Chapter 9

As to the future peace and harmony of the Union, it is of the highest importance that the people lately in rebellion be not permitted to build up another "peculiar institution" whose spirit is in conflict with the fundamental principles of our political system; for as long as they cherish interests peculiar to them in preference to those they have in common with the rest of the American people, their loyalty to the Union will always be uncertain.

I desire not to be understood as saying that there are no well-meaning men among those who were compromised in the rebellion. There are many, but neither their number nor their influence is strong enough to control the manifest tendency of the popular spirit. There are great reasons for hope that a determined policy on the part of the national government will produce innumerable and valuable conversions. This consideration counsels lenity as to persons, such as is demanded by the humane and enlightened spirit of our times, and vigor and firmness in the carrying out of principles, such as is demanded by the national sense of justice and the exigencies of our situation.

In submitting this report I desire to say that I have conscientiously endeavored to see things as they were, and to represent them as I saw them: I have been careful not to use stronger language than was warranted by the thoughts I intended to express. A comparison of the tenor of the annexed documents with that of my report, will convince you that I have studiously avoided overstatements. Certain legislative attempts at present made in the south, and especially in South Carolina, seem to be more than justifying the apprehensions I have expressed.

Conscious though I am of having used my best endeavors to draw, from what I saw and learned, correct general conclusions, yet I am far from placing too great a trust in my own judgment, when interests of such magnitude are at stake. I know that this report is incomplete, although as complete as an observation of a few months could enable me to make it. Additional facts might be elicited, calculated to throw new light upon the subject. Although I see no reason for believing that things have changed for the better since I left for the south, yet such may be the case. Admitting all these possibilities, I would entreat you to take no irretraceable step towards relieving the States lately in rebellion from all national control, until such favorable changes are clearly and unmistakably ascertained.

To that end, and by virtue of the permission you honored me with when sending me out to communicate to you freely and unreservedly my views as to measures of policy proper to be adopted, I would now respectfully suggest that you advise Congress to send one or more "investigating committees" into the southern States, to inquire for themselves into the actual condition of things, before final action is taken upon the readmission of such States to their representation in the legislative branch of the government, and the withdrawal of the national control from that section of the country.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CARL SCHURZ.

His Excellency ANDREW JOHNSON, _President of the United States_.

DOCUMENTS ACCOMPANYING THE REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL CARL SCHURZ.

No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

_Hilton Head, S.C., July_ 27, 1865.

Dear Sir: I have received your letter of the 17th instant, from Charleston, propounding to me three questions, as follows:

1st. Do you think that there are a number of _bona fide_ loyal persons in this State large enough to warrant the early establishment of civil government?

2d. Do you think that the white population of South Carolina, if restored to the possession of political power in this State, would carry out the spirit of the emancipation proclamation, and go to work in a _bona fide_ manner to organize free labor?

3d. What measures do you think necessary to insure such a result in this State?

The first of these questions I am forced to answer in the negative, provided that white persons only are referred to in the expression "_bona fide loyal persons_," and provided that "the early establishment of civil government" means the early withdrawal of the general control of affairs from the United States authorities.

To the second question, I answer that I do not think that the white inhabitants of South Carolina, if left to themselves, are yet prepared to carry out the spirit of the emancipation proclamation; neither do I think that they would organize free labor upon any plan that would be of advantage to both whites and blacks until the mutual distrust and prejudice now existing between the races are in a measure removed.

To the third question I answer, that, in order to secure the carrying out of the "spirit of the emancipation proclamation," and the organization of really free labor in good faith, it appears to me necessary that the military, or some other authority derived from the national government, should retain a supervisory control over the civil affairs in this State until the next season's crops are harvested and secured.

The reasons which have dictated my replies I shall notice quite briefly.

Loyalty in South Carolina--such loyalty as is secured by the taking of the amnesty oath and by the reception of Executive clemency--does not approach the standard of loyalty in the north. It is not the golden fruit of conviction, but the stern and unpromising result of necessity, arising from unsuccessful insurrection. The white population of the State accept the condition which has been imposed upon them, simply because there is no alternative.

They entered upon the war in the spring of 1861 and arrayed themselves on the side of treason with a unanimity of purpose and a malignity of feeling not equalled by that displayed in any other State.

