PART V—RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended:

That the United States Government provide as early as practicable moral, advisory, and material support to China and South Korea in order to contribute to the early establishment of peace in the world in consonance with the enunciated principles of the United Nations, and concomitantly to protect United States strategic interests against militant forces which now threaten them.

That United States policies and actions suggested in this report be thoroughly integrated by appropriate government agencies with other international commitments. It is recognized that any foreign assistance extended must avoid jeopardizing the American economy.

CHINA

That China be advised that the United States is favorably disposed to continue aid designated to protect China’s territorial integrity and to facilitate her recovery, under agreements to be negotiated by representatives of the two government, with the following stipulations:

That China inform the United Nations promptly of her request to the United States for increasing material and advisory assistance.

That China request the United Nations to take immediate action to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Manchuria and request that Manchuria be placed under a Five-Power Guardianship or, failing that, under a Trusteeship in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

That China make effective use of her own resources in a program for economic reconstruction and initiate sound fiscal policies leading to reduction of budgetary deficits.

That China give continuing evidence that the urgently required political and military reforms are being implemented.

That China accept American advisors as responsible representatives of the United States Government in specified military and economic fields to assist China in utilizing United States aid in the manner for which it is intended.

KOREA

That the United States continue efforts for the early establishment of a Provisional Korean Government in consonance with the Moscow Agreement and meanwhile provide necessary support of the political, economic and military position of South Korea.

APPENDIX E TO PART III—KOREA

POLITICAL

_Resumé of United States Policy Toward Korea_

The first treaty between the United States and Korea, signed in 1882, provided that if other powers dealt unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other would exert its good offices to bring about an “amicable agreement.” During the early period of United States-Korean relations the United States considered Korea as an independent state for the purposes of fulfilling treaty obligations, although that nation was actually under Chinese suzerainty. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, when efforts were made to gain the support of the United States to avert war, the United States took the position that, while it stood for peace, it would do nothing which might cause it to assume responsibility for settlement of the dispute. Under the treaty ending the war, China relinquished suzerainty over Korea, which was in turn assumed by Japan. Therefore, the United States continued its policy of non-interference in Korean internal affairs and in 1899 denied a Korean request for American initiative in obtaining from the powers an agreement guaranteeing Korea’s integrity. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, President Theodore Roosevelt stated that the United States could not intervene to preserve Korea’s integrity since the Koreans were unable “to strike one blow in their own defense.” When Japan forced the Korean Emperor to agree to Japanese control of the administration of Korean affairs, the Emperor appealed to the United States, under the good offices clause of the United States-Korean Treaty of 1882, but his appeal was denied. Nor did the United States protest Japanese formal annexation of Korea in 1910. Thus, with little or no effort on the part of the United States to oppose such a development, Korea passed from the suzerainty of China to that of Japan and thence to the status of a Japanese colony. Efforts of Korean exiles to introduce Korea’s case at the Paris Peace Conference and at the Washington Conference of 1921-22 were rebuffed, but these exiles continued their efforts to further the cause of Korean independence, some of them in the United States. With the outbreak of World War II, the question of Korean independence was revived and Korean exiles in the United States and China began to agitate for Korean independence and official recognition. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, agreement was reached by the participating powers, later adhered to by the Soviet Union, that Korea would become independent “in due course.” This phrase caused great resentment among the Koreans who felt that they should be given immediate independence upon the defeat of Japan. This resentment was increased when the decision was reached at the Moscow Conference in December, 1945, that Korea would be placed under a Four-Power Trusteeship (the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and China) for a period of up to five years. A tentative agreement in this regard had previously been reached between the United States and the Soviet Union, and when the end of the war was imminent agreement was reached between the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and China that Soviet forces accept the Japanese surrender in Korea north of the 38° North parallel, while the American forces would accept such surrender south of that line. This arbitrary line, originally serving as a marker of military responsibility, soon became a complete barrier to free movement between North and South Korea. It has resulted in separation of the country into two parts, an economically unstable division which has seriously blocked efforts to establish a unified Korea.

_Current Political Situation_

The major political problem in Korea is that of carrying out the Moscow Agreement of December, 1945, for the formation of a Provisional Korean Government. The United States-Soviet Joint Commission, established in accordance with that Agreement, held its first meeting March 8, 1946, but finally adjourned on May 28, 1946, without having reached an agreement looking toward the implementation of the Moscow Agreement regarding Korea. The failure of the Joint Commission arose from the unwillingness of the Soviet Delegation to agree to consultation with the Commission of all Korean groups, as provided for in the Moscow agreement, to assist in the formation of the Provisional Korean Government. Soviet motives have been to eliminate the majority of the rightist groups in the American-occupied zone of Korea from consultation and subsequently from participation in the new government. Had the Soviet Delegation been successful the result would have been a Communist-dominated government in Korea. Soviet objections to consultation with these rightist groups have been based on the latter’s openly expressed opposition to trusteeship. The American Delegation has taken the stand that criticism of trusteeship did not disqualify Korean groups from participation in consultation, since to do so would deprive a considerable section of the Korean people of an opportunity to be heard in regard to the formation of the Provisional Korean Government. An exchange of notes between the Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister in April and May, 1947, resulted in a resumption of the meetings of the Joint Commission on May 21, 1947, under a formula which provided for consultation by all Korean groups which were prepared to sign a declaration that they would not, after such signing, “foment or instigate active opposition” to the work of the Joint Commission or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Agreement. After repeated sessions of the Joint Commission a deadlock was again reached in July, the Soviet Delegation returning to its position of the previous year and the American Delegation insisting upon the implementation of the formula set forth in the Marshall-Molotov letters, which guaranteed wide-scale participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations in consultation and freedom of expression of opinion by all Koreans. Further meetings of the Commission having produced no results, Secretary Marshall addressed another note to Foreign Minister Molotov on August 12, requesting that the Commission submit by August 21, 1947, a joint status report or that each Delegation submit separate reports. No reply having been received to this note and the Soviet Delegation refusing to participate in a joint report, the American Delegation on August 20 transmitted a unilateral report to Washington. Since the receipt of this report, the Secretary of State has addressed identical notes to China, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union proposing a Four Power Conference for a settlement of the Korean situation. China and the United Kingdom have indicated their willingness to participate in such a conference. The Soviet Union has declined.

Internally, the Korean problem has been complicated by the Soviet establishment of a Communist state in North Korea and by its encouragement of the activities of Communist and Communist-dominated organizations in South Korea hostile to the United States.

* * * * *

The rightist groups are probably the best organized parties in South Korea. They command a majority of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly and, if elections were held under present conditions would gain control of any government established in South Korea by such elections. The American authorities in South Korea are endeavoring to turn over to the Koreans as rapidly as possible administrative responsibility in the various departments of the United States Military Government, have organized a half-elected and half-appointed Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, and in general are striving to carry out a policy of “Koreanization” of government in South Korea.

_Military Government Directive and Steps Taken to Implement Same_

The Directive under which the United States Military Government now operates in Korea sets forth three basic United States objectives: (1) To establish an independent and sovereign Korea, free from all foreign domination and eligible for membership in the United Nations (2) to insure that the National Government so established shall be a democratic government fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people; and (3) to assist the Koreans in establishing the sound economy and adequate educational system necessary for an independent democratic state. The Directive points out that the policy of the United States in regard to Korea, in accordance with the Moscow Agreement, contemplates the establishment of a Provisional Korean Government to assist the United States-Soviet Joint Commission in preparing Korea for self-government, the creation of some form of trusteeship for Korea under the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union for a period of up to five years and the complete independence of Korea at the earliest possible moment, with subsequent membership in the United Nations. The Directive goes on to state that the American occupation of South Korea is for the purpose of facilitating the attainment of the basic American objectives in Korea and shall continue as long as it contributes to that end.

As a result of Soviet obstruction and tactics designed to eliminate the majority of the rightist groups from participation in the new government to be established for all of Korea, the American military authorities in South Korea have been unable to proceed with the initial steps required for the establishment of a Provisional Korean Government. As required by the Directive, the American authorities have made considerable progress in utilizing qualified Koreans in posts in local and provincial administration and in the administration of the United States zones as a whole. American personnel remains in the provincial administrations only in an advisory capacity and all administrative posts are filled by Koreans. In the overall administration of South Korea, all Government departments are now headed by Korean officials and Americans are utilized only in an advisory capacity, although important controversial matters may be referred either to the United States Military Governor or the Commanding General of the United States Occupation Forces for final decision. American military personnel in the Military Government are being replaced as rapidly as possible by American civilians. A Korean Interim Legislative Assembly was established in December, 1946, half of its membership being selected by the United States Commanding General from a list of Koreans recommended by Korean groups and half being elected as representatives of the various provinces and municipalities. Presently under consideration by this Assembly is a program for land reform in South Korea and the Assembly has recently adopted a general election law providing for election of officials to an Interim South Korean Government according to certain stipulated rules and regulations. In accordance with the Directive, the United States military authorities have permitted full freedom of expression to all political groups, except in those cases when the activities of certain Communist-dominated groups were clearly prejudicial to the security of American military occupation.

* * * * *

In seeking to attain the cultural objectives set forth in the Directive, the United States occupational authorities have caused funds to be set aside for training courses in industry and agriculture, have encouraged the establishment of teacher training schools and of summer and winter institutes for the reeducation of teachers and have in general devoted their efforts to the restoration of schools, the enforcement of new system of education and expansion of school facilities. They have also encouraged the formation of various committees for the purpose of democratizing the Korean educational administration. The implementation of these programs has been handicapped by lack of funds. Culturally, as well as politically, efforts have been made to carry out a process of “Koreanization” looking toward a free and independent Korea.

