CHAPTER XII

Chapter 2411,490 wordsPublic domain

RACE DISTINCTIONS _VERSUS_ RACE DISCRIMINATIONS

Heretofore, the writer has let the legislatures and courts speak for themselves, withholding personal opinions and refraining from making deductions from the facts revealed. Now, however, that the various race distinctions have been reviewed at some length, it may be worth while to consider what conclusions the facts warrant and what practical lessons they suggest.

RACE DISTINCTIONS NOT CONFINED TO ONE SECTION

Race distinctions are not confined to any one section of the country. This conclusion is the most patent of all. There is scarcely a State or Territory in the Union where legislative or judicial records do not reveal the actual existence of at least some race distinctions. Of the twenty-six States and Territories that prohibit intermarriage, more than half, extending from Delaware to Oregon, are outside the South. Negroes have, on account of their race, been excluded, usually contrary to the local laws, from hotels in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Indiana, New York, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, and Iowa; from barber-shops, in Nebraska and Connecticut; from bootblack stands, in New York; from billiard-rooms, in Massachusetts; from saloons, in Minnesota and Ohio; from soda fountains, in Illinois; from theatres, in Illinois and New York; from skating rinks in New York and Iowa; and the bodies of Negroes have been refused burial with those of white persons in Pennsylvania. It is not meant here that Negroes are always excluded from such places in these States, but that instances of such exclusions are found in the laws. Most of the States have at one time or another made distinctions between the races in schools. California and other States of the Far West are demanding separate schools for Japanese. Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, besides other States of the Middle West, clash from time to time with their school boards for attempting to separate the races in schools. Delaware is diligent in providing separate schools for white persons and Negroes. In Massachusetts, until 1857, the school board of Boston provided a separate school for Negroes in that city. As to public conveyances, the term “Jim Crow,” applied to a car set apart for Negroes, was first used in Massachusetts, and it was in Pennsylvania that the first leading case involving the right of street car companies to separate their passengers by race arose. Instances of actual discrimination against Negroes by common carriers were found in Illinois, Iowa, and California. How common race distinctions are in the States mentioned the above resumé does not clearly show, because the great majority of grievances caused by race distinctions do not reach the court. But when one finds that the legislature has deemed it advisable to enact a law against race distinctions, it is reasonable to assume that they did in fact exist. For instance, five States, all outside the South, prohibit discriminations by insurance companies on account of race. Had these companies not evinced signs of discrimination against Negroes, such statutes would not have been enacted. It is well known that race distinctions are common in the South.

Were this general prevalence of race distinctions fully realized, the result would be a kindlier feeling one to another among the white people of the various sections. They would then see that the presence or absence of race distinctions is due, not to any inherent difference in the character of the people, but to diverse conditions and environment. When, therefore, the Negro children of Upper Alton, Illinois, are seen to constitute an appreciable percentage of the school population, the people of that town, as the people of a Southern town would do under similar circumstances, demand for them a separate school.

RACE DISTINCTIONS NOT CONFINED TO ONE RACE

Race distinctions are not confined to any one race. It is true that most of the statutes and judicial decisions above referred to relate to the Negro because he belongs to a race which is the largest non-Caucasian element in the United States. Where, however, other race elements exist in considerable numbers, similar distinctions are sanctioned. One finds, for instance, in California and other States of the Far West, where Japanese are numerous, laws prohibiting intermarriage between Mongolians and Caucasians, and requiring separate schools for the two races. Similar laws have been enacted wherever there is an appreciable number of Indians. Wherever, in other words, any two races have lived together in this country in anything like equal numbers, race distinctions have been recognized in the law sooner or later; and, before becoming legally recognized, have existed in practice.

RACE DISTINCTIONS NOT DECREASING

Race distinctions do not appear to be decreasing. On the contrary, distinctions heretofore existing only in custom tend to crystallize into law. As a matter of fact, most of the distinctions which are described above as the “Black Laws of 1865–68” are no longer in force. No State now carries statutes prescribing the hour when a Negro laborer must arise, requiring his contracts to be in writing, prohibiting him from leaving the plantation or receiving visitors without his employer’s consent, or exacting a license fee of him before he can engage in certain trades. These laws were vestiges of the slave system and survived but a short time after that system had been abolished. Likewise, those statutes which prohibited Negroes from testifying in court against white persons were repealed during the first few years after Emancipation. But distinctions which are not the direct results of slavery have found an increasing recognition in the law. Thus, though Florida, Mississippi, and Texas had separate railroad coaches for freedmen in 1866, the regular “Jim Crow” laws did not begin to creep into the statutes of the Southern States till 1881. Now every Southern State, except Missouri, has a law separating the races in railroad cars. Mississippi, in 1888, was the first State to require separate waiting-rooms. Louisiana, in 1902, took the lead in compelling separate street car accommodations, being followed by most of the Southern States within the last seven years.

A similar tendency toward crystallization of race distinctions into law is found in schools. Though Massachusetts permitted separate schools as early as 1800, and though the Southern States required them from the beginning of their public school system, it is only recently that any States have seen fit to create distinctions in private schools by legislation. At present, Florida, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Tennessee prohibit the teaching of white and Negro students in the same private schools, and their action in so doing the Supreme Court of the United States in the Berea College case has decided to be constitutional. Moreover, the Japanese school question of the West has become of national concern only within the last two years.

In the matter of suffrage also one observes the same general trend of practices slowly passing into statutes. Between 1877 and 1890 Negroes in the South were disfranchised to a great extent in defiance of law. Beginning with Mississippi in 1890 and ending with Georgia in 1908, seven Southern States have made constitutional provisions which, though not in letter creating race distinctions, lend themselves to race discriminations.

That actual race distinctions still persist outside the South is shown by recent decisions. For instance, within a year, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, in reducing damages awarded in the court below to a Negro porter for false imprisonment, held that by reason of his race, he did not suffer as much damage as would a white man under like circumstances. The New York _Times_ of November 19, 1909, refers to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa as holding that a coffee company licensed under the State laws, being a private concern, has the right to refuse to serve a Negro.

Perhaps, as a whole, actual race distinctions in the United States are not increasing; but distinctions, formerly sanctioned only by custom, are now either permitted or required by law, and the number of recent suits in States outside the South indicates that actual discriminations are as prevalent as they have been at any time since 1865.

DISTINCTIONS NOT BASED ON RACE SUPERIORITY

What is the fundamental cause of race distinctions? No comparison of laws can formulate an answer to that question; but the personal observation of the writer leads to the belief that race distinctions are not based fundamentally upon the feeling by one race of superiority to the other, but are rather the outgrowth of race consciousness. If Negroes were in every way equally advanced with white people, race distinctions would probably be even more pronounced than now; because, in addition to physical differentiation, there would be the rivalry of equally matched races. Thus, the widespread prejudice entertained by Gentiles toward Jews, resulting in actual, if not legal, distinctions, is due, not to any notion that Jews are intellectually or morally inferior to any people, but to a race consciousness which each possesses. The exclusion of the Japanese was due, not so much to an intellectual or moral inferiority of that race to the white race, as to a difference in their racial ideals. So long as two races living side by side have each an _amour propre_, the more numerous may be expected to prescribe distinctions to which the less numerous must submit; that is, until the spirit of universal brotherhood is a more compelling force than it is at present.

SOLUTION OF RACE PROBLEM HINDERED BY MULTIPLICITY OF PROPOSED REMEDIES

If the above generalizations are correct, they should enable one to draw some practical conclusions for dealing with race problems. The proper adjustment of race relations is being retarded by the multiplicity of suggested solutions, many of them conflicting and thus hindering one another, some of them parallel and necessarily duplicating expenditure of energy. For instance, some men, including both Negroes and white persons, believe that the proper solution of the race problem is the deportation of the Negro race; others, that it is the segregation of that race in some portion of the United States or colonization in some territorial possession; while others believe that the South should remain the permanent home of the majority of Negroes. Advocates of territorial separation of one sort or another think that efforts should be directed toward getting the Negro to his new home as soon as possible. Those who believe that the home of the Negro will remain in this country are divided upon the steps to be taken. Some of this class approve of further education of the Negro, being divided, however, into two overlapping groups, the one emphasizing literary training, and the other industrial. Others of this class maintain that any sort of systematic education of the Negro is only hastening an inevitable race conflict. In the midst of these conflicting opinions, the Negro problem, instead of reaching a complete or even partial solution, is only being aggravated.

