquet, had expounded his imperial policy, and in the course of his speech had used the words “_imperium et libertas_.” The speech attracted great attention as an authoritative exposition of the Prime-Minister’s views on domestic and foreign affairs.

NOTE 78, p. 344.—With this position Lord Beaconsfield would probably have heartily agreed. He might even have asked Mr. Gladstone, “Was it not to prevent just such aggrandizement as you condemn that we objected to the Treaty of San Stefano, and insisted upon a Congress?” More than that, he might have asked: “How do you reconcile your plea for the independence of the smaller states with your denunciation of the Congress of Berlin, brought about by ‘needless and mischievous armaments,’ by which alone the independence of Turkey could be saved?” To these questions Mr. Gladstone would probably have replied: “Yes; but you ought to have accomplished all this by preventing the war between Russia and Turkey in the beginning.” How Mr. Gladstone thought this might have been done and ought to have been done he pointed out in the first of the Mid-Lothian speeches, delivered at Edinburgh.

Transcriber’s Notes

Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.

Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced quotation marks retained.

Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained; occurrences of inconsistent hyphenation have not been changed.