Chapter 2

Assuming this to be the case, and assuming also, as we are compelled to do, that an interruption of gauge must exist somewhere, the question is reduced to this: to ascertain at what points such interruption should be fixed in order to occasion the least inconvenience to the traffic and commerce of the country. From the fact that nearly 2,000 miles of Railway are already made or sanctioned on the narrow gauge, while not more than 300 are sanctioned on the wide gauge, a disproportion which will be still more largely increased by the new Railways now in contemplation, an inference might be drawn in favour of confining the gauge which is in such a decided minority within the narrowest possible limits; and this inference might be strengthened by referring to the obvious fact that the wide gauge has not realized those decided advantages over the narrow gauge which were at one time anticipated. The actual speed of trains upon the Great Western Railway, as shown by the published time-tables, and by official returns, is not so high as upon some narrow-gauge Railways, and notwithstanding the excellence of its gradients, very slightly higher than the average speed of other great Railways on the narrow gauge. In respect of safety, it is manifest that both gauges are alike unobjectionable, with due precaution and proper management; and in respect of convenience and of economy, including the cost both of construction and working, the opinion of a great majority of the most eminent authorities is unfavourable to the wide gauge.

Without wishing to express any positive opinion ourselves upon the point, it is enough for us to say that we think there is nothing in the relative merits of the two gauges in themselves materially to affect the question between them, which turns upon commercial considerations.

In this point of view the question is, as we have already observed, whether the points of junction between the wide and narrow gauge should be at Rugby, Birmingham and Wolverhampton, or at Oxford and Bristol. In support of the first view, it is contended that the principle which should regulate the choice of the points of junction ought to be to fix them at great _foci_ of traffic, and centres of converging Railways, where delay must take place and large establishments be maintained at any rate; while on the other hand it is contended that such points are the worst possible to select, and that the opposite principle should be adopted, of confining an inevitable inconvenience within the narrowest possible limits, by fixing the points of junction where there is least through-traffic.

The correctness of the latter proposition seems perfectly obvious upon general considerations; but the question is one of such great commercial importance, that we have thought it right to inquire fully and in detail into the practical effects that would result to the principal interests concerned from an interruption of the gauge, on the one hand, at Birmingham and Rugby, and on the other at Bristol and Oxford.

By either combination the traffic of places intermediate between Birmingham and Bristol with each other, and with London, would not be affected; uniformity of gauge being secured equally in the one case by the wide, in the other by the narrow gauge. By either combination the traffic between places north and east of the line of the London and Birmingham Railway and places south of the line of the Great Western Railway would not be affected, interruption of gauge having equally to be encountered in the one case at Bristol and Oxford, in the other at Birmingham and Rugby.

By the former or wide-gauge combination, the traffic between Devonshire, Cornwall and all places south of the line of the Great Western Railway, and Birmingham, and all places between Birmingham and Bristol, would gain, _i.e._ would escape an interruption of gauge; also such of the traffic of South Wales, to Birmingham, and places short of Birmingham, as in the event of the South Wales Railway being sanctioned, would take the circuitous route by that Railway to the north of Gloucester.

On the other hand by the narrow-gauge combination, a break is avoided in the whole of the traffic between Manchester, Liverpool, Hull, and the Northern, Eastern, and Midland portions of the kingdom, and Bristol, Gloucester, Worcester, and the whole district intermediate between the London and Birmingham and Great Western Railways.

The paramount importance of this consideration has been strongly urged upon us by parties practically acquainted with the traffic, and by the principal interests affected by the question.

In the memorial already referred to, signed by the representatives of 46 iron-works, 57 furnaces, and 98 collieries, in the Staffordshire mineral district, in favour of the London and Birmingham line, and narrow-gauge system, it is stated that, of the total export of the district, only eight per cent. is sent in the direction of Bristol, of which by far the greater quantity is shipped from that port, and would therefore be unaffected by a break of gauge there; while 37 per cent. is sent to Liverpool and the north and north-west of the kingdom, and 13 per cent. to Hull and the east, all of which would consequently suffer by a break at Birmingham.

The wool trade between Bristol, where wool fairs are held annually, and Leicester and the West Riding of Yorkshire, is very considerable, all of which would escape a break of gauge by the narrow-gauge combination.

The export of salt from Droitwich, both to Gloucester and Bristol, and to Hull and other parts of the kingdom, is already large, and likely to receive very great increase, if an unbroken Railway communication is afforded, which can only be done by the narrow-gauge combination.