There is no need of prophesying what the final solution will be, but one is justified in believing that the inevitable changes will be gradual. Whether or not the final adjustment is a segregation of the Negro race, one can hardly expect it to come in one, two, or even six decades. A century hence the white people will probably be living side by side with Negroes as they do now. The duty of the American people is to act properly toward all races in their own lifetime: the far future will take care of itself. The difficult thing to ascertain is the proper mode of acting to-day. The solution of the race problem, when it does come, will doubtless be a composite result. The race relations are not the same in different sections of the country or in different States of the South or even in different counties of the same State. Though the proper steps now to be taken in the various sections or States or counties may be different, there can, in the nature of things, be but one best mode of action for each community. That must be one for which all people, regardless of race or section, may profitably strive.

SEARCH FOR A COMMON PLATFORM

A noticeable effort has been made during the past few years by students of race relations to construct a platform upon which all men of every race may stand and work together for the permanent settlement of all racial antagonisms. This is evidenced by the organization of late years of national movements which have enlisted the support of men of different sections and races. One of these, the Southern Education Association, has been promoted by men from the North and East as well as by men from the South, by both Negroes and white people. Soon after the Atlanta riots of two years ago, a conference of Southern white men and Negroes was held at Atlanta, for the purpose of promoting harmony between the races in the South. Within a few months a conference of Northern and Southern white men has met in Washington City to consider the Negro problem. Still more recently a group of Southern students in Harvard University, realizing that the race relations were different in different localities of the South, have organized an informal club to study the practical problems arising out of the presence of the Negro in the South and to exchange ideas formed from observation and experience in their respective localities. There are other indications of a desire to work out a common set of principles by which everyone may be governed.

PROPER PLACE OF RACE DISTINCTIONS

Assuming that it is possible to formulate a platform deserving the approval of all races, it is appropriate for a student of any phase of race relations to suggest a plank for it. A student in the special field of race distinctions in American law may endeavor to show the place that such legal distinctions properly hold, bearing in mind all the while that the whole issue springs out of race consciousness as it actually exists to-day, not as it should be or as it may be in the distant future.

Let one imagine the existence of a Federal statute—waiving the question of its constitutionality—prohibiting States from legalizing race distinctions, so that all public places of amusement, accommodation, and instruction would be, so far as the law could make them, open to all persons, regardless of race. Such a measure, far from effecting its purpose, would doubtless be the beginning of extensive race discriminations. Once abolish separate hotel accommodations and the white race, wherever it is in the majority, would monopolize every hotel, leaving other races either to walk the streets or to find accommodations in private houses. Were separate street car accommodations forbidden in cities where there is a fairly large percentage of Negroes, if any passenger were forced to stand or be crowded off the car altogether, it would be the Negro. Were separate schools not permitted, Negro children might possibly be excluded from schools altogether in defiance of the law; but even if admitted, their interests, if different from those of the more numerous race, would have to be sacrificed. A further review of race distinctions now legally recognized would only more fully substantiate the conclusion that, with race feeling as it is, if such distinctions were not recognized and enforced, the stronger race would naturally appropriate the best for itself and leave the weaker race to fare as it could.

On the other hand, let one imagine that the same laws recognizing race distinctions as now exist in the South obtained in all communities where two races are nearly equal in numbers. Suppose, for instance, that separate hotels were permitted in all cities which receive an appreciable number of Negro travelers. Respectable Negroes might then secure comfortable entertainment in hotels provided for their race and thus escape the inconvenience and humiliation of being denied admission to hotels maintained exclusively for white persons. If separate schools were provided, Negro children would be free to pursue, unhampered by requirements prescribed for the more developed race and unembittered by continuous manifestations of race prejudice, a curriculum especially adapted to their own needs. Wherever separate railroad and street car accommodations were provided, a Negro might enter the car or compartment reserved for his race and go his way in peace, unmolested by the thoughtless or vicious of the other race. The result, therefore, of the honest enforcement of race distinctions would be to the advantage of the weaker race.

OBLITERATION OF RACE DISCRIMINATIONS

The people of the different sections and races, instead of inquiring into the truth or falsity of such a conclusion, have been agitating the theoretical right and wrong of race distinctions. Meanwhile, indications are that legalized race distinctions have been unfairly enforced. For instance, statutes require that equal accommodations be given Negro passengers in public conveyances; yet, while people have been debating the constitutionality and justification of the “Jim Crow” laws, railroad companies have been compelling Negroes to occupy uncomfortable and unsanitary coaches and waiting-rooms, and this though Negroes paid the same fare as white passengers. Furthermore, while they have been arguing the constitutionality of the suffrage laws of the South, white registrars have been putting unfair tests to Negro applicants for registration, and by so doing have made the laws a tool by which to work injustice to the Negro. While, finally, they have been strenuously discussing the school laws, Negro children have been suffering from, not only inadequate but, in many cases, improper training by ignorant Negro teachers.

In suggesting the benefits that would accrue to the weaker race from legalized race distinctions, it is assumed that such distinctions would apply only in communities in which two races live side by side in something like equal numbers. The white people of the South should recognize the inexpediency of requiring separate schools, separate railroad and street cars, separate hotels, and separate accommodations in general for the colored races in most places outside the South where they constitute, in many instances, not more than one-tenth of the total population. The white people in the places last mentioned should recognize that it would be equally unwise to crowd together white and colored races in schools, public conveyances, hotels, theatres, and other public places in the South. Colored people everywhere should realize that a race distinction is not necessarily a badge of racial inferiority, but may be simply a natural result of racial differentiation. Race distinctions may, therefore, have a very appropriate place in communities where, as has been said before, two races are about equal in numbers, at least where there are enough of the subordinate race to arouse in the dominant a feeling of race consciousness.

Where, under the above view, race distinctions are justifiable, and are enacted into law, the people of all races should unite in demanding that the laws be fairly applied. If, for instance, the presence of sufficient Negroes make it advisable to separate the races in public conveyances, the white people should unite with them in demanding that they be given equal accommodations. The Negro who has paid a first-class fare is entitled to coaches and waiting-rooms as sanitary, comfortable, and convenient as those provided for white persons paying the same fare. With separate schools provided, they should insist that each race be given an equal opportunity to get the sort of training it most needs to do its work. This training may be different. The Southern Education Association[776] in session at Lexington, Kentucky, said: “On account of economic and psychological differences in the two races we believe there should be a difference in the courses of study and methods of teaching, and that there should be such an adjustment of school curricula as shall meet the evident needs of Negro youth.” If it is true that the Negro child needs a different sort of training from the white, then it is a discrimination to give him the training peculiarly suited to the child of the other race. People may demand for the two races equal educational opportunities, and at the same time advocate different courses of study and methods of teaching.

In States which have added new qualifications for suffrage, both races may demand their impartial application. A Negro public spirited enough to pay his taxes, with education enough to read and write, or thrifty enough to accumulate the required amount of property should be allowed to register and vote as freely as a white man with similar qualifications. A white registrar who discriminates against a Negro applicant, by setting for him more difficult tests than are set for white applicants, is doing an injustice to the white people equally as great as that done to the Negroes. John B. Knox,[777] President of the Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901, said at that time: “If we would have white supremacy, we must establish it by law—not by force or fraud. If you teach your boy that it is right to buy a vote, it is an easy step for him to learn to use money to bribe or corrupt officials or trustees of any class. If you teach your boy that it is right to steal a vote, it is an easy step for him to believe that it is right to steal whatever he may need or greatly desire.” Speaking from the standpoint of the Negro, Dr. Booker T. Washington[778] said: “As a rule, I believe in universal, free suffrage, but I believe that in the South we are confronted with peculiar conditions that justify the protection of the ballot in many of the States, for a while at least, either by an educational test, a property test, or by both combined; but whatever tests are required, they should be made to apply with equal and exact justice to both races.” All people, white and black, should unite, not to secure the repeal of the suffrage laws, but to secure their enforcement with absolute impartiality.

The welfare of both races—and this conclusion applies equally to the other non-Caucasian races—requires the recognition of race distinctions and the obliteration of race discriminations. The races should be separated wherever race friction might result from their enforced association. The white race cannot attain its highest development when continually venting its spite upon the less fortunate race. Nor, indeed, can the Negro race reach its highest development when continually subjected to the oppressions of the more fortunate race.

Such a recognition of race distinctions and such an obliteration of race discriminations as are here advocated constitute principles by which all people, of every section and of every race, may stand and labor for the promotion of good feeling between all sections and harmony between all races.

NOTES

Footnote 776:

Raleigh, N. C., _News and Observer_, Dec. 31, 1907.

Footnote 777:

Proceedings of the Ala. Const. Conv., 1901, p. 12.

Footnote 778:

Booker T. Washington: “Up from Slavery,” p. 237.

