Part 11
I expected, the Political Officers objected, and tried to persuade us that the risk was imaginary, &c. However, I was firm, and after a long and hot conversation which, at one time, seemed likely to culminate in a row, I carried the day, and an order was issued that all Pathans (men) should leave the City, and that in the afternoon search parties would go round to ascertain that the order was being obeyed. This unpleasant duty was confided to me, and I made all preparations for resistance, but in no case met with any, and it was clear the exodus had commenced, and eventually resulted in about 12,000 persons leaving the City of their own free will. This was a gain not only in getting rid of a certain set of desperate enemies, but also in reducing the number of mouths to be fed and supplied with water, the latter more especially. Though this was a good beginning, I was by no means satisfied that all the dangerous element had been removed, and from time to time persistently urged my views to this effect, until eventually it seemed we had reduced the evil to a minimum. I cannot say that even yet (written August 14th) I am quite satisfied, but I hope and believe the internal danger is greatly reduced. Throughout we got no hearty assistance from the Political Officers, the Wāli, or the City Authorities, the Chief of which (called the Kotwal) is, I believe, the prime villain of the lot, and I informed Colonel St. John (the Political Officer) that I considered he ought to be arrested, and that I should myself, on my own responsibility, assuredly seize him if there was the sign of an emeute in the town. I have no doubt Colonel St. John will hereafter try to prove I was too decided, and too hard in this matter, but I am convinced I was right, and only wish I had more certainty that we were as safe from danger from within as he tries to make me believe. If I were General Primrose I would relieve him of all political powers while the present state of affairs lasted, and constitute myself _only_ and chief Political Officer, and this I have urged on him. When I found it quite impossible, as it seemed to be at first, to move the Pathans out, I threatened (having received authority from General Primrose to act as might seem best) to throw a few shells into the Pathan quarter, and certainly would have done so when all other means failed, but never desired or wished to resort to so extreme a measure until all fair means had been tried.
JULY 31st.--After a quiet night I was up at 4·30 and sent out a reconnoitering party, which got well into Cantonments without resistance, and returned almost unopposed. While, however, they were so employed, a large body of Cavalry and Infantry appeared on our right front, in the direction of Mandi Hissar, and occupied 2 villages within 1,000 yards of the wall. General Primrose ordered me to take out some Cavalry and Infantry to clear them off, which I did, and had a smart little fight, effecting our object, and killing about 30 of the enemy, with a loss to ourselves of one man killed and 3 wounded. I sent in to ask General Primrose to send me some guns, as the enemy had fallen back into a strong village, against the loopholed walls of which I did not care to rush the men until I had got a practicable breach. No guns coming, and the object of the little expedition having been effected, I withdrew my party to the Fort, where I found that General Primrose had not wished to push the affair further, and had sent to tell me so, but the message had not reached me. Hard at work all day improving our defences. Everyone is on duty always, and despite the hot sun and incessant labor, all are in first-rate
[Sidenote: Demolitions of cover outside city gates.]
health. Now the General regrets that he did not take advantage of the opportunity offered by the firing on our guards and picquets, to have all the cover, which lies round the City Gates outside, down. It must all be done now, and as our working parties are always opposed, we lose men daily over the business. We all feel that we owe more than half our troubles and difficulties to the happy-go-lucky style adopted by General Stewart, who steadily objected to any military precautions whatever being taken at Kandahar. He is certainly the luckiest man in the world--having got safe away before his faults and oversights began to bear fruit.
AUGUST 1st.--Sent out very heavy working parties to clear the front of the Kabul Gate, which is a mass of houses and bazaars. These parties are relieved every four hours, and have to be protected by strong covering parties who are in conflict with the enemy the whole day, but both sides taking advantage of the cover afforded by the numerous walls, little serious loss results as a rule, though there is seldom a day that 4, 5, or more men are not killed and wounded. At 2 p.m. took direction of a small force to endeavour to find more of the Pathans, who are, I am confident, still lurking in the City intent on no good. It was a most unpleasant duty, but I hardened my heart, and made all I found go out. We got over 700 out on this occasion. I cannot say I am yet satisfied, and think we are being fooled and possibly betrayed by the Wāli and his servants.
AUGUST 2nd.--Up at 5 a.m. to direct an attack on a garden opposite our S.W. Bastion, which is the salient of my line of defence. Gave the executive charge to Colonel Bannerman, who carried out the affair in accordance with my instruction in an excellent manner, and most successfully, and though the resistance was steady, our loss was only 1 man killed and 1 wounded, the enemy losing very considerably.
[Sidenote: Walls divided into separate commands.]
AUGUST 3rd.--My birthday; 44 years old to-day; could not help thinking much of all the dear ones at home, knowing how anxious they would be, and feeling sure I would not be forgotten on this day especially. Still working hard at our defences. The walls were divided into 4 sections for commands, as follows:--
General Primrose--The North or Eedgah Front. General Burrows--W. or Herat Front. General Nuttall--E. or Kabul Front. General Brooke--S. or Shikarpore Front.
