chapter II. With the assistance of Agent in Charge Sorrels of the

Dallas field office of the Secret Service, Lawson was responsible for working out a great many arrangements for the President’s trip. The Service prefers to have two agents perform advance preparations. In the case of Dallas, because President Kennedy had scheduled visits to five Texas cities and had also scheduled visits to other parts of the country immediately before the Texas trip, there were not enough men available to permit two agents to be assigned to all the advance work. Consequently, Agent Lawson did the advance work alone from November 13 to November 18, when he was joined by Agent David B. Grant, who had just completed advance work on the President’s trip to Tampa.

The Commission concludes that the most significant advance arrangements for the President’s trip were soundly planned. In particular, the Commission believes that the motorcade route selected by Agent Lawson, upon the advice of Agent in Charge Sorrels and with the concurrence of the Dallas police, was entirely appropriate, in view of the known desires of the President. There were far safer routes via freeways directly to the Trade Mart, but these routes would not have been in accordance with the White House staff instructions given the Secret Service for a desirable motorcade route.[C8-154] Much of Lawson’s time was taken with establishing adequate security over the motorcade route and at the two places where the President would stop, Love Field and the Trade Mart. The Commission concludes that the arrangements worked out at the Trade Mart by these Secret Service agents with the cooperation of the Dallas police and other local law enforcement agents, were carefully executed. Since the President was to be at the Trade Mart longer than at any other location in Dallas and in view of the security hazards presented by the building, the Secret Service correctly gave particular attention in the advance preparations to those arrangements. The Commission also regards the security arrangements worked out by Lawson and Sorrels at Love Field as entirely adequate.

The Commission believes, however, that the Secret Service has inadequately defined the responsibilities of its advance agents, who have been given broad discretion to determine what matters require attention in making advance preparations and to decide what action to take. Agent Lawson was not given written instructions concerning the Dallas trip or advice about any peculiar problems which it might involve; all instructions from higher authority were communicated to him orally. He did not have a checklist of the tasks he was expected to accomplish, either by his own efforts or with the cooperation of local authorities.[C8-155] The only systematic supervision of the activities of the advance agent has been that provided by a requirement that he file interim and final reports on each advance assignment. The interim report must be in the hands of the agent supervising the protective group traveling with the President long enough before his departure to apprise him of any particular problems encountered and the responsive action taken.[C8-156] Agent Lawson’s interim report was received by Agent Kellerman on November 20, the day before departure on the Texas trip.[C8-157]

The Secret Service has advised the Commission that no unusual precautions were taken for the Dallas trip, and that “the precautions taken for the President’s trip were the usual safeguards employed on trips of this kind in the United States during the previous year.”[C8-158] Special Agent in Charge Sorrels testified that the advance preparations followed on this occasion were “pretty much the same” as those followed in 1936 during a trip to Dallas by President Roosevelt, which was Sorrels’ first important assignment in connection with Presidential work.[C8-159]

In view of the constant change in the nature of threats to the President and the diversity of the dangers which may arise in the various cities within the United States, the Commission believes that standard procedures in use for many years and applied in all parts of the country may not be sufficient. There is, for example, no Secret Service arrangement for evaluating before a trip particular difficulties that might be anticipated, which would bring to bear the judgment and experience of members of the White House detail other than the advance agent. Constant reevaluation of procedures, with attention to special problems and the development of instructions specific to particular trips, would be a desirable innovation.

_Liaison with local law enforcement authorities._--In the description of the important aspects of the advance preparations, there have been references to the numerous discussions between Secret Service representatives and the Dallas Police Department. The wholehearted support of these local authorities was indispensable to the Service in carrying out its duties. The Service had 28 agents participating in the Dallas visit.[C8-160] Agent Lawson’s advance planning called for the deployment of almost 600 members of the Dallas Police Department, Fire Department, County Sheriff’s Department, and the Texas Department of Public Safety.[C8-161] Despite this dependence on local authorities, which would be substantially the same on a visit by the President to any large city, the Secret Service did not at the time of the assassination have any established procedure governing its relationships with them.[C8-162] It had no prepared checklist of matters to be covered with local police on such visits to metropolitan areas and no written description of the role the local police were expected to perform. Discussions with the Dallas authorities and requests made of them were entirely informal.

The Commission believes that a more formal statement of assigned responsibilities, supplemented in each case to reflect the peculiar conditions of each Presidential trip, is essential. This would help to eliminate varying interpretations of Secret Service instructions by different local law enforcement representatives. For example, while the Secret Service representatives in Dallas asked the police to station guards at each overpass to keep “unauthorized personnel” off, this term was not defined. At some overpasses all persons were excluded, while on the overpass overlooking the assassination scene railroad and yard terminal workmen were permitted to remain under police supervision, as discussed in chapter III.[C8-163] Assistant Chief Batchelor of the Dallas police noted the absence of any formal statement by the Secret Service of specific work assigned to the police and suggested the desirability of such a statement.[C8-164] Agent Lawson agreed that such a procedure would assist him and other agents in fulfilling their responsibilities as advance agents.[C8-165]

_Check of buildings along route of motorcade._--Agent Lawson did not arrange for a prior inspection of buildings along the motorcade route, either by police or by custodians of the buildings, since it was not the usual practice of the Secret Service to do so.[C8-166] The Chief of the Service has provided the Commission a detailed explanation of this policy:

Except for inauguration or other parades involving foreign dignitaries accompanied by the President in Washington, it has not been the practice of the Secret Service to make surveys or checks of buildings along the route of a Presidential motorcade. For the inauguration and certain other parades in Washington where the traditional route is known to the public long in advance of the event, buildings along the route can be checked by teams of law enforcement officers, and armed guards are posted along the route as appropriate. But on out-of-town trips where the route is decided on and made public only a few days in advance, buildings are not checked either by Secret Service agents or by any other law enforcement officers at the request of the Secret Service. With the number of men available to the Secret Service and the time available, surveys of hundreds of buildings and thousands of windows is not practical.

In Dallas the route selected necessarily involved passing through the principal downtown section between tall buildings. While certain streets thought to be too narrow could be avoided and other choices made, it was not practical to select a route where the President could not be seen from roofs or windows of buildings. At the two places in Dallas where the President would remain for a period of time, Love Field and the Trade Mart, arrangements were made for building and roof security by posting police officers where appropriate. Similar arrangements for a motorcade of ten miles, including many blocks of tall commercial buildings is not practical. Nor is it practical to prevent people from entering such buildings, or to limit access in every building to those employed or having business there. Even if it were possible with a vastly larger force of security officers to do so, many observers have felt that such a procedure would not be consistent with the nature and purpose of the motorcade to let the people see their President and to welcome him to their city.

In accordance with its regular procedures, no survey or other check was made by the Secret Service, or by any other law enforcement agency at its request, of the Texas School Book Depository Building or those employed there prior to the time the President was shot.[C8-167]

This justification of the Secret Service’s standing policy is not persuasive. The danger from a concealed sniper on the Dallas trip was of concern to those who had considered the problem. President Kennedy himself had mentioned it that morning,[C8-168] as had Agent Sorrels when he and Agent Lawson were fixing the motorcade route.[C8-169] Admittedly, protective measures cannot ordinarily be taken with regard to all buildings along a motorcade route. Levels of risk can be determined, however, as has been confirmed by building surveys made since the assassination for the Department of the Treasury.[C8-170] An attempt to cover only the most obvious points of possible ambush along the route in Dallas might well have included the Texas School Book Depository Building.

Instead of such advance precautions, the Secret Service depended in part on the efforts of local law enforcement personnel stationed along the route. In addition, Secret Service agents riding in the motorcade were trained to scan buildings as part of their general observation of the crowd of spectators.[C8-171] These substitute measures were of limited value. Agent Lawson was unable to state whether he had actually instructed the Dallas police to scan windows of buildings lining the motorcade route, although it was his usual practice to do so.[C8-172] If such instructions were in fact given, they were not effectively carried out. Television films taken of parts of the motorcade by a Dallas television station show the foot patrolmen facing the passing motorcade, and not the adjacent crowds and buildings, as the procession passed.[C8-173]

Three officers from the Dallas Police Department were assigned to the intersection of Elm and Houston during the morning of November 22 prior to the motorcade.[C8-174] All received their instructions early in the morning from Capt. P. W. Lawrence of the traffic division.[C8-175] According to Captain Lawrence:

I then told the officers that their primary duty was traffic and crowd control and that they should be alert for any persons who might attempt to throw anything and although it was not a violation of the law to carry a placard, that they were not to tolerate any actions such as the Stevenson incident and arrest any person who might attempt to throw anything or try to get at the President and his party; paying particular attention to the crowd for any unusual activity. I stressed the fact that this was our President and he should be shown every respect due his position and that it was our duty to see that this was done.[C8-176]

Captain Lawrence was not instructed to have his men watch buildings along the motorcade route and did not mention the observation of buildings to them.[C8-177] The three officers confirm that their primary concern was crowd and traffic control, and that they had no opportunity to scan the windows of the Depository or any other building in the vicinity of Elm and Houston when the motorcade was passing. They had, however, occasionally observed the windows of buildings in the area before the motorcade arrived, in accordance with their own understanding of their function.[C8-178]

As the motorcade approached Elm Street there were several Secret Service agents in it who shared the responsibility of scanning the windows of nearby buildings. Agent Sorrels, riding in the lead car, did observe the Texas School Book Depository Building as he passed by, at least for a sufficient number of seconds to gain a “general impression” of the lack of any unusual activity.[C8-179] He was handicapped, however, by the fact that he was riding in a closed car whose roof at times obscured his view.[C8-180] Lawson, also in the lead car, did not scan any buildings since an important part of his job was to look backward at the Presidents car.[C8-181] Lawson stated that he “was looking back a good deal of the time, watching his car, watching the sides, watching the crowds, giving advice or asking advice from the Chief and also looking ahead to the known hazards like overpasses, underpasses, railroads, et cetera.”[C8-182] Agent Roy H. Kellerman, riding in the front seat of the Presidential car, stated that he scanned the Depository Building, but not sufficiently to be alerted by anything in the windows or on the roof.[C8-183] The agents in the followup car also were expected to scan adjacent buildings. However, the Commission does not believe that agents stationed in a car behind the Presidential car, who must concentrate primarily on the possibility of threats from crowds along the route, provide a significant safeguard against dangers in nearby buildings.

_Conduct of Secret Service agents in Fort Worth on November 22._--In the early morning hours on November 22, 1963, in Fort Worth, there occurred a breach of discipline by some members of the Secret Service who were officially traveling with the President. After the President had retired at his hotel, nine agents who were off duty went to the nearby Fort Worth Press Club at midnight or slightly thereafter, expecting to obtain food; they had had little opportunity to eat during the day.[C8-184] No food was available at the Press Club. All of the agents stayed for a drink of beer, or in several cases, a mixed drink. According to their affidavits, the drinking in no case amounted to more than three glasses of beer or 1½ mixed drinks, and others who were present say that no agent was inebriated or acted improperly. The statements of the agents involved are supported by statements of members of the Fort Worth press who accompanied or observed them and by a Secret Service investigation.[C8-185]

According to their statements, the agents remained at the Press Club for periods varying from 30 minutes to an hour and a half, and the last agent left the Press Club by 2 a.m.[C8-186] Two of the nine agents returned to their rooms. The seven others proceeded to an establishment called the Cellar Coffee House, described by some as a beatnik place and by its manager as “a unique show place with continuous light entertainment all night [serving] only coffee, fruit juices and no hard liquors or beer.” [C8-187] There is no indication that any of the agents who visited the Cellar Coffee House had any intoxicating drink at that establishment.[C8-188] Most of the agents were there from about 1:30 or 1:45 a.m. to about 2:45 or 3 a.m.; one agent was there from 2 until 5 a.m.[C8-189]

The lobby of the hotel and the areas adjacent to the quarters of the President were guarded during the night by members of the midnight to 8 a.m. shift of the White House detail. These agents were each relieved for a half hour break during the night.[C8-190] Three members of this shift separately took this opportunity to visit the Cellar Coffee House.[C8-191] Only one stayed as long as a half hour, and none had any beverage there.[C8-192] Chief Rowley testified that agents on duty in such a situation usually stay within the building during their relief, but that their visits to the Cellar were “neither consistent nor inconsistent” with their duty.[C8-193]

Each of the agents who visited the Press Club or the Cellar Coffee House (apart from the three members of the midnight shift) had duty assignments beginning no later than 8 a.m. that morning. President Kennedy was scheduled to speak across the street from his hotel in Fort Worth at 8:30 a.m.,[C8-194] and then at a breakfast, after which the entourage would proceed to Dallas. In Dallas, one of the nine agents was assigned to assist in security measures at Love Field, and four had protective assignments at the Trade Mart. The remaining four had key responsibilities as members of the complement of the followup car in the motorcade. Three of these agents occupied positions on the running boards of the car, and the fourth was seated in the car.[C8-195]

The supervisor of each of the off-duty agents who visited the Press Club or the Cellar Coffee House advised, in the course of the Secret Service investigation of these events, that each agent reported for duty on time, with full possession of his mental and physical capabilities and entirely ready for the performance of his assigned duties.[C8-196] Chief Rowley testified that, as a result of the investigation he ordered, he was satisfied that each of the agents performed his duties in an entirely satisfactory manner, and that their conduct the night before did not impede their actions on duty or in the slightest way prevent them from taking any action that might have averted the tragedy.[C8-197] However, Chief Rowley did not condone the action of the off-duty agents, particularly since it violated a regulation of the Secret Service, which provides:

_Liquor, use of._--a. Employees are strictly enjoined to refrain from the use of intoxicating liquor during the hours they are officially employed at their post of duty, or when they may reasonably expect that they may be called upon to perform an official duty. During entire periods of travel status, the special agent is officially employed and should not use liquor, until the completion of all of his official duties for the day, after which time a very moderate use of liquor will not be considered a violation. However, all members of the White House Detail and special agents cooperating with them on Presidential and similar protective assignments are considered to be subject to call for official duty at any time while in travel status. Therefore, the use of intoxicating liquor of any kind, including beer and wine, by members of the White House Detail and special agents cooperating with them, or by special agents on similar assignments, while they are in a travel status, is prohibited.[C8-198]

The regulations provide further that “violation or slight disregard” of these provisions “will be cause for removal from the Service.”[C8-199]

Chief Rowley testified that under ordinary circumstances he would have taken disciplinary action against those agents who had been drinking in clear violation of the regulation. However, he felt that any disciplinary action might have given rise to an inference that the violation of the regulation had contributed to the tragic events of November 22. Since he was convinced that this was not the case, he believed that it would be unfair to the agents and their families to take explicit disciplinary measures. He felt that each agent recognized the seriousness of the infraction and that there was no danger of a repetition.[C8-200]

The Commission recognizes that the responsibilities of members of the White House detail of the Secret Service are arduous. They work long, hard hours, under very great strain, and must travel frequently. It might seem harsh to circumscribe their opportunities for relaxation. Yet their role of protecting the President is so important to the well-being of the country that it is reasonable to expect them to meet very high standards of personal conduct, so that nothing can interfere with their bringing to their task the finest qualities and maximum resources of mind and body. This is the salutary goal to which the Secret Service regulation is directed, when it absolutely forbids drinking by any agent accompanying the President on a trip. Nor is this goal served when agents remain out until early morning hours, and lose the opportunity to get a reasonable amount of sleep. It is conceivable that those men who had little sleep, and who had consumed alcoholic beverages, even in limited quantities, might have been more alert in the Dallas motorcade if they had retired promptly in Fort Worth. However, there is no evidence that these men failed to take any action in Dallas within their power that would have averted the tragedy. As will be seen, the instantaneous and heroic response to the assassination of some of the agents concerned was in the finest tradition of Government service.

_The motorcade in Dallas._--Rigorous security precautions had been arranged at Love Field with the local law enforcement authorities by Agents Sorrels and Lawson. These precautions included reserving a ceremonial area for the Presidential party, stationing police on the rooftops of all buildings overlooking the reception area, and detailing police in civilian clothes to be scattered throughout the sizable crowd.[C8-201] When President and Mrs. Kennedy shook hands with members of the public along the fences surrounding the reception area, they were closely guarded by Secret Service agents who responded to the unplanned event with dispatch.[C8-202]

As described in chapter II, the President directed that his car stop on two occasions during the motorcade so that he could greet members of the public.[C8-203] At these stops, agents from the Presidential follow-up car stood between the President and the public, and on one occasion Agent Kellerman left the front seat of the President’s car to take a similar position. The Commission regards such impromptu stops as presenting an unnecessary danger, but finds that the Secret Service agents did all that could have been done to take protective measures.

_The Presidential limousine._--The limousine used by President Kennedy in Dallas was a convertible with a detachable, rigid plastic “bubble” top which was neither bulletproof nor bullet resistant.[C8-204] The last Presidential vehicle with any protection against small-arms fire left the White House in 1953. It was not then replaced because the state of the art did not permit the development of a bulletproof top of sufficiently light weight to permit its removal on those occasions when the President wished to ride in an open car. The Secret Service believed that it was very doubtful that any President would ride regularly in a vehicle with a fixed top, even though transparent.[C8-205] Since the assassination, the Secret Service, with the assistance of other Federal agencies and of private industry, has developed a vehicle for the better protection of the President.[C8-206]

_Access to passenger compartment of Presidential car._--On occasion the Secret Service has been permitted to have an agent riding in the passenger compartment with the President. Presidents have made it clear, however, that they did not favor this or any other arrangement which interferes with the privacy of the President and his guests. The Secret Service has therefore suggested this practice only on extraordinary occasions.[C8-207] Without attempting to prescribe or recommend specific measures which should be employed for the future protection of Presidents, the Commission does believe that there are aspects of the protective measures employed in the motorcade at Dallas which deserve special comment.

The Presidential vehicle in use in Dallas, described in chapter II, had no special design or equipment which would have permitted the Secret Service agent riding in the driver’s compartment to move into the passenger section without hindrance or delay. Had the vehicle been so designed it is possible that an agent riding in the front seat could have reached the President in time to protect him from the second and fatal shot to hit the President. However, such access to the President was interfered with both by the metal bar some 15 inches above the back of the front seat and by the passengers in the jump seats. In contrast, the Vice Presidential vehicle, although not specially designed for that purpose, had no passenger in a jump seat between Agent Youngblood and Vice President Johnson to interfere with Agent Youngblood’s ability to take a protective position in the passenger compartment before the third shot was fired.[C8-208]

The assassination suggests that it would have been of prime importance in the protection of the President if the Presidential car permitted immediate access to the President by a Secret Service agent at the first sign of danger. At that time the agents on the running boards of the followup car were expected to perform such a function. However, these agents could not reach the President’s car when it was traveling at an appreciable rate of speed. Even if the car is traveling more slowly, the delay involved in reaching the President may be crucial. It is clear that at the time of the shots in Dallas, Agent Clinton J. Hill leaped to the President’s rescue as quickly as humanly possible. Even so, analysis of the motion picture films taken by amateur photographer Zapruder reveals that Hill first placed his hand on the Presidential car at frame 343, 30 frames and therefore approximately 1.6 seconds after the President was shot in the head.[C8-209] About 3.7 seconds after the President received this wound, Hill had both feet on the car and was climbing aboard to assist President and Mrs. Kennedy.[C8-210]

_Planning for motorcade contingencies._--In response to inquiry by the Commission regarding the instructions to agents in a motorcade of emergency procedures to be taken in a contingency such as that which actually occurred, the Secret Service responded:

The Secret Service has consistently followed two general principles in emergencies involving the President. All agents are so instructed. The first duty of the agents in the motorcade is to attempt to cover the President as closely as possible and practicable and to shield him by attempting to place themselves between the President and any source of danger. Secondly, agents are instructed to remove the President as quickly as possible from known or impending danger. Agents are instructed that it is not their responsibility to investigate or evaluate a present danger, but to consider any untoward circumstances as serious and to afford the President maximum protection at all times. No responsibility rests upon those agents near the President for the identification or arrest of any assassin or an attacker. Their primary responsibility is to stay with and protect the President.

Beyond these two principles the Secret Service believes a detailed contingency or emergency plan is not feasible because the variations possible preclude effective planning. A number of steps are taken, however, to permit appropriate steps to be taken in an emergency. For instance, the lead car always is manned by Secret Service agents familiar with the area and with local law enforcement officials; the radio net in use in motorcades is elaborate and permits a number of different means of communication with various local points. A doctor is in the motorcade.[C8-211]

This basic approach to the problem of planning for emergencies is sound. Any effort to prepare detailed contingency plans might well have the undesirable effect of inhibiting quick and imaginative responses. If the advance preparation is thorough, and the protective devices and techniques employed are sound, those in command should be able to direct the response appropriate to the emergency.

The Commission finds that the Secret Service agents in the motorcade who were immediately responsible for the President’s safety reacted promptly at the time the shots were fired. Their actions demonstrate that the President and the Nation can expect courage and devotion to duty from the agents of the Secret Service.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission’s review of the provisions for Presidential protection at the time of President Kennedy’s trip to Dallas demonstrates the need for substantial improvements. Since the assassination, the Secret Service and the Department of the Treasury have properly taken the initiative in reexamining major aspects of Presidential protection. Many changes have already been made and others are contemplated, some of them in response to the Commission’s questions and informal suggestions.

Assassination a Federal Crime

There was no Federal criminal jurisdiction over the assassination of President Kennedy. Had there been reason to believe that the assassination was the result of a conspiracy, Federal jurisdiction could have been asserted; it has long been a Federal crime to conspire to injure any Federal officer, on account of, or while he is engaged in, the lawful discharge of the duties of his office.[C8-212] Murder of the President has never been covered by Federal law, however, so that once it became reasonably clear that the killing was the act of a single person, the State of Texas had exclusive jurisdiction.

It is anomalous that Congress has legislated in other ways touching upon the safety of the Chief Executive or other Federal officers, without making an attack on the President a crime. Threatening harm to the President is a Federal offense,[C8-213] as is advocacy of the overthrow of the Government by the assassination of any of its officers.[C8-214] The murder of Federal judges, U.S. attorneys and marshals, and a number of other specifically designated Federal law enforcement officers is a Federal crime.[C8-215] Equally anomalous are statutory provisions which specifically authorize the Secret Service to protect the President, without authorizing it to arrest anyone who harms him. The same provisions authorize the Service to arrest without warrant persons committing certain offenses, including counterfeiting and certain frauds involving Federal checks or securities.[C8-216] The Commission agrees with the Secret Service[C8-217] that it should be authorized to make arrests without warrant for all offenses within its jurisdiction, as are FBI agents and Federal marshals.[C8-218]

There have been a number of efforts to make assassination a Federal crime, particularly after the assassination of President McKinley and the attempt on the life of President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt.[C8-219] In 1902 bills passed both Houses of Congress but failed of enactment when the Senate refused to accept the conference report.[C8-220] A number of bills were introduced immediately following the assassination of President Kennedy.[C8-221]

The Commission recommends to the Congress that it adopt legislation which would:

Punish the murder or manslaughter of, attempt or conspiracy to murder, kidnaping of and assault upon

the President, Vice President, or other officer next in the order of succession to the Office of President, the President-elect and the Vice-President-elect,

whether or not the act is committed while the victim is in the performance of his official duties or on account of such performance.