TABLE OF CASES CITED[779]

Footnote 779:

The number in parentheses refers to the note; the other number, to the page.

Alsberg v. Lucerne Hotel Co. ([266]), 127.

Anderson v. L. & N. Ry. Co. ([560]), 218.

Anthony v. Halderman ([700]), 293.

Barrett v. Jarvis ([46]), 27.

Baylies v. Curry ([286]), 135.

Bell v. State ([40]), 17.

Berea College v. Com. ([339]), 157; ([339]), 158.

Bernier v. Russell ([705]), 293.

Binyon v. U. S. ([636]), 250.

Board of Education of Richmond Co. v. Cummings ([492]), 193; ([159]), 193.

Board of Education v. Tinnon ([446]), 183.

Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College ([481]), 188.

Bowlin v. Com. ([217]), 106; ([603]), 243.

Bowlin v. Lyon ([289]), 136.

Bradwell v. State ([593]), 240.

Bryan v. Adler ([269]), 128.

Bullock v. N. J. ([638]), 250.

Burks v. Basso ([274]), 130.

Burns v. State ([210]), 97.

Bush v. Com. of Ky. ([636]), 250.

Butler v. Butler ([145]), 74.

C. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Williams ([532]), 212.

C. & O. Ry. Co. v. Com. of Ky. ([558]), 217; ([566]), 221.

Carter v. Texas ([637]), 249; ([638]), 250; ([638]), 250.

Cavitt v. Texas ([638]), 250.

Cecil v. Green ([282]), 133.

Chase v. Stephenson ([428]), 179.

Chiles v. C. & O. Ry. ([563]), 219.

Civil Rights Cases ([227]), 110.

Clark v. Board of Sch. Dirs. ([440]), 183.

Claybrook v. Owensboro ([510]), 197.

Coger v. N. W. Union Packet Co. ([533]), 212.

Coleman v. Vollmer ([141]), 73.

Collins v. Texas ([638]), 250.

Com. v. Sylvester ([275]), 131.

Com. v. Williamson ([465]), 186.

Comer v. Comer ([121]), 69.

Cooper v. Md. ([638]), 250.

Cory v. Carter ([436]), 181.

Crosby v. City of Mayfield ([514]), 198.

Cumby v. Garland ([141]), 73.

Dallas v. Fosdick ([453]), 185.

Dawson v. Lee ([511]), 197.

Derry v. Lowry ([529]), 211.

De Veaux v. Clemmons ([270]), 128.

Dick’s Charge to Grand Jury ([225]), 109.

Dolan v. State ([597]), 242.

Donnell v. State ([283]), 134.

Dove v. Ind. Sch. Dist. of Keokuk ([441]), 183.

Down v. Allen ([148]), 74.

Eastling v. Ark. ([638]), 250.

Eden v. Legare ([44]), 27.

Ellis v. Ala. ([650]), 274.

Emmons’s Charge to Grand Jury ([226]), 109; ([284]), 134.

Estill v. Rogers ([128]), 71.

Faulkner v. Salozzi ([273]), 129.

Ferguson v. Gies ([268]), 128.

Flood v. _News and Courier_ Co. ([50]), 28.

Francois, _ex parte_ ([193]), 86.

Frasher v. State ([212]), 97.

Fugett v. Texas ([638]), 250.

Furchey v. Eagleson ([264]), 125.

Giles v. Harris ([725]), 314.

Giles v. Teasley ([725]), 314.

Gillespie v. Palmer ([673]), 284.

Green v. Ala. ([638]), 250.

Green v. “City of Bridgeton” ([542]), 216.

Green v. State ([211]), 97.

Griffin v. Brady ([660]), 276.

Haden v. Ivey ([137]), 73.

Haggard v. Ky. ([638]), 250.

Hall v. DeCuir ([536]), 213.

Hedgman v. Bd. of Registration ([721]), 297.

Hicks v. Ky. ([638]), 250.

Hopkins v. Bowers ([39]), 17.

Houck v. S. Pac. Ry. Co. ([568]), 224.

Hubbard v. Texas ([638]), 250.

Humburd v. Crawford ([271]), 129.

Jones v. Montague ([725]), 314.

Joseph v. Bidwell ([285]), 135.

Kaine v. Sch. Dirs. ([467]), 186.

Kellar v. Koerber ([277]), 133.

Kellogg v. Warmouth ([701]), 293.

Kelly v. State ([598]), 242.

Kinney, _ex parte_ ([206]), 94.

Kinney v. Com. ([191]), 84; ([205]), 93.

Knox v. Board of Education of Independence ([446]), 183.

Ky. v. Jackson ([638]), 250.

L. & N. Ry. Co. v. Catron ([567]), 223.

L. & N. Ry. Co. v. Com. of Ky. ([571]), 226.

L. N. O. & T. Ry. Co. v. State ([558]), 217; ([559]), 218.

La. v. Casey ([638]), 250.

La. v. Joseph ([638]), 250.

La. v. Murray ([638]), 250.

Lane v. Baker ([357]), 167.

Leach v. Texas ([641]), 251.

Lehew v. Brummell ([489]), 192.

Lewis v. Henley ([359]), 167.

Lewis v. Hitchcock ([267]), 127.

Logwood v. M. & C. Ry. Co. ([568]), 224; ([569]), 224.

Lonas v. State ([212]), 97.

Lord v. Ala. ([650]), 274.

McAlpine v. State ([194]), 88.

McDowell v. Bowles ([47]), 27.

McDowell v. Sapp ([146]), 74.

McMillan v. School Com. ([38]), 17.

McPherson’s Case ([28]), 15.

McPherson v. McCarrick ([645]), 252.

Marshall v. Donovan ([507]), 196.

Martin v. Board of Education of Morgan Co. ([471]), 186.

Martin v. Texas ([638]), 250.

Medway v. Needham ([208]), 94.

Messenger v. State ([272]), 129.

Mills v. Green ([725]), 314.

Minor v. Happersett ([707]), 294.

Minor v. Jones ([147]), 74.

Mo. v. Brown ([638]), 250.

Monroe v. Collins ([31]), 16.

Murphy v. W. & A. Ry. Co. ([568]), 224.

Murray, _ex parte_ ([636]), 250.

N. C. v. Daniels ([638]), 250.

N. C. v. Peoples ([638]), 250.

N. C. v. Sloan ([638]), 250.

Neal v. Del. ([636]), 250.

Norwood v. G. H. & S. A. Ry. Co. ([570]), 224.

O. Val. Ry. Rec. v. Lander ([558]), 217; ([561]), 218.

Pace v. Ala. ([650]), 274.

Pace and Cox v. State ([649]), 273.

Parker v. Texas ([638]), 250.

People v. Board of Education of Quincy ([429]), 179.

People v. Board of Education of Upper Alton ([430]), 179.

People v. Dean ([29]), 15.

People v. Easton ([454]), 185.

People v. Gallagher ([51]), 29; ([455]), 185.

People v. Mayor, etc., of City of Alton ([431]), 180; ([433]), 180.

People v. School Board of Borough of Queens ([456]), 185.

People v. Washington ([616]), 245.

Pierce v. Union Dist. Sch. Trustees ([451]), 184.

Pierre v. Fontennette ([133]), 72.

Pleasant v. N. B. & M. Ry. Co. ([531]), 212.

Plessy v. Ferguson ([558]), 217; ([568]), 224.

Poindexter v. Greenhow ([728]), 316.

Pruitt v. Gaston Co. Commissioners ([515]), 198.

Pullman-Palace Car Co. v. Cain ([564]), 220.

Ratliff v. Beale ([49]), 295.

Reynolds v. Board of Education of Topeka ([445]), 183; ([491]), 192.

Rhone v. Loomis ([276]), 132.

Riggles v. City of Durham ([515]), 198.

Roberts v. The City of Boston ([360]), 167.

Rogers v. Ala. ([635]), 249.

Rowles v. Board of Education of Wichita ([446]), 183.

Russ’s Application ([263]), 125.

Ry. Co. v. Brown ([534]), 213.

S. C. v. Brownfield ([638]), 250.

Scott v. Lairamore ([130]), 71.

Scott v. Sandford ([3]), 8.

Scott v. State ([157]), 80.

Selden v. Montague ([725]), 314.

Slaughter-House Cases ([223]), 107.

Smith v. Chamberlain ([565]), 220.

Smith v. Dirs. of the Ind. Sch. of the Dist. of Keokuk ([441]), 183.

Smith v. Ky. ([638]), 250.

Smith v. Moody ([62]), 64.

Smith v. State ([562]), 219; ([636]), 250.

