Part 51

£. _s._ _d._ 1 Colonel 1 6 3 1 Lieutenant-colonel 0 18 1 2 Captains, at 11_s._ 1_d._ 1 2 2 2 First lieutenants, at 6_s._ 10_d._ 0 13 8 2 Second ditto, at 5_s._ 7_d._ 0 11 2 —— —— —— 4 11 4

Or if unity of direction and execution were required, the staff of officers and men at the rate of pay for general service from the public would be as follows. The rate of pay therein stated is subsistence pay: the half-fees for every alteration made in a building would in most cases suffice for the extra pay given to officers and men in active service:—

£. _s._ _d._ 1 Captain 0 11 1 2 First lieutenants 0 13 8 3 Second ditto 0 16 9 1 Colour-sergeant 0 3 0½ 3 Sergeants, at 2_s._ 6½_d._ 0 7 7½ 6 Corporals, at 2_s._ 2½_d._ 0 13 3 22 Privates, at 1_s._ 2½_d._ 1 6 7 —— —— —— 4 12 0

The high rates of remuneration ordinarily given for fragments of practically irresponsible service, would not only serve to defray the expense of direction by scientific officers, but of execution by trained subordinate officers.

The following return will afford a display of the comparative rate of emoluments in other towns from fees on the ordinary scale of surveyors’ fees:—

Rate of Rate of No. of New Rate of Increase of Increase of Houses per Surveyors’ Fees Families per Houses per Diem. per Diem for Annum. Annum. Fourthclass Houses.

£. _s._ _d._

Liverpool 1205 638 1‑7/10 3 8 0

Leeds 940 855 2‑3/10 4 12 0

Manchester 590 589 1‑6/10 3 4 0

Birmingham 561 474 1‑3/10 2 12 0

For the construction of efficient works for drainage, it is shown that science is indispensable. If scientific officers be chosen for this one purpose, if the objectionable mode of remuneration by fees be preserved, since they are required to inspect the foundations of houses for the purpose of drainage, they might for one-fourth of the proposed fee be required to give inspection to the remainder of the work, and the process of double certificates and divided responsibility be saved. Even if the amount of work were in particular places too great to be performed by one person, it would be better, and less expensive, that it should be performed by him through an assistant, for whose defaults he should be responsible. A reduction of the accustomed fees to one-fourth, or of the aggregate emoluments obtainable under a general Building Act to 15,000_l._ or 20,000_l._ per annum would still entail the loss of so much money that might serve to secure superior scientific service; whilst in the less populous districts the payment for the separate duty of verifying the fact of compliance with the provisions of the Act would be too small to ensure the service of competent and responsible officers.

Besides the evils inherent in narrow districts, and the splitting of connected functions which prevent the application of science by preventing the appointment of scientific officers, there are other evils attendant on such small jurisdictions and separation of functions, namely, in the mode in which the money for such expenditure is levied. The popular jealousy is excited by the further multiplication of unnecessary offices, as of clerks and collectors, but real annoyance is given by the consequent increased expense of separate collections. The prevalent repugnance to direct taxation in any shape has hitherto been greatly owing to the cause of grievances experienced in the number and oppressiveness of the collections incidental to the ordinary local taxation. Those collections confuse and obstruct the rate payers’ economy. Where there are a number of rates collected at different periods, some are forgotten and not provided for; and when demanded, they fall with the inconvenience and create the irritation of a new tax. The householder may have paid the collector of his poor’s rates, then the collector of his assessed taxes, then the collector of the land tax, then the collector of the watch rates, then the collector of his paving rates, then his lighting rates, then his water rates, and then he thinks he has done, when a collector calls to demand the payment of the church rates; he may have paid him, when another collector appears to demand the payment of a sewers’ rate for two years, probably for the period of a former tenant, and for which the tenant on whom the demand is levied receives no apparent advantage. A witness says[45] (2231), “In Limehouse there had not been a sewer built for 100 and odd years, and there are 2000 houses, and not a sewer to them.” Another states (2066), “In one case a sewer rate of 6_d._ in the pound was levied for 10 years, without even surface drainage;” and in that case the party paid another rate to a trust for paving, lighting, and making drainage. “We could claim six years,” says another witness (860); “three years’ rates in arrear, as against former occupiers, were levied on the incoming tenants” (1798).

