Part 69
A. I learned, after the firing, that a great deal of excitement prevailed. I might as well state now, that the fact of the firing upon the mob did not make any difference, whether it was by orders or without orders. The crowd supposed it was by orders, because their vengeance seemed to be concentrated on General Pearson, who was in command. They thought he gave orders, but practically it made no difference whether it was by an order or without an order. It makes a difference, in fact, so far as parties killed were concerned, or the act itself; but they supposed that an order had been given to fire, and that they then had a grievance, which they had not before. Before that, it was confined to railroad employés. They assumed that they had not got wages enough. There were double-headers put on, but when people were killed, they said there was then a good cause for grievance, and they rushed to the gunshops--one right opposite my office--took all the weapons they could find in there, broke open the whole place, carried off the guns, and paraded the streets. The feeling then was intense--bitter, and revengeful feelings seemed to pervade all classes of labor. There had been a sympathy with them all the way through--they were part of the labor element. I think myself that if the military had not been there, and had not provoked a collision at that unfortunate time, that there would not have been a life lost, nor a dollar's worth of property destroyed. As everybody can tell after the battle is lost how it might have been won, we find that after we survey the whole thing over again, it is pretty hard to lay the blame on anybody. The action of the militia just at that time has been the common action of the militia all over the world. It requires the strictest and sternest discipline of the regular soldier, to obey the command after he has been struck or knocked, to refrain from resistance. The militiaman is not paid for it; he carries his humanity into the ranks, and when he is struck he resists. What our militia did here, they did in Baltimore, they did all over the country, and they would do again under similar circumstances. The question of their firing without orders, is a thing you never can provide against with militia.
Q. Sunday morning, what was done by the military or civil authorities, county or city?
A. Sunday morning, at nine o'clock, when I came to my office I found a number of gentlemen there, merchants, manufacturers, and business men, alarmed and dazed by the condition of things. About the first thing that was done, was to write a resolution--they wrote a resolution to get the citizens together, and provide a leader. They waited from Thursday until Sunday, the city, the county, and the State at her back, and we had not provided any other agency for self-protection or the preservation of the peace, but these. When we ascertained on Sunday morning, that twelve hundred soldiers, veterans, under the command of experienced officers, had not been able to quell this violence, we felt that no fifty or one hundred men could do it, and we were at a loss to dam the brook on Saturday night, and the flood was then over, and we had to wait until the water subsided before we could get foothold or make a landing. We went to work as fast as we could. I went to the Union depot until about half-past nine or ten o'clock. I saw quite a lot there, they appeared to be cool but utterly unable to provide for the difficulty, the military having gone away, contrary to their instructions or their orders. While I was in there, General Gallagher, I think it was, came in. He had been around the city, and they asked him how many troops it would take to hold the city at that time, and he said, it would require at least fifteen thousand. I stayed there that time, and a servant came up and said we were the last people in the hotel building, and we had better go off. Then we went to the Monongahela House.
Q. Who is Gallagher?
A. I think he is colonel in one of the neighboring counties.
Q. Belonging to the National Guard of Pennsylvania?
A. Yes, he is a colonel--at least he was in undress.
Q. Was he not a colonel in the Pennsylvania Reserves, during the war?
A. Yes; in Westmoreland, I think. The whole town was out, you know. I think there has a very great delusion taken possession of the public mind, in regard to the Sunday's burning. There were not many people on the tracks at any time during Sunday, because they were crowded with cars--cars burning slowly, and the work of destruction commenced at night. The motive was, they wanted to burn these troops out of the round-houses, and communicating fire from car to car, was rather slow, and many people imagined, that because there were but few people on the tracks during the day, therefore a few people could have controlled them. The reflection seems to be made upon the officers of the city and county, and the military, that a few policemen, or a few military, could have driven those people off the tracks, and that would have been the end of it. But anybody that stood there during that day, and was among these people, found thousands of people on the streets and on the side-walks, the side streets, at Liberty street, that prevented any water being thrown on the cars, and prevented any interference. It was not necessary for many people to be there to fire the cars. They were strangers. I suppose the railroad men who had the first grievances, did not go there, because they might have been recognized, but they all stood on the streets, and not a drop of water dared to be thrown on these tracks. It is the sheerest nonsense to talk about ten men, or twenty-five men, or two thousand men, to have stopped this. They had broken open barrels of whisky, and they knew the military were gone, and they were perfectly satisfied there was no police force to stop the people, and unarmed citizens called by the sheriff to put down the mob, was simply ridiculous. The sheriff did what any sheriff would do--he called a posse, a lot of clerks, or--lawyers, to put down a mob. The mob understood as well as anybody else, that that could not be done, it was not his fault, and it was not the fault of the mayor that there was not any police. The State prevented the city of Pittsburgh from borrowing any money. The bankers in this city offered to furnish the amount of appropriation that was short for police, but they could not get the money back again, because the city could not borrow any money. The bankers offered to provide us with our usual number of police, but the State law stated that we could not borrow any money for that purpose.
