Part 3

* This is a happy exposure of the inconsistency of M. Thiers. But we have had recently, and in the sitting of the late National Assembly, a curious example of the perversion of his extraordinary powers, in the speeches, full of false brilliancy, to the legislature of France, in condemnation of the principles of Free-trade. His statements were coloured, or altogether without foundation; the examples which he adduced, when looked into, told against him, and his logic was puerile. Yet he found an attentive and a willing auditory. Indeed, the prejudices of the French on this subject, mixed up as they are with so many influences operating on their vanity, are still inveterate; and it was, as it always has been, M. Thiers's object to reflect faithfully the national mind. His aim never was the noble one of raising and enlightening the views of his countrymen, but simply to gain an influence over their minds, by encouraging and echoing their prejudices and keeping alive their passions.

Well, Sir, let us make a comment, if you do not object, on this text.

Like you, I see property at first in the free disposal of the person; then of the faculties; finally, of the produce of those faculties, which proves, I may say as a passing remark, that, from a certain point of view, Liberty and Property are identical.

I dare hardly say, like you, that property in the produce of our faculties is less inherent in our nature than property in these faculties themselves. Strictly speaking, that may be true; but whether a man is debarred from exercising his faculties, or deprived of what they may produce, the result is the same, and that result is called _Slavery_. This is another proof of the identity of the nature of liberty and property. If I force a man to labour for my profit, that man is my slave. He is so still, if, leaving him personal liberty, I find means, by force or by fraud, to appropriate to myself the fruits of his labour. The first kind of oppression is the more brutal, the second the more subtle. As it has been remarked that free labour is more intelligent and productive, it may be surmised that the masters have said to themselves, 'Do not let us claim directly the powers of our slaves, but let us take possession of much richer booty--the produce of their faculties freely exercised, and let us give to this new form of servitude the engaging name of _Protection_.'

You say, again, that society is interested in rendering property secure. We are agreed; only I go further than you; and if by _society_ you mean _government_, I say that its only province as regards property is to guarantee it in the most ample manner; that if it tries to measure and distribute it by that very act, government, instead of guaranteeing, infringes it. This deserves examination.

When a certain number of men, who cannot live without labour and without property, unite to support a _common authority_, they evidently desire to be able to labour, and to enjoy the fruits of their labour in all security, and not to place their faculties and their properties at the mercy of that authority. Even antecedent to all form of regular government, I do not believe that individuals could be properly deprived of the _right of defence_--the right of defending their persons, their faculties, and their possessions.

Without pretending, in this place, to philosophise upon the origin and the extent of the rights of governments--a vast subject, well calculated to deter me--permit me to submit the following idea to you. It seems to me that the rights of the state can only be the reduction into method of personal rights _previously existing_. I cannot, for myself, conceive _collective right_ which has not its root in _individual right_, and does not presume it. Then, in order to know if the state is legitimately invested with a right, it is incumbent on us to ask whether this right dwells in the individual in virtue of his being and independently of all government.

It is upon this principle that I denied some time ago the right of labour. I said, since Peter has no right to take directly from Paul what Paul has acquired by his labour, there is no better foundation for this pretended right through the intervention of the state: for the state is but the _public authority_ created by Peter and by Paul, at their expense, with a defined and clear object in view, but which never can render that just which is in itself not so. It is with the aid of this touchstone that I test the distinction between property secured and property controlled by the state. Why has the state the right to secure, even by force, every man's property? Because this right exists previously in the individual. No one can deny to individuals the _right of lawful defence_--the right of employing force, if necessary, to repel the injuries directed against their persons, their faculties, and their effects. It is conceived that this individual right, since it resides in all men, can assume the collective form, and justify the employment of public authority. And why has the state no right to _equalize_ or apportion worldly wealth? _Because, in order to do so, it is necessary to rob some in order to gratify others_. Now, as none of the thirty-five millions of Frenchmen have the right to take by force, under the pretence of rendering fortunes more equal, it does not appear how they could invest public authority with this right.

