CHAPTER LIV.

CLEVELAND'S EXTRAORDINARY MESSAGE TO CONGRESS. First Session of the 50th Congress--The President's "Cry of Alarm" --Troubled by the Excess of Revenues over Expenditures--My Answer to His Doctrines--His Refusal to Apply the Surplus to the Reduction of the Public Debt--The Object in Doing So--My Views Concerning Protection and the Tariff--In Favor of a Tariff Commission--"Mills Bill" the Outcome of the President's Message--Failure of the Bill During the Second Session--My Debates with Senator Beck on the Coinage Act of 1873, etc.--Omission of the Old Silver Dollar--Death of Chief Justice Waite--Immigration of Chinese Laborers--Controversy with Senator Vest--Speech on the Fisheries Question--Difficulties of Annexation with Canada.

The 50th Congress convened on the 5th of December, 1887, and was promptly organized, the Senate being Republican, and the House Democratic. During this long session of about eleven months, nearly every question of political or financial importance in American politics was under discussion, and I was compelled, by my position on the committees on foreign relations and finance, to take an active part in the debates.

On the 6th the President sent to Congress his annual message, in which he departed from the established usage of his predecessors, who had presented in order the subjects commented upon, commencing with a summary of our relations with foreign nations, and extending to the business of all the varied departments of the government. Instead of this he abruptly opened with a cry of alarm, as follows:

"To the Congress of the United States.

"You are confronted, at the threshold of your legislative duties, with a condition of the national finances which imperatively demands immediate and careful consideration."

This threatening announcement of a great national danger startled the general public, who had settled down into the conviction that all was going on very well with a Democratic administration. The President said that the amount of money annually exacted largely exceeded the expenses of the government. This did not seem so great a calamity. It was rather an evidence of good times, especially as he could apply the surplus to the reduction of the national debt. Then we were told that:

"On the 30th day of June, 1885, the excess of revenues over public expenditures, after complying with the annual requirement of the sinking fund act, was $17,859,735.84; during the year ended June 30, 1886, such excess amounted to $49,405,545.20; and during the year ended June 30, 1887, it reached the sum of $55,567,849.54."

In other words, we had an excess of revenue over expenditures for three years of about $122,000,000. The sinking fund during that three years, as he informed us, amounted in the aggregate to $138,058,320; that is, we had stipulated by law to pay of the public debt that sum during three years, and had been able to pay all we agreed to pay, and had $122,000,000 more. He did not state that during and subsequent to the panic of 1873 the United States did not pay the sinking fund, and this deficiency was made good during the prosperous years that followed 1879. Upon the facts stated by him he based his extraordinary message. The only recommendation made by him was a reduction of taxation. No reference to the vast interests intrusted to departments other than the treasury was made by him except in a brief paragraph. He promised that as the law makes no provision for any report from the department of state, a brief history of the transactions of that important department might furnish the occasion for future consideration.

I have a sincere respect for President Cleveland, but I thought the message was so grave a departure from the customary annual message of the President to Congress that it ought to be answered seriatim. I did so in a carefully prepared speech. The answer made can be condensed in a few propositions: An increase of revenue (the law remaining unchanged) is an evidence of unusual trade and prosperity. The surplus revenue, whatever it might be, could and ought to be applied to the reduction of the public debt. The law under which the debt was created provided for this, by requiring a certain percentage of the debt to be paid annually, and appropriating the surplus revenue for that purpose. Under this policy it was estimated that the debt would be paid off prior to 1907.

But experience soon demonstrated that, whatever might be the law in force, the revenues of the government would vary from year to year, depending, not upon rates of taxation, but upon the financial condition of the country. After the panic of 1873, the revenues were so reduced that the sinking fund was practically suspended by the fact that there was no surplus money in the treasury to meet its requirements. At periods of prosperity the revenues were in excess of the current expenses and the sinking fund, and in such conditions the entire surplus revenue, was applied to the reduction of the public debt and thus made good the deficiency in the sinking fund in times of financial stringency. This was a wise public policy, fully understood and acted upon by every Secretary of the Treasury since the close of the war and prior to Mr. Manning.