Smith v. Texas ([638]), 250; ([642]), 251; ([643]), 251.

So. Ry. Co. v. Thurman ([53]), 31.

Spotarno v. Fourichon ([48]), 27.

Spraigue v. Thompson ([728]), 316.

State _ex rel._ Tax Collector v. Falkenheimer ([279]), 133.

State v. Bell ([150]), 78; ([204]), 92.

State v. Board of Education of Cincinnati ([490]), 192.

State v. Board of Education of Oxford ([462]), 185.

State v. City of Cincinnati ([354]), 166.

State v. Duffy ([449]), 184.

State v. Gibson ([209]), 96.

State v. Grubbs ([438]), 182.

State v. Hairston ([212]), 97.

State v. Kennedy ([151]), 78.

State v. Lasater ([241]), 117.

State v. Mitchell ([439]), 183.

State v. Patterson ([587]), 233.

State v. Tutty ([207]), 94.

Stewart, of color, v. Munchandler ([129]), 71.

Stewart v. Southard ([353]), 166.

Stikes v. Swanson ([137]), 73.

Strauder v. W. Va. ([635]), 249.

Taylor, _in re_ ([592]), 239.

“The Sue” ([543]), 216.

Thomas v. Williams ([288]), 136.

Thompson v. Texas ([644]), 251.

Thurman v. State ([35]), 16.

Turner, _in re_ ([112]), 57; ([219]), 106.

Upton v. _Times-Democrat_ Pub. Co. ([49]), 28.

United States v. Canter ([698]), 292.

United States v. Crosby ([699]), 292.

United States v. Cruikshank ([703]), 293.

United States v. Dodge ([537]), 214; ([568]), 224.

United States v. Given ([702]), 293.

United States v. Newcomer ([262]), 124.

United States v. Petersburg (Va.) Judges of Election ([704]), 293.

United States v. Reese ([697]), 291; ([708]), 294.

United States v. Rhodes ([218]), 106; ([594]), 242.

Va., _ex parte_ ([635]), 249.

Va. v. Rives ([635]), 249.

Van Camp v. Board of Education of Logan ([356]), 166.

Walden v. Vicksburg Ry. and Light Co. ([586]), 231.

Walker v. Brockway ([30]), 16.

Ward v. Flood ([420]), 177.

Warren, _ex parte_ ([611]), 244.

Washington v. Washington ([136]), 73.

West Chester and Phila. Ry. Co. v. Mills ([530]), 212; ([568]), 224.

Whitney v. Texas ([639]), 250.

Whitney v. Texas ([647]), 252.

Williams v. Board of Education of Fairfax Dist. ([471]), 186.

Williams v. Board of Education of Parsons ([445]), 183.

Williams v. Directors of Sch. Dist. No. 6 ([350]), 165.

Williams v. Miss. ([724]), 314.

Williams v. State ([122]), 69.

Williams v. Texas ([638]), 250.

Wilson v. Ga. ([638]), 250.

Wolfe v. Ry. Co. ([52]), 31.

Wood v. King ([45]), 27.

Wysinger v. Crookshank ([422]), 178.

Yarborough, _ex parte_ ([706]), 293.

Younger v. Judah ([287]), 136.

INDEX

Accommodations, equality of,in schools, 192–194; nature of, under “Jim Crow” laws, 223–224.

Adultery and fornication between Negro and White, punishment for, 273.

“African” as race name, 20.

Africans, naturalization of, 297.

“Afro-American” as race name, 20.

Age as a qualification for voting, 297.

Alabama, limitations in, upon Negroes in respect to occupations, 41–42; sale of drugs by free Negroes prohibited in, 42; separation of paupers by race in, 47; apprentice laws in, 53; slave marriages legal in, by statute, 73; effect of attempted intermarriage in, 84; punishment in, for issuing license for intermarriage, 86; for performing ceremony, 87; for cohabitation without intermarriage, 88; separation of races in, in prisons, 146; in asylums for deaf and blind, 148; in public schools, 170; division of public school fund between races in, 195; Negroes as witnesses in, 242; actual service by Negroes on juries in, 253–264; qualifications for voting in, 322–323.

Alaska, qualifications for voting in, 338–339.

Albany, N. Y., separation of races in schools of, 185.

Aliens as voters, 296–297.

Alton, Ill., separation of races in schools of, 180.

Amalgamation, between race elements in United States, 12; race line blurred by, 12. See Intermarriage, Miscegenation.

Amendments to Federal Constitution, purpose of first ten, 102. See Constitutionality, Suffrage.

Anderson, Charles W., on proper name for Negro, 23.

Apprentice laws applying to Negroes, 53–58; in Alabama, 53; in Kentucky, 53; in North Carolina, 53; in Mississippi, 53–55; in South Carolina, 55–57; in Delaware, 57; constitutionality of, 57.

Arizona, selling liquor and firearms to Indians prohibited in, 45; effect given to marriages in other States by, 93; separation of races in schools of, 187; qualifications for voting in, 338–339.

Arkansas, slave marriages legal in, by statute, 73; punishment in, for performing ceremony of intermarriage, 87; civil rights legislation in, 116; Negroes in militia in, 145; separation of races in prisons of, 146; in schools of, 170; Negroes as witnesses in, 242; early statute in, on Negro jury service, 249; actual service by Negroes on juries in, 254–255; qualifications for voting in, 322–323.

Arnett, Benjamin W., excluded from hotels in Boston, 126.

Asheville, N. C., suits in, over mistakes in race designation in directory, 32.

Asylums, separation of races in, 148.

Atlanta, Ga., separation of races in saloons of, 133.

Baker, Ray Stannard, “Following the Colour Line,” 6; on intermarriage in North, 99; on race discrimination by labor unions, 140.

Baptist denomination, race distinctions in, 141.

Barber shops, race distinctions in, 129–130.

Berea College, separation of races in, 154–159.

Billiard rooms, race distinctions in, 131–132.

“Black Laws,” of 1865–68, 35–63; of free States, 36–39; excuse for Reconstruction régime, 62–63.

Black man, proper name for, in America, 20–24.

“Blacks” as race name, 21.

Blind, in asylums, separated by race, 147.

Boarding houses. See Restaurants.

Bootblack stands, race distinctions at, 130–131.

Borough of Queens, N. Y., separation of races in schools of, 185.

Boston, intermarriage in, 98; race distinctions in hotels of, 126; separation of races in public schools of, before 1857, 167–170; separation of races on steamers plying between South and, 215–216.

Bowen, J. W. E., on proper name for Negro, 20, 23.

British Columbia, separation of races in schools of, 163.

Brooks, Walter H., on proper name for Negro, 23.

Brownsville, Texas, and Negro militia, 144.

Bryce, James, on effect of Dred Scott decision, 8.

Buffalo, N. Y., separation of races in schools of, 185.

Caboose cars not under “Jim Crow” laws, 221.

Cafés. See Restaurants.

California, race distinctions at skating rinks in, 136; separation of races in schools of, 159–163; of Whites and Negroes in public schools of, 177–178; Mongolians and Indians as witnesses in, 245; qualifications for voting in, 322–323. See Japanese.

Canady, E. W., on Negro as lawyer, 241.

Capitalization of “Negro” as race name, 21–22, 24.

Cemeteries, race distinctions in, 136–137.

Ceremony of intermarriage, punishment for performing, 87–88.

Certificates of slave marriages, 70–73; in Kentucky, 70–72; in Louisiana, 72; in Maryland, 72.

Character as qualification for voting, 308–310.

Cheshire, Joseph Blount, on separation of races in Episcopal Church, 143–144.

Chicken-stealing a felony, 275.

Chinese, intermarriage of, with Whites, 82–83; separate schools for, in California, 159; as witnesses in California, 245.

Chinese Exclusion Act, 296.

Chop-houses. See Restaurants.

Churches, race distinctions in, 141–144.

Citizenship as a qualification for voting, 296–297.

Civil rights of Negroes, 102–149; Civil Rights Bill of 1866, 9, 10, 104, 106; Civil Rights Bill of 1875, 10, 108–111, 247–248; Civil Rights Cases, 110–111; civil rights legislation, Federal, 103–111; in States, between 1865 and 1883, 111–120; in Northern States, between 1865 and 1883, 112–115; in South, after 1883, 120; in States outside South, after 1883, 120–124; in Massachusetts, 112; in Delaware, 112–114, 118; in Kansas, 114; in Florida, 115; in New York, 115; in Arkansas, 116; in Louisiana, 116; in Tennessee, 116–118; in North Carolina, 118–120; State Civil Rights Bills, table of, 122; penalty for violating, 123; construed, 137–138. See Barber Shops, Billiard Rooms, Bootblack Stands, Cemeteries, Conveyances, Hotels, Restaurants, Saloons, Schools, Skating Rinks, Soda Fountains, and Theatres.

