Recollections Of Forty Years In The House Senate And Cabinet An

Chapter 112

Chapter 1127,774 wordsPublic domain

LAST DAYS OF THE HAYES ADMINISTRATION. Invitation From General Arthur to Speak in New York--Letter to Hon. John Jay on the Subject--Mr. Evarts' Refined Specimen of Egotism-- An Anecdote of the Hayes Cabinet--Duty of the Government to Protect the Election of All Federal Officers--My Speech in Cooper Institute --Offers of Support to Elect Me as a Successor of Senator Thurman --My Replies--Republican Victory in New York--President Hayes' Message to Congress--My Report as Secretary of the Treasury-- Modification of My Financial Views Since that Time--Bank Notes as Currency--Necessity for Paper Money--Mr. Bayard's Resolution Concerning the Legal Tender Quality of United States Notes--Questions Asked Me by the Finance Committee of the Senate.

In the latter part of September I was invited by General Arthur, as chairman of the Republican state committee of New York, to speak to the Republicans of that state during the pending canvass, in aid of election of Mr. Cornell as governor. The circumstances of the removal of Arthur and Cornell caused some doubt whether I should accept the invitation, as it seemed that the nomination of Cornell and the management of the canvass by Arthur was an expression of triumph, and my acceptance would be regarded as a humiliation of the President. I did not think so and in this opinion the President concurred. I, therefore, accepted the invitation by the following letter:

"Treasury Department, } "Washington, September 29, 1879.} "Dear Sir:--I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th inst., inviting me to speak to the Republicans in New York some time during the pending campaign. It will give me great pleasure to do my utmost in aid of the election of Mr. Cornell and the Republican ticket at the coming election, and I wish I could accept your invitation without reserve; but in view of engagements made in Ohio, and the official duties incumbent upon me, I cannot make any more definite reply than to say that by the middle of October I hope to be able to set aside two or three days to be spent in your canvass at such places as you may think I can render the most satisfactory service. I have also received an invitation from Mr. Johnson, secretary of your committee. Please consider this an answer.

"Very respectfully, "John Sherman. "To General C. A. Arthur, "Chairman Republican State Committee, New York."

Shortly afterward I received a letter from Hon. John Jay, expressing regret at my acceptance, for the reasons I have stated. To this I replied as follows:

"October 4, 1879. "My Dear Sir:--Your note of the 2nd is received.

"I feel as you do that the nomination of Mr. Cornell, and the appointment of Mr. Arthur to conduct the canvass, has the look of a reproach to the President for their removal. If only their personal interests were involved, I should feel great indifference to their success, but it so happens that Republican success in New York is of such vital importance to the people of the United States, that their personal interest in the matter, and even the motive of the nomination and appointment, should be overlooked, with a view to secure the country against the return to power of the Democratic party.

"We must carry New York next year, or see all the results of the war overthrown and the constitutional amendments absolutely nullified. We cannot do this if our friends defeat a Republican candidate for governor fairly nominated, and against whom, there are no substantial charges affecting his integrity. Besides, the nomination of Mr. Cornell could easily have been prevented if the friends of the President and the administration had aided to defeat it. He was nominated by our acquiescence, and we should not now complain of it. The expediency of holding the meeting you propose, depends entirely upon the question whether or not it would aid the Republican cause this fall. I am inclined to think it would not, that such a meeting would deter Republicans from supporting the regular ticket and, therefore, is ill advised. I thus frankly state my opinion as you ask it, but without any desire in any way to influence that of others.

"Very truly yours, "John Sherman. "Hon. John Jay, Katonah, N. Y."

After the election in Ohio I received from General Arthur a list of appointments for me in New York, which if I had attempted to fill would have overtaxed my strength. Mr. Evarts had also been invited, but limited his acceptance to one speech to be made in Cooper Institute. I complained to him that it was not fair to request of me so many speeches where he, a citizen of that state, agreed to make but one. His answer was characteristic. He said: "Well, Mr. Sherman, when the people of New York wish my views upon public questions they arrange for a meeting in Cooper Institute, or some such place. I make the speech and it is printed and is read." I thought this, under the circumstances, a refined specimen of egotism, meaning that he had only to pronounce his opinion to attract universal attention and he need not therefore repeat his speech at any other place.