It should be pointed out that the Directive itself necessarily allows latitude of interpretation and execution and that the American authorities in Korea have functioned within the framework of that Directive.

* * * * *

Also, the failure to implement the badly needed land reform program has been due to the desire to await the unification of North and South Korea, at which time a Provisional Korean Government would be in a position to carry out a uniform program of this kind for the entire nation. Now that unification appears to be a matter for the indefinite future, plans are being made to carry out such a program at the earliest possible moment.

_Obstructions to Realizations of United States Objectives_

The chief obstructions to the realization of United States objectives in Korea have been the division of that country by the 38° North parallel barrier and the lack of Soviet cooperation in carrying out the provisions of the Moscow Agreement regarding Korea. Behind the 38° North parallel the Soviet Union has established a Democratic Front Government modelled along Soviet lines and has eliminated all political parties of a non-Communist character. North Korean Communist groups have thus been able to encourage and assist the activities of the Democratic Front and other Communist-dominated leftist groups in South Korea hostile to the United States by the infiltration of agents from North Korea into the American zone of occupation. The Soviet refusal in the United States-Soviet Joint Commission to consult with all Korean political and social organizations, as the first step in the formation of a Provisional Korean Government, has so far made it impossible to realize American objectives in Korea—the establishment of a self-governing, sovereign Korea, independent of foreign control and fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people.

Other obstructions to the realization of American objectives in Korea have come from sources within the United States zone of occupation:

* * * * *

2. Similarly, extreme leftist groups have endeavored to foment hostility to the United States and opposition to the attainment of American objectives in Korea. Such groups have been particularly active among Korean peasants in opposing the rice collection program instituted by the United States Military Government for the purpose of ensuring sufficient food for the urban areas.

_Implication of Withdrawal of All United States Assistance or Continuing Present United States Policy_

The American occupation forces in Korea could not remain in that country if all assistance to South Korea were stopped, since the cessation of all aid would lead to an early economic breakdown and to the outbreak of riots and disorder throughout the United States zone of occupation. The withdrawal of American military forces from Korea would, in turn, result in the occupation of South Korea either by Soviet troops, or, as seems more likely, by the Korean military units trained under Soviet auspices in North Korea. The end result would be the creation of a Soviet satellite Communist regime in all of Korea. A withdrawal of all American assistance with these results would cost the United States an immense loss on moral prestige among the peoples of Asia; it would probably have serious repercussions in Japan and would more easily permit the infiltration of Communist agents into that country; and it would gain for the Soviet Union prestige in Asia which would be particularly important in the peripheral areas bordering the Soviet Union, thus creating opportunities for further Soviet expansion among nations in close proximity to the Soviet Union.

Present American policy provides that, in view of the failure of the United States-Soviet Joint Commission to succeed in implementing the provisions of the Moscow Agreement regarding Korea, the matter be referred to the Four Powers for solution. It also provides that the matter be referred to the General Assembly of the United States in the event of the failure of the Four Powers to solve the Korean problem. This indicates that the United States will continue to seek, by consultation with the powers concerned, a solution of the problem, but a failure to reach an agreement on Korea in the United Nations will require that the United States make a decision regarding its future course in Korea: whether it shall withdraw or whether it shall organize a South Korean Government and under what conditions and whether it shall give economic and military aid to such a government.

A continuation of present American policies will serve to give notice to the Soviet Union and to other nations in the Far East that the United States will not abandon Korea in the face of Soviet intransigence and that the United States will continue to insist upon the fulfillment of the Moscow Agreement regarding Korea.

A continuation of present American policies will serve to deny to the Soviet Union direct or indirect control of all of Korea and prevent her free use of the entire nation as a military base of operations, including the ice-free ports in South Korea.

APPENDIX F TO PART III—KOREA

ECONOMIC

South Korea has few resources except agricultural land. This area formerly obtained much of its anthracite, electric power, timber, fertilizer, and other chemical products from North Korea, and bituminous coal and food from Manchuria, but must now obtain these essential items (except electric power) as well as raw materials and repair parts for her industries, from other external sources.

_Coal_—The whole of Korea, particularly South Korea, lacks coal No bituminous deposits are known and existing coal deposits are of a law-grade anthracite. The coal runs high in ash, and tends to disintegrate to powder. The largest producing mine in South Korea, constituting in fact 50 per cent of the production, is located at Sam Chok on the east coast. Production involves costly rail-sea-rail distribution. This coal can be and is being used in thermal plants by pulverizing and mixing with oil, but its use is costly and maintenance of boiler equipment is heavy. In any case, bituminous coal must be imported for the operation of the railways and most of the industries.

_Electric Power_—Because of the unfavorable coal situation, South Korea is at the mercy of North Korea with respect to electric power because virtually all of the large hydroelectric installations are in North Korea. In 1945 there was a total of 1,240,000 kilowatts of installed capacity, 90 per cent of it hydroelectric and in North Korea. Some of the capacity in North Korea has been removed by the Russians. At the present time South Korea depends on North Korea sources for 75 per cent of its power requirements in the winter months when stream flow for its hydroelectric plants is low, and 50 per cent to 60 per cent during the rainy summer months. Conditions will be critical during the coming winter. Minimum peak requirements are estimated at 200,000 kilowatts and only 110,000 kilowatts are in sight including the area’s own generating capacity of 60,000 kilowatts—and that only if rehabilitation materials are received—plus 50,000 kilowatts from North Korea, which is all the Russians profess to be able to deliver. If North Korea power were cut off, all industrial production in South Korea would have to be suspended, and remaining locally generated energy rationed for military and emergency use. Any new plants to correct this deficiency or permit any revival of industry would require four to five years to complete, and would still be dependent upon imported coal or oil, or upon a considerable expansion of the low quality anthracite production. There is no reasonable solution to this dilemma other than to unite North and South Korea.

_Forestry_—The forest situation in South Korea is unfavorable. Before the war, effective programs of reforestation and erosion control were under way, but dining the war the annual cut averaged 168 million cubic feet as compared with annual estimated growth of only 113 million cubic feet. Furthermore, over two-thirds of South Korean requirements of lumber, fuel wood, and pulp were formerly supplied by North Korea. With this source cut off and coal imports and production drastically reduced, hills and mountains around the Urge cities have been literally denuded. Unless North and South Korea are united or substantial imports are provided, the needs of South Korea for fuel wood, lumber, railroad ties, and telephone and telegraph poles, make it inevitable that overcutting and denuding of forest land in South Korea will continue, with resulting increased erosion and flood damage to agricultural land.

_Mineral Resources_—Mineral resources of Korea are varied and rather extensive, but with a few exceptions are of low grade. There is a large deposit—over one billion metric tons—of low grade (35 per cent magnetic) iron ore at Musan in Northeastern Korea which the Japanese mined extensively before and during the war. Capacities are said to have been developed for the production of over 800,000 tons of pig iron and 350,000 tons of steel annually, but operations were possible only by large imports of bituminous coal from Manchuria and Japan.

In both North and South Korea, gold and copper were also mined, the latter as an adjunct of the former, and some lead and zinc, and a large quantity of graphite, the latter, however, of low quality. There is enough developed tungsten production in South Korea to make it an important export commodity.

_Industries_—The prospects for Korean industry, even in the event of early unification, are not bright. Before 1931 Japan exploited Korea primarily as a source of raw materials, rice and cheap labor. Thereafter Korea became Japan’s bridgehead to the Asiatic mainland, and with Manchuria, was developed as the mainland portion of Japan’s war potential. By 1938 there were 7,000 factories, mostly small, employing 183,000 workers, principally in the production of chemicals, textiles and processed foods. Main industrial concentrations were in the north, near hydroelectric power plants and the larger mineral deposits. This rather impressive industrial plant was not damaged by bombing, but it would be a mistake to assume therefore that Korea possesses a ready-made industrial plant which could quickly be turned to full and efficient peacetime operations. Production, at perhaps 20 per cent of capacity, was restored after the occupation, but output has dwindled as stocks of raw materials have been exhausted, and as machinery has stopped functioning for lack of spare parts and competent maintenance and operating personnel. The dearth of competent administrative supervisory and technical personnel, practically all of whom were formerly Japanese and are now evacuated, is the outstanding deficiency in Korean industries, power, and transportation systems. The unification of North and South Korea would make some of the required raw materials available, and spare parts may eventually be obtainable from Japan, but the serious deficiency of competent personnel is an unresolved problem.

_Railways_—Korea has an excellent standard-gauge railway system including a double-track main line from Pusan on the southeast coast to Antung on the Manchurian border, which adequately serves the country with the exception of the eastern half of Kangwon Province. However, trackage, rolling stock except locomotives, and railway communications are badly in need of rehabilitation as a result of years of undermaintenance because of wartime shortages of materials. The railways in common with the country as a whole have been badly crippled by the evacuation of the Japanese administrative, supervisory, and technical personnel. The right-of-way is excellently engineered and constructed and characterized by a profusion of concrete and masonry structures, but all of the seven million ties in South Korea will require replacement within the next seven years, and quantities of rails and fishplates are also needed. One hundred and one new locomotives of the 2-8-0 type have been provided by the Military Government, but much of the other rolling stock requires overhaul. Railway communications also require considerable rehabilitation.

_Highways_—There are no modern roads in Korea. The highways of South Korea are practically nonoperable for automotive traffic except from Seoul to Inchon, Kaisong, and Chunchon. Practically all supplies must be distributed throughout Korea by rail.

_Shipping_—The only shipping of South Korea consists of eight Baltic vessels, and 12 LST’s, operated by the Military Government coast-wise and for some trade with Japan.