Another rule of action, founded upon the clearest public policy, had been observed prior to the incumbency of Mr. Cleveland, and that was not to hold in the treasury any form of money in excess of a reasonable balance, in addition to the fund held to secure the redemption of United States notes. All sums in excess of these were promptly applied to the payment of the public debt, and, if none of it was redeemable, securities of the United States were purchased in the open market. It was the desire of Congress and every Republican Secretary of the Treasury, in order to comply with the sinking fund law, to apply the surplus to the gradual reduction of the debt. While I was secretary I heartily co-operated with the committees of Congress in reducing appropriations, and in this way was enabled to maintain the reserve, and to reduce the interest- bearing public debt.

The policy of Mr. Cleveland and Secretary Manning was to hoard in the treasury as much of the currency of the country as possible, amounting sometimes to more than $200,000,000, and this created a stringency which affected injuriously the business of the country. It was the policy of all the early Presidents to apply any surplus revenue either to the reduction of the public debt or to public objects.

Mr. Jefferson, in his message of 1806, says: "To what object shall the surplus be appropriated? Shall we suppress the impost, and thus give that advantage to foreign over domestic manufacturers?" He believed that the patriotism of the people would "prefer its continuance and application for the purpose of the public education, roads, rivers and canals." This was in exact opposition to the policy proposed by Mr. Cleveland, who refused to apply the surplus revenue to the reduction of the debt, and in his extraordinary message demanded a reduction of duties on foreign goods. A larger surplus revenue had frequently, from time to time, been wisely dealt with by Republican administrations. It had either been applied by the executive authorities to the payment of the public debt, or its accumulation had been prevented by Congress, from time to time, by the reduction or repeal of taxes. In the administration of each of Mr. Cleveland's predecessors since the close of the war, this simple remedy had been applied without neglecting other matters, or raising a cry of alarm. It was apparent that the object of the President was to force the reduction of duties on imported goods, which came into competition with domestic products, and that the accumulation of money in the treasury was resorted to as a means to compel such a reduction.

On the 19th of July, 1886, I had called the attention of the Senate to the difficulty and danger of hoarding in the treasury surplus revenue, and the readiness of the Senate to provide for the reduction of taxes and the application of the surplus. The revenues could have been reduced without endangering domestic industries. At the date of his extraordinary message both Houses of Congress were quite ready to reduce taxes. Full authority had been given to the Secretary of the Treasury to apply surplus revenue to the purchase of United States bonds. But the President, set in his opinion, was not satisfied with such measures, but demanded the reduction of duties which protected American industries.

The greater part of my speech in reply to the President's message was a discussion of the different forms of taxation imposed by the United States and especially the duties imposed on imported goods. I never was an extreme protectionist. I believed in the imposition of such a duty on foreign goods which could be produced in the United States as would fairly measure the difference in the cost of labor and manufacture in this and foreign countries. This was a question not to be decided by interested capitalists, but by the careful estimate of business men. The intense selfishness exhibited by many of those who demanded protection, and the error of those who opposed all protection, were alike to be disregarded.

I believe that no judicious tariff can be framed by Congress alone, without the help of a commission of business men not personally interested in the subject-matter, and they should be aided by experienced officers in the revenue service. I have participated in a greater or less degree in the framing of every tariff law for forty years. I have spoken many times on the subject in the Senate and on the rostrum. My reply to the President's message is the best exposition I have made as to the principles and details of a protective tariff. If I had my way I would convene such a tariff commission as I have discussed, give it ample time to hear and gain all information that could aid it, and require it to report the rates of duty proposed in separate schedules so that the rate of each schedule or paragraph might be raised or lowered from time to time to meet the wants of the treasury. If Congress would allow such a bill to become a law we could dismiss the tariff free from party politics and lay the foundation for a durable system of national taxation, upon which domestic industries may be founded without the hazard which they now encounter every year or two by "tinkering with the tariff."