This incident recalls to my mind a specimen of his keen wit. Among the early meetings of the cabinet President Hayes announced three or four personal appointments that he intended to make, mainly in the foreign service, in the department of which Mr. Evarts was the head. Evarts seemed to be surprised at these appointments, and after some pause he said: "Mr. President, I have never had the good fortune to see the 'great western reserve' of Ohio, of which we have heard so much." For a moment Hayes did not perceive the quiet sarcasm of Mr. Evarts, which was a polite expression of his feeling that he should have been consulted about these nominations before they were announced. We all caught the idea and the President joined heartily in the laughter. Mr. Evarts is not only a man of keen wit, but is a great lawyer and able advocate. I learned, from my intimate association with him in the cabinet, and subsequently in the Senate as a member of the committee on foreign relations, to respect and love him.

On the 25th of October, when on my way to New York, at the request of General Kilpatrick I made a speech at Paterson, New Jersey, on the occasion of the ratification of the Republican nominations. In this speech I expressed my opinions upon the subject of fraudulent elections, especially in the south, and, while the government has not been able at any time to completely protect the ballot box in several states, the opinions I then expressed are still entertained. I believe the right of each lawful voter to vote in national elections should be enforced by the power of the national government in every state and territory of the Union. I said at this time:

"Now I want to serve notice on the Democratic party, that the Republican party has resolved upon two things, and it never makes up its mind upon anything until it is determined to put it through. _We are going to see that every lawful voter in this country has a right to vote one honest ballot at every national election, and no more_. If the Democratic party stands in the way, so much the worse for the Democratic party. If the south, rebellious as it is, stands in the way again, we will protect every voter in his right to vote wherever the constitution gives the right to vote. Local elections must be regulated by state laws. Southern voters may cheat each other as they please in local elections. The Republican party never trenched on the rights of states, and does not intend to.

"Whenever national officers or Congressmen are elected, those are national elections, and, under the plain provisions of the constitution, the nation has the right to protect them. The Republican party intends, if the present law is not strong enough, _to make it stronger_. In the south 1,000,000 Republicans are disfranchised. With the help of Almighty God, we intend to right that wrong. Congress has a right to regulate congressional elections. The Tweed frauds, reversing the vote of New York state in 1868, led to the passage of the first federal election law, breaking up false counts. Then the Mississippi plan was introduced in the south.

"If Congress was purged to-day of men elected by fraud and bloodshed in the south, the Democrats would be in a pitiful minority in the capital. At the last session the Democrats tried to repeal the election laws, and were met by veto after veto from the stanch Republican President. Then they tried to nullify existing laws. We must as firmly resist nullification now as when Jackson threatened 'by the eternal God' to hang the original nullifier, Calhoun. _We must have free elections_. We are determined to assert the _supremacy of the United States in all matters pertaining to the United States_, and to _enforce the laws of the United States, come what will_."

This declaration of mine at the time created a good deal of criticism, especially in the New York papers, but, in spite of this, my convictions have grown stronger with time that it is the imperative duty of the national government to protect the election of all federal officers, including Members of Congress, by wise conservative laws.

On the 27th of October I spoke in Cooper Institute, confining myself mainly to an exposition and defense of the financial policy of the administration. This was hardly needed in the city of New York though, as Evarts said of his speech, I knew what I said would be printed, and people who were not familiar with financial topics could read it. The commercial papers, while approving the general tenor of the speech, complained that I did not advocate the retirement of the legal tender notes of the government. They seemed then, as they do now, to favor a policy that would withdraw the government from all participation in furnishing a currency. I have always honestly entertained the opinion that the United States should furnish the body of circulating notes required for the convenience of the people, and I do yet entertain it, but the notes should always be maintained at parity with coin. In the cities generally, where banks have great influence and where circulating notes are superseded in a great measure by checks, drafts and clearing house certificates, the wants of the people for paper money secured by the highest sanction of law and by the promise and credit of the government are not appreciated. In this speech I referred to the banks as follows:

"They [the banks] are interwoven with all the commercial business of the country, and their loans and discounts form our most active and useful capital. . . . The abolition of the national banks would inevitably lead to the incorporation of state banks, especially in bankrupt states, where any expedient to make paper money cheap will be quickly resorted to. . . . It will open the question of the repeal of the provisions of the loan laws fixing a limit to the amount of United States notes, and thus will shock the public credit and raise new questions of authority which the Supreme Court would probably declare to be unconstitutional. Free banking open to all, with prompt and easy redemption, supplies a currency to meet the varying wants of different periods and seasons. Who would risk such a question to the changing votes of Congress?"