Cohabitation of Negroes and Whites without intermarriage, 88; constitutionality of laws against, 89.

Colonies, race distinctions in, 7.

Colorado, effect of intermarriage in, 84; punishment in, for issuing license, 86; for performing ceremony, 87; race distinctions in churches prohibited in, 141; separation of races in schools forbidden in, 187; statute as to Negroes practicing law in, 239; qualifications for voting in, 322–323.

“Colored” required on street cars, 231.

“Colored Persons” as race name, 20.

Conductors, of trains, punishment of, for violating “Jim Crow” laws, 225–226; on street cars, special policemen to enforce “Jim Crow” laws, 231.

Connecticut, race distinctions in, in barber shops, 129; by insurance companies, 138–139; Negroes in militia in, 145; qualifications for voting in, 322–323.

Constitutionality of apprentice laws, 57; of laws against cohabitation without intermarriage, 89; of laws against intermarriage, 95–97; of law separating races in Berea College, 157–159; of California separate school law, 161; of laws separating races in public schools, 181; of exemptions in street car laws, 233; of Federal statute as to jurors, 249–250; of Southern Suffrage Amendments, 313–317.

Contracts for labor by Negroes, 46–53; in Florida, 46; in Virginia, 47; in Mississippi, 47; in Kentucky, 47; in South Carolina, 48–53.

Conveyances, public, separation of races in, 207–233. See “Jim Crow” laws.

“Coon,” a term of contempt, 20.

Cotton, bagging off, at night, a crime, 275.

Court room, Negro in, 237–277. See Judges, Jurors, Lawyers, Spectators, Witnesses.

Courts, separate, for Negroes, 272–273.

Croatan Indians, intermarriage of, with Negroes prohibited, 90; separate schools for, 174.

Curfew law for Negroes in Mobile, Ala., 276.

Dakota Territory, selling liquor to Indians prohibited in, 45; “white” stricken from election laws of, 286.

Dare, Virginia, and Lost Colony, 90–91.

“Darkies” as race name, 20.

Defamation to call a white person a Negro, 26–33; actionable _per se_, 32.

Delaware, “Black Laws” of, 37; apprentice laws of, 57; effect of intermarriage in, 87; effect given to marriages in other States in, 92; civil rights legislation in, 112–114; provisions for public schools for Negroes in, 169; separation of races in public schools of, 178; “Jim Crow” legislation in, 211; intimidation of Negroes at polls in, 293; qualifications for voting in, 324–325.

Dependents, State, separated by race, 146–149. See Asylums, Blind, Lunatic, Prisoners, Reformatories.

Designation of race separation under “Jim Crow” laws, 225.

Detroit, Mich., race distinctions in restaurants of, 127.

Dickinson, Secretary of War, on suffrage in Porto Rico, 313.

Discriminations, race, and distinctions contrasted, 2–4, 348–362. See Distinctions.

Disfranchisement, extent of actual, in South, 320–321. See Suffrage.

Distinctions, race, defined, 1; contrasted with race discriminations, 2–4, 348–362; actual and legal, contrasted, 5; in Colonies, 7; in hotels, 124–127; in restaurants, 127–129; in barber shops, 129–130; at bootblack stands, 130–131; in billiard rooms, 131–132; at soda fountains, 133–134; in saloons, 132–133; in theatres, 134–136; at skating rinks, 136; in cemeteries, 136–137; by insurance companies, 138–140; in churches, 141; in punishments, 273–277; in vagrancy laws, 275; not confined to one section, 348–350; not confined to one race, 350–351; not decreasing, 351–353; not based on race superiority, 353–354; proper place of, 356–358.

District of Columbia, intermarriages in, 93; separate schools in, 189–190; suffrage in, 286.

Division of public school fund between races, 194–199.

East Orange, N. J., separate classes for white and Negro children in public schools of, 184–185.

East St. Louis, Ill., burning school building in, to prevent Negro school, 180.

Eating houses. See Restaurants.

Education Association, Southern, on race problem, 356; on curricula for Negro schools, 360.

Educational test as qualification for voting, 301–315. See Suffrage.

Effect given by one State to marriages between Whites and Negroes in other States, 92–95.

Eggleston, J. D., Jr., on proportion of public school fund in Virginia contributed by Negroes, 195.

Elements, race, in United States, 6.

Eliot, Charles W., on separation of races in schools, 163–164.

Emancipation Proclamation as military expedient, 8.

_Emmanuel Magazine_ on Negroes as lawyers, 240.

Employees of railroad, “Jim Crow” laws do not apply to, 222–223.

“Enforcement Act” of 1870, 290–291.

Episcopal Church, separation of races in, 143–144.

Equality of accommodations in public schools, 192–194; in public conveyances, 223–224. See Schools, Conveyances, “Jim Crow” laws.

Evidence admitted as presumption of race, 17.

Exemptions from application of “Jim Crow” laws, 222, 232.

Extent of separation of races on railroad cars, 216; on street cars, 228–229; of actual disfranchisement of Negroes, 320–321. See “Jim Crow” laws, Suffrage.

Extra cars, “Jim Crow” laws do not apply to, 221.

Federal legislation on slave marriages, 75; on civil rights of Negroes, 103–111; on separate schools, 189–190.

Fifteenth Amendment, ratified, 10; and Negro suffrage, 281–282; and Oregon, 289; and Maryland, 317–320. See Suffrage.

Firearms, sale of, to Negroes prohibited, 43–44; in Florida, 43; keeping of, by Negroes in Mississippi prohibited, 44; keeping of, by Negroes in South Carolina limited, 44; selling of, to Indians in Oregon prohibited, 45; carrying of, limited to Whites in Oregon, 45; selling of, to Indians prohibited in Arizona, 45.

Flack, Horace E., on contemporary understanding of Civil Rights Bill of 1866, 106; on purpose of adoption of Fourteenth Amendment, 107.

Florida, sale of firearms to Negroes prohibited in, 43; contracts for labor by Negroes in, 46; remarriage of Negroes in, 68; effect of intermarriage in, 84; punishment in, for issuing license for intermarriage, 86; for performing ceremony, 87; for cohabitation without intermarriage, 88; civil rights legislation in, 115; race distinctions in cemeteries in, 136; separation of races in schools of, 170; in private schools of, 190; early “Jim Crow” laws in, 208; Negroes as witnesses in, 243; actual jury service by Negroes in, 255–256; different punishments for Negroes in, 274; qualifications for voting in, 324–325.

Foraker, Senator, on Brownsville affair, 145.

Fornication and adultery between Negro and White, punishment for, 273. See Punishments.

Fourteenth Amendment, ratified, 9; and intermarriage, 97; superseding Civil Rights Bill of 1866, 106; interpreted by Slaughter-House cases, 107–108; and Berea College affair, 157–158; and Negro jury service, 252; and Negro suffrage, 287. See Civil Rights, “Jim Crow” laws.

Free Negroes, marriage between, and slaves, 74. See Negroes, Marriage, Movements, “Black Laws,” Civil Rights.

Genealogical table in determining race, 18.

Georgia, remarriage of Negroes in, 69; social status not a subject of legislation in, 80; effect given by, to marriages in other States, 93; Negroes in militia in, 145; separation of prisoners by race in, 146; separation of races in reformatories of, 147; in public schools of, 170; Negroes as witnesses in, 243; actual service by Negroes on juries in, 256–258; qualifications for voting in, 324–325.

Germantown, Pa., _Guide_ on cemeteries for Negroes, 137.

“Grandfather Clauses” as qualifications for voting, 305–308. See Suffrage.

Harvard University, Dr. Chas. W. Eliot on separation of races at, 164; study of race problem at, 356.

Hawaii, qualifications for voting in, 338–339.

High Schools, for Whites and not for Negroes, 193; no separation of race in, of Indiana, 182; of Kansas, 183. See Schools.

Hotels, race distinctions in, 124–127.

Hurd, John Codman, “The Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United States,” 8.

Idaho, selling firearms to Indians prohibited in, 45; separation of races in public schools of, forbidden, 187; qualifications for voting in, 324–325.

Identity, race, mistaken on cars, 29–32.

Illinois, “Black Laws” of, 38; slave marriages in, legal by statute, 74; race distinctions in, at soda fountains, 133; in theatres, 135; at skating rinks, 136; separation of races in public schools of, 178–179; qualifications for voting in, 324–325.