The real controversy raised by the President's message was not whether taxes should be reduced, but what taxes should be reduced or abolished. I stated the position of the two parties in a debate with Mr. McKenna, as follows;

"There is a broad line of division between the two parties as they exist now and as they will exist in the future. The President says, 'retain all internal taxes and reduce the duties on imported merchandise that comes in competition with home industries.' We say we will not strike down any prospering industry in this country; that where manufactures have sprung up in our midst by aid of a duty, this protection, as you call it, we will not reduce; we will not derange contracts, industries, or plans, or lower the prices of labor, or compel laborers or manufacturers to meet any sudden change or emergency. We say that we are willing to join with you in reducing the taxes. We will select those taxes that bear most heavily upon the people, especially internal taxes, and repeal those. We will maintain the policy of protection by tariff duties just as long as it is necessary to give our people the benefit of a home market, and diversified productions a fair chance in the trade and commerce of our country, but we will not invite into our country foreign importations to compete with and break down our home industries."

The bill entitled "A bill to reduce taxation and simplify the laws in relation to the collection of the revenue," known as the Mills bill, was the outcome of the President's message. It was reported to the House of Representatives by Roger Q. Mills, of Texas, and thus obtained its name. Mr. Mills, on the 17th of April, called it up for consideration, and it was debated and amended, and passed the House on the 21st of July, more than seven months after the President's cry of alarm, by the close vote of 162 yeas to 149 nays. Samuel J. Randall, then absent and sick, desired his colleague to pair him against the bill, as, if present, he would record his vote in opposition to the bill. It came to the Senate and was referred to the committee on finance. On the 8th of October Mr. Allison, from that committee, reported back the Mills bill with a substitute for the entire bill. This substitute was a careful and elaborate protective tariff bill, containing some provisions I did not approve, but, in its general provisions, was, in my opinion, a far better bill than the Mills bill. The debate on these rival bills continued until the close of the session on the 19th of October, when the Senate, by a resolution, authorized and directed the committee on finance to continue during the recess of Congress the investigation of such revenue measures, including the Senate and House bills, as had been referred to the Senate.

The history of the bills during the second session of this Congress is easily told. They were debated in the Senate nearly every day until the 22nd of January, 1889, when the amendment of the Senate was adopted as a substitute for the entire Mills bill, by the close vote of 32 yeas to 30 nays. It was debated in the House of Representatives and referred to its committee of ways and means. It was reported by the committee to the House of Representatives, with a resolution declaring that the action of the Senate in substituting an entire bill for the House bill was in violation of the constitution. No action was taken on this resolution, and then all tariff legislation was defeated for that Congress.

On the 6th of March, 1888, Senator Beck made a rambling speech commencing with a fierce denunciation of a bill then pending to grant pensions to certain disabled soldiers of the Union army. He then veered off on the tariff and the great trusts created by it. I ventured, in a mild-mannered way, to suggest to him a doubt whether trusts were caused by the tariff, whether they did not exist as to domestic as well as to foreign productions. I named to him the whisky trust, the cotton-seed trust and other trusts of that kind, and wanted to know how these grew out of the tariff. Thereupon he changed his ground and took up the silver question and commenced assailing me for the coinage act of 1873, saying I was responsible for it. He said it was secretly passed, surreptitiously done, that I did it, that I knew it.

I promptly replied to that charge by showing from the records that the act referred to, and especially the part of it relating to the silver dollar, was recommended by Mr. Boutwell, the Secretary of the Treasury, and all the officers connected with coinage and the mints, that it was debated at great length for three successive sessions in both Houses, that it was printed thirteen times, and that the clause omitting the old silver dollar was especially considered and the policy of it fully debated, and a substitute for the old dollar was provided for by each House. I can say with confidence that every Member of the Senate but Beck felt that he had been worsted in the debate, and that the charge aimed at me, but which equally applied to Morrill and Bayard, and especially to all the Senators from the silver states who earnestly and actively supported the bill, was thoroughly refuted.

Senator Beck, chafed by his defeat, on the 13th of March made in the Senate a three hours' speech in support of his position. Instead of going to the public records and showing by them whether or not the law was put through the Senate in a secret way, he quoted what several Senators and Members said they did not know, what Grant did not know, a mode of argument that if of effect would invalidate the great body of the legislation of Congress.

