Part 7

The recognition of these facts would only be a beginning; but it would be a beginning which would avoid the cardinal error fallen into not only by the leading exponents of evolutionist morality, but also to be found in much of the ethical work of idealist metaphysicians. It seems to have been assumed that moral principles can be reached by the application of scientific generalisations or of the results of a metaphysical analysis which has started by overlooking the facts of the moral consciousness. Even as a metaphysic this procedure is inadequate; and the interpretations of reality to which it has led have erred by over-intellectuality.

The systems of naturalism and of idealism, whose ethical consequences have been passed in review, have one feature in common; and it is a feature which from of old has been regarded as a mark of genuine philosophy. They both seek the One in the many; but they seek it on different roads. For the naturalist the most comprehensive description of things may be the conception of mass-points in motion; or it may be some more recondite conception to which physical analysis points. In either case the unity reached will be mechanical. For the idealist, on the other hand, reason may be said to be the central principle of things: the unity of reality is a rational unity. I have contended in these lectures that neither the mechanical unity of the naturalists nor the rational unity of the idealists has succeeded in comprehending within its unifying principle the essential nature of morality with its deep-going dualism of good and evil. But while I have maintained that even the conception of reality as the reproduction of itself by an eternal self-consciousness is an inadequate conception, it is still possible to hold that reality is a connected whole, and that its true principle of unity is an ethical principle.

If I were asked what is meant by an ethical unity, I should answer, in the first place, that it implies purpose. The unity of reality is not exhibited by a description of its present or past conditions or even by an account of its causal connexions. These modes of description are all affected by the fragmentariness which always belongs to temporal apprehension. But, when things are seen in the light of a purpose, a view of them as a whole becomes possible, and the fragmentariness of time is transcended. And, in the second place, I should say that an ethical unity implies the presence within itself of different finite centres of conscious activity, whose freedom is not inconsistent with their relation to one another and to the Whole.

In his own life, so far as it is a moral life, each individual seeks system or unity. And this unity is realised on three different levels--as we may call them--which may be distinguished for clearness' sake, though it is not possible actually to separate them. On each level morality is realised through system, and system is brought about by the rule of the morally higher and the submission of the morally lower: in this goodness lies, in the opposite evil. If we isolate the individual and consider him apart, he may be said to attain goodness by the due ordering and control of his sensuous and passional nature by rational or spiritual ends. The result may be described, negatively, as the suppression of sensualism. But the positive description remains imperfect until we can say what the rational or spiritual principle is which is to weld all man's 'particular impulses' into an organic whole.

And this cannot be done so long as we contemplate the mere individual in isolation. We cannot remain at the level of bare individuality. Personality itself is not a merely individual product: neither the knowledge nor the activity of the individual can be explained without reference to his position as a member of society; his inheritance is a social inheritance. Nor can the individual establish a claim to deal with his own personality as a merely individual end. It is a factor in social life; and, in systematising his own life, he must have regard to the social factor. In this respect he attains goodness only when his individual life seeks a unity higher than that of his own individuality, and not centred in his selfish interests. From this point of view we may say, again negatively, that goodness consists in the suppression of selfishness. But once again there is a difficulty about the positive description. Many moralists, undoubtedly, are content to rest with the social aspect: to regard the 'health' or 'vitality' of society as the final expression of morality. But a life which is simply absorbed by society cannot be said to be a perfect unity. Society itself is a process; and its changes are determined in large measure by the moral ideals of its members. For its unity we must look to an end--an ideal--of which its actual forms can offer indications only. Both man and society are factors in a universal order; and their perfection cannot be independent of the purpose of this order. When the consciousness of it fills man's life, morality is merged in religion.

INDEX.

Absolute, the, 101 ff. as good, 105. as not good, 104. Altruism, 15 ff., 74 f., 118. Appearance, 101 ff. Approbation, 111 ff. Aristotle, 87. Artificial selection, 61 ff. Austen, Jane, 4 n.

Benevolence, 16. Bentham, J., 4 n. Bradley, F.H., 88, 100 ff. Browning, R., 31.