And remark, that the right of distributing* the wealth of individuals is destructive of the right which secures it. There are the savages. They have not yet formed a government; but each of them possesses the _right of lawful defence_. And it is easy to perceive that it is this right which will become the basis of legitimate public authority. If one of these savages has devoted his time, his strength, his intelligence to make a bow and arrows, and another wishes to take these from him, all the sympathies of the tribe will be on the side of the victim; and if the cause is submitted to the judgment of the elders, the robber will infallibly be condemned. From that there is but one step to the organization of public power. But I ask you--Is the province of this public power, at least its lawful province, to repress the act of him who defends his property in virtue of his abstract right, or the act of him who violates, contrary to that right, the property of another? It would be singular enough if public authority was based, not upon the rights of individuals, but upon their permanent and systematic violation! No; the author of the book before me could not support such a position. But it is scarcely enough that he could not support it; he ought perhaps to condemn it. It is scarcely enough to attack this gross and absurd Communism disseminated in low newspapers. It would perhaps have been better to have unveiled and rebuked that other and more audacious and subtle Communism, which, by the simple perversion of the just idea of the rights of government, insinuates itself into some branches of our legislation, and threatens to invade all.

* It is not easy here, and in some other places, to convey the exact meaning without using circuitous language.

For, Sir, it is quite incontestable that by the action of the tariffs--by means of Protection--governments realize this monstrous thing of which I have spoken so much. They abandon the right of lawful defence, previously existing in all men, the source and foundation of their own existence, to arrogate to themselves a _pretended right of equalizing the fortunes of all by means of robbery_, a right which, not existing before in any one, cannot therefore exist in the community.

But to what purpose is it to insist upon these general ideas? Why should I show the absurdity of Communism, since you have done so yourself (except as to one of its aspects, and, as I think, practically the most threatening) much better than it was in my power to effect?

Perhaps you will say to me that the principle of the system of Protection is not opposed to the principle of property. See, then, the means by which this system operates.

These are two: by the aid of premiums or bounties, or by restriction.

As to the first, that is evident. I defy any one to maintain that the end of the system of premiums, pushed to its legitimate conclusion, is not absolute Communism. Men work under protection of the public authority, as you say, charged to secure to each one his own--_suum cuique_. But in this instance the state, with the most philanthropic intentions in the world, undertakes a task altogether new and different, and, according to me, not only exclusive, but destructive of the first. It constitutes itself the judge of profits; it decides that this interest is not sufficiently remunerated, and that that is too much so; it stands as the distributor of fortunes, and makes, as M. Billault phrases it, the pendulum of civilization oscillate from the liberty of individual action to its opposite. Consequently it imposes upon the community at large a contribution for the purpose of making a present, under the name of premiums, to the exporters of a particular kind of produce. The pretext is to favour industry; it ought to say, _one_ particular interest at the expense of _all_ the others. I shall not stop to show that it stimulates the off-shoot at the expense of that branch which bears the fruit; but I ask you, on entering on this course, does it not justify every interest to come and claim a premium, if it can prove that the profits gained by it are not as much as those obtained by other interests? Is it not the duty of the state to listen, to entertain, to give ear to every demand, and to do justice between the applicants. I do not believe it; but those who do so, should have the courage to put their thoughts in this form, and to say--Government is not charged to render property secure, but to distribute it equally. In other words, there is no such thing as property.

I only discuss here a question of principle. If I wished to investigate the subject of premiums for exportation, as shown in their economical effects, I could place them in the most ridiculous light, for they are nothing more than a gratuitous gift made by France to foreigners. It is not the seller who receives it, but the purchaser, in virtue of that law which you yourself have stated with regard to taxes; the consumer in the end supports all the charges, as he reaps all the advantages of production. Thus we are brought to the subject of premiums, one of the most mortifying and mystifying things possible. Some foreign governments have reasoned thus: 'If we raise our import duties to a figure equal to the premium paid by the tax-payers in France, it is clear that nothing will be changed as regards our consumers, for the net price will remain the same. The goods reduced by five francs on the French frontier, will pay five francs more at the German frontier; it is an infallible means of paying our public expenses out of the French Treasury.' But other governments, they assure me, have been more ingenious still. They have said to themselves, 'The premium given by France is properly a present she makes us; but if we raise the duty, no reason would exist why more of those particular goods should be imported than in past times; we ourselves place a limit on the generosity of these excellent French people; let us abolish, on the contrary, provisionally, these duties; let us encourage, for instance, an unusual introduction of cloths, since every yard brings with it an absolute gift.' In the first case, our premiums have gone to the foreign exchequer; in the second they have profited, but upon a larger scale, private individuals.

Let us pass on to restriction.

