Part 3

On leaving, General Pearson gave General Brinton orders to hold the position until he returned, which he thought would be within an hour. On reaching Union depot General Pearson was informed that the mob was very much exasperated against him, as they held him responsible for the firing on them by the troops, and was advised by General Latta and others that his presence would still further aggravate the crowd, and that he had better retire to some place of safety until the excitement was over, which advice was followed, and he therefore did not return to General Brinton. The effort to provision General Brinton's troops was a failure, as the mob seized, used, and destroyed the food which was sent out for the purpose. The round house and machine shop overlooked Liberty street on one side, on the other side were the tracks, many of them filled with cars, and near the machine shop were piles of lumber and materials used in repairs. Pickets were put out on this side of the machine shop so as to prevent the mob from taking shelter behind the piles of lumber, and firing on the troops from these places. The mob had broken into two or three gun stores in the city between eight and nine o'clock that evening, and had, by this means, secured guns and ammunition, and soon after dark commenced firing on the round house and machine shops, firing in at the windows and at any soldiers they could get sight of, one of the mob firing an explosive bullet, which the troops could see explode every time it struck anything in their vicinity.

Two of the soldiers were wounded, one in the arm and one in the leg, during the night, which is all the casualties that occurred among them until after they left the round house and shop in the morning. About ten o'clock P.M., the mob began setting fire to the cars, and running them down the track nearest the round house, in order, if possible, to set it on fire, and thus drive out the troops. From some distance above Twenty-eighth street to below Twenty-sixth street it is down grade, and the cars will run of their own gravitation, on being started, down to and below the buildings in which the troops were located. The first car fired was a car of coal, and, after being set on fire, it was started on the down grade with one of the mob on it, and he, on arriving at the round house, broke up the car and stopped it. Other cars were fired and run down against the first one, and there was soon a string of fire the whole length of the shops on the side next the tracks. The round house was well supplied with water, and the troops were enabled to keep the fire from communicating with the buildings during the night.

About one o'clock, on the morning of the 22d, (Sunday,) it was discovered that the mob had a field piece on Liberty street, ready to fire on the round house. By General Brinton's orders his men were stationed at the windows ready to fire, and the mob were notified to abandon the gun and not attempt to fire it, or they would be fired on. They paid no attention to the warning, and when one of them was seen with the lanyard in his hand ready to discharge the piece, orders were given the troops to fire, and several of the mob fell, and the rest ran away. Several attempts were made by the mob during the night to creep up and discharge the gun, but the soldiers kept close watch on it and allowed them no opportunity to do so. General Brinton succeeded in communicating with General Latta during the night by sending out one of his men, Sergeant Joseph F. Wilson, who, by disguising himself, succeeded in getting out and back twice, but would not undertake it again. He brought orders from General Latta to hold on as long as possible, that Guthrie had been ordered to report to him, and ought to reach him at five or six o'clock, but if compelled to escape at last, to do so to the eastward, to take Penn avenue if possible, and make for Colonel Guthrie, at Torrens. The scout, Wilson, brought in the last dispatch about two o'clock, A.M., the 22d, and this was the last communication that reached General Brinton while in the round house. The ordeal through which these men passed that night was fearful. Tired, hungry, worn out, surrounded by a mob of infuriated men, yelling like demons, fire on nearly all sides of them, suffocated and blinded by smoke, with no chance to rest, and but little knowledge of what efforts were being made for their relief, with orders not to fire on the mob unless in necessary self defense, the wonder is that they were not totally demoralized; but the evidence of all the officers is that the men behaved like veterans, obeyed all orders cheerfully and with promptness, and during the whole night but one company manifested any spirit of insubordination, and these proposed to lay down their arms and quit, as they were not allowed to use them on the mob, while the latter were taking every opportunity of shooting down the soldiers. This insubordination was quickly brought to an end as soon as the attention of the proper officer was called to it, and when the troops marched out in the morning, no one could tell by their actions which of the men had wavered during the night. About half-past seven, Sunday morning, the 22d instant, the machine shop caught fire in many places, the roof of the round house also was on fire, and it became necessary to evacuate the buildings. The two Napoleon guns could not be removed, and were spiked, and about eight, A.M., the command marched out into the street in good, order, taking their Gatling guns with them. The mob scattered in every direction at sight of the troops coming out, and no attempt was made to molest the soldiers until they began their march eastward by Penn avenue, in pursuance of the orders received from General Latta.