In a house receiving no benefit, the occupier, having refused to pay the rate ten years, and having paid it but once in 1827, the commissioners, when he left (1834) the house, “distrained on the new comer, and tore down the corn-bin,” &c. His solicitor previously wrote to them that the occupier was out of town, and wished them to abstain from taking any violent measures, at the same time offering on his part to refer the matter to any competent person (2328). In another case of aggravated proceeding, Mr. William Baker, who was clerk to a like commission, complained of the state of the sewerage, and of the rates in another commission. He did not resist the rate, “for he knew very well what the powers of the commissioners are, and it was not worth his while to resist so strong a body.” The assessments of sewers’ rates are seldom strictly legal.

Such rates, being small in amount, they are levied at long intervals, for the collection at once of a sum sufficient to defray the expense of collection; and because they are collected at long intervals, the irritation and resistance and trouble is great, and an additional sum is paid by the public for the collector’s share of the trouble of the collection. For the collection of the assessed taxes 3_d._ in the pound is paid; for the collection of the sewers’ rates from 6_d._ to 1_s._ in the pound is usually paid. I venture to state, that by a consolidation of the collection of such charges, enough may be saved of money (independently of the saving of oppression and irritation) from the collection of the one local tax, the sewers’ rate, to pay the expense of the services of scientific officers throughout the country. At present the high constable collects the county rate from every parish, and carries it to the county treasurer, in the county town, and charges for the expense of a journey. By an easy alteration, by payment by cheques from the union treasurer to the county treasurer, in one county (Kent) 1000_l._ per annum might be saved, or enough to defray the immediate expense of constructing permanent drains for upwards of 500 tenements. What might be gained on this head for immediate expenditure, in most towns, will be shown in the following extract, from the evidence of _Mr. Simkiss_, the auditor of the Wolverhampton union:—

What are the amounts of the chief local rates collected, in round numbers?—The poor’s rates are about 4000_l._, the highway rates about 2000_l._, and there are rates levied by commissioners under a local Act for lighting, watching, and improving the town, amounting to about 3000_l._ in round numbers.

On his admission of the practicability of combining with advantage the superintendence of all this expenditure by one Board in such a town, a combination of which there are several examples, he observes:—

The greatest public advantage in having those duties united would be the collection of the whole of the rates in one sum by the same individual, and payment afterwards to the several purposes.

What are the present disadvantages of a separate collection of these rates?—First, that there are three collectors to pay instead of one. 1_s._ in the pound is paid to the collector of the highway rates, which is supposed to produce 100_l._ per annum. The collector of the poor’s rates is paid by a fixed salary of 150_l._ per annum. The collector of the commissioners’ rates is paid 8_d._ in the pound, and he gets upwards of 100_l._ per annum. If the collection of the rates were consolidated, they might be collected for 200_l._ per annum, and upwards of 150_l._ per annum might be saved in salaries alone; but a much larger sum might be saved by a more efficient collection of the smaller rates. The surveyor’s rates and the commissioners’ rates not being sufficient to occupy the whole time of separate individuals, they attend to other things, and consequently much money is lost by the delay in the operation. Parties remove, or die, or leave the town. Three times the amount has been lost in Wolverhampton on the collection of the highway rate as compared with the poor’s rates. The highway rate and the commissioners’ rates, each being made for twelve months, the collectors usually collect from the large rate payers first; considerable time elapses before the smaller payers are called upon, consequently much is lost by the delay. I have known it that the highway rate has not been demanded in some parts of the town for seven or eight months after it has been granted. The surveyors of highways, and the commissioners of improvements, not taking so much care in obtaining securities for the smaller rates, run greater risks of defalcation. I do not advert to the collectors of the smaller rates in our town, but the collectors of the smaller rates, being tradesmen, usually use the public money in their trades, and there is frequently much peculation. The accounts of the collection and expenditure of the smaller rates are generally badly kept.

What I have already submitted will, I hope, suffice to sustain the recommendation, that at the least nothing should be done to aggravate the existing state of complication and waste, by new divisions of service and the unnecessary additions of new and unqualified officers, and that everything should be done to guard against the continued reproduction of the evils in question in districts where there is clear ground. It would, I apprehend, be practicable in the old districts to superadd the appointments of officers, with proper qualifications, without any diminution of the emoluments of the existing paid officers or any material disturbance of them.