I am a workman--a joiner, for example--I have a little workshop, tools, some materials. All these things incontestably belong to me, for I have made them, or, which comes to the same thing, I have bought and paid for them. Still more, I have strong arms, some intelligence, and plenty of good will. On this foundation I endeavour to provide for my own wants and for those of my family. Remark, that I cannot directly produce anything which is useful to me, neither iron, nor wood, nor bread, nor wine, nor meat, nor stuffs, &c., but I can produce the _value_ of them. Finally, these things must, so to speak, circulate under another form, from my saw and my plane. It is my interest to receive honestly the largest possible quantity in exchange for the produce of my labour. I say honestly, because it is not my desire to infringe on the property or the liberty of any one. But I also demand that my own property and liberty be held equally inviolable. The other workmen and I, agreed upon this point, impose upon ourselves some sacrifices; we give up a portion of our labour to some men called public _functionaries_, because theirs is the special _function_ to secure our labour and its produce from every injury that might befal either from within or from without.

Matters being thus arranged, I prepare to put my intelligence, my arms, my saw, and plane into activity. Naturally my eyes are always fixed on those things necessary to my existence, and which it is my duty to produce indirectly in creating what is equal to them in _value_. The problem is, that I should produce them in the most advantageous manner possible. Consequently I look at _values_ generally, or what, in other words, may be called the current or market price of articles. I am satisfied, judging from these materials in my possession, that my means for obtaining the largest quantity possible of fuel, for example, with the smallest possible quantity of labour, is to make a piece of furniture, to send it to a Belgian, who will give me in return some coal.

But there is in France a workman who extracts coal from the earth. Now, it so happens that the officials, whom the miner and I _contribute_ to pay for preserving to each of us his freedom of labour, and the free disposal of its produce (which is property), it so happens, I say, that these officials have become newly enlightened and assumed other duties. They have taken it into their heads to compare my labour with that of the miner. Consequently, they have forbidden me to warm myself with Belgian fuel: and when I go to the frontier with my piece of furniture to receive the coal, I find it prohibited from entering France, which comes to the same thing as if they prohibited my piece of furniture from going out. I then reason with myself--if we had never paid the government in order to save us the trouble of defending our own property, would the miner have had the right to go to the frontier to prohibit me from making an advantageous exchange, on the ground that it would be better for him that this exchange should not be effected? Assuredly not. If he had made so unjust an attempt, we would have joined issue on the spot, he, urged on by his unjust pretensions, I, strong in my right of legitimate defence.

We have appointed and paid a public officer for the special purpose of preventing such contests. How does it happen, then, that I find the miner and him concurring in restraining my liberty and hampering my industry, in limiting the field of my exertions? If the public officer had taken my part, I might have conceived his right; he would have derived it from my own; for lawful defence is, indeed, a right. But on what principle should he aid the miner in his injustice? I learn, then, that the public officer has changed his nature. He is no longer a simple mortal invested with rights delegated to him by other men, who, consequently, possess them. No. He is a being superior to humanity, drawing his right from himself, and, amongst these rights, he arrogates to himself that of calculating our profits, of holding the balance between our various circumstances and conditions. It is very well, say I; in that case, I will overwhelm him with claims and demands, while I see a richer man than myself in the country. He will not listen to you, it may be said to me, for if he listen to you, he will be a Communist, and he takes good care not to forget that his duty is to secure properties, not to destroy them.

What disorder, what confusion in facts; but what can you expect when there is such disorder and confusion in ideas? You may have resisted Communism vigorously in the abstract; but while at the same time you humour, and support, and foster it in that part of our legislation which it has tainted, your labours will be in vain. It is a poison, which, with your consent and approbation, has glided into all our laws and into our morals, and now you are indignant that it is followed by its natural consequences.

Possibly, Sir, you will make me one concession; you will say to me, perhaps, the system of Protection rests on the principle of Communism. It is contrary to right, to property, to liberty; it throws the government out of its proper road, and invests it with arbitrary powers, which have no rational origin. All this is but too true; but the system of Protection is useful; without it the country, yielding to foreign competition, would be ruined.

This would lead us to the examination of Protection in the economical point of view. Putting aside all consideration of justice, of right, of equity, of property, of liberty, we should have to resolve the question into one of pure utility, the money question, so to speak; but this, you will admit, does not properly fall within my subject. Take care that, availing yourself of expediency in order to justify your contempt of the principle of right is as if you said, 'Communism or spoliation, condemned by justice, can, nevertheless, be admitted as an expedient,' and you must admit that such an avowal is replete with danger.