Such a statute would cover the President and Vice President or, in the absence of a Vice President, the person next in order of succession. During the period between election and inauguration, the President-elect and Vice-President-elect would also be covered. Restricting the coverage in this way would avoid unnecessary controversy over the inclusion or exclusion of other officials who are in the order of succession or who hold important governmental posts. In addition, the restriction would probably eliminate a need for the requirement which has been urged as necessary for the exercise of Federal power, that the hostile act occur while the victim is engaged in or because of the performance of official duties.[C8-222] The governmental consequences of assassination of one of the specified officials give the United States ample power to act for its own protection.[C8-223] The activities of the victim at the time an assassination occurs and the motive for the assassination bear no relationship to the injury to the United States which follows from the act. This point was ably made in the 1902 debate by Senator George F. Hoar, the sponsor of the Senate bill:

* * * what this bill means to punish is the crime of interruption of the Government of the United States and the destruction of its security by striking down the life of the person who is actually in the exercise of the executive power, or of such persons as have been constitutionally and lawfully provided to succeed thereto in case of a vacancy. It is important to this country that the interruption shall not take place for an hour * * *[C8-224]

Enactment of this statute would mean that the investigation of any of the acts covered and of the possibility of a further attempt would be conducted by Federal law enforcement officials, in particular, the FBI with the assistance of the Secret Service.[C8-225] At present, Federal agencies participate only upon the sufferance of the local authorities. While the police work of the Dallas authorities in the early identification and apprehension of Oswald was both efficient and prompt, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who strongly supports such legislation, testified that the absence of clear Federal jurisdiction over the assassination of President Kennedy led to embarrassment and confusion in the subsequent investigation by Federal and local authorities.[C8-226] In addition, the proposed legislation will insure that any suspects who are arrested will be Federal prisoners, subject to Federal protection from vigilante justice and other threats.[C8-227]

Committee of Cabinet Officers

As our Government has become more complex, agencies other than the Secret Service have become involved in phases of the overall problem of protecting our national leaders. The FBI is the major domestic investigating agency of the United States, while the CIA has the primary responsibility for collecting intelligence overseas to supplement information acquired by the Department of State. The Secret Service must rely in large part upon the investigating capacity and experience of these and other agencies for much of its information regarding possible dangers to the President. The Commission believes that it is necessary to improve the cooperation among these agencies and to emphasize that the task of Presidential protection is one of broad national concern.

The Commission suggests that consideration might be given to assigning to a Cabinet-level committee or the National Security Council (which is responsible for advising the President respecting the coordination of departmental policies relating to the national security)[C8-228] the responsibility to review and oversee the protective activities of the Secret Service and the other Federal agencies that assist in safeguarding the President. The Committee should include the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, and, if the Council is used, arrangements should be made for the attendance of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General at any meetings which are concerned with Presidential protection.[C8-229] The Council already includes, in addition to the President and Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense and has a competent staff.

The foremost assignment of the Committee would be to insure that the maximum resources of the Federal Government are fully engaged in the job of protecting the President, by defining responsibilities clearly and overseeing their execution. Major needs of personnel or other resources might be met more easily on its recommendation than they have been in the past.

The Committee would be able to provide guidance in defining the general nature of domestic and foreign dangers to Presidential security. As improvements are recommended for the advance detection of potential threats to the President, it could act as a final review board. The expert assistance and resources which it could draw upon would be particularly desirable in this complex and sensitive area.

This arrangement would provide a continuing high-level contact for agencies that may wish to consult respecting particular protective measures. For various reasons the Secret Service has functioned largely as an informal part of the White House staff, with the result that it has been unable, as a practical matter, to exercise sufficient influence over the security precautions which surround Presidential activities. A Cabinet-level committee which is actively concerned with these problems would be able to discuss these matters more effectively with the President.

Responsibilities for Presidential Protection

The assignment of the responsibility of protecting the President to an agency of the Department of the Treasury was largely an historical accident.[C8-230] The Secret Service was organized as a division of the Department of the Treasury in 1865, to deal with counterfeiting. In 1894, while investigating a plot to assassinate President Cleveland, the Service assigned a small protective detail of agents to the White House. Secret Service men accompanied the President and his family to their vacation home in Massachusetts and special details protected him in Washington, on trips, and at special functions. These informal and part-time arrangements led to more systematic protection in 1902, after the assassination of President McKinley; the Secret Service, then the only Federal investigative agency, assumed full-time responsibility for the safety of the President. Since that time, the Secret Service has had and exercised responsibility for the physical protection of the President and also for the preventive investigation of potential threats against the President.

Although the Secret Service has had the primary responsibility for the protection of the President, the FBI, which was established within the Department of Justice in 1908, has had in recent years an increasingly important role to play. In the appropriations of the FBI there has recurred annually an item for the “protection of the person of the President of the United States,” which first appeared in the appropriation of the Department of Justice in 1910 under the heading “Miscellaneous Objects.”[C8-231] Although the FBI is not charged with the physical protection of the President, it does have an assignment, as do other Government agencies, in the field of preventive investigation in regard to the President’s security. As discussed above, the Bureau has attempted to meet its responsibilities in this field by spelling out in its Handbook the procedures which its agents are to follow in connection with information received “indicating the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the President” or other protected persons.

With two Federal agencies operating in the same general field of preventive investigation, questions inevitably arise as to the scope of each agency’s authority and responsibility. As the testimony of J. Edgar Hoover and other Bureau officials revealed, the FBI did not believe that its directive required the Bureau to notify the Secret Service of the substantial information about Lee Harvey Oswald which the FBI had accumulated before the President reached Dallas. On the other hand, the Secret Service had no knowledge whatever of Oswald, his background, or his employment at the Book Depository, and Robert I. Bouck, who was in charge of the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service, believed that the accumulation of the facts known to the FBI should have constituted a sufficient basis to warn the Secret Service of the Oswald risk.

The Commission believes that both the FBI and the Secret Service have too narrowly construed their respective responsibilities. The Commission has the impression that too much emphasis is placed by both on the investigation of specific threats by individuals and not enough on dangers from other sources. In addition, the Commission has concluded that the Secret Service particularly tends to be the passive recipient of information regarding such threats and that its Protective Research Section is not adequately staffed or equipped to conduct the wider investigative work that is required today for the security of the President.

During the period the Commission was giving thought to this situation, the Commission received a number of proposals designed to improve current arrangements for protecting the President. These proposals included suggestions to locate exclusive responsibility for all phases of the work in one or another Government agency, to clarify the division of authority between the agencies involved, and to retain the existing system but expand both the scope and the operations of the existing agencies, particularly those of the Secret Service and the FBI.

It has been pointed out that the FBI, as our chief investigative agency, is properly manned and equipped to carry on extensive information gathering functions within the United States. It was also suggested that it would take a substantial period of time for the Secret Service to build up the experience and skills necessary to meet the problem. Consequently the suggestion has been made, on the one hand, that all preventive investigative functions relating to the security of the President should be transferred to the FBI, leaving with the Secret Service only the responsibility for the physical protection of the President, that is, the guarding function alone.

On the other hand, it is urged that all features of the protection of the President and his family should be committed to an elite and independent corps. It is also contended that the agents should be intimately associated with the life of the Presidential family in all its ramifications and alert to every danger that might befall it, and ready at any instant to hazard great danger to themselves in the performance of their tremendous responsibility. It is suggested that an organization shorn of its power to investigate all the possibilities of danger to the President and becoming merely the recipient of information gathered by others would become limited solely to acts of physical alertness and personal courage incident to its responsibilities. So circumscribed, it could not maintain the esprit de corps or the necessary alertness for this unique and challenging responsibility.

While in accordance with its mandate this Commission has necessarily examined into the functioning of the various Federal agencies concerned with the tragic trip of President Kennedy to Dallas and while it has arrived at certain conclusions in respect thereto, it seems clear that it was not within the Commission’s responsibility to make specific recommendations as to the long-range organization of the President’s protection, except as conclusions flowing directly from its examination of the President’s assassination can be drawn. The Commission was not asked to apply itself as did the Hoover Commission in 1949, for example, to a determination of the optimum organization of the President’s protection. It would have been necessary for the Commission to take considerable testimony, much of it extraneous to the facts of the assassination of President Kennedy, to put it in a position to reach final conclusions in this respect. There are always dangers of divided responsibility, duplication, and confusion of authority where more than one agency is operating in the same field; but on the other hand the protection of the President is in a real sense a Government-wide responsibility which must necessarily be assumed by the Department of State, the FBI, the CIA, and the military intelligence agencies as well as the Secret Service. Moreover, a number of imponderable questions have to be weighed if any change in the intimate association now established between the Secret Service and the President and his family is contemplated.

These considerations have induced the Commission to believe that the determination of whether or not there should be a relocation of responsibilities and functions should be left to the Executive and the Congress, perhaps upon recommendations based on further studies by the Cabinet-level committee recommended above or the National Security Council.

Pending any such determination, however, this Commission is convinced of the necessity of better coordination and direction of the activities of all existing agencies of Government which are in a position to, and do, furnish information and services related to the security of the President. The Commission feels the Secret Service and the FBI, as well as the State Department and the CIA when the President travels abroad, could improve their existing capacities and procedures so as to lessen the chances of assassination. Without, therefore, coming to final conclusions respecting the long-range organization of the President’s security, the Commission believes that the facts of the assassination of President Kennedy point to certain measures which, while assuming no radical relocation of responsibilities, can and should be recommended by this Commission in the interest of the more efficient protection of the President. These recommendations are reviewed below.

General Supervision of the Secret Service

The intimacy of the Secret Service’s relationship to the White House and the dissimilarity of its protective functions to most activities of the Department of the Treasury have made it difficult for the Treasury to maintain close and continuing supervision. The Commission believes that the recommended Cabinet-level committee will help to correct many of the major deficiencies of supervision disclosed by the Commission’s investigation. Other measures should be taken as well to improve the overall operation of the Secret Service.

Daily supervision of the operations of the Secret Service within the Department of the Treasury should be improved. The Chief of the Service now reports to the Secretary of the Treasury through an Assistant Secretary whose duties also include the direct supervision of the Bureau of the Mint and the Department’s Employment Policy Program, and who also represents the Secretary of the Treasury on various committees and groups.[C8-232] The incumbent has no technical qualifications in the area of Presidential protection.[C8-233] The Commission recommends that the Secretary of the Treasury appoint a special assistant with the responsibility of supervising the Service. This special assistant should be required to have sufficient stature and experience in law enforcement, intelligence, or allied fields to be able to provide effective continuing supervision, and to keep the Secretary fully informed regarding all significant developments relating to Presidential protection.

This report has already pointed out several respects in which the Commission believes that the Secret Service has operated with insufficient planning or control. Actions by the Service since the assassination indicate its awareness of the necessity for substantial improvement in its administration. A formal and thorough description of the responsibilities of the advance agent is now in preparation by the Service.[C8-234] Work is going forward toward the preparation of formal understandings of the respective roles of the Secret Service and other agencies with which it collaborates or from which it derives assistance and support. The Commission urges that the Service continue this effort to overhaul and define its procedures. While manuals and memoranda are no guarantee of effective operations, no sizable organization can achieve efficiency without the careful analysis and demarcation of responsibility that is reflected in definite and comprehensive operating procedures.

The Commission also recommends that the Secret Service consciously set about the task of inculcating and maintaining the highest standard of excellence and esprit for all of its personnel. This involves tight and unswerving discipline as well as the promotion of an outstanding degree of dedication and loyalty to duty. The Commission emphasizes that it finds no causal connection between the assassination and the breach of regulations which occurred on the night of November 21 at Fort Worth. Nevertheless, such a breach, in which so many agents participated, is not consistent with the standards which the responsibilities of the Secret Service require it to meet.

Preventive Intelligence

In attempting to identify those individuals who might prove a danger to the President, the Secret Service has largely been the passive recipient of threatening communications to the President and reports from other agencies which independently evaluate their information for potential sources of danger. This was the consequence of the Service’s lack of an adequate investigative staff, its inability to process large amounts of data, and its failure to provide specific descriptions of the kind of information it sought.[C8-235]

The Secret Service has embarked upon a complete overhaul of its research activities.[C8-236] The staff of the Protective Research Section (PRS) has been augmented, and a Secret Service inspector has been put in charge of this operation. With the assistance of the President’s Office of Science and Technology, and of the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense, it has obtained the services of outside consultants, such as the Rand Corp., International Business Machines Corp., and a panel of psychiatric and psychological experts. It has received assistance also from data processing experts at the CIA and from a specialist in psychiatric prognostication at Walter Reed Hospital.[C8-237] As a result of these studies, the planning document submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Bureau of the Budget on August 31, 1964, makes several significant recommendations in this field.[C8-238] Based on the Commission’s investigation, the following minimum goals for improvements are indicated:

_Broader and more selective criteria._--Since the assassination, both the Secret Service and the FBI have recognized that the PRS files can no longer be limited largely to persons communicating actual threats to the President. On December 26, 1963, the FBI circulated additional instructions to all its agents, specifying criteria for information to be furnished to the Secret Service in addition to that covered by the former standard, which was the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the President. The new instructions require FBI agents to report immediately information concerning:

Subversives, ultrarightists, racists and fascists (a) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (b) who have made threats of bodily harm against officials or employees of Federal, state or local government or officials of a foreign government, (c) who express or have expressed strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who have been involved in bombing or bomb-making or whose past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and (d) whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against organized government.[C8-239]

Alan H. Belmont, Assistant to the Director of the FBI, testified that this revision was initiated by the FBI itself.[C8-240] The volume of references to the Secret Service has increased substantially since the new instructions went into effect; more than 5,000 names were referred to the Secret Service in the first 4 months of 1964.[C8-241] According to Chief Rowley, by mid-June 1964, the Secret Service had received from the FBI some 9,000 reports on members of the Communist Party.[C8-242] The FBI now transmits information on all defectors,[C8-243] a category which would, of course, have included Oswald.

Both Director Hoover and Belmont expressed to the Commission the great concern of the FBI, which is shared by the Secret Service, that referrals to the Secret Service under the new criteria might, if not properly handled, result in some degree of interference with the personal liberty of those involved.[C8-244] They emphasized the necessity that the information now being furnished be handled with judgment and care. The Commission shares this concern. The problem is aggravated by the necessity that the Service obtain the assistance of local law enforcement officials in evaluating the information which it receives and in taking preventive steps.

In June 1964, the Secret Service sent to a number of Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies guidelines for an experimental program to develop more detailed criteria.[C8-245] The suggestions of Federal agencies for revision of these guidelines were solicited. The new tentative criteria are useful in making clear that the interest of the Secret Service goes beyond information on individuals or groups threatening to cause harm or embarrassment to the President.[C8-246] Information is requested also concerning individuals or groups who have demonstrated an interest in the President or “other high government officials in the nature of a complaint coupled with an expressed or implied determination to use a means, other than legal or peaceful, to satisfy any grievance, real or imagined.”[C8-247] Under these criteria, whether the case should be referred to the Secret Service depends on the existence of a previous history of mental instability, propensity toward violent action, or some similar characteristic, coupled with some evaluation of the capability of the individual or group to further the intention to satisfy a grievance by unlawful means.[C8-248]

While these tentative criteria are a step in the right direction, they seem unduly restrictive in continuing to require some manifestation of animus against a Government official. It is questionable whether such criteria would have resulted in the referral of Oswald to the Secret Service. Chief Rowley believed that they would, because of Oswald’s demonstrated hostility toward the Secretary of the Navy in his letter of January 30, 1962.[C8-249]

I shall employ all means to right this gross mistake or injustice to a boni-fied U.S. citizen and ex-service man. The U.S. government has no charges or complaints against me. I ask you to look into this case and take the necessary steps to repair the damage done to me and my family.[C8-250]

Even with the advantage of hindsight, this letter does not appear to express or imply Oswald’s “determination to use a means, other than legal or peaceful, to satisfy [his] grievance” within the meaning of the new criteria.[C8-251]

It is apparent that a good deal of further consideration and experimentation will be required before adequate criteria can be framed. The Commission recognizes that no set of meaningful criteria will yield the names of all potential assassins. Charles J. Guiteau, Leon F. Czolgosz, John Schrank, and Guiseppe Zangara--four assassins or would-be assassins--were all men who acted alone in their criminal acts against our leaders.[C8-252] None had a serious record of prior violence. Each of them was a failure in his work and in his relations with others, a victim of delusions and fancies which led to the conviction that society and its leaders had combined to thwart him. It will require every available resource of our Government to devise a practical system which has any reasonable possibility of revealing such malcontents.

_Liaison with other agencies regarding intelligence._--The Secret Service’s liaison with the agencies that supply information to it has been too casual. Since the assassination, the Service has recognized that these relationships must be far more formal, and each agency given clear understanding of the assistance which the Secret Service expects.[C8-253]

Once the Secret Service has formulated its new standards for collection of information, it should enter into written agreements with each Federal agency and the leading State and local agencies that might be a source of such information. Such agreements should describe in detail the information which is sought, the manner in which it will be provided to the Secret Service, and the respective responsibilities for any further investigation that may be required.

This is especially necessary with regard to the FBI and CIA, which carry the major responsibility for supplying information about potential threats, particularly those arising from organized groups, within their special jurisdiction. Since these agencies are already obliged constantly to evaluate the activities of such groups, they should be responsible for advising the Secret Service if information develops indicating the existence of an assassination plot and for reporting such events as a change in leadership or dogma which indicate that the group may present a danger to the President. Detailed formal agreements embodying these arrangements should be worked out between the Secret Service and both of these agencies.

It should be made clear that the Secret Service will in no way seek to duplicate the intelligence and investigative capabilities of the agencies now operating in this field but will continue to use the data developed by these agencies to carry out its special duties. Once experience has been gained in implementing such agreements with the Federal and leading State and local agencies, the Secret Service, through its field offices, should negotiate similar arrangements with such other State and local law enforcement agencies as may provide meaningful assistance. Much useful information will come to the attention of local law enforcement agencies in the regular course of their activities, and this source should not be neglected by undue concentration on relationships with other Federal agencies. Finally, these agreements with Federal and local authorities will be of little value unless a system is established for the frequent formal review of activities thereunder.

In this regard the Commission notes with approval several recent measures taken and proposed by the Secret Service to improve its liaison arrangements. In his testimony Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon informed the Commission that an interagency committee has been established to develop more effective criteria. According to Secretary Dillon, the Committee will include representatives of the President’s Office of Science and Technology, Department of Defense, CIA, FBI, and the Secret Service.[C8-254] In addition, the Department of the Treasury has requested five additional agents for its Protective Research Section to serve as liaison officers with law enforcement and intelligence agencies.[C8-255] On the basis of the Department’s review during the past several months, Secretary Dillon testified that the use of such liaison officers is the only effective way to insure that adequate liaison is maintained.[C8-256] As a beginning step to improve liaison with local law enforcement officials, the Secret Service on August 26, 1964, directed its field representatives to send a form request for intelligence information to all local, county, and State law enforcement agencies in their districts.[C8-257] Each of these efforts appears sound, and the Commission recommends that these and the other measures suggested by the Commission be pursued vigorously by the Secret Service.

_Automatic data processing._--Unless the Secret Service is able to deal rapidly and accurately with a growing body of data, the increased information supplied by other agencies will be wasted. PRS must develop the capacity to classify its subjects on a more sophisticated basis than the present geographic breakdown. Its present manual filing system is obsolete; it makes no use of the recent developments in automatic data processing which are widely used in the business world and in other Government offices.

The Secret Service and the Department of the Treasury now recognize this critical need. In the planning document currently under review by the Bureau of the Budget, the Department recommends that it be permitted to hire five qualified persons “to plan and develop a workable and efficient automated file and retrieval system.”[C8-258] Also the Department requests the sum of $100,000 to conduct a detailed feasibility study; this money would be used to compensate consultants, to lease standard equipment or to purchase specially designed pilot equipment.[C8-259] On the basis of such a feasibility study, the Department hopes to design a practical system which will fully meet the needs of the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service.

The Commission recommends that prompt and favorable consideration be given to this request. The Commission further recommends that the Secret Service coordinate its planning as closely as possible with all of the Federal agencies from which it receives information. The Secret Service should not and does not plan to develop its own intelligence gathering facilities to duplicate the existing facilities of other Federal agencies. In planning its data processing techniques, the Secret Service should attempt to develop a system compatible with those of the agencies from which most of its data will come.[E]

[E] In evaluating data processing techniques of the Secret Service, the Commission had occasion to become informed, to a limited extent, about the data processing techniques of other Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The Commission was struck by the apparent lack of effort, on an interagency basis, to develop coordinated and mutually compatible systems, even where such coordination would not seem inconsistent with the particular purposes of the agency involved. The Commission recognizes that this is a controversial area and that many strongly held views are advanced in resistance to any suggestion that an effort be made to impose any degree of coordination. This matter is obviously beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission, but it seems to warrant further study before each agency becomes irrevocably committed to separate action. The Commission, therefore, recommends that the President consider ordering an inquiry into the possibility that coordination might be achieved to a greater extent than seems now to be contemplated, without interference with the primary mission of each agency involved.

_Protective Research participation in advance arrangements._--Since the assassination, Secret Service procedures have been changed to require that a member of PRS accompany each advance survey team to establish liaison with local intelligence gathering agencies and to provide for the immediate evaluation of information received from them.[C8-260] This PRS agent will also be responsible for establishing an informal local liaison committee to make certain that all protective intelligence activities are coordinated. Based on its experience during this period, the Secret Service now recommends that additional personnel be made available to PRS so that these arrangements can be made permanent without adversely affecting the operations of the Service’s field offices.[C8-261] The Commission regards this as a most useful innovation and urges that the practice be continued.

Liaison With Local Law Enforcement Agencies

Advice by the Secret Service to local police in metropolitan areas relating to the assistance expected in connection with a Presidential visit has hitherto been handled on an informal basis.[C8-262] The Service should consider preparing formal explanations of the cooperation anticipated during a Presidential visit to a city, in formats that can be communicated to each level of local authorities. Thus, the local chief of police could be given a master plan, prepared for the occasion, of all protective measures to be taken during the visit; each patrolman might be given a prepared booklet of instructions explaining what is expected of him.

The Secret Service has expressed concern that written instructions might come into the hands of local newspapers, to the prejudice of the precautions described.[C8-263] However, the instructions must be communicated to the local police in any event and can be leaked to the press whether or not they are in writing. More importantly, the lack of carefully prepared and carefully transmitted instructions for typical visits to cities can lead to lapses in protection, such as the confusion in Dallas about whether members of the public were permitted on overpasses.[C8-264] Such instructions will not fit all circumstances, of course, and should not be relied upon to the detriment of the imaginative application of judgment in special cases.

Inspection of Buildings

Since the assassination of President Kennedy, the Secret Service has been experimenting with new techniques in the inspection of buildings along a motorcade route.[C8-265] According to Secretary Dillon, the studies indicate that there is some utility in attempting to designate certain buildings as involving a higher risk than others.[C8-266] The Commission strongly encourages these efforts to improve protection along a motorcade route. The Secret Service should utilize the personnel of other Federal law enforcement offices in the locality to assure adequate manpower for this task, as it is now doing.[C8-267] Lack of adequate resources is an unacceptable excuse for failing to improve advance precautions in this crucial area of Presidential protection.

Secret Service Personnel and Facilities

Testimony and other evidence before the Commission suggest that the Secret Service is trying to accomplish its job with too few people and without adequate modern equipment. Although Chief Rowley does not complain about the pay scale for Secret Service agents, salaries are below those of the FBI and leading municipal police forces.[C8-268] The assistant to the Director of the FBI testified that the caseload of each FBI agent averaged 20-25, and he felt that this was high.[C8-269] Chief Rowley testified that the present workload of each Secret Service agent averages 110.1 cases.[C8-270] While these statistics relate to the activities of Secret Service agents stationed in field offices and not the White House detail, field agents supplement those on the detail, particularly when the President is traveling. Although the Commission does not know whether the cases involved are entirely comparable, these figures suggest that the agents of the Secret Service are substantially overworked.

