Part 1

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REFORMED LOGIC

Oxford

Horace Hart, Printer to the University

REFORMED LOGIC

A System Based on Berkeley's Philosophy with an Entirely New Method of Dialectic

by

D. B. McLACHLAN

'SPIRITS are active, indivisible substances; IDEAS [objects] are inert, fleeting, dependent things, which subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in minds or spiritual substances.... The cause of Ideas is an incorporeal active SUBSTANCE or Spirit.'

--_Berkeley._

London Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Paternoster Square 1892

[All rights reserved]

'_Looking to the chaotic state of logic text-books at the present time, one would be inclined to say that there does not exist anywhere a recognised, currently-received body of speculation to which the title Logic can be unambiguously assigned, and that we must therefore resign the hope of attaining by any empirical consideration of the received doctrine, a precise determination of the nature and limits of logical theory._'

_Encyc. Brit._, Art., LOGIC.

PREFACE

The object of the following treatise is to give an intelligible account of the principal facts of Mind, with a method for the right expression and criticism of Reasoning. It is based on principles not before applied to such a purpose. The current systems of Metaphysic are obscure and difficult simply because they start from false premises, not because the nature and operations of Mind cannot, if properly understood, be made as comprehensible to beginners as other branches of knowledge. The rules of Dialectic are quite within the capacity of any intelligent schoolboy, and should be an essential part of early education, like Arithmetic.

Let not the student be repelled at finding a philosophy reputed to be one of the most difficult taken as the basis of this work. It is Berkeleyism considerably modified. Also it is to be borne in mind that a philosophy is not to be judged by its _primâ facie_ probability, but by its power of explaining many facts in a coherent and lucid way. A theory that does this should not be rejected for a seeming paradox at the outset.

Most of the theoretical and all the dialectical parts of this work can be adapted to Realistic thinking, by treating the judgments of the two Berkeleyan categories as intuitions instead of inferences.

CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFACE v

INTRODUCTION

SECT.

I Division of Philosophies into Ideal and Substantial--Substantial subdivided into Mental and Material--Berkeley's philosophy a Mental Substantialism 1

II Ontological principles essential to logical theory--Mind consists of (at least) Self and a Plastic Substance--Functions of each--Perception of Inorganic things discussed--Berkeley's view on this point rejected--Body to be considered an apparatus of Perception 4

III Current Metaphysic is Ideal and therefore incoherent--Substantial alone has a connecting principle--Importance of Categories in Substantialism--Its doctrine of Reason totally different from the Academic 8

INTELLECT

IV Origin of Intellect--Its use--Difference between Sentimental and Intellectual consciousness--Intellect not the governing intelligence of Man--Moral education the most important 11

V Truth, its various meanings--Veracity--Correct Ideation--Correct Inference--No absolute standard of Truth--_Nisi utile est, quod novimus, stulta est Sapentia_--Schopenhauer on the function of Intellect 14

VI Standard of Truth relating to Bodily welfare different from that relating to Mental welfare--Realism the theory of Perception under the former standard--Its main dogmas--Cause why it is superseded--Superstition of One Truth--Realism and Substantialism both true and yet contradictory 18

PERCEPTION

VII Defined, according to Substantial principles--Noumenon--Subject--Object--Sentiment not excited by Objects, but Objects accompany Sentiments--Subject not passive in Perception--ATTENTION--Kant's opinion on the inconceivability of Noumena refuted--Difficulty of overcoming Realistic prejudices--Science of little use in Philosophy 23

IDEAS

VIII How produced--Hume's notion untenable--No innate Ideas--but Sentiment is innate--Division of Ideas into Particular, General, and Imaginary 27

IX MEMORY--OBLIVION--RECOLLECTION--Images, how preserved and how lost--Good Memory not necessarily advantageous--Recovery of the apparently Forgotten--Sudden extinction of Ideas--'Decay of the mind' in old age--Memory inexplicable on any theory but the Substantial--John Stuart Mill's confession--Memory the chief fact of Mental Science 28

X Sentiments may be remembered--Feelings and Emotions--No detailed analysis of Sentiments possible or necessary--Spinoza's list--Can sentiments be noumenally excited without objects? 34

XI Analysis of Comparison--It is the principle of Generalisation and Imagination 36

GENERALISATION

XII Purpose of Generalisation--Objects classified must be similar and have similar utilities--Inferiority of general ideas acquired by definition--Names not essential to general thought--Generalisation resembles composite photography--Classification on mere objective resemblance--neat but superficial--Conceptualism 38

