Part 5

As a starting-point for the discussion of this question, two propositions may be laid down as broadly true. The first is, that at some period or other, all Aryans have been in the habit of obtaining their wives (or some of their wives) by capture and by purchase. This fact may ultimately imply scarcity of native women, female infanticide, polyandry, and kinship through the female line; or it may prove to be perfectly compatible with a patriarchal and agnatic system. But it is a fact, and a fact of the first importance for this discussion. The second proposition that may safely be made is, that in historical times at least, the patriarchal form of family has always been the prevailing form amongst Aryan nations. The exceptions may be real, or they may be due to faulty observation; they may be of the highest importance, as being the sole indications of a prior and very different form of family life, or they may be merely local, transient departures from the normal patriarchal form, and so be insignificant or deceptive; but in any case, they are relatively so few as to leave it a practically true statement to say that the patriarchal family has been normal among the Aryans in historic times.

The evidence of the existence of marriage by capture is furnished by folk-lore. It is not necessary, nor is this the place to review that evidence; but the survivals of this form of marriage which are recorded in the _Romane Questions_ must be mentioned. The Romans, Plutarch says (_R. Q._, 29), "_would not permit the new wedded bride to passe of herself over the door-sill or threshold, when she is brought home to her husband's house, but they that accompanie her must lift her up between them from the ground, and so convey her in_."[98] That the Romans themselves were dimly conscious of the real origin of this custom is implied in the first solution suggested by Plutarch, viz., that the ceremony was "in remembrance of those first wives whom they ravished perforce from the Sabines;" and Rossbach, in his great work on Roman marriage,[99] sees in the custom a survival from times when the bride, captured by force, was conveyed against her will into the house (or den) of her captor. Parallels to the Roman custom are to be found elsewhere. Among the modern Greeks the bride is lifted over the threshold, as it would be most unlucky if she touched it in crossing.[100] It is the most important wedding-guest among the Servians,[101] the bride's nearest relation in Lorraine,[102] who carries her in his arms from the waggon into her new home. Among the North Frisians the "bride-lifter" (_bridlefstr_) is a regular wedding-official.[103] The ceremony seems to have been known to the ancient Hindoos also.[104] The Finnish-Ugrians, whether they borrowed or lent, or independently developed the custom, uniformly practise it.[105] It is further noteworthy that the Finnish-Ugrians agree with the Romans, the Hindoos, and the Russians in this, viz., that the bride is not only carried over the threshold by some of the bridal party (not by the bridegroom) but is then caused by them "to sit upon a fliece of wooll."[106] The meaning and object of this strange proceeding were quite unknown to the Romans, who practised it in Plutarch's time, as they are to the Finnish-Ugrians and Russians who still observe the custom. Rossbach rightly compares the ancient Roman custom of making the _flamen_ and _flaminica_, when married _per farreationem_, sit upon the fleece of the sheep that was slaughtered during the wedding ceremonies;[107] he then refers to the Roman practice of sitting for a short time after prayer in silent meditation, and this he thinks explains the custom in question. But surely it leaves unexplained just that which requires explanation. Granted, that the Romans showed more reverence than, say the Scots whom Dr. Boyd can remember; still, are we to imagine them so rapt into "the mind's internal heaven" that they could sit down in the grease and the gore of a freshly-slaughtered sheep's fell, "nor heed nor see what things these be"? Why did they not sit down somewhere else?

A possible answer to this question may be found in the following considerations. Many savages consider themselves peculiarly liable on their wedding-day to the attacks of evil spirits. The Hindoos and the Finnish-Ugrians unanimously regard the seating of the bride on the fleece as the right time for exorcising evil spirits and purifying the bride: the Hindoos recite an incantation, the Esthonians clash daggers over her head, for iron is generally dreaded by spirits. It is, therefore, an easy inference that the fleece itself had purificatory powers; and, as a matter of fact, we find that the Greeks, at any rate, regarded a sheepskin in this light, for in the preliminary ceremonies of the Eleusinia was a purificatory rite which was known as the Zeus-fleece.[108] In the collection of the Hôtel Lambert[109] is a red-figured vase bearing a representation of this rite, in which the person purified is represented as crouching on the fleece.

In days when marriage by capture was real, and not merely symbolical, it was highly important that a strange woman should, immediately on entering the house, be, so to speak, spiritually disinfected, lest she should introduce unwelcome spirits into her new home; or, in the intimate relations which were to subsist between her and her captor,[110] should bring him into the power of strange and hostile gods. Hence the close adhesion of the ceremony of the fleece, long after its meaning was forgotten, to that of lifting the bride over the threshold.