In its budget request for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1964, the Secret Service sought funds for 25 new positions, primarily in field offices.[C8-271] This increase has been approved by the Congress.[C8-272] Chief Rowley explained that this would not provide enough additional manpower to take all the measures which he considers required. However, the 1964-65 budget request was submitted in November 1963 and requests for additional personnel were not made because of the studies then being conducted.[C8-273]

The Secret Service has now presented its recommendations to the Bureau of the Budget.[C8-274] The plan proposed by the Service would take approximately 20 months to implement and require expenditures of approximately $3 million during that period. The plan provides for an additional 205 agents for the Secret Service. Seventeen of this number are proposed for the Protective Research Section; 145 are proposed for the field offices to handle the increased volume of security investigations and be available to protect the President or Vice President when they travel; 18 agents are proposed for a rotating pool which will go through an intensive training cycle and also be available to supplement the White House detail in case of unexpected need; and 25 additional agents are recommended to provide the Vice President full protection.

The Commission urges that the Bureau of the Budget review these recommendations with the Secret Service and authorize a request for the necessary supplemental appropriation, as soon as it can be justified. The Congress has often stressed that it will support any reasonable request for funds for the protection of the President.[C8-275]

Manpower and Technical Assistance From Other Agencies

Before the assassination the Secret Service infrequently requested other Federal law enforcement agencies to provide personnel to assist in its protection functions.[C8-276] Since the assassination, the Service has experimented with the use of agents borrowed for short periods from such agencies. It has used other Treasury law enforcement agents on special experiments in building and route surveys in places to which the President frequently travels.[C8-277] It has also used other Federal law enforcement agents during Presidential visits to cities in which such agents are stationed. Thus, in the 4 months following the assassination, the FBI, on 16 separate occasions, supplied a total of 139 agents to assist in protection work during a Presidential visit,[C8-278] which represents a departure from its prior practice.[C8-279] From February 11 through June 30, 1964, the Service had the advantage of 9,500 hours of work by other enforcement agencies.[C8-280]

The FBI has indicated that it is willing to continue to make such assistance available, even though it agrees with the Secret Service that it is preferable for the Service to have enough agents to handle all protective demands.[C8-281] The Commission endorses these efforts to supplement the Service’s own personnel by obtaining, for short periods of time, the assistance of trained Federal law enforcement officers. In view of the ever-increasing mobility of American Presidents, it seems unlikely that the Service could or should increase its own staff to a size which would permit it to provide adequate protective manpower for all situations. The Commission recommends that the agencies involved determine how much periodic assistance they can provide, and that each such agency and the Secret Service enter into a formal agreement defining such arrangements. It may eventually be desirable to codify the practice in an Executive order. The Secret Service will be better able to plan its own long-range personnel requirements if it knows with reasonable certainty the amount of assistance that it can expect from other agencies.

The occasional use of personnel from other Federal agencies to assist in protecting the President has a further advantage. It symbolizes the reality that the job of protecting the President has not been and cannot be exclusively the responsibility of the Secret Service. The Secret Service in the past has sometimes guarded its right to be acknowledged as the sole protector of the Chief Executive. This no longer appears to be the case.[C8-282] Protecting the President is a difficult and complex task which requires full use of the best resources of many parts of our Government. Recognition that the responsibility must be shared increases the likelihood that it will be met.

Much of the Secret Service work requires the development and use of highly sophisticated equipment, some of which must be specially designed to fit unique requirements. Even before the assassination, and to a far greater extent thereafter, the Secret Service has been receiving full cooperation in scientific research and technological development from many Government agencies including the Department of Defense and the President’s Office of Science and Technology.[C8-283]

Even if the manpower and technological resources of the Secret Service are adequately augmented, it will continue to rely in many respects upon the greater resources of the Office of Science and Technology and other agencies. The Commission recommends that the present arrangements with the Office of Science and Technology and the other Federal agencies that have been so helpful to the Secret Service be placed on a permanent and formal basis. The exchange of letters dated August 31, 1964, between Secretary Dillon and Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, is a useful effort in the right direction.[C8-284] The Service should negotiate a memorandum of understanding with each agency that has been assisting it and from which it can expect to need help in the future. The essential terms of such memoranda might well be embodied in an Executive order.

CONCLUSION

This Commission can recommend no procedures for the future protection of our Presidents which will guarantee security. The demands on the President in the execution of his responsibilities in today’s world are so varied and complex and the traditions of the office in a democracy such as ours are so deepseated as to preclude absolute security.

The Commission has, however, from its examination of the facts of President Kennedy’s assassination made certain recommendations which it believes would, if adopted, materially improve upon the procedures in effect at the time of President Kennedy’s assassination and result in a substantial lessening of the danger.

As has been pointed out, the Commission has not resolved all the proposals which could be made. The Commission nevertheless is confident that, with the active cooperation of the responsible agencies and with the understanding of the people of the United States in their demands upon their President, the recommendations we have here suggested would greatly advance the security of the office without any impairment of our fundamental liberties.

APPENDIX I

IMMEDIATE RELEASE NOVEMBER 30, 1963

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXECUTIVE ORDER

NO.11130

APPOINTING A COMMISSION TO REPORT UPON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

Pursuant to the authority vested in me as President of the United States, I hereby appoint a Commission to ascertain, evaluate and report upon the facts relating to the assassination of the late President John F. Kennedy and the subsequent violent death of the man charged with the assassination. The Commission shall consist of--

The Chief Justice of the United States, Chairman;

Senator Richard B. Russell;

Senator John Sherman Cooper;

Congressman Hale Boggs;

Congressman Gerald R. Ford;

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles;

The Honorable John J. McCloy.

The purposes of the Commission are to examine the evidence developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and any additional evidence that may hereafter come to light or be uncovered by federal or state authorities; to make such further investigation as the Commission finds desirable; to evaluate all the facts and circumstances surrounding such assassination, including the subsequent violent death of the man charged with the assassination, and to report to me its findings and conclusions.

The Commission is empowered to prescribe its own procedures and to employ such assistants as it deems necessary.

Necessary expenses of the Commission may be paid from the “Emergency Fund for the President”.

All Executive departments and agencies are directed to furnish the Commission with such facilities, services and cooperation as it may request from time to time.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE,

November 29, 1963.

APPENDIX II

IMMEDIATE RELEASE November 29, 1963

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

The President today announced that he is appointing a Special Commission to study and report upon all facts and circumstances relating to the assassination of the late President, John F. Kennedy, and the subsequent violent death of the man charged with the assassination.

The President stated that the Majority and Minority Leadership of the Senate and the House of Representatives have been consulted with respect to the proposed Special Commission.

The members of the Special Commission are:

Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman Senator Richard Russell (Georgia) Senator John Sherman Cooper (Kentucky) Representative Hale Boggs (Louisiana) Representative Gerald Ford (Michigan) Hon. Allen W. Dulles of Washington Hon. John J. McCloy of New York

The President stated that the Special Commission is to be instructed to evaluate all available information concerning the subject of the inquiry. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, pursuant to an earlier directive of the President, is making complete investigation of the facts. An inquiry is also scheduled by a Texas Court of Inquiry convened by the Attorney General of Texas under Texas law.

The Special Commission will have before it all evidence uncovered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and all information available to any agency of the Federal Government. The Attorney General of Texas has also offered his cooperation. All Federal agencies and offices are being directed to furnish services and cooperation to the Special Commission. The Commission will also be empowered to conduct any further investigation that it deems desirable.

The President is instructing the Special Commission to satisfy itself that the truth is known as far as it can be discovered, and to report its findings and conclusions to him, to the American people, and to the world.

APPENDIX III

Public Law 88-202 88th Congress, S. J. Res. 137 December 13, 1963

Joint Resolution

Authorizing the Commission established to report upon the assassination of President John F. Kennedy to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of evidence.

[Sidenote: Commission investigating assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Subpena power. 28 F.R. 12789.]

_Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled_, That (a) for the purpose of this joint resolution, the term “Commission” means the Commission appointed by the President by Executive Order 11130, dated November 29, 1963.

(b) The Commission, or any member of the Commission when so authorized by the Commission, shall have power to issue subpenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence that relates to any matter under investigation by the Commission. The Commission, or any member of the Commission or any agent or agency designated by the Commission for such purpose, may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and receive evidence. Such attendance of witnesses and the production of such evidence may be required from any place within the United States at any designated place of hearing.

(c) In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpena issued to any person under subsection (b), any court of the United States within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on or within the jurisdiction of which said person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts business, upon application by the Commission shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear before the Commission, its member, agent, or agency, there to produce evidence if so ordered, or there to give testimony touching the matter under investigation or in question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by said court as a contempt thereof.

[Sidenote: Manner of service.]

[Sidenote: 77 STAT. 362.]

[Sidenote: 77 STAT. 363.]

(d) Process and papers of the Commission, its members, agent, or agency, may be served either upon the witness in person or by registered mail or by telegraph or by leaving a copy thereof at the residence or principal office or place of business of the person required to be served. The verified return by the individual so serving the same, setting forth the manner of such service, shall be proof of the same, and the return post office receipt or telegraph receipt therefor when registered and mailed or telegraphed as aforesaid shall be proof of service of the same. Witnesses summoned before the Commission, its members, agent, or agency, shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are paid witnesses in the courts of the United States, and witnesses whose depositions are taken and the persons taking the same shall severally be entitled to the same fees as are paid for like services in the courts of the United States.

[Sidenote: Privilege against self-incrimination.]

[Sidenote: 77 STAT. 363.]

(e) No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or other in obedience to a subpena, on the ground that the testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture: but no individual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture (except demotion or removal from office) for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.

[Sidenote: Place of service.]

(f) All process of any court to which application may be made under this Act may be served in the judicial district wherein the person required to be served resides or may be found.

Approved December 13, 1963.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 109 (1963): Dec. 9: Passed Senate. Dec. 10: Considered and passed House.

APPENDIX IV

Biographical Information and Acknowledgments

MEMBERS OF COMMISSION

The Honorable Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the United States, was born in Los Angeles, Calif., on March 19, 1891. He graduated from the University of California with B.L. and J.D. degrees, and was admitted to the California bar in 1914. Chief Justice Warren was attorney general of California from 1939 to 1943. From 1943 to 1953 he was Governor of California and in September 1953 was appointed by President Eisenhower to be the Chief Justice of the United States.

The Honorable Richard B. Russell was born in Winder, Ga., on November 2, 1897. He received his B.L. degree from the University of Georgia in 1918 and his LL.B. from Mercer University in 1957. Senator Russell commenced the practice of law in Winder, Ga., in 1918, became county attorney for Barrow County, Ga., and was a member of the Georgia House of Representatives from 1921 to 1931. He was Governor of Georgia from 1931 to 1933, was elected to the U.S. Senate in January 1933 to fill a vacancy, and has been Senator from Georgia continuously since that date.

The Honorable John Sherman Cooper was born in Somerset, Ky., on August 23, 1901. He attended Centre College, Kentucky, received his A.B. degree from Yale College in 1923, and attended Harvard Law School from 1923 to 1925. Senator Cooper has been a member of the House of Representatives of the Kentucky General Assembly, a county judge and circuit judge in Kentucky, and is now a member of the U.S. Senate, where he has served, though not continuously, for 12 years. He was a delegate to the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, an advisor to the Secretary of State in 1950 at meetings of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Ambassador to India and Nepal in 1955-56. He served in the 3d U.S. Army in World War II in Europe, and after the war headed the reorganization of the German judicial system in Bavaria.

The Honorable Hale Boggs was born in Long Beach, Miss., on February 15, 1914. He graduated from Tulane University with a B.A. degree in 1935 and received his LL.B. in 1937. He was admitted to the Louisiana bar in 1937 and practiced law in New Orleans. Representative Boggs was elected to the 77th Congress of the United States and in World War II was an officer of the U.S. Naval Reserve and of the Maritime Service. He has been a Member of Congress since 1946 when he was elected to represent the Second District, State of Louisiana, in the 80th Congress, and he is currently the majority whip for the Democratic Party in the House of Representatives.

The Honorable Gerald R. Ford was born in Omaha, Nebr., on July 14, 1913. He graduated from the University of Michigan with a B.A. degree in 1935 and from Yale University Law School with an LL.B. degree in 1941. Representative Ford was admitted to the Michigan bar in 1941. He was first elected to Congress in 1948 and has been reelected to each succeeding Congress. He served 47 months in the U.S. Navy during World War II. Representative Ford was elected in January 1963 the chairman of the House Republican Conference.

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles was born in Watertown, N.Y., on April 7, 1893. He received his B.A. degree from Princeton in 1914, his M.A. in 1916, his LL.B. from George Washington University in 1926, and LL.D. degrees. Mr. Dulles entered the diplomatic service of the United States in 1916 and resigned in 1926 to take up law practice in New York City. In 1953 Mr. Dulles was appointed Director of Central Intelligence and served in that capacity until 1961.

The Honorable John J. McCloy was born in Philadelphia, Pa., on March 31, 1895. He received an A.B. degree, cum laude, from Amherst College in 1916; LL.B. from Harvard, and LL.D. from Amherst College. He was admitted to the New York bar in 1921 and is now a member of the firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. He was Assistant Secretary of War from April 1941 to November 1945. Mr. McCloy was President of the World Bank from 1947 to 1949 and U.S. Military Governor and High Commissioner for Germany from 1949 to 1952. He has been coordinator of U.S. disarmament activities since 1961.

GENERAL COUNSEL

J. Lee Rankin was born in Hartington, Nebr., on July 8, 1907. He received his A.B. degree from the University of Nebraska in 1928 and his LL.B. in 1930 from the University of Nebraska Law School. He was admitted to the Nebraska bar in 1930 and practiced law in Lincoln, Nebr., until January 1953 when he was appointed by President Eisenhower to be the assistant attorney general in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice. In August 1956 President Eisenhower appointed Mr. Rankin to be the Solicitor General of the United States. Since January 1961 Mr. Rankin has been in private practice in New York City. He accepted the appointment as General Counsel for the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy on December 8, 1963.

ASSISTANT COUNSEL

Francis W. H. Adams was born in Mount Vernon, N.Y., on June 26, 1904. He graduated from Williams College with an A.B. degree, and received his LL.B. degree from Fordham Law School in 1928. Mr. Adams has acted as chief assistant U.S. attorney in New York, special assistant to the U.S. Attorney General, and as an arbitrator for the War Labor Board. In 1954 and 1955 he served as police commissioner of New York City. Mr. Adams is a member of the New York and Washington law firm of Satterlee, Warfield & Stephens.

Joseph A. Ball was born in Stuart, Iowa, on December 16, 1902. He received his B.A. degree from Creighton University in Omaha, Nebr., and his LL.B. degree from the University of Southern California in 1927. Mr. Ball teaches criminal law and procedure at the University of Southern California. He is a member of the U.S. Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Ball is a member of the firm of Ball, Hunt & Hart, Long Beach and Santa Ana, Calif.

David W. Belin was born in Washington, D.C., on June 20, 1928. He is a graduate of the University of Michigan, where he earned three degrees with high distinction: A.B. (1951), M. Bus. Adm. (1953), and J.D. (1954). At the University of Michigan he was associate editor of the Michigan Law Review. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and the Order of the Coif. He is a member of the law firm of Herrick, Langdon, Sandblom & Belin, Des Moines, Iowa.

William T. Coleman, Jr., was born in Germantown, Philadelphia, Pa., on July 7, 1920. He graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1941 with an A.B. degree, summa cum laude, received his LL.B. in 1946, magna cum laude, from Harvard Law School and served as an editor of the Harvard Law Review. From 1947 to 1948 he served as law clerk to Judge Herbert F. Goodrich, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and during the 1948-49 term of the U.S. Supreme Court, as law clerk to Justice Felix Frankfurter. Mr. Coleman has served as a special counsel for the city of Philadelphia and has been a consultant with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency since January 1963. He is a member of the law firm of Dilworth, Paxson, Kalish, Kohn & Dilks, Philadelphia, Pa.

Melvin A. Eisenberg was born in New York City on December 3, 1934. He was graduated from Columbia College, A.B., summa cum laude, in 1956, and from Harvard Law School, LL.B., summa cum laude, in 1959. Mr. Eisenberg is a member of Phi Beta Kappa, and served as an editor of the Harvard Law Review. He is associated with the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler in New York City.

Burt W. Griffin was born in Cleveland, Ohio, on August 19, 1932. He received his B.A. degree, cum laude, from Amherst College in 1954, and LL.B. from Yale University Law School in 1959. He was note and comment editor of the Yale Law Journal. During 1959-60 Mr. Griffin served as law clerk to Judge George T. Washington of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. From 1960 to 1962 Mr. Griffin was an assistant U.S. attorney for the northern district of Ohio, and since 1962 he has been associated with the firm of MacDonald, Hopkins & Hardy, Cleveland, Ohio.

Leon D. Hubert, Jr., was born in New Orleans, La., July 1, 1911. He received his A.B. degree from Tulane University in 1932, and LL.B. from Tulane in 1934. He was associate editor of the Tulane Law Review, and a member of Phi Beta Kappa and the Order of the Coif. Mr. Hubert was assistant U.S. attorney for the eastern district of Louisiana, 1934-46, and a professor of law at Tulane University, 1942-60. He has worked with the Louisiana State Law Institute on the revision of statutes and on the codes of civil and criminal procedure. Mr. Hubert is a member of the law firm of Hubert, Baldwin & Zibilich, New Orleans, La.

Albert E. Jenner, Jr., was born in Chicago, Ill., on June 20, 1907. He received his law degree from the University of Illinois in 1930. He is a member of the Order of the Coif. In 1956 and 1957 Mr. Jenner served as a special assistant attorney general of Illinois in the investigation of fraud in the office of the auditor of public accounts of the State of Illinois. Mr. Jenner is a Commissioner on Uniform State Laws, a member of the U.S. Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and vice chairman of the Joint Committee for the Effective Administration of Justice. He is a former professor of law at the Northwestern University School of Law. Mr. Jenner is a member of the law firm of Raymond, Mayer, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Ill.

Wesley J. Liebeler was born in Langdon, N. Dak., on May 9, 1931. He received his B.A. degree from Macalester College, St. Paul, Minn., in 1953 and graduated, cum laude, from the University of Chicago Law School in 1957. He was a managing editor of the University of Chicago Law Review and is a member of the Order of the Coif. Mr. Liebeler is associated with the law firm of Carter, Ledyard & Milburn, New York City.

Norman Redlich was born in New York City on November 12, 1925. He received his B.A. degree, magna cum laude, from Williams College in 1947, his LL.B., cum laude, from Yale Law School in 1950, and LL.M. (Taxation) in 1955 from the New York University School of Law. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and the Order of the Coif, and was executive editor of the Yale Law Journal. Mr. Redlich is Professor of Law at the New York University School of Law, and is editor in chief of the Tax Law Review, New York University.

W. David Slawson was born in Grand Rapids, Mich., on June 2, 1931. He received his A.B. degree, summa cum laude, from Amherst College in 1953, and M.A. from Princeton University in 1954. Mr. Slawson received his LL.B., magna cum laude, from Harvard University in 1959. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and was a note editor of the Harvard Law Review. Mr. Slawson is a member of the law firm of Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Denver, Colo.

Arlen Specter was born in Wichita, Kans., on February 12, 1930. He received his B.A. degree from the University of Pennsylvania in 1951, where he was a member of Phi Beta Kappa, and received his LL.B. from Yale Law School in 1956. He was an editor of the Yale Law Journal. Mr. Specter was an associate of the law firm of Dechert, Price & Rhoads in Philadelphia from 1956 to 1959, and from 1959 to 1964 he was an assistant in the Philadelphia district attorney’s office. Mr. Specter is a member of the firm of Specter & Katz, Philadelphia, Pa.

Samuel A. Stern was born in Philadelphia, Pa., on January 21, 1929. He graduated with honors from the University of Pennsylvania with an A.B. in 1949. In 1952 he received his LL.B., magna cum laude, from Harvard Law School, and was developments editor of the Harvard Law Review. Mr. Stern served as law clerk to Chief Judge Calvert Magruder, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, during 1954-55 and was law clerk to Chief Justice Earl Warren during 1955-56. He is a member of the law firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C.

Howard P. Willens was born in Oak Park, Ill., on May 27, 1931. He received his B.A. degree, with high distinction, from the University of Michigan in 1953 and his LL.B. from Yale Law School in 1956. Mr. Willens is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and was an editor of the Yale Law Journal. He was associated with the law firm of Kirkland, Ellis, Hodson, Chaffetz & Masters, Washington, D.C., until 1961, when he was appointed Second Assistant in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.

STAFF MEMBERS

Philip Barson was born in Philadelphia, Pa., on May 2, 1912. He received his Bachelor of Science of Commerce, from Temple University, Philadelphia, in 1934. Mr. Barson has been employed by the Internal Revenue Service, Intelligence Division, Philadelphia, since September 1948, first as a special agent and since 1961 has been group supervisor. Mr. Barson is a certified public accountant from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Edward A. Conroy was born in Albany, N.Y., on March 20, 1920. He attended Brooklyn Polytechnical Institute and Benjamin Franklin University, Washington, D.C. Mr. Conroy joined the Internal Revenue Service as a revenue officer in 1946. After acting as executive assistant to the assistant regional inspector, Boston, Mass., Mr. Conroy became senior inspector in the Planning and Programing Branch of the Internal Security Division, Inspection, of the Internal Revenue Service. He currently occupies that position.

John Hart Ely was born in New York City on December 3, 1938. He graduated, summa cum laude, from Princeton University in 1960, and from Yale Law School, magna cum laude, in 1963. He was note and comment editor of the Yale Law Journal. He is a member of the Phi Beta Kappa and the Order of the Coif. During the 1964-65 term. Mr. Ely will serve as law clerk to Chief Justice Warren.

Alfred Goldberg was born in Baltimore, Md., on December 23, 1918. He received his A.B. degree from Western Maryland College in 1938, and his Ph. D. from the Johns Hopkins University in 1950. After 4 years’ service with the U.S. Army, Dr. Goldberg became historian with the U.S. Air Force Historical Division and later Chief of the Current History Branch. In 1962-63 he was a visiting American fellow, King’s College, University of London, and since his return has been senior historian, U.S. Air Force Historical Division. Dr. Goldberg is the author or editor of several publications on historical subjects and is a contributor to Encyclopedia Britannica and the World Book.

Murray J. Laulicht was born in Brooklyn, N.Y., on May 12, 1940. He received his B.A. in 1961 from Yeshiva College, and received his LL.B. degree, summa cum laude, from Columbia University School of Law in 1964. He was notes and comments editor of the Columbia Law Review. During 1964-65 Mr. Laulicht will clerk for Senior Judge Harold R. Medina of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Arthur K. Marmor was born in New York City on December 5, 1915. He received a B.S.S. degree from the College of the City of New York in 1937 and an A.M. degree from Columbia University in 1940. He served in the U.S. Army in World War II. Mr. Marmor has been historian for the Departments of Interior, Army, and Air Force, and Chief, Editorial Services Branch, Department of State. He has also taught for the American University and the University of Maryland. Mr. Marmor has contributed to numerous Government publications and has been in charge of the editing of historical and legal volumes. At present he is a historian for the Department of the Air Force.

Richard M. Mosk was born in Los Angeles, Calif., on May 18, 1939. He graduated from Stanford University, with great distinction, in 1960 and from Harvard Law School, cum laude, in 1963. Mr. Mosk is a member of Phi Beta Kappa. During the 1964-65 term of the California Supreme Court Mr. Mosk will clerk for Justice Mathew Tobriner.

