Part 50

A. I suppose in the neighborhood of twelve o'clock in the night. When we arrived in the neighborhood of Twenty-eighth street, several shots were fired--not at us, however. They were fired, I presume, in the air, at least, nobody was hurt, and we went in among the crowd, and the sheriff mounted a little pile of lumber or so, and told this crowd who he was, and was answered with most outrageous language. He told them he was there as a law officer of the county, and insisted upon them dispersing. Told them the consequences of their illegal acts. After he had spoken sometime, some one, who evidently was leader of the party, cried out, "Why, you can go and bring your posse, we don't care a damn for you or your posse. Mayor McCarthy and his police are with us." Then they mentioned the name of some merchant who had promised them a thousand barrels of flour, and another gentleman who promised them one thousand dollars if they would continue. After they had made these remarks, two or three of the fellows took me one side, and told me about a man named McCall, who had been arrested for striking Mr. Watt, and wanted to know if I would defend him next morning at the mayor's office at ten o'clock. I told them if it was necessary; that I was an attorney, and I would go with them, and advised them to leave the railroad property at that time. Talked to them quietly, and promised to meet them the next morning to defend this fellow who had struck Mr. Watt. Sheriff Fife still talked with the crowd. The crowd was very large, and, while he was talking, one or two, maybe three, dispatches--whether they were telegraphic dispatches or not, I do not know--but they received one or two, and probably three dispatches.

Q. The mob?

A. The mob; and as some person would announce the fact that they received these dispatches they would run hurriedly with a lantern, and he would read it out. They said we don't care a damn for you, or your posse, to-morrow at eleven o'clock we will stop every road in the Commonwealth. There will not be a railroad train run to-morrow after eleven o'clock. Their language was simply outrageous. One or two women in the party were, if anything, worse than the men, and extended invitations to the sheriff which he did not accept at that time. Whether he has or not, I don't know. No such invitations were extended to me, however. At that time I was treated very civil, indeed. They treated me very nicely with the exception of the boisterous language which had been used more directly to the sheriff. Finding nothing could be done they insisted upon remaining where they were, and stopping the trains. We walked down to the telegraph office where we had left, and there in consultation with Mr. Scott and others who were present, the sheriff sent communications to the Governor, to the Lieutenant Governor, to the Adjutant General, and Mr. Quay, and whether he sent to any other State officers or not I can't say. He hesitated at first in regard to writing these communications, and said he would prefer to have his attorney. Says he: "I can't reach Mr. Carnochan, but I will submit and ask your advice in regard to this matter."

Q. That is, addressing himself to you?

A. Addressing himself to me. I told him I was very free to confess that after having heard what had been said by the mob at Twenty-eighth street, and the fact that there was not a single police officer to be seen in that neighborhood, although large crowds had congregated there, that it was more than likely that what they said in regard to the mayor was true, that everything looked very serious, that he had but one duty to perform, and that was to call out his _posse comitatus_, and in view of the fact that everything looked so badly just then, that I would not hesitate, were I the sheriff of the county, under the circumstances, to notify the Adjutant General of the true state of affairs. He then sent the telegraphic dispatches as I have stated.

Q. By whom were they written?

A. That is what I cannot tell you, sir. They were sent, I know, by the sheriff. They were not written by myself, and I do not think they were written by Sheriff Fife.

Q. Were they written by Mr. Scott, the solicitor?

A. I think it is more than probable that Mr. Scott wrote the dispatches. When I knew he was going to send the dispatches I had other things to think about. I knew my command was scattered, and I would have a good deal of work to get them out if I was so ordered.

Q. Who first suggested the calling out of the militia in that conversation?

A. That would be hard to tell. The conversation was a general one. Probably there were half a dozen gentlemen present at that meeting.