I replied in a speech occupying less than half an hour, producing the original bill as it came from the treasury department with the dollar omitted from the silver coins, with the report of the Secretary of the Treasury calling attention to its omission, and the opinion of Knox, LInderman, Patterson, Elliott, all of whom were prominent officers of the treasury department in charge of currency and coinage, giving fully the reasons why the old silver dollar was omitted. I also quoted from the records of each House of Congress, showing that special attention was called to the omission of the old silver dollar by Mr. Hooper, having charge of the bill. The House of Representatives, in compliance with the advice of Comptroller Knox, did authorize in its bill, which it passed, a subsidiary dollar containing 384 grains of standard silver, the same weight as two half dollars, but these dollars were, like the subsidiary fractional coins, a legal tender for only five dollars. When this bill came to the Senate it was thoroughly debated. The legislature of California petitioned Congress for a silver dollar weighing more than the Mexican dollar instead of the subsidiary dollar provided for by the House. In compliance with this petition, the Senate so amended the bill as to authorize the owner of silver bullion to deposit the same at any mint, to be formed into bars or into dollars of the weight of 420 grains, designated as "trade dollars." These dollars were intended solely for the foreign trade, and were worth in the market only the value of 420 grains of standard silver. It was the dollar desired by the silver producing states, and but for the rapid decline in the price of silver, which made this dollar worth less than its face in gold, the mint would probably be coining them to-day; but before the mint was closed to their coinage more than 35,000,000 pieces had been made. No unprejudiced persons could claim that the charges of Mr. Beck were not completely answered.

On the 23rd of March Chief Justice Waite, of the Supreme Court of the United States, died at his residence in Washington. Upon the 27th, upon my motion, the Senate adopted a resolution that a committee of five Senators be appointed by the chair, whose duty it should be to accompany the remains of the chief justice to Toledo, in the State of Ohio, and attend the funeral there. The committee appointed were Messrs. Sherman, Allison, Evarts, George and Gray. They attended the funeral as directed. Chief Justice Waite was born in Connecticut, but lived all his manhood life in Toledo, Ohio, until appointed by President Grant as chief justice. He was an able lawyer and a patient, conscientious and learned judge.

On the 1st of March I was directed by the committee on foreign relations to report the following resolution:

"_Resolved by the Senate of the United States_, That, in view of the difficulties and embarrassments that have attended the regulation of the immigration of Chinese laborers to the United States, under the limitations of our treaties with China, the President of the United States be requested to negotiate a treaty with the Emperor of China, containing a provision that no Chinese laborer should enter the United States."

After a brief debate, participated in by Senators Morgan, Stewart, Mitchell and others, I made a few remarks, commencing as follows:

"Whatever differences there may have been in the Senate or in the country, with regard to the restriction of Chinese immigration, the time has come when I believe the general sentiment of the people is, that the law on the subject should be fairly enforced; that the Chinese laborer should be excluded from enjoying the benefits of our country, because he will not adapt himself to the civilization of our country. That feeling is most strongly expressed by Senators and Representatives from the Pacific coast, among whom the 100,000 or more Chinese in the country live, and they have expressed that opinion to the committee on foreign relations so decidedly and unanimously, and supported by such potent reasons, that I believe every member of that committee is of the opinion that the object of the law to exclude the immigration of Chinese laborers should be effectively carried out."

The resolution was adopted.

During this Congress the question of excluding Chinese immigration by treaty and by law was pending and copiously debated. There seemed to be a general concurrence that such immigration was not desirable, and that Chinese coolies should be absolutely excluded. A treaty was negotiated providing for such exclusion, but, as there was a long dely by the Chinese government in ratifying it, and the coolies still continued to come, bills were introduced in Congress prohibiting, under severe penalties, the immigration of all Chinese laborers. Before the bill became a law the treaty was ratified. Now, both by treaty and by law, such immigrants are excluded, but in spite of law and treaty they still come in lessening numbers, and it does not appear how they can be entirely excluded. I have been in favor of the exclusion of Chinese laborers when practically they are slaves, but have sought to moderate the legislation proposed, so as not to disturb our friendly relations with China, or to exclude educated Chinamen engaged in commercial pursuits.

