Part 46

V. About this time news was brought to Rome that Cæcina and Valens, acting as the lieutenants of Vitellius, had seized the passes of the Alps. The prætorians also conceived suspicions of the loyalty of Dolabella,[637] a man of patrician family. Whether Otho feared him or some one else is uncertain: however, he assured him of his friendship, and sent him to reside at the city of Aquinum. Otho now selected the officers who were to company him on his campaign. Amongst these was Lucius, the brother of Vitellius, whom he neither promoted nor removed from the rank in the army which he held. He also took especial care of the mother and wife of Vitellius, that they might not have any fear for their own safety. He entrusted the government of Rome to Flavius Sabinus, either because he wished to show his respect for Nero (for Sabinus had been appointed to this post by Nero, and had been deprived of it by Galba), or because by the promotion of Sabinus he declared his good will and confidence in Vespasianus. He himself remained at Brixellum, a city of Italy situated upon the river Padus, and sent on his forces under the command of Marius Celsus, Suetonius Paullinus, and of Gallus and Spurinna, who were all generals of renown, but who, on account of the want of discipline of their troops, were unable to conduct the campaign, according to the plans which they had arranged. Indeed the soldiers of the guard refused to obey any authority except that of the emperor himself, for he alone, they declared, had the right to command them. Nor were the enemy's troops altogether obedient and well-behaved, but the same causes rendered them also swaggering and untrustworthy. Yet they possessed experience of actual war, and were accustomed to fatigue; whereas Otho's troops were weak from their life of unwarlike leisure, for they spent most of their time in the theatres and at public shows, or else in their quarters, and affected such a degree of insolence that they refused to perform the necessary labours of a campaign, alleging that to do so was beneath their dignity, not that it was beyond their strength. Spurinna, when he endeavoured to force them to do their duty, came within a very little of losing his life. The soldiers insulted him grossly, and set no bounds to their language, calling him a traitor to Cæsar and the ruin of his cause. Some of them actually got drunk and went to Spurinna's tent at night to demand money for a journey; for they said they must go and impeach him before Cæsar.

VI. However, the cause of Otho, and Spurinna with it, received some advantage from the abusive language which these same soldiers met with at Placentia. Here the Vitellians who were besieging the city ridiculed Otho's men whom they saw on the battlements, calling them stay-at-home soldiers, sword-dancers, and spectators of games, declaring that they had never seen or tasted of real war, but were full of pride at having cut off the head of an unarmed old man, meaning Galba, though they dared not come out and fight like men. The soldiers were so furiously exasperated by these reproaches that they eagerly besought Spurinna to employ them in whatever service he pleased, assuring him that they would not shrink from any toils or dangers. When the enemy furiously assaulted the walls, and brought up many battering engines,[638] Spurinna's men won the victory, drove back their opponents with great slaughter, and saved from ruin one of the most famous and prosperous cities of Italy.

The generals of Otho were found both by cities and by individuals to be much less offensive to deal with than those of Vitellius. Among the latter was Cæcina, a man who neither spoke nor dressed like a citizen of Rome, but was harsh and overbearing, of great stature, wearing the Gaulish trousers and sleeves, and using signs[639] even when addressing Roman magistrates. He was accompanied by his wife[640] who rode with him in a showy dress, escorted by a picked body of cavalry.

The other general, Fabius Valens,[641] was so avaricious that neither the plunder which he took from the enemy, nor yet the thefts, which he committed or the bribes which he received from the allied states could satiate him; and he was even suspected of having been too late for the first battle of the war because he delayed his march to amass wealth for himself. Others blame Cæcina, because in his haste to win a victory before Valens came up, he, besides other blunders of less consequence, began a battle so unseasonably and conducted it so remissly that he very nearly brought the cause of Vitellius to ruin.

VII. After Cæcina's repulse at Placentia he proceeded to Cremona, another large and flourishing city. Meanwhile Annius Gallus, who was on his way to Placentia to reinforce Spurinna, hearing while on the march that the troops at Placentia had been victorious, but that Cremona was in danger, changed the direction of his march towards that place, and encamped close to the enemy. Here Cæcina concealed many foot-soldiers in rough and wooded ground ordering his cavalry to ride forward and, if they fell in with the enemy, to retire little by little so as to draw them into the ambuscade. This plan was betrayed to Celsus by deserters. Celsus attacked them with the best of his cavalry, pursued them with caution, taking care to avoid the ambuscade, and then surrounded the troops in ambush, and threw them into confusion. He now sent for his infantry from the camp: and it was thought that if they had come up promptly after the cavalry, the whole army of Cæcina might have been destroyed; but as it was, Paullinus brought them up slowly and too late, and tarnished his glory as a general by overcaution. The mass of the soldiers charged him with treason, and tried to exasperate Otho against him by boasting that they had won the victory, but that their success was not followed up owing to the cowardice of their generals. Otho, though he did not believe their accusations, yet feared to be thought to disbelieve them. He accordingly sent his brother Titianus to the army, and with him Julius Proculus[642], the prefect of the prætorians, who virtually had the supreme command, though Titianus was the nominal chief, while Celsus and Paullinus were given the titles of counsellors and friends, but were not allowed the least real power or authority.

