Part 48
Q. You were speaking about taking command of the three regiments--the regiments commanded by Colonel Howard and Colonel Gray--did you take command by virtue of your seniority over them?
A. I would, but I do not think I spoke of taking command of the three regiments, as I had not seen Colonel Gray. I do not know what he would do if he had been dismissed by General Brown. I suppose he would think General Brown had his reasons for that. Colonel Howard had voluntarily offered to join with me, and I did assume command. I had no conversation with Colonel Gray at that time, nor for weeks afterwards. I did say that on Monday, when Colonel Gray and myself were parading the streets, that, to the best of my knowledge, as we were returning, I saw Colonel Gray out with his regiment doing the same thing. That continued during the time we remained in our armory afterwards. In other words, I am satisfied that the Fourteenth regiment was organized and ready for duty on Monday.
Q. After they had been dismissed by General Brown?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You say you refused to receive orders from General Brown on Monday?
A. I did.
Q. Give us the reason for that?
A. My reason for that was, that General Brown had dismissed his command, and when he dismissed his command, his authority ceased over them until he re-organized. The act of re-organizing or bringing together the Nineteenth regiment, was a personal matter on the part of Colonel Howard; General Brown had nothing to do with that; it was between Colonel Howard and myself, until General Brown got a brigade together. He could not command me. One regiment does not need a brigadier general and a colonel to command it; there would be a conflict of authority at once; those were my reasons.
Q. Did you not regard him as your superior officer, if you were the only man in his brigade?
A. I would regard him as my superior officer. I believe I could have done better service than he. I was willing to take the responsibility. I think that is the trouble with all the National Guard--there are too many officers.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. And not enough men?
A. And not enough men.
Q. Was there any reason you had for disobeying his orders or receiving orders from him?
A. There was. I believe that General Brown has been suffering from sickness more or less. He was physically weak, and I did not believe was fully equal to the fatigues and annoyance of the command. I had no disposition to ignore General Brown, but I did think that in the great excitement of that day I could have handled my regiments better without being hindered by orders from brigadier generals.
Q. In other words, you regarded him incapacitated for his position in consequence of his illness and mental distress?
A. I did.
Q. And that would justify you?
A. That would have been my defense if I had got into any trouble.
Q. If it had not been that, as a disciplinarian and a military man, you would have considered it your duty to obey?
A. I would. I considered General Brown, under ordinary circumstances, was fully competent for his command; a braver man, I know, never breathed than General Brown--possesses every quality for bravery. His military capacity can hardly be doubted, when a man has filled the various commands that he had in the army.
Q. That is, when he is in good health?
A. When he is in good health, he is a good man.
Q. Did you see anything of General Brinton's command during this trouble, up to the time the collision occurred at Twenty-eighth street?
A. I saw nothing of any troops, except my own regiment, until Sunday night or Monday morning, when I came to town. I saw the troops of General Brinton in the cars, as the passed the stock-yards on their way to Pittsburgh. That is all I saw of them.
Q. As an officer of experience in the army and active service, did you think it was prudent for General Brinton to retire to the round-house when he did?
A. I would not like to have done it. If I had had command enough to have guarded every approach to the round-house, and to have had a guard around the round-house, for the purpose of allowing one portion to sleep while the other was on duty, I might have taken the round-house.
Q. For the reserves?
A. Yes, for the reserves; but under no circumstances would I go into the round-house, without I was certain that every approach to the round-house was thoroughly and properly guarded, and, if it was going to take too many men to guard the approaches to the round-house, I would not go into it then.
Q. Where would you have stationed your men?
A. The hill side there furnished an excellent position. Men could have slept there, and with a small portion of them guarding it, and been free from attack. They could have been free from danger. I like to be out in the open air myself, where I can swing free and clear.
Q. Could you have intrenched yourself on the hill side, so as to make the position secure and safe?
A. I do not think it needed any--it is naturally a strong position. If it was necessary they could have gone to the top of the hill, and nothing could have come in there. A very small force would have guarded any approach. It would not be likely that anybody would have crawled up there.
Q. If there would have been an assault made, would not the troops have been exposed without entrenchments?
A. Not to any extent. Men could have hidden behind a house here and there, and might have taken advantage of the inequalities of the ground, and no large body could have got there.
Q. That hillside is terraced with ravines and wash-outs, which would have given your men as much protection as the enemy?
A. Just as much, and with the advantage that a man in command of the troops would have the selection of the ground. I never walked over the ground particularly--I walk by there twice a day, and I am familiar with the appearance of the hill. What the number of inequalities of the ground are, I do not know, but it is a hill, at all events, and the mob would come from below.