John J. O’Brien was born in Somerville, Mass., on September 11, 1919. Mr. O’Brien received his B.B.A. degree in law and business, cum laude, from Northeastern University, Boston, Mass. He received his M.A. degree in the field of governmental administration from George Washington University, Washington, D.C., and in 1941 joined the Bureau of Internal Revenue. After service in the U.S. Coast Guard, Mr. O’Brien resumed his work as an Internal Revenue Service investigator, and is currently the Assistant Chief of the Inspection Services Investigations Branch, in the National Office of Internal Revenue.

Stuart R. Pollak was born in San Pedro, Calif., on August 24, 1937. He received his B.A. degree from Stanford University, with great distinction, in 1959, and was a member of Phi Beta Kappa. Mr. Pollak obtained his LL.B., magna cum laude, from Harvard Law School in 1962, where he was book review and legislation editor of the Harvard Law Review. During the 1963-64 term Mr. Pollak was law clerk to Justices Stanley Reed and Harold Burton. Mr. Pollak is a staff assistant in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Alfredda Scobey was born in Kankakee, Ill. She received her A.B. degree from American University, Washington, D.C., in 1933, studied law at John Marshall Law School, Atlanta, Ga., and was admitted to the Georgia bar in 1945. Miss Scobey did graduate study at the National University of Mexico, at Duke University, and at Emory University, Atlanta. She practiced law from 1945 to 1949 in Atlanta and since 1949 has been a law assistant in the Court of Appeals, Georgia.

Charles N. Shaffer, Jr., was born in New York City on June 8, 1932. He attended Fordham College in 1951 and received his LL.B. from the Fordham University School of Law in 1957. From 1958 to 1959 Mr. Shaffer was associated with the law firm of Chadburn, Parke, Whiteside & Wolff, New York City. He was assistant U.S. attorney in the southern district of New York from 1959 to 1961, when he was appointed Special Trial Attorney in the Criminal and Tax Divisions of the U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Lloyd L. Weinreb was born in New York City on October 9, 1936. He received B.A. degrees from Dartmouth College, summa cum laude, in 1957, and from the University of Oxford in 1959. He received his LL.B., magna cum laude, from Harvard Law School in 1962. He was case editor of the Harvard Law Review. During the 1963-64 term. Mr. Weinreb was law clerk to Justice John M. Harlan. Mr. Weinreb is a staff assistant in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Acknowledgments

During the taking of testimony in various parts of the United States, The Commission was greatly assisted by the offices of numerous U.S. attorneys of the Department of Justice. The Commission would like to acknowledge its gratitude for this assistance and thank in particular Harold Barefoot Sanders, Jr., U.S. attorney for the northern district of Texas, and his conscientious assistant, Martha Joe Stroud.

In addition the Commission wishes to thank the following lawyers, secretaries, and clerks for their unstinting efforts on behalf of the Commission:

Sheila Adams Stephen R. Barnett Thomas D. Barr Miriam A. Bottum Stephen G. Breyer Patrick O. Burns Charlene Chardwell Anne M. Clark Jonathan M. Clark George C. Cochran Betty Jean Compton Francine Davis Viola C. Davis Paul Dodyk Charlee Dianne Duke Julia T. Eide Josephine M. Farrar William T. Finley, Jr. Dennis M. Flannery James C. Gaither Stephen R. Goldstein Patricia E. Gormley Jeanne C. Hauer Beverly A. Heckman Sadie M. Hennigan Lela B. Hewlett Elaine Johnson Vivian Johnson Pearl G. Kamber Sharon Kegarise Adele W. Lippard David T. Luhm Ella M. McCall Louise S. McKenzie Michael W. Maupin Jean H. Millard Seresa Mintor Maurice Moore Mary L. Norton Vaughnie Perry Jane W. Peter Edward R. Pierpoint James H. Pipkin, Jr. S. Paul Posner Douglas Prather Monroe Price Lucille Ann Robinson Suzanne Rolston Mary Ann Rowcotsky Carolyn A. Schweinsberg Ruth D. Shirley Ray Shurtleff Helen Tarko Jane M. Vida Jay Vogelson Anne V. Welsh Margaret C. Yager

APPENDIX V

List of Witnesses

The following is a list of the 552 witnesses whose testimony has been presented to the Commission. Witnesses who appeared before members of the Commission have a “C” following their names; those questioned during depositions by members of the Commission’s legal staff are indicated by a “D”; and those who supplied affidavits and statements are similarly identified with “A” and “S”. The brief descriptions of the witnesses pertain either to the time of their testimony or to the time of the events concerning which they testified.

_Witness_ _Description_ _Testimony_

Ables, Don R.^{D} Jail Clerk, Dallas Vol. VII, p. 239. Police Department.

Abt, John J.^{D} New York City attorney. Vol. X, p. 116.

Adamcik, John P.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 202. Department.

Adams, R. L.^{AD} Placement interviewer, Vol. X, p. 136. Texas Employment Vol. XI, p. 480. Commission.

Adams, Victoria Employee, Texas School Vol. VI, p. 386. Elizabeth^{D} Book Depository (TSBD).

Akin, Gene Coleman^{D} Doctor, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 63. Hospital.

Alba, Adrian Thomas^{D} Acquaintance of Oswald in New Orleans. Vol. X, p. 219.

Allen, Mrs. J. U.^{A} Secretary, Chamberlin-Hunt Academy. Vol. XI, p. 472.

Altgens, James W.^{D} Witness at assassination scene. Vol. VII, p. 515.

Anderson, Eugene D.^{D} Marine Corps markmanship expert. Vol. XI, p. 301.

Andrews, Dean Adams, New Orleans attorney. Vol. XI, p. 325. Jr.^{D}

Applin, George Witness of Oswald Vol. VII, p. 85. Jefferson, Jr.^{D} arrest.

Arce, Danny G.^{D} Employee, TSBD. Vol. VI, p. 363.

Archer, Don Ray^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. XII, p. 395. Department.

Armstrong, Andrew, Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XIII, p. 302. Jr.^{D} Ruby.

Arnett, Charles Member, Dallas Police Vol. XII, p. 128. Oliver^{D} Department.

Aycox, James Thomas^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 203. Ruby.

Baker, Marrion L.^{AC} Member, Dallas Police Vol. III, p. 242. Department. Vol. VII, p. 592.

Baker, Mrs. (Rachley) Employee, TSBD. Vol. VII, p. 507. Donald.^{D}

Baker, T. L.^{C} Member, Dallas Police Vol. IV, p. 248. Department.

Ballen, Samuel B.^{D} Acquaintance of the Oswalds in Texas. Vol. IX, p. 45.

Barbe, Emmett Charles, Employee, William B. Jr.^{A} Reily Co. Vol. XI, p. 473.

Bargas, Tommy^{D} Superintendent, Leslie Welding Co. Vol. X, p. 160.

Barnes, W. E.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 270. Department.

Barnett, W. E.^{D} do. Vol. VII, p. 539.

Barnhorst, Colin^{D} Desk Clerk, YMCA, in Vol. X, p. 284. Dallas.

Bashour, Fouad A.^{D} Doctor, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 61. Hospital.

Batchelor, Charles^{D} Assistant Chief, Dallas Vol. XII, p. 1. Police Department. Vol. XV, p. 114.

Bates, Pauline Public stenographer, Vol. VIII, p. 330. Virginia^{D} Fort Worth.

Baxter, Charles Doctor, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 39. Rufus^{D} Hospital.

Beaty, Buford Lee^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. XII, p. 158. Department.

Beavers, William Psychiatrist, Dallas. Vol. XIV, p. 570. Robert^{D}

Beers, Ira J. “Jack”, Newspaper photographer, Vol. XIII, p. 102. Jr.^{D} Dallas.

Bellocchio, Frank^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XIV, p. 466. Ruby.

Belmont, Alan H.^{C} Assistant to the Vol. V, p. 1. Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Benavides, Domingo^{D} Witness in the vicinity Vol. VI, p. 444. of the Tippit crime scene.

Benton, Nelson^{D} Television reporter, Vol. XV, p. 456. CBS.

Bieberdorf, Fred A.^{D} First aid attendant, Vol. XIII, p. 83. Dallas Health Department.

Biggio, William S.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. XIV, p. 48. Department.

Blalock, Vance^{D} Observed Oswald in New Vol. X, p. 81. Orleans.

Bledsoe, Mary E.^{D} Oswald’s former Vol. VI, p. 400. landlady in Dallas.

Bogard, Albert Guy^{D} Automobile salesman, Vol. X, p. 352. Dallas.

Bookhout, James W.^{D} Agent, FBI. Vol. VII, p. 308.

Boone, Eugene^{C} Deputy Sheriff, Dallas Vol. III, p. 291. County.

Boswell, J. Doctor, Bethesda Naval Vol. II, p. 376. Thornton^{C} Hospital.

Botelho, James Acquaintance of Oswald Vol. VIII, p. 315. Anthony^{A} in Marine Corps.

Bouck, Robert Inman^{C} Agent, U.S. Secret Vol. IV, p. 294. Service.

Boudreaux, Anne^{D} Acquaintance of Oswald Vol. VIII, p. 35. during his youth.

Bouhe, George A.^{D} Acquaintance of the Vol. VIII, p. 355. Oswalds in Texas.

Bowers, Lee E., Jr.^{D} Employee, Union Vol. VI, p. 284. Terminal Co.

Bowron, Diana Nurse, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 134. Hamilton^{D} Hospital.

Boyd, Elmer L.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 119. Department.

Branch, John Henry^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 473. Ruby.

Brennan, Howard Witness at Vol. III, pp. 140, Leslie^{AC} assassination scene. 184, 211. Vol. XI, p. 206.

Brewer, E. D.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VI, p. 302. Department.

Brewer, Johnny Witness of Oswald Vol. VII, p. 1. Calvin^{D} arrest.

Brian, V. J.^{C} Member, Dallas Police Vol. V, p. 47. Department.

Bringuier, Carlos^{D} Cuban attorney, now a Vol. X, p. 32. resident of New Orleans.

Brock, Alvin R.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. XII, p. 171. Department.

Brock, Mary^{A} Witness in the vicinity Vol. VII, p. 593. of the Tippit crime scene.

Brock, Robert^{A} do. Vol. VII, p. 593.

Brooks, Donald E.^{D} Employment counselor, Vol. X, p. 143. Texas Employment Commission.

Brown, C. W.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 246. Department.

Brown, Earle V.^{D} do. Vol. VI, p. 321.

Brown, Peter Counsel for Community Vol. XI, p. 470. Megargee^{A} Service Society, New York.

Burcham, John W.^{A} Chief of Unemployment Vol. XI, p. 473. Insurance, Texas Employment Commission.

Burns, Doris^{D} Employee, TSBD. Vol. VI, p. 397.

Burroughs, Warren Employee, Texas Theatre. Vol. VII, p. 14. H.^{D}

Cabell, Earle^{D} Mayor of Dallas. Vol. VII, p. 476.

Cabell, Mrs. Earle^{D} Wife of Mayor Cabell. Vol. VII, p. 485.

Cadigan, James C.^{CD} Questioned document Vol. IV, p. 80. expert, FBI. Vol. VII, p. 418.

Call, Richard Acquaintance of Oswald Vol. VIII, p. 322. Dennis^{A} in the Marine Corps.

Callaway, Ted^{C} Witness in the vicinity Vol. III, p. 351. of the Tippit crime scene.

Camarata, Donald Acquaintance of Oswald Vol. VIII, p. 316. Peter^{A} in the Marine Corps.

Carlin, Bruce Ray^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XIII, p. 201. Ruby. Vol. XV, p. 641.

Carlin, Karen do. Vol. XIII, p. 205. Bennett^{D} Vol. XIV, p. 656.

Carr, Waggoner^{C} Attorney general of Vol. V, p. 258. State of Texas.

Carrico, Charles Doctor, Parkland Vol. III, p. 357. James^{CD} Hospital. Vol. VI, p. 1.

Carro, John^{D} Probation officer, New Vol. VIII, p. 202. York City, 1952-54.

Carroll, Bob K.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 17. Department

Carswell, Robert^{C} Special assistant Vol. IV, p. 299. to Secretary of the Vol. V, p. 486. Treasury.

Carter, Clifton C.^{A} Assistant to President Vol. VII, p. 474. Johnson.

Cason, Frances^{D} Telephone clerk, Dallas Vol. XIII, p. 89. Police Department.

Cason, Jack Charles^{A} President, TSBD. Vol. VII, p. 379.

Caster, Warren^{D} Assistant manager, Vol. VII, p. 386. Southwestern Publishing Co., TSBD.

Chayes, Abram^{C} Legal Adviser, Vol. V, pp. 307, Department of State. 327.

Cheek, Bertha^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XIII, p. 382. Ruby.

Church, George B., Passenger with Oswald Vol. XI, p. 115. Jr.^{A} on SS _Marion Lykes_.

Church, Mrs. George do. Vol. XI, p. 116. B., Jr.^{A}

Clardy, Barnard S.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. XII, p. 403. Department.

Clark, Max E.^{D} Acquaintance of the Vol. VIII, p. 343. Oswalds in Texas.

Clark, Richard L.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 235. Department.

Clark, William Kemp^{D} Doctor, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 18. Hospital.

Clements, Manning Agent, FBI. Vol. VII, p. 318. C.^{D}

Cole, Alwyn^{CD} Questioned document Vol. IV, p. 358. examiner, Treasury Vol. XV, p. 703. Department.

Combest, B. H.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. XII, p. 176. Department.

Connally, John Bowden, Governor of Texas. Vol. IV, p. 129. Jr.^{C}

Connally, Mrs. John Wife of the Governor of Vol. IV, p. 146. Bowden, Jr.^{C} Texas.

Connor, Peter Acquaintance of Oswald Vol. VIII, p. 317. Francis^{A} in the Marine Corps.

Conway, Hiram P.^{D} Fort Worth neighbor of Vol. VIII, p. 84. the Oswalds in Oswald’s youth.

Corporon, John^{A} Official of New Orleans Vol. XI, p. 471. radio station.

Couch, Malcolm O.^{D} TV news cameraman, Vol. VI, p. 153. Dallas.

Coulter, Harris^{C} State Department Vol. V, p. 408. interpreter.

Cox, Roland A.^{D} Reserve force, Dallas Vol. XV, p. 153. Police Department.

Crafard, Curtis Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XIII, p. 402. LaVerne^{D} Ruby. Vol. XIV, p. 1.

Craig, Roger D.^{D} Witness at Vol. VI, p. 260. assassination scene.

Crawford, James N.^{D} do. Vol. VI, p. 171.

Creel, Robert J.^{A} Employee, Louisiana Vol. XI, p. 477. Department of Labor, New Orleans.

Crowe, William D., Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 96. Jr. (a.k.a. Bill Ruby. DeMar).^{D}

Crowley, James D.^{A} Specialist in Vol. XI, p. 482. intelligence matters, Department of State.

Croy, Kenneth Reserve force, Dallas Vol. XII, p. 186. Hudson^{D} Police Department.

Crull, Elgin E.^{D} City Manager of Dallas. Vol. XV, p. 138.

Cunningham, Firearms identification Vol. II, p. 251. Cortlandt^{AC} expert, FBI. Vol. III, p. 451. Vol. VII, p. 591.

Cunningham, Helen Employment Counselor, Vol. X, p. 117. P.^{AD} Texas Employment Vol. XI, p. 477. Commission.

Curry, Jesse Chief, Dallas Police Vol. IV, p. 150. Edward^{ACD} Department. Vol. XII, p. 25. Vol. XV, p. 124, 641.

Curtis, Don Teel^{D} Doctor, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 57. Hospital.

Cutchshaw, Wilbur Member, Dallas Police Vol. XII, p. 206. Jay^{D} Department.

Daniels, John L.^{D} Employee, Dallas Vol. XIII, p. 296. parking lot.

Daniels, Napoleon Former member, Dallas Vol. XII, p. 225. J.^{D} Police Department.

Davis, Barbara Witness in the vicinity Vol. III, p. 342. Jeanette^{C} of the Tippit crime scene.

Davis, Floyd Guy^{D} Operator, Sports Drome Vol. X, p. 356. Rifle Range.

Davis, Virginia (Mrs. Witness in the vicinity Vol. VI, p. 454. Charles).^{D} of the Tippit crime scene.

Davis, Virgina Wife of Floyd Guy Davis. Vol. X, p. 363. Louise^{D}

Day, J.C.^{AC} Lieutenant, Dallas Vol. IV, p. 249. Police Department. Vol. VII, p. 401.

Dean, Patrick Member, Dallas Police Vol. V, p. 254. Trevor^{CD} Department. Vol. XII, p. 415.

Decker, J. E. Sheriff, Dallas County. Vol. XII, p. 42. (Bill)^{D}

Delgado, Nelson^{D} Acquaintance of Oswald Vol. VIII, p. 228. in Marine Corps.

DeMar, William (see Crowe, William D., Jr.).

De Mohrenschildt, Acquaintance of the Vol. IX, p. 166. George S.^{D} Oswalds in Texas.

De Mohrenschildt, do. Vol. IX, p. 285. Jeanne^{D}

Dhority, C. N.^{AD} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, pp. 149, Department. 380.

Dietrich, Edward C.^{D} Guard, Armored Motor Vol. XV, p. 269. Service.

Dillard, Tom C.^{D} Photographer-Journalist, Vol. VI, p. 162. Dallas.

Dillon, C. Douglas^{C} Secretary of the Vol. V, p. 573. Treasury.

Dobbs, Farrell^{AD} International Vol. X, p. 109. Secretary, Socialist Vol. XI, p. 208. Workers Party.

Donabedian, George^{D} Captain, U.S. Navy. Vol. VIII, p. 311.

Donovan, John E.^{D} Acquaintance of Oswald Vol. VIII, p. 289. in the Marine Corps.

Dougherty, Jack Employee, TSBD Vol. VI, p. 373. Edwin^{D}

Dowe, Kenneth Lawry^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 430. Ruby.

Dulany, Richard B.^{D} Doctor, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 113. Hospital.

Duncan, William Glenn, Employee, radio Vol. XV, p. 482. Jr.^{D} station, Dallas.

Dymitruk, Lydia^{D} Acquaintance of the Vol. IX, p. 60. Oswalds in Texas.

Dziemian, Arthur J.^{C} Wound ballistics Vol. V, p. 90. expert, U.S. Army.

Eberhardt, A. M.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Department. Vol. XIII, p. 181.

Edwards, Robert Employee, Dallas City Edwin^{D} Courthouse. Vol. VI, p. 200.

Euins, Amos Lee^{C} Witness at Vol. II, p. 201. assassination scene.

Evans, Julian^{D} Husband of Myrtle Evans. Vol. VIII, p. 66.

Evans, Myrtle^{D} Acquaintance of Vol. VIII, p. 45. Marguerite Oswald in Oswald’s youth.

Evans, Sidney, Jr.^{D} Resident of Ruby’s Vol. XIII, p. 195. apartment house.

Fain, John W.^{C} Agent, FBI. Vol. IV, p. 403.

Fehrenbach, George Resident of Ashland, Vol. XV, p. 289. William^{D} Oreg.

Feldsott, Louis^{A} President, Crescent Vol. XI, p. 205. Firearms, Inc.

Fenley, Robert Gene^{D} Reporter, Dallas. Vol. XI, p. 314.

Finck, Pierre A.^{C} Doctor, Bethesda Naval Vol. II, p. 377. Hospital.

Fischer, Ronald B.^{D} Auditor, City of Dallas Vol. VI, p. 191.

Fleming, Harold J.^{D} Employee, Armored Motor Vol. XV, p. 159. Service, Inc.

Folsom, Allison G., Lt. Col., U.S. Marine Vol. VIII, p. 303. Jr.^{D} Corps

Ford, Declan P.^{C} Husband of Katherine N. Vol. II, p. 322. Ford and acquaintance of the Oswalds in Texas.

Ford, Katherine N.^{C} Acquaintance of the Vol. II, p. 295. Oswalds in Texas.

Foster, J. W.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VI, p. 248. Department.

Frazier, Buell Employee, TSBD and Vol. II, p. 210. Wesley^{CD} neighbor of the Paines Vol. VII, p. 531. in Irving, Tex.

Frazier, Robert A.^{AC} Firearms Identification Vol. III, p. 390. Expert, FBI. Vol. V, p. 58. Vol. VII, p. 590.

Frazier, W. B.^{D} Captain, Dallas Police Vol. XII, p. 52. Department.

Fritz, John Will^{ACD} do. Vol. IV, p. 202. Vol. VII, p. 403. Vol. XV, p. 145.

Fuqua, Harold R.^{D} Parking attendant in Vol. XIII, p. 141. basement of city hall.

Gallagher, John F.^{D} Agent, FBI. Vol. XV, p. 746.

Gangl, Theodore Employee, Padgett Vol. XI, p. 478. Frank^{A} Printing Corp.

Garner, Jesse J.^{A} Neighbor of the Oswalds Vol. X, p. 276. in New Orleans.

Garner, Mrs. Jesse^{D} Landlady of Oswald in Vol. X, p. 264. New Orleans.

Gauthier, Leo J.^{C} Inspector, FBI. Vol. V, p. 135.

George, M. Waldo^{A} Landlord of Oswalds in Vol. XI, p. 155. Dallas.

Geraci, Philip, III^{D} Resident of New Orleans Vol. X, p. 74. who met Oswald.

Gibson, Mrs. Donald^{D} Acquaintance of the Vol. XI, p. 123. Oswalds in Texas.

Gibson, John^{D} Witness to Oswald Vol. VII, p. 70. arrest.

Giesecke, Adolph H., Doctor, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 72. Jr.^{D} Hospital.

Givens, Charles Employee, TSBD. Vol. VI, p. 345. Douglas^{D}

Glover, Everett D.^{D} Acquaintance of the Vol. X, p. 1. Oswalds in Texas.

Goin, Donald Edward^{D} Armored car operator. Vol. XV, p. 168.

Goldstein, David^{A} Owner, Dave’s House of Vol. VII, p. 594. Guns.

Goodson, Clyde Member, Dallas Police Vol. XV, p. 596. Franklin^{D} Department.

Graef, John G.^{D} Oswald’s supervisor, Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall, Vol. X, p. 174. Dallas.

Graf, Allen D.^{A} Acquaintance of Oswald Vol. VIII, p. 317. in Marine Corps.

Grant, Eva^{D} Sister of Jack Ruby Vol. XIV, p. 429. Vol. XV, p. 321.

Graves, Gene^{A} Secretary, Leslie Vol. XI, p. 479. Welding Co.

Graves, L. C.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 251. Department. Vol. XIII, p. 1.

Gravitis, Dorothy^{D} Acquaintance of Mrs. Vol. IX, p. 131. Paine in Dallas.

Gray, Virginia^{A} Employee, Duke Vol. XI, p. 209. University Library.

Greener, Charles W.^{D} Proprietor, Irving Vol. XI, p. 245. Sports Shop.

Greer, William Agent, U.S. Secret Vol. II, p. 112. Robert^{C} Service.

Gregory, Charles Doctor, Parkland Vol. IV, p. 117. F.^{CD} Hospital. Vol. VI, p. 95.

Gregory, Paul Son of Peter Vol. IX, p. 141. Roderick^{D} Paul Gregory and acquaintance of the Oswalds in Texas.

Gregory, Peter Paul^{C} Acquaintance of the Vol. II, p. 337. Oswalds in Texas.

Guinyard, Sam^{D} Witness in the vicinity Vol. VII, p. 395. of Tippit crime scene.

Hall, C. Ray^{D} Agent, FBI. Vol. XV, p. 62.

Hall, Elena A.^{D} Acquaintance of the Vol. VIII, p. 391. Oswalds in Texas.

Hall, John Raymond^{D} Husband of Elena A. Vol. VIII, p. 406. Hall and acquaintance of the Oswalds.