_Ports_—There are two major ports in South Korea; Pusan, an excellent deep-water port with four large piers at the Southeast end of the peninsula, and Inchon, west of Seoul, a much smaller tidal-basin port which can accommodate four three-quarter-thousand-ton ships at dockside in the basin and larger trans-Pacific cargo and passenger vessels in the anchorage outside. Two other deep-water ports, Masan and Yosu, were mined and are little used at present. Mukko on the east coast is the export terminal for Sam Chok, the largest anthracite mining area in South Korea. The other ports of Mokpo, Pohang, Chinhae, and Kunsan are limited by unfavorable factors of nigh tidal range, and a lack of berths and port clearance facilities.

In North Korea, there are two first-class warm water commercial and naval ports at Wonsan and Chungjin on the east coast, the latter particularly desirable from a Russian viewpoint, and other ports Oongki, Rashin, Eungjin, Chinnanpo, and Simhu, the latter two handicapped by the 25- to 30- foot tides of the Yellow Sea.

_Withdrawal of Japanese Personnel_

As disastrous in its effects on Korean economy as the division of Korea’s people and resources by the 38° North parallel, was the evacuation of all Japanese personnel, except 500 retained in North Korea, after VJ-Day. The 700,000 Japanese formerly resident in Korea dominated all elements of the economy and supplied management and technical personnel even to the mechanic class. Koreans were denied opportunities or positions of consequence in all phases of political and economic life. It is no reflection on the individuals concerned to note that a former Korean stationmaster at Pusan is now head of the railways, or that a vocational school graduate is in responsible charge of a large hydroelectric plant not far from Seoul. It is however, an indication of an almost fatal deficiency in South Korean economy. The ultimate solution is not readily apparent.

_Disinvestment_

The process of disinvestment probably began in South Korea during the late thirties when the Japanese decided to put all new capital into war production and permit nonwar facilities to depreciate. Capital goods provided by the Japanese for maintenance and development in South Korea went with few exceptions to war plants such as the submarine shop at Pusan, and to the strategic transport services linking Japan with the Manchuria-North Korea industrial complex. This meant that facilities such as the north-south railroad from Pusan to Antung on the Manchurian border received the main portion of construction materials available. Other industrial establishments in South Korea were converted to war production or allowed to deteriorate. The supply of fertilizer, essential to rice culture in the exhausted paddies of South Korea, was drastically reduced in the early forties as a result of the conversion of North Korean nitrogen fixation plants to the manufacture of explosives. Exploitation of South Korea’s meager forest resources resulted in severe erosion and the destruction of crops and utilities through flooding The Japanese also depleted Korean stock-piles and withdrew skilled labor for Army service, or for the mines and factories of Manchuria and the Japanese islands. During two years of military government, the process of disinvestment has continued.

The possibility of South Korea financing a program of investment and rehabilitation out of the proceeds of exports is not worth considering in detail. Although South Korea is primarily agricultural, it is unlikely that it will be able to export foodstuff, even under the most favorable circumstances. Deterioration of agriculture, due to accumulated soil deficiencies and erosion, and an increase of population from 15 to 20 million since 1940 indicate that no export surplus of food can be expected in the next several years. The only exports which may be derived from South Korea are small amounts of such minerals as tungsten, gold and copper, some ginseng root, and marine products such as agar-agar. The most optimistic estimate is $10 million worth of exports by 1950. Much more than $10 million earned by Korean exports will be needed to finance essential raw material imports, and there is no prospect of any capital development out of current production.

_Inflation_

The Korean inflation is not as serious as the Chinese inflation in rate of price increase, but its causes are less susceptible to control by measures taken within Korea. Price increases have been due to physical inability to produce goods, and not to unrestrained issuance of paper currency. Prices of consumers’ goods in various categories have risen 200 to 700 times over the 1937 level. The official rise price, however, has risen only 70 times, and about 80 per cent of the calorie requirement for the urban population is available at the official price. A runaway inflation has not yet occurred in South Korea, because (_a_) the Military Government has restrained the issuance of currency by keeping governmental expenditures and local occupation costs at reasonable levels, and (_b_) because cannibalization and the use of Japanese stocks have kept some industry going, and (_c_) the forcible collection of rice at harvest time has brought in sufficient food to maintain, with “disease an unrest” imports, an adequate official ration in the cities without the use of large inflationary payments to the farmers. Highly inflationary factors such as the exhaustion of raw material stocks, cumulative breakdowns in public services and transportation, and the cutting of power supply from the North, might occur simultaneously. The Korean economic outlook is, therefore, more grave than in China or Japan, where governmental fiscal policies as well as low production, are the main causes of inflation. Korea, lacking raw materials and skilled labor, is not in a position to be saved from a disastrous and chaotic hyper-inflation by the efforts of its own people combined with correct policy decisions. A breakdown could be forestalled only by external provision of large amounts of consumers’ goods and transportation equipment.

_Agriculture and Fisheries_

_Agriculture_—Over three-quarters of the total population of South Korea are farmers. The total area of land under cultivation in 1946 was 6,033,000 acres, or about 2½ acres per farm household. Approximately 15 per cent of agricultural land was formerly owned by Japanese, but title thereto remains with the Military Government and will eventually pass to Koreans. In the projected land reforms an additional 60 per cent of land, which is tenant-operated, would be involved. The Military Government has not proceeded with land reform even with regard to Japanese-held land, in the view that such reform should not precede establishment of an interim Korean Government.

After VJ-Day the influx of over two and a half million Koreans from Japan, China, and North Korea into South Korea, coupled with almost complete lack of commercial fertilizers as well as severe floods, resulted in a severe food shortage. Farmers have been reluctant to double-crop soils already depleted because of a lack of fertilizer, and have preferred to conserve land for rice, the best money crop. In 1946 the average planted acreage was only 79 per cent of the 1935-39 average, and production of grains and pulses was only 71 per cent.

In the past, about 36 per cent of the population and 36 per cent of the food production of Korea were located north of the 38° North parallel. However, postwar population movements, plus the availability of more commercial fertilizers in North Korea (where almost all of Korea’s large chemical plants are located), has changed this situation. Only about 30 per cent of Korea’s population is now north of the 38° North parallel, but that area accounts for around 38 per cent of food production.

Rice is the principal Korean crop, and it has consistently represented more than half the total value of agricultural production. During the 1930’s the rice crop averaged about 100,000,000 bushels annually. Forty per cent or more was exported each year to Japan accounting generally for about one-third of the total gross value of exports. This was by no means voluntary on the part of the Korean people. In line with Japanese policy, farm tenancy increased from less than 40 per cent in 1910 to more than 75 per cent in 1945. This facilitated grain collections, for landlords usually received their rentals in rice, and these averaged about 60 per cent of the crop. Consequently, although Koreans preferred rice to other grains, their per capita consumption was forced down from 3.62 bushels in 1915-19 to 2.0 bushels in 1939-45, a decline of 44 per cent. This deficiency was partly made up by imports of Manchurian millet and soya beans, but underconsumption was nevertheless chronic.

To meet the food crisis in South Korea and to rehabilitate agriculture the Military Government developed program to import foodstuffs to prevent starvation and to assure Korean urban residents at least a subsistence diet until indigenous production could be increased to meet minimum food needs; and a fertilizer import program designed to restore depleted soils and increase agricultural production to levels at least as high as had been reached in the past.

In 1945 the Military Government’s attempt to institute a compulsory system of rice collection for rationing to non-self-suppliers was largely unsuccessful. In 1946, a poor crop year due to floods, the Military Government collected 87,428 tons of rice, or about one-sixth of the total production. In order to supplement indigenous production to meet the minimum needs of non-self-suppliers in South Korea, 180,848 metric tons of wheat, corn, and flour were imported into South Korea by the Military Government from May through December, 1946.

A program for the collection of the rice in 1946 was given highest priority by the Military Government, as one of the most important ways to ease the food situation, stabilize the economy, and check the inflationary spiral. This program was fully supported by all agencies, and it succeeded in collecting a total of 548,000 metric tons of polished rice, or its equivalent, about 30 per cent of the total 1946 production.

This successful collection program, coupled with the importation of 275,962 metric tons of cereals purchased with U. S. funds during the first seven months of 1947, has enabled the Military Government to stabilize the food situation in South Korea through the issuance to non-self-suppliers of minimum staple rations averaging slightly over 300 grams (1,050 calories) per person per day.

_Fisheries_—Fishing was one of the important prewar Korean industries, ranking sixth in the world. It is second in importance, only to agriculture in the economic structure of the country. The industry was, however, largely dependent upon Japan for imports of fisheries supplies and, has deteriorated seriously since this source has been cut off. Consumption of fish products has decreased from a prewar average of 47 pounds per capita per year to 32 pounds. Korea needs additional fisheries supplies, boats, manila line, nets, trawls, ammonia for refrigeration, tin plate for canning, salt and sugar for canning. Fears are expressed that if such supplies are not forthcoming and fishing operations considerably expanded, the Japanese will enter claims for fishing grounds now reserved for the Koreans.

_Foreign Trade_

The total volume of Korea’s external trade grew from 660,000,000 yen in 1910 to more than 2,400,000,000 yen in 1939. With respect to the principal categories of its trade, i. e., foodstuffs, textiles and fibres, minerals, manufactures, and miscellaneous items. Korea was consistently a net importer; of all, except for foodstuffs. Food exports however, were seldom so large that they did more than offset imports of textiles and fibers.