I must add, however, that I do not believe the banking system would be sustained by popular opinion unless the great body of our currency was in the form of United States notes or certificates based upon coin. If there is any profit in the circulation of such notes, it ought to inure to the government. The circulation of banks should only be equal to the local demands for currency and should always be amply secured, as now, by the deposit of United States bonds, or some substitute for these bonds equally valuable, when the national bonds shall be redeemed. This security ought not to extend beyond the amount of bank notes actually outstanding, leaving the security of deposits by individuals to depend upon the assets of each bank. The duty of the government is performed when it guards with undoubted security the payment of the circulating notes issued by the banks. In this speech I spoke of the resumption act and the history of resumption as follows:

"The resumption act was a Republican measure, supported, advocated and voted for by Republican Senators and Members, and without the aid of a single Democrat in either House of Congress. It has been adhered to and successfully executed by that party. The Republican party has won no victory more complete than the passage, execution and success of the resumption act. This measure was adopted in January, 1875, in the midst of the panic, when our paper money was worth only 85 cents on the dollar. It was a period of wild speculation and inflation. The rate of interest was higher than before or since--the government paying six per cent. in gold, corporations in fair credit from eight to ten per cent., and individuals from ten to twelve per cent. Recklessness in contracting debts was universal. Railroads were built where they were not needed; furnaces were put up in excess of all possible demands; and over-production and over-trading occurred in all branches of business. The balance of trade for ten years had been steadily against us, with an aggregate excess of imports over exports of over $1,000,000,000.

"The panic of 1873 put an end to all these wild, visionary schemes, and left the country prostrate and in ruin. All business enterprises were paralyzed. Congress, in a hopeless quandary, looked in vain for some way of escape from the bankruptcy which threatened every interest and every individual. Then it was the Republican party devised and placed upon the statute book the resumption act, and, against noisy opposition and continual speaking, steadily persevered in its execution.

* * * * * *

"Now that resumption is a success, Democrats say the Republican party did not bring it about, but that Providence has done it; that bountiful crops here and bad crops in Europe have been the cause of all the prosperity that has come since resumption. We gratefully acknowledge that Providence has been on the side of the Republican party, or rather, that, having sought to do right, we find ourselves supported by Divine Providence, and we are grateful to the Almighty for the plentiful showers and favorable seasons that brought us good crops; but we also remember that it was the passage of the resumption act, the steady steps toward resumption, the accumulation of the coin reserve, the economy of the people, and their adjustment of business affairs to the time fixed for resumption, that, with the blessings of Divine Providence, brought us resumption.

"We should be, and are, thankful to the Almighty, but we are under no thanks whatever to the Democratic party. It has not, for twenty- five years, had Providence on its side, but we may fairly infer that, as it has steadily resisted Providence and patriotic duty for more than twenty years, it must have had the devil on its side. Democrats can claim no credit, but stand convicted of a blundering mistake in abandoning the old and tried principles of their party, and following after strange gods with the hope of a brief and partial success. They have failed, and that dogma for hard money, which they abandoned, has been adopted by the Republican party, as the corner stone of its greatest success."

I spoke at Albany, Rochester, and Syracuse, and, on my way to Washington, at New Brunswick, New Jersey.

After the election in Ohio, I received several letters from members of the legislature, offering their support to me as a candidate for United States Senator, to be elected in January to succeed Mr. Thurman, for the term commencing on the 4th of March, 1881. Among them was a letter from L. M. Dayton, a member of the general assembly from Hamilton county, to which I replied as follows:

"Washington, D. C., November 2, 1879. "My Dear Sir:--Your note of the 30th ult., in which you inquire whether I will be a candidate for election as Senator of the United States in place of Senator Thurman, is received.