When the great importance of the general land drainage to the health of those who labour upon it and to their most productive employment is fully considered, it will, I conceive, be found entitled to all collateral aid, to which an additional title would be conferred by equal contribution of the owners and occupiers to the expenses of public drainage. If officers of proper qualifications and responsibilities were appointed, the works for sewerage branching from the towns, and the road drainage, could not fail to aid, as indeed I conceive it should be directed to aid, the private land drainage. The same surface levels and sewerage, if made on the scale proposed by the Poor Law and Tithe Commissioners (namely, of three chains to an inch) would serve for all civil purposes, whether of towns or general land drainage, or road drainage, for determining the descent of streams, for the application of the water of which it is desirable to rid the upland wastes, and would frequently be most beneficially applied for the use of the towns, and for the use of the poorer districts.

The appointment of persons having the scientific qualifications and position of civil engineers might serve to supply a want which is generally found to be the chief impediment to the drainage of land subdivided amongst numerous small holders, namely, the means of reference or appeal to some authority deriving confidence from skill and impartiality to determine on the need of works, and the mode of executing them, or to arbitrate; and on the compensation due from damage arising from them. Given such an authority, and in those small, but, from their great number, most important cases, where the expense of an application to Parliament is out of the question, it might, be safe to say, by a general provision, that the inhabitants of a town may procure springs of water, and make, deepen, and scour drains through the circumjacent district; that regulations may be made for arching over or covering the sewers to proper distances from the towns; for the purchase of ground, and for the erection of works for rendering the refuse of the towns available for agricultural purposes: power might also be given to lay pipes in the highways, to put plugs for the supplies of water against fires, and for watering the roads.

On referring to the experience of the efforts made in Ireland for the drainage and reclaiming of bog lands, by which large tracts would be obtained, it appears that the working of legislative measures for those purposes have extensively failed, because the landowners had not sufficient security that the work would be properly planned and executed.[46]

I would here beg leave to guard myself from an apparent inconsistency. In 1838, I was examined before a committee of the House of Commons on their resolution, “That it is expedient that the parishes, townships, and extra-parochial places should be united in districts for the repair of the highways throughout England and Wales.” On that occasion I adverted to the evil of the unnecessary multiplication of new establishments as well as new officers, to their inevitable inefficiency and to the expense and obstruction to improvement which they created; and I submitted these, amongst other grounds, for proposing that the new duties should devolve on the boards of guardians of the new unions, as such duties had been in various instances combined under local Acts. The committee recommended the proposal for adoption. On the premises then placed before me, as to the expediency of establishing a new administrative body with new clerks and officers for the collection and management of the fund for repairs of the highways _alone_, and in small districts for which even the areas of unions were thought large, I should still adhere to the same conclusion.[47]

The present inquiry, however, has shown the general primary importance of the works of sewerage and drainage throughout the country. The execution of those works would properly devolve upon the commissioners of sewers already in existence in the towns, or in the marsh districts, or upon commissions of sewers which it will be found necessary to issue to places where there has been no need of surface drainage, but which stand in need of under-drainage. These being the primary works for making the ground clear and keeping it clear for all other works, would necessarily require the highest science and skill, and the strongest establishment; and it would be only carrying farther the principle of consolidation, as the only means of obtaining the most efficient service, the most conveniently and at the lowest cost, now to recommend that the care of the roads should, of all structural works, be made to devolve upon that body which has the best means of executing them, namely, the commissions of sewers, revised as to jurisdiction, and amended and strengthened as to power and responsibility. What Colonel J. F. Burgoyne, the experienced chairman of the Board of Works in Ireland, stated in his evidence before the committee of the House Commons in 1836, (question 35,) on the consolidation of the turnpike trusts, may be applied to the consolidation of other local works:—“One office and account will then do for the whole; a superior superintendent could then be employed, and more perfect machinery; the means will be more generally available, and can be concentrated where required, by which the works will be carried on with more advantage, and a system of regular and rigid maintenance can be established so much more economical and beneficial than that of occasional and periodical repairs.”

