Part 47

A. When I got to Torrens station I found at least twelve hundred men there, composed of strikers, and the crowd and mob--not a mob--lookers on. I had no trouble in getting into position, no trouble of any kind. Was not greeted with hisses, noise, or demonstration of any kind whatever. As soon as I got my command in the position I wanted them in, I brought them to a rest. Then I went around on the tracks to see what the condition of affairs was. I found, as I stated before, that the mob contained two elements there--strikers and lookers on. I sent for the man who was represented to me to be a leader among the strikers, had him brought down to my position, and had a long conversation with him. I informed him that I had been sent out there with orders from General Pearson to see that all trains passed through the stock-yards. It was my duty to keep the tracks clear, and keep the crowd from interfering with the passage of trains, &c. I didn't want to have any trouble or any disturbance of any kind; but the moment a train approached there it was going to go through. He told me that the strikers had no intention, no disposition to interfere with the passage of the trains, that the Pennsylvania railroad might send all the trains through they had got. He said they could not send any through because they could not get the men to man them; but if they could, they could send them through; they didn't intend to interfere. I told him I was glad to hear that, that it would probably make things a great deal easier, because if the crowd interfered outside of the strikers a man would have less hesitation in dealing with them. This conversation with this leader of the strikers occurred immediately after I got there, as soon as I got my command into a position and gave the command rest. Almost immediately after, and during my conversation with this man, a train came up to the stock-yards from Pittsburgh. That was a freight train or a passenger train--I have forgotten. I did not probably look at that time; but I think it was a freight train; but that train was loaded down with roughs on the cars, and platforms of the cars, the engine, cow-catcher, and every available space. I think the train was crowded with the most infernal lot of scoundrels that a man ever saw. I do not think that they were strikers entirely, though. There were a great many men from Pittsburgh that I recognized; but there was a large element on that train I could not account for at all. They became very noisy and offensive. All of them got off that train and crowded on to any trains that were stationary there--cars standing on the track, which brought them within a very few feet of my regiment. Their remarks became so offensive to me that I was afraid that if it was allowed to continue it might bring about trouble. I had the bayonets fixed on my guns, and I charged bayonets on this crowd. They broke and fled away, and got some distance off. In the interval I formed my men in another position more satisfactory to me--got them on the street, and in what we call column of companies. Before, I was in line of battle. I remained in that position for some time. I would say here that the understanding between General Pearson and myself, when I went to the stock-yards, was that the trains would be sent out immediately. I urged it upon General Pearson. I believed it was the best thing then, and I believe so now, that a train should have been started, that if one train could have got through, all the rest would have followed, and even one train would have broken the force of the strike; but I waited and waited and waited in position there until the men could stand it no longer. The crowd three times during my stay at the stock-yards annoyed me, and crowded close on my lines, and became somewhat demonstrative, so much so that I was afraid to allow the thing to continue, and I charged bayonets. Every time I charged bayonets the crowd dispersed, and twice I loaded the guns in the presence of the mob, and the moment the guns were loaded the crowd fled and dispersed; but would return almost immediately after. As soon as the crowd would go away from my front I would take the cartridges out of the guns to prevent the men from recklessly firing and bringing about any conflict between the troops and the crowd. That continued time after time during my whole stay at the stock-yards. These men were easily driven away by me. At any appearance I would make of a disposition to fire upon them or use force against them, the mob would disperse--the crowd would disperse, because it was hardly a mob. I could not see that they were armed at all. If they were armed they had pistols--they had no guns of any kind.