Though mine is shorter a good deal than either General Burrows' or General Nuttall's, it has the drawback of being farthest from the Citadel, and it is generally supposed it will be the one on which the heaviest attack will come. Each front is covered outside with a net-work of walls which must be destroyed.
AUGUST 4th.--All at the works. The enemy was rather troublesome, but a few shot and shell, and a steady fire from our selected marksmen, kept them off. The Wāli's Cavalry--about 80 men--went out of the Shikarpore Gate and looted some forage, about a mile to the front, in very good style. Prepared an Abatis in front of my gate, and cut off the water supply of a village 1,000 yards due south. Slept on the ramparts, and visited all my line twice between 11 p.m. and 4 a.m. I have a camp bed up on the walls, but no one undresses, and sleep is taken in very small snatches. I may say now I live on my wall, as, except returning to the Citadel for breakfast and dinner and a wash, I never leave the ramparts. We have rather a snug little mess, managed by Colonel Beville, consisting of General Burrows and his Brigade Major, Captain Law; Colonel Beville, and Captain Leckie, my Brigade Major, and myself. So far we have fared very comfortably, as there is a good deal to be bought, and we had a good deal of stores, &c., when we came in. I have quite given up any sort of wine or spirits during the day, and drink nothing but water or cold tea until dinner, when I have one glass of sherry, and sometimes a little hock and water, but generally, when I can get it, lime juice and water. I never touch spirits at all, and am convinced that for hard work there is nothing like drinks that do not inebriate.
AUGUST 5th.--Large covering and working parties in front of the Herat Gate to remove heavy cover between it and the General's old garden. Hardly any resistance offered by the enemy. I completed the Abatis and wire entanglements opposite my gate, and the S.E. and S.W. Bastions, both of which come within my charge. I consider the S.W. Bastion the weakest point of my line, and the one where the heaviest and worst attack will be. I have a 40-pounder gun in the S.E. Bastion, and 2 9-pounders in the S.W. Bastion. Urged thereto by General Burrows and myself, General Primrose had the Kotwal of the City arrested, and in the presence of General Burrows, Colonel St. John, the Nawab Hussun Ali, and myself, warned him of the precarious position in which he stood in case of any outbreak in the City, and told him of the reason of his arrest, &c. He was then conveyed to safe quarters, where he is kept under a European guard, no one seeing him except in the presence of the officer. I feel sure he was a traitor to us, and had some bad scheme in contemplation, and his arrest will nip his machinations in the bud. Even Colonel St. John was glad he was arrested.
AUGUST 6th.--At 3 a.m. every man was turned out and occupied the post he would hold in case of attack, to ascertain that all knew their places. Everything was very quietly done, and the arrangements worked well. The working parties in front of my gate were much annoyed by the enemy firing at long distances. One officer, Lieut. De Trafford, 7th Fusiliers, was wounded. We brought down a mortar and cleared out one of the most troublesome villages. Ayoob Khan's Camp was observed to be pitched behind Picquet Hill in the old Cantonments.
[Sidenote: Enemy's camp successfully shelled.]
AUGUST 7th.--Threw some shells (40-pounders) with excellent effect into Ayoob's Camp. A regular stampede ensued, and many tents were seen to be on fire, and the Camp was quickly deserted. The distance from us being 3,500 yards (2 miles) they thought they were quite safe, and their horror and astonishment was all the greater. We heard afterwards that one shell had killed 10 and wounded 2 men, burning down the tent in which they were lying. Busy all day on my walls improving the fire capacity which, owing to the peculiar formation of the walls and towers, is very defective, and, do what we may, will never be really good. The heat is very great, inducing great lassitude, which is not wonderful, seeing one barely gets 4 hours sleep out of 24, and never has one's clothes off except for one's tub, the great luxury of the day, and which I always have now just before dinner.
AUGUST 8th.--Heavy firing from the enemy on the working parties in front of the Durani and Kabul Gates, and it took a serious administration of mortar shells to quiet the enemy. For the first time the enemy opened their Artillery on us from a well constructed battery on Picquet Hill. Our 40-pounder at the N.W. angle, however, made excellent practice, and dismounted one of their guns. The enemy have moved their Camp to a position beyond Abasabad, 5,000 yards from our guns. They are busy throwing up batteries against the Herat face.
[Sidenote: First proposal to attack Deh Kojah.]