From 1910 to 1945, Korea’s external trade was almost wholly absorbed by the Japanese Empire and the prime factor during the entire period was the export of rice to Japan. In 1936, of the value of 41 Korean products showing a net export balance, rice accounted for approximately 64 per cent. Although by 1939 the relative importance of rice exports had declined in favor of minerals and manufactures, of the 55 net export products in that year, rice still made up one-third of the total money value. Until the years immediately preceding the war, fish and marine products ranked second to rice, averaging from 7.5 per cent to 9 per cent of all net export commodities. Other exports individually were of minor significance. Korea’s principal imports historically have reflected its dependence on the outside world for fuels, heavy manufacturers, machinery, automotive equipment, textiles, and fibers, and specialized products.

Under current conditions, foreign trade in the ordinary sense of the term is small in amount. During the period August 15, 1945, through June 30, 1947, the value of goods entering or leaving the area was approximately $168,000,000. Of this sum, however, only about $25,000,000 represents the value of goods exchanged between Korea and the mainland of Asia as a result of the operations of private traders. The remaining $143,000,000 represents mainly commodities imported by agencies of the United State Government as a part of the Civilian Supply Program and financed with appropriated funds of the War Department, or as shipments made under the $25,000,000 UNRRA supplies. Exports which enter into this figure are surplus Foreign Liquidation Commission credit, plus small amounts of government-owned minerals and marine products, to the value of some $5,000,000.

The Military Government is endeavoring to encourage such trade as will reduce the area’s dependence upon American funds. Credits realized from South Korea exports, unless balanced in kind by imports approved as essential, are to be used to purchase commodities similar to those making up the Civilian Supply list and certified for import by the Military Government. On July 15, 1947, Korea was declared open to small numbers of foreign businessmen, who might desire to develop trade possibilities within the framework established by the military authorities. Meanwhile, trade has been undertaken with Hong Kong and Macao, and some critically needed materials have been obtained by barter in exchange for Korean surpluses. Recent negotiations with the Egyptian government have led to an agreement to exchange 730 tons of tungsten concentrates for 3,000 bales of long-staple Egyptian cotton.

All dealings with Japan are restricted to a governmental level, and China has imposed conditions which make legitimate trade virtually out of the question. Actually, a growing smuggling trade is going on both with Japan and China, and via Hong Kong and Macao. An essential step for promoting Korea’s trade on a sound basis would be development of an efficient customs service.

_United States Investment in Rehabilitation_

There is one basic policy question which overhangs all financial and economic programs for Korea: How long will the occupation of South Korea continue on a unilateral basis? Until this question is answered in terms of months or years, no satisfactory decision can be made on United States financial or developmental programs for the area. The characteristics of the South Korean economy are such that there is no compromise which provides effective utilization of dollars, and at the same time leaves open the decision concerning the duration of the occupation. If a serious decline in the living standard, and possibly economic disintegration are to be avoided, South Korea must have (_a_) unification with North Korea, or (_b_) substantial relief supplies, or (_c_) relief and rehabilitation supplies of $200 to $300 million a year for several years. The third alternative would provide a possible basis for an indefinite continuance of occupation. The capital investment in a permanently separate South Korea would be wasteful, and the likelihood of a stable economy resulting therefrom would be in doubt for some years. South Korea is a depleted and eroded country with no minerals worth mentioning; an agriculture dependent on nitrate input, and a backward people. In terms of the needs of the East Asia area, an investment in rehabilitation and industrialization, which would permit South Korea to subsist on its own industrial output at its standards of the past 10 years with a minimum of relief, could be justified only by political and strategic consideration of the highest order.

A consideration affecting the duration of the occupation of Korea, and hence the type of economic program, is the estimated length of the occupation in Japan. General MacArthur has indicated his desire for a United Nations, or other international administration to take responsibility in Japan soon after the peace treaty is signed. There would be obvious difficulties in any long-term occupation and rehabilitation program for South Korea, initiated at a time when the occupation of Japan was about to be relinquished by the United States. Apart from the problem of tactical forces in Japan to back up the Korean occupation, there would be communication and supply problems. There might he political objection to the occupation of liberated Korea after the termination of occupation in defeated Japan.

The United States Military Government in Korea has recommended a five-year rehabilitation program starting in July, 1948, and requiring U. S. financing for a deficit of $647 million. The estimates indicate that the proposed rehabilitation of the Korean economy would cost more per year for the first three years, than the relief program of $137 million which was tentatively approved for fiscal 1948, but reduced in July, 1947, to $92.7 million.

A feature of the proposed rehabilitation program is an expenditure of $35 million to provide a chemical fertilizer industry and the supporting power installations, roughly duplicating the installations in North Korea which formerly supplied the fertilizer needs of South Korea. An additional amount of approximately $85 million is included in the five-year rehabilitation program to cover the cost of fertilizer imports, pending the completion of the plants. Other items in the program are investment in coal mining to provide low-grade anthracite for briquetting, and to provide for the development and reconstruction of the transportation, textile and fisheries industries. There is no assurance, however, that (_a_) $35 million fertilizer industry would meet the estimated requirements, or reach capacity production in the time allotted. The suitability of low-grade anthracite dust as the basic energy source for a considerable industrial establishment in South Korea has not been tested, and (_b_) there are no reliable estimates of the reserves of this fuel, and no evidence of this fuel, and no evidence that the mines and railroads could be developed to fit the prescribed time schedule.

In the event that it is decided to continue a one-nation occupation of South Korea for some years, the least costly program would be one designed to provide, not capital goods, but raw materials and fertilizer in sufficient quantity to stabilize the economy at a satisfactory standard of living as measured by a prewar Japanese and potential North Korean living standards. In this way, the risk of an experiment in industrialization without resources would be avoided.

A relief program of the type envisaged might cost the United States about $150 million a year, in addition to the present military occupation costs which are in the neighborhood of $200 million a year. It would be necessary frankly to recognize this as a relief program which held no prospect of financial return, and no prospect of making South Korea a self sufficient economy.

_Industrial Survey_

A comprehensive industrial survey of South Korea would not be warranted. The industrial elements and capabilities as well as weaknesses of that area are all too evident. Should Korea be reunited, and the United States bear a responsibility in the economic rehabilitation of the country, an industrial survey wholly or in part by qualified United States Government personnel is indicated. If, however, it be made by private consultants, they should clearly understand that the survey must be realistic and reflect the economic needs and capabilities of the country. Foreign consultants and construction firms do themselves and their own country as well as the country concerned, a disservice in recommending projects for which there is not complete economic justification.

APPENDIX G TO PART III—KOREA

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL

Because Japan had administered and developed Korea uniformly for Japanese and not Korean purposes, and in particular had persistently suppressed the people’s historic culture, once the region was freed of the Japanese, its people undertook a re-Koreanization program with feverish activity. Since VJ-Day, their own labors in behalf of education, for example, apart from the contributions of American authorities have been determined and surprisingly effective. In that short time it is estimated that total illiteracy has been cut from 75 to 44 per cent (to 25 per cent in a most favored area), a commendable record even when one notes warningly that the degree of literacy thus attained is necessarily a modest one permitting little more in some cases than ability to read a ballot. Although there are today more children in school in South Korea than were in school in all Korea during the Japanese rule, popular education is but begun, whether one considers primary or secondary schooling. Its advancement calls for buildings, texts and other equipment, teachers and advisors, and these requirements call for money.

The program of the educational group in our own Military Government is well designed but promoted within tight financial limits The same can be said for adult educational work of the United States Office of Civil Information. It operates through local libraries whose pictures, posters, periodicals, and other exhibits reach a great many urban visitors, and through a special train which moves periodically among the villages, presenting well-attended educational picture shows and distributing eagerly read farm weeklies and newspapers. Of many lacks the worst is of picture films.

Korean newspapers are numerous but for the most part are primarily political organs. Only by hastening education in the Korean language, long suppressed by Japan, can there be prompt development of adult education; there is present need for increased educational and cultural activities to occupy the attention of young people who presently have insufficient employment.

American health advisers report good progress in prevention of such serious diseases as smallpox and typhus, scant progress in the fight on chronic maladies. Institutional welfare work is insufficient but no more so than under Japan.

In general, one notes abundant energy among Korean leaders and a great desire for mass improvement socially and culturally as well as in other fields; it merits greater financial encouragement than thus far has been available.

APPENDIX H TO PART III—KOREA

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN KOREA AND PROPOSED MILITARY AID

_Military Situation_

In September, 1945, United States Army Forces, pursuant to instructions contained in General Order Number 1 of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, occupied Korea south of the 38° North parallel and accepted the surrender of Japanese troops south of that line. This arbitrary line of demarcation between the United States and Soviet Union occupation areas rapidly became a complete barrier to free movement between agricultural South Korea and the more industrialized North Korea. Numerous disputes and incidents, mostly political or economic, continue to take place even after two years of occupation.

The Commander in Chief, Far East, has delegated military responsibility and authority for occupation of South Korea to Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commanding General of the XXIV Corps. This Corps of two divisions totals 41,000 United States troops and constitutes the American Occupational Force in Korea.

There are no South Korean Armed Forces to augment these American occupational troops. There are, however, three authorized Korean uniformed elements or quasi-military forces: the National Police with a strength of 28,000, the Constabulary with 16,000, and the Korean Coast Guard with 3,000. These forces may be expected to remain loyal to the United States Military Government in the event of emergency. The National Police Force is the agency for enforcing law and order in Korea and is organized into district and subdistrict headquarters with police stations in principal towns and villages.

* * * * *

The Constabulary is similar in purpose to the National Guard of the United States in that it is used to back up the police in event of major disorders. At present, the Constabulary is also being utilized to augment American guards on United States Army installations. It is armed with captured Japanese rifles and small arms, and its efficiency is low by American standards.