But it was necessary not merely to detach the strange woman from her own gods, she must also be introduced to the gods of her new home. This introduction survived in the Roman custom, whereby _new wedded wives are bidden to touch fire and water_ (_R. Q._ 1).[111] That this custom goes back to the time when wives were captured is indicated by the words "are bidden:" the force which was at first necessarily used survives in this gentle compulsion. Parallels to this custom are forthcoming: the Hindoo bride, according to the Kâuçikasûtra (77. 16), was led thrice round the hearth in the bridegroom's house. Exactly the same ceremony not only was practised by the ancient Teutons, but is still observed in some places in North Germany and in Westphalia.[112] The Esthonians and Wotjaks still honour the custom.[113] The first thing a Servian bride has to do on entering her new home is to mend the fire,[114] and in ancient Greece she was taken at once to the hearth. It need hardly be said that the hearth is the abode of the house-spirit and the centre of the family worship. At Rome, we find from Festus,[115] the bride was also sprinkled with water. In Sardinia,[116] her mother-in-law empties a glass of water over her. Amongst the ancient Hindoos[117] this was the bridegroom's duty; with the Servians it is the function of the _Djewer_.[118] That this sprinkling was originally an introduction of the strange woman to the local water-spirit seems indicated by the fact that amongst the Servians the sprinkling is performed at the well, in the Unterkrain at the burn,[119] in Albania[120] at the village-spring, while in modern Greece the bride casts offerings into the spring.[121]

The conventionally extravagant lamentation which was required of the Roman bride[122] is regarded by Rossbach (p. 329) as a survival of marriage by capture, and may be paralleled amongst many Aryan nations: with the Hindoos it was part of the officially prescribed programme;[123] in the Oberpfalz it is obligatory; in Bohemia and in Russia it is required by public opinion.[124]

The evidence of folk-lore (so far as it is called for by the _Romane Questions_) that the Aryans obtained wives by capturing the women of other households or family groups than their own, has now been stated. It does not suffice to show that an Aryan was forbidden to marry a woman of his own household; but a wider survey of early Aryan wedding-customs would bring out this important fact, that however other parts of the ceremony vary, there is one which is always present, and which may be regarded as essential—that is the _domum deductio_, the bringing-home of the bride; and from this fact we may fairly draw the conclusion that normally, and—so strong is custom—probably uniformly, the bride and the bridegroom belonged to different households, and that the bride came to live in the home of the bridegroom.

Marriage by purchase does not happen to be mentioned in the _Romane Questions_, nor is it necessary to prove what is universally admitted. All that need be remarked here is that purchase was not necessarily preceded by a state of things in which capture prevailed; frequently it may have been a peaceable remedy for the grievances caused by capture, but quite as often it may have been practised side by side with capture from the beginning. Further, the purchase, like the capture, of wives implies that husband and wife belonged to different households; and purchase indicates that the wife thus bought was the property of the husband, or at least that she was subject to him.

Let us now turn to the evidence showing that the family was patriarchal and agnatic. The evidence is furnished by the comparative study of law, especially the law regulating the order in which the relatives of a dead man shall succeed to his property. The order of succession prescribed by the earliest legal codes is strikingly similar among all the Aryan peoples; first, the deceased's male descendants to the third generation (his sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons); next, the male descendants of the deceased's father to the third generation (_i.e._, the deceased's brothers, nephews, and grand-nephews); then the male descendants of the deceased's grandfather to the third generation (_i.e._, his uncles, cousins, and their children); and finally, the male descendants of his great-grandfather to the third generation (_i.e._, his great-uncles, his first cousins once removed, and his second cousins once removed). Beyond these degrees, kin was not counted; and if no heir were forthcoming within them, the property went, amongst the Hindoos, to those of the same name as the deceased; amongst the Romans, to the members of his _gens_; in Crete, to the village community. What is the origin of this unanimous and well-marked distinction between the Near and the Remote Kin? Why were the _anchisteis_, "the nearest relations," as the Greeks technically named them, so sharply distinguished from the others?

To begin with, it is clear that the distinction, being common to all the Aryans, was not developed subsequently to their dispersion, but is pre-historic—indeed, pro-ethnic. Hence it follows that the distinction was not the work of any legislator or of any individual; it could not have been a law enacted by a lawgiver and enforced by the State under pains and penalties, for the simple reason that the Aryans, previous to their dispersion, were not organised into a State, and had no government to issue or execute laws. But before Law, Custom was, and "Kin and Custom go together and imply each other, as do Law and State. Law is the enactment of the State—Custom is the habit of the Kin. And as Custom precedes Law, so the State is preceded by kin or sib associations. The earliest form of the State is modelled on that of the sib associations out of which it is developed, and the first laws promulgated by the State are but the old customs committed to writing."[125]

In what pro-ethnic Aryan custom, then, are we to seek the origin of the clear and deep-cut line between the Near and the Remote Kin? The answer is furnished by what is known among the Slavonians as the house community, and to Anglo-Indian lawyers as "the joint undivided family." As it exists now in India, the joint undivided family consists, or may consist, of the sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons of a man (deceased), who, on the death of their common ancestor, do not separate, but continue to live on the undivided estate and worship their deceased ancestor as their house-spirit. The family, as defined by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,[126] is "joint in food, worship, and estate."