Q. The hill would have been the most eligible position for the force From your knowledge of the Union depot, would that have served as a fortification for General Brown's command to repel the mob, in case they had made an attack on the depot?
A. To go down to the Union depot?
Q. For instance, if they were in the depot?
A. Oh, no; I think not. I do not think that depot was a desirable place for any defense, because there was too much space between there and the transfer station, where General Brown was, but the Union depot was certainly the only place where these troops could get supplies, and it would have been a good thing to have kept that space open, between the Union depot and General Brown. I do not think that the force could have scattered them to the extent that you speak of, defending the Union Depot hotel and transfer station and the round-house. I do not think they had enough men for it.
Q. Was there any available position between the transfer station and the Union depot, where he could have entrenched himself and secured a position?
A. The hillside was there. I think there was too much space between Twenty-eighth street and the Union depot for General Brinton to have attempted to protect all that line of property. He had not enough for that.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Could he, with his men stationed at the Union depot, have gone out and driven off any crowd of men that might attempt to set fire to the cars and thus keep the space clear by sallying from the Union depot.
A. I think he could; and, if it was necessary for him to go into any house, I would have preferred taking the whole command down to the Union depot, than going into the round-house and transfer station.
Q. And then guarded it as far out as you could?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The reason for that would have been that the supplies were all at the Union depot?
A. All at the Union depot.
Q. And the ammunition?
A. The ammunition was there. However, I do not think that General Brinton knew anything about the ammunition, where that was, or anything about it, when he went into the round-house, and neither do I believe that General Brinton anticipated any trouble when he went into the round-house. Firing upon the mob and dispersing it, he was left without any disposition for some time, and then he went into the round-house.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Do you know whether General Brinton received the order from General Latta, to join you at the stock-yards?
A. No; I can only answer that by hearsay.
Q. Did he report that he received that order?
A. Yes, he does. The adjutant general in his report states that Colonel Norris and Colonel Stewart went out to deliver an order to General Brinton. General Brinton in his report states that at a certain time, Colonel Norris did join; he did not state whether Colonel Norris gave him, or what answer he gave Colonel Norris; but the two put together, demonstrate pretty clearly that he did receive an order.
Q. Was there anything to prevent General Brinton from joining you at the stock-yards?
A. Nothing at all, except, probably he might have not known the way out, but he could have found that by inquiring. There was not even that excuse, because he had an officer of the Sixth division with him, I believe, showing him the way.
Q. In his retreat or march from the city to Blairsville, how far did he pass from you, from the stock-yards, how near?
A. He was going away from me within fifteen minutes of the time he left the round-house--about fifteen minutes' march from the round-house he came to the junction of the Sharpsburg and East Liberty roads. The East Liberty led to the right and the Sharpsburg road to the left. He took the road to the left, so he was going away from me all the time after he got to where these two roads united. General Brinton did not get this order that General Latta speaks of in his report and that Colonel Norris carried to him--he did not get that order, and Colonel Norris did not join him until he got to the Sharpsburg bridge.
Q. Until he got to it--he received it before he crossed the river?
A. I think he did. This is only hearsay on my part. I do know that General Brinton had not received that order until he got to the Sharpsburg bridge, because Captain Aull of my regiment had a copy of the order. He had the written order. Colonel Norris had a verbal copy. Stewart and Norris reached General Brinton. Captain Aull did not. Captain Aull was in uniform, and had not the same facilities for passing through crowds that the other two men had who were in citizens' clothes.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. In the absence of the commander-in-chief, who is the senior?
A. The next officer of the line, the senior officer?
Q. Who is he--what person would be the next?
A. In these troops out here I believe General Pearson would be in command.
Q. Of the troops of the State who would be?
A. The Governor is the commander-in-chief. After the Governor, the next senior major general. I believe the senior major general was General Dobson or General Osborne. I have forgotten which. After him comes General Pearson in order of seniority, and after all the major generals had been exhausted the brigadier generals would come in; then the colonels.
Q. Is there any other person except the Governor as commander-in-chief who has authority to call out the militia?
A. I think not. That is a matter of law, and that I am not exactly able to give an opinion upon. My understanding as a military officer is that no one but the Governor can call the troops out. I certainly would hesitate a long time before I would obey an order from anybody else.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. In the absence of the Governor from the State is there any one that could call out the troops?