North of the 38° North parallel, the estimated Soviet troop strength in Korea is approximately 45,000. These forces are organized into two major units, the 40th Rifle Division and the 19th Mechanized Division, plus complementary air, naval, and service support. There is evidence of further Soviet withdrawal now underway. An accurate figure denoting the Soviet-trained and equipped North Korean People’s (Communist) Army in its overall structure has not yet been obtained but the figure of 125,000 troops has been generally accepted. These forces assist Soviets in control of the border, maintain liaison with Chinese Communists in Manchuria, and constitute a potential military threat to South Korea.

Current political and economic unrest in Southern Korea is aggravated by Communistic terrorism, and by Communist-inspired riots and revolutionary activities in the occupied area. Such disorders impose additional military burdens on the police, the constabulary, and the American Occupation Forces. In addition, there is a possibility, however remote, of a Soviet-inspired invasion of South Korea by troops of the North Korean People’s (Communist) Army. Recent reports from Manchuria indicate that sizable elements of Korean troops are operating with Chinese Communists, possibly to acquire battle conditioning. Furthermore there is evidence that Soviet officers and equipment are being used to groom the Korean Army.

Although it is extremely doubtful that the Soviets or their North Korean satellites would invade South Korea in the near future, infiltration of Communists and of large numbers of the North Korean Army, in connection with large-scale Communist-inspired or abetted riots or revolts in the South, is always a dangerous threat. Should this occur, the forces available should be adequate for maintaining order under any circumstances except for an outright Soviet directed or controlled invasion.

_Strategic Importance_

The political, social, economic, and military situations in South Korea are inextricably mingled. A Soviet-dominated Korea would constitute a serious political and psychological threat to Manchuria, North China, the Ryukyus, and Japan, and hence to United States strategic interests in the Far East. It is therefore in the best interest of the United States to ensure the permanent military neutralization of Korea. Neutralization can only be assured by its occupation until its future independence as a buffer state is assured.

So long as Soviet troops remain in occupation of North Korea, the United States must maintain troops in South Korea or admit before the world an “ideological retreat.” The military standing of the United States would decline accordingly; not only throughout the Far East, but throughout the world. Withdrawal of United States Occupation Forces from Korea would result in a growing unrest among the Japanese people because of their uncertainty regarding future United States policy in the Far East, and their consequent fears of expanding Soviet influence. This might well increase occupational requirements for Japan.

Except as indicated above, and the fact that its occupation denies a potential enemy the use of warm-water ports and the opportunity to establish strong air and naval bases in the peninsula, the United States has little military interest in maintaining troops or bases in Korea. In the event of major hostilities in the Far East, present forces in Korea would most likely be a military liability as they could not be maintained there within our present military capabilities.

There are three possible courses of action with reference to United States Occupation Forces in Korea:

They may be withdrawn immediately, which would abandon South Korea to the Soviet Union through pressures which could be exerted by the North Korea People’s (Communist) Army and is therefore an unacceptable course from the strategic viewpoint.

They may remain in occupation indefinitely, which course would be unacceptable to the American public after Soviet withdrawal, and would subject United States to international censure.

They may be withdrawn concurrently with Soviet occupation forces.

Soviet forces in Northern Korea will not be withdrawn until the North Korean puppet government and armed forces which they have created are strong enough and sufficiently well indoctrinated to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops. One of these Soviet objectives will undoubtedly be to obtain control of South Korea by utilization of Communist Korean armed forces as a means of pressure after withdrawal of United States forces, as was done in the cases of Poland, Outer Mongolia, Yugoslavia, and Albania.

There appears to be a strong possibility that Soviet Russia will withdraw its occupational forces when such conditions are favorable and thus induce our own withdrawal.

_Military Aid to Korea_

The Military Government in Korea, which is currently being turned over to American and Korean civilians, is the only government in South Korea. The immediate and primary objectives of the American Military Commander in Korea are to maintain law and order in the face of subversive uprisings in the American zone, to care for and safeguard American noncombatants and property, and to operate a military government which looks toward the future political independence of Korea together with its economic and social rehabilitation. In view of these objectives, the immediate purpose of any American military aid to Korea should be to facilitate their realization.

The long-term purpose of military aid to Korea should be to enable South Korea, and later all Korea, to engage in a holding operation against the progressive expansion of militaristic Communism. Minimum military aid to Southern Korea therefore should envisage the support of the uniformed elements of Korean military and quasi-military forces through the furnishing of United States equipment including carbines and some light machine guns as well as furnishing vehicles, telephone and radio communications, etc., and training advice.

Consideration was given by the Mission to the organization, training, and equipping of a strong Korean military force along the lines of the former Philippine Scouts. This force should be under the control of the United States Military Commander, initially should be officered throughout by Americans, but with a program for replacement and understudy by Korean officers, and should be of sufficient strength to cope with the threat from the north. Such a force will become truly effective only if the United States Commander in Korea is given clear-cut authority to establish and control it.

Because of its occupation by two nations of radically differing ideologies and policies, and the corresponding separation into two parts economically, there is little that Korea, even as a liberated nation, can do to improve its situation. South Korea lacks the experience and industrial potential to create or support its own armed forces.

An American organized and equipped Korean military force would serve to counteract in large measure the North Korean People’s (Communist) Army when the American and the Soviet forces are withdrawn from Korea. It might possibly preclude the forceful establishment of a Communist Government, and thus contribute to a situation favorable for the establishment of a free and independent Korea.

_Conclusions_

United States-Soviet Union troop strengths in South and North Korea are approximately equal but the Soviets, assisted by a Soviet-controlled, equipped, and trained North Korean People’s (Communist) Army of 125,000 men, and geographically supported by a contiguous Soviet Siberia, are in an infinitely stronger military position.

There is considerable unrest in South Korea but forces available to General Hodge are adequate to cope with it and to maintain order, though completely inadequate, even with maximum assistance from General MacArthur, to meet Soviet-controlled invasion of North Korean forces.

A United States withdrawal which permitted the Soviet Union to dominate Korea would result in a serious political and psychological threat to China, including Manchuria, and Japan.

The United States has a strong strategic interest in insuring permanent military neutralization of Korea and its denial as a base to the Soviet Union.

The Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces just as soon as they can be sure that the North Korean puppet government and armed forces which they have created will be strong enough and sufficiently well indoctrinated to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops.

_Recommendations_

It is recommended that:

United States withdrawal from Korea be based upon agreements with the Soviet Union to effect proportional withdrawals, with as many guarantees as possible to safeguard Korean freedom and independence.

Military aid be furnished to South Korea which would support the achievement of such adequate safeguards and which would envisage:

Continuing to furnish arms and equipment to Korean National Police and Korean Coast Guard.

The creation of an American-officered Korean Scout Force to replace the present Constabulary of sufficient strength to cope with the threat from the North.

Continued interim occupation by United States Army forces in Korea.

Advice in training of technical specialists and tactical units.

_Bibliography_

A

_Alexander of Macedon_, by Harold Lamb, Doubleday, Doran Co., Garden City, N. Y. 1946.

_American Mercury Magazine_, March, 1951.

_Asia at the Crossroads_, by E. Alexander Powell, Century Co., N. Y., 1922.

C

_Caesar and Christ_, by Will Durant, Simon & Schuster, N. Y., 1944.

_Challenge of the East, The_, by George E. Eddy, Farrar, N. Y., 1931.

_China of Chiang Kai-shek_, a political study, by Paul M. A. Linebarger, World Peace Foundation, Boston, Mass., 1941.

_China Shall Rise Again_, by Mei-ling Soong Chiang, Harper and Bros., N. Y., and London, 1940.

_China in the Sun_, by Randall Gould, Doubleday and Co., Inc., N. Y., 1946.

_Chinese Civilization_, by Marcel Granet, Alfred Knopf, N. Y., 1930.

_Chinese, Their History and Culture, The_, by Kenneth Scott Latourette, The MacMillan Co., N. Y., 1934.

_City of the Czars, The_, by Harold Lamb, Doubleday & Co., Garden City, N. Y., 1948.

_Civilization on Trial_, Essays, by Arnold J. Toynbee, N. Y., Oxford University Press, 1948.

_Conquest of Civilization, The_, by James H. Breasted, Harper Bros., N. Y., 1938.

Current Magazines and Newspapers.

D

_Discovery of Freedom, The_, by Rose Wilder Lane, The John Day Co., N. Y., 1943.

_Dawn of Conscience, The_, by James Henry Breasted, N. Y., London, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1933.

E

_Early Empires of Central Asia, The_, by William Montgomery McGovern, Chapel Hill, 1939.

_Economics and the Public Welfare_, by Benjamin McAlister Anderson, Literary Guild of America, N. Y., 1938.

_Economics in One Easy Lesson_, by Henry Hazlitt, Harper and Bros., N. Y. and London, 1946.

_Empire of the Tsars and the Russians, The_, by Anatole Leroy Beaulieu, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, N. Y., 1893.

F

_Fight for the Republic of China, The_, by B. L. Putnam Weale, Dodd, Mead and Co., N. Y., 1917.

G

_Genghis Khan_, by Harold Lamb, Robert M. McBride and Co., N. Y., 1927.

_Great Globe Itself, The_, by William C. Bullitt, Charles Scribner’s Sons, N. Y., 1946.

H

_History of Civilization_, by James Henry Breasted, Ginn & Co., N. Y. and Boston, 1937.

_History of Russia, A_, by Bernard Pares, Alfred A. Knopf, N. Y., 1926.

_History of the Russian Empire Under Peter the Great_, by Voltaire, Vol. XVIII, St. Hubert Guild, N. Y., 1901.

_History of the Russian Revolution_, by Leon Trotsky, Vols. I, II, III, Simon and Schuster, N. Y., 1932.

I

_Inside Asia_, by John Gunther, Harper and Bros., N. Y. and London, 1942.

