Part 8

JULY 5th.--The Infantry Brigade under General Burrows marched this morning, halting for the day at Kokaran. They did not get off quite so easily and well as the Cavalry Brigade, as they were hampered by having with them a large quantity of extra ammunition for both rifles and horse artillery guns, and as in this country there is no such thing as a road, and wheeled vehicles of any kind are impossible, everything has to be carried on pack animals, and the trouble and worry of loading and starting has to be seen to be understood. Here we use five animals for carrying packs--viz., camels, mules, ponies, bullocks, and donkeys, and I should be afraid to say the numbers of each which has accompanied this column. For the extra ammunition alone there were 250 ponies and bullocks, and as in that number there were a certain proportion of bad tempered brutes who at first refused to carry anything at all, delay was inevitable. However, the great comfort in marching is that the first march is always the most tiresome, as each day the men and animals fall more easily into the routine, and in a short time the machine works quite easily. I went out with the Brigade to their first halting ground, and having seen them all settled down, rode back to Kandahar, and spent the most of the day in perfecting my arrangements, as far as the means and force at my disposal would permit, for the safety and protection of our painfully straggling and badly laid out position at Kandahar. Certainly General Stewart has not left behind him any marks of a long-seeing and provident General. On the contrary, he seems to have trusted to good fortune, and fortune seems to have stuck to him in a remarkable manner. I consider the position here, from a military point of view, bad in all respects, and that even all the advantage which might have been taken of it has not been availed of. I have urged my view of the case, and can do more. As far as one can judge from the appearance of things, and the reports we get, it is extremely unlikely we should ever be attacked here, but I don't think that is any reason why we should not take every precaution. At the same time I must confess that the weakness of the position has one great advantage, and that is, we should operate in the open, a much better place for our soldiers than behind walls. I only wish the enemy would be so badly advised as to attack us, as, with all disadvantages, I have no doubt of the results.

[Sidenote: Rode out to General Burrows' brigade.]

JULY 6th.--I was up at 4 a.m. and out at ½ past 4, and set off across country to catch up the Brigade and ride a few miles with them, and then come home. They, however, had started at 4 o'clock also, and so I did not come up with them till they were 12 miles from Kandahar, which was not to be wondered at, as they had 6 miles start of me, and got off half an hour earlier than I did. I could not, therefore (as I had to be back for breakfast and work), go very much further with them, so, after seeing them on their way a mile or so further, I struck off through new country and went straight for Camp, which I reached at nine o'clock. I rode Rufus, who did his 27 miles in first-class style, and could have done half as many more without any trouble. The morning was cool, almost cold, and a good deal of the country very pretty. The climate just now, and the excellent forage we get, suits the horses very well, and they are all, both public and private, in first-class order.

JULY 7th.--Nothing of interest, except that we had news from Kelat-i-Ghilzi that they had a small skirmish there on the 1st July. The news made me more than ever disappointed that I did not get off to visit that place as was originally intended, as I should then have been in for this affair.

JULY 8th.--Rode a long way up the Argandab Valley this morning in hopes of picking up some information, or ascertaining if there were any signs of movement or excitement. Everything seemed very quiet, and the people in the numerous villages I rode through were very busy thrashing their corn. An absurd accident happened to me as I was riding home, which at one time threatened, though quite free from any danger to myself, to effect the destruction of my one pair of long riding boots, which would have been an irreparable disaster. I had to ford a small water channel about 6 or 7 yards wide, the water of which was muddy, but looked quite shallow, so I rode in very carelessly, but had not gone 2 yards when Mr. Akhbar went right down over his saddle, plunging violently. He managed to get his chest on the bank, and I lost no time in springing on to hard ground and hauling him, with some difficulty, out of the hole, nothing the worse, I am glad to say. It appears that the people had dug a well about 10 feet deep in the bed of the water-course, and it was into this we had got. Of course I was wet through, and so was the saddle, but the sun was warm, and I was an hour and a half from home, and long before I arrived there everything was dry. I had to take my poor boots off most gingerly, and have been nursing them greatly, and I think they are nothing the worse. I was much more anxious about them than anything else, as nothing of the kind is to be got here, and parcels take 2 and 3 months coming up from Bombay. I am beginning to get rather short of clothes, as it was a great loss having all the contents of my portmanteau, which were principally strong warm clothes, looted on the way up here. The orchards of peaches and nectarines in the Argandab Valley are just now quite beautiful to look at. The trees are loaded with most splendid looking fruit, which, however, are rather disappointing when picked, as they don't seem to ripen thoroughly.