The same combination affords the important advantage of an unbroken communication to the traffic of Manchester and Liverpool with Bristol, and indeed with the whole of the West of England, as a very inconsiderable proportion of the goods actually dispatched require to be carried in transit through Bristol. The same remark applies to the trade of the Potteries with the West of England; of Bristol and Gloucester with the Midland Counties, where the imports of these ports now meet those of Hull and Liverpool; of Worcester, Kidderminster, &c. with Liverpool, Lancashire, and Yorkshire, and of various other branches of traffic that might be specified.

As a proof of the importance of some of the branches of traffic that would be thus inconvenienced by a change of gauge at Birmingham, it may be mentioned that single carriers already send as much as 20,000 tons a year in transit through Birmingham, by the Birmingham and Gloucester Railway, and that the total quantity thus sent is estimated at from 50,000 to 100,000 tons per annum, and is considered to be capable of great increase, the line of communication having been only very recently completed by the opening of the Bristol and Gloucester Railway, and the development of the traffic having since been greatly impeded by the interruption of the gauge at Gloucester, and other circumstances.

With the low rates which it is now proposed to establish on coals, salt, agricultural produce, and other heavy goods, the amount of traffic that may be expected to pass from the west in transit through Birmingham, and _vice versa_, if the advantage of an unbroken communication can be secured, will be exceedingly great. It has been represented to us that Droitwich alone would send upwards of 250,000 tons of salt annually.

The same observation applies as to the coal traffic from the Midland Counties through Rugby to Oxford. The whole of the extensive district between Rugby and Oxford, where coal is now usually at a very high price, may be cheaply supplied by Railway; an object of great importance, which could be only partially attained if the impediment of an interruption of gauge were allowed to exist at Rugby.

Another important consideration which seems to point to Bristol rather than Birmingham, as a proper point for the interruption of the gauge, and which has been strongly urged upon us by carriers, merchants, and practical men acquainted with the course of traffic, is, that Bristol, like London, is a great emporium and shipping port, through which a comparatively small portion of the goods which enter by Railway require to be forwarded in transit without repacking and assortment. The facilities for water communication with Bristol also give the public a better alternative than they would enjoy elsewhere of avoiding the inconvenience of the change of gauge, and thus afford the best possible security, that if the interruption be fixed there, the Railway Companies interested will use every possible effort to reduce the inconvenience to a _minimum_.

For all these considerations, we can have no hesitation in expressing our preference, on public grounds, to the alternative that proposes to fix the break of gauges at Bristol and Oxford, rather than at Birmingham and Rugby.

Another important advantage offered by the London and Birmingham scheme, and intimately connected with the question of the gauge, is the arrangement by which it is proposed to lay down an additional double line of rails throughout the mineral district, to be devoted entirely to the accommodation of the mineral traffic.

We have already seen that the production of iron of the district requires a continued interchange of coals, lime, ironstone, and other raw materials among the different mines and works, to the extent of about 4,000,000 tons annually.

It is only by obtaining ready access to the Railway by means of short branches or tramroads from those mines and works, that the benefits contemplated from the introduction of Railway communication can be fully realized. But if this is to be the case, and if any considerable portion of this immense local traffic is to pass by Railway, it is manifest that the rails so used could not be rendered available without extreme danger and inconvenience for the general traffic. Even the export trade alone in coals and iron could not be conducted with convenience upon the same line of rails as the passenger traffic, and would require a separate line of rails in order to allow the waggons passing and repassing from the different works within the district to reach without interruption some principal station at its extremity, where trains of the proper size could be formed and dispatched to distant points. This object would be very imperfectly fulfilled by the plan proposed by the wide-gauge Railway, of laying down an extra rail, or pair of rails, on the narrow gauge, inside the principal rails, which would, in fact, obviate none of the objections to the accumulation of slow mineral trains upon the main passenger line, and would allow of no access by lateral tramroads, without cutting up the main line by crossings. It is represented also that the waggons of the wide gauge are, from their greater weight and size, ill adapted for the purposes of the mineral traffic.

The arrangement in question, of an additional double line of rails, is equally proposed by the line from Birmingham to Shrewsbury, _via_ Dudley and Wolverhampton, which traverses the same mineral district, and must be considered as, to a great extent, identified with the Tring or London and Birmingham scheme.

The case of the Shrewsbury line, as compared with the competing scheme of the Grand Junction Company, which stops at Wolverhampton, depends very much on the same arguments, of the importance of opening up the Staffordshire mineral field by Railway communication, which have been already adduced in favour of the Tring line; and the objections to it on the part of the Canal and other interests are of the same description. The arrangements proposed for supplying the local wants of the district are also of the same nature, and the plans and sections of the two lines correspond, so that the portion between Dudley and Wolverhampton is common to the two; the understanding being that, if both are sanctioned by Parliament, this portion is to be made by the Shrewsbury Company, and used on equitable conditions by the other Company.