After marching two or three squares, the troops were harassed by a fire in their rear. They were fired at from second story windows, from the corners of the streets, and from every place where one of the mob could fire from under cover so as to be safe himself from a return fire. They were also fired at from a police station, where eight or ten policemen stood in uniform, as they passed, and when they were a convenient distance from the station, shots were fired at them from the crowd there assembled. It is hard to believe charges of this kind, but the evidence is too positive and circumstantial to leave room for doubt. At one point, just before reaching the United States arsenal, there was some confusion among the men in the rear of the column, caused by an attack by the mob that was following up, and a halt was made, and the Gatling guns used on the attacking party, which dispersed them, and this ended all attacks on the troops. In this retreat, three of the soldiers were killed and several wounded, one of whom, Lieutenant Ashe, died a few days afterwards, at the United States arsenal. On arriving at the arsenal several of the soldiers climbed over the fence, into the grounds, and General Brinton called on the commandant, Major Buffington, for leave to feed and shelter his troops there. General Brinton and Major Buffington disagreed as to what occurred between them at that time, which question of veracity the purposes of this report does not require us to decide, but General Brinton is corroborated by the testimony of one of his officers, and Major Buffington has no corroborating witness. The result of the conference was, that General Brinton and his well men went on, and his wounded were left, and well cared for, at the arsenal. General Brinton, hearing nothing from Colonel Guthrie, continued his march out to and through Sharpsburg, and finally brought up in the vicinity of the work-house, and encamped on the grounds near that institution, where he was furnished with rations for his men, and gave them a chance to get the rest they so much needed. These rations reached General Brinton's command during Sunday afternoon, through the personal exertions of A. J. Cassatt, who, from the time of the occupation of the round-house by the troops, had been unwearied in his endeavors to get provisions to them. The command was also furnished with blankets and other necessary camp equipments, by Colonel Thomas A. Scott, who had also been vigilant in looking after the welfare of the men, and all necessary transportation needed on their behalf, after their departure from Philadelphia, unprepared for a campaign, on account of the brief notice given them. To these two gentlemen, the friends of the National Guard owe a debt of gratitude for the personal interest taken by them, at all times, during the campaign, to render any service that lay in their power to make the men comfortable.

The destruction of the railroad property by the mob had been continued all night, the cars and goods contained in them that could not be carried off being burned as fast as they could be broken open, the goods thrown out and the cars set on fire. Crowds of men, women, and children were engaged in the work of pillage, and everything portable, of any value, was seized as fast as thrown from the cars, and carried away and secreted. One feature of the mob at Pittsburgh is new in this country. A large number of women were in the crowd at Twenty-eighth street, on Saturday, the 21st instant, and according to testimony, they talked to the sheriff, and others who tried to get the crowd to disperse, worse than the men, used viler epithets, and more indecent language, and did everything in their power to influence and excite the mob to resistance. They also, during Saturday night and Sunday, brought out tea and coffee for the men engaged in the destruction of property, and were the most active in carrying away the goods taken from the cars. This work of pillage and destruction continued all day Sunday, and the actual destruction was participated in by only thirty to fifty men, the citizens in the meantime standing looking helplessly on, and no effort made to stay the damage by the bystanders. There was a very large crowd in the vicinity of the burning, who were supposed to be in sympathy with the destruction, and this probably deterred anyone from interfering to put a stop to it. The police, on Sunday, arrested some seventy-five persons who were carrying off goods, the arrests being made some distance from the place where the articles were taken. Those arrested were taken before Deputy Mayor Butler, and most of them were by him discharged. This seems to be all that the police did to restrain the rioting that day, and it is in evidence that one policeman in uniform got into one of the cars and threw goods out to the mob.

On Saturday morning, General Latta had sent written orders by Captain Aull to General Brinton, for the latter to make a junction with Colonel Guthrie, at Torrens, and with the whole force to march to Pittsburgh, and fearing that Captain Aull might fail to reach General Brinton, the order was read to Colonel Norris, who volunteered to go in search of General Brinton.

Colonel Norris, in company with J. M. Stewart, overtook General Brinton's command a little beyond Sharpsburg, and they both testify that Colonel Norris told General Brinton that Captain Aull had been sent by General Latta in search of him with orders, and communicated to him, (General Brinton,) the substance of the orders, and that General Brinton refused to go back, saying that his men had been fired at from houses, street crossings, and police stations, and were almost famished for want of food, and he was going into the open country where he could intrench and defend himself, and procure food for his men, but that if he received positive orders he might return.