Q. Constitution, ain't it?
A. Yes; it is in the Constitution, too. The State stepped in, and would not let us do it. Eighty-five men to cover twenty-five miles square. The patrolmen were up all Thursday night, and on Friday we hadn't any police. We held a meeting at half past twelve, and in the meantime a committee five was appointed, of which I was one, who went into the crowd, and asked them to stop. There was one man, he was in a blouse, he seemed to be dressed as a railroader--he attached a burning car to a locomotive, and jumped the track four or five squares east of the depot. When our committee came in, and when Bishop Tuigg was speaking, he rang his bell, and started off with his steam whistling, not allowing people to hear what was said, and there were words lost on the crowd that was in front. They were not railroad men. If it hadn't been for the fireman the city would have been in ashes. If it hadn't been for the citizens preserving the peace, there is no telling what would have happened. The matter was of such dimensions, and extended over so many cities, and miles of railway, that if this whole city had have burned down, and if every man, woman, and child had been arrested, that was not the end of the thing. It was only a small element--a portion of it. I think it extended over nine cities, and twenty thousand miles of railway. It had proclamations from six or seven Governors, and proclamations from the President of the United States. It was a matter not of contagion, but of organization. I have here the proclamation of the Governor, and meeting of trainmen.
Q. What facts have you to say that it was a matter or organization?
A. Not being a member of any of their organizations, although I am of some other societies, I only get it by publications which I have in my bound files, and can furnish you the meetings of trainmen, and the fact that on the 16th of July, on Monday, that these same railroad men, on account of wages in West Virginia, Martinsburg, resisted the authority. They called on the Governor, and the Governor appealed to the President of the United States. That on Wednesday, the 18th, the proclamation of the President of the United States was issued, which was twenty-four hours in advance of the first interruption here, and that it extended over nine of the most populous States in the Union. It is a matter of current public positive history, which of itself would be sufficient to show that all the railroad employés were in consultation, and had, of course, an organization. I suppose that railroads had to reduce wages in consequence of reduced receipts, and that these people, with their oath bound organization, had agreed that the only way they could cure that, would be by stopping work. I think that was their only object.
Q. Have you any facts, aside from the actual existence of the strike, to show that they had secret organizations and a pre-arranged plan to strike throughout the nine States?
A. Not being a member of any secret organization myself, I was only governed, as a public journalist, by the facts that came to me.
Q. You arrive at that conclusion, then, from the existence of the strikes themselves, and their spreading over so large a territory?
A. Yes; and at the same time, it could not be simply contagion from one line to the other. There was not time enough to communicate from man to man along all the line of railroads, and that they having possession of the telegraphic wires at the same time, they had all the works of the entire railroad itself, and it was communicated to the whole of them, and they had their resolutions and perfected their organization.
Q. Do you know how many railroads in this country reduced their wages ten per cent. on the 1st of June?
A. I do not, except from the current reports at the time that the four great trunk lines did--branches of the roads east agreed with it. About forty thousand miles of railroad in the United States agreed with it. About all, although the strike was not developed all over. I think some of the New York roads, perhaps, arranged it with their employés, but still there was trouble. The main trouble here, was the reduction of wages. I don't know that it would be of benefit to this committee, but I would be perfectly willing to give my bound files which give the current history of that during the two weeks. It might be useful to look over to show the existence of this thing. There are many things that are official--the Governor's proclamation is official.
Q. You have no copies of the papers that you could furnish us to retain?
A. I will furnish them to you or send them to you at Harrisburg by express. You can keep them as long as you want. I can get them very well. I have extracts taken out of them, all of which I would be very glad to furnish. There is one thing I might state----
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Have you got your files bound for the month of July?
A. The daily and weekly are bound together. I have them bound, and I will furnish them gladly to you.
Q. Could you not furnish us with a bound copy, with references to the pages?
A. You can have from July 28, to August 24, that is two weeks. We felt here the crisis approaching, and the importance of this whole matter, and I telegraphed to Mr. Scott, president of the Pennsylvania railroad, these words:
PITTSBURGH, _Saturday noon, 1877_.