JULY 9th.--We had an unofficial rumour that the advance guard of the Wāli's army had been met at Washir by the Cavalry of Ayoub Khan's army and defeated, but as no confirmation of the rumour has come from General Burrows, we are not inclined to credit it, though it is received as quite true by the people in the city, who are only too glad to believe anything to the detriment of the Wāli. Of course we must expect all sorts of rumours now, and I am, for curiosity, writing them all down as we get them to see how many eventually prove true, and how many are incorrect.

[Sidenote: Chief of Kokaran deserted the Wāli.]

JULY 10th.--To-day it was reported that considerable disaffection exists among the Wāli's Chiefs and Officers, and that the most important man of the lot, the Chief of Kokaran, a place about 6 miles from this, has deserted, and this--July 11th--was so far confirmed that we received official news that he had, with 80 followers, withdrawn himself from the Wāli's force, although it does not appear, so far, that he has joined Ayoub Khan. In accordance with Afghan customs, the Wāli's representatives here at once took reprisals by seizing the son of the Chief of Kokaran (a small boy in a bad state of health) and putting him in prison, and taking possession of the house and property of the deserter at Kokaran.

JULY 12th.--Employed during the morning in endeavouring to make arrangements for making the Citadel safer and more in accordance with the rules of war, but the task is hopeless, as the place is radically bad in a military point of view, and surrounded with houses on 3 sides. Strictly speaking these houses should have been knocked down for at least 300 yards all round the wall of the Citadel, but General Stewart appears to have set his face against any military precautions, insisting that they were quite unnecessary, "as the people were friendly to us." The consequence is that the whole position here is, strictly speaking, untenable--that is, if an enemy with either organization or means were to come against it. As, however, there is no possibility of any scientific attack being made on us, we feel that, bad as the position is, we can quite engage to hold it, and lick the enemy outside into the bargain. The City of Kandahar is a parallelogram about 1¼ miles long, and ¾ of a mile wide, something like this--

There are 6 gates in the wall of the City, which is fully 20 to 30 feet high, and very thick and strong. At each of the city gates there is a guard of Native Infantry, and we hold the keys of the gates which we lock every night at sunset, after which hour neither entrance nor exit is permitted to anyone. The guards are stationed on the ramparts, and their posts should, from the first, according to the most ordinary rules of war, have been put in a state of defence, but nothing was done to them, and General Primrose has been unwilling to make a change in the matter. Now, however, he has allowed me to take measures to make them safe in the event of any outbreak.

[Sidenote: Rumoured advance of Ayoub Khan.]

JULY 13.--A welcome addition to our force reached us to-day, in the shape of the Head Qrs. Wing of the 4th N.I., which marched in from Quetta. The remainder of the regiment will follow shortly. There was a report that Ayoub Khan, with his army, had actually left Furrah, and that his advance guard was at Washir, but there is no confirmation of the collision between his and the Wāli's forces there, which has probably never occurred. There is much excitement in the city, and the merchants, jewellers, &c., are hiding and burying their property, which means, I assume, that they don't believe in our power to defend the city against Ayoub Khan. A gathering of the enemy is reported as being at Karkrez, about 30 miles off, and there is much excitement among the tribes in the Arghastan Valley. There is no doubt it is very desirable that our force at Girishk should have an opportunity of administering a lesson to some one, or we shall probably have to do something in that way ourselves here.