"Early last summer, when this subject was first mentioned to me by personal friends, I freely expressed my conviction that as the general assembly of Ohio had three times conferred upon me this high and much coveted honor, I ought not to stand in the way of others who might fairly aspire to that position. I am of the same opinion now. During the recent canvass I stated to several gentlemen who had been named in the public press as probable candidates, that I would not be a candidate, and I could not now recede from that position without just reproach.

"Please say so to your fellow members, and accept my hearty thanks for your partiality.

"Very truly yours, "John Sherman. "Hon. L. M. Dayton, Cincinnati, Ohio."

I also wrote the following letter to Senator A. B. Cole, of Portsmouth, in reply to a similar offer:

"Washington, D. C., November 11, 1879. "My Dear Sir:--Your very kind letter of the 10th inst. is received. I thank you again for your offer to support me for the Senate, but you will have seen from the letter I wrote to Colonel Dayton, that I have determined, under the circumstances stated therein, not to be a candidate, so that members may feel entirely free to follow their judgment in the selection of the Senator. I must be impartial between the several candidates.

"I thank you also for what you say about the nomination for the presidency. Such a nomination would be a very exalted honor, so much so that I ought not to do anything to promote or to defeat it. I would be very glad to get the hearty cordial support of the Ohio delegation, and that being granted I am perfectly willing to abide the decision of the national convention, and will be ready to support anyone who is nominated.

"I should be glad to see your son, and hope you will give him a letter of introduction to me.

"Very truly yours, "John Sherman. "Hon. A. B. Cole, Portsmouth, Ohio."

Cornell was elected Governor of New York, and with him a Republican legislature. The elections generally that fall were in favor of the Republican party, but, as both Houses of the 46th Congress were Democratic, President Hayes had to conduct executive business with a Congress not in political harmony with him until the 4th of March, 1881, when the term of Congress and of the President expired. I feel bound to say that no merely obstructive financial measures were adopted during that Congress.

The message of the President, communicated to Congress on the 1st of December, 1879, dealt with the usual topics of such a document; but, instead of commencing with our foreign relations as usual, he began by congratulating Congress on the successful execution of the resumption act and the funding of all the public debt redeemable, into bonds bearing a lower rate of interest. He recommended the suspension of the coinage of the silver dollar, and the retirement from circulation of United States notes with the capacity of legal tender. He held that the issue of such notes during the Civil War was not authorized except as a means of rescuing the country from imminent peril, and the protracted use of them as money was not contemplated by the framers of the law. While I did not concur in all the views stated by the President, especially as to the policy of retiring United States notes then in circulation, yet his general conclusions in favor of the coin standard were, in my view, sound and just. I was very willing to hold on to the progress made in making United States notes equivalent to coin rather than to attempt to secure their retirement from circulation.

In the report made by me as Secretary of the Treasury I stated my opinion that the existing law was ample to enable the department to maintain resumption upon the volume of United States notes then outstanding; but added, that in view of the large inflow of gold into the country, and the high price of public securities, it would seem to be a favorable time to invest a portion of the sinking fund in United States notes to be retired and canceled, and in this way gradually to reduce the maximum of such notes to the sum of $300,000,000, the amount named in the resumption act.

I would not make such a recommendation now, as I am convinced that United States notes based on coin in the treasury are the best form of currency yet devised, and that the volume might be gradually increased as the volume of business increases. Since resumption such notes have been maintained at par with coin by holding in the treasury coin to the amount of thirty per cent. of the notes outstanding. This coin, lying idle and yielding no interest, costs the government the interest on an equal amount of bonds, or a fraction over one per cent. on the sum of United States notes in circulation. These notes are a part of the debt of the United States, and if redeemed, must be paid by the issue of $346,000,000 of bonds. I see no reason why the people of the United States should not have the benefit of this cheap loan rather than the national banks, and there are many reasons why the issue of a like amount of notes by national banks cannot fill the place or perform the functions of United States notes. The issue of bank notes would be governed by the opinions and interest of the banks, and the amount could be increased or diminished according to their interests and without regard to the public good. As an auxiliary and supplement to United States notes, bank notes may be issued as now when amply secured by United States bonds, but it would be a dangerous experiment to confine our paper money to bank notes alone, the amount of which would depend upon the interest, hopes and fears of corporations which would be guided alone by the supposed interests of their stockholders.