Hall, Marvin E. Employee, Armored Motor Vol. XV, p. 174. “Bert”^{D} Service, Dallas.

Hallmark, Garnett Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 488. Claud^{D} Ruby.

Hamblen, C. A.^{D} Employee, Western Union Vol. XI, p. 311. Telegraph Co.

Hankal, Robert L.^{D} Director, television Vol. XIII, p. 112. station, Dallas.

Hansen, Timothy M., Member, Dallas Police Vol. XV, p. 438. Jr.^{D} Department.

Hardin, Michael^{D} City ambulance driver. Vol. XIII, p. 94.

Hargis, Bobby W.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VI, p. 293. Department.

Harkness, D. V.^{D} do. Vol. VI, p. 308.

Harrison, William do. Vol. XII, p. 234. J.^{D}

Hartogs, Renatus^{D} Psychiatrist, New York Vol. VIII, p. 214. City.

Hawkins, Ray^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 91. Department.

Haygood, Clyde A.^{D} do. Vol. VI, p. 296.

Heindel, John Rene^{A} Acquaintance of Oswald Vol. VIII, p. 318. in Marine Corps.

Helmick, Wanda Yvonne Employee of Ralph Paul, Vol. XV, p. 396. or Wanda Sweat.^{D} an acquaintance of Jack Ruby.

Helms, Richard M.^{CA} Deputy Director Vol. V, p. 120. for Plans, Central Vol. XI, p. 469. Intelligence Agency.

Henchliffe, Margaret Nurse, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 139. M.^{D} Hospital.

Henslee, Gerald D.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VI, p. 325. Department.

Herndon, Bell P.^{D} Polygraph operator, FBI. Vol. XIV, p. 579.

Hicks, J. B.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 286. Department.

Hill, Clinton J.^{C} Agent, U.S. Secret Vol. II, p. 132. Service

Hill, Gerald Lynn^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 43. Department.

Hill, Jean Lollis^{D} Witness at Vol. VI, p. 205. assassination scene.

Hine, Geneva L.^{D} Employee, TSBD. Vol. VI, p. 393.

Hodge, Alfred Owner, Buckhorn Trading Vol. XV, p. 494. Douglas^{D} Post.

Holland, S. M.^{D} Witness at Vol. VI, p. 239. assassination scene.

Holly, Harold B., Reserve force, Dallas Vol. XII, p. 261. Jr.^{D} Police Department.

Holmes, Harry D.^{D} U.S. Post Office Vol. VII, p. 289, inspector. 525.

Hoover, J. Edgar^{C} Director, FBI. Vol. V, p. 97.

Hosty, James, P., Agent, FBI. Vol. IV, p. 440. Jr.^{C}

Howlett, John Joe^{AD} Agent, U.S. Secret Vol. VII, p. 592. Service. Vol. IX, p. 425.

Hudson, Emmett J.^{D} Witness at Vol. VII, p. 558. assassination scene.

Huffaker, Robert S., Newsman, Dallas. Vol. XIII, p. 116. Jr.^{D}

Hulen, Richard Employee of Dallas YMCA. Vol. X, p. 277. Leroy^{D}

Hulse, C. E.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. XIII, p. 99. Department.

Humes, James. J.^{C} Doctor, Bethesda Naval Vol. II, p. 347. Hospital.

Hunley, Bobb^{A} Employee, Louisiana Vol. XI, p. 476. Department of Labor, New Orleans.

Hunt, Jackie H.^{D} Doctor, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 76. Hospital.

Hunter, Gertrude^{D} Witness concerning Vol. XI, pp. 253, alleged encounter with 275. Oswald.

Hutchison, Leonard Owner of grocery store Vol. X, p. 327. Edwin^{D} in Irving.

Hutson, Thomas Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 26. Alexander^{D} Department.

Isaacs, Martin^{D} Employee, Special Vol. VIII, p. 324. Services Welfare Center, New York.

Jackson, Robert News photographer, Vol. II, p. 155. Hill^{C} Dallas.

Jackson, Theodore^{D} Attendant at Dallas Vol. XIII, p. 299. parking lot.

James, Virginia H.^{D} International Relations Vol. XI, p. 180. Officer, Office of Soviet Affairs, State Department.

Jarman, James, Jr.^{C} Employee, TSBD. Vol. III, p. 198.

Jenkins, Marion T.^{C} Doctor, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 45. Hospita.

Jenkins, Ronald Lee^{D} News editor, radio Vol. XV, p. 600. station, Dallas.

Jimison, R. J.^{D} Orderly, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 125. Hospital.

Johnson, Arnold Director of Information Vol. X, p.95. Samuel^{D} and Lecture Bureau, Communist Party, U.S.A.

Johnson, Arthur Owner of roominghouse Vol. X, p. 301. Carl^{D} in Dallas where Oswald resided.

Johnson, Mrs. Arthur Wife of A. C. Johnson. Vol. X, p. 292. Carl^{D}

Johnson, Joseph Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 218. Weldon, Jr.^{D} Ruby.

Johnson, Lyndon B.^{S} President of the United Vol. V, p. 561. States.

Johnson, Mrs. Lyndon Wife of the President Vol. V, p. 564. B.^{S} of the United States.

Johnson, Marvin^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 100. Department.

Johnson, Priscilla Newspaper reporter who Vol. XI, p. 442. Mary Post^{D} interviewed Oswald in Russia.

Johnson, Speedy^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 607. Ruby.

Johnston, David L.^{D} Justice of the peace, Vol. XV, p. 503. Dallas.

Jones, O. A.^{D} Captain, Dallas Police Vol. XII, p. 58. Department.

Jones, Ronald C.^{D} Doctor, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 51. Hospital.

Kaiser, Frankie^{D} Employee, TSBD. Vol. VI, p. 341.

Kaminsky, Eileen^{D} Jack Ruby’s sister. Vol. XV, p. 275.

Kantor, Seth^{D} Reporter. Vol. XV, p. 71.

Kaufman, Stanley M.^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 513. Ruby.

Kellerman, Roy H.^{C} Agent, U.S. Secret Vol. II, p. 61. Service.

Kelley, Thomas J.^{AC} Inspector, U.S. Secret Vol. V, pp. 129, Service. 175. Vol. VII, pp. 403, 590.

Kelly, Edward^{D} Porter, Dallas City Vol. XIII, p. 146. Hall.

Kennedy, Mrs. John Widow of President John Vol. V, p. 178. F.^{C} Fitzgerald Kennedy.

Killion, Charles L.^{A} Firearms identification Vol. VII, p. 591. expert, FBI.

King, Glen D.^{D} Captain, Dallas Police Vol. XV, p. 51. Department.

Klause, Robert G.^{C} Printer of handbill Vol. V, p. 535. attacking President Kennedy.

Kleinlerer, Acquaintance of the Vol. XI, p. 118. Alexander^{A} Oswalds in Texas.

Kleinman, Abraham^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 383. Ruby.

Kline, William^{A} Agent, U.S. Customs. Vol. XV, p. 640.

Knight, Frances G.^{C} Director, Passport Vol. V, p. 371. Office, Department of State. Knight, Russell (see Moore).

Kramer, Monica^{A} Tourist in Minsk in Vol. XI, p. 212. 1961.

Kravitz, Herbert B.^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 231. Ruby.

Kriss, Harry M.^{D} Reserve force, Dallas Vol. XII, p. 266. Police Department.

Krystinik, Raymond Fellow employee of Vol. IX, p. 461. Franklin.^{D} Michael R. Paine in Texas.

Lane, Doyle E.^{D} Clerk, Western Union Vol. XII, p. 221. Telegraph Co.

Lane, Mark R.^{C} Attorney, New York City. Vol. II, p. 32. Vol. IV, p. 546.

Latona, Sebastian Fingerprint expert, FBI. Vol. IV, p. 1. F.^{C}

Lawrence, Perdue W.^{D} Captain, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 577. Department.

Lawson, Winston G. Agent, U.S. Secret Vol. IV, p. 317. (accompanied by Fred Service. B. Smith).^{C}

Leavelle, James R.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 260. Department. Vol. VIII, p. 14.

LeBlanc, Charles Maintenance man, Vol. X, p. 213. Joseph^{D} William B. Reily Co.

Lee, Ivan D.^{A} Agent, FBI. Vol. XI, p. 481.

Lee, Vincent T.^{DA} Official, Fair Play for Vol. X, p. 86. Cuba Committee. Vol. XI, p. 208.

Lehrer, James^{D} Reporter, Dallas. Vol. XI, p. 464.

Leslie, Helen^{D} Member of Vol. IX, p. 160. Russian-speaking community in Dallas.

Lewis, Aubrey Lee^{D} Employee, Western Union Vol. IX, p. 318. Telegraph Co.

Lewis, Erwin Donald^{A} Acquaintance of Oswald Vol. VIII, p. 323. in Marine Corps.

Lewis, L. J.^{A} Witness in the vicinity Vol. XV, p. 703. of the Tippit crime scene.

Light, Frederick W., Wound ballistics Vol. V, p. 94. Jr.^{C} expert, U.S. Army.

Litchfield, Wilbyrn Acquaintance of Ruby. Vol. XIV, p. 95. Waldon (Robert), II.^{D}

Lord, Billy Joe^{A} Passenger with Oswald Vol. XI, p. 117. on SS _Marion Lykes_.

Lovelady, Billy Employee, TSBD. Vol. VI, p. 336. Nolan^{D}

Lowery, Roy Lee^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. XII, p. 271. Department.

Lujan, Daniel Appeared in lineup with Vol. VII, p. 243. Gutierrez^{D} Oswald.

Lux, J. Philip^{A} Employee, H. L. Green Vol. XI, p. 206. Co.

McClelland, Robert Doctor, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 30. N.^{D} Hospital.

McCone, John Alex^{C} Director, Central Vol. V, p. 120. Intelligence Agency.

McCullough, John G.^{D} Reporter, Philadelphia. Vol. XV, p. 373.

McCurdy, Danny Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 529. Patrick^{D} Ruby.

McDonald, M. N.^{C} Member, Dallas Police Vol. III, p. 295. Department.

McFarland, John Passenger on bus with Vol. XI, p. 214. Bryan^{A} Oswald to Mexico City in 1963.

McFarland, Meryl^{A} do. Vol. XI, p. 214.

McKinzie, Louis^{D} Porter, Dallas City Vol. XIII, p. 147. Hall.

McMillon, Thomas Member, Dallas Police Vol. XIII, p. 37. Donald^{D} Department.

McVickar, John A.^{C} Foreign Service officer Vol. V, pp. 299, stationed at American 318. Embassy in Soviet Union in 1959-61.

McWatters, Cecil J.^{C} Busdriver, Dallas. Vol. II, p. 262.

Malley, James R.^{A} Inspector, FBI. Vol. XI, p. 468.

Mallory, Katherine^{A} Tourist in Minsk in Vol. XI, p. 210. 1961.

Mamantov, Ilya A.^{D} Member of Vol. IX, p. 102. Russian-speaking community in Dallas.

Mandella, Arthur^{C} Fingerprint expert, Vol. IV, p. 48. (accompanied by Joseph New York City Police A. Mooney). Department.

Markham, Helen Witness in the vicinity Vol. III, p. 305. Louise^{CD} of the Tippit crime Vol. VII, p. 499. scene.

Martello, Francis Lieutenant, New Orleans Vol. X, p. 51. L.^{AD} Police Department. Vol. XI, p. 471.

Martin, B. J.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VI, p. 289. Department.

Martin, Frank M.^{D} Captain, Dallas Police Vol. XII, p. 277. Department.

Martin, James Former business manager Vol. I, p. 469. Herbert^{C} for Mrs. Lee Harvey Vol. II, p. 1. Oswald.

Maxey, Billy Joe^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. XII, p. 285. Department.

Mayo, Logan W.^{D} Reserve force, Dallas Vol. XII, p. 291. Police Department.

Meller, Anna N.^{D} Acquaintance of the Vol. VIII, p. 379. Oswalds in Texas.

Meyers, Lawrence V.^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 620. Ruby.

Michaelis, Heinz W.^{D} Manager, Seaport Vol. VII, p. 372. Traders, Inc.

Miller, Austin L.^{D} Witness at Vol. VI, p. 223. assassination scene.

Miller, Dave L.^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 450. Ruby.

Miller, Louis D.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. XII, p. 297. Department.

Mitchell, Mary Ann^{D} Witness at Vol. VI, p. 175. assassination scene.

Molina, Joe R.^{D} Employee, TSBD. Vol. VI, p. 368.

Montgomery, L. D.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 96. Department. Vol. XIII, p. 21.

Mooney, Luke^{C} Deputy Sheriff, Dallas Vol. III, p. 281. County.

Moore, Henry M.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 212. Department.

Moore, Russell Lee Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 251. (Knight)^{D} Ruby.

Mumford, Pamela^{D} Passenger on bus with Vol. XI, p. 215. Oswald to Mexico City in 1963.

Murphy, Joe E.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VI, p. 256. Department

Murphy, Paul Edward^{A} Acquaintance of Oswald Vol. VIII, p. 319. in Marine Corps.

Murray, David do. Vol. VIII, p. 319. Christie, Jr.^{A}

Murret, Charles (Dutz) Uncle of Lee Harvey Vol. VIII, p. 180. ^{D} Oswald, New Orleans.

Murret, John Martial Cousin of Lee Harvey Vol. VIII, p. 188. (Boogie)^{D} Oswald, New Orleans.

Murret, Lillian^{AD} Sister of Marguerite Vol. VIII, p. 91. Oswald and aunt of Lee Vol. XI, p. 472. Harvey Oswald, New Orleans.

Murret, Marilyn Cousin of Lee Harvey Vol. VIII, p. 154. Dorothea^{D} Oswald, New Orleans.

Naman, Rita^{A} Tourist in Minsk in Vol. XI, p. 213. 1961.

Nelson, Doris Mae^{D} Nurse, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 143. Hospital.

Newman, William J.^{D} Reserve force, Dallas Vol. XII, p. 314. Police Department.

Newnam, John^{D} Advertising department Vol. XV, p. 534. employee, Dallas newspaper.

Nichols, Alice Reaves Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XIV, p. 110. ^{D} Ruby.

Nichols, H. Louis^{D} Former president, Vol. VII, p. 325. Dallas bar association.

Nicol, Joseph D.^{C} Firearms identification Vol. III, p. 496. expert, Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation, Illinois Department of Public Safety.

Norman, Harold^{C} Employee, TSBD. Vol. III, p. 186.

Norton, Robert L.^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 546. Ruby.

O’Brien, Lawrence Assistant to President Vol. VII, p. 457. F.^{D} Kennedy.

Odio, Sylvia^{D} Former citizen of Cuba Vol. XI, p. 367. now residing in Dallas.

O’Donnell, Kenneth^{D} Assistant to President Vol. VII, p. 440. Kennedy.

Odum, Bardwell D.^{A} Agent, FBI. Vol. XI, p. 468.

Ofstein, Dennis Employee, Vol. X, p. 194. Hyman^{D} Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall, Dallas.

Olds, Gregory Lee^{D} President, Dallas Vol. VII, p. 322. Chapter, American Civil Liberties Union.

Oliver, Revilo P.^{D} Member of the council Vol. XV, p. 709. of the John Birch Society.

Olivier, Alfred G.^{C} Wound ballistics Vol. V, p. 74. expert, U.S. Army.

Olsen, Harry N.^{D} Former member, Dallas Vol. XIV, p. 624. Police Department.

Olsen, Kay Helen^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XIV, p. 640. Ruby.

Osborne, Mack^{A} Acquaintance of Oswald Vol. VIII, p. 321. in Marine Corps.

O’Sullivan, Frederick Acquaintance of Oswald Vol. VIII, p. 27. S.^{D} at Beauregard Junior High School, New Orleans.

Oswald, Marguerite^{C} Mother of Lee Harvey Vol. I, p. 126. Oswald.

Oswald, Marina^{CD} Widow of Lee Harvey Vol. I, p. 1. Oswald. Vol. V, pp. 387, 410, 588. Vol. XI, p. 275.

Oswald, Robert Edward Brother of Lee Harvey Vol. I, p. 264. Lee^{C} Oswald.

Owens, Calvin Bud^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 78. Department.

Paine, Michael R.^{CD} Acquaintance of the Vol. II, p. 384. Oswalds in Texas. Vol. IX, p. 434. Vol. XI, p. 398.

Paine, Ruth Hyde^{ACD} Wife of Michael R. Vol. II, p. 430. Paine and acquaintance Vol. III, p. 1. of the Oswalds in Texas. Vol. IX, p. 331. Vol. XI, pp. 153, 389.

Palmer, Thomas Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 206. Stewart^{D} Ruby.

Pappas, Icarus M.^{D} Reporter, radio Vol. XV, p. 360. station, New York City.

Patterson, B. M.^{A} Witness in the vicinity Vol. XV, p. 744. of the Tippit crime scene.

Patterson, Bobby G.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. XII, p. 334. Department.

Patterson, Robert Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XIV, p. 126. Carl^{D} Ruby.

Paul, Ralph^{D} do. Vol. XIV, p. 134. Vol. XV, p. 664.

Pena, Orest^{D} Owner, Habana Bar, New Vol. XI, p. 346. Orleans.

Pena, Ruperto^{D} Brother of Orest Pena. Vol. XI, p. 364.

Perry, Malcolm O.^{CD} Doctor, Parkland Vol. III, p. 366. Hospital. Vol. VI, p. 7.

Perry, W. E.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 232. Department.

Peterman, Viola^{D} Neighbor of Oswald Vol. VIII, p. 38. family in New Orleans.

Peters, Paul C.^{D} Doctor, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 68. Hospital.

Peterson, Joseph Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XIV, p. 615. Alexander^{D} Ruby.

Phenix, George R.^{D} Television cameraman Vol. XIII, p. 123. and reporter, Dallas.

Pic, Edward John, First husband of Vol. VIII, p. 196. Jr.^{AD} Marguerite Oswald. Vol. XI, p. 82.

Pic, John Edward^{D} Half brother of Lee Vol. XI, p. 1. Harvey Oswald.

Pierce, Edward E.^{D} Employee, Dallas City Vol. XIII, p. 156. Hall.

Pierce, Rio S.^{D} Lieutenant, Dallas Vol. VII, p. 76. Police Department. Vol. XII, p. 337.

Pinkston, Nat A.^{D} Employee, TSBD. Vol. VI, p. 334.

Piper, Eddie^{D} do. Vol. VI, p. 382. Vol. VII, p. 388.

Pitts, Elnora^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XIII, p. 228. Ruby.

Pizzo, Frank^{D} Assistant manager of Vol. X, p. 340. auto agency, Dallas.

Poe, J. M.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 66. Department.

Postal, Julia^{D} Cashier, Texas Theatre. Vol. VII, p. 8.

Potts, Walter E.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 195. Department.

Powell, Nancy M. Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 404. (a.k.a. Tammie Ruby. True).^{D}

Powers, Daniel Acquaintance of Oswald Vol. VIII, p. 266. Patrick^{D} in Marine Corps.

Powers, David F.^{A} Assistant to President Vol. VII, p. 472. Kennedy.

Price, Charles Jack^{D} Administrator, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 148. Hospital.

Price, Malcolm H., Patron, Sports Drome Vol. X, p. 369. Jr.^{D} Rifle Range.

Priddy, Hal Jr.^{D} Relief dispatcher, Vol. XIII, p. 239. O’Neil Funeral Home in Dallas.

Pryor, Roy A.^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 554. Ruby.

Pugh, Oran^{A} Agent, U.S. Customs. Vol. XV, p. 640.

Pullman, Edward J.^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 222. Ruby.

Putnam, James A.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 74. Department. Vol. XII, p. 341.

Quigley, John L.^{C} Agent, FBI. Vol. IV, p. 431.

Rachal, John R.^{A} Employee, Louisiana Vol. XI, p. 474. Department of Labor, New Orleans.

Rackley, George W., Employee, Coordinated Vol. VI, p. 273. Sr.^{D} RR. Co.

Raigorodsky, Paul Member of Vol. IX, p. 1. M.^{D} Russian-speaking community in Dallas.

Randle, Linnie Mae^{C} Buell Wesley Frazier’s Vol. II, p. 245. sister and neighbor of Ruth Paine.

Ray, Natalie (Mrs. Acquaintance of the Vol. IX, p. 27. Thomas M.).^{D} Oswalds in Texas.

Ray, Thomas M.^{D} Husband of Natalie Ray Vol. IX, p. 38. and acquaintance of the Oswalds in Texas.

Ray, Valentine A. Acquaintance of the Vol. VIII, p. 415. (Mrs. Frank H.).^{D} Oswalds in Texas.

Rea, Billy A.^{D} Advertising staff, Vol. XV, p. 571. Dallas newspaper.

Reeves, Huey^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XIII, p. 243. Ruby.

Reid, Mrs. Robert Employee, TSBD. Vol. III, p. 270. A.^{C}

Reilly, Frank E.^{D} Witness at Vol. VI, p. 227. assassination scene.

Revill, Jack^{CD} Lieutenant, Dallas Vol. V, p. 33. Police Department. Vol. XII, p. 73.

Reynolds, Warren Witness in the vicinity Vol. XI, p. 434. Allen^{D} of the Tippit crime scene.

Rheinstein, Producer-director, NBC. Vol. XV, p. 354. Frederic^{D}

Rich, Nancy Perrin^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XIV, p. 330. Ruby.

Richey, Marjorie R.^{D} do. Vol. XV, p. 192.

Richey, Warren E.^{D} TV engineer, Fort Worth. Vol. XIII, p. 255.

Riggs, Alfreadia^{D} Porter, City Hall. Vol. XIII, p. 166.

Riggs, Chester Allen, Landlord of the Oswalds Vol. X, p. 229. Jr.^{A} in Fort Worth.

Ritchie, James L.^{D} Passport Officer, Vol. XI, p. 191. Department of State.

Roberts, Earlene^{AD} Housekeeper at Oswald’s Vol. VI, p. 434. roominghouse in Dallas. Vol. VII, p. 439.

Robertson, Mary Employee, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 404. Jane^{D} Department.

Robertson, Victor F., Reporter, Dallas. Vol. XV, p. 347. Jr.^{D}

Rodriguez, Evaristo^{D} Bartender at Habana Vol. XI, p. 339. Bar, New Orleans.

Rogers, Eric^{D} Neighbor of the Oswalds Vol. XI, p. 460. in New Orleans.

Romack, James E.^{D} Witness at Vol. VI, p. 277. assassination scene.

Rose, Guy F.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 227. Department.

Ross, Henrietta M.^{D} Technician, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 123. Hospital.

Rossi, Joseph^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 235. Ruby.

Roussel, Henry J., Acquaintance of Oswald Vol. VIII, p. 320. Jr.^{A} in Marine Corps.

Rowland, Arnold Witness at Vol. II, p. 165. Louis^{C} assassination scene.

Rowland, Barbara (Mrs. do. Vol. VI, p. 177. Arnold L.).^{D}

Rowley, James J.^{C} Chief, U.S. Secret Vol. V, p. 449. Service.

Rubenstein, Hyman^{D} Brother of Jack Ruby. Vol. XV, p. 1.

Ruby, Earl^{D} do. Vol. XIV, p. 364.

Ruby, Jack^{CD} Convicted slayer of Vol. V, p. 181. Oswald. Vol. XIV, p. 504.

Ruby, Sam^{D} Brother of Jack Ruby. Vol. XIV, p. 488.

Rusk, Dean^{C} Secretary of State. Vol. V, p. 363.

Russell, Harold^{A} Witness in the vicinity Vol. VII, p. 594. of the Tippit crime scene.

Ryder, Dial D.^{D} Employee, Irving Sports Vol. XI, p. 224. Shop.