A. Unless he left orders with his adjutant general.
Q. Can he delegate that power as commander-in-chief to any person?
A. That is another fine legal point. I will say this: That if the Governor is absent and an order came signed by order of the commander-in-chief, James W. Latta, Adjutant General, I should obey it. It is not my business to know whether the Governor is present or not. The order the official----
Q. He might exercise his powers as commander-in-chief out of the State, and without the exercise of the power from him, could any other person exercise that power of commander-in-chief?
A. No, sir; there is no power can order out the militia but the Governor.
Q. Is there such a thing as a Governor _pro tem._ in the absence of the Governor?
A. I do not think there is such a thing as a Governor _pro tem._
Q. The Lieutenant Governor, would he exercise the functions of Governor in case of the death of the Governor?
A. Of course in event of his death he becomes Governor at once. I do not understand that anybody can exercise the functions of the Governor but the Governor. That is a little bit of teaching I learned in the Democratic party when I was a very little bit of a fellow, and never forgot it. We have a respect for law and authority in our party.
Q. Is there anything else you can enlighten us on in regard to the military movements of the mob that you can think of?
A. There is nothing that I can say, except to give an opinion about the character of this mob, and the sufficiency of the military, and civil authorities, &c. I looked around very closely into this matter, and I am perfectly satisfied, in my own mind, that this mob was not to be dealt with by a trifling force. I do not believe it was in the power of the civil authorities to have put it down. I do not believe it was within the power of the small military force that was first called out to have put it down. It ceased to be a riot and got to be an insurrection almost instantly. The time was very short that intervened between the mob and the insurrection.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. What distinction do you make between a mob and an insurrection?
A. I believe that a mob is an uprising in a locality, either here or anywhere else--a small uprising that is within the power of the sheriff to look after. The sheriff, with what posse he might get together, may attempt to restore peace, and, failing in that, call out the local military. I make the dividing line as to when it becomes an insurrection when the executive of the state is compelled to interfere. If the sheriff and the Eighteenth regiment and the Fourteenth regiment and the Nineteenth regiment had put down that thing and restored peace and order, and placed the cars of the railroad in the hands of the company, I would have called it a riot.
Q. And then the difference between a mob and an insurrection is in strength and power?
A. Strength and power. If they overcome the local authorities and the State authorities have to interfere, then it is an insurrection. The sheriff is one arm of the executive. If he cannot quell it, then the executive himself has to come in.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. When you first arrived at the Union depot, that was on----
A. Friday, at noon.
Q. Would it have required a large force to disperse the mob then?
A. It would not--not at Twenty-eighth street. I did not get off the cars at Twenty-eighth street; and I did not go up to Twenty-eighth street; and I did not know what the disposition of the crowd was; and I do not know what was back there--what could be seen--but those that could be seen certainly did not appear over two hundred or two hundred and fifty men.
Q. If there had been active measures taken on Friday or Saturday, could not that mob have been dispersed and the rioting suppressed?
A. I believe it could on Friday. I do not believe it could on Saturday. On Friday it could, because the strikers were determined themselves not to go to work, and some of them were rioters. There is no doubt about it; because some of them had interfered with the civil authorities, and a great portion of them were simply determined that they would not work, and they would not furnish any assistance to the Pennsylvania railroad in running their trains. For that reason, I believe the trains ought to have been started at once. I believe if a train had been started, the backbone of the thing would have been broken. I believe so to-day; but it was impossible to move trains, because you could not get men to man them. They were afraid of the strikers. It was not necessary for a striker to go up and stick a pistol at a man's head, or say, "I will shoot you." Some of them would give a wink and lift a finger, which would be just as effectual as if they had shot at you. I saw one striker go on the back part of an engine tender of a locomotive and take hold of a brake that was there. The engineer attempted to start the train. He just lifted his finger and the engineer never moved that train.
Q. If these trainmen that were willing to run had received the protection either of the military or civil authorities, could they not have run out these trains, and do you not think they would have been run out?
A. I think everybody got all the protection it was possible to give them. The Pennsylvania railroad were not prepared to run these trains, and they knew what the riot was, and what it would amount to more than we did. I knew no reason why troops should be called out on the morning I was called out. Never heard of a disturbance of any kind. After the military had been called out, then affairs had progressed so far that to have started a train from Twenty-eighth street would have required to place upon that train a large force of military to protect it. You could have moved it, probably to the stock-yards, and through the stock-yards, because there was a military force to protect it there, but as soon as they got a little west, why something might be thrown upon the track--a demonstration made of some kind that would block the cars up. There was no certainty it could go very far after it had started. But for the reason that there had been no demonstration made at any point, I believe if the train had been started, it could have gone through; not that it was in the power of the small force, civil or military, to put down the strikers, had they determined to resist, because there were too many of those strikers and fellow helpers in the mob.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. You think there was a necessity for calling on the military?