On the 18th of April I made a speech on a bill for the admission of Dakota, as a state, into the Union. That territory had more than the usual population of a new state, but its admission had been postponed, year after year, by the action of the Democratic party. This speech led to a long debate between Mr. Vest and myself on the election in Louisiana in 1876. It is not an unusual occurrence to change the subject of discussion in the Senate where debate is unlimited. I made a long review of the events in Louisiana, mainly in reply to a question put by Mr. Vest as follows:

"I have never understood, and the people of this country have never been able to understand, why Packard was not elected governor with a larger number of votes than Hayes received for President. But Packard was thrown out and sent as consul to Liverpool, and Hayes was sworn in as President of the United States."

To this I replied that the returning board was invested with the power to pass upon the election of electors and they did perform that duty, but the question of the election of a governor and a legislature of Louisiana could only be passed upon by the legislature itself, each house being the judge of its own elections, and the two houses, when organized, had the sole and exclusive power to pass upon the election of a governor. This condition of affairs led to a controversy which endangered the public peace and involved the use of United States troops to prevent civil war. President Hayes thereupon had selected five gentlemen, Charles B. Lawrence, Joseph R. Hawley, John M. Harlan, John C. Brown and Wayne MacVeagh, each of whom was a man of marked distinction in the community in which he lived. They were sent to Louisiana to inquire and report upon the existing condition of affairs bordering on a state of civil war between the opposing factions. They were instructed to promote, as far as possible, the organization of a legislature, so that it might pass upon the question of who was governor of the state. The result of their inquiry led to the organization of the legislature, and when so organized it recognized Nichols as Governor of Louisiana, as it clearly had the right to do. The returning board had the unquestioned right to pass upon the election of electors for President, but it was equally clear that the legislature was invested with the sole power of passing upon the election of the governor. The returning board certified to the election of the Hayes electors, and the legislature determined that Nichols was elected governor. Although these decisions were inconsistent with each other yet each was legal and binding. I took occasion in this speech to defend the action of the returning board, and especially the two leading members, J. Madison Wells and Thomas A. Anderson, both of whom were men of high character and standing in that state.

In the course of this debate Vest and Butler charged me with inconsistency in my speeches at Nashville and Springfield. This allegation had been frequently made in the newspapers of the time. In reply I said:

"I am much obliged to my friend from Missouri for his kindness in reading extracts from my speeches. They sound much better to me read by him than when spoken by myself. The speeches speak for themselves, particularly the one at Nashville. Every word I uttered on that night I utter now. If I could repeat it over, I would add emphasis to give force and effect to it, and so I feel about the south. I have not the slightest feeling of hostility against the south, and no desire in regard to it, except to preserve and protect the rights of all the people of the south.

"Now, in regard to my speech at Springfield, every word of that is true. Why does not the Senator dispute some fact stated in that speech? That was a review made to a legislature--indeed, both speeches were made to legislative assemblies, dignified and honorable men. I was speaking in sight of the monument of Lincoln; I was recalling the incidents of Lincoln's life, the period of the war, and referred, of course, to the Democratic party north and south. I could not truthfully draw a more flattering picture. The one was a speech as to the future to men who, I believed, were hopefully looking forward to the disappearance of the feelings of the war. The other was a recapitulation and review of the past. Every word of it was true. If the Senator can point out the inconsistency in these speeches, he will oblige me. There is not a single word in one inconsistent with the other. I did denounce the course of the Democratic party north and south, during and since the war, especially in regard to the reconstruction measures. I did, at Nashville, speak hopefully, and I feel hopefully, of the future, but it is only upon the basis of the recognized rights of every American citizen."

On the 16th of July I made a speech in favor of the passage of a bill for the erection of a monument to General George Rogers Clark, of the American Revolution. His march through the wilderness and attack upon the British posts in the northwestern territory was one of the most brilliant events in the Revolutionary War. The bill passed the Senate and was reported to the House, but was not acted upon. It is one of the obligations of honor and duty which, I trust, will be discharged by the United States before many years.