XIII MATTER the most general notion derived from Objects--Belief in Real Matter a form of Mysticism--A material basis for phenomena unnecessary 43

XIV NOMINALISM--Berkeley's Nominalism, and objections thereto--Concrete Thought expressed in general terms 46

XV Generalisation the bane of European philosophy--Plato's theories on General Ideas--Aristotle's 'Essence'--Classification a means, not the end of Reason--The explanatory Unity a unity of service--Evolution a concrete Platonism 58

IMAGINATION

XVI How distinguished from Recollection and Reverie--Imagination by Simple Combination--By Transfusion--Artistic Imagination--Rational Imagination--Wrong views of Metaphysicians 63

DIALECTIC

XVII Recapitulation of the genealogy of Reason--It is the art of conceiving the Future and Unknown--Dialectic the science of Reason--Division of theorems into Arguments and Fallacies--Method of Dialectic 68

XVIII The RATIONAL PARALLEL--Rational Conclusions are never certain--Essential parts of an Argument--Rules of Parallel--False conclusions cannot be destroyed but may be stigmatised--In what circumstances we may reason concerning a known fact 74

XIX Hypothetical Arguments--Current errors with respect to these--Dilemma 80

XX DEBATE is extra-dialectic--How a valid argument may be criticised 87

CATEGORIES

XXI Natural--Realistic--Scientific--Philosophical --Categories of Pythagoreans--of Aristotle--of Kant, etc. 92

XXII Category of Inherence--It is a metaphysical analysis of objects--Examples of Judgment and Argument--Use of Standards for Mediate Comparison 97

XXIII Category of Association defined--Position--Examples of Judgment and Argument--Movement--Number--Flat Space 103

XXIV Perspection or Depth in groups--Perspective degradation--Redintegration, real and ideal--This groupment as a fixed Precedent--Standard of Depth--Sky Perspection 108

XXV Concretion of Cubic ideas from flat objects--Backs of things--Resistance--Dr. Johnson on Idealism--Danger of trifling with Idealists, illustrated from the Dabistán--Geographical Concretion--Its superiority to mere Recollection--Sphericity of the Earth, what it means 118

XXVI Material Sequence defined, with examples--TIME the interval between objects in Sequence--Eternity--Scientific confusion of Sequence with Causation 126

XXVII CAUSATION--Its peculiarities--How distinguished from Sequence--Effects are never causes--Cause consists of Motive, Plan, and Power--Generation not causation--Atoms not causes--Sub-categories of Causation--'Conservation' of Energy discussed--Note on DREAMS 130

REDACTION OF COLLOQUIAL ARGUMENTS

XXVIII Language not naturally an instrument of Argument--How to adapt it to this purpose--Negative words--Partitive words--Redaction does not extend to the correction of faulty observation--Syllogistic Conversion not necessary on the Substantial method 151

FALLACIES

XXIX Of Equivocation--Of Imperfect Observation 157

XXX Of Parallel Arrangement--Suppressed Precedent--Inferring a negative from Contrast--False Analogy--Doubtful Precedent--Of Accident--Of Division--Of Composition--Dialectical Tautology--Cross Reasoning--Fallacy of No Case--Of Inversion--Suppressed Conclusion--Of No Application--Of Irrelevant Conclusion 161

ACADEMICAL DIALECTIC

XXXI Various notions of Reason entertained by Syllogists--One only true, Analogy 175

XXXII 'Immediate Inference' is not Argument, but explicitness and emphasis in language 176

XXXIII Arithmetic, what it is--The Real and the Symbolic--Reasoning enters only into the Real--The Symbolic a kind of expression 177

XXXIV Geometrical Demonstration not a form of Reasoning--The so-called 'deductive reasoning' of Geometry a graduated series of lessons in perception 182

XXXV Induction not a special kind of reasoning, but a deduction with suppressed precedent--Other meanings of the word 185

XXXVI Aristotle's Dictum explained and refuted 187

XXXVII Mediate Comparison not Argument 189

XXXVIII Syllogism analysed--It is not Argument--Doctrine of the Predicate--Moods of the Syllogism discussed--All moods reducible to One 191

STUDIES IN DIALECTIC

XXXIX Additional examples to illustrate the Dialectic of Substantialism 205

INTRODUCTION

I--RELATION OF BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY TO OTHER SYSTEMS

Philosophies are either Ideal or Substantial. The ideal are those which resolve all things, actual and possible, into thought or consciousness. They seek to find in consciousness the reason and meaning of itself, or, if this be impossible, to account for each item in consciousness by defining its relation to some other item, or to some general mass of consciousness. This type of philosophy includes German transcendentalism and idealism, and some species of Buddhist and Persian metaphysic. European idealists are seldom consistent, for at the basis of their philosophies (or at the apex) they place GOD, who is not an item of human consciousness, actual or potential, and who therefore occupies, whether it be admitted or not, the relation of substance to human thought.