Q. Had they thrown any missiles?

A. The second time I charged on them, they began throwing, but it didn't amount to anything--no more than five or six men were engaged. One man who stood on the top of the cars--a man known as Monkey John, a man who has since been tried by the courts here--was the most offensive in the whole crowd. He expressed a great desire on his part to split my head open, but he didn't try it. He was within a few feet of me, and I was strongly tempted to split his head open, but I thought I had better not. During the time I remained at the stock-yards, I was frequently visited by General Pearson, and to all of my inquiries, why trains had not started out, his answer was, the troops were not ready in the town, and hadn't been able to get possession of Twenty-eighth street, which brings me back to my original assertion, that, if the first troops had gone to Twenty-eighth street, we might have had the trains moving. General Pearson, every time he came out, was accompanied by some of the railroad officials, and all of them seemed to be very anxious with regard to my ability to hold that place; but I told them there was no mob in front of me, only a crowd, that might become a mob if they got the upper hand, and so long as they didn't have the upper hand they were a crowd. That was the state of affairs until the arrival of the troops from Philadelphia. At the time they arrived, General Pearson informed me that as soon as they got into the Union Depot hotel they would be disembarked, and brought out to Twenty-eighth street, and placed in position at Twenty-eighth street, and the Fourteenth, and Nineteenth, and Breck's battery would be sent out to me, and the trains moved. I waited until nearly two o'clock that night, (Saturday,) waiting for trains, and waiting for information. Not a train appeared, and not a word of official information reached me until Sunday morning. On Sunday morning, about half past two o'clock, I received a communication from James W. Latta, Adjutant General, which was the first information I had that General Pearson was not in command, and that General Latta was directing affairs--informing me that ammunition would be sent out to me by wagon, under the charge of an officer of the staff. Upon the arrival of that ammunition, I would be joined by troops from Walls station, and, when that junction was formed, I was to march into town to the relief of General Brinton, besieged in the round-house. I prepared my men for marching, and waited the arrival of the ammunition. Sometime after that the ammunition arrived, and I am not able to state the time exactly, because my watch had run down, and everybody else's around. When the ammunition reached me, an order also came with it, stating that the troops at Walls station were without ammunition, that the engineer was unable to bring the train in, and they could not make a movement until they had ammunition. That all the approaches to the city from Walls station were crowded by rioters. That all points along the railroad, suitable for their purpose, was in possession of the rioters--a fact which I demonstrated afterwards by sending men out of my own command to determine whether that was the case or not. I received orders also to send ammunition by wagon out to these men. As soon as that ammunition was received, they were directed to continue to march in to me, and, when they joined me, I was directed to complete the movement as ordered in my first dispatch. I hired a wagon, and sent a squad of men out with it. They had to take a roundabout way to get there. I sent, I think, five thousand rounds of ammunition out to these men. Time was passing away very rapidly, and it was nearly ten o'clock before these men got to Walls station with that ammunition.

Q. Ten o'clock on what day?

A. On Sunday morning. In the meantime I had made up my mind that the Walls station troops could not get in. About five o'clock I had made up my mind that the troops from Walls station could not get in to me in time to make the junction and march in to the relief of General Brinton, and I sent Captain Aull, of my regiment, in to General Latta, with instructions to tell him that, in my opinion, these forces couldn't join me, and to countermand the order so far as Walls station troops were concerned, and order me into the city. On the way in to General Latta, Captain Aull witnessed the leaving of the round-house by General Brinton's command. He conveyed that information to General Latta. General Latta then sat down and wrote an order to General Brinton, ordering him to unite with me at the stock-yards, and sent a copy of that order out to me. Of course that prevented me acting on my own responsibility, and I was compelled to remain at the stock-yards. The order reached General Brinton, and General Brinton refused to join me--at all events he didn't join me. I waited there until about twelve o'clock, and I was satisfied then that it was not General Brinton's intention to come to me--that he had left the city, and he didn't intend to return. I then made up my mind I would go into town and see myself what was going on. In all this time I hadn't one word of official information concerning what was going on in town. Colonel Smith came to my camp on Sunday morning, and gave me the first information of the state of affairs in Pittsburgh. Of course I could see a dim light in town, but the extent of what had occurred I didn't understand--I could hardly believe--and I could hardly believe that the large force of well drilled men under General Brinton could not control any mob that might be brought against them. At twelve o'clock and about ten minutes, these troops from Walls station came down to Torrens station.

Q. Twelve o'clock Sunday night?

A. Twelve o'clock noon on Sunday. At that time I knew, from the officers I had sent out after Brinton, that Brinton was not going to come back to Pittsburgh. I had official information from the staff of the Sixth division that the Fourteenth regiment and the Nineteenth had been disbanded by General Brown, and there was no military force in the city of Pittsburgh. I didn't deem that the troops from Walls station were of any assistance to me whatever, at that time. I thought they were a great hinderance to my efforts. I ordered them back to Walls station, and to go from there to Blairsville, which would be, I thought, almost necessary that Brinton should make a junction. 1 didn't see how he was to get home unless he did go to Blairsville in some way or another. I then came into town to see how affairs stood. I went to the Union Depot hotel; reached the Union Depot hotel just about the time it had been fired--it was then in a blaze, commencing to burn, though the fire was not thoroughly under way. I went to the end of the building, and I saw some fifty or sixty men on the tracks engaged in burning and pillaging. I think at that time that twenty-five good men could have checked that whole business. There was a large crowd in the open space in front of the Union Depot hotel, and a large crowd on Liberty street. I went through the crowd in front of the hotel, and went through the crowd on Liberty street, and I am satisfied there were not men enough in the Sixth division to stop that burning. The crowd on Liberty street and in the space in front of the Union Depot hotel was merely lookers-on, but it only needed a demonstration of some kind against them to have made every one of those men, or nearly every one of those men, part and parcel of that mob engaged in pillaging and burning. They would have gone to the defense of those men without any question. I satisfied myself of this matter pretty thoroughly. I was not hasty about it--calmly went through that crowd and heard them talk, and knew exactly what they meant. They were men that were not disposed to take upon themselves to burn or pillage, because there was no necessity, since they had other men to do it for them.