On the 24th of August a message from the President, in regard to the fishing rights of the United States, was read in the Senate. I moved that the message be referred to the committee on foreign relations. Before this motion was put an extended debate took place mainly between Senators Edmunds and Morgan, though several other Senators took part. I made a speech expressing my opinion of the President's position on the fishery question, and then took occasion to refer to the surplus in the treasury in the following words:

"It seems to me that the position taken by the President is a good deal like that held by him as to the payment of the public debt. My former old and honored colleague [Mr. Thurman] is going around through the country talking about surplus money in the treasury, there accumulated all because we Republicans will not let it out. Of all the financial management that I have read or know of, the worst is that by the present administration. Here there was an accumulating surplus in the treasury, day by day and year by year, since the first day Mr. Cleveland entered the presidential chair. What did he do with that surplus revenue? He did not make proclamation of it for two or three years, but let it accumulate and accumulate until he did not know what to do with it. Finally the attention of the administration was called to the fact that they ought to buy bonds with it. Well, Mr. Cleveland, with his sharp construction, thought he had not the power to buy bonds; he thought he could not do it legally. The law confers the power upon the Secretary of the Treasury.

"The President had no more power over it than the Senator from Connecticut before me [Mr. Platt] has. The law confers it upon the secretary; it was his duty to buy bonds. What untold sums have been lost by his failure to comply with that law. Until recently, during nearly all the administration of Mr. Cleveland, the four per cent. bonds have been sold in the market about 123. I have here the American almanac giving the value of the four per cent. bonds during his administration, and they have usually sold at 123. If the United States had quietly watched its opportunities in the way the present secretary's predecessors had done, he could have gone into the market and absorbed those bonds, to the amount of half a million or a million at a time, and bought them at the market price, 123, and then how much money would have been saved to the government of the United States.

"My former colleague says they have over $100,000,000 of surplus. If they had applied that one hundred million in the purchase of bonds they would have saved four per cent. per annum for three years--that is, twelve per cent. And besides, they would have saved six or seven per cent. lost by the advance of bonds. At any time during the administration of Mr. Cleveland, if his Secretary of the Treasury had exercised the power conferred on him by the law, he might have saved the government of the United States from twelve to sixteen per cent. on the whole hundred million of dollars, if he had invested it in bonds of the United States. But he would not do it because he had not the power. So the President sent to Congress and asked for power, just as he has done in this case, when he had ample power, and both Houses declared unanimously that he had the power, and then, after the bonds had gone up to 127 or 128, when he had lost three years' interest on a large portion of this accumulation, he commenced to buy bonds and complains that they are too high, and that he calls wise financial management.

"So now here is a law, on the statute book for over a year, to enforce a demand on the Canadian authorities that our fishermen, who are there carrying on their hazardous enterprise, should have the right to enter the port of Halifax and ship their goods under the plain provisions of the treaty or the law, and, if that right was denied, then here was the law expressly prepared for the particular case, to authorize the President not to do any violent act of retaliation, not to involve us in any dangerous or delusive measure which would excite the public mind and probably create animosities between these two great countries. But suppose he had simply said: 'Well, if you deny to the Yankee fishermen the right to transship their fish, we deny you the right to bring fresh fish into Maine, Boston, and New York, and scatter them all over, cured by ice,' for that is the effect of it--ice takes the place of salt."

My allusion to the finances as usual excited the ire of Mr. Beck, who said:

"The Senator from Ohio gets away from the treaty and talks about this administration not buying bonds and how much we could have saved because they have raised the price; but I want to say that he himself was the man, both as Secretary of the Treasury and as chairman of the committee on finance, who arranged our debts in such a way that we could not pay them."

In my reply I again called attention to the fact that the House, of which Mr. Beck was a Member at the time of the passage of the four per cent. bond bill, and not the Senate, was responsible for the long period of the bonds. I said:

"The Senator from Kentucky says I am responsible for the fact that there is the prolonged period of thirty years to the four per cent. bonds. He knows, because he was here the other day when I showed from the public record, that the Senate of the United States proposed to pass a bill to issue bonds running only twenty years, with the right of redemption after ten years; and if the law had been passed in that form in which it was sent from the Senate none of this trouble would have existed; but it was changed by the House of Representatives, of which the Senator from Kentucky was then a Member. I believe he voted for the House proposition against the Senate proposition, by which the time was extended to thirty years, and they were not redeemable during that time. Yet I am charged with the responsibility of lengthening these bonds.