Characteristics of goodness, 113. reality, 103. Competition between groups, 52 f., 58, 74, 79. ideas, 53 ff. individuals, 52, 74, 79. Content of morality, agreement as to, 7. Christian morality, 7, 18, 20. Cosmic process and moral order, 46 ff.

Darwin, C., 35 ff., 39 ff., 57, 60, 62. Degrees of reality, 103 ff. Descriptive ethics, 76 ff. theory of science, 129. Desire and goodness, 90 ff., 102, 110 ff. Distinction of good and evil, 93 ff., 113.

Egoism, 15 ff., 74 f., 118. Empiricism, 3. _Ens reale_, 102. _realissimum_, 102. Environment, moral, 70 ff. Epicurus, 17. Eternal mind, the, 96 ff. Ethical controversies at present day, 13 ff. in nineteenth century, 1 ff. Ethical unity of things, 133 ff. Ethics of evolution, 36 ff. Evolution, ethical significance of, 51, 67 ff. Evolution of ethics, 36 ff. Evolution, theory of, 33 ff., 36 ff. Exceptional cases, 11. Experiments in morality, 50.

Fichte, J.G., 87. Fittest, survival of the, 35, 69 ff.

Galt, J., 4 n. Good, the true, 92 ff. Goodness as appearance, 102 ff. Goodness as contradictory, 117. Green, T.H., 77 n., 89 ff., 123. Guyau, 125 f.

Halévy, E., 4 n. Hedonism, 100. Hegel, 87, 104, 123. Higher and lower, 107 ff. Huxley, T.H., 45 ff., 68.

Ibsen, 31. Idealism, 87 ff. Ideals, need of, 125. Illusions as ideals, 127. Immoralist, 24. Individual and group, 40 ff. Influences forming ethical thought: current morality, 26 ff. science and philosophy, 32 ff. Intelligent selection, 61 ff., 80. Intuitionism, 2 ff., 81.

Kant, 87, 123, 127 f.

Lange, F.A., 125. Leibniz, 87.

Material and moral progress, 29 f. Mechanical unity, 133. Metaphysics, 82, 85 ff. Mill, J.S., 3 n., 8 ff., 28. Modifications of general rules, 9. Monism and ethics, 109. Moral consciousness and reality, 128. environment, 70 ff. experience, 131. ideas, origin of, 1 ff. order and cosmic process, 46 ff. value, criterion of, 1 ff., 75.

Natural selection, 35, 43 ff., 49. in morals, 55. Naturalism, 83 f., 86 f. Nietzsche, F., 18 ff., 31 f., 47 ff., 67., 127. Nobles, morality of, 20.

Origin and validity, 37, 97. Over-man, the, 22, 31. Owen, Sir R., 59.

Physiological interpretation of life, 67, 76. Plato, 31, 87. Practical nature of knowledge, 128. Pragmatism, 130. Progress of life, 34. Progressive morality, 9. Psychological ethics, 109 ff. Purposive selection, 61 ff., 80.

Rational unity, 133. Religion, 82 f., 136. Renaissance, 33.

Science and metaphysics, 85. Self-assertion, 116 ff. Self-love, 17. Self-realisation, 90 ff., 113 ff. Self-sacrifice, 116 ff. Selfishness, suppression of, 136. Sensationalism, 100. Sensualism, suppression of, 135. Servile morality, 20. Sexual selection, 66. Sidgwick, H., 16 f. Social qualities, 40 ff. Sophists, the, 27. Spencer, H., 44, 47, 51, 73, 122. Spinoza, 87 f. Stephen, Sir L., 44. Subjective selection, 60, 66, 80. Subjectivity in ethics, 81.

Taylor, A.E., 116, 118. Tennyson, 31. Tille, A., 25 n. Transvaluation, 21. Truth as appearance, 101. as moral law, 9 ff., 22 f.

Uebermensch, the, 22, 25 n. Unity of life, 34. Utilitarianism, the term, 3 n. the theory, 2 ff., 81.

Variation, 49. Volz, J., 24 n.

Wellbeing, 71, 75. Wilberforce, S., 59.

Zola, 31.