JULY 14th.--Information received that one of the Wāli's regiments, composed of men from Kabul, is mutinous. They are in the fort of Girishk with the Wāli. Ayoub Khan is said to have with him 1,800 cavalry and 4,000 infantry, and 30 guns. So General Burrows' force of 2,500 men and 6 guns have not much to fear. I visited all the guards on the city gates in the evening, and walked round the whole city on the ramparts, and had a good view of the inhabitants preparing to go to bed on the roofs of their houses, which are flat, and always used as the sleeping apartments of the family. The ramparts are 20 to 25 feet high, and as the houses are all one-storied, the roofs were much below us, and we saw more of Afghan domestic life than usual, as the people did not anticipate that anyone would be passing round then, and the roofs were covered with ladies, who, however, very quickly let down their veils when they saw us in the distance.

[Sidenote: Guns recovered from mutinous troops.]

JULY 15.--News from General Burrows received this morning states, that the whole of the Wāli's army was mutinous, and that the situation was so critical that he had decided it was necessary he should disregard the positive orders he had received not to cross the Helmund, and that he proposed to do so, and disarm the mutineers. I should explain that our force is, under orders from the Viceroy, halted on the Kandahar side of the Helmund, while the Wāli and his army are in the fort of Girishk, which is on the Herat side of the Helmund. Later in the day news arrived from the Wāli (which was apparently authentic), that early the previous morning (14th) the whole of his army left him, taking with them the Battery of guns our Government had been so idiotic as to give the Wāli. The letter, which was from the Wāli to his son, who is here, went on to say, that immediately General Burrows heard this, he had crossed the river with his cavalry and Horse artillery, and pursued the mutineers, and coming up with them had killed 200 and recovered the guns. This report seems authentic, though probably exaggerated, but as yet no confirmation has been received from General Burrows. True or not, the report has had a good effect in the city, and will help to show that the people are not likely to improve matters by trying conclusions with us. I had a deputation from the Parsee shopkeepers, who have followed the army from India, and have shops in our camp, where they sell us wine and provisions, &c., at most exorbitant rates, to beg me to give them a place in the fort for their stores, as they were in a dreadful fright for their lives and their property. Even if I had considered they were in danger, I would not have acceded to their request, as I would much prefer their running certain risks, to giving public confidence the shock of supposing I thought it necessary for our camp followers to take refuge in the fort, so I laughed at their fears, refused their petition, and comforted them by saying, that even if they now lost the whole contents of their shops, they would still be great gainers, as they have made their fortunes already by swindling us. They did not seem to see this in the light I did, but had to accept the inevitable, and take their share of the risks. As there is a large number of evilly-disposed men in the city, it was decided that it was desirable to show

[Sidenote: 40-pounder guns moved into fort.]

them we were determined to put down any disturbances with a strong hand, so we moved down two of our 40 pounder guns into the fort, and placed them in position to shell the city, and at the same time established a system of strong patrols, which night and day visit the city, and go through all the main streets. There is no denying these patrols would be in an unpleasant position if attacked, as street fighting is, of all, the most disagreeable, but I have given clear and distinct orders for the guidance of the officers in command, from which they learn what they are expected to do, and which will cover their responsibility in resorting, if necessary, to strong measures. The great objection one feels to returning a fire in a street is, that in such cases it is always unfortunate children and women who suffer, and not the men who deserve it, and who take precious good care to remain under cover. I visited the city myself, and found all quiet, and went with the Wāli's chief man to arrange for certain improvement to the fortifications, and was quite civilly received everywhere. It was satisfactory to find that already the arrival of the guns in the fort was known and appreciated, and one Afghan said to me, "They" (the guns) "are very big: two discharges from them and the city would be destroyed." I answered in the language of the country, "I believe you, my boy."