There is another objection to a sole dependence on bank notes as currency: They cannot be made a legal tender either by the states or the United States, while it is settled by the Supreme Court that notes of the United States may be made a legal tender, a function that ought to belong to money.

I know that my views on this subject are not entertained by the influential class of our citizens who manage our banks, but in this I prefer the opinion and interest of the great body of our people, who instinctively prefer the notes of the United States, supported by coin reserves, to any form of bank paper that has yet been devised. The only danger in our present currency is that the amount may be increased to a sum that cannot be maintained at par with coin, but the same or a greater danger would exist if the volume of paper money should be left to the interested opinion of bankers alone.

It is sometimes claimed that neither the government nor banks should issue paper money, that coin only is money. It is sufficient to say that all commercial nations have been constrained by necessity to provide some form of paper money as a substitute for coin. The experience of the United States has proven this necessity and for many years our people were compelled to rely upon state bank notes as a medium of exchange, with resulting loss and bankruptcy. For the want of paper money at the commencement of the Civil War, the United States was compelled to issue its notes and to make them a legal tender. Without this the effort to preserve the Union would have utterly failed. With such a lesson before us it is futile to attempt to conduct the business of a great country like ours with coin alone. Gold can only be a measure or standard of value, but cannot be the current money of the country. Silver also can only be used as money for the small transactions of life, its weight and bulk forbidding its use in commerce or trade. The fluctuations in market value of these metals make it impossible to permit the free coinage of both at any ratio with each other without demonetizing one of them. The cheaper money will always be the money in circulation. Wherever free coinage now exists silver is the only money, while where gold is the standard, silver is employed as a subsidiary coin, maintained at par in gold by the mandate of the government and its receipt for or redemption in gold. The only proposed remedy for this fluctuation is an agreement by commercial nations upon a common ratio, but thus far all efforts for such an agreement have failed. If successful the result might not be as satisfactory as anticipated.

I urged, in my report, the importance of adjusting the coinage ratio of the two metals by treaties with commercial nations, and, until this could be done, of limiting the coinage of the silver dollar to such sum as, in the opinion of Congress, would enable the department to readily maintain the standard dollars of gold and silver at par with each other.

In this report I stated the refunding transactions already described, and recommended the refunding of all bonds of the United States in the same manner as they became redeemable. This was successfully executed by my successors in office. I was able to say truly of the treasury department, in conclusion:

"The organization of the several bureaus is such, and the system of accounting so perfect, that the financial transactions of the government during the past two years, aggregating $3,354,345,040.53, have been adjusted without question, with the exception of a few small balances now in the process of collection, of which it is believed the government will eventually lose less than $13,000, or less than four mills on each $1,000 of the amount involved."

The question of the legal tender quality of United States notes, discussed in my report, was followed, on the 3rd of December, by the introduction in the Senate of a resolution by Mr. Bayard as follows:

"_Resolved, etc._, That from and after the passage of this resolution the treasury notes of the United States shall be receivable for all dues to the United States excepting duties on imports, and shall not otherwise be a legal tender; and any of said notes hereafter reissued shall bear this inscription."

This resolution, while pending in the committee, was debated at some length, and reported back adversely on the 15th of January, 1880, by Mr. Allison, from a majority of the committee. Mr. Bayard presented the views of the minority in favor of the resolution. It was subsequently discussed at considerable length by Mr. Coke, of Texas, and Mr. Bayard, on opposite sides. No definite action was taken and the matter rested, and I do not recall that it was ever again brought before the Senate. I felt satisfied with the majority report, as I doubted the expediency or power of Congress to deny to these notes any of the qualities conferred upon them by the law authorizing their issue, as was the legal tender clause. The beneficial result of resumption was appreciated by both parties and there was no disposition of Congress to pass any legislation on the subject. The speech of Mr. Bayard, made on the 27th of January, 1880, was a careful and able review of the whole subject of legal tender, but it was evident that neither House of Congress agreed with him in opinion.