The individual exceptions to this rule were too few in numbers and were possessed of too little power to be taken into account at all. Although the overt treason then inaugurated has been overcome by superior force, few will claim that it has been transformed into loyalty toward the national government. I am clearly of the opinion that it has not, and that time and experience will be necessary to effect such a change.

All intelligent whites admit that the "abolition of slavery" and the "impracticability of secession" are the plain and unmistakable verdicts of the war. Their convictions as yet go no further. Their preference for the "divine institution," and their intellectual belief in the right of a State to secede, are as much articles of faith in their creed at the present moment as they were on the day when the ordinance of secession was unanimously adopted. When the rebel armies ceased to exist, and there was no longer any force that could be invoked for waging war against the nation, the insurgents accepted that fact simply as proof of the impossibility of their establishing an independent government. This sentiment was almost immediately followed by a general desire to save as much property as possible from the general wreck. To this state of the public mind, which succeeded the surrender of the rebel armies with noteworthy rapidity, I am forced to attribute the prevailing willingness and desire of the people to "return" to their allegiance, and resume the avocations of peace.

I do not regard this condition of things as at all discouraging. It is, indeed, better than I expected to see or dared to hope for in so short a time. One good result of it is, that guerilla warfare, which was so very generally apprehended, has never been resorted to in this State. There was a sudden and general change from a state of war to a state of peace, and, with the exception of frequent individual conflicts, mostly between the whites and blacks, and often, it is true, resulting in loss of life, that peace has rarely been disturbed.

It is, however, a peace resulting from a cool and dispassionate appeal to reason, and not from any convictions of right or wrong; it has its origin in the head, and not in the heart. Impotency and policy gave it birth, and impotency, policy and hope keep it alive. It is not inspired by any higher motives than these, and higher motives could hardly be expected to follow immediately in the footsteps of armed insurrection. The hopes of the people are fixed, as a matter of course, upon the President. The whites hope and expect to recover the preponderating influence which they have lost by the war, and which has been temporarily replaced by the military authority throughout the State, and they receive with general satisfaction the appointment of Mr. Perry as provisional governor of the State, and regard it as a step toward their restoration to civil and political power. Even those men who have taken the lead during the war, not only in the heartiness and liberality of their support of the rebel cause, but also in the bitterness of their denunciation of the national government and the loyal people of the northern States, express themselves as entirely satisfied with the shape which events are taking.

The colored population, on the contrary, or that portion of it which moulds the feelings and directs the passions of the mass, look with growing suspicion upon this state of affairs, and entertain the most lively apprehensions with regard to their future welfare. They have no fears of being returned to slavery, having the most implicit faith in our assurance of its abolition for all time to come, but they think they see the power which has held the lash over them through many generations again being restored to their former masters, and they are impressed with a greater or less degree of alarm.

Thus the "irrepressible conflict," the antagonism of interest, thought, and sentiment between the races is perpetuated. The immediate resumption by the whites of the civil and political power of the State would have a tendency to augment this evil. At the present time all differences between the whites and blacks, but more especially those growing out of agreements for compensated labor, are promptly and willingly referred to the nearest military authority for adjustment; the whites well knowing that simple justice will be administered, and the blacks inspired by the belief that we are their friends. This plan works smoothly and satisfactorily. Many of the labor contracts upon the largest plantations have been made with special reference to the planting and harvesting of the next year's crops; others expire with the present year. The immediate restoration of the civil power by removing military restraint from those planters who are not entirely sincere in their allegiance, and have not made their pledges and especially their labor contracts in good faith, and by withdrawing from the blacks that source of protection to which alone they look for justice with any degree of confidence, would, by engendering new suspicions, and new prejudices between the races, work disadvantageously to both in a pecuniary sense, while the successful solution of the important question of free black labor would be embarrassed, deferred, and possibly defeated, inasmuch as it would be placed thereby in the hands of men who are avowedly suspicious of the negro, and have no confidence in his fitness for freedom, or his willingness to work; who regard the abolition of slavery as a great sectional calamity, and who, under the semblance and even the protection of the law, and without violating the letter of the emancipation proclamation, would have it in their power to impose burdens upon the negro race scarcely less irksome than those from which it has theoretically escaped. Indeed, the ordinary vagrancy and apprenticeship laws now in force in some of the New England States (slightly modified perhaps) could be so administered and enforced upon the blacks in South Carolina as to keep them in practical slavery. They could, while bearing the name of freeman, be legally subjected to all the oppressive features of serfdom, peonage, and feudalism combined, without possessing the right to claim, much less the power to exact, any of the prerogatives and amenities belonging to either of those systems of human bondage. All this could be done without violating the letter of the emancipation proclamation; no argument is necessary to prove that it would be a total submission of its spirit. Even upon the presumption that the whites, when again clothed with civil authority, would be influenced by a sincere desire to enforce the emancipation proclamation, and organize free labor upon a wise and just basis, it would seem injudicious to intrust them with unlimited power, which might be wielded to the injury of both races until the prejudices and animosities which generated the rebellion and gave it life and vigor have had time to subside. Few men have any clear conception of what the general good at the present time requires in the way of State legislation. A thousand vague theories are floating upon the public mind.