JULY 16th.--Rode out to Kokeran, and on arrival there, met a well armed caravan, the people composing which could give but an unsatisfactory account of themselves, so one of our native cavalry patrols coming up at the moment, I made the lot prisoners, and sent them into the city to be examined. They may only be peaceful traders armed for their own defence, as they were perfectly civil, but even in that case some information will be got out of them. No news yet from General Burrows, who possibly has gone on in hopes of meeting Ayoub Khan. We have decided to disarm every Afghan approaching Kandahar, and I have issued the necessary orders to ensure this being done.

JULY 16th.--Rode out to Kokeran in the morning, returning by the Argandab, all seemed quiet. Visited the city in the evening, and found all quiet there also.

JULY 17th.--Was woke at 2·30 a.m. by the Brigade-Major bringing the officer commanding the cavalry patrol (which is on duty round the camp all night), who reported that a considerable fire was burning in the direction of Kokeran. As these fires very often indicate a collection of men bent on mischief, I desired him to proceed cautiously with his patrol in the direction of the fire, and ascertain its cause, and bring me information, and at the same time I ordered a troop of cavalry to follow in support. The fire proved to be caused by some evilly-disposed persons having set a light to the corn and straw stacks of a peaceably-disposed native, living some 8 or 9 miles from camp, and the patrol found no signs of a gathering of men, so returned to camp. Confirmation was received from General Burrows of his successful fight at Girishk against our _supposed_ friends, the troops of the Wāli, in which he had succeeded in recovering the Battery of artillery which our Government had given as a present to the Wāli, and the first time it was used was to fire upon us! General Burrows also recovered a great deal of stores and baggage belonging to the Wāli, and much ammunition, and on the whole made a very successful business, losing but very few men himself, the loss of the enemy being computed by themselves at 400, but was probably not more than half that number. There being a want of supplies at Girishk, General

[Sidenote: Retrograde movement on Kushki-Nakud.]

Burrows thought it right to fall back to a place 25 miles nearer to Kandahar, called Kushki-Nakud. There were many good reasons, I confess, for this move, but personally I would never willingly, in Eastern warfare, take a retrograde step, except under the strongest compulsion, as Afghans know nothing, and care less, about the laws of strategy, and see only defeat in any but forward movements. The fact is, had we known that the Wāli's army intended to mutiny, we would never have advanced beyond Kushki-Nakud, as there are many good objections to the position at Girishk. That we did not know the shaky state of the Wāli's troops is all the fault of the Political officer with the Wāli, who, wishing to see all things _couleur de rose_, persuaded himself that all was right, and could not, or would not, believe any evil of them. Even he must now see what we have felt sure of all along, that Shere Ali is quite without power or influence, and quite unable to maintain his own authority for a day without our assistance. We have, of course, here, the reflex of the events at Girishk, as there has been a very marked increase of excitement and turbulence in the city, since the news of the mutiny of the Wāli's troops has arrived, and had not, at the same time, the intelligence of the licking they had received from us reached the city, we should certainly have had an outbreak there.

JULY 18th.--Moved another 40 pounder gun into the fort, and mounted it on a very commanding position, from which we could soon destroy the best part of the city. Of course there is no intention of a measure of this kind, but a big gun ready for action has a very _soothing_ effect on the warlike feelings of Afghans, or Easterns generally. Intelligence was brought in, that attacks on the posts of Mandi Hissar and Abdul Rahmon were likely, and though it was not thought there was much chance of these places, which are now very fairly strong, being attacked, it was thought wise to send some cavalry to reconnoitre, which was done; but the officer, on arrival at Abdul Rahmon (25 miles off), was able to telegraph that all was quiet and no sign of gatherings or excitement. If, however, the existing state of feeling in the country grows or becomes intensified, it is quite possible these posts may be attacked, but if so they should be well able to hold their own.

[Sidenote: Cavalry patrol fired upon--officer wounded.]