"Whatever my sins, I can claim to have always favored the right to redeem the bonds of the United States as the 5-20's and the 10-40's were issued to be redeemed; and if I had had my way we would have had the same kind of bonds issued instead of the thirty-year bonds."

The relation of Canada with the United States, especially in connection with the fisheries, became at this period dangerously strained. This led me, on the 18th of September, to offer in the Senate the following resolution:

"_Resolved_, That the committee on foreign relations be directed to inquire into, and report at the next session of Congress, the state of the relations of the United States with Great Britain and the Dominion of Canada, with such measures as are expedient to promote friendly commercial and political intercourse between these countries and the United States, and for that purpose have leave to sit during the recess of Congress."

In support of this resolution I said in opening:

"The recent message of the President recommending a line of retaliation against the Dominion of Canada involves the consideration of our relations with that country in a far more important and comprehensive way than Congress has ever before been called upon to give. The recent treaty rejected by the Senate related to a single subject, affecting alone our treaty rights on her northeastern coast. The act of retaliation of 1887 was confined to the same subject-matter. This message, however, treats of matters extending across the continent, affecting commercial relations with every state and territory on our northern boundary. Under these circumstances I feel it is my duty to present my views of all these cognate subjects, and in doing so I feel bound to discard, as far as possible, all political controversy, for in dealing with foreign relations, and especially those with our nearest neighbor, we should think only of our country and not of our party."

The real difficulty of dealing with Canada is its dependence on Great Britain. Our negotiations must be with the English government, while the matters complained of are purely Canadian, and the consent of Canada is necessary to the ratification of any treaty. The President complained that Canadian authorities and officers denied to our fishermen the common privileges freely granted to friendly nations to enter their ports and harbors, to purchase supplies and transship commodities. He said that they subjected our citizens, engaged in fishing enterprises in waters adjacent to their northeastern shore, to numerous vexatious interferences and annoyances, had seized and sold their vessels upon slight pretexts, and had otherwise treated them in a rude, harsh, and oppressive manner. He further said:

"This conduct has been justified by Great Britain and Canada, by the claim that the treaty of 1818 permitted it, and upon the ground that it was necessary to the proper protection of Canadian interests. We deny that treaty agreements justify these acts, and we further maintain that, aside from any treaty restraints, of disputed interpretation, the relative positions of the United States and Canada as near neighbors, the growth of our joint commerce, the development and prosperity of both countries, which amicable relations surely guaranty, and, above all, the liberality always extended by the United States to the people of Canada, furnished motives for kindness and consideration higher and better than treaty covenants."

I agreed with the President in his arraignment of the Canadian authorities for denying to our fishing vessels the benefit of the enlightened measures adopted in later years by commercial nations, especially by the United States and Great Britain. We admitted fish free of duty into our country, while Canada refused to our fishermen the right to purchase bait and other supplies in Canadian ports, thus preventing our fishermen from competing with the Canadians on the open sea. The President undertook, by treaty, to correct this injustice, but the Senate thought that the provisions of the treaty were not adequate for that purpose, and declined to ratify it. He thereupon recommended that Congress provide certain measures of retaliation, which, in the opinion of the Senate, would have inflicted greater injury to the United States than to Canada. This honest difference of opinion, not based upon party lines, opened up the consideration of all our commercial relations with Canada. The speech made by me dealt with the policy of the United States with Canada in the past and for the future, and led me to the expression of my opinion that Canada should be, and would be, represented in the parliament of Great Britain or the Congress of the United States, with the expression of my hope of its being annexed to our country. I said:

"And now I submit if the time has not come when the people of the United States and Canada should take a broader view of their relations to each other than has heretofore seemed practicable. Our whole history, since the conquest of Canada by Great Britain in 1763, has been a continuous warning that we cannot be at peace with each other except by a political as well as commercial union. The fate of Canada should have followed the fortunes of the colonies in the American Revolution. It would have been better for all, for the mother country as well, if all this continent north of Mexico had participated in the formation, and shared in common the blessings and prosperity of the American Union.