Salyer, Kenneth E.^{D} Doctor, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 80. Hospital.

Saunders, Richard Advertising staff, Vol. XV, p. 577. L.^{D} Dallas newspaper.

Sawyer, J. Herbert^{D} Inspector, Dallas Vol. VI, p. 315. Police Department.

Sawyer, Mildred^{D} Neighbor and Vol. VIII, p. 31. acquaintance of Oswald as a youth in New Orleans.

Schmidt, Hunter, City editor, Dallas. Vol. XI, p. 240. Jr.^{D}

Scibor, Mitchell J.^{D} Employee, Klein’s Vol. VII, p. 370. Sports Goods.

Scoggins, William Witness in the vicinity Vol. III, p. 322. W.^{C} of the Tippit crime scene.

Seeley, Carroll Assistant Chief, Legal Vol. XI, p. 193. Hamilton, Jr.^{D} Division, Passport Office, Department of State.

Semingsen, W.W.^{D} Employee, Western Union Vol. X, p. 405. Telegraph Co.

Senator, George^{D} Roommate of Jack Ruby. Vol. XIV, p. 164.

Servance, John Head porter, City Hall Vol. XIII, p. 175. Olridge^{D} and Municipal Building.

Shaneyfelt, Lyndal Photography expert, FBI. Vol. IV, p. 279. L.^{CD} Vol. V, p. 138, 176. Vol. VII, p. 410.

Shasteen, Clifton Owner of barbershop in Vol. X, p. 309. M.^{D} Irving, Tex.

Shaw, Robert Doctor, Parkland Vol. IV, p. 101. Roeder^{CD} Hospital. Vol. VI, p. 83.

Shelley, William H.^{D} Employee, TSBD. Vol. VI, p. 327. Vol. VII, p. 390.

Shields, Edward^{D} Employee, TSBD. Vol. VII, p. 393.

Shires, George T.^{D} Doctor, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 104. Hospital.

Siegel, Evelyn Grace Social worker, New York Vol. VIII, p. 224. Strickman^{D} City.

Simmons, Ronald^{C} Weapons evaluation Vol. III, p. 441. expert, U.S. Army Weapons System Division.

Sims, Richard M.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 158. Department.

Skelton, Royce G.^{D} Witness at Vol. VI, p. 236. assassination scene.

Slack, Garland Patron, Sports Drome Vol. X, p. 378. Glenwill^{D} Rifle Range.

Slack, Willie B.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. XII, p. 347. Department.

Slaughter, Malcolm Resident in Jack Ruby’s Vol. XIII, p. 261. R.^{D} apartment building.

Smart, Vernon S.^{D} Lieutenant, Dallas Vol. XIII, p. 266. Police Department.

Smith, Bennierita^{D} Acquaintance of Oswald Vol. VIII, p. 21. at Beauregard Junior High School in New Orleans.

Smith, Edgar Leon, Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 565. Jr.^{D} Department.

Smith, Glenn Emmett^{D} Service Station Vol. X, p. 399. attendant in Dallas.

Smith, Hilda L.^{A} Employee, Louisiana Vol. XI, p. 474. Department of Labor, New Orleans.

Smith, Joe Marshall^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 531. Department.

Smith, John Allison^{D} TV technician, Fort Vol. XIII, p. 277. Worth.

Smith, William Witness in the vicinity Vol. VII, p. 82. Arthur^{D} of the Tippit crime scene.

Snyder, Richard Foreign Service Vol. V, p. 260. Edward^{C} officer, stationed in the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1959-61.

Solomon, James Captain, Dallas Police Vol. XII, p. 87. Maurice^{D} Department.

Sorrels, Forrest Agent, U.S. Secret Vol. VII, pp. 332, V.^{DA} Service. 592. Vol. XIII, p. 55.

Standifer, Roy E.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. XV, p. 614. Department.

Standridge, Ruth Head nurse of operating Vol. VI, p. 115. Jeanette^{D} rooms, Parkland Hospital.

Staples, Albert F.^{A} Dentist at Baylor Vol. XI, p. 210. University College of Dentistry.

Statman, Irving^{D} Assistant District Vol. X, p. 149. Director of Dallas District, Texas Employment Commission.

Steele, Charles Hall, Resident of New Orleans Vol. X, p. 62. Jr.^{D} who assisted Oswald in distribution of handbills.

Steele, Charles Hall, Father of Charles Hall Vol. X, p. 71. Sr.^{D} Steele, Jr.

Steele, Don Francis^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. XII, p. 353. Department.

Stevenson, M. W.^{D} Deputy Chief, Dallas Vol. XII, p. 91. Police Department. Vol. XV, p. 133.

Stombaugh, Paul Hair and fiber expert, Vol. IV, p. 56. Morgan^{CA} FBI. Vol. XV, p. 702.

Stovall, Richard S.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 186. Department.

Stovall, Robert L.^{D} President, Vol. X, p. 167. Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall, Dallas, Tex.

Strong, Jesse M.^{D} Employee, Western Union Vol. XIII, p. 284. Telegraph Co.

Stuckey, William Radio program director, Vol. XI, p. 156. Kirk^{D} New Orleans.

Studebaker, Robert Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 137. Lee^{D} Department.

Surrey, Robert Alan^{C} Publisher of handbill Vol. V, p. 420. attacking President Kennedy.

Tague, James Thomas^{D} Witness at Vol. VII, p. 552. assassination scene.

Talbert, Cecil E.^{D} Captain, Dallas Police Vol. XII, p. 108. Department. Vol. XV, p. 182.

Tasker, Harry T.^{D} Taxicab driver in Vol. XV, p. 679. Dallas.

Taylor, Gary E.^{DA} Acquaintance of the Vol. IX, p. 73. Oswalds in Texas. Vol. XI, p. 470.

Thompson, Llewellyn Former U.S. Ambassador Vol. V, p. 567. E.^{C} to Russia.

Thornley, Kerry Acquaintance of Oswald Vol. XI, p. 82. Wendell^{D} in Marines.

Tice, Wilma May^{D} Resident of Dallas. Vol. XV, p. 388.

Tobias, Mahlon F., Manager of apartment Vol. X, p. 251. Sr.^{D} house where the Oswalds resided, Dallas.

Tobias, Mrs. Mahlon Wife of M. F. Tobias, Vol. X, p. 231. F.^{D} Sr.

Tomlinson, Darrell Senior engineer, Vol. VI, p. 128. C.^{D} Parkland Hospital.

Tormey, James J.^{D} Executive secretary, Vol. X, p. 107. Hall-Davis Defense Commission.

Truly, Roy Sansom^{ACD} Superintendent, TSBD. Vol. III, p. 212. Vol. VII, pp. 380, 591.

Turner, F. M.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 217. Department.

Turner, Jimmy^{D} TV director, Fort Worth. Vol. XIII, p. 130.

Twiford, Horace Member, Socialist Labor Vol. XI, p. 179. Elroy^{A} Party, Houston, Tex.

Twiford, Estelle^{A} Wife of Horace Elroy Vol. XI, p. 179. Twiford.

Underwood, James R.^{D} Assistant news Vol. VI, p. 167. director, TV and radio, Dallas.

Vaughn, Roy Eugene^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. XII, p. 357. Department.

Vinson, Philip Reporter, Fort Worth. Vol. VIII, p. 75. Eugene^{D}

Voebel, Edward^{D} Acquaintance of Oswald Vol. VIII, p. 1. in Beauregard Junior High School, New Orleans.

Voshinin, Igor Member of Vol. VIII, p. 448. Vladimir^{D} Russian-speaking community in Dallas.

Voshinin, Mrs. Igor Acquaintance of the Vol. VIII, p. 425. Vladimir.^{D} Oswalds in Texas.

Wade, Henry^{C} District attorney, Vol. V, p. 213. Dallas County.

Waldman, William J.^{D} Vice President, Klein’s Vol. VII, p. 360. Sporting Sporting Goods, Inc.

Waldo, Thayer^{D} Reporter, Forth Worth. Vol. XV, p. 585.

Walker, C. T.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 34. Department.

Walker, Maj. Gen. Resident of Dallas and Vol. XI, p. 404. Edwin A.^{D} object of shooting in April 1963.

Walker, Ira N., Jr.^{D} Broadcast technician, Vol. XIII, p. 289. Fort Worth.

Wall, Breck (a.k.a. Acquaintance of Ruby. Vol. XIV, p. 599. Billy Ray Wilson).^{D}

Walthers, Eddy Raymond Deputy sheriff, Dallas Vol. VII, p. 544. ^{D} County.

Warner, Roger C.^{A} Agent, U.S. Secret Vol. XV, p. 619. Service.

Waterman, Bernice^{C} Adjudicator, Passport Vol. V, p. 346. Office, Department of State.

Watherwax, Arthur Printer, Dallas Vol. XV, p. 564. William^{D} newspaper.

Watson, James C.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. XII, p. 372. Department.

Weinstock, Louis^{A} General manager, the Vol. XI, p. 207. Worker.

Weissman, Bernard^{CD} Codraftsman and signer Vol. V, p. 487. of November 22, 1963, Vol. XI, p. 428. full page advertisement.

Weitzman, Seymour^{D} Deputy constable, Vol. VII, p. 105. Dallas County.

West, Troy Eugene^{D} Employee, TSBD. Vol. VI, p. 356.

Westbrook, W. R.^{D} Captain, Dallas Police Vol. VII, p. 109. Department.

Wester, Jane Nurse, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 120. Carolyn^{D} Hospital.

Whaley, William Taxicab driver in Vol. II, pp. 253, Wayne^{CD} Dallas. 292. Vol. VI, p. 428.

White, J. C.^{D} Member, Dallas Police Vol. VI, p. 253. Department.

White, Martin G.^{D} Doctor, Parkland Vol. VI, p. 82. Hospital.

Whitworth, Edith^{D} Manager, used furniture Vol. XI, p. 262. store, Irving, Tex.

Wiggins, Woodrow^{D} Lieutenant, Dallas Vol. XII, p. 388. Police Department.

Wilcox, Laurance R.^{D} District manager, Vol. X, p. 414. Western Union Telegraph Co.

Williams, Bonnie Employee, TSBD. Vol. III, p. 161. Ray^{C}

Willis, Linda Kay^{D} Daughter of Phillip L. Vol. VII, p. 498. Willis.

Willis, Phillip L.^{D} Witness at Vol. VII, p. 492. assassination scene. Wilson, Billy Ray (see Wall, Breck).

Wittmus, Ronald G.^{A} Fingerprint expert, FBI. Vol. VII, p. 590.

Wood, Homer^{D} Patron, Sports Drome Vol. X, p. 385. Rifle Range.

Wood, Sterling Son of Dr. Homer Wood. Vol. X, p. 390. Charles^{D}

Wood, Theresa^{D} Wife of Dr. Homer Wood. Vol. X, p. 398.

Worley, Gano E.^{D} Reserve Force, Dallas Vol. XII, p. 378. Police Department.

Worrell, James Witness at Vol. II, p. 190. Richard, Jr.^{C} assassination scene.

Wright, Norman Earl^{D} Acquaintance of Jack Vol. XV, p. 244. Ruby.

Wulf, William E.^{D} Acquaintance of Oswald Vol. VIII, p. 15. in his youth.

Yarborough, Ralph U.S. Senator from Texas. Vol. VII, p. 439. W.^{A}

Yeargan, Albert C., Employee, H. C. Green, Vol. XI, p. 207. Jr.^{A} Dallas.

Youngblood, Rufus Agent, U.S. Secret Vol. II, p. 144. Wayne^{C} Service.

Zahm, James A.^{D} Marine Corps expert on Vol. XI, p. 306. marksmanship.

Zapruder, Abraham^{D} Witness at Vol. VII, p. 569. assassination scene.

APPENDIX VI

Commission Procedures for the Taking of Testimony

RESOLUTION GOVERNING QUESTIONING OF WITNESSES BY MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION STAFF

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 11130, November 29, 1963, which authorizes this Commission “to prescribe its own procedures,” it is therefore

_Resolved_, That the following are hereby adopted as the rules of this Commission for the questioning of witnesses by members of the Commission staff.

I. _Sworn Depositions_

A. Individual members of the staff are hereby authorized to administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and receive evidence in the form of sworn depositions on any matter under investigation by the Commission.

B. Such sworn depositions may be taken only from witnesses designated in writing for questioning in this manner by the Commission, by a member of the Commission, or by the General Counsel of the Commission.

C. A stenographic verbatim transcript shall be made of all sworn depositions. Copies of the witness’ testimony shall be available for inspection by the witness or his counsel. When approved by the Commission, said copies may be purchased by the witness or his counsel at regularly prescribed rates from the official reporter.

D. Process and papers of the Commission issued under Paragraph (d) of Joint Resolution S.J. 137, 88th Congress, 1st session, shall be returnable no less than three days from the date on which such process or papers are issued, and shall state the time, place, and general subject matter of the deposition. In lieu of such process and papers, the Commission may request the presence of witnesses and production of evidence for the purpose of sworn depositions by written notice mailed no less than three days from the date of the deposition.

E. The period of notice specified in Paragraph D may be waived by a witness.

F. A witness at a sworn deposition shall have the right to be accompanied by counsel of his own choosing, who shall have the right to advise the witness of his rights under the laws and Constitution of the United States, and the state wherein the deposition shall occur, and to make brief objections to questions. At the conclusion of the witness’ testimony, counsel shall have the right to clarify the testimony of the witness by questioning the witness.

G. At the opening of any deposition a member of the Commission’s staff shall read into the record a statement setting forth the nature of the Commission’s inquiry and the purpose for which the witness has been asked to testify or produce evidence.

H. Any witness who refuses to answer a question shall state the grounds for so doing. At the conclusion of any deposition in which the witness refuses to answer a question the transcript shall be submitted to the General Counsel for review and consideration whether the witness should be called to testify before the Commission.

II. _Sworn Affidavits_

A. Members of the Commission staff are hereby authorized to obtain sworn affidavits from those witnesses who have been designated in writing by the Commission, a member of the Commission, or the general counsel of the Commission as witnesses whose testimony will be obtained in this manner.

B. A copy of the affidavit shall be provided the affiant or his counsel.

_RESOLUTION_

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 11130, November 29, 1963, which authorizes this Commission “to prescribe its own procedures,” it is therefore

_Resolved_, That the following are hereby adopted as the rules of this Commission in connection with hearings conducted for the purpose of the taking of testimony or the production of evidence.

1. One or more members of the Commission shall be present at all hearings. If more than one Commissioner is present, the Chairman of the Commission shall designate the order in which the Commissioners shall preside.

2. Any member of the Commission or any agent or agency designated by the Commission for such purpose, may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and receive evidence.

3. Process and papers of the Commission issued under Paragraph (d) of Joint Resolution S.J. 137, 88th Congress, 1st session, shall be returnable no less than three days from the date on which such process or papers are issued, and shall state the time, place, and general subject matter of the hearing. In lieu of such process and papers, the Commission may request the presence of witnesses and the production of evidence by written notice mailed no less than 3 days from the date of the hearing.

4. The period of notice specified in paragraph three (3) may be waived by a witness.

5. At the opening of any hearing at which testimony is to be received a member of the Commission shall read into the record a statement setting forth the nature of the Commission’s inquiry and the purpose for which the witness has been asked to testify or produce evidence. A copy of this statement shall be given to each witness prior to his testifying.

6. A witness shall have the right to be accompanied by counsel, of his own choosing, who shall have the right to advise the witness of his rights under the laws and Constitution of the United States and to make brief objections to questions. At the conclusion of the witness’ testimony, counsel shall have the right to clarify the testimony of the witness by questioning the witness.

7. Every witness who testifies at a hearing shall have the right to make an oral statement and to file a sworn statement which shall be made part of the transcript of such hearing, but such oral or written statement shall be relevant to the subject of the hearing.

8. Rulings on objections or other procedural questions shall be made by the presiding member of the Commission.

9. A stenographic verbatim transcript shall be made of all testimony received by the Commission. Copies of such transcript shall be available for inspection or purchase by the witness or his counsel at regularly prescribed rates from the official reporter. A witness or his counsel shall be permitted to purchase or inspect only the transcript of his testimony before the Commission.

APPENDIX VII

A Brief History of Presidential Protection

In the course of the history of the United States four Presidents have been assassinated, within less than 100 years, beginning with Abraham Lincoln in 1865. Attempts were also made on the lives of two other Presidents, one President-elect, and one ex-President. Still other Presidents were the objects of plots that were never carried out. The actual attempts occurred as follows:

Andrew Jackson Jan. 30, 1835. Abraham Lincoln Apr. 14, 1865. Died Apr. 15, 1865. James A. Garfield July 2, 1881. Died Sept. 19, 1881. William McKinley Sept. 6, 1901. Died Sept. 14, 1901. Theodore Roosevelt Oct. 14, 1912. Wounded; recovered. Franklin D. Roosevelt Feb. 15, 1933. Harry S. Truman Nov. 1, 1950. John F. Kennedy Nov. 22, 1963. Died that day.

Attempts have thus been made on the lives of one of every five American Presidents. One of every nine Presidents has been killed. Since 1865, there have been attempts on the lives of one of every four Presidents and the successful assassination of one of every five. During the last three decades, three attacks were made.

It was only after William McKinley was shot that systematic and continuous protection of the President was instituted. Protection before McKinley was intermittent and spasmodic. The problem had existed from the days of the early Presidents, but no action was taken until three tragic events had occurred. In considering the effectiveness of present day protection arrangements, it is worthwhile to examine the development of Presidential protection over the years, to understand both the high degree of continuing danger and the anomalous reluctance to take the necessary precautions.

BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR

In the early days of the Republic, there was remarkably little concern about the safety of Presidents and few measures were taken to protect them. They were at times the objects of abuse and the recipients of threatening letters as more recent Presidents have been, but they did not take the threats seriously and moved about freely without protective escorts. On his inauguration day, Thomas Jefferson walked from his boarding house to the Capitol, unaccompanied by any guard, to take the oath of office. There was no police authority in Washington itself until 1805 when the mayor appointed a high constable and 40 deputy constables.[A7-1]

John Quincy Adams received many threatening letters and on one occasion was threatened in person in the White House by a court-martialed Army sergeant. In spite of this incident, the President asked for no protection and continued to indulge his fondness for solitary walks and early morning swims in the Potomac.[A7-2]

Among pre-Civil War Presidents, Andrew Jackson aroused particularly strong feelings. He received many threatening letters which, with a fine contempt, he would endorse and send to the Washington Globe for publication. On one occasion in May 1833, Jackson was assaulted by a former Navy lieutenant, Robert B. Randolph, but refused to prosecute him. This is not regarded as an attempt at assassination, since Randolph apparently did not intend serious injury.[A7-3]

Less than 2 years later, on the morning of January 10, 1835, as Jackson emerged from the east portico of the Capitol, he was accosted by a would-be assassin, Richard Lawrence, an English-born house painter. Lawrence fired his two pistols at the President, but they both misfired. Lawrence was quickly overpowered and held for trial. A jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity. He was confined in jails and mental hospitals for the rest of his life.[A7-4]

The attack on Jackson did not inspire any action to provide protection for the Chief Executive. Jackson’s immediate successor, Martin Van Buren, often walked to church alone and rode horseback alone in the woods not far from the White House. In August 1842, after an intoxicated painter had thrown rocks at President John Tyler, who was walking on the grounds to the south of the White House, Congress passed an act to establish an auxiliary watch for the protection of public and private property in Washington. The force was to consist of a captain and 15 men. This act was apparently aimed more at the protection of the White House, which had been defaced on occasion, than of the President.[A7-5]

LINCOLN

Even before he took the oath of office, Abraham Lincoln was thought to be the object of plots and conspiracies to kidnap or kill him. Extremist opponents apparently contemplated desperate measures to prevent his inauguration, and there is some evidence that they plotted to attack him while he was passing through Baltimore on his way to Washington.[A7-6]

For the inauguration, the Army took precautions unprecedented up to that time and perhaps more elaborate than any precautions taken since. Soldiers occupied strategic points throughout the city, along the procession route, and at the Capitol, while armed men in plain clothes mingled with the crowds. Lincoln himself, in a carriage with President Buchanan, was surrounded on all sides by such dense masses of soldiers that he was almost completely hidden from the view of the crowds. The precautions at the Capitol during the ceremony were almost as thorough and equally successful.[A7-7]

Lincoln lived in peril during all his years in office. The volume of threatening letters remained high throughout the war, but little attention was paid to them. The few letters that were investigated yielded no results.[A7-8] He was reluctant to surround himself with guards and often rejected protection or sought to slip away from it. This has been characteristic of almost all American Presidents. They have regarded protection as a necessary affliction at best and contrary to their normal instincts for either personal privacy or freedom to meet the people. In Lincoln these instincts were especially strong, and he suffered with impatience the efforts of his friends, the police, and the military to safeguard him.[A7-9]

The protection of the President during the war varied greatly, depending on Lincoln’s susceptibility to warnings. Frequently, military units were assigned to guard the White House and to accompany the President on his travels. Lincoln’s friend, Ward H. Lamon, on becoming marshal of the District of Columbia in 1861, took personal charge of protecting the President and provided guards for the purpose, but he became so exasperated at the President’s lack of cooperation that he tendered his resignation. Lincoln did not accept it. Finally, late in the war, in November 1864, four Washington policemen were detailed to the White House to act as personal bodyguards to the President. Lincoln tolerated them reluctantly and insisted they remain as inconspicuous as possible.[A7-10]

In the closing days of the war, rumors of attempts on Lincoln’s life persisted. The well-known actor, John Wilkes Booth, a fanatical Confederate sympathizer, plotted with others for months to kidnap the President. The fall of the Confederacy apparently hardened his determination to kill Lincoln.[A7-11] Booth’s opportunity came on Good Friday, April 14, 1865, when he learned that the President would be attending a play at Ford’s Theater that night. The President’s bodyguard for the evening was Patrolman John F. Parker of the Washington Police, a man who proved himself unfit for protective duty. He was supposed to remain on guard in the corridor outside of the Presidential box during the entire performance of the play, but he soon wandered off to watch the play and then even went outside the theater to have a drink at a nearby saloon. Parker’s dereliction of duty left the President totally unprotected.[A7-12] Shortly after 10 o’clock on that evening, Booth found his way up to the Presidential box and shot the President in the head. The President’s wound was a mortal one; he died the next morning, April 15.[A7-13]

A detachment of troops captured Booth on April 26 at a farm near Bowling Green, Va.; he received a bullet wound and died a few hours later. At a trial in June, a military tribunal sentenced four of Booth’s associates to death and four others to terms of imprisonment.[A7-14]

Lincoln’s assassination revealed the total inadequacy of Presidential protection. A congressional committee conducted an extensive investigation of the assassination, but with traditional reluctance, called for no action to provide better protection for the President in the future. Nor did requests for protective measures come from the President or from Government departments. This lack of concern for the protection of the President may have derived also from the tendency of the time to regard Lincoln’s assassination as part of a unique crisis that was not likely to happen to a future Chief Executive.[A7-15]

THE NEED FOR PROTECTION FURTHER DEMONSTRATED

For a short time after the war, soldiers assigned by the War Department continued to protect the White House and its grounds. Metropolitan Washington policemen assisted on special occasions to maintain order and prevent the congregation of crowds. The permanent Metropolitan Police guard was reduced to three and assigned entirely to protection at the White House. There was no special group of trained officers to protect the person of the President. Presidents after Lincoln continued to move about in Washington virtually unattended, as their predecessors had done before the Civil War, and, as before, such protection as they got at the White House came from the doormen, who were not especially trained for guard duty.[A7-16]

This lack of personal protection for the President came again tragically to the attention of the country with the shooting of President James A. Garfield in 1881. The President’s assassin, Charles J. Guiteau, was a self-styled “lawyer, theologian, and politician” who had convinced himself that his unsolicited efforts to help elect Garfield in 1880 entitled him to appointment as a consul in Europe. Bitterly disappointed that the President ignored his repeated written requests for appointment to office and obsessed with a kind of megalomania, he resolved to kill Garfield.