Now, the relatives whom the earliest Aryan codes, the laws of the Twelve Tables, the laws of Solon, of Menu, the Gortyn Code, &c., specify as a man's heirs-at-law are in every case precisely those relatives who belonged, or might at some time have belonged, to the same joint undivided family as the deceased. It is worth while to note that at different times a man might belong to four different joint undivided families: he might be born into a family which still united in worshipping the spirit of his great-grandfather: and thus his cousins, his first cousins once removed, and his second cousins once removed, would dwell in the same household with him. His grandfather might then die and become a house-spirit: in that event, his grand-uncle (and descendants) would have to set up a family of his own, for they only can belong to a joint undivided family who are descended from a common house-father. Now, my grand-uncle, being the brother of my grandfather, is not descended from my grandfather, therefore cannot worship his spirit, therefore cannot belong to the joint undivided family which worships my grandfather's spirit. On the other hand, the family, of which my (deceased) grandfather is the house-spirit, includes my grandfather's descendants to the third generation, _i.e._, includes not only my cousins, but also their sons. This (cousins' sons) is the limit of the second joint undivided family to which it is possible for a man to belong. Thirdly, when my father becomes a house-spirit, and is worshipped by his children's children, I dwell in the same household as my nephews and grand-nephews. Finally, when I am gathered to my fathers, I dwell, in the spirit, with my sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons.

Here we obviously have the key to the order of succession prescribed by the earliest Aryan codes: my own descendants (if any) are called first, because they constitute the joint undivided family, with which, at the time of dying, I am presumably dwelling. My father's descendants come next, because that was the family I had previously belonged to; and on the same principle my grandfather's descendants, and then those of my great-grandfather were called.

So long as the joint undivided family was a living institution, so long there was no need (as there was no thought) of specifying who a man's heirs were, and so long a man could be in no doubt as to who his Near Kin were—they were those who had been brought up in the same family as himself. It was only when this unwieldy form of family came to be disintegrated by the advance of civilisation that it became necessary to specify the order of succession, and to determine who were a man's Near Kin; and, as we have seen, the earliest laws on this subject are but the old customs reduced to writing.

Two facts of importance in the history of Aryan marriage have now been shown. The first, inferred from the _domum deductio_ and from the existence of marriage by capture and by purchase, is that amongst the undispersed Aryans a man customarily abstained from marrying a woman belonging to his own family group. The second is that the family groups in which the Aryans lived, if not originally, certainly for some time before their dispersion, were joint undivided families. The Aryan was averse to marrying women of his Near Kin; the difficult question now arises, whether he was equally averse to marrying into his Remote Kin? The "prohibited degrees" of historic times do not help us much in answering this question. The Athenians had lost the Aryan aversion to marriages within the near kin: they married their cousins, and even half-sisters. There is no evidence to show that the Romans ever abstained from marrying their Remote Kin. Rossbach maintains that the prohibition extended only to first cousins; Klenze, Walter, Burchardy, Göttling, and Gerlach make it go as far as the extreme limit of the Near Kin, _i.e._, to second cousins once removed—no writer on Roman law or marriage supports a wider prohibition; and the _jus osculi_[127] (which, by the way, was accorded by men to men as well as by women to men) extended only to the near kin. The Hindoos, again, were averse to marriage between any persons of the same name.

Does the Hindoo system come down from pro-ethnic times, or is it a development peculiar among Aryan nations to the Hindoos? Many savages have a much wider circle of prohibited degrees than civilised peoples possess, and amongst civilised peoples themselves the number of prohibited degrees has even in historic times diminished. We thus seem to get a sort of law of diminishing degrees, which would point to the Hindoo system as that which was known to the pro-ethnic Aryans. But though some savages have more prohibited degrees than civilised men have, other savages have few or none. The downward movement, therefore, from the maximum to the minimum number of prohibited degrees which is observable in historic times must have been preceded in pre-historic ages by an upward movement from the minimum to the maximum; and, as far as the evidence at present goes, though the upward movement may, in pro-ethnic times, have proceeded as far as the Remote Kin, it may equally well only have reached to the limits of the Near Kin; while, after the Aryan dispersion, the movement may have continued upwards amongst the Hindoos, downwards amongst the Athenians, and, for a long time, have ceased to move in any direction amongst the conservative Romans.