Substantial philosophies affirm that thought invariably inheres in some sort of Substance, for whose service it exists. It is incapable of independent being, and cannot be understood abstracted from its substance. It is intermittent, called up when wanted, and is liable to variation and aberration.

Substantialists differ however as to what the substance of human intelligence is. Some hold that it is the human body. Consciousness exists, they argue, for the use of the body and varies with its condition. This class of philosophers may be subdivided into Materialists and Metaphysicians (including logicians).

Materialists believe that consciousness is a product of the physical body--has therefore no existence before the body is formed or after it is dissolved. It is really as physical as the teeth or hair.

In metaphysic the intelligence is supposed to have a principle of existence apart from the body, and does not, or need not, share the fate of the body. The body is nevertheless regarded as the substance or superior fact during the union of the two. This is an eminently inconsistent philosophy, for if consciousness has an existence apart from body it must be in some other substance, and if so its relations to that substance are more important than its relations to the body, and should be the first object of inquiry. Metaphysic is in its development an idealism, since the connection admitted between body and thought is too slight to afford a sufficient explanation of intelligence, and no other substantial relation is known.

The notion that an invisible immaterial substance may underlie consciousness has occurred to some philosophers, among others to the illustrious BERKELEY. His theory of Vision, which has never been refuted or even weakened, is founded on this hypothesis.

Berkeleyan substantialism combines the characteristic features of the other theories, and affords an easy solution of many difficult problems in philosophy. It has in common with idealism--whence it is sometimes, but erroneously, called by that name--that it regards all _material_ bodies and things as facts or items of consciousness. It agrees with materialism that a substance is essential to consciousness, and that the consciousness of man serves the needs of his body, though that is not the highest use to which it can be put. It confirms the metaphysical view that intelligence is not, in its abstract or essential character, dependent on the body, and may therefore survive the body.

This is the theory on which the following logic is based: I shall refer to it briefly as Substantialism.

II--ONTOLOGICAL NOTIONS

Substantialism has two main divisions--Ontology, which treats of the mental substance in itself, and Logic or Metaphysic, which deals with its consciousness. The present essay is specially concerned with logic, but certain ontological premises must be assumed to render the logic intelligible. This follows from the subordinate relation of consciousness to substance.

The substantial mind consists of two principal parts--a SELF and a PLASMA--the Atman and Aka['s]a of Sanscrit philosophers.

Self is the seat of Energy and Consciousness. The plasma is inert and unconscious; it protects the Self and receives, communicates, and retains impressions of experience, both the external and the internal[1].

The Self would be conscious though isolated from other minds, at least from those of its own grade of being. It would feel the fluctuations of its energy. But the experience called 'external' depends on the mutual action of minds. It is the form into which their consciousness is thrown when they come in contact. It lasts no longer than the contact, and so has only a casual existence.

The constitution of the mind is not given by Berkeley, and on other points also we must supplement and correct his philosophy. He was wrong as regards the mental cause of the perception of the Inorganic or Dead.

Since external experience implies that another mind is operating upon ours, what mind is operating when we perceive an object that is apparently mindless? Berkeley replies that it is the supreme mind that is then acting upon us.

Many objections can be urged against this view. I will mention only one, which seems to me conclusive. By every canon of judgment we possess, the living or organised is better--more important and significant--than the lifeless and elemental; so if Berkeley's reasoning be valid the phenomena excited by finite and created beings are superior to those excited by their Creator. The movements of a living man are referred to a human mind--a putrescent carcase is a vision immediately induced by the Deity.

The beauty of the starry sky is irrelevant to the question. Apart from the finite life and thought that may be associated with the stars, they have no more philosophical importance than a spadeful of sand.

A more reasonable account of the inorganic is found in several ancient philosophies. Gnostics and Neo-Platonists referred the elemental to a cosmic mind (_Demiurgos_) intermediate between human beings and the Supreme. The demiurgic mind is inconceivably greater and more powerful than the human, but is not necessarily better in quality. It is the origin of all natural forces, and its organic processes are what we term 'physical laws.' This is the explanation of inorganic consciousness which I feel disposed to adopt, but to discuss it fully would carry us too far from the subject of this work.