General Brinton and several of his officers testify that although Colonel Norris visited him at the time and place stated, yet that he delivered no orders whatever, and stated that his errand was to find out where the command was. In regard to these counter-statements your committee will have something to say under the head of "conduct of the militia." It is proper to state here, however, that the written order given to Captain Aull to take to General Brinton was not delivered to him till the 1st day of August, a week from its date.

Soon after the first car was set on fire, Saturday night, the alarm of fire was given, and the firemen with their engines at once turned out and arrived in the vicinity of the fire about eleven o'clock, but were not allowed to attempt to stop the destruction of the railroad company property. They tried several times to lay their hose, so as to play on the fire, but the mob cut their hose and threatened them with death if they persisted. Some of the police testify that they cleared away the mob at one place and notified the firemen that they were ready to protect them if they would go to work and put out the fire; but the firemen deny this, and testify that no such offer was made, and that at no time did they see half a dozen police together.

In view of the general failure of the police to do what must be considered their duty in regard to the rioters, during the whole time of the trouble, they need not think it strange if the majority of people are inclined to believe the statements of the firemen. The officers of the fire department testify that the firemen were well organized at the place of danger, ready to do their duty at all times, and that this department was the only one in the city that was organized trying to do its duty during the time of the riot. The firemen, after some remonstrance on the part of a portion of the rioters, were allowed to save private property, and to this fact may be ascribed the safety of a good portion of the city; for the fire from the railroad property communicated to the adjoining property of individuals, and but for the labors of the firemen there must have been a very extensive conflagration throughout Pittsburgh. The destruction of property did not cease until about five o'clock, P.M., on Sunday, the 22d, and then only when the limit of the corporation property had been reached at Seventh street by the destruction of the Union depot, Union depot hotel, and the grain elevator. The latter did not belong to the railroad company, but it was believed by the mob to be owned by a corporation, and therefore it was doomed to destruction with the rest. Several times during the day--Sunday--the cry of "police" was made by some one in the crowd, and whenever this was done the mob would scatter in all directions, but as soon as it was ascertained to be a false alarm they would again return to the work of destruction. It was demonstrated also that whenever any citizen gave a determined and positive order to any of the mob it was usually obeyed.

A notice had been published in the Sunday morning papers, and had also been given out in the various churches, that a meeting of the citizens would be held at the old city hall, at noon, for the purpose of organizing to protect the city. Some citizens met at the old city hall, according to notice, but there seemed to be no head to the movement, and it adjourned to meet at the new city hall immediately. At this place a committee of safety was appointed, and a sort of an organization for defense commenced, but in the language of a prominent witness engaged in the movement: "They were all day doing very little; there was no head anywhere; the mayor did nothing, and seemed to be powerless, and the sheriff had run away. The mayor seemed to be confused; he ran around some, but really did nothing." A nucleus for an organization of the responsible citizens of the city was formed, however, which on the following day developed into vigorous action, and the best men of the city came forward and subscribed liberally to a fund to pay an extra police force, and pledged themselves to subscribe any amount necessary to put the city in a complete state of defense against the mob element. Some sixty thousand dollars was actually subscribed, of which about fifteen thousand dollars was used to pay the extra police force called into existence by the action of the citizens during the emergency.

About four to five o'clock, P.M., a body of fifty or sixty men, composed of professional and business men, were organized under the lead of Doctor Donnelly, and armed at first with ax-helves, and afterwards with some old muskets and no ammunition, and with white handkerchiefs on their left arms, appeared at the scene of the trouble, near the Union depot and elevator, but it was too late to save these buildings, as they were already burned. The crowd gave way to this force, but as the destruction was completed here but little could be accomplished. The doctor ordered the mob to take hold and tear down a fence so as to stop the spread of the fire, and they obeyed orders.

There was such an apathy among the citizens, that it took all the day to raise this force led by Doctor Donnelly, and after being on the ground a short time, and finding nothing for them to do, they disbanded.

During the day (Sunday) a car load of whisky or high wines was broken open by the mob, and they drank very freely of it, and towards night, at the time the Union depot and elevator were burned, most of the active rioters were so drunk as to be unable to continue the work of destruction, if they had been so disposed. Whisky had done good service in this case, if never before. The fatigue consequent upon the labors of Saturday night and Sunday was also producing its effect upon the rioters, and taken in connection with the fact, that most of them must have been filled to satiety with rioting and destruction of property, shows a good cause for the waning of the riot on Sunday afternoon. A few of the rioters, between five and six o'clock, P.M., went to the Duquesne depot, (the property of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company,) at the junction of the Allegheny and Monongahela rivers, with the intention of burning it and the cars in the vicinity. One car was set on fire and an attempt made to set the depot on fire, but some six or eight of the citizens' safety committee arrived there about the time the rioters did, and they interfered at once to put a stop to destruction, and had no difficulty in doing so, as the rioters desisted and left as soon as they saw any authority exerted in opposition to their schemes.