The Great Western scheme, on the other hand, introduces a different gauge and different arrangements, and adopts a different line between Dudley and Wolverhampton, so that its existence is hardly compatible with that of the Shrewsbury scheme.

For the reasons stated we are therefore of opinion that, for the purpose of accommodating the great mineral district of Staffordshire, the combined scheme of the Tring and Shrewsbury lines is preferable to any other that has been proposed.

The Tring scheme is equally superior for the local accommodation of Kidderminster, Stourbridge, and Stourport, to which it gives better stations, by pursuing a lower level along the bottom of the valleys, and it admits of more easy extension towards Leominster, Ludlow, and the West. Between Worcester and London it accommodates, as we have already seen, a larger population; and therefore, on the whole, both in these respects and in the important particular of the gauge, it seems to us to be in itself decidedly preferable to the competing Great Western scheme.

It remains to be seen whether there are any other considerations which might modify this conclusion.

It is urged, that the concession of this line to a Company promoted by the London and Birmingham Company, will constitute a great monopoly, extending over a vast extent of country, while, by giving it to the Great Western Company, a competition would be introduced, from which the Public might derive benefit. On the other hand, it may be said that, to allow the Great Western Company to embrace, by their influence, not only the whole western communications of the island, but also the whole of South Wales, and the whole district up to Worcester and Birmingham, would be to establish a monopoly much more gigantic than that of the London and Birmingham. This latter monopoly would also be more obviously objectionable, inasmuch as an interest adverse to the Public would at once be established if the line from London to Worcester and Wolverhampton, and that from Bristol to Birmingham, were to be in the same hands, and upon the same wide gauge, as the line now proposed through South Wales. The accommodation of Herefordshire, Worcestershire, South Wales, and the important districts lying to the west of the present lines of Railway, will evidently, at no distant period, require not only a wide-gauge Railway along the Southern coast, to place them in communication with London, but also a narrow-gauge Railway to place them in direct and unbroken communication, through Birmingham, with the manufacturing districts and the great Railway system of the rest of the kingdom.

The extension of such a Railway would be greatly facilitated by the establishment of the narrow gauge, and of an interest independent of the Great Western, in the Worcester district, and, on the other hand, would be greatly impeded if that district were assigned to the Great Western interest and to the wide gauge.

In respect therefore of the general question of monopoly, it appears to us that nothing would be gained by substituting that of the Great Western for that of the London and Birmingham, which is the only alternative; at the same time, if the latter Company had shown no disposition to meet the fair demands of the Public by a reduction of rates, and to obviate the objections of monopoly by the offer of reasonable guarantees, it might perhaps have become necessary, notwithstanding the disadvantages of the Great Western scheme, in respect of the gauge and other points, to adopt this alternative.

This is, however, by no means the case; but, on the contrary, the London and Birmingham Company have come forward voluntarily to offer guarantees and conditions of a very advantageous character.

They offer, on condition of their Worcester scheme being sanctioned, at once to meet the objections of monopoly, by inserting in their Act the following provisions:

1. The whole of the Railways under their control, including the existing London and Birmingham Railway, to become subject to the options of revision and purchase contained in the Act of last year: the option of revision, however, at 10 per cent. to accrue at an earlier period than that of 20 years, specified in the Act.

2. A revised tariff to be framed for the whole of the said Railways, including the London and Birmingham Railway, upon the principle of fixing _maximum_ rates for passengers and goods lower than those at present charged, and at as low a level as those charged upon any of the principal Northern Railways.

3. One article of such tariff to be, that coals and iron are to be carried at rates not exceeding 1_d._ per ton per mile, including toll and locomotive power.

4. All differences with other Railway Companies, by which the public safety or convenience are affected, to be referred to the Board of Trade, or other competent authority for that purpose established by Parliament.

6. The London and Birmingham Company to pledge the whole revenue of their existing line for the completion of the proposed undertaking within a reasonable time.

It appears to us that these guarantees hold out for the Public a prospect of permanent and certain advantage greatly beyond anything that could be expected from the competition of two great Companies, who would be urged by every motive of interest to combine.