The evils which we would have to fear from an immediate re-establishment of civil government would be not only hasty and ignorant but excessive legislation. While there may be wide differences of opinion as to which is the greater of these two evils _per se_, I am free to express my belief that one or the other of them would be very likely to follow the immediate restoration of civil government, and that it would be not only injudicious in itself but productive of prospective harm, to whites as well as blacks, to place the former in a position where a community of feeling, the promptings of traditional teachings, and the instincts of self-interest and self-preservation, would so strongly tempt them to make a choice. I believe that a respectable majority of the most intelligent whites would cordially aid any policy calculated, in their opinion, to secure the greatest good of the greatest number, blacks included, but I do not regard them as yet in a condition to exercise an unbiassed judgment in this matter. Inasmuch as very few of them are yet ready to admit the practicability of ameliorating the condition of the black race to any considerable extent, they would not be likely at the present time to devise a wise system of free black labor. Neither would they be zealous and hopeful co-laborers in such a system if desired by others.

I have spoken of the contract system which has been inaugurated by the military authorities throughout the State as working smoothly and satisfactorily. This statement should, of course, be taken with some limitation. It was inaugurated as an expedient under the pressure of stringent necessity at a time when labor was in a greatly disorganized state, and there was manifest danger that the crops, already planted, would be lost for want of cultivation. Many of the negroes, but more especially the able-bodied ones and those possessing no strong family ties, had, under the novel impulses of freedom, left the plantation where they had been laboring through the planting season, and flocked to the nearest military post, becoming a useless and expensive burden upon our hands. Very many plantations, under extensive cultivation, were entirely abandoned. At places remote from military posts, and that had never been visited by our troops, this exodus did not take place so extensively or to a degree threatening a very general loss of crops. The negroes were retained partly through ignorance or uncertainty of their rights and partly through fear of their former masters and the severe discipline unlawfully enforced by them.

Under the assurance that they were free, that they would be protected in the enjoyment of their freedom and the fruits of their labor, but would not be supported in idleness by the government so long as labor could be procured, the flow of negroes into the towns and military posts was stopped, and most of them already accumulated there were induced to return to the plantations and resume work under contracts to be approved and enforced by the military authorities. Both planters and negroes very generally, and apparently quite willingly, fell into this plan as the best that could be improvised. Although there have been many instances of violation of contracts, (more frequently, I think, by the black than by the white,) and although the plan possesses many defects, and is not calculated to develop all the advantages and benefits of a wise free-labor system. I am not prepared to recommend any material modification of it, or anything to replace it, at least for several months to come.

For reasons already suggested I believe that the restoration of civil power that would take the control of this question out of the hands of the United States authorities (whether exercised through the military authorities or through the Freedmen's Bureau) would, instead of removing existing evils, be almost certain to augment them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Q.A. GILLMORE, _Major General_.

General CARL SCHURZ, _Charleston, S.C._

No. 4.

Charleston, South Carolina, _July_ 25, 1865.

General: Since handing you my letter of yesterday I have read a speech reported to have been delivered in Greenville, South Carolina, on the 3d instant.

I have judged of Mr. Perry by reports of others, but as I now have an opportunity from his own lips of knowing his opinions, I must request that you will cross out that portion of my letter referring to him.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN P. HATCH, _Brevet Major General, Commanding_.

Major General CARL SCHURZ.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DISTRICT OF CHARLESTON,

_Charleston, South Carolina, July_ 24, 1865.