_Intelligence Digest_—A Review of World Affairs.

_International Relations of the Chinese Empire, The_, by Hosea Ballou Morse, Longmans, Green and Co., N. Y., Vols. I, II, III, 1918.

_I Speak for the Chinese_, by Carl Crow, Harper and Bros., N. Y. and London, 1937.

_Ivan the Terrible, Czar of Russia_, by George Backer, Random House, N. Y., 1950.

J

_Journey to China, A_, by Arnold J. Toynbee, London, Constable and Co., Ltd., 1931.

L

_Life Magazine_, The June 14, issue.

_Lost Peace in China_, by George Moorad, E. P. Dutton, N. Y., 1949.

M

_Man of Independence, The_, by Jonathan Daniels, Lippincott & Co., N. Y., 1940.

_March of the Barbarians_, by Harold Lamb, Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., N. Y., 1940.

_March of Muscovy, The_, by Harold Lamb, Doubleday and Co., Inc., Garden City, N. Y., 1948.

_Marco Polo, the Venetian_, Everyman’s Library, Edited by Ernest Rhys, 1907.

O

_Old Civilizations of the New World_, by Hyatt Verrill, Bobbs-Merrill Co., N. Y., 1929.

P

_Pageant of Chinese History, The_, by Elizabeth Seeger, Longmans, Green and Co., N. Y., 1934.

Pamphlets, Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-on-Hudson, N. Y.

_Practical Program for America, A_, Edited by Henry Hazlett, Harcourt Brace and Co., N. Y., 1932.

R

_Resistance and Reconstruction_, by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Harper and Bros., N. Y. and London, 1943.

_Riding the Tiger_, by Harry Carr, Houghton Mifflin Co., N. Y., and Boston, 1934.

_Russia and the Peace_, by Bernard Pares, The MacMillan Co., N. Y., 1944.

_Russian Enigma, The_, by William Henry Chamberlin, Charles Scribner’s Sons, N. Y., 1943.

_Russia and the Russians_, by Edward Crankshaw, Viking Press, N. Y., 1948.

S

_Siberia_, by Emil Lengyel, Random House, N. Y., 1942.

_Soong Sisters, The_, by Emily Hahn, Doubleday, Doran and Co., Garden City, N. Y., 1942.

_Speaking Frankly_, by James F. Byrnes, Harper Bros., N. Y., 1947.

_Stalin, A Critical Survey of Bolshevism_, by Boris Souvarine, Longmans, Green and Co., N. Y., 1939.

_Stalin’s Russia and the Crisis in Socialism_, by Max Eastman, W. W. Norton and Co., N. Y., 1940.

_Study in History, A_, by Arnold J. Toynbee, Abridgement of Vols. I-VI, by D. C. Somervell, N. Y., G. Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1946.

T

_Tamerlane, the Earth Shaker_, by Harold Lamb, Robert M. McBride and Co., N. Y., 1928.

_Tinder Box of Asia, The_, by George E. Sokolsky, Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., N. Y., 1932.

_Together_, by Katherine Tupper Marshall, Tupper & Love, Inc., N. Y., Atlanta, 1946.

_Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire, The_, by Hosea Ballou Morse, Longmans, Green and Co., N. Y., 1908.

W

_War in the East_, by Charles A’Court Repington, John Murray, London, 1905.

_We’re in This with Russia_, by Wallace Carroll, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1942.

_Index_

A

Acheson, 19, 26, 118.

_American Mercury_, 23.

Atwood, Harry E., 134.

Anti-Imperialist League, 67

Aristotle, 144.

Attila, the Hun, 73, 74.

Attlee, Prime Minister, 146.

B

“Ballentine Beer Patches,” 16.

“Big Noses,” 117.

Bleucher, General, 59.

Borodin, Michael, 59.

Bourtai, 76. (See _also_ Genghis Khan, favorite wife of)

Browder, Earl, 50, 53, 59, 60.

Byrnes, Secretary of State, 19, 24.

C

Cairo Conference, 108.

Canton, Russians in, 113, 120, 121.

Chang Kuo Sin, 117, 119.

Checfoo, 9.

Cheng Tien-shi, Dr., 129, 130.

Chennault, Claire L., 119.

Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, 64, 104, 106; building of model village by, 106, (See _also_ Soong, Sisters).

Chiang Kai-shek, 7, 8, 27, 59, 62, 67, 85, 92, 93, 103-116, contributions of, to the U. S., 103; “Golden Decade” of, 104; mistakes of, 10; tragedy of, 103-116.

Chinese Communist Party, 45; Central Committee of, 32; Central People’s Government, 45; Personalities, 45-68; young intelligentsia of, 57.

Chinese New Year, 87.

Chingwangtao, 7.

Chou En-lai, 8, 13, 28, 42, 56-61, 125; family of, 59; wife of, 60, 126; “Executioner,” 59.

Chungking, 45, 105, 106; destruction of, by Japanese, 106; model village in, 106.

Churchill, 26, 33, 108.

Chu Teh, 13, 38, 40, 50-56; as a movie “fan,” 40; family of, 51; hunting prowess of, 40; wives of, 51, 54.

Comintern, 49.

Communism, the “lure” of, 1; forebears of, 70-81.

Communist, flag; propaganda, 82-93; (See _also_ Propaganda, Communist)

Confucius, 50, 115.

Courcy, Kenneth de, 145.

“Cumshaw,” 36.

D

Dairen, 9.

Daniels, Jonathan, 25.

Drugs, “actedon,” 90; “mescaline,” 90; use of, 90, 91; on Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty, 91; (See _also_ Hypnotism, use of) on Michael Shipkov, 91; on Robert A. Vogeler, 91, 92; (See _also_ Hypnotism, use of).

Democracy, as a principle, 133.

E

England, 139.

Estabrooks, Dr. G. H., 91; (See _also_ Hypnotism, use of).

Eurasia, 7.

F

Fifth Column, conception of, 72.

Finland, 132.

Foundation for Economic Education, 136.

Formosa, 112, 115, 118; invasion of, 118-120.

France, 132.

Free love, 125.

G

Gallen, 59.

Genghis Khan, 17, 22, 53, 68, 70, 74-78, 79, 81, 96, 99, 100, 105, 106, 108, 109; favorite wife of, 76; “Scourge of God,” 74; superstitions of, 77; Yassa of, 1, 78.

Generalissimo, 7, 10, 17, 28, 33, 45.

H

Hankow, 115.

Hatem, Dr., 63, 64; family of, 63, 64. (See _also_ Ma Hia-teh).

Hiss, 26.

Hirohito, 131.

Hitler, 46, 131, 136.

Hong Kong, 108, 124, 128, 129; treatment of British in, 129.

Hoover administration, 135, 136.

Hoover, J. Edgar, 137.

Huns, 70, 73.

Hutton, Betty, 40.

Hurley, Ambassador, 10, 41, 45, 109.

Hypnotism, use of, 91, 92; (See _also_ Estabrooks, Dr. G. H.); on Cardinal Mindszenty, 91, 92; on Robert Vogeler, 91, 92; (See _also_ Drugs, use of); on Van der Lubbe, 92; (See _also_ Drugs, use of).

I

International News Service, 18.

International Hospital, 30, 37. (See _also_ Yenan).

J

Japanese, peace terms offered, 108, 115.

Jefferson, Thomas, 142.

Jenner, William E., 20, 22.

Jessup, 26.

Joffe, Adolph, 104.

Judd, Walter H., 17.

K

Kalgan Pass, 9.

Kung, H. H., Madame, 64. (See _also_ Soong, Sisters).

Kung, H. H., Dr., 104.

Kwangsi Province, 113.

L

Lamb, Harold, 22.

Lattimore, 26.

Lehey, William D., 25.

Lesser concessions, theory of, 135.

Li Li San, 61, 96; wife of, 61.

_Life Magazine_, 115.

Lin Piao, 62.

Li Tsun-jen, General, 113.

“Long March,” the, 47, 48, 54, 121.

Lu Hsun Art Academy, 34, 64.

M

MacArthur, General Douglas, 22, 23, 25, 107.

Madison, James, 134.

Ma Hai-teh, 63, 64. (See _also_ Hatem, Dr.).

Malinovsky, Marshall, 61.

Mao Tse-tung, 13, 14, 15, 29, 33, 45-50, 54, 57, 61, 62, 63, 68, 76, 92, 102, 121, 125; daughter of, 30; son of, 46; wives of, 48; heroine of “Long March,” 48, 49; Lang Ping, 48, 49; Myth, 49; propaganda speech by, 92, 93.

Manchuria, 9, 10, 11, 15, 17, 61, 94-102; as granary of Asia, 94; occupation of, by Japanese, 94; stripping of, by Communists, 96.

Manchus, 94, 104.

Marriage, New Democracy, 125-126.

Marshall, General George C., 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 24, 28, 56; at a Chinese opera, 14; at a Communist banquet, 14; in conference with Mao, 15; preference for Mao, 16; visit of, to Yenan, 12, 14, 15.

McNeil, Hector, 130.

Michener, James, 115.

Mindszenty, Joseph Cardinal, 91; (See _also_ Drugs, use; Hypnotism, use of).

Ming Bing, 13.

Min Yuan Park, 87.

Missionaries, Catholic, 34; Protestants, 35.

Mongol, 38, 70, 72, 73, 74, 81, 100, 101.

Mongolia, 9.

Mossadegh, Mohammed, 146.

Moses, 70, 133.

Mud caves, of Yenan, 29, 44.

Mukden, 95, 99.

N

Nanking, 16, 56, 58.

Nan Yuan, 8.

Nationalist, 9, 11; (See _also_ Chiang Kai-shek, tragedy of).