To T. A. SCOTT, _Philadelphia_:
Don't you think you could best serve your company, rescue imperiled interests, and perhaps save valuable lives by your presence here, and make in person some proposition to convince our people your company has rights and grievances. The current sets against you with every shade of labor, and it is important that you should be on hand to decide whatever may be presented to you. I can assure you the situation is critical.
J. P. BARR.
That was on Saturday, about eleven o'clock, before any firing--before I knew that the Philadelphia people were here at all. I was so utterly convinced of the critical situation of affairs here, that I thought if Mr. Scott was here in person, that he might be able to say to these people that they were then an unlawful assembly, and that an appeal from him would settle this thing. If the committee desire, I will read his answer:
PHILADELPHIA, _July 21--4, P.M._
JAMES P. BARR, _Pittsburgh_:
I have just received your message, and fully appreciate the grave importance of the matters transpiring in your community. You will speedily discover that the strike of a few of our railway employés is simply being used by the mob violence, which some of your people are permitting or encouraging, to effect other purposes, which, if successful, will destroy many of your leading local interests. The strike on our road at Pittsburgh was inaugurated without any notice to or conference with the officers of our company as to the existence of a grievance. The reductions in the compensation to the people in the service of this company are to-day less than in any other branch of business in the country, and were made only because of the great depression in trade interests, to enable us to aid the various communities in carrying on business at all. When violent possession was taken of our property, and the business obstructed, there was no recourse left us but to call upon the authorities of the city, county, and State to take charge of the matter, and vindicate the laws by the restoration of order in such form as to them should seem best. If I could be of any possible service in Pittsburgh, I would go out, but at present I think it would be most unwise to interfere in any manner with the State authorities in their enforcement of law and order.
Thomas A. Scott.
On Sunday he telegraphs:
PHILADELPHIA, _July 25--12.30, P.M._
To JAMES P. BARR, _Pittsburgh_:
What is the situation of affairs in Pittsburgh to-day? Are the loyal people in shape to protect life and property? The statements of my message of last Saturday to you have been terribly realized. I think there is not and cannot be any safety for life or property unless the State and United States authorities will adopt the measures necessary to restore absolute law and order, and make it permanent. Would be glad to have your views of the situation this morning.
THOMAS A. SCOTT.
I telegraphed him back:
PITTSBURGH, _Wednesday, July 25--2, P.M._
To T. A. SCOTT, _Philadelphia_:
The local military and organized citizens, animated by a determination to quell mobs, are quite sufficient to preserve the peace and property of this city. Everything is quiet. Our impending danger is the suspension of general labor and thronging our streets with idle men. Local traffic for coal and provisions is first demanded.
Neither you nor labor will surrender, because it involves humiliation, but you can suggest or agree to a board of arbitration to present a compromise, which will relieve you and labor without disturbing the rights or grievances of either. Compromise governs the daily business of the world. You have it in your power to restore peace and preserve society. The discontent of many years against the extravagance of railway management has culminated, and forms the subject of complaint, as well as the reduction of wages.
I implore you not to assume the ground that military can settle anything but defiance of law. Have this compromise effected at once, and the country will owe you a debt of gratitude.
J. P. BARR.
And he says:
PHILADELPHIA, _Wednesday--4, P.M._
To JAMES P. BARR:
I like your suggestion as to the restoration of the local business of the country, and the giving of employment to mines and factories. This it has always been a pleasure to me to do, and we will do it to-morrow, if your people will protect the employés of the company who are willing and anxious to work and preserve the interest of the country, as highways like our own are able to do.
My own judgement is that the restoration of law and order can only be effected by a return to common sense by the people, and by them refraining from encouraging or connecting themselves with mobs or violence of any kind, and that the channels of trade and business will immediately fill up, and give employment to every man that the depressed condition of the business of the country will permit. I am sure we shall be glad to aid them, but to do it in any other way would be but simply temporizing with the worst evil the world has ever seen; but to effect permanent peace and order, and protection to life and property, the matter must be settled by the governmental authorities of the country as they exist, and independently of the transportation companies of the country, which have been doing and are anxious to do their full duty.
I believe if our men are protected by you and by other good citizens, there won't be an hour's delay in opening our roads for the convenience of traffic. I am sure that nearly the entire force connected with our road is thoroughly loyal, and that no trouble will come from them, but that they will do their duty.
THOMAS A. SCOTT.