Q. Between yourself and the sheriff?

A. There was Mr. Scott was there, and I think Mr. Watt and the sheriff, and two or three other railroad officials, and myself. The dispatches were sent. I telegraphed General Latta that I was then at the telegraph office, and subject to any orders that he might send. At about three o'clock, probably half past three o'clock in the morning, I received a telegraphic communication--order from General Latta--ordering me to place one regiment--ordering out one regiment for duty. Upon that order I telegraphed Colonel Guthrie, who resided at the East End, telling him I had ordered out his regiment--the Eighteenth regiment. I came down to the city and stopped one or two of the newspaper presses, and got my order--I think it was in the _Gazette_ and the _Dispatch_--calling upon the Eighteenth regiment to assemble at their armory at six o'clock in the morning, and report at the Union depot at seven. My adjutant was out of town, and I had no means of reaching any members of my staff; but having telegraphed Colonel Guthrie, I fortunately met him early on the following morning, and he had been at work from the time he had received my dispatch in getting his men together. From the fact that his regiment was scattered all over town, it was almost impossible for him to have access to the members of his command, and they did not report at the hour named, to wit: seven o'clock in the morning, but at about twelve o'clock. Colonel Guthrie reported at the Union Depot hotel. I deemed it then--at that time, at Torrens station, where the stock-yards were--there was a large number of sheds, and a great many cattle congregated there, and a large crowd had been there, and I considered it was the principal point of attack--that there was more danger to be apprehended there than any place else. I consequently sent Guthrie and his command to Torrens station by rail. I had telegraphed General Latta of the situation of affairs, and suggested the propriety of calling out the remainder of my division, and received an answer thereto, with orders to that effect. General Brown lived at McKee's, some distance below the city, and I had no means of communicating. I consequently issued my orders directly to the regimental commanders, Colonel Gray and Colonel Howard; also, instructing Captain Breck to report with two pieces of artillery. Late in the afternoon of Friday, probably in the neighborhood of half past three o'clock, Captain Breck reported with his two pieces of artillery, and Colonel Howard reported with but a very few men--I suppose, all told, not fifty from his regiment. I then ordered Colonel Howard and Captain Breck, with his two pieces of artillery, to take their position on Liberty avenue, with the expectation of moving out to Twenty-eighth street. Mr. Thaw, Mr. Scott, and Mr. Cassatt, and one or two other gentlemen, met at the office of Mr. Butler, who was the depot master, and wanted to know whether I could clear Twenty-eighth street with the number of men I then had--that was about seventy-five. I told them there was no doubt about my----

Q. What time was that?

A. That was at four o'clock. I told them there was no doubt about my ability to clear the tracks, at that time, with the number of men. That I had already ordered them to start, to go out Liberty avenue to Twenty-eighth street, and up Twenty-eighth, and take possession of the tracks at that point. I had no doubt of my ability to clear the tracks, at that time, but I was compelled to say that it would be at a fearful loss of life, a thing that I preferred to avert, if possible. Mr. Thaw and Mr. Scott both expostulated, and asked if I would send an aid, and stop the troops from going at that time, which I did. They halted at the Catholic church, and we then talked the matter over. Mr. Cassatt thought it much better to go out and take possession of the property then, even if there should be a trouble. I told them, then, that I could go and take possession of the track, that I thought, from the feeling that was existing then, it would be impossible for me, with seventy-five men, to hold the position. I would clear the tracks, but I would not promise to hold the position at that locality. After considerable conversation, believing it better to avert bloodshed and loss of life, and, acting upon the suggestion of Mr. William Thaw and Mr. Scott, I re-called the troops, and brought them into the Union depot, but, in the meantime, I had visited Torrens station, in company with the sheriff, and he there had spoken to the crowd, and commanded and demanded that they should disperse. They treated him with a very great deal of disrespect, hurling all sorts of outrageous epithets at him, and, seeing quite a number in the crowd whom I knew, not by name, but whom I knew, I thought if I would talk to them I might have some influence, and I got up on a tender, and spoke to them. It just had the opposite effect. They said, we don't care a damn for you or your troops. One man in particular said, "I have been in the army for four years, and many of us have been, and we are going to have bread or blood, and we will wade up to our waists in blood before this thing is over." I told them that was the language generally used by fellows who ran away. There was a good many women and children, and I begged that they would go away. We then returned to Twenty-eighth street, and I again spoke to the crowd there, with a like result. After the troops had been re-called into the Union Depot hotel, it was suggested that, inasmuch as very many of the men of my division were workingmen, who, probably, had fathers or brothers who were directly interested in the railroads, being employés of the road, that their sympathies would be with those that were opposing law and order, that some other troops should be called, and Mr. Cassatt suggested that a Philadelphia regiment be sent for. I telegraphed to General Latta what had been suggested, and, in answer thereto, he asked what I thought of affairs. I told him, from the situation of affairs, that I thought it would be much better to bring additional troops here, and that we ought not to have less than two thousand. That there was but one way to avoid the shedding of blood and loss of life, and that was to overawe the strikers and rioters by an appearance of strength. Acting upon that suggestion, I think General Brinton's command was ordered here. In the evening, I received a telegraphic dispatch from General Latta, stating that he had ordered General Brinton's division to report to me. I received a dispatch from General Brinton, stating that he would leave at one o'clock with eighteen hundred men, fully armed and equipped. At that time, Colonel Gray had reported with the Fourteenth regiment at the Union depot, and a considerable number of the Nineteenth regiment--Colonel Howard's regiment--had also reported, swelling the entire strength of the division to the neighborhood, probably, of six hundred men. Of that number Colonel Guthrie, probably, had two hundred, and over, men at Torrens station. Anticipating the arrival of General Brinton early on Saturday morning before daylight, I ordered Colonel Gray, and Colonel Howard, and Captain Breck to have their men under arms, and ready for any movement I might suggest.