A. Oh, undoubtedly. There is no question about it in my mind. The only thing I find to regret was that the military did not have proper information as to what it meant. I am but an humble citizen of the city of Pittsburgh, and I know nothing about the strike on the Pennsylvania railroad, and what led to it, and what it meant. I went down to Union depot, and until I met General Pearson, or the sheriff, I knew no reason why the military should be called out. When I got back I could see why. There was a demonstration against law and order.
Q. There was a necessity?
A. There was a necessity, for the evidence proved that.
* * * * *
Colonel Joseph H. Gray, _sworn_:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where do you reside, Colonel?
A. I reside in Pittsburgh, East End.
Q. What is your official position in the National Guard?
A. I am colonel of the Fourteenth regiment.
Q. Were you in the war of the late rebellion?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What rank did you hold?
A. I was orderly sergeant of a company in the One Hundred and Fifth Pennsylvania regiment.
Q. How long were you in the army?
A. I went in in 1861, and remained in the service until the battle of Fair Oaks, where I was laid up from service.
Q. State when you received the orders calling you into service in July last--what day it was and what time?
A. I was not present. I had left Thursday morning and gone to the country, fourteen miles, and on Friday the order reached head-quarters for Colonel Glenn to assemble the regiment, about noon or after dinner some time.
Q. Was he lieutenant colonel?
A. Yes; lieutenant colonel. About Friday evening I heard that there was trouble in the city, and that the military was called out, and I also heard that the men could not be depended on--that they were not going to respond. Citizens from East Liberty came up. I jumped in my buggy and started to the city, and I met one company at East Liberty. I stopped there and, to my astonishment, found that the company had been assembled, and that a large majority of the company had responded to the call, and were ready for service, in their armory. I spoke a few words to the captain and told him to remain there until I came from the city, and he requested me to telegraph him immediately, and send him some orders. I stopped at my home, and put on my fatigue uniform, and came to the city, and went to the central armory and found there my adjutant, and that Lieutenant Colonel Glenn had taken what men had assembled there--there are three companies who have their armories there--and he had taken them to the Union Depot hotel. I immediately went there and reported for duty to General Brown. I inquired of my officers as to the number of men that had reported for duty, and then I had six companies in the city and four in the country. I inquired whether Captain Shof had been ordered out at East Liberty--he told me not. I went to the dispatcher's office, at the end of the hotel, and telegraphed to those companies to report to me immediately, at the Union Depot hotel. However, at that time they could not very well get in, and I changed the order to report to me on the first morning train coming into the city. About 7 o'clock Captain Nesbitt came up and Captain Glenn, of Mansfield, reported with their companies. That was Friday evening. It was six o'clock when I came to the Union depot, and they arrived at seven. I went out to the dispatcher's office the second time, to order Captain Perchman in. I then met, for the first time, General Pearson and told him what I proposed doing, and he said that he preferred that Captain Perchman should remain in his armory there for the present, and Colonel Moore, as chief of staff, told me he had communicated with Captain Perchman to this effect, that he should go and get his men rations and remain there, so that I then turned my attention to having my men fed. I asked the gentleman in charge of the depot if he had any cars in the ... he should run them down, so that I could put my men into them for the night, until further orders. He immediately had cars run down. I did that because I wanted to get my men--there was a great deal of talking on the platform around the depot about the future operations. General Latta had just come in, and there was a good deal of excitement, and I did not want my men to know anything about it. I put them in the cars and kept them there until three o'clock, in the morning. Then I received an order, about twelve or one o'clock, to take my command, at three o'clock, sharp, to Twenty-eighth street, by way of Webster avenue. I marched out of the Union depot precisely at three o'clock, and General Brown and Colonel Smith and another gentleman. We went to Twenty-eighth street by a circuitous route, and took a position on the hill side center, opposite Twenty-eighth street, in line. There we remained during the day. I should say about nine o'clock, perhaps between eight and nine o'clock, General Brown sent his adjutant to me, asking the detail of one or two companies--I think he said fifty men.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. That was on Saturday?
A. That was on Saturday morning. I sent two companies to the foot of the hill, and they were on duty there for an hour, perhaps an hour and a half, and they were relieved by two other companies.
Q. From your regiment?
A. Yes, sir; during the forenoon I sent a request to General Brown that my two companies should be relieved. They had all been down, and I asked that they be relieved by the Nineteenth regiment. I thought we were doing more than our share of duty, and for other reasons I asked to be relieved.
Q. You speak here of Colonel Glenn?