It is well enough in Scott to say--I think he stated in an independent communication, that ninety per cent. of the Pennsylvania railroad employés were loyal. If there were ten per cent. of them loyal I think it would be nearer the truth, for if on Sunday twenty-five men could have put down that riot--they have three hundred clerks, and three or four hundred more in their machine shops, that could have been sworn in by the mayor--they had a better right to protect them. I suppose it is well enough for Scott to say, that they were not invited by the citizens of Pittsburgh. It was a rebellion on the part of the employés, because of grievances they had, or supposed they had, and when mad riot was inaugurated after that, other people came in to do it. It was not the people of Pittsburgh, the taxpayers or representatives of the people of Pittsburgh, any more than it was in Philadelphia in 1844, while a riot held possession of that city for over a week, notwithstanding the military. It was an unfortunate thing that the military were ever called. They did the very best they could. They supposed they were coming to restore order, by the quickest method. I have no complaints to make in that regard, because if our foresight was as good as our hindsight, I don't think there would have been any trouble in this case.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Did you have any consultation with the sheriff about his calling for militia?
A. No, sir; I did not.
Q. When you learned he had made the call, did you take any steps to see him?
A. I did not.
Q. Didn't you know that he was going to make the call?
A. No; I never heard of any call. I did hear, to some extent, I may say. I knew that the railroad authorities were more perfectly aware of the extent of this trouble than the community generally, and when the strike was made, on Thursday, July 19--when the day for putting the order for double-headers into effect. That when an officer of the railroad was assaulted, and the police were asked to arrest that man, which was done, and immediately communication was made with the State authorities to provide for a military force.
Q. How do you know that?
A. I don't want you to ask me how I know it exactly.
Q. If you can give us any knowledge----
A. As a member of a grand jury, I cannot tell who swore to these facts, although I did make certain facts public. I can state here the facts that came before me--that the general of the Sixth division here was called several hours before the civil authorities were called upon. That he was at the railroad depot, and in communication with the State authorities. That he was called there by the State authorities to consult with them. Under the law, I take it, that the civil authorities must come in as a sort of figure head. It was not intended that the sheriff could get any posse of our citizens to put down the riot, but he had to follow up the requirements of the law. That was after the railroad had called upon the State to do this work, being perfectly aware that we had no police force sufficient. The sheriff did his full duty. It was not the fault of the mayor that there was no police. So I do not think the railroad, if they intended to meet this thing, had anything else to do but to call on the State. I think it is a most dangerous power, and one that will stab the liberties of this country, that by the click of the telegraph they can call for a thousand armed men, instead of exhausting the civil authority, if it takes two weeks to do it. It is a dangerous power to give them.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. You claim that they have the power to compel the Governor to furnish troops?
A. Who?
Q. The sheriff or the railroad company?
A. I say it is a power entrusted to him, that Mr. Scott can call on the Governor of the State and furnish transportation, after the sheriff only says so, because the sheriff must conform with the law.
Q. Is that dangerous that he has that right?
A. It is dangerous that any man has a right to ... with a thousand armed troops.
Q. It is dangerous for anyone to have that power?
A. The Governor or any other man. The bill reads: It says that the military shall be subordinate to the civil authorities. It means that the civil power are paramount, and the military should never be called in except to kill--they are not to be degraded into police.
Q. I want to know whether you wish to convey the idea that the railroad company or the sheriff has the power to call out the military, or that he can only make a request, and the Governor has the power?
A. Under the old militia law of the State the sheriff could call them out, or General Pearson, or the major general in command of this division, and he could oblige them to serve as a posse. As it is to-day, he cannot do it.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. I understand, from what you have already said, that it was not necessary, in your opinion, to call out the militia in this instance, at the time they were called?
A. I don't exactly mean that, but I do mean to say, it seemed to be the only power at hand, as we have not enough provided in the city or county. It was ill advised and bad judgment when they were called to put them inside of the mob, and not to keep them in reserve. The purpose of a soldier is simply to kill, and it was particularly ill advised on Saturday, in the teeth of protests made by representative citizens. It could effect nothing but what it did effect, and that was violence in every form.
Q. You had not sufficient police force here to cope with a mob of its extent and power?
A. No, sir.
Q. The sheriff had not sufficient force to cope with it?
A. No.
Q. And I understand it would be folly for the sheriff to attempt to raise a posse of citizens to cope with it--then there was nothing left but to call out the military?
A. I do not see anything else--if they intended to do what they supposed they could do. I do not think it was necessary to call out anybody.