AUGUST 9th.--Large working and covering parties (under Colonel Daubeny) in front of the S.W. Bastion to complete necessary demolitions. We lost several men, killed and wounded, but did good work. A large force of the enemy collected in the village opposite Shikarpore Gate, but were turned out by our mortar fire. It was proposed to attack the village of Deh Kojah, which is 900 yards from the Kabul Gate, in view to inflicting a lesson on the enemy. It was clear we could not think of holding it, or any other place beyond the walls, and therefore we should have no real advantage to recompense us for the certain loss the enterprise would entail. For many good reasons I objected to the plan, as useless and involving a certain heavy loss and discouragement to the men, and eventually it was given up, a short bombardment being substituted for it, which was, I fear, not very useful either.
AUGUST 10th.--Quiet night; but at 6·30 a.m. enemy opened, on the S.W. Bastion, with a gun which had been placed in position during the night in village opposite Shikarpore Gate. The shells fell short, doing no damage, and our artillery forced him to evacuate the position. Enemy appear to be busy throwing up entrenchments on Picquet Hill, also in a corner of the garden opposite S.W. Bastion. He threw some shells into the Citadel, one bursting in a room next to the Church. For the first time I had leisure, and went round and visited all the wounded officers and men, all doing well, though Major Iredell's wound is very serious. Threw some shells into enemy's work in front of S.W. Bastion. Effect not satisfactory, and the distance being only 400 yards, portions of the shells flew back over us, and one bit killed one of our mules. On going my rounds at 10 p.m. I heard decided indications of men at work in the village opposite the Shikarpore Gate, and also sounds of wheels (artillery), from which I judged the enemy were throwing up a battery there. Reinforced parties on walls, and remained expecting an attack all night, but none came.
AUGUST 11th.--At daylight discovered that the village in front of my Gate has, as I anticipated, been much fortified since the previous evening, but were quite unable to discover where the battery, if there is one, is placed. Letters received for the first time from India, but only two in cypher, for General Primrose and Colonel St. John. By them we are informed that Sir F. Roberts left Kabul on the 7th, with a division to assist us--he cannot be here before the 1st of next month--and that General Phayre was doing all he could to gather a force to bring to our relief. He was at Quetta on the 6th, so it is unlikely that he either can arrive until the end of the month. Bombarded village in front of Shikarpore Gate with good effect.
[Sidenote: Gallant act of two R.E. Officers.]
AUGUST 12th.--A quiet night. Being grouse-shooting day, we acted as grouse, and were heavily shot at as we had a large covering and working party out opposite the S.W. Bastion, in hopes of effecting some much wanted demolitions. The whole were under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Griffiths, 1st N.I., who, in my judgment, by no means made the most of his opportunities, and little or no work was done. The gardens which had to be taken were full of the enemy, who were, however, smartly driven out by the Fusiliers and 19th N.I., but owing to supports not being brought up, the enemy returned in force, and the position became untenable, unless we wished to precipitate a general action, which was undesirable. All sorts of wild reports were sent in of large gatherings of the enemy approaching, which I did not credit, but it was considered wiser to recall the parties, which was done, and all fell back under a fierce fire, during which many of our men fell. I was standing on the parapet, directing matters as far as I could, when I witnessed, just 20 feet beneath me, a grand piece of gallantry on the part of two young R.E. Officers (Lieuts. Jones and Waller), who, under a galling fire, returned from safe cover and carried into safety a wounded sepoy, during which operation one of the men who was with them, a private of the 7th, was killed--shot through the head. I can personally testify to the hotness of the fire, and I have recommended both for the V. C., which I think they fully deserve. I am opposed altogether to these small fights which cost many lives and have but little results, but the next there is I shall, I think, take myself and try to make a better job of it than was done to-day.
AUGUST 13th.--Quiet night and morning. Not a soul to be seen all round. After breakfast went on the Signal Tower to watch the effect of a few 40-pounder shells, which we were going to throw into the enemy's new camp, at 5,000 yards' range. The shots were excellent, and evidently created much consternation, but the enemy had evidently seen our group on the Signal Tower, and at once sent a 12-pounder shell at us, which went beyond the Tower, his second trial was short and went into the City, but his third shot was so far successful that he hit the lower part of the Tower. At 6 p.m. we shelled a Battery in Deh Khoja. The enemy replied briskly for ½ an hour, and then finding it too hot, shut up. On this occasion we used 7-pounder shells in the 9-pounder guns, to which they had been adapted by an ingenious contrivance of Major Caldecott. They proved a great success, and are a grand addition to our firing powers, as we have 1,100 of them in the Arsenal. On coming back to the walls after dinner I found a telegram from the Herat Gate, to say that large bodies of men were advancing with music, &c. Knowing the anxious nature of my friend in command there the information did not much excite me, and I waited till I could get down to the S.W. Bastion before deciding if any special measures were necessary. Getting there I heard the music (most discordant), and concluded it was in the Engineer Garden in our old Cantonments, and was merely the enemy having a musical evening. The fact that there was music was rather a proof that the enemy did not contemplate an attack. There were, no doubt, many people about, but on the whole I decided there was nothing at the moment worth turning out the Garrison for, so sent a re-assuring telegram to Head Quarters, which was justified by a quiet night.