The next point relates to the body. What is its function in substantialism? The brain, says Berkeley, is an idea in the mind, and he ridicules the notion that one idea should generate all other ideas. This is an argument against materialism. No doubt he would have admitted, though he does not say so, that the body-idea facilitates, or at least must precede, the experience of other ideas. He would not have denied that it is an _instrumental_ idea.

Since his time an important discovery has been made with reference to the constitution of the body. I allude to the Cell theory. It is no longer possible to regard the body either as a self-moving machine (if this is not a contradiction in terms), or as a lump of 'dead matter' animated by the mind. It is a society of minute animals[2], each having a certain degree of independent energy and liberty of movement. They are organised and governed by the human or animal mind with which they are associated. In short, the relation of the cell to the man is analogous to, if not quite the same as, the relation of the man to the cosmic being.

This discovery complicates the problem of 'external' consciousness, without however affecting the principles on which a substantialist would endeavour to solve it. Instead of conceiving human minds as coming into immediate contact in perception, we have to conceive the cellular systems of each as forming a medium between the two. We do not perceive the other mind immediately or intuitively; what we perceive intuitively is certain affections in our own organism, which we must first refer to the other body, and then to the mind behind that body. Our knowledge of other human beings is thus altogether inferential.

The cellular medium explains why we are not generally aware of the substantial constitution of other minds; it is veiled by the intervening organisms.

The relation of body to mind, the reason of embodiment, and so forth, are questions of prime importance in ontology, but in logic we are concerned only with the object in consciousness, without reference to the apparatus of perception. The instrument of intellectual perception may in its proper character be ignored.

III--DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SUBSTANTIAL AND METAPHYSICAL LOGIC

All the current academic metaphysic is ideal. Materialists, when they attempt to explain thought, fail to attach it properly to the body, or to account for that large and important division of mental activity which has no bearing, direct or indirect, on bodily welfare. They drop their materialism at an early stage of their enquiry and continue on the metaphysical method.

Hence in none of the current systems is there any true principle of arrangement in the treatment of logical phenomena. Unless we know the use of a thing we cannot describe it, let alone explain it. We know not the relative importance of its parts, and we arrange them according to superficial resemblances, or on some arbitrary principle which conceals instead of revealing their meaning.

Substantial philosophy alone possesses a principle of coherence. The facts of consciousness are determined by anterior facts of substance, and there can be only one true mode in which to present them--they must follow and reflect the substantial order. They will thus appear as a consecutive and coherent system of ideas, no one of which could be otherwise placed without damage to the whole. This is perhaps the most important respect in which substantial logic differs from others.

The doctrine of Categories has to receive full development in order to elucidate the genesis of the 'material world.' Except to a substantialist the categories have no particular value, and so they are barely mentioned in the academic systems.

The theory of Reasoning or Dialectic (logic in the narrower sense) given in the following chapters, will be found totally different from the academic. It does not merely state in other words or metaphors the doctrines laid down in works of the Aristotelian type,--it declares that the theory of reasoning taught in these works is altogether false. Our argumentation is not conducted in syllogisms, either tacit or explicit. This has been suspected by several critics of logic, but no attempt has been made to substitute a more correct theory and method. Of course logicians do not always reason wrongly, and true arguments may be stated in the syllogistic form. What I mean is that logicians nowhere tell us in what right reasoning essentially consists, and for want of a distinct notion on the subject they all of them occasionally admit as valid, arguments that are not so.

The main dogma of substantialism should be kept in view in reading the following pages. It is mind alone that is conceived as having solidity and energy: material things are temporary forms of our consciousness; they have length and breadth but no depth, and they are without energy, even passive resistance. If an object cannot be removed at pleasure, what resists us is the other mind causing that object, not the object itself.

As far as possible I have utilised the existing logical terminology. But substantialism has notions which require special technical words, and I have not hesitated to invent such when necessary. On the other hand, I have rejected the latinisms of current logic, which have never been assimilated by modern languages. The English language is good enough for all the purposes of logic.

[Footnote 1: The mental substance is the _fifth essence_ of the initiate Greeks and of Alchemists. They also called it _chaos_ and _first matter_. 'Man was made of that very matter and chaos whereof all the world was made, and all the creatures in it: which is a most high mystery to understand, and must, nay is altogether necessary to be known of him that expecteth good from this art, being the ground of the wisdom thereof. Foolish men, nay they that the world holds for great doctors, say and tell it for truth, that God made man of a piece of mud, or clay, or dust of the earth, which is false; it was no such matter, but a Quintessential Matter which is called earth, but is no earth.'--_De Manna Benedicto._]