Indiana, “Black Laws” in, 37; effect of intermarriage in, 84; punishment in, for performing ceremony of intermarriage, 87; race distinctions in hotels in, 125; separation of races in orphan asylums in, 148–149; in schools of, before 1865, 167; in public schools of, 181; Negroes as witnesses in, 245; qualifications for voting in, 326–327.

Indians, selling firearms to, prohibited, 45; in Arizona, 45; in Idaho, 45; selling liquor to, prohibited, 45–46; in Arizona, 45; in New Mexico, 45; in Nebraska, 45; in Dakota Territory, 45; in Idaho, 45; in Maine, 46; in Utah, 45; in Washington, 45; intermarriage between Whites and, 82; between Croatan Indians and Negroes, 90; separate schools for, allowed in California, 159; as witnesses in California, 245; in Virginia, 245; in Washington, 246.

Indictments quashed because no Negroes on jury, 250–252.

Insular possession of United States, suffrage in, 312–313.

Insurance companies, race distinctions by, 138–140.

Intermarriage, and miscegenation, 78–99; during Reconstruction, 78–80; between Whites and “Persons of Color,” 81; present state of the laws on, 81; to whom laws apply, 81–83; between Chinese and Whites, 82–83; between Indians and Whites, 82–83; between Kanakans and Whites, 83; between Mongolians and Whites, 82–83; effect of attempted, 83–84; punishment for, 84–86; punishment for issuing license for, 86–87; punishment for performing ceremony of, 87–88; repeal of laws against, 89–90; and Federal Constitution, 95–97; and Fourteenth Amendment, 97; in Boston, 98; at Xenia, O., 99; in North, 99.

Interstate travel and “Jim Crow” laws, 217–219.

Intimidation of Negroes at polls, 291–294.

Iowa, “Black Laws” in, 38; race distinctions in boarding houses in, 128; at skating rinks in, 136; separation of races in public schools of, not allowed, 183; in steamboats in, 212; statute as to Negroes practicing law in, 239; “white” stricken from Constitution of, 286; qualifications for voting in, 326–327.

Japanese, excluded from public schools of San Francisco, 159–163; census of, to be taken in California, 163.

“Jim Crow” laws, origin of term, 208; legislation between 1865 and 1881, 211–214; as applied to interstate travel, 217–219; means of separation of races, 224; designation of separation of races, 225; punishment for violating laws, 225–226. See Conveyances.

Johnson, E. A., on proper name for Negro, 22.

Joyner, J. Y., on proportion of public school fund in North Carolina contributed by Negroes, 194.

Judges, Negroes as, 238.

Jurors, Negroes as, 247–272; jury service and Civil Rights Bill of 1875, 247–248; State statutes on jury service, 248; actual jury service by Negroes in South, 253–271.

Kanakans, term defined, 25; intermarriage between, and Whites, 83.

Kansas, civil rights legislation, 114; race distinctions in cemeteries, 136; separation of race in public schools of cities of first class, 183; intimidation of Negroes at polls, 292; qualifications for voting, 326–327.

Kentucky, movements of Negroes restricted in, 40; selling liquor to Negroes prohibited in, 44; contracts for labor by Negroes in, 47; apprentice laws in, 53; certificates of slave marriages in, 70–72; separation of lunatics by race in, 148; separation of races in private schools of, 154–155; in public schools of, 171; local taxation for schools of, 196–197; Negroes as witnesses in, 242–243; actual service by Negroes on juries in, 258; different punishments for Negroes in, 274; punishment for chicken-stealing in, 275; qualifications for voting in, 326–327.

Kitchin, W. W., on Negro suffrage in North Carolina in 1835, 283.

Knox, John B., on suffrage, 361.

Labor, contracts for, by Negroes, 46–53; in Florida, 46; in Kentucky, 47; in Mississippi, 47; in Virginia, 47; in South Carolina, 48–53.

Labor unions, race discrimination by, 140–141.

Lawyers, Negroes as, 239–241.

Legitimacy of children of slave marriages, 67–75. See Marriages.

License, punishment for issuing, for intermarriage, 86–87.

Limitations upon Negroes in respect to occupations, 41–43.

Lincoln, Neb., race distinctions in barber shops in, 129.

Liquor, sale of, to free Negroes prohibited, 43–44; in Kentucky, 44; in Mississippi, 44; sale of, to Indians prohibited, 45–46; in Arizona, 45; in Dakota Territory, 45; in Idaho, 45; in Nebraska, 45; in Utah, 45; in Washington, 45; in Maine, 46.

Lost Colony and Virginia Dare, 90–91.

Louisiana, certificates of slave marriages in, 72; punishment in, for cohabitation without intermarriage, 89; civil rights legislation in, 116; separation of races in saloons in, 133; race distinctions in theatres in, 135; separation of races in schools of, during Reconstruction, 171; at present, 172; race distinctions on public conveyances in, 213; early statute on Negro jury service in, 249; actual service by Negroes on juries in, 258–259; intimidation of Negroes at polls in, 293; qualifications for voting in, 326–327.

Lucas County, O., race distinctions in restaurants in, 128.

Lunatics, separated by race, 147.

Lunch counters. See Restaurants.

Lynch, James, body of, removed from white to Negro cemetery, 137.

Machen, A. W., Jr., on Fifteenth Amendment, 319.

Maine, sale of liquor to Indians prohibited in, 46; repeal of law against intermarriage of Negroes and Whites in, 90; qualifications for voting in, 328–329.

Marital relations of slaves fixed, 67–75.

Marriages, slave, certificates of, 70–73; in Kentucky, 70–72; in Louisiana, 72; in Maryland, 72; legal by statute, 73–74; in Alabama, 73; in Arkansas, 73; in Texas, 73; in Illinois, 74; in Ohio, 74; in Virginia, 74; in West Virginia, 74; between slaves and free Negroes, 74; slave, and Federal legislation, 75; between Negroes and other non-Caucasian races, 90–91; between Negroes and Croatan Indians in North Carolina, 90; effect given by one State to, in other States, 92–95; marriage a status, 96.

Maryland, “Black Laws” in, 36; certificates of slave marriages in, 72; effect of intermarriage in, 84; separation of races in public schools of, 172–173; and Negro lawyers, 239; Negroes as witnesses in, 243; qualifications for voting in, 328–329; and Fifteenth Amendment, 317–320.

Massachusetts, civil rights legislation in, 112; race distinctions in hotels in, 125; in barber shops in, 129; in billiard rooms in, 131; at skating rinks in, 136; by insurance companies in, 138; resolution against discrimination by labor unions of, 140; separation of races in public schools of, before 1857, 167–170, 187; gave name to “Jim Crow” car, 208; qualifications for voting in, 328–329.

Mathews, John Mabry, on Fifteenth Amendment, 314–315.

Means of separation of races under “Jim Crow” laws, 224; on street cars, 229–230.

Metcalf, Secretary, on separation of races in schools of San Francisco, 160.

Methodist Church, race distinctions in, 141.

Michigan, repeal of law against intermarriage in, 90; race distinctions by insurance companies in, 138, 139; separation of races in schools of, 187–188; qualifications for voting in, 328–329.

Militia and Negroes, 144–145.

Milton, Senator, and intermarriage in District of Columbia, 95.

Milwaukee, Wis., race distinctions in restaurants in, 128.

Minnesota, race distinctions in saloons in, 132; separation of races in schools of, forbidden, 188; qualifications for voting in, 328–329.

Miscegenation, not a bridge from one race to the other, 19; and intermarriage, 78–99. See Intermarriage, Marriages.

Mississippi, limitations upon Negroes in respect to occupations in, 43; keeping firearms by Negroes without license prohibited in, 44; selling liquor to Negroes prohibited in, 44; contracts for labor by Negroes in, 47; apprentice law in, 53–55; vagrancy law in, 59–60; pauper law in, 61–62; effect of intermarriage in, 85; effect given to marriage in other States in, 93; race distinctions in theatres in, 134; in cemeteries in, 137; no discrimination against prisoners on account of race in, 146; separation of races in public schools of, 173; early “Jim Crow” law in, 208; Negroes as witnesses in, 243; early statute on Negro jury service in, 249; actual service by Negroes on juries in, 259; qualifications for voting in, 328–329.

Missouri, “Black Laws” in, 37; remarriage of slaves in, 69; effect of intermarriage in, 85; race distinctions in theatres in, 135; separation of races in schools of, 173; actual service by Negroes on juries in, 263–265; chicken-stealing a felony in, 275; qualifications for voting in, 330–331.