Without seeking to solve in this place the economical problem, allow me to make one assertion. I affirm that I have submitted to arithmetical calculation the advantages and the inconveniences of Protection, from the point of view of mere wealth, and putting aside all higher considerations. I affirm, moreover, that I have arrived at this result: that all restrictive measures produce one advantage and two inconveniences, or, if you will, one profit and two losses, each of these losses equal to the profit, from which results one pure distinct loss, which circumstance brings with it the encouraging conviction, that in this, as in many other things, and I dare say in all, expediency and justice agree.

This is only an assertion, it is true, but it can be supported by proofs of mathematical accuracy.*

* What M. Bastiat here asserts is unquestionably true. For it has often been shown, and may readily be shown, that the importation of foreign commodities, in the common course of traffic, never takes place except when it is, economically speaking, a national good, by causing the same amount of commodities to be obtained at a smaller cost of labour and capital to the country. To prohibit, therefore, this importation, or impose duties which prevent it, is to render the labour and capital of the country less efficient in production than they would otherwise be; and compel a waste of the difference between the labour and capital necessary for the home production of the commodity, and that which is required for producing the things with which it can be purchased from abroad. The amount of national loss thus occasioned is measured by the excess of the price at which the commodity is produced over that at which it could be imported. In the case of manufactured goods, the whole difference between the two prices is absorbed in indemnifying the producers for waste of labour, or of the capital which supports that labour. Those who are supposed to be benefited--namely, the makers of the protected article, (unless they form an exclusive company, and have a monopoly against their own countrymen, as well as against foreigners,) do not obtain higher profits than other people. All is sheer loss to the country as well as to the consumer. When the protected article is a product of agriculture--the waste of labour not being incurred on the whole produce, but only on what may be called the last instalment of it--the extra price is only in part an indemnity for waste, the remainder being a tax paid to the landlords.--J. S. Mill

What causes public opinion to be led astray upon this point is this, that the profit produced by Protection is palpable--visible, as it were, to the naked eye, whilst of the two equal losses which it involves, one is distributed over the mass of society, and the existence of the other is only made apparent to the investigating and reflective mind.

Without pretending to bring forward any proof of the matter here, I may be allowed, perhaps, to point out the basis on which it rests.

Two products, A and B, have an original value in France, which I may denominate 50 and 40 respectively. Let us admit that A is not worth more than 40 in Belgium. This being supposed, if France is subjected to the protective system, she will have the enjoyment of A and B in the whole as the result of her efforts, a quantity equal to 90, for she will, on the above supposition, be compelled to produce A directly. If she is free, the result of her efforts, equal to 90, will be equal: 1st, to the production of B, which she will take to Belgium, in order to obtain A; 2ndly, to the production of another B for herself; 3rdly, to the production of C.

It is that portion of disposable labour applied to the production of C in the second case, that is to say, creating new wealth equal to 10, without France being deprived either of A or of B, which makes all the difficulty. In the place of A put iron; in the place of B, wine, silk, and Parisian articles; in the place of C put some new product not now existing. You will always find that restriction is injurious to national prosperity.

Do you wish to leave this dull algebra? So do I. To speak of facts, therefore, you will not deny that if the prohibitory system has contrived to do some good to the coal trade, it is only in raising the price of the coal. You will not, moreover, deny that this excess of price from 1822 to the present time has only occasioned a greater expense to all those who use this fuel--in other words, that it represents a loss. Can it be said that the producers of coal have received, besides the interest of their capital and the ordinary profits of trade, in consequence of the protection afforded them, an extra gain equivalent to that loss? It would be necessary that Protection, without losing those unjust and Communistic qualities which characterize it, should at least be _neuter_ in the purely economic point of view. It would be necessary that it should at least have the merit of resembling simple robbery, which displaces wealth without destroying it. But you yourself affirm, at page 236, 'that the mines of Aveyron, Alais, Saint-Etienne, Creuzot, Anzin, the most celebrated of all, have not produced a revenue of four per cent, on the capital embarked in them.' It does not require Protection that capital in France should yield four per cent. Where, then, in this instance, is the profit to counterbalance the above-mentioned loss?

This is not all. There is another national loss. Since by the relative rising of the price of fuel, all the consumers of coal have lost, they have been obliged to limit their expenses in proportion, and the whole of national labour has been necessarily discouraged to this extent. It is this loss which they never take into their calculation, because it does not strike their senses.