“New Democracy,” 82; marriage under the, 125-126.

New Life Movement, 61, 106.

Nimitz, Admiral Chester, 107.

O

Open Door Policy, 9.

Opera, Chinese, 14; Shanghai, 68.

P

Peace terms, Japanese, 108.

Pei Yuan, 8.

Peking, 7, 8, 57, 87, 122; capture of, 87, 122; famine in, 122.

Personalities, Communist, 45-69.

Plato, 50

Politburo, 15.

Port Arthur, 9.

“Prisoners of War School,” 32; (See _also_ Yenan).

Propaganda, Communist, 82-93; against Americans, 85; basic purpose of, 82; distortion of terms in, 82, 83; Democracy, 82; Freedom, 82, 83; Security, 83; Truth, 83; for children, 84, 85; newspapers as, 86; opera as, 89; posters as, 84; slogans as, 84; speeches as, 86; by Mao Tse-tung, 12, 93; titles as reward, 87; types of, two, 83.

Q

Quislings, 100.

Quo Vadis, 131-148.

R

Red Curtain, Behind the, 117-130.

Republic, discussion of, 133, 134.

Rosenberg, Anna, 27.

Roosevelt, 21, 26, 33, 108, 135.

“Rosamond,” 65.

Russell, Dean, 143.

Russia, war potential, 138, 139.

Russian advisors, 117.

S

Samarkand, Battle of, 100.

Sanzo Nosako, 33.

Shanghai, fall of, 119, 120, 124; Mayor of, 119; Russians in, 120; treatment of Americans in, 127. Shensi Province, 29.

Shipkov, Michael, 91; (See _also_ Drugs, use of).

Soong, Charlie, 65; family, 65, 104; Sisters, 64, 104.

“Stakhanovitism,” 80.

Stalin, 3, 28, 49, 50, 131.

State Department, 7, 9, 27, 42.

Stuart, J. Leighton, Ambassador, 24, 56.

Sun Fo, 66.

Sun Yat-sen, Madame, 31, 45, 64-69; (See _also_ Soong, Sisters).

Sun Yat-sen, 47, 103; revolution of, 51.

T

Tamerlane, 53, 78.

Tang Shan, 8.

Tartars, 63, 70, 78.

Tientsin, 7, 87, 88.

Tipping, prohibition against, 36; “cumshaw,” 36.

Trans-Siberian Railway, 97.

Trohan, Walter, 23, 25.

Trotsky, 2.

Truce teams, 16.

Truman, President, 7, 10, 15, 19, 22, 108, 111.

U

United States, 7, 8, 16, 117.

Urals, 96, 97.

V

Vogeler, Robert A., 91; (See _also_ Drugs, use of; Hypnotism, use of).

V-J Day, 95, 97.

_Voice of America_, 118.

W

Wallace, Henry, 131.

Wedemeyer, Lieutenant General Albert C., 9, 24, 111, 114, 118, 142.

Wei Tao-ming, Madame, 68, 69.

Wesleyan College, 65.

Wife swapping, 125.

Worton, Major General William Arthur, 7, 8.

Y

Yalta, 10, 12, 13, 22.

Yangtse River, 60, 105.

“Yassa,” 1, 78.

Yeaton, Colonel Ivan D., 31.

Yenan, 12, 15, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 42, 43, 48, 57, 64; International Hospital in, 30; Market place in, 35; “Prisoner of War School,” 32.

Yenching University, 24, 56, 57.

Z

Zukov, 62.

About the Author...

Mary Lamar Knight, famed foreign correspondent and lecturer, graduated into the ranks of foreign correspondents while she was on a two-month “tour” of Europe in 1930. The tour lasted for five full years with only brief vacations and assignments at home. At that time Miss Knight was the only woman employed on a full-time basis in the Paris Bureau of the United Press Associations. In this capacity she covered the European continent as a feature writer in the varied fields of women’s fashions, crime and politics.

She reported on the outstanding fashions of the Parisian designers as they paraded their creations into pages of history; she was the first woman since the days of the French Revolution to witness the guillotining of a famous convict in Paris; she interviewed royalty of many nationalities; and, most important of all, she saw and studied the beginnings of World War II: the propaganda build-up, the international deceit and intrigue, the in-human characters of the men who promoted the war and prepared the nations of Europe for their own destruction.

During her varied career, Miss Knight, who is the daughter of the late Dr. Lucian Lamar and Edith Nelson Knight, of Atlanta, Georgia, has worked as a nurse at Bellevue Hospital, New York, to report on a bitter campaign to regulate working conditions for doctors and nurses; she was assigned to the New York Women’s House of Detention to pose as a prostitute, going to jail with Lucky Luciano’s “girls” and latter covered his vice trial in the courtroom; at one time she was assigned the role of a taxi-dance girl, and at another time to join the chorus line of the world-famous “Rockettes” at the lavish Music Hall theater; she was the first woman reporter allowed to invade the training camps of Joe Louis and Max Schmeling prior to their title fight which she covered at ringside. In 1935, the author embarked for China on a Norwegian freighter.

Remaining in China for two years she travelled to most of the principal cities in China, Korea and Manchuria. At the borders of Mongolia she witnessed the beginnings of her RED BLIGHT of today. The Communists were then in the process of developing the tactics, the brutality, the deceit and the methods which they have so far so successfully employed against their homeland and the neighboring countries of Tibet and Korea. In China, 1935-36, Mary Lamar Knight had a 15-year advance in preview of the tragic days that are now immediately ahead for all civilized nations. She returned to China again in 1946, independently covering the Pauley and the Marshall Missions. She met and became personally acquainted with most of the men who dominate today’s great human conflict—Marshall, Wedemeyer, Ambassador Hurley, Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang, Chou En-lai and many others. Herein she was able to objectively view the entire American-Chinese crisis, make a personal analysis of the appalling international situation and draw the conclusions which she presents in RED BLIGHT.

In recent months Miss Knight has spent her time in bringing this vitally enlightening book up-to-the-minute and appearing before many outstanding political, civic and patriotic clubs and organizations as a featured speaker on Communism and its avowed principles of ruling or ruining the earth.

Among Miss Knight’s published works are: _On My Own_, an autobiography, (MacMillan, 1938); _Spies versus Censors_ (Reader’s Digest, May, 1946) and _Red Realm in China_ (Reader’s Digest, February, 1947). The author was the only woman contributor to _We Cover the World_, the first symposium of foreign correspondents (Prentice-Hall).

The author is available for personal appearances and speaking engagements. (Fees are variable.)

A Note on KOREA ...

_By Mary Lamar Knight_

Books already have been written about the Korean situation. Although it is one spoke in the great Asiatic wheel, Korea is very important, but China still remains in the hub of the wheel. One of the greatest tragedies of this whole chain of events is that General Douglas MacArthur had the difficult—the impossible—task of trying to rescue the Korean chestnut from the fire—a fire which might not have ignited had his counsel and advice, along with that of Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer and others, been heeded in the first place.

The Communist-inspired invasion of South Korea by the North Korean Communists was a trial balloon let loose by the Soviet and Chinese Communists to determine how far the United States and the United Nations would go before buying an all-out Asiatic war. It was a trick from the start, to draw U. S. and UN forces foremost into the area from which the U. S. had withdrawn in 1949. Once committed, and once having dispatched American—and a trickle of UN soldiers into South Korea, the chances were that they could be kept there indefinitely. We were permitted, early in the conflict, to cross the arbitrary 38th parallel, and to proceed at great difficulty and even greater loss of life, to the borders of Manchuria. Then, in typical Communist fashion, they struck back in the evening, almost, of our declaration of all but total victory. One need only to glance at a map of Korea to realize that the Communists, Soviet and Chinese, are in a position to pour millions of men into North Korea, dressed as Koreans or otherwise, at their will. How could we hope to do anything of a permanent nature in unifying Korea against the Communists? The Korean patriot Kim Koo, shortly before his assassination and replying to a question put to him by Representative Walter Judd said: “It doesn’t make any difference what you (the U. S.) do now. There just isn’t any way to get Korea so that she can be independent and secure and self-sustaining, until you solve the Communist problem across the border in Manchuria.” We solved that problem by giving that prize to the Soviets. It was Russia’s price for entering the war, the last six days of it, as an ally, even though it was rather generally known that Japan was ready to surrender.

For every life that may have been spared by the signing of the questionable Yalta agreement, thousands of American and Korean GI’s, and Korean civilians are now dead, dying and maimed. This little Florida-shaped country of Korea, cut up by outsiders, is a tragic example of failure to think beyond military objectives. We cannot defend Korea from Russian attack without an all-out war. We can only prolong the agony. If it was right for us to leave Korea in 1949, can we, honestly, justify our re-entry there in 1950—at the price we have paid?

There yet remain other fates to be decided—Formosa, the Philippines and numerous islands of the Pacific, whether we occupy them or not. Have we not already proven that, “It is fantastic to imagine that we can convert our enemies into our friends by treating our friends as if they were our enemies”?

But to understand the overall picture, one must begin with a knowledge of the background that has made China and the United States the estranged bed-fellow nations which they have become. The historic removal of Douglas MacArthur from all of his commands in the Far East, by President Truman at 1 a. m. on April 11, 1951, will have far-reaching effects. Due to this move, disaster looms before us larger than ever, especially for the United States and Great Britain. Nearly a month before the news of the impending MacArthur dismissal by the President “leaked” to the American press, headlines had appeared in Danish newspapers saying: “British Say ‘MacArthur Must go’.”