It is due to state that in petitions from ratepayers much dissatisfaction is expressed with the proceedings of the commissions of sewers, and their objectionable working is assigned to their irresponsibility, and a favourite remedy proposed is to make them elective; but if the administration of expenditure by elective vestries be examined, it is found to be no better; and of entirely open vestries, even worse; and the practical responsibility for injustice done to individuals, or to any one who cannot get up a party, still less. It may, however, be submitted for consideration, whether the commissions for sewers might not be so far modified as to admit some infusion of the representative principle in their composition, by including, as ex-officio members of the commission, the chairman and vice-chairmen for the time being of the Boards of Guardians of the poor law unions included within the jurisdiction of the commission. These officers are elected by the elected representatives of the ratepayers—the guardians. It will be seen that much of the evil which the preventive measures within the province of the commission of sewers must provide against, is presented, in the first instance, to the Board of Guardians, in the shape of claims to relief on the ground of destitution occasioned by sickness. The chairman or the vice-chairman, before whom the cases are thus brought, would form an efficient medium of communication. The measures of drainage and structural improvement are permanent improvements of the greatest importance to the labouring men, in common with other classes; but it is matter of fact that such improvements are the least supported by those who have the least permanent interest—the smaller occupiers; or by those who have the least means and have the greatest dread of immediate expenses—the smaller owners. The chairmen and the vice-chairmen of the unions in the rural districts are, however, the chief landed proprietors, who are elected by the guardians for the interest they take in the improvement of local administration. The most important improvements in the residences of the labouring classes that have been brought to view by this inquiry have arisen from the spontaneous benevolence of the larger proprietors; and so much improvement must depend upon their voluntary exertion, that, for the sake of the labouring classes, it recommends itself as an important arrangement, that those who, as chairmen of the Boards, have the distribution of relief to the destitution attendant on sickness, should be placed in a position to represent the need of the means of prevention, and urge forward their execution.

When the extent of the removable causes of sickness and mortality are more clearly and extensively understood, as they will be, the Board of Guardians will of necessity occupy much of the position of the Leet, as a body fitted to act on complaints made, and to reclaim the execution of the law against omissions and infractions which occasion illness or injury to the most helpless classes.

_Boards of Health, or Public Officers for the Prevention of Disease._

In reports and communications, the institution of district Boards of Health is frequently recommended, but in general terms, and they nowhere specify what shall be their powers, how they shall seek out information or receive it, and how act upon it. The recommendation is also sanctioned by the committee which sat to inquire into the health of large towns; and the committee state that “the principal duty and object of these boards of health would be precautionary and preventive, to turn the public attention to the causes of illness, and to suggest means by which the sources of contagion might be removed.” “Such boards would probably have a clerk, paid for his services, whose duty it would be to make minutes of the proceedings, and give such returns in a short tabular form as might be useful for reference, and important, as affording easy information on a subject of such vital interest to the people.”

I would submit that it is shown by the evidence collected in the present inquiry, that the great preventives—drainage, street and house cleansing by means of supplies of water and improved sewerage, and especially the introduction of cheaper and more efficient modes of removing all noxious refuse from the towns—are operations for which aid must be sought from the science of the civil engineer, not from the physician, who has done his work when he has pointed out the disease that results from the neglect of proper administrative measures, and has alleviated the sufferings of the victims. After the cholera had passed, several of the local boards of health that were appointed on its appearance continued their meetings and made representations; but the alarm had passed, and although the evils represented were often much greater than the cholera, the representations produced no effect, and the boards broke up. In Paris a Board of Health has been in operation during several years, but if their operations, as displayed in their reports, be considered, it will be evident that, although they have examined many important questions and have made representations, recommending for practical application some of the principles developed in the course of the present inquiry; still as they had no executive power, their representations have produced no effect, and the labouring population of Paris is shown to be, with all the advantages of climate, in a sanitary condition even worse than the labouring population of London. In the Appendix I have submitted a translation of a report descriptive of the labours of the Conseil de Salubrité, in Paris. From this report it will be seen that they have few or no initiative functions, and that they are chiefly called into action by references made to them by the public authorities to examine and give their opinion on medical questions that may arise in the course of public administration as to what manufacturing or other operations are or are not injurious to the public health.

The action of a board of health upon such evils as those in question must depend upon the arrangements for bringing under its notice the evils to be remedied. A body of gentlemen sitting in a room will soon find themselves with few means of action if there be no agency to bring the subject matters before them; and an inquiring agency to seek out the evils from house to house, wherever those evils may be found, to follow on the footsteps of the private practitioner would be apparently attended with much practical difficulty.