Q. Were you in military uniform?

A. No, sir; I was not. I could never have got into town with a military uniform on. I came into town not only disguised, but in a great measure hidden. I did that for the reason that men that joined my command, within a few moments of leaving, had told me of being stopped on the way themselves. They had to take a roundabout way to go out to the camp. I saw on my way in there were crowds of men everywhere who would have put a stop to any person coming into town in uniform. I went to the Union Depot hotel for the purpose of finding General Latta, and discover what was being done and what had been done. The moment I got there I saw for myself what had been done by the rioters, but what the military authorities were doing, of course, I couldn't ascertain until I had found General Latta. 1 hunted around through the town and found General Latta at the Monongahela House. He was regretting very much, at that time, that General Brinton had gone out of the city instead of going out to me or coming into the city. He was powerless to do anything, he had no troops under his command except my own regiment. I went to my armory, and I sent out to Colonel Smith and the adjutant general of the Fourth brigade instructions to my regiment to march into town. Through some delay on the part of Captain Aull, the regiment was delayed about two hours. They reached here about dark.

Q. By what route?

A. They came in on Fifth avenue, the only route they could have gotten into town. The crowd was very large on Penn avenue. Notwithstanding, they came into town, I believe, without any demonstrations of any kind against them whatever; marched down to the armory. We remained there on duty continually. Colonel Howard came in and he brought his regiment together. Colonel Gray, of the Fourteenth, got his regiment together. On Monday morning the three regiments were here in the city of Pittsburgh ready for duty, and on Monday morning, the three regiments, I believe, paraded through the streets. Colonel Howard's and my own regiment paraded together. I think I remember, after going back to the armory, seeing Colonel Gray's regiment return to the armory after their parade. I am not certain about that, but I think I did. Those two regiments returned to their armory, were ready, and could have been assembled had anybody taken the trouble to order them--could have been assembled in a very short time. On Monday morning, I believed that I was in command of the troops of the Sixth division. I certainly was in command of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth regiments, because Colonel Howard was then in my armory with his regiment and had agreed to obey orders under me. General Brown came in and assumed command on Monday morning, and I refused to recognize or obey any orders from him. He remonstrated, but I insisted that I wouldn't obey his orders. I was in command of the troops, and I intended to handle them, and he went out and various men came in and thought it was a very serious thing to have dissensions in the military at that time--the city was apparently in the hands of the mob, and it would be better for the military to proceed as a military body, without any dissensions in rank. After listening to them, I agreed to serve under General Brown, and I so notified him. From that time until the troops were ordered to Luzerne, and until we returned, I served immediately under the command of Brigadier General Brown. That is the outline of my service.

Q. Did you receive any orders from General Brown to disband your regiment at any time?

A. On the 31st of July, about one o'clock in the afternoon, General Brown sent an officer of his staff to my head-quarters, requesting my presence at his head-quarters. I think it was the 31st of July. I went up to General Brown's head-quarters, and he gave me a verbal order to dismiss my regiment. I asked him by what authority the regiment was disbanded. He said he had just come from the Governor's head-quarters, or he had received an official communication from the Governor's head-quarters, I have forgotten which. At all events, the orders were from his superior officers that my regiment, and also Colonel Gray's and Colonel Howard's were to be disbanded. I think he had sent to Colonel Howard and Colonel Gray also. I determined that I wouldn't disband my regiment, and I couldn't see why the Sixth division should be dismissed when the Governor was rapidly assembling all the troops of the State in this city. Could not understand it, and felt there was a mistake of some kind about it. I went back to the armory. That afternoon I paraded my regiment, and before I got through the parade I had official knowledge that the Sixth division was to go to the coal regions, which demonstrates fully to my mind that there had been a mistake made somewhere, or there never was a communication of the Governor's that the Sixth division should be dismissed at all. So far as official knowledge of what took place in the city of Pittsburgh on Friday after half-past one o'clock, and on Saturday until six o'clock, I know nothing at all. I was not present with my regiment and knew nothing at all about it, except on Sunday afternoon, when I came in myself. With the burning of the elevator on Sunday afternoon, I think all danger of a mob had passed. The men had got all the whisky they could get hold of, and the whisky had worked its effect on these men. The burning and pillaging of this city was stopped by the giving out of whisky, and with the natural working of the whisky on the human body. The men were dead drunk. On Monday morning there was no mob in the city of Pittsburgh that I could see, though the railroad property and trains were in the possession of the strikers, and remained so until the arrival of Governor Hartranft with the national guard.