Mobile, Ala., curfew law for Negroes in, 276.

Mongolians, intermarriage between Whites and, 82–83; separate schools for, permitted in California, 159; as witnesses in California, 245. See Chinese, Japanese.

Montana, qualifications for voting in, 330–331.

Movement of Negroes restricted, 40–41; in Kentucky, 40; in South Carolina, 40–41.

Mulattoes, difficulty in getting census enumeration of, 13; definition of, 16; separation of Negroes and, in churches, 144. See Negroes.

Name, proper, for Negro, 20–24.

Narrow-gauged roads, “Jim Crow” laws do not apply to, 221.

Nashville, Tenn., separation of races in saloons in, 133.

Nature of railroad accommodations under “Jim Crow” laws, 223–224. See “Jim Crow” laws.

Naturalization of Africans, 297.

Nebraska, selling liquor to Indians prohibited in, 45; qualifications for voting in, 330–331.

“Negress,” an offensive term, 22.

“Negro-Americans” as race name, 22.

“Negroes” as race name, 20.

Negroes, legal definition of, 12–20; defamation to call Whites Negroes, 26–33; movements of, restricted, 40–41; in Kentucky, 40; in South Carolina, 40–41; limitations upon, in respect to occupations, 41–43; prohibited from having firearms, 43–44; in Mississippi, 44; in South Carolina, limited, 44; selling liquor to, prohibited, 44; in Kentucky, 44; in Mississippi, 44; contracts for labor by, 46–53; apprentice laws applying to, 53–58; marital relations of, fixed, 67–75; remarriages of, after Emancipation, 68–70; in Florida, 68; in Georgia, 69; in Missouri, 69; marital relations of, established in South Carolina, 70; marriages between other non-Caucasian races and, 90–91; civil rights of, 102–149; influence of Civil Rights Bill of 1866 upon conduct of, 105; in militia, 144–145; in court room, 237–277; as judges, 238; as lawyers, 239–241; as witnesses, 246; as jurors, 247–272; jury service of, and Fourteenth Amendment, 252; actual jury service of, in South, 253–271; separate courts for, 272–273; suffrage for, 281–289; and Fifteenth Amendment, 281–282; in New York, 283; in North Carolina before 1835, 283; in Tennessee in 1834, 284; before 1865, 282–285; between 1865 and 1870, 285–288; and Fourteenth Amendment, 287; between 1870 and 1890, 288–294.

Nevada, effect of intermarriage in, 85; punishment in, for performing ceremony, 87; for cohabitation without intermarriage, 89; separation of races in public schools of, 184; Negroes as witnesses in, 246; qualifications for voting in, 330–331.

New Hampshire, qualifications for voting in, 330–331.

New Jersey, Negroes in militia of, 145; separation of races in public schools of, 184; qualifications for voting in, 330–331.

New Mexico, selling liquor to Indians prohibited in, 45; repeal of law against intermarriage in, 90; separation of races in public schools of, prohibited, 188; qualifications for voting in, 338–339.

New York, slave marriages valid in, 74; civil rights legislation in, 115; race distinctions in restaurants in, 127; at bootblack stands in, 130; in cemeteries in, 136; at skating rinks in, 136; in theatres in, 136; by insurance companies in, 138–139; separation of races in asylums of, 148; in public schools of, forbidden, 185; Negro suffrage in, 283; qualifications for voting in, 330–331.

_News and Courier_, Charleston, S. C., sued for calling white man “colored,” 28.

“Nigger,” a term of contempt, 20.

Non-Caucasian races, marriage between, and Negroes, 90–91.

North Carolina, apprentice law of, 55; effect of intermarriage in, 85; punishment in, for issuing license for intermarriage, 86; for performing ceremony, 87; civil rights legislation in, 118–120; separation of races in, in militia, 145; in prisons, 147; in insane asylums, 148; in public schools, 173–174; local taxation for schools of, 198; on steamboats, 214; actual service by Negroes on juries in, 265–267; Negro suffrage in, before 1835, 283; qualifications for voting in, 332–333.

North Dakota, qualifications for voting in, 332–333.

Northern States, intermarriage between Whites and Negroes in, 99; civil rights legislation in, between 1865 and 1883, 112–115; after 1883, 120–124.

Nurses, exempt from “Jim Crow” laws, 222, 232.

Occupations, limitations upon Negroes in respect to, 41–43; in Alabama, 41–42; in South Carolina, 42; in Mississippi, 43; in Tennessee, 43. See Contracts, Labor.

Officers in charge of prisoners exempt from “Jim Crow” laws, 222.

Ohio, “Black Laws” in, 37; slave marriages legal in, by statute, 74; repeal of laws against intermarriage in, 90; race distinctions in, in saloons, 133; by insurance companies, 138, 139; separation of races in public schools of, before 1865, 165–167; forbidden at present, 185; intimidation of Negroes at polls of, 292; qualifications for voting in, 332–333.

Oklahoma, effect of intermarriage in, 85; punishment in, for issuing license for intermarriage, 86; for performing ceremony, 87; separation of races in public schools of, 174–175; in private schools of, 191; actual service by Negroes on juries in, 267; qualifications for voting in, 332–333.

Oregon, “Black Laws” in, 38; carrying of firearms restricted to Whites in, 45; effect of intermarriage in, 85; punishment for performing ceremony in, 88; and Fifteenth Amendment, 289; qualifications for voting in, 332–333.

Origin of “Jim Crow,” 208.

Ownership of property as qualification for voting, 300–301. See Suffrage.

Partitioned cars under “Jim Crow” laws, 229.

Passengers, punishment of, for violating “Jim Crow” laws, 225; separated by race on street cars, 227–233. See “Jim Crow” laws.

Paupers, laws concerning, 60–62; in South Carolina, 60–61; in Mississippi, 61–62; separation of, by race, 147.

Payment of taxes as qualification for voting, 299–300. See Suffrage.

Pennsylvania, race distinctions in cemeteries in, 137; separation of races in schools of, prohibited, 186; qualifications for voting in, 332–333.

“Persons of African Descent” as race name, 20.

“Persons of Color” as race name, 20; intermarriage of, with Whites, 81.

Persons to whom “Jim Crow” laws do not apply, 222–223; excluded from suffrage, 310–312.

Philadelphia, race distinctions in hotels in, 124–125; race discriminations by labor unions in, 140; separation of races in street cars in, 211.

Philippine Islands, qualifications for voting in, 338–339.

Platform, common, on race problem, 355–356.

Polls, intimidation of Negroes at, 291–294. See Suffrage.

Porto Rico, qualifications for voting in, 338–339.

Postal clerks on railroads, not separated by race, 227.

Presbyterian Church, race distinctions in, 141.

Prisoners separated by race, 146–147.

Private schools, separation of races in, 190–192.

Problem, race, remedies for, 354; common platform on, 355–356.

Proctor, H. H., on proper name for Negro, 23.

Property, ownership of, as qualification for voting, 300–301. See Suffrage.

Public school fund, division of, between races, 194–199. See Schools.

Punishments, for intermarriage, 84–86; for issuing license for, 86–87; for performing ceremony of, 87–88; for cohabitation without intermarriage, 88–89; for violating Civil Rights Bills, 123; upon insurance companies for making race distinctions, 139; for violating “Jim Crow” laws, 225–226, 231; different, for Negroes and Whites, 273–277; made equal by statute, 275.

Qualifications for voting, in United States, table of, 322–339; age, 297; sex, 298; payment of taxes, 299–300; ownership of property, 300–301; educational test, 301–304; “Grandfather Clauses,” 305–308; “Understanding Clauses,” 308–310; “Character Clauses,” 308–310; persons excluded from suffrage, 310–312.

Quashing indictments because no Negroes on jury, 250–252.

Quincy, Ill., separation of races in public schools, 179.

Race elements in United States, 6.

Railroads, separation of races on cars of, 216–227; punishment upon companies for violating “Jim Crow” laws, 225–226. See Conveyances, “Jim Crow” laws.

Raleigh, Sir Walter, and Lost Colony, 90–91.

Reconstruction, and “Black Laws,” 62–63; and intermarriage, 78–80; and separation of races in public conveyances, 209–210.

Reduction of representation of Southern States in Congress, 287.

Reformatories, separation of races in, 147.

Relief trains, “Jim Crow” do not apply to, 221.

Remarriage of Negroes after Emancipation, 68–70; in Florida, 68; in Georgia, 69; in Missouri, 69.

Remedies for race problem, 354–355.

Repeal of laws against intermarriage, 89–90.

Representation in Congress, reduction of, 287.

Residence as qualification for voting, 316. See Suffrage.