Q. On Saturday morning?

A. Yes, sir; and I think about two-thirty o'clock that morning, I sent Colonel Gray out, taking a circuitous route--taking Bedford avenue, so as to strike the top of the hill directly opposite Twenty-eighth street, with orders to deploy on the summit of the hill, and move down, and giving him time to get to that locality. I had taken out Breck's two guns upon gondola cars and what troops of the Nineteenth had reported under Colonel Howard, and just as we reached Twenty-eighth street, Colonel Gray's regiment could be seen coming down from the summit of the hill, and moving down towards the pieces. At that time there were not many men there--not many of the mob. We disembarked Captain Breck's guns, and placed them in position, facing Twenty-eighth street, and commanding that position. Colonel Gray moved his command down, probably half way down the hill and halted. Colonel Howard took possession of the railroad tracks, and I walked up to meet Colonel Gray's command, and found half a dozen men who had evidently been posted there, and we drove them off the hill. We pushed the crowd back clear to the westerly track, and I told them then and there, that the Philadelphia troops had been ordered here, and that we had no blank ammunition, that these men were all sworn into the service, that they had but one duty to perform, and that was to obey orders, and that they were there in opposition to the law, and that they must leave.

Q. The mob was there in opposition?

A. The mob was there in opposition to the law, and they must leave the tracks, that they had no right there, and that the orders that I would give to my troops would be to keep the hill side clear, and the tracks open for the passage of any trains the railroad officials might see fit to send. There was considerable howling at that time, and some of them spoke about wanting bread, and says I, "If you want bread, if you will go away from there, I will send you a car load of bread. I will furnish you with all the bread you want, if you go away and let these tracks alone." The tracks then were comparatively clear. There was no person on the hill side with the exception of the troops. I then gave directions to General Brown, who had command of the infantry portion of the division, to keep the hill side clear, and allow no person upon the track, and to hold it in the position until he received further orders from me. He spoke of the fact that Twenty-eighth street was a public street, and that the public had a right to use it. I told him that was a matter he had no concern about whatever. I had the responsibility of closing up that street, and I gave him an order to keep the hill side clear, and the people off the track, and anything he might do to carry out that order I would be responsible for, and he would be doing what would place him in no false position. I then jumped on the locomotive, and returned to the Union Depot hotel. During this time numbers of people had come to me to expostulate with me for calling out the troops. I told them that was a matter in which I had no concern whatever; I was merely obeying orders. I was a sworn officer of the Commonwealth, and that every officer and every man in my command had filed their oaths to obey orders. I was there to obey orders, and anything that might happen would not be upon my shoulders, but upon those who were breaking the laws. I received telegrams from General Brinton from various points on his route to Pittsburgh from Philadelphia. When he reached Pittsburgh, it was then in the neighborhood of two o'clock. He had about five hundred and fifty men and two Gatling guns, and I think twenty thousand rounds of extra ammunition. Upon his arrival, we furnished his command--they came in two sections--when the first section arrived, we furnished the troops of that section with such rations as we could procure, which was nothing more or less than a sandwich and cup of coffee, and probably thirty minutes after the second section arrived, and we furnished the troops in that section with sandwiches and coffee. We took the ammunition and placed it in the small building near the track, and I then took General Brinton out and had a consultation with General Latta, who was then in the Union Depot hotel. He wanted to know what my plans were, and I told him, and he asked me the question, "Do you still think that it is better to overawe the mob with the large number of troops?" And I told him, certainly I did, and General Latta agreed with me. Says he, "I think you are pursuing a wise policy. We will try to avert the shedding of blood and loss of life if possible." He then wanted me to show General Brinton the situation of affairs, and I drew a small plot of Twenty-eighth street and the hill, and the track, the round-house, &c. And General Latta asked me, "Who will you send out with General Brinton to show him the situation?" I told him I had better go out myself. We started out the tracks, taking the two Gatling guns by hand. At that time a large crowd was congregated in the neighborhood of the Union Depot hotel, many of them looking over the fences, and others had got inside, and were mingling with the troops, but we pushed out the tracks, and in the neighborhood of Twenty-fourth street there was quite a crowd lining the tracks, standing on the cars, occupying the side of the hill. Probably at that time there was in the neighborhood of one thousand five hundred or two thousand cars laden with all kinds of goods there, and I suggested to General Brinton the propriety of leaving a portion of his troops to guard his flank and rear, as well as to protect the cars, which he did. I think that was probably General Loud's brigade, consisting probably of three hundred men. They were deployed over that locality clear up to the lower round-house. We pushed on with the balance of the troops, headed by the sheriff and his posse. When we got to Twenty-eighth street, instead of finding the tracks clear, and the hill side clear of people, there was one dense mass of humanity, men, women, and children--the hill side was crowded with people. I could not see Colonel Gray's regiment, the Fourteenth. I found a small portion of the Nineteenth occupying the right hand track of the railroad, and the entire tracks in possession of the mob. As we went up the track the sheriff was received with all manner of derisive shouts, calling him all sorts of names. I was received in a like manner, but the crowd seemed to know me very well by name. They pointed me out, and everything that a dirty, low man could say was said. At that time one of the mob pushed through the line of soldiers and struck at one of the officers--whether it was General Brinton, or General Mathews, who commanded one of his brigades, I don't know.

Q. What did he strike with?