Q. What day was that?

A. I do not remember what day that was; that was probably the 25th or 26th of July--it was later than that. I cannot state the date of his arrival. They were here on the 31st of July. I remember that, because I went to out to see General Brinton on that day.

Q. Did you have any trouble in assembling your regiment--in getting them together?

A. When they were first ordered out?

Q. Yes.

A. Oh, I had a great deal.

Q. What I mean is, were the men willing to serve?

A. Oh, yes; no trouble of that kind in my regiment whatever. The only trouble was in getting hold of the men.

Q. Was there any disposition among your men to aid or sympathize with the strikers?

A. Not a bit, sir.

Q. Could you have depended on them, do you think, for any emergency?

A. Depended on them for any emergency whatever. I had no trouble of that kind. I never gave a thought of trouble of that kind. I had no personal worry or annoyance with the men in my regiment. I do not believe there was much of that thing in any of the other regiments.

Q. How much, or under what circumstances, would you deem it proper for an officer under command, in the face of a mob, to give the order to fire. That is, how much resistance on the part of the mob, or demonstration on their part, before an officer would be justifiable in firing, or giving the word of command to his men to fire?

A. I would hesitate some before I would give an order to fire, unless there was a shot fired. The firing of a gun or pistol into the ranks of my men would, I believe, justify me in giving an order to fire, and I would at once do it. A man in command of troops has to judge a good deal of the disposition of the crowd, as he can see it. I can hardly tell you exactly what I mean. Sometimes you find a crowd in front of you good-natured, meaning no harm, and you generally find among the crowd a lot of men who are working the mischief--see an element of that kind in a crowd. I do not think an officer is justified in hesitating at all, because these men can soon influence a crowd to do as they want to. If a crowd attempted to seize hold of the guns of my command, I should certainly give an order to fire. I would not give the order recklessly to fire. I would give the crowd time to get out of the way, by simply announcing to them that I would fire if the crowd did not disperse. If they had been firing into me, and committing acts imperiling the lives of my men, I do not know that I would give them that warning. These are little things a man would have to judge of as they occurred. I believe an overt act committed by a mob justifies the officer who commands the troops to fire.

Q. Would the hurling of missiles into your men by the mob be a provocation sufficient to justify the commander giving an order to fire?

A. I believe it would, but the commander would consider the previous acts of the mob and all the conditions of it, the character of it, and the character of the people in it, &c. I believe whenever a mob in the presence of the military does damage to the military that the military are justified in doing damage to the mob, and doing it right quick.

Q. And use the necessary efforts to disperse the mob?

A. Yes; fire at them, and do it quickly, and do enough of it to prevent them ever coming back. I do not believe a man in command of troops has any right to act rashly, and would hesitate some before he would do a thing of that kind. My idea of the military has always been that they are subordinate until the sheriff is satisfied he can do nothing--that then they step in and act quickly. Probably there would be no demonstration against the military if the military officer would inform the mob that if they did not disperse within a certain time, he would fire upon them, and if necessary, load in the presence of the mob, and ninety-nine times out of one hundred, I believe, there would be no mob by the time they got loaded.

Q. Did the mob flee or disperse before your men every time you gave the order to load?

A. They scattered every time. I had no trouble at all with the mob--I did not consider that I had a mob in front of me. I simply had a large crowd, which I believe would have been a mob if they could have got the upper hand in any way.

Q. You ordered to charge bayonets once or twice?

A. Three times.

Q. In the charge bayonets, did the crowd stand until your men came close to them?

A. No, sir; they fled in a good natured way. Laughed--no trouble at all to get rid of them. My object only was to prevent them coming too close. If the men get close enough some men in the crowd might feel like taking a musket away, and that would bring about a disturbance. It is better to prevent anything of that kind than to allow it to come and then act afterwards.

Q. Your object was to preserve the military character of your regiment?

A. Yes, sir.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. Keep the troops and the mob separate?

A. Yes. I never let the mob in with my troops at all, sir.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. You were in active service during the last war, were you not?

A. I was.

Q. In what capacity?

A. I went out in the service as second lieutenant, and came back a major--filled all the intermediate ranks.

Q. How long were you in the service?

A. Three years and seven months.