The enemy also showed want of discipline, especially in the army of Valens. These men, when they heard of the ambuscade and the defeat to which it had led, were greatly enraged at not having been there in time to prevent so great a slaughter of their friends. Valens[643] was forced to beg for his life; for the soldiers were preparing to stone him. He pacified them with difficulty, and led them to join the forces of Cæcina.

VIII. When Otho arrived at the camp at Bedriacum,[644] which is a village near Cremona, he held a council of war. Proculus and Titianus were of opinion that, as the troops were full of confidence and flushed with victory, it would be best to fight a decisive battle at once, and not blunt their spirit by delay, which would also bring Vitellius down upon them from Gaul. On the other hand Paullinus argued that the enemy had already collected their entire available force, whereas Otho might expect another army as large as his present one to join him from Moesia and Pannonia, if he would only wait until it suited him to fight, and not play into the hands of the enemy by engaging prematurely. The troops, he said, after being so largely reinforced, would be no less confident than at present, when they are but few; indeed, they would fight with a great superiority of numbers. Besides this, delay would be all in their favour, as they had abundance of supplies, while the opponents, who were in an enemy's country, would soon be reduced to great straits by the want of provisions. Marius Celsus agreed with the views of Paullinus. Annius Gallus was not present at the council, having been disabled by a fall from his horse: but when Otho wrote a letter to him, asking his opinion, he advised the emperor not to be hasty, but to await the arrival of the legions which were already on their way from Moesia. However Otho was not convinced by these arguments, but agreed with those who urged him to fight at once.

IX. Many other reasons for this decision are given by various writers, and it is evident that the prætorians, or bodyguard of the emperor, who now for the first time had experience of actual warfare, were eager to return to their old haunts at Rome, and the unwarlike pleasures of the theatre and the circus, and that their eagerness for battle could not be restrained, as they imagined that they would overthrow their antagonists at the first onset. It seems, too, that Otho himself could no longer endure the uncertainty of his position, for his ignorance of war and his life of enervating luxury had unfitted him for a calm calculation of his chances of success, and, worn out as he was with anxiety, he longed to let the matter be settled whichever way chance might determine, like a man who covers his face through dizziness at looking over a precipice. This is the account which is given by the orator Secundus, who acted as private secretary to Otho. Other[645] authorities relate that many efforts were made by the soldiers of both armies to combine, and agree to elect an emperor from among their own officers: or, if this proved impossible, to place the election in the hands of the senate. It seems indeed rightly probable, considering the ill-repute of both claimants of the throne, that the more sedate and thoughtful of the soldiers should have reflected that it would be a horrible and shameful thing that the Romans should be made to suffer for a second time all the miseries which they had once endured in the civil wars of Sulla and of Marius and of Cæsar and Pompeius, merely in order to provide an empire to bear the charges of the gluttony and drunkenness of Vitellius, or of the luxury and profligacy of Otho. It is suspected that Marius Celsus, knowing that this feeling was gaining ground, endeavoured to gain time, hoping that the whole matter might be decided without fighting; and that Otho, fearing this, hurried on an engagement.

X. After the council Otho again retired to Brixellum. This was a mistake, not only because the army would have fought with greater zeal and discipline when under the eye of the emperor, but because by taking away the best and most loyal troops, both of cavalry and infantry, to act as his bodyguard, he made his army like a spear which has lost its steel point. At this time a battle took place on the bank of the Padus, across which Cæcina endeavoured to throw a bridge, while the Othonians tried to prevent him from doing so. As they did not succeed in this, they threw lighted sulphur and pitch into the boats which formed the bridge, and a wind suddenly springing up carried the fire across the stream towards the enemy. At first volumes of smoke, and then a mass of flames burst out, so that the enemy were thrown into confusion and forced to leap from the bridge into the river, upsetting the boats and exposing themselves to the missiles and the ridicule of the enemy. However, the Germans were victorious in a fight with Otho's corps of gladiators for the possession of an island in the river, and slew many of them.

XI. As, after this, the soldiers in Otho's camp at Bedriacum were frantically eager for battle, Proculus led them forward about six miles from that place and encamped in such an ignorant and ridiculous fashion that the men suffered from want of water, although it was spring time, and all the surrounding country was full of springs and perennial streams. On the next day he wished to lead them at least twelve miles nearer the enemy, but Suetonius Paullinus would not allow him to do so, thinking that the soldiers ought to have some rest, and not first be fatigued with a long march, and then while they were confusedly mixed up with baggage animals and camp-followers, be brought to fight against an enemy who could quietly and deliberately place themselves in order of battle. While the generals were at variance, one of the horsemen called Numidians rode up bearing a letter from Otho, in which he ordered them not to waste any time, but to march against the enemy at once. On receiving this they started. Cæcina, hearing of their march, was much disquieted, abandoned his operations by the river, and proceeded to the camp. Here after Valens had got the men under arms, and had given them the watchword, he sent forward the best of the cavalry while the legions were taking up their respective positions in the line of battle.

XII. For some reason or other the men of Otho's vanguard conceived an idea that the generals of Vitellius intended to desert to their side: and so, when they came near to