At that time Guiteau was 38 years old and had an unusually checkered career behind him. He had been an itinerant and generally unsuccessful lecturer and evangelist, a lawyer, and a would-be politician. While it is true he resented Garfield’s failure to appoint him consul in Paris as a reward for his wholly illusory contribution to the Garfield campaign, and he verbally attacked Garfield for his lack of support for the so-called Stalwart wing of the Republican Party, these may not have supplied the total motivation for his crime. At his trial he testified that the “Deity” had commanded him to remove the President. There is no evidence that he confided his assassination plans to anyone or that he had any close friends or confidants. He made his attack on the President under circumstances where escape after the shooting was inconceivable. There were some hereditary mental problems in his family and Guiteau apparently believed in divine inspiration.[A7-17]

Guiteau later testified that he had had three opportunities to attack the President prior to the actual shooting. On all of these occasions, within a brief period of 3 weeks, the President was unguarded. Guiteau finally realized his intent on the morning of July 2, 1881. As Garfield was walking to a train in the Baltimore and Potomac Railroad Station in Washington, Guiteau stepped up and shot him in the back. Garfield did not die from the effects of the wound until September 19, 1881. Although there was evidence of serious abnormality in Guiteau, he was found guilty of murder and sentenced to be hanged. The execution took place on June 30, 1882.[A7-18]

At least one newspaper, the New York Tribune, predicted that the assault on Garfield would lead to the President becoming “the slave of his office, the prisoner of forms and restrictions,” in sharp and unwelcome contrast to the splendidly simple life he had been able to live before.

The bullet of the assassin who lurked in the Washington railway station to take the life of President Garfield shattered the simple Republican manner of life which the custom of nearly a century has prescribed for the Chief Magistrate of the United States. Our Presidents have been the first citizens of the Republic--nothing more. With a measure of power in their hands far greater than is wielded by the ruler of any limited monarchy in Europe, they have never surrounded themselves with the forms and safeguards of courts. The White House has been a business office to everybody. Its occupant has always been more accessible than the heads of great commercial establishments. When the passions of the war were at fever heat, Mr. Lincoln used to have a small guard of cavalry when he rode out to his summer residence at the Soldier’s Home; but at no other time in our history has it been thought needful for a President to have any special protection against violence when inside or outside the White House. Presidents have driven about Washington like other people and travelled over the country as unguarded and unconstrained as any private citizen.[A7-19]

The prediction of the Tribune did not come to pass. Although the Nation was shocked by this deed, its representatives took no steps to provide the President with personal protection. The President continued to move about Washington, sometimes completely alone, and to travel without special protection. There is a story that President Chester A. Arthur, Garfield’s successor, once went to a ceremony at the Washington Navy Yard on a public conveyance that he hailed in front of the White House.[A7-20]

During Grover Cleveland’s second administration (1893-97) the number of threatening letters addressed to the President increased markedly, and Mrs. Cleveland persuaded the President to increase the number of White House policemen to 27 from the 3 who had constituted the force since the Civil War. In 1894, the Secret Service began to provide protection, on an informal basis.[A7-21]

The Secret Service was organized as a division of the Department of the Treasury in 1865, to deal with counterfeiting.[A7-22] Its jurisdiction was extended to other fiscal crimes against the United States in later appropriations acts,[A7-23] but its early work in assisting in protecting the President was an unofficial, stopgap response to a need for a trained organization, with investigative capabilities, to perform this task. In 1894, while investigating a plot by a group of gamblers in Colorado to assassinate President Cleveland, the Secret Service assigned a small detail of operatives to the White House to help protect him. Secret Service men accompanied the President and his family to their vacation home in Massachusetts; special details protected the President in Washington, on trips, and at special functions.[A7-24] For a time, two agents rode in a buggy behind President Cleveland’s carriage, but this practice attracted so much attention in the opposition newspapers that it was soon discontinued at the President’s insistence.[A7-25] These initially informal and part-time arrangements eventually led to the organization of permanent systematic protection for the President and his family.

During the Spanish-American War the Secret Service stationed a detail at the White House to provide continuous protection for President McKinley. The special wartime protective measures were relaxed after the war, but Secret Service guards remained on duty at the White House at least part of the time.[A7-26]

Between 1894 and 1900, anarchists murdered the President of France, the Premier of Spain, the Empress of Austria, and the King of Italy. At the turn of the century the Secret Service thought that the strong police action taken against the anarchists in Europe was compelling them to flee and that many were coming to the United States. Concerned about the protection of the President, the Secret Service increased the number of guards and directed that a guard accompany him on all of his trips.[A7-27]

Unlike Lincoln and Garfield, President McKinley was being guarded when he was shot by Leon F. Czolgosz, an American-born 28-year-old factory worker and farmhand. On September 6, 1901, the President was holding a brief reception for the public in the Temple of Music at the Pan American Exposition in Buffalo. Long lines of people passed between two rows of policemen and soldiers to reach the President and shake his hand. In the immediate vicinity of the President were four Buffalo detectives, four soldiers, and three Secret Service agents. Two of the Secret Service men were facing the President at a distance of 3 feet. One of them stated later that it was normally his custom to stand at the side of the President on such occasions, but that he had been requested not to do so at this time in order to permit McKinley’s secretary and the president of the exposition to stand on either side of McKinley. Czolgosz joined the line, concealed a pistol under a handkerchief, and when he stood in front of the President shot twice through the handkerchief. McKinley fell critically wounded.[A7-28]

Czolgosz, a self-styled anarchist, did not believe in rulers of any kind. There is evidence that the organized anarchists in the U.S.A. did not accept or trust him. He was not admitted as a member to any of the secret anarchist societies. No co-plotters were ever discovered, and there is no evidence that he had confided in anyone. A calm inquiry made by two eminent alienists about a year after Czolgosz was executed found that Czolgosz had for some time been suffering from delusions. One was that he was an anarchist; another was that it was his duty to assassinate the President.[A7-29]

The assassin said he had no grudge against the President personally but did not believe in the republican form of government or in rulers of any kind. In his written confession he included the words, “‘I don’t believe one man should have so much service and another man should have none.’” As he was strapped to the chair to be electrocuted, he said: “‘I killed the President because he was the enemy of the good people--the good working people. I am not sorry for my crime.’”[A7-30]

McKinley lingered on for 8 days before he died of blood poisoning early on the morning of September 14. Czolgosz, who had been captured immediately, was swiftly tried, convicted, and condemned to death. Although it seemed to some contemporaries that Czolgosz was incompetent, the defense made no effort to plead insanity. Czolgosz was executed 45 days after the President’s death. Investigations by the Buffalo police and the Secret Service revealed no accomplices and no plot of any kind.[A7-31]

DEVELOPMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION

This third assassination of a President in a little more than a generation--it was only 36 years since Lincoln had been killed--shook the nation and aroused it to a greater awareness of the uniqueness of the Presidency and the grim hazards that surrounded an incumbent of that Office. The first congressional session after the assassination of McKinley gave more attention to legislation concerning attacks on the President than had any previous Congress but did not pass any measures for the protection of the President.[A7-32] Nevertheless, in 1902 the Secret Service, which was then the only Federal general investigative agency of any consequence, assumed full-time responsibility for the safety of the President. Protection of the President now became one of its major permanent functions, and it assigned two men to its original full-time White House detail. Additional agents were provided when the President traveled or went on vacation.[A7-33]

Theodore Roosevelt, who was the first President to experience the extensive system of protection that has surrounded the President ever since, voiced an opinion of Presidential protection that was probably shared in part by most of his successors. In a letter to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge in 1906, from his summer home, he wrote:

The Secret Service men are a very small but very necessary thorn in the flesh. Of course, they would not be the least use in preventing any assault upon my life. I do not believe there is any danger of such an assault, and if there were, as Lincoln said, “though it would be safer for a President to live in a cage, it would interfere with his business.” But it is only the Secret Service men who render life endurable, as you would realize if you saw the procession of carriages that pass through the place, the procession of people on foot who try to get into the place, not to speak of the multitude of cranks and others who are stopped in the village.[A7-34]

Roosevelt, who had succeeded to the Presidency because of an assassin’s bullet, himself became the object of an assassination attempt a few years after he left office and when he was no longer under Secret Service protection. During the Presidential campaign of 1912, just as he was about to make a political speech in Milwaukee on October 14, he was shot and wounded in the breast by John N. Schrank, a 36-year-old German-born ex-tavern keeper. A folded manuscript of his long speech and the metal case for his eyeglasses in the breast pocket of Roosevelt’s coat were all that prevented the assassination.[A7-35]

Schrank had had a vision in 1901, induced possibly by McKinley’s assassination, which took on meaning for him after Roosevelt, 11 years later, started to campaign for the Presidency. In this vision the ghost of McKinley appeared to him and told him not to let a murderer (i.e., Roosevelt, who according to the vision had murdered McKinley) become President. It was then that he determined upon the assassination. At the bidding of McKinley’s ghost, he felt he had no choice but to kill Theodore Roosevelt. After his attempt on Roosevelt, Schrank was found to be insane and was committed to mental hospitals in Wisconsin for the rest of his life.[A7-36]

The establishment and extension of the Secret Service authority for protection was a prolonged process. Although the Secret Service undertook to provide full-time protection for the President beginning in 1902, it received neither funds for the purpose nor sanction from the Congress until 1906 when the Sundry Civil Expenses Act for 1907 included funds for protection of the President by the Secret Service.[A7-37] Following the election of William Howard Taft in 1908, the Secret Service began providing protection for the President-elect. This practice received statutory authorization in 1913, and in the same year, Congress authorized permanent protection of the President.[A7-38] It remained necessary to renew the authority annually in the Appropriations Acts until 1951.

As in the Civil and Spanish-American Wars, the coming of war in 1917 caused increased concern for the safety of the President. Congress enacted a law, since referred to as the threat statute, making it a crime to threaten the President by mail or in any other manner.[A7-39] In 1917 Congress also authorized protection for the President’s immediate family by the Secret Service.[A7-40]

As the scope of the Presidency expanded during the 20th century, the Secret Service found the problems of protection becoming more numerous. In 1906, for the first time in history, a President traveled outside the United States while in office. When Theodore Roosevelt visited Panama in that year, he was accompanied and protected by Secret Service men.[A7-41] In 1918-19 Woodrow Wilson broadened the precedent of Presidential foreign travel when he traveled to Europe with a Secret Service escort of 10 men to attend the Versailles Peace Conference.[A7-42]

The attempt on the life of President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933 further demonstrated the broad scope and complexity of the protection problems facing the Secret Service. Giuseppe Zangara was a bricklayer and stonemason with a professed hatred of capitalists and Presidents. He seemed to be obsessed with the desire to kill a President. After his arrest he confessed that he had first planned to go to Washington to kill President Herbert Hoover, but as the cold climate of the North was bad for his stomach trouble, he was loath to leave Miami, where he was staying. When he read in the paper that President-elect Roosevelt would be in Miami, he resolved to kill him.[A7-43]

On the night of February 15, 1933, at a political rally in Miami’s Bayfront Park, the President-elect sat on the top of the rear seat of his automobile with a small microphone in his hand as he made a short informal talk. Fortunately for him, however, he slid down into the seat just before Zangara could get near enough to take aim. The assassin’s arm may have been jogged just as he shot; the five rounds he directed at Roosevelt went awry. However, he mortally wounded Mayor Anton Cermak, of Chicago, and hit four other persons; the President-elect, by a miracle, escaped. Zangara, of course, never had any chance of escaping.[A7-44]

Zangara was electrocuted on March 20, 1933, only 33 days after his attempt on Roosevelt. No evidence of accomplices or conspiracy came to light, but there was some sensational newspaper speculation, wholly undocumented, that Zangara may have been hired by Chicago gangsters to kill Cermak.[A7-45]

The force provided since the Civil War by the Washington Metropolitan Police for the protection of the White House had grown to 54 men by 1922.[A7-46] In that year Congress enacted legislation creating the White House Police Force as a separate organization under the direct control of the President.[A7-47] This force was actually supervised by the President’s military aide until 1930, when Congress placed supervision under the Chief of the Secret Service.[A7-48] Although Congress transferred control and supervision of the force to the Secretary of the Treasury in 1962,[A7-49] the Secretary delegated supervision to the Chief of the Secret Service.[A7-50]

The White House detail of the Secret Service grew in size slowly from the original 2 men assigned in 1902. In 1914 it still numbered only 5, but during World War I it was increased to 10 men. Additional men were added when the President traveled. After the war the size of the detail grew until it reached 16 agents and 2 supervisors by 1939. World War II created new and greater protection problems, especially those arising from the President’s trips abroad to the Grand Strategy Conferences in such places as Casablanca, Quebec, Tehran, Cairo, and Yalta. To meet the increased demands, the White House detail was increased to 37 men early in the war.[A7-51]

The volume of mail received by the White House had always been large, but it reached huge proportions under Franklin D. Roosevelt. Presidents had always received threatening letters but never in such quantities. To deal with this growing problem, the Secret Service established in 1940 the Protective Research Section to analyze and make available to those charged with protecting the President, information from White House mail and other sources concerning people potentially capable of violence to the President. The Protective Research Section undoubtedly permitted the Secret Service to anticipate and forestall many incidents that might have been embarrassing or harmful to the President.[A7-52]

Although there was no advance warning of the attempt on Harry S. Truman’s life on November 1, 1950, the protective measures taken by the Secret Service availed, and the assassins never succeeded in firing directly at the President. The assassins--Oscar Collazo and Griselio Torresola, Puerto Rican Nationalists living in New York--tried to force their way into Blair House, at the time the President’s residence while the White House was being repaired. Blair House was guarded by White House policemen and Secret Service agents. In the ensuing gun battle, Torresola and one White House policeman were killed, and Collazo and two White House policemen were wounded. Had the assassins succeeded in entering the front door of Blair House, they would probably have been cut down immediately by another Secret Service agent inside who kept the doorway covered with a submachine gun from his vantage point at the foot of the main stairs. In all, some 27 shots were fired in less than 3 minutes.[A7-53]

Collazo was brought to trial in 1951 and sentenced to death, but President Truman commuted the sentence to life imprisonment on July 24, 1952. Although there was a great deal of evidence linking Collazo and Torresola to the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico and its leader, Pedro Albizu Campos, the Government could not establish that the attack on the President was part of a larger Nationalist conspiracy.[A7-54]

The attack on President Truman led to the enactment in 1951 of legislation that permanently authorized the Secret Service to protect the President, his immediate family, the President-elect, and the Vice President, the last upon his request. Protection of the Vice President by the Secret Service had begun in January 1945 when Harry S. Truman occupied the office.[A7-55]

In 1962 Congress further enlarged the list of Government officers to be safeguarded, authorizing protection of the Vice President (or the officer next in order of succession to the Presidency) without requiring his request therefor; of the Vice President-elect; and of a former President, at his request, for a reasonable period after his departure from office. The Secret Service considered this “reasonable period” to be 6 months.[A7-56]

Amendments to the threat statute of 1917, passed in 1955 and 1962, made it a crime to threaten to harm the President-elect, the Vice President, or other officers next in succession to either office. The President’s immediate family was not included in the threat statute.[A7-57]

Congressional concern regarding the uses to which the President might put the Secret Service--first under Theodore Roosevelt and subsequently under Woodrow Wilson--caused Congress to place tight restrictions on the functions of the Service and the uses of its funds.[A7-58] The restrictions probably prevented the Secret Service from developing into a general investigative agency, leaving the field open for some other agency when the need arose. The other agency proved to be the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), established within the Department of Justice in 1908.[A7-59]

The FBI grew rapidly in the 1920’s, and especially in the 1930’s and after, establishing itself as the largest, best equipped, and best known of all U.S. Government investigative agencies. In the appropriations of the FBI there recurred annually an item for the “protection of the person of the President of the United States,” that had first appeared in the appropriation of the Department of Justice in 1910 under the heading “Miscellaneous Objects.”[A7-60] But there is no evidence that the Justice Department ever exercised any direct responsibility for the protection of the President. Although it had no prescribed protection functions, according to its Director, J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI did provide protection to Vice President Charles Curtis at his request, when he was serving under Herbert Hoover from 1929 to 1933. Over the years the FBI contribution to Presidential protection was confined chiefly to the referral to the Secret Service of the names of people who might be potentially dangerous to the President.[A7-61]

In recent years the Secret Service has remained a small and specialized bureau, restricted to very limited functions prescribed by Congress. In 1949, a task force of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission), recommended nonfiscal functions be removed from the Treasury Department.[A7-62] The recommendation called for transfer of the White House detail, White House Police Force, and Treasury Guard Force from the Secret Service to the Department of Justice. The final report of the Commission on the Treasury Department omitted this recommendation, leaving the protective function with the Secret Service.[A7-63] At a meeting of the Commission, ex-President Hoover, in a reference to the proposed transfer, expressed the opinion that “the President will object to having a ‘private eye’ looking after these fellows and would rather continue with the service.”[A7-64]

In 1963 the Secret Service was one of several investigative agencies in the Treasury Department. Its major functions were to combat counterfeiting and to protect the President, his family, and other designated persons.[A7-65] The Chief of the Secret Service administered its activities through four divisions: Investigation, Inspection, Administrative, and Security, and 65 field offices throughout the country, each under a special agent in charge who reported directly to Washington. The Security Division supervised the White House detail, the White House Police, and the Treasury Guard Force. During fiscal year 1963 (July 1, 1962-June 30, 1963) the Secret Service had an average strength of 513, of whom 351 were special agents. Average strength of the White House Police during the year was 179.[A7-66]

APPENDIX VIII

Medical Reports From Doctors at Parkland Memorial Hospital, Dallas, Tex.

The president arrived in the Emergency Room at exactly 12:43 p.m. in his limousine. He was in the back seat, Gov. Conally was in the front seat of the same car, Gov. Connally was brought out first and was put in room two. President was brought out next and put in room one. Dr. Clark pronounced the President dead at 1 p.m. exactly. All of the President’s belongings except his watch were given to the Secret Service. His watch was given to Mr. C. P. Wright. He left the Emergency Room, the President, at about 2 p.m. in an O’Neal ambulance. He was put in a bronze colored plastic casket after being wrapped in a blanket and was taken out of the hospital. He was removed from the hospital. The Gov. was taken from the Emergency room to the Operating Room.

The President’s wife refused to take off her bloody gloves, clothes. She did take a towel and wipe her face. She took her wedding ring off and placed it on one of the President’s fingers.

SUMMARY

The President arrived at the Emergency Room at 12:43 P.M., the 22nd of November, 1963. He was in the back seat of his limousine. Governor Connally of Texas was also in this car. The first physician to see the President was Dr. James Carrico, a Resident in General Surgery.

Dr. Carrico noted the President to have slow, agonal respiratory efforts. He could hear a heartbeat but found no pulse or blood pressure to be present. Two external wounds, one in the lower third of the anterior neck, the other in the occipital region of the skull, were noted. Through the head wound, blood and brain were extruding. Dr. Carrico inserted a cuffed endotracheal tube. While doing so, he noted a ragged wound of the trachea immediately below the larynx.

At this time, Dr. Malcolm Perry, Attending Surgeon, Dr. Charles Baxter, Attending Surgeon, and Dr. Ronald Jones, another Resident in General Surgery, arrived. Immediately thereafter, Dr. M. T. Jenkins, Director of the Department of Anesthesia, and Doctors Giesecke and Bunt, two other Staff Anesthesiologists, arrived. The endotracheal tube had been connected to a Bennett respirator to assist the President’s breathing. An Anesthesia machine was substituted for this by Dr. Jenkins. Only 100% oxygen was administered.

A cutdown was performed in the right ankle, and a polyethylene catheter inserted in the vein. An infusion of lactated Ringer’s solution was begun. Blood was drawn for type and crossmatch, but unmatched type “O” RH negative blood was immediately obtained and begun. Hydrocortisone 300 mgms was added to the intravenous fluids.

Dr. Robert McClelland, Attending Surgeon, arrived to help in the President’s care. Doctors Perry, Baxter, and McClelland began a tracheostomy, as considerable quantities of blood were present from the President’s oral pharynx. At this time, Dr. Paul Peters, Attending Urological Surgeon, and Dr. Kemp Clark, Director of Neurological Surgery, arrived. Because of the lacerated trachea, anterior chest tubes were placed in both pleural spaces. These were connected to sealed underwater drainage.

Neurological examination revealed the President’s pupils to be widely dilated and fixed to light. His eyes were divergent, being deviated outward; a skew deviation from the horizontal was present. No deep tendon reflexes or spontaneous movements were found.

There was a large wound in the right occipito-parietal region, from which profuse bleeding was occurring. 1500 cc. of blood were estimated on the drapes and floors of the Emergency Operating Room. There was considerable loss of scalp and bone tissue. Both cerebral and cerabellar tissue were extruding from the wound.

Further examination was not possible as cardiac arrest occurred at this point. Closed chest cardiac massage was begun by Dr. Clark. A pulse palpable in both the carotid and femoral arteries was obtained. Dr. Perry relieved on the cardiac massage while a cardiotachioscope was connected. Dr. Fouad Bashour, Attending Physician, arrived as this was being connected. There was electrical silence of the President’s heart.

President Kennedy was pronounced dead at 1300 hours by Dr. Clark.

Kemp Clark, M.D, Director Service of Neurological Surgery

KC:ca

cc to Dean’s Office, Southwestern Medical School

cc to Medical Records, Parkland Memorial Hospital

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL SCHOOL

DALLAS

M. T. JENKINS. M. D. PROFESSOR AND CHAIRMAN Department of Anesthesiology

Clinical Departments of Anesthesia PARKLAND MEMORIAL HOSPITAL CHILDREN’S MEDICAL CENTER

November 22, 1963 1630

To: Mr. C. J. Price, Administrator Parkland Memorial Hospital

From: M. T. Jenkins, M.D., Professor and Chairman Department of Anesthesiology

Subject: Statement concerning resuscitative efforts for President John F. Kennedy

Upon receiving a stat alarm that this distinguished patient was being brought to the emergency room at Parkland Memorial Hospital, I dispatched Doctors A. H. Giesecke and Jackie H. Hunt with an anesthesia machine and resuscitative equipment to the major surgical emergency room area, and I ran down the stairs. On my arrival in the emergency operating room at approximately 1230 I found that Doctors Carrico and/or Delaney had begun resuscitative efforts by introducing an orotracheal tube, connecting it for controlled ventilation to a Bennett intermittent positive pressure breathing apparatus. Doctors Charles Baxter, Malcolm Perry, and Robert McClelland arrived at the same time and began a tracheostomy and started the insertion of a right chest tube, since there was also obvious tracheal and chest damage. Doctors Paul Peters and Kemp Clark arrived simultaneously and immediately thereafter assisted respectively with the insertion of the right chest tube and with manual closed chest cardiac compression to assure circulation.

For better control of artificial ventilation, I exchanged the intermittent positive pressure breathing apparatus for an anesthesia machine and continued artificial ventilation. Doctors Gene Akin and A. H. Giesecke assisted with the respiratory problems incident to changing from the orotracheal tube to a tracheostomy tube, and Doctors Hunt and Giesecke connected a cardioscope to determine cardiac activity.