Restaurants, race distinctions in, 127–129.

Restrictions upon movements of Negroes, 40–41; in Kentucky, 40; in South Carolina, 40–41. See “Black Laws.”

Rhode Island, repeal of law against intermarriage in, 90; qualifications for voting in, 332–333.

Robeson County, N. C., and Croatan Indians, 91.

Roosevelt, President, on separation of races in schools of San Francisco, 160.

Saloons, race distinctions in, 132–133; in Atlanta, Ga., 133; in Nashville, Tenn., 133; in Louisiana, 133.

San Francisco, exclusion of Japanese from public schools of, 159–163; separation of races on street cars of, 212.

Schools, separation of races in, 154–199; before 1865, 155–170; present extent of separation in, 170–190; in private schools, 190–192; division of public school fund between races, 194–199.

Scott, Dred, decision, 8; contravened by Civil Rights Bill of 1866, 105.

Separation of Whites and Negroes, in saloons, in Atlanta, Ga., 133; in Nashville, Tenn., 133; in Louisiana, 133; in churches, 141–144; in militia, 144–145; State dependents, 146–149; blind, 147; lunatics, 147; mutes, 147; paupers, 147; persons in reformatories, 147; prisoners, 147; in schools, 154–199; before 1865, 165–170; present extent of, 170–190; in public schools in South, 170–176; during Reconstruction, 175; in States outside South, 177–199; in private schools, 190–192; in public conveyances, 207–233; during Reconstruction, 209–210; on steamboats, 214; in railroad cars, 216–227; on sleeping cars, 219–220; in waiting rooms, 220–221; of postal clerks on mail cars, 227; on street cars, 227–233; in court rooms, 238.

Service on juries in South by Negroes, 253–271.

Sex as qualification for voting, 298. See Suffrage.

Sims, Thetus W., on proper name for Negro, 21.

Skating rinks, race distinctions at, 136.

Slander, actionable _per se_, to call White a Negro, 26–33.

Slaughter-House Cases interpreting Fourteenth Amendment, 107–108.

Slave marriages, reconstruction of, 67–75; certificates of, 70–73; in Kentucky, 70–72; in Maryland, 72; declared legal by statute, 73–74; in Alabama, 73; in Arkansas, 73; in Texas, 73; in Illinois, 74; in Ohio, 74; in Virginia, 74; in West Virginia, 74; marriages between slaves and free Negroes, 74; in Tennessee, 74; and Federal legislation, 75.

Sleeping cars, separation of races on, 219–220.

Social status not a subject of legislation in Georgia, 80.

Soda fountains, race distinctions at, 133–134.

South Carolina, restrictions on movements of Negroes in, 40–41; limitations upon Negroes in respect to occupations in, 42; keeping firearms by Negroes limited in, 44; contracts for labor by Negroes in, 48–53; apprentice laws in, 55–57; vagrancy laws in, 58–59; pauper laws in, 60–61; marital relations of Negroes in, established, 70; effect of intermarriage in, 85; punishment in, for performing ceremony, 88; Negroes in militia of, 145; separation of races in public schools of, at present, 175–176; on ferries, 215; Negroes as witnesses in, 244; actual service by Negroes on juries in, 267–268; separate courts for Negroes in, 272–273; different punishments for Whites and Negroes in, 274; qualifications for voting in, 334–335.

South Carolina, University of, open to Negroes during Reconstruction, 175.

South Dakota, qualifications for voting in, 334–335.

Southern Education Association on race problem, 356.

Southern States, civil rights legislation in, between 1865 and 1883, 115–120; after 1883, 120; present extent of separation of races in public schools of, 170–176; early statutes in, on Negro jury service, 249; actual service by Negroes on juries in, 253–271; reduction of representation of, in Congress, 287.

Spectator, Negro in court room as, 237.

Status, social, not a subject of legislation in Georgia, 80; of marriage, 96.

Steamboats, separation of races on, 214.

Stevens, Thaddeus, and “Black Laws,” 63; opposition of, to President Johnson’s plan of Reconstruction, 104.

Stimson, Frederick J., on laws of Michigan against intermarriage, 90.

Street cars, separation of races in, 227–233.

Suffrage, Negro, 281–339; before 1865, 282–285; in New York, 283; in North Carolina in 1835, 283; in Tennessee in 1834, 284; between 1865 and 1870, 285–288; in District of Columbia, 286; and Fourteenth Amendment, 287; between 1870 and 1890, 288–294; Southern Suffrage Amendments, 294–339; in insular possessions of United States, 312–313; constitutionality of Suffrage Amendments, 313–317.

Taft, President, on suffrage in Porto Rico, 313.

Taverns. See Restaurants.

Taxation for school purposes, 195–199.

Taxes, payment of, as qualification for voting, 299–300. See Suffrage, Schools.

Tennessee, limitations upon Negroes in respect to occupations in, 43; marriages between slaves and free Negroes in, 74; effect given to marriages in other States in, 93; civil rights legislation in, 116–118; race distinctions in theatres in, 134; separation of races in, in asylums for deaf and blind, 148; in public schools, 176; in private schools, 190; Negroes as witnesses in, 244; early statute on Negro jury service in, 249; Negro suffrage in, in 1834, 284; qualifications for voting in, 334–335.

Texas, slave marriages legal in, by statute, 73; effect of intermarriage in, 85; separation of races in public schools of, 176; division of public school fund in, 199; early “Jim Crow” law in, 209; separation of races in railroad cars in, 214; Negroes as witnesses in, 244; actual service by Negroes on juries in, 268–269; qualifications for voting in, 334–335.

Theatres, race distinctions in, 134–136.

Thirteenth Amendment, 9. See Civil Rights.

_Times-Democrat_, New Orleans, La., sued for calling white person “colored,” 28.

Trains to which “Jim Crow” laws do not apply, 221–222.

_Tribune_, New York, on proper name for Negro, 22.

“Understanding Clauses” as qualifications for voting, 308–310. See Suffrage.

Unions, labor, race discriminations by, 140–141.

Upper Alton, Ill., separation of races in public schools of, 179.

Utah, selling liquor to Indians prohibited in, 45; qualifications for voting in, 334–335.

Vagrancy laws, 58–60; in South Carolina, 58–59; in Mississippi, 59–60; as race distinctions, 275.

Vardaman, J. K., on division of public school fund between races, 195.

Vermont, qualifications for voting in, 334–335.

Virginia, contracts for labor by Negroes in, 47; slave marriages legal in, by statute, 74; effect of intermarriage in, 86; punishment in, for performing ceremony, 88; effect given to marriages in other States in, 93; separation of races in public schools of, 176; on steamboats in, 215; Negroes as witnesses in, 245; Indians as witnesses in, 245; actual jury service by Negroes in, 269–271; intimidation of Negroes at polls of, 293; qualifications for voting in, 336–337.

_Voice of the Negro_, on proper name for Negro, 20.

Voting, qualifications for, in United States, table of, 322–339. See Suffrage.

Waiting rooms, separation of races in, 220–221.

Washington, selling liquor to Indians prohibited in, 45; Negroes as witnesses in, 246; Indians as witnesses in, 246; qualifications for voting in, 336–337.

Washington, Booker T., on his ancestry, 13; on proper name for Negro, 21; and Hamlet, N. C., incident, 221; on suffrage, 361.

Washington, D. C., City of Refuge for miscegenating couples, 94; separation of prisoners by race in, 147; separate public schools in, 189.

West Virginia, slave marriages legal in, by statute, 74; effect of intermarriage in, 86; punishment in, for performing ceremony, 88; effect given to marriages in other States in, 93; Negroes in militia of, 145; separation of races in asylums for insane in, 149; in public schools of, 186; qualifications for voting in, 336–337.

“White,” omitted from statutes of Florida, 116; of New York, 115; required on street cars, 231; stricken from election laws of Dakota Territory, 286; from Constitution of Iowa, 286; from suffrage laws, 288; still in Maryland Constitution, 288, 317.

White, John, and Lost Colony, 90–91.

White persons, defamation to call, Negroes, 26–33; intermarriage between, and Chinese, 82–83; and Kanakans, 83; and Indians, 82–83.

Wisconsin, qualifications for voting in, 336–337.

Witnesses, Negroes as, 241–247.

Wyoming, separation of races in public schools of, 186; qualifications for voting in, 338–339.

Xenia, Ohio, intermarriage at, 99.

Y. M. C. A., separation of races in, 144.

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

1. Silently corrected typographical errors and variations in spelling. 2. Archaic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings retained as printed. 3. Footnotes were re-indexed using numbers. 4. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.