A more important point to notice is that, if we believe the Hindoo system to date from pro-ethnic times, we must also assume that the Hindoo system of naming is pro-ethnic, _i.e._, we must assume that each Aryan had two names, one distinguishing him personally from other people, the other indicating what kin he belonged to; and in this event, the Near and the Remote Kin must, in pro-ethnic times, have had a common name. There is, however, very little evidence to show that this was the case: gentile names are found among the Hindoos and the Romans alone of Aryan peoples. It is, of course, possible that, before the dispersion, the Aryans had gentile names, and that, after the dispersion, all the Aryans, with the exception of the Romans and the Hindoos, lost them entirely. On the other hand, if there was a time when gentile names had not yet been invented, if they have had a history and growth, we must consider it as at least possible that gentile names had not been evolved at the time of the dispersion, and were only developed subsequently by the Romans and Hindoos.

Whether the undispersed Aryans had gentile names, and at the same time an aversion to marriages between persons of the same name, is a question on which it were vain to pronounce confidently. We may more safely consider both these equally possible alternatives, together with the consequences which flow from each. Let us assume that marriage was, amongst the Aryans as amongst the Hindoos, prohibited between persons of the same gentile name: is there anything in the social organisation presupposed by this prohibition incompatible with the patriarchal system? According to Mr. D. M‘Lennan there is: not only are there "numerous societies of which the patriarchal theory does not even attempt to give any account," but "in the societies upon contemplation of which it was formed, a most serious difficulty for it is presented by the tribes, which consist of several clans, each clan considered separate in blood from all the others. The patriarchal theory, of course, involves that the clans are all of the same blood."[128] Mr. M‘Lennan's difficulty seems to be this: where inheritance (of family name, property, sacra, &c.) is confined to the male line, the descendants of a common ancestor must all have the same family or gentile name; persons having different names cannot be descended from the same ancestor—that is to say, different _gentes_ or clans cannot have a common origin. A tribe, therefore, which consists of several clans cannot consist of descendants of a common ancestor. Yet, these clans believe they have an ancestor, however remote, in common. If their belief is incorrect (if the _gentes_ have not a common origin), how did the error arise? If, on the other hand, the different _gentes_ of the same tribe have a common origin, how came they to have different names?

The source of this difficulty plainly is the assumption that the original ancestor of the tribe had a family name, which was inherited by all his descendants. It is impossible to disprove or to prove this assumption. We may, however, note that the Teutons (according to Dr. Taylor[129]) rejoiced in only one name a-piece. An Athenian added to his own name his father's. And—to set assumption against assumption—we may conjecture that as patronymics are formed from personal names, so gentile names were developed out of patronymics. At first, a man's sons bore nothing in their names to indicate from what father they were sprung. In course of time the sons of Anchises were known as Anchisiadæ; and as long as the family group consisted only of parents and children, this system of nomenclature would suffice. It might even continue into times when the family group included three generations: Iulus, as well as his father, Æneas, might be an Anchisiades. And here we may note that if all the members of a joint undivided family bore the surname Anchisiades, an aversion to marriage in the near kin would forbid the marriage of any two Anchisiadæ. When, however, owing to natural growth, the joint undivided family of Anchises becomes so large that it is necessary for his younger (married) sons to go out into the world and start joint undivided families of their own, leaving Æneas and his children in possession of the old home, it is obvious that persons who once had belonged to the same joint undivided family, and therefore had possessed the same family name, and had been prohibited to intermarry, would now belong to different families, and (being named after the respective house-fathers of the newly formed families) would have different patronymics, and would be allowed to marry persons whom previously they were forbidden to wed. In these circumstances an extension both of prohibited degrees and of the family name might very naturally be the ultimate result. Iulus, who for years had worshipped Anchises as house-spirit, and had consequently been an Anchisiades, might, when Æneas became his house-spirit, come to be known as an Ænæades, but on the other hand the old patronymic might stick to him and to his children for ever. In the same way, the aversion to marrying women who belonged to the same joint undivided family might cease when they ceased to belong to the same family, but it might continue. Hence a continual tendency to extend the family name, and to enlarge the number of prohibited degrees.

The transition from the system of naming by patronymics to that of gentile names would not be made in a day or in a generation, and during the transition the usage would fluctuate: the descendants of Æneas might choose to be known as Ænæadæ rather than as the sons of Anchises, while the children of Æneas' brothers might retain the name of Anchisiadæ, because their fathers were less distinguished than their grandfather. The period of this fluctuation in usage may be assumed to have been long enough to allow of the requisite diversity of gentile names, while the fact that the number of _gentes_ is always fixed, however far back they can be historically traced, shows that the fluctuation at last hardened into unyielding custom.