"So, evidently, our fathers thought, for among the earliest military movements by the Continental Congress was the expedition for the occupation of Canada, and the capture of the British forces in Montreal and Quebec. The story of the failure of the expedition, the heroism of Arnold and Burr, the death of Montgomery, and the fearful suffering borne by the Continental forces in the march and retreat, is familiar to every student of American history. The native population of Canada were then friendly to our cause, and hundreds of them, as refugees, followed our retiring forces and shared in the subsequent dangers and triumphs of the war. It was the earnest desire of Franklin, Adams, and Jay, at the treaty of peace, to secure the consent of Great Britain to allow Canada to form a part of the United States, and at one time it appeared possible, but for the influence of France and Spain, then the acknowledged sovereigns of large parts of the territory now included within the United States. The present status of Canada grew out of the activities and acquisitions of European powers after the discovery of this continent. Spain, France, and England especially desired to acquire political jurisdiction over this newly discovered country.

"Without going into the details so familiar to the Senate, it is sufficient to say that Spain held Florida, France held all west of the Mississippi, Mexico held Texas west to the Pacific, and England held Canada. The United States held, subject to the Indian title, only the region between the Mississippi and the Atlantic. The statesmen of this government early discerned the fact that it was impossible that Spain, France, and Mexico should hold the territory then held by them without serious detriment to the interests and prosperity of the United States, and without the danger that was always present of conflicts with the European powers maintaining governments in contiguous territory. It was a wise policy and a necessity to acquire these vast regions and add them to this country. They were acquired and are now held.

"Precisely the same considerations apply to Canada, with greater force. The commercial conditions have vastly changed within twenty- four years. Railroads have been built across the continent in our own country and in Canada. The seaboard is of such a character, and its geographical situation is such on both oceans, that perfect freedom as to transportation is absolutely essential, not only to the prosperity of the two countries, but to the entire commerce of the world; and as far as the interests of the two people are concerned, they are divided by a mere imaginary line. They live next door neighbors to each other, and there should be a perfect freedom of intercourse between them.

"A denial of that intercourse, or the withholding of it from them, rests simply and wholly upon the accident that a European power, one hundred years ago, was able to hold that territory against us; but her interest has practically passed away and Canada has become an independent government to all intents and purposes, as much so as Texas was after she separated herself from Mexico. So that all the considerations that entered into the acquisition of Florida, Louisiana, and the Pacific coast and Texas, apply to Canada, greatly strengthened by the changed condition of commercial relations and matters of transportation. These intensify not only the propriety, but the absolute necessity, of both a commercial and a political union between Canada and the United States."

This was my opinion then, but further reflection convinces me that the annexation of Canada to the United States presents serious difficulties, and that the best policy for the other English-speaking countries is that Canada should constitute an independent republic, founded upon the model of the United States, with one central government, and provinces converted into states with limited powers for local governments. The United States already embraces so vast a country, divided into forty-four states and four territories, exclusive of Alaska and the Indian Territory, that any addition to the number of states would tend to weaken the system, and the conversion of the provinces of Canada into states of our Union would introduce new elements of discord, while with Canada as an independent and friendly republic we could, by treaties or concurrent legislation, secure to each the benefit of free trade and intercourse with the other, and without the danger of weakening the United States. Great Britain, the common mother of both republics, could take pride in her progeny and be relieved from the cares and controversies that have arisen and will arise in her guardianship of Canada. Her policy in recent years has been to surrender, as much as possible, her legislative power over Canada, but, as Canada is not represented in parliament and cannot be represented by a minister at Washington, the spectacle of a British minister of the highest rank engaged in an effort to negotiate a treaty for the benefit of Canada about bait and fish and fisheries, imposing restrictions of trade in direct opposition to the policy of the mother country. This condition of Canada constantly invites a breach of the peace between the United States and Great Britain, but with Canada governed by a parliament and by local assemblies in the provinces on a plan similar to our own, the two republics would be independent of each other, and could arrange their matters without any other country to interfere.

There were many other measures of interest and importance in the discussing and framing of which I participated at this session, but as this is not a general history of Congress, I do not deem it necessary to mention them in detail.