General: In answer to your question as to the disposition of the people being such as to justify their speedy return to the control of political power, I would say no.

Many portions of the State have not yet been visited by our troops, and in other parts not long enough occupied to encourage the formation of a new party, disposed to throw off the old party rulers, who, after thirty years preaching sedition, succeeded in carrying their point and forcing the people into rebellion.

Were elections to be held now, the old leaders already organized would carry everything by the force of their organization. I would say delay action, pardon only such as the governor can recommend, and let him only recommend such as he feels confident will support the views of the government. Men who supported nullification in thirty-two, and have upheld the doctrine of States' rights since, should not be pardoned; they cannot learn new ways. I have read with care the published proceedings of every public meeting held in this State, and have observed that not one single resolution has yet been passed in which the absolute freedom of the colored man was recognized, or the doctrine of the right of secession disavowed. Why is this? Because the old leaders have managed the meetings, and they cannot see that a new order of things exists. They still hope to obtain control of the State, and then to pass laws with reference to the colored people which shall virtually re-establish slavery; and although they look upon secession as at present hopeless, a future war may enable them to again raise the standard.

You ask what signs do they show of a disposition to educate the blacks for the new position they are to occupy? This is a question that has so far been but little discussed. No education, except as to their religious duties, was formerly allowed, and this only to make them contented in their position of servitude. Whilst thoroughly instructed in the injunction, "servants obey your masters," adultery was not only winked at, but, unfortunately, in too many cases practically recommended. A few gentlemen have said to me that they were willing to have the blacks taught to read and write, but little interest appears to be felt on the subject.

With reference to the benefit to be derived by the general government by delaying the formation for the present of a State government, I will be brief. It will discourage the old leaders who are anxious to seize immediately the reins of power. It will, by allowing time for discussion, give the people an opportunity to become acquainted with subjects they have heretofore trusted to their leaders. Wherever our troops go, discussion follows, and it would be best that the people should not commit themselves to a line of policy, they have not had time to examine and decide upon coolly. It will give the young men ambitious of rising opportunity for organizing on a new platform a party which, assisted by the government, can quiet forever the questions which have made the State of South Carolina a thorn in the side of the Union. These young men, many of whom have served in the army, take a practical view of their present condition that the old stay-at-homes cannot be brought to understand. Give them time and support and they will do the work required of them. Their long absence has made it necessary to become acquainted with the people; but they will be listened to as men who have honestly fought in a cause which has failed, and will be respected for as honestly coming out in support of the now only reasonable chance of a peaceful government for the future.

Where our troops have been the longest time stationed we have the most friends; and were the people thoroughly convinced that the government (until they have shown a disposition to unite heartily in its support) is determined not to give them a State government, the change would go on much more rapidly.

The selection of Governor Perry was most fortunate. I know of no other man in South Carolina who could have filled the position.

I remain, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. P. HATCH, _Brevet Major General Commanding_.

General CARL SCHURZ.

No. 5.

Charleston, S.C., _July_ 24, 1865.

General: In compliance with your verbal request, made at our interview this a.m., to express to you my opinions and impressions regarding the status of the people of South Carolina, and of such others of the insurrectionary States with whom I have come in contact, respecting a return to their allegiance to the federal government, and a willingness on their part to sustain and support the same in its efforts to restore and accomplish the actual union of the States, and also their probable adhesion to the several acts and proclamations which have been enacted and promulgated by the legislative and executive branches of the government, I beg to reply, that, as an officer of one of the departments, I have been enabled by constant intercourse with large numbers of this people to form an approximate estimate of the nature of their loyalty, and also to gain a knowledge of the prejudices which remain with them towards the forces, military and political, which have prevailed against them after the struggle of the last four years, and established the integrity and power of the republic.

Whatever may be said upon the abstract question of voluntary or forcible State secession, the defeat of the insurrectionary forces has been so perfect and complete, that the most defiant have already avowed their allegiance to the national government. The first experience of the insurgents is a complete submission, followed by a promise to abstain from all further acts of rebellion--in fact, the nucleus of their loyalty is necessity, while perhaps some with still a sentiment of loyalty in their hearts for the old flag turn back, like the prodigal, with tearful eyes, wasted means, and exhausted energies.