We attach the greatest importance to the security obtained for the cheap transit of coals and minerals. Not only will a great benefit be thereby, as we believe, secured for the important mineral districts of Staffordshire and the Midland Counties, but also a still more important benefit for the poorer and industrious classes, and for the consumers of coals generally throughout the Southern and Western Counties, and in the Metropolis.

The charge of conveyance of coals by Railway from South Staffordshire or Derbyshire to London will not exceed 11_s._ or 12_s._ per ton, and it has been stated to us, that, after payment of all charges, good house coals could be sold here, with a profit, at prices not exceeding 20_s._ per ton.

During the recent frost and easterly winds the price of coals in London has been as high as 40_s._ per ton; and during the winter the price frequently exceeds 30_s._ for coals of ordinary quality. When we consider how materially the comfort of all classes, more especially of those in humble circumstances, depends on a regular supply of cheap coal, and also how much the employment of industry is affected by the same circumstances, and when we bear in mind that a saving of every shilling per ton on the average consumption of the Metropolis is equivalent to an annual saving to its inhabitants of 150,000_l._, it is impossible not to appreciate the importance of insuring low rates of charge upon the principal Railways which are in connexion with the great inland coal fields.

In other respects also we think that the introduction of a system of moderate charges upon the London and Birmingham and its tributary Railways, will be calculated to afford great advantage to important commercial interests, and to the community at large, while we see every reason to hope that it will not be unproductive of benefit to the Company itself. We must remember, however, that this latter point is, to a certain extent, experimental, and that it is highly important to obtain voluntarily from the Company guarantees of a permanent character.

It must not be forgotten that, without some arrangement of this sort, the Company, if so disposed, has a perfect legal right to resort to charges so high as greatly to inconvenience the Public, and that, under an altered state of things, with a depressed money-market, and all fear of immediate competition removed, it is by no means certain that it might not find it for its interest to do so.

We have also the authority of the Select Committee of last Session for attaching great importance to the prospective guarantee, for the future, in the shape of options of revision or purchase, which are now voluntarily offered by one of the first Railway Companies in the kingdom, whose line could not be, otherwise than by their own consent, subjected to the operation of any conditions not contained in their original Act.

On the whole, therefore, when we consider on the one hand the superior advantages afforded by the London and Birmingham scheme in itself, and by the adoption of the narrow gauge, and on the other the great advantages offered by the London and Birmingham Company, in connexion with it, over their whole system, and the ample guarantees given against any possible abuses of monopoly, we can arrive at no other conclusion than that the scheme promoted by that Company is preferable on public grounds to the competing scheme, which is inferior in itself, and which holds out no such collateral advantages.

Having already referred to the Shrewsbury, Wolverhampton, Dudley, and Birmingham scheme, as connected, in a great measure, with those between Worcester and Wolverhampton, it will be convenient to include this scheme in the present Report.

We have stated that the general question involved in the comparison of this scheme with the competing line proposed by the Grand Junction Company is, that the latter joins the Grand Junction line at Wolverhampton, and thus affords no accommodation to the mineral district between Wolverhampton and Birmingham.

If the views which we have stated in regard to the importance of opening up this district by Railway communication are correct, this consideration alone is sufficient to give a decided preference to the more extended scheme. It also appears to us, that to entrust the branch to Shrewsbury to the Grand Junction Company would be open to the objection which we have stated in our previous Report upon the South Eastern schemes, when discussing the general policy of giving a preference to lines proposed by existing Companies for the accommodation of adjoining districts, viz. that there may be danger in giving such preference where the scheme proposed by the existing Company, although insufficient for the complete accommodation of the district to be provided for, may yet be sufficient to throw impediments in the way of other parties coming forward with more extensive schemes.

A line to Shrewsbury, in the hands of the Grand Junction Company, would manifestly be not unlikely to be used for the purposes of protection against competition, rather than of encouragement to Extensions beyond Shrewsbury, and to the legitimate development of the traffic. It appears to us, therefore, that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the fact of the Shrewsbury and Birmingham line being promoted by a substantial and independent local party, is a legitimate ground of preference, in addition to that already pointed out, of the superior advantages afforded by the independent line to the populous mining district between Wolverhampton and Birmingham.

As regards the line between Shrewsbury and Stafford, of which plans and sections have likewise been deposited by the Grand Junction Company, it appears sufficient to say, that although as a mere line for the town of Shrewsbury, it might afford considerable advantages, it accomplishes none of the more important advantages for the district at large which are held out by the line to Birmingham.

We are of opinion, therefore, that the latter line is preferable to all the competing schemes proposed, upon general grounds of public policy; and we are aware of no public reasons why it should not receive the sanction of Parliament.