A bill in regard to refunding the debt maturing after the 1st of March, 1881, was introduced in Congress on the 27th of December, 1879, by Fernando Wood, chairman of the committee of ways and means of the House. It provided for a change of existing laws so as to limit the rate of interest upon the bonds to be issued in such refunding to not to exceed three and a half per cent. per annum. This bill, if it had been passed, would have prohibited the sale of all bonds for resumption, as well as for refunding, at a greater rate of interest than three and a half per cent. I opposed this proposition, as it would impair the power of maintaining resumption in case such bonds could not be sold at par, and the existing law did not prevent the secretary from selling those already authorized at a premium. No action was taken upon the bill by that Congress, and Mr. Windom, my successor, found no difficulty in refunding these bonds on more favorable terms without any change of existing law.

On the 30th of January, 1880, I appeared before the finance committee of the Senate in response to their invitation. The committee was composed of Senators Bayard (chairman), Kernan, Wallace, Beck, Morrill, Allison and Ferry, all of whom were present. Mr. Bayard stated that a number of propositions, upon which it was desired to obtain my views, had been submitted by Senator Beck, and then read them as follows:

"1. What reason, if any, there is for refusing to pass a bill authorizing the receipt of legal tenders for customs dues.

"2. Why the trade dollar should not be converted into a standard dollar.

"3. What has been the cost of converting the interest-bearing debt, as it stood July 14, 1870, to what it is now, including double interest, commissions, traveling expenses of agents, etc., and the use of public money by banks, and the value of its use, so as to determine whether the system should be continued or changed.

"4. The effect of the abolition of the legal tender quality of greenbacks upon the paper currency.

"5. The necessity for a sinking fund and how it is managed.

"6. Whether silver coin received in payment of customs duties has been paid out for interest on the public debt; and if not, why not."

Senator Allison desired to know if this interview was to be stenographically reported, and the committee decided that it should be.

My answers to these questions and the colloquy with the committee in respect to details cover fifty-four printed pages, and give by far the most comprehensive statement of treasury operations during the two or three years before that meeting, and suggestions for future legislation, that has been written or published. The length of the interview prevents its introduction in full, but a statement of some portions of it may be interesting. In answer to the first question I said:

"The act of February 25, 1862 (section 3694, R. S.), provides that all the duties on imported goods shall be paid in coin; and the coin so paid shall be set apart as a special fund to be applied to two purposes, one of which is the payment in coin of interest on the bonds of the United States, and the balance to the sinking fund.

"This is an obligation of the government that its coin revenue should be applied to the payment of interest on the public debt. So long as legal tender notes are maintained at par and parties are willing to receive them in payment of coin interest, there is no objection to receiving legal tender notes for customs dues.

"Since resumption it has been the practice of the department to thus receive them, but this practice can be kept up only as long as parties holding interest obligations are willing to accept the same notes in payment thereof. If, by any unforseen and untoward event, the notes should again depreciate in value below coin, the obligations of the government would still require that interest on the public debt be paid in coin; and if customs dues were payable in legal tender notes, the department would have no source from which to obtain the coin necessary to the payment of interest, for of course holders of interest obligations would not accept a depreciated currency when they were entitled by law to coin."

I reminded the committee that in my report of December, 1878, I stated that on the 1st of January following I would receive United States notes for customs duties. As these notes were redeemable in coin, it was unreasonable to require the holder of notes to go to one government officer to get coin for his notes to pay customs duties to another government officer. I held that the United States notes had become coin certificates by resumption, and should be treated as such. I informed them that I issued the order with some reluctance, and only after full examination and upon the statement of the Attorney General, who thought technically I could treat the note as a coin certificate. I called their attention to the fact that I had informed Congress of my purpose to receive United States notes for customs duties and had asked specific authority to do so, but no action was taken, and I was assured that none was needed. The conversation that followed showed that they all agreed that what I did was right. It was evidently better not to provide by specific law that the United States notes should be receivable for customs dues, for in case of an emergency the law would be imperative, while, if the matter was left to the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, he could refuse to receive notes for customs dues and compel their payment in coin.