[Sidenote: Further attacks on the Shikapore Gate.]
AUGUST 14th.--At 6·30 the enemy opened a Battery on the Shikarpore Gate, to which we quickly replied, shutting him and his guns up in ½ an hour. A spy came in who reports our shells have created much damage among the enemy; also that they lost 60 men in the little affair of the 12th, among them Mahomed Azim Khan, Governor of Furrah, a very great man indeed. The spy says there is an Artillery Officer prisoner with Ayoub Khan, and that he is very well treated in every way; he also says that the enemy have 1,500 wounded now lying at Maiwand.
Here the Diary ends!
APPENDIX.
From Rt. Hon. Hugh Childers, M.P., War Office.
To Mrs. Brooke, Ashbrooke, Brookeboro'.
I deeply regret to have to announce to you that General BROOKE fell in a sortie from Kandahar on the Sixteenth of August. Pray accept my most sincere condolences on the terrible loss to yourself and to the country.
* * * * *
From Her Majesty the Queen.
Balmoral Castle, August 27th, 1880.
Lt.-General Sir Henry Ponsonby presents his compliments to Mrs. Brooke.
He has been commanded to convey the Queen's sincere and earnest sympathy with her in her grief, and Her Majesty's sorrow at the loss sustained by Mrs. Brooke in the recent action near Kandahar, where the Queen has had to lament the death of so many brave officers and men.
The accounts which Her Majesty has received of Brigadier-General BROOKE only increase her deep regret that she should have been deprived of the services of so gallant and worthy a soldier.
* * * * *
From
H. E. The Governor, Bombay.
To
Mrs. Brooke, Ashbrooke, Brookeboro'.
Viceroy desires me to convey to you his deep sympathy, in which I beg to join. It is reported your gallant Husband was killed while trying to carry off Captain Cruikshank when wounded.
* * * * *
From Major General Dillon. Horse Guards, Pall Mall, London, August 30th, 1880.
My dear Mrs. Brooke,
I have waited for some days before carrying out the wishes of the Duke of Cambridge, received from Kissengen, to convey to you by letter an expression of His Royal Highness' deep sympathy with you in your great affliction, and his sense of the loss which the service has sustained by the death of a gallant soldier and distinguished officer. In alluding to the sad event in the last letter received from Germany only to-day, His Royal Highness continues--"I am too sorry for General BROOKE'S death, a good officer lost to the service at a critical moment for the garrison of Kandahar. Lord Napier will feel it much."
Believe me,
Dear Mrs. Brooke,
Yours very sincerely,
M. A. DILLON.
* * * * *
From Lord Napier of Magdala.
August 25th, 1880. Dear Lady Arabella,
I cannot resist writing you a few lines to express my most sincere sympathy with you, and my sorrow at the loss of your gallant son at Kandahar, which the telegram has to-day announced to us. I have felt so much confidence in your son being with the Force, that I look upon his loss as a great public misfortune, as well as a domestic calamity, the bitterness of which you and his widow alone can tell. I much entreat you, dear friend, to try and remember that he fell nobly doing his duty, and I trust that God in his mercy will give you strength to bear this heavy bereavement, and will in His own time comfort you and the poor widow. Lady Napier joins me in the truest and deepest sympathy.
Believe me, Dear Lady Arabella, Yours most sincerely, NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
* * * * *
Statement of Sergeant-Major Rickard, 2/7th Royal Fusiliers.
Sergeant-Major T. Rickard, of the 2/7th Fusiliers, states:--On the 16th August, 1880, I was one of the Party ordered out for the storming of Deh Khoja, under General BROOKE. We attacked the village at the South end about 5.30 a.m. under a very heavy fire in all directions from the enemy. When we arrived in the centre of the village, Captain Cruikshank, R.E., got wounded. General BROOKE assisted in helping him along. We then advanced further on, to force our way through the village, when we halted and got under a wall, as we thought under cover, but the enemy's fire from all directions kept getting heavier, and the longer we stopped the heavier the fire got. General BROOKE said to me, "Sergeant-Major, we shall never get out of this, I am afraid." He then ordered us to retire back out of the village. We did so. After we got out of the village about 300 yards, we halted again under cover about 10 minutes, and fired on the enemy as fast as we could. General BROOKE asked me to send him another man to help him along with Captain Cruikshank. I did so, and we retired again towards the Fort, and had only got about 200 yards when General BROOKE was shot in the head (dead), and the other man that was helping was shot. I was with General BROOKE the whole time, till he was shot.
T. RICKARD, Sergeant-Major 2/7th Royal Fusiliers.
* * * * *
From Colonel French, R.A., Commanding Artillery in Kandahar.
Kandahar, 26th August. My Dear Annie,