The Eighteenth regiment (Colonel Guthrie) had remained at Torrens station, keeping the track clear at that point, and waiting for the expected trains. The crowd at that place numbered about fifteen hundred men, composed of mill men, some railroad men, boys, roughs, and tramps. The passenger trains were allowed to run by the mob, but between Pittsburgh and Torrens they were filled to overflowing by the roughest of the crowd, who traveled backwards and forwards between those places on the trains at their pleasure, and no one dared to interfere with them. They even climbed on the engine and tender, and roofs of the cars, and controlled the movements of the trains whenever they chose so to do between those two points. At Torrens, the crowd would occasionally become demonstrative and defiant, and Colonel Guthrie was obliged to charge bayonets on them several times, and each time had no difficulty in dispersing them. Twice he ordered his men to load in presence of the crowd, and this of itself dispersed them. Colonel Guthrie's troops were not allowed to fraternize with the mob, but were kept entirely aloof from them, and this regiment does not seem to have become demoralized, as the Fourteenth and Nineteenth regiments were. About four o'clock, P.M., Sunday, Colonel Guthrie, hearing that the Fourteenth and Nineteenth regiments had been disbanded, and being unable to ascertain the exact condition of affairs at Pittsburgh, went there and consulted with General Latta, and his regiment was ordered to march to that place, where they arrived about dark, and, of course, too late to be of any service in stopping the destruction of property, which had all taken place before their arrival. They marched to the armory and stayed all night, and on Monday forenoon, the Twenty-third, together with the Fourteenth and Nineteenth regiments, which had been ordered to reassemble that morning, marched through the principal streets of the city for the purpose of overawing any riotous disposition that might still remain in those who had been engaged in the work of destruction the day before. Colonel Guthrie assumed command of the division, his commission being older than Colonel Gray's or Colonel Howard's, and when General Brown wished to assume command Colonel Guthrie refused to recognize his authority, on account of the manner in which he had managed matters on Saturday, the 21st. On Saturday night, a few of the leading citizens had suggested to the mayor that it would be well to call out all of the old police force that had been discharged, and in accordance with this suggestion the chief of police caused a notice to be published, calling on them to report at his office and they would be assigned to duty. During the day several reported and were employed, and afterwards most of the old force were taken back and assigned to duty for a time. This extra force, together with the force of citizens organized for the purpose, patrolled the city that Sunday night, and succeeding nights, until the danger had passed.

From the first commencement of the strike, the strikers had the active sympathy of a large portion of the people of Pittsburgh. The citizens had a bitter feeling against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company on account of, as they believed, an unjust discrimination by the railroad company against them in freight rates, which made it very difficult for their manufacturers to compete successfully with manufacturers further west, and this feeling had existed and been intensified for years, and pervaded all classes. A large portion of the people also believed that the railroad company was not dealing fairly by its men in making the last reduction in wages, and the tradesmen with whom the trainmen dealt also had a direct sympathy with the men in this reduction, for its results would affect their pockets.

The large class of laborers in the different mills, manufactories, mines, and other industries in Pittsburgh and vicinity, were also strongly in sympathy with the railroad strikers, considering the cause of the railroad men their cause, as their wages had also been reduced for the same causes as were those of the railroad men, and they were not only willing but anxious to make a common fight against the corporations. This feeling of aversion to the railroad company and sympathy with the strikers was indulged in by the Pittsburgh troops to the same extent that it was by the other classes, and as many of them had friends and relatives in the mob, it is not much to be wondered at that they did not show much anxiety to assist in dispersing the crowd and enforcing the law.

With the repulse of the attempt to set fire to the Duquesne depot ended all active efforts by the mob to destroy property, and after that Sunday night no mob of any size was again assembled, although it was several days before complete order was fully restored, as the people had lost confidence in all the laboring men, and no one knew who to trust or what to expect from others on account of the extent to which the demoralization had gone.

About sixteen hundred cars, (mostly freight,) including passenger and baggage cars, with such of their contents as were not carried away by the thieves; one hundred and twenty-six locomotives, and all the shops' materials and buildings, except one or two small ones, of the railroad company, from above Twenty-eighth street to the Union depot, were burned on that Saturday night and Sunday.