During the progress of these activities, the emergency room cart was elevated at the feet in order to provide a Trendelenburg position, a venous cutdown was performed on the right saphenous vein, and additional fluids were begun in a vein in the left forearm while blood was ordered from the blood bank. All of these activities were completed by approximately 1245, at which time external cardiac massage was still being carried out effectively by Doctor Clark as judged by a palpable peripheral pulse. Despite these measures there was no electrocardiographic evidence of cardiac activity.

These described resuscitative activities were indicated as of first importance, and after they were carried out attention was turned to all other evidences of injury. There was a great laceration on the right side of the head (temporal and occipital), causing a great defect in the skull plate so that there was herniation and laceration of great areas of the brain, even to the extent that the cerebellum had protruded from the wound. There were also fragmented sections of brain on the drapes of the emergency room cart. With the institution of adequate cardiac compression, there was a great flow of blood from the cranial cavity, indicating that there was much vascular damage as well as brain tissue damage.

It is my personal feeling that all methods of resuscitation were instituted expeditiously and efficiently. However, this cranial and intracranial damage was of such magnitude as to cause the irreversible damage. President Kennedy was pronounced dead at 1300.

Sincerely,

M. T. Jenkins, M.D.

PARKLAND MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

OPERATIVE RECORD

DATE: 11-22-63 Thoracic Surg

ROOM: 220

STATUS: Pvt

NAME: John Connally

Unit # 26 36 99

AGE:

RACE: W/M

PRE-OPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS: Gunshot wound of the chest with comminuted fracture of the 5th rib

POST-OPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS: Same with laceration right middle lobe, hematoma lower lobe of lung

OPERATION: Thoractomy, removal rib fragment, debridement of wound

BEGAN: 1335

ENDED: 1520

ANESTHETIC: General

BEGAN: 1300

ANESTHESIOLOGIST: Giesecke

SURGEON: Robert Shaw. M.D

ASSISTANTS: Drs. Boland and Duke

SCRUB NURSE: King/Burkett

CIRC. NURSE: Johnson

SPONGE COUNTS: 1ST Correct

2ND Correct

DRUGS

I.V. FLUIDS AND BLOOD

111-500 cc whole blood

11-1000cc D-5-RL

COMPLICATIONS: None

CONDITION OF PATIENT: Satisfactory

CLINICAL EVALUATION: The patient was brought to the OR from the EOR. In the EOR a sucking wound of the right chest was partially controlled by an occlusive dressing supported by manual pressure. A tube had been placed through the second interspace in the mid-clavicular line connected to a waterseal bottle to evacuate the right pneumothorax and hemathorax. An IV infusion of RL solution had already been started. As soon as the patient was positioned on the OR table the anesthesia was Induced by Dr. Giesecke and an endotracheal tube was in place. As soon as it was possible to control respiration with positive pressure the occlusive dressing was taken from the right chest and the extent of the wound more carefully determined. It was found that the wound of entrance was just lateral to the right scapula close the the axilla yet had passed through the latysmus dorsi muscle shattered approximately ten cm of the lateral and anterior portion of the right fifth rib and emerged below the right nipple. The wound of entrance was approximately three cm in its longest diameter and the wound of exit was a ragged wound approximately five cm in its greatest diameter. The skin and subcutaneous tissue over the path of the missile moved in a paradoxical manner with respiration indicating softening of the chest. The skin of the whole area was carefully cleansed with Phisohex and Iodine. The entire area including the wound of entrance and wound of exit was draped partially excluding the wound of entrance for the first part of the operation. An elliptical incision was made around the wound of exit removing the torn edges of the skin and the damaged subcutaneous tissue. The incision was then carried in a downward curve up toward the right axilla so as to not have the skin incision over the actual path of the missile ban through the chest wall. This incision was carried down through the subcutaneous tissue to expose the Serratus anterior muscle and the anterior border of the latissimus dorsi muscle. The fragmented and damaged portions of the Serratus anterior muscle were excised. Small rib fragments that were adhering to periosteal tags were carefully removed preserving as much periosteum as possible. The fourth intercostal muscle bundle and fifth intercostal muscle bundle were not appreciably damaged.

The ragged ends of the damaged fifth rib were cleaned out with the rongeur. The plura had been torn open by the secondary missiles created by the fragmented fifth rib. The wound was open widely and exposure was obtained with a self retaining retractor. The right plural cavity was then carefully inspected. Approximately 200 cc of clot and liquid blood was removed from the pleural cavity. The middle lobe had a linear rent starting at its peripheral edge going down towards itshilum separating the lobe into two segments. There was an open bronchus in the depth of this wound. Since the vascularlty and the bronchial connections to the lobe were intact it was decided to repair the lobe rather then to remove it. The repair was accomplished with a running suture of #000 chromic gut on atraumatic needle closing both plural surfaces as well as two runnin sutures approximating the tissue of the central portion of the lobe. This almost completely sealed off the air leaks which were evident in the torn portion of the lobe. The lower lobe was next examined and found to be engorged with blood and at one point a laceration of allowed the oozing of blood. This laceration had undoubtedly been caused by a rib fragment. This laceration was closed with a single suture of #3-O chromic gut on atraumatic needle. The right pleural cavity was now carefully examined and small ribs fragments were removed, the diaphram was found to be uninjured. There was no evidence of injury of the mediastinum and its contents. Hemostasis had been accomplished within the plural cavity with the repair of the middle lobe and the suturing of the laceration in the lower lobe. The upper lobe was found to be uninjured. The drains which had previously been placed in the second interspace in the midclavicular line was found to be longer than necessary so approximately ten cm of it was cut away and the remaining portion was demonstrated with two additional openings. An additional drain was placed through a stab wound in the eighth interspace in the posterior axillary line. Both these drains were then connected to a waterseal bottle. The fourth and fifth intercostal muscles were then approximated with interrupted sutures of #O chromic gut. The remaining portion of the Serratus anterior muscle was then approximated across the closure of the intercostal muscle. The laceration of the latissimus dorsi muscle on its intermost surface was then closed with several interrupted sutures of #O chromic gut. ~The subcutaneous tissue was th~ Before closing the subcutaneous tissue one million units of Penicillin and one gram of Streptomycin in 100 cc normal saline was instilled into the wound. The stab wound was then made in the most dependent portion of the wound coming out near the angle of the scapula. A large Penrose drain was drawn out through this stab wound to allow drainage of the wound of the chest wall. The subcutaneous tissue was then closed with interrupted #O chromic gut inverting the knots. Skin closed with interrupted vertical mattress sutures of black silk. Attention was next turned to the wound of entrance. It was excised with an elliptical incision. It was found that the latissimus dorsi muscle although lacerated was not badly damaged so that the opening was closed with sutures of #O chromic gut in the fascia of the muscle. Before closing this incision ~the~ palpation with the index finger the Penrose drain could be felt immediately below in the space beneath the latissimus dorsi muscle. The skin closed with interrupted vertical mattress sutures of black silk. Drainage tubes were secured with safety pens and adhesive tape and dressings applied. As soon as the operation on the chest had been concluded Dr. Gregory and Dr. Shires started the surgery that was necessary for the wounds of the right wrist and left thigh.

Dr. Robert Shaw

RS:bl

* There was also a comminuted fracture of the right radius secondary to the same missile and in addition a small flesh wound of the left thigh. The operative notes concerning the management of the right arm and left thigh will be dictated by Dr. Charles Gregory and Dr. Tom Shires.

PARKLAND MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

OPERATIVE RECORD

DATE: 11-22-63 Ortho

ROOM: 220

STATUS: Pvt.

NAME: Governor John Connally

UNIT: 26 36 99

AGE: W/M

RACE:

PRE-OPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS: Comminuted fracture of the right distal radius, open secondary to gunshot wound

POST-OPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS: Same

OPERATION: Debridement of gunshot wound of right wrist, reduction of fracture of the radius

BEGAN: 1600

ENDED: 1650

ANESTHETIC: General

BEGAN: 1300

ANESTHESIOLOGIST: Giesecke

SURGEON: Dr. Charles Gregory

ASSISTANTS: Drs. Osborne and Parker

SCRUB NURSE: Rutherford

CIRC. NURSE: Schroeder

COMPLICATIONS: None

CONDITION OF PATIENT: Fair

(handwritten: also a partial transection of the superficial radial nerve or Ext. Pol Brevis)

CLINICAL EVALUATION: While still under general anesthesia and following a thoracotomy and repair of the chest injury by Dr. Robert Shaw, the right upper extremity was thoroughly prepped in the routine fashion after shaving. he was draped in the routine fashion using stockinette, the only addition was the use of a debridement pan. The wound of entry on the dorsal aspect of the right wrist over the junction of the distal fourth of the radius and shaft was approximately two cm in length and rather oblique with the loss of tissue with some considerable contusion at the margins of it. There was a wound of exit along the volar surface of the wrist about two cm above the flexion crease of the wrist and in the midline. The wound of entrance was carefully excised and developed through the muscles and tendons from the radial side of the bone to the bone itself where the fracture was encountered. It was noted that the tendon of the abductor palmaris longus was transected, only two small fragments of bone ~was~ were removed, one approximately one cm in length and consisted of lateral cortex which lay free in the wound and had no soft tissue connections, another much smaller fragment perhaps 3 mm in length was subsequently removed. Small bits of metal were encountered at various levels throughout the wound and these were wherever they were identified and could be picked up were picked up and have been submitted to the Pathology department for identification and examination. Throughout the wound ~it was not~ and especially in the superficial layers and to some extent in the tendon and tendon sheaths on the radial side of the arm small fine bits of cloth consistent with fine bits of Mohair. It is our understanding that the patient was wearing a Mohair suit at the time of the injury and this accounts for the deposition of such organic material within the wound. After as careful and complete a debridement as could be carried out and with an apparent integrity of the flexor tendons and the median nerve in the volar side, and after thorough irrigation the wound of exit on the volar surface of the wrist was closed primarily with wire sutures while the wound of entrance on the radial side of the forearm was only partially closed being left open for the purpose of drainage should any make spontaneous appearance.

This is because of the presence of Mohair and organic material deep into the wound which is prone to produce tissue reactions and to encourage infection and this precaution of not closing the wound was taken in correspondence with our experience in that regard.

In view of the urgency of the Governor’s original chest injury it was impossible to definitely ascertain the status of the circulation and the nerve supply to the hand and wrist on the right side. Accordingly, it was determined as best we could at the time of operation and the radial artery was found to be intact and pulsating normally. The integrity of the median nerve and the ulnar nerve is not clearly established but it is presumed to be present. Following closure of the volar wound and partial closure of the radial wound, dry sterile dressings were applied and a long arm cast was then applied with skin tape traction, rubber band variety, attached to the thumb and index finger of the right hand. ~The-righ~ An attitude of flexon was created at the right elbow, and post operatively the limbus suspended from an overhead frame using tape traction. The post operative diagnosis for the right forearm remains the same and again I suggest that you incorporate this particular dictation together with other dictations which will be given to you by the surgeons concerned with this patient.

Charles Gregory, M.D.

CG:bl

PARKLAND MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

OPERATIVE RECORD

DATE: NOV. 22, 1963

ROOM: 220

STATUS: Pvt.

NAME: Connally, John

UNIT #: 263699 A #24842

RACE: W/M

PRE-OPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS: Gunshot Wound, Right Chest, Right Wrist, Left Thigh

POST-OPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS: Same

OPERATION: Exploration and Debridement of Gunshot Wound of Left Thigh (*See below)

BEGAN: 16:00

ENDED: 16:20

ANESTHETIC: General

BEGAN: 13:00

ANESTHESIOLOGIST: Geisecke

SURGEON: Dr. Shires

ASSISTANTS: Drs. McClelland, Baxter and Patman

SCRUB NURSE: Oliver

CIRC. NURSE: Deming and Schroder

SPONGE COUNTS: 1ST Correct PS

COMPLICATIONS: *This portion of the operation is involved only with the operation on the left thigh. The chest injury has been dictated by Dr. Shaw, the orthopedic injury to the arm by Dr. Gregory.

CONDITION OF PATIENT:

CLINICAL EVALUATION: There was a 1 cm. punctate missile wound over the juncture of the middle and lower third, medial aspect, of the left thigh. X-rays of the thigh and leg revealed a bullet fragment which was imbedded in the body of the femur in the distal third. The leg was prepared with Phisohex and I.O. Prep and was draped in the usual fashion.

Following this the missile wound was excised and the bullet tract was explored. The missile wound was seen to course through the subcutaneous fat and into the vastus medialis. The necrotic fat and muscle were debrided down to the region of the femur. The direction of the missile wound was judged not to be in the course of the femoral vessel, since the wound was distal and anterior to Hunter’s canal. Following complete debridement of the wound and irrigation with saline, the wound was felt to be adequately debrided enough so that three simple through-and-through, stainless steel Aloe #28 wire sutures were used encompassing skin, subcutaneous tissue, and muscle fascia on both sides. Following this a sterile dressing was applied. The dorsalis pedis and posterior tibial pulses in both lags were quite good. The thoracic procedure had been completed at this time, the debridement of the compound fracture in the arm was still in progress at the time this soft tissue injury repair was completed.

Tom Shires, M.D.

fa

PARKLAND MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

OPERATIVE RECORD

DATE: 11/24/63 Surg.

ROOM:

STATUS: S NAME: Oswald, Lee Harvey

EOR UNIT # 25260

AGE: 24 Yr.

RACE: W/M

PRE-OPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS: GSW of upper abdomen and chest with massive bleeding

POST-OPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS: Major vascular injury in abdomen and chest

OPERATION: Exploratory laparotomy, thoracotomy, efforts to repair aorta 1’15”

BEGAN: 1142

ENDED: 1307

ANESTHETIC: General

BEGAN: 1142

ANESTHESIOLOGIST: Dr. M.T. Jenkins Dr. Gene Akin Dr. Curtis Spier

SURGEON: Dr. Tom Shires

ASSISTANTS: Dr. Perry, Dr. McClelland, Dr. Ron Jones

SCRUB NURSE: Schrader-Lunsford

CIRC. NURSE: Schrader-Bell-Burkett-Simpson

2 counted sponges missing when body closed. Square pack count correct.

DRUGS Ca chloride--3 vials Cedilanid--12 One molar lactate--6 Isuprel--24 Adrenalin 1:1000--3

I.V. FLUIDS AND BLOOD 3-1000 cc. lactated Ringer’s solution 16--500cc. whole blood 6--1000cc. 5% dextrose in lactated Ringer’s solution

CONDITION OF PATIENT: Expired at 1307

Measured blood loss--8,376 cc.

CLINICAL EVALUATION: Previous inspection had revealed an entrance wound over the left lower lateral chest cage, and an exit was identified by subcutaneous palpation of the bullet over the right lower lateral chest cage. At the time he was seen preoperatively he was without blood pressure, heart beat was heard infrequently at 130 beats per minute, And preoperatively had endotracheal tube placed and was receiving oxygen by anesthesia at the time he was moved to the operating room.

DESCRIPTION OF OPERATION: Under endotracheal oxygen anesthesia, a long mid-line abdominal incision was made. Bleeders were not apparent and none were clamped or tied. Upon opening the peritoneal cavity, approximately 2 to 3 liters of blood, both liquid and in clots, were encountered. These were removed. The bullet pathway was then identified as having shattered the upper medial surface of the spleen, then entered the retroperitoneal area where there was a large retroperitoneal hematoma in the area of the pancreas. Following this, bleeding was seen to be coming from the right side, and upon inspection there was seen to be an exit to the right through the inferior vena cava, thence through the superior pole of the right kidney, the lower portion of the right lobe of the liver, and into the right lateral body wall. First the right kidney, which was bleeding, was identified, dissected free, retracted immediately, and the inferior vena cava hole was clamped with a partial occlusion clamp of the Satinsky type. Following this immobilization, packing controlled the bleeding from the right kidney. Attention was then turned to the left, as bleeding was massive from the left side. The inspection of the retroperitoneal area revealed a huge hematoma in the mid-line. The spleen was then mobilized, as was the left colon, and the retroperitoneal approach was made to the mid-line structures. The pancreas was seen to be shattered in its mid portion, bleeding was seen to be coming from the aorta. This was dissected free. Bleeding was controlled with finger pressure by Dr. Malcolm O. Perry. Upon identification of this injury, the superior mesenteric artery had been sheared off of the aorta, there was back bleeding from the superior mesenteric artery. This was cross-clamped with a small, curved DeBakey clamp. The aorta was then occluded with a straight DeBakey clamp above and a Potts clamp below. At this point all major bleeding was controlled, blood pressure was reported to be in the neighborhood of 100 systolic. Shortly thereafter, however, the pulse rate, which had been in the 80 to 90 range, was found to be 40 and a few seconds later found to be zero. No pulse was felt in the aorta at this time. Consequently the left chest was opened through an intercostal incision in approximately the fourth intercostal space. A Finochietto retractor was inserted, the heart was seen to be flabby and not beating at all. There was no hemopericardium. There was a hole in the diaphragm but no hemothorax. A left closed chest tube had been introduced in the Emergency Room prior to surgery, so that there was no significant pneumothorax on the left side. The pericardium was opened, cardiac massage was started, and a pulse was obtainable with massage. The heart was flabby, consequently calcium chloride followed by epinephrine-Xylocaine® were injected into the left ventricle without success. However, the standstill was converted to fibrillation. Following this, defibrillation was done, using 240, 360, 500, and 750 volts and finally successful defibrillation was accomplished. However, no effective heart beat could be instituted. A pacemaker was then inserted into the wall of the right ventricle and grounded on skin, and pacemaking was started. A very feeble, small, localized muscular response was obtained with the pacemaker but still no effective beat. At this time we were informed by Dr. Jenkins that there were no signs of life in that the pupils were fixed and dilated, there was no retinal blood flow, no respiratory effort, and no effective pulse could be maintained even with cardiac massage. The patient was pronounced dead at 1:07 P.M. Anesthesia consisted entirely of oxygen. No anesthetic agents as such were administered. The patient was never conscious from the time of his arrival in the Emergency Room until his death at 1:07 P.M. The subcutaneous bullet was extracted from the right side during the attempts at defibrillation, which were rotated among the surgeons. The cardiac massage and defibrillation attempts were carried out by Dr. Robert N. McClelland, Dr. Malcolm O. Perry, Dr. Ronald Jones. Assistance was obtained from the cardiologist, Dr. Fouad Bashour.

Tom Shires, M.D.

APPENDIX IX

Autopsy Report and Supplemental Report

CLINICAL RECORD AUTOPSY PROTOCOL A63-272 (JJH:ec)

DATE AND HOUR DIED 22 November 1963 1300 (CST)

DATE AND HOUR AUTOPSY PERFORMED 22 November 1963 2000 (EST)

FULL AUTOPSY X

PROSECTOR (497831) CDR J.J. HUMES, MC., USN

ASSISTANT (439878) CDR “J” THORNTON BOSWELL, MC, USN

LCOL PIERRE A. FINCK, MC, USA (04 043 322)

Ht.--72½ inches

Wt.--170 pounds

Eyes--Blue

Hair--Reddish brown

PATHOLOGICAL DIAGNOSES

CAUSE OF DEATH: Gunshot wound, head.

APPROVED-SIGNATURE J.J. HUMES, CDR, MC, USN

MILITARY ORGANIZATION (When required) PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES

AGE 46

SEX M

RACE Cauc.

AUTOPSY NO. A63-272

PATIENT’S IDENTIFICATION KENNEDY, JOHN F. NAVAL MEDICAL SCHOOL

CLINICAL SUMMARY: According to available information the deceased, President John F. Kennedy, was riding in an open car in a motorcade during an official visit to Dallas, Texas on 22 November 1963. The President was sitting in the right rear seat with Mrs. Kennedy seated on the same seat to his left. Sitting directly in front of the President was Governor John B. Connolly of Texas and directly in front of Mrs. Kennedy sat Mrs. Connolly. The vehicle was moving at a slow rate of speed down an incline into an underpass that leads to a freeway route to the Dallas Trade Mart where the President was to deliver an address.

Three shots were heard and the President fell forward bleeding from the head. (Governor Connolly was seriously wounded by the same gunfire.) According to newspaper reports (“Washington Post” November 23, 1963) Bob Jackson, a Dallas “Times Herald” Photographer, said he looked around as he heard the shots and saw a rifle barrel disappearing into a window on an upper floor of the nearby Texas School Book Depository Building.

Shortly following the wounding of the two men the car was driven to Parkland Hospital in Dallas. In the emergency room of that hospital the President was attended by Dr. Malcolm Perry. Telephone communication with Dr. Perry on November 23, 1963 develops the following information relative to the observations made by Dr. Perry and procedures performed there prior to death.

Dr. Perry noted the massive wound of the head and a second much smaller wound of the low anterior neck in approximately the midline. A tracheostomy was performed by extending the latter wound. At this point bloody air was noted bubbling from the wound and an injury to the right lateral wall of the trachea was observed. Incisions were made in the upper anterior chest wall bilaterally to combat possible subcutaneous emphysema. Intravenous infusions of blood and saline were begun and oxygen was administered. Despite these measures cardiac arrest occurred and closed chest cardiac massage failed to re-establish cardiac action. The President was pronounced dead approximately thirty to forty minutes after receiving his wounds.

The remains were transported via the Presidential plane to Washington, D.C. and subsequently to the Naval Medical School, National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland for postmortem examination.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF BODY: The body is that of a muscular, well-developed and well nourished adult Caucasian male measuring 72½ inches and weighing approximately 170 pounds. There is beginning rigor mortis, minimal dependent livor mortis of the dorsum, and early algor mortis. The hair is reddish brown and abundant, the eyes are blue, the right pupil measuring 8 mm. in diameter, the left 4 mm. There is edema and ecchymosis of the inner canthus region of the left eyelid measuring approximately 1.5 cm. in greatest diameter. There is edema and ecchymosis diffusely over the right supra-orbital ridge with abnormal mobility of the underlying bone. (The remainder of the scalp will be described with the skull.)

There is clotted blood on the external ears but otherwise the ears, nares, and mouth are essentially unremarkable. The teeth are in excellent repair and there is some pallor of the oral mucous membrane.

Situated on the upper right posterior thorax just above the upper border of the scapula there is a 7 x 4 millimeter oval wound. This wound is measured to be 14 cm. from the tip of the right acromion process and 14 cm. below the tip of the right mastoid process.

Situated in the low anterior neck at approximately the level of the third and fourth tracheal rings is a 6.5 cm. long transverse wound with widely gaping irregular edges. (The depth and character of these wounds will be further described below.)

Situated on the anterior chest wall in the nipple line are bilateral 2 cm. long recent transverse surgical incisions into the subcutaneous tissue. The one on the left is situated 11 cm. cephalad to the nipple and the one on the right 8 cm. cephalad to the nipple. There is no hemorrhage or ecchymosis associated with these wounds. A similar clean wound measuring 2 cm. in length is situated on the antero-lateral aspect of the left mid arm. Situated on the antero-lateral aspect of each ankle is a recent 2 cm. transverse incision into the subcutaneous tissue.

There is an old well healed 8 cm. McBurney abdominal incision. Over the lumbar spine in the midline is an old, well healed 15 cm. scar. Situated on the upper antero-lateral aspect of the right thigh is an old, well healed 8 cm. scar.

MISSILE WOUNDS: 1. There is a large irregular defect of the scalp and skull on the right involving chiefly the parietal bone but extending somewhat into the temporal and occipital regions. In this region there is an actual absence of scalp and bone producing a defect which measures approximately 13 cm. in greatest diameter.

From the irregular margins of the above scalp defect tears extend in stellate fashion into the more or less intact scalp as follows:

a. From the right inferior temporo-parietal margin anterior to the right ear to a point slightly above the tragus.

b. From the anterior parietal margin anteriorly on the forehead to approximately 4 cm. above the right orbital ridge.