The average reader, in all probability, sees only a difference of opinion in the policies of the political and military leadership on the conduct of World War III, but the facts go deeper than this. There appears to be a determination on the part of those who are playing international politics, to obtain and control world power. MacArthur, definitely, was the greatest single stumbling block in their path. To be in a position, militarily, to bomb enemy supply sources, and yet forbidden, by political directives from Washington, to do this, put greater handicaps on MacArthur than he was willing to take. With the MacArthur removal, Truman will bend every effort toward silencing all who remain opposed to his Acheson-approved manifesto.

On April 1, 1951, correspondent Kenneth de Courcy (_Intelligence Digest_—A Review of World Affairs) cabled from London:

“There is no longer even a definite objective in the Korean war. Each nation or organization concerned in it seems to have a different objective; while each high commander seems to have a private idea of what would represent success or victory. If the powers that be cannot agree even in Korea, it is hardly surprising that they cannot devise an agreed strategy for the entire world. Mr. Truman, who is becoming very tired, seems determined to await decisive trends of public opinion. His private views and conclusions are not likely to be pressed unless he is convinced that public opinion is more than ready for them. In fact, American public opinion is far ahead of its leadership. Mr. Truman however, has not yet been convinced of this....

“The Kremlin reckons on a steadily progressive weakening of the Atlantic group of powers. Meanwhile, it is intended to increase the flow of warlike supplies and indirect help to Asiatic Communist forces, rather than to the European satellites. Major developments are timed to take place in Asia before the end of this year, which by the middle of 1952, will give the USSR access to certain valuable and essential raw materials which now have to be purchased from outside the Soviet system.... The Kremlin thinks war with the West will become inevitable ... but hopes to be able to postpone this war until Burma and India have been brought within the Soviet sphere of influence.”

To follow the MacArthur program has been called a “colossal gamble,” but what greater gamble can there be than sitting back and waiting for the enemy to come and destroy us? Was England able to stop Hitler by appeasement? Nor will the present British Labor Government be able to silence the Chinese Communists by promising them Formosa and a hand in the Japanese peace treaty if, indeed, the Japanese accept such a treaty.

Those who still believe that a “deal” can be made with Stalin or Communists anywhere, just do not know the history of Communism or of Communism’s forbears. MacArthur’s removal from the scene at this time is cause for jubilation among the radically inclined the world over, for this particular American hero was Stalin’s Enemy Number One.

Another great boon to the Chinese and Korean Reds is that Truman has virtually promised them that their Manchurian bases will not be bombed by us, unless of course, they step out of line and bomb us first. Thus, they can continue to kill and maim our boys without fear of too much retaliation on our part. We won two great victories on the battlefields of World Wars I and II, but we lost them both at conference tables. Political double-talk always gives the enemy a far greater victory than could be won on the battlefield.

The political moves made by the powers that be in Washington serve only to cancel out our military victories. On November 16, 1950, when Russia vetoed the Security Council’s resolution demanding that China clear out of Korea, she put the blame for the Korean war squarely in her own lap. But as long as Stalin and the Kremlin remain within the United Nations, this international body politic will remain hamstrung, for it will be used as an instrument to give aid and comfort to Communists everywhere in achieving military aggression against the Western Hemisphere. For Russia, as a member of the United Nations, with veto power, has sent no troops to Korea to fight the aggression. But why should she be exempt when others are not? A United Nations operating in opposite directions cannot be very united. With one side of the UN fighting aggression and another faction pushing it, defeat can be the only outcome. When the Korean war first burst into actual flame, and we discovered that Russia was openly, as well as secretly, supporting the North Koreans, why did we not then expel her from the UN and declare her an enemy of the peace? Had we had the courage to do so, the story would be different today. Now, with our hands tied behind our backs, we wait for the enemy to make the next move in the most tragic game of chess ever played with flesh and blood pawns.

It is difficult to understand why General MacArthur was prevented from arming some 400,000 unarmed South Koreans. On April 6, 1951, he stated that political decisions beyond his authority prevented him from doing this, but why were they deprived of fighting for their own land? And why were American fathers and sons to be butchered in battle to free those who would gladly fight for themselves, but for political interference? No short term good ever derived from a long term evil, nor can any amount of political expediency replace military emergency.

Terrible sabotage in this country is not unlikely. On April 7, 1951, J. Edgar Hoover stood before the Senate Committee and said: “A hard core of Communists trained in sabotage is ready to strike at vital industries ...” and he added that this would be one of the most effective weapons that Stalin could use against the United States.

Despite denials from the White House and State Department, we know that Russia has a solid network of spies and undercover agents operating in every department of our national life, operating to destroy us from within, circumventing the need for any long-range attack.

To those who stubbornly maintain that the blood of more than sixty thousand American boys killed or wounded in Korea, in addition to an almost equal number of what are called non-battle casualties, still constitutes merely a “police action,” I say in all reverence, may God forgive you. We are at war now. No amount of waiting or appeasement will put off World War III. We are in it up to our necks.

Your First Step....

“The journey of a thousand miles begins with just one step ...” says a Chinese proverb.

Millions of Americans today know that we have to take that “one step” individually, if order is to be restored to the national house in which we live.

You have read in this volume of the many wrong steps in the wrong direction that have been taken by our national planners. These have resulted in the human turmoil, the domestic unrest, and in undeclared war against Communism. Our battlefield casualties have already passed the seventy thousand mark.

Every American must act NOW to preserve our Constitutional Way of Life. But before concerted political action can be taken the facts must be known. RED BLIGHT tells these facts!

Now _you_ can take _your_ first step in the right direction by helping to disseminate the truth about the RED BLIGHT that is engulfing the earth. You can do this by placing RED BLIGHT into the hands of as many people as possible.

RED BLIGHT is bound in two editions: Paper bound, $1.50 per copy; Cloth Bound, $2.50 per copy. Please use the coupon below for placing your order.

LORRIN L. MORRISON, _Publisher_, 1915 South Western Avenue, Los Angeles 18, California.

Enclosed please find remittance in the amount of $.......... for which please send .... copy/ies of the .......... Bound Edition of RED BLIGHT, by _Mary Lamar Knight_, as indicated in Remittance Advice column below.

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Transcriber’s Notes

pg 10 Changed at no time had be to: he pg 13 Changed spelling of Moa Tse-tung to: Mao pg 15 Changed swayed to its ryhthmic to: rhythmic pg 22 Changed methods of Genghis Kahn to: Khan pg 23 Changed that these are dissillusioning to: disillusioning pg 25 Changed Eighth Regiment at Fort Screvan to: Screven pg 26 Added quote after: finest regiments in the Army. pg 27 Changed May God forebid to: forbid pg 31 Changed this last shipemnt to: shipment pg 32 Changed proved to be a diobolical to: diabolical pg 46 Changed Moa’s childhood was to: Mao’s pg 50 Changed devotion to Confuscius to: Confucius pg 52 Changed fire of vitrolic to: vitriolic pg 56 Replaced comma with period at: foreign dignitaries with ease pg 56 Changed did such a consumate to: consummate pg 58 Changed more violent and vitrolic to: vitriolic pg 58 Added double quote to end of sentence: return to China from Europe? pg 66 Changed publicity she so abhored to: abhorred pg 67 Changed capitalization of world Anti-Imperialist to: World pg 67 Changed capitalization of a cable to the anti-Imperialist to: Anti pg 67 Changed mind and persuasive personalitly to: personality pg 72 Changed horsemen in the earily to: early pg 73 Changed dirty and disheaveled to: disheveled pg 86 Changed effort is wasted on superflous to: superfluous pg 91 Changed warrant a demontration to: demonstration pg 105 Changed capitalization of it had become obvious to: It pg 135 Changed established in this county to: country pg 138 Changed humiliation and degredation to: degradation pg 141 Changed economically and phychologically to: psychologically pg 142 Changed use our almost unprecendented to: unprecedented pg 146 Changed dispatch datelined Teheran to: Tehran pg 152 Changed Russian reentry to: re-entry pg 153 Changed facilitate China’s post-war to: postwar pg 154 Added comma after: Korea, the political pg 155 Changed bound ideolologically to: ideologically pg 163 Changed developments as portentious to: portentous pg 164 Changed program of assistant to: assistance pg 164 Changed eight years of war. to: war, pg 166 Changed to preserve Korea to: Korea’s pg 167 Removed comma from: first meeting March 8, 1946 pg 169 Changed continue as long is to: as pg 169 Changed In the over-all administration to: overall pg 174 Added space between words eastern and half pg 177 Changed land for rise to: rice pg 177 Changed chaotic hyperinflation to: hyper-inflation pg 178 Removed period after: 1915-19 to 2.0 pg 178 Changed diet until indigeous to: indigenous pg 179 Changed over 300 gram to: grams pg 179 Changed salt an sugar to: and pg 180 Changed long-staple Egyption to: Egyptian pg 181 Changed in the time alloted to: allotted pg 182 Removed duplicate word and their own own country pg 184 Changed Army in its over-all to: overall pg 186 Changed expansion of miltaristic to: militaristic pg 189 Changed Charles Schribner’s to: Scribner’s pg 191 Changed Education, Irrington-on Hudson to: Irvington pg 193 Changed spelling of Aristole to Aristotle and changed page number from 143 to 144 pg 193 Changed spelling of Centrol People’s Government to: Central pg 193 Changed spelling of Crinese New Year to: Chinese pg 193 Changed period to semicolon after: Drugs, use of, 90, 91 pg 193 Changed period to semicolon after: Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, 64, 104, 106 pg 194 Fixed page references under Hypnotism pg 194 Replaced semi-colon with period after: International News Service pg 195 Changed spelling under Mindszenty of Hynotism to: Hypnotism pg 196 Changed Sun Yet-sen to: Yat-sen pg 196 Changed spelling of: Hynotism under Vogeler to: Hypnotism