This led to a long colloquy as to whether the time might come when the United States notes could not be redeemed in coin. I entered into a full explanation of the strength of the government, the amount of reserve on hand, the nature of our ability, and said: "Still we know that wars may come, pestilence may come, an adverse balance of trade, or some contingency of a kind which we cannot know of in advance may arise. I therefore think it is wise to save the right of the United States to demand coin for customs duties if it should be driven to that exigency."

The question then arose as to the propriety of confining redemption of notes to one place. Mr. Wallace inquired whether the government notes should not be receivable and interchangeable at every government depositary. I answered that the notes should be received everywhere at par with coin, but I doubted the propriety of paying coin for United States notes except at one place and that in New York, the natural center for financial operations, where most of the customs dues were paid and where coin could be most safely hoarded.

Mr. Beck examined me at considerable length, and, with his usual Scotch tenacity, insisted, in spite of the attorney general, that I was not authorized to receive legal tender notes for customs dues. He asked me by what authority I claimed this power. I quoted the third section of the resumption act, and gave him a copy of my circular letter to officers of customs, dated on the 21st of December, 1878, in which, after calling attention to that section, I said:

"By reason of this act, you are authorized to receive United State notes, as well as gold coin and standard silver dollars, in payment of duties on imports, on and after the first day of January, 1879.

"Notes thus received will in every instance be deposited with the treasurer, or some assistant treasurer of the United States, as are other collections of such duties, to be redeemed, from time to time, in coin, on government account, as the convenience of the service may demand."

Mr. Beck then said:

"I desire to know, Mr. Secretary, whether it is not better, in your opinion, that the Congress of the United States should prescribe the duties of executive officers, so that they can act in pursuance of law, rather than the executive officer should be acting on his own notions of what is best?"

I replied:

"I say yes, decidedly."

Mr. Beck inquired:

"Is not that what we are proposing to do now, by the passage of this law which I seek to have enacted, and are you not opposing that condition of things?"

I replied:

"An executive officer, when there is a doubt about the law, must give his own construction of it, but should, of course, readily conform to the action of Congress as soon as it is declared. The objection I make is not to the passage of a law, but that the bill as proposed applies it to a possible future state of affairs such as did not exist when this order was made and does not now."

The subject then turned to the exchange of trade dollars for standard dollars. Mr. Beck said: "I have introduced several bills to facilitate the exchange of trade for standard dollars." I said:

"The bill which I have here is a House bill. There is no objection in my mind to the object of this bill; that is, to provide for the exchange of the trade dollar for the standard silver dollar; the only point is whether the trade dollar shall be treated as bullion, or as a coined dollar of the United States. Now, I am clearly of the opinion that it ought to be treated as so much bullion, issued at the expense of merchants, for their convenience and benefit, and without profit to the United States, and therefore not entitled to any preference over other bullion, and we might say not to so much, because it was issued to private parties for their benefit and at their cost, but stamped by us merely to enable the coins to be used to better advantage in a foreign market. I have not, therefore, any objection to the bill if you allow us to pay the same for these trade dollars as for other bullion."

This reply led to a long examination about silver at home and in foreign markets, and the objections made to having two silver dollars, one coined for private persons, from bullion furnished by them, and the other coined for the United States from bullion purchased by it.

Mr. Beck next inquired what effect the abolition of the legal tender quality of the greenbacks would have on our paper currency. This led to a long colloquy between him and myself, in which all the laws relating to the subject and the practice of the government, from its organization to that time, were discussed.

On the question whether United States notes ought still to be a legal tender, I referred him to my report, in which I said: "The power of Congress to make them such was asserted by Congress during the war, and was upheld by the Supreme Court. The power to reissue them in time of peace, after they are once redeemed, is still contested in that court."

I soon found that Mr. Bayard and Mr. Beck were quite opposed to each other on this topic, and I suggested that I thought that the argument upon it should be between them. My own opinions were sufficiently stated in the report in which I submitted to Congress whether the legal tender should not be repealed as to all future contracts, and parties be left to stipulate the mode of payment. I said that United States notes should still be receivable for all dues to the government, and ample provision should be made to secure their redemption on demand.

The examination, or, rather, conference, took a wide range between the members of the committee and myself. Mr. Beck pressed me to express my opinion of the legal tender which was contained in the bill introduced by him, providing for a mandatory legal tender of all forms of money. I answered:

"I do not think, Mr. Senator, you ought to ask me that question, because that is a matter you are called upon to decide and pass upon in your sphere as a Senator. I would say, on the other hand, that I do not think it ought to have any such effect. I suppose, however, Mr. Bayard would very frankly tell you what the intention of the resolution is."

Mr. Bayard then said:

"I know one thing: That banks cannot compel me to receive their notes for debts due me, nor can any man compel me to receive them. If the government owes me my salary, I think they could, perhaps, pay me in the national bank notes, under the existing law, but you cannot compel the payment of a debt between private parties with it."

I said:

"If you will allow me, I should like to amplify a little on one point: I think if Congress would take up this question of the modification of the legal tender note and make certain rules of evidence (which would be clearly constitutional), which good lawyers undoubtedly approve, declaring that where a contract is made between parties upon the basis of United States notes, it shall be presumed by courts, in the affirmance of contracts, that the payment in United States notes shall be a sufficient compliance therewith, and that, in the absence of any absolute provision to the contrary, paper money, or promises to pay money, shall be a legal tender in discharge of any obligation."

In respect to the cost of refunding, the next subject of inquiry, I was able to give them full details, with all the orders of the treasury department from the 16th of January, 1878, until the close of these operations in the summer of 1879. Many of these details had not then been published, but I furnished the fullest information available. In response to an inquiry as to the amount of commissions paid to the national banks on account of the sale of the four per cent. bonds, a full table was exhibited of the subscriptions of, and commissions paid to, the twenty-six national banks chiefly engaged in this business, in which the total amount of sales made by them was shown to be $552,929,100, and the amount of commissions paid was $1,363,070.34. In exhibiting these tables I said:

"Here is a table showing the sales and commissions of certain banks. I have taken all banks who sold over $1,000,000. There were twenty- six of them. The First National Bank, having been always connected with the national securities and having been the agent of the syndicate, continued to be the agent of the foreign syndicate, and continued to have altogether the largest business. They sold of the four per cent. bonds $262,625,000. The sales of the other banks are kept here in the same way. The Bank of New York (National Banking Association), I think, was the next. It sold $57,259,500. The National Bank of Commerce sold $51,684,000; the National Bank of the State of New York sold $46,915,000, and so on down."

I called attention to the fact that in the last sale of about $200,000,000 four per cent. bonds, we received one-half of one per cent. premium, or a million dollars, which nearly covered the entire commissions paid to the twenty-six banks named. Full details were given of the various loans, and it was shown that the cost of selling the last loan was less expensive to the government, in proportion to the amount sold, than any previous loan.

In reference to the sinking fund, about which I was asked my opinion, I said it was the same old question that had been so often debated. I explained that a sinking fund is nothing but an obligation or promise, on the part of the government or an individual, to pay a certain amount annually of the principal of the debt in addition to the interest. In this way the debt is gradually liquidated and the annual interest lessened. A sinking fund promised by a government is nothing more or less than a name for the surplus revenue of the government. A government without a surplus revenue cannot possibly have a sinking fund. There is no way to pay a debt except by having an income above your expenditures, and you can call your surplus revenue a sinking fund if you choose. I said that under existing law the department was required to purchase one per cent. of the entire debt of the United States each fiscal year, and to set the amount apart as a sinking fund, and to compute interest thereon to be added with the amount to be subsequently purchased each year. This act can only be construed as an authority to purchase the debt in case of surplus revenue for the purpose.

In practice, while keeping a book account with the sinking fund, we have reduced the debt by the application of surplus revenue more rapidly than if the requirements of the sinking fund had been literally complied with. At several periods we, in fact, did not reduce the debt, but actually increased it, and especially within the last two years, but in other years of prosperity, when the revenues exceeded our expenditures, we were able to pay a much larger amount of the debt than the sinking fund required by law.

Mr. Beck said: "I propose to inquire pretty carefully, before we get through with this interview, concerning the immense reduction of the public debt which has been made, of over $700,000,000, from the highest point down to the present, so that we may be governed in the future taxation by actual requirements of the public service." He expressed his wish, after he had carefully examined the interview thus far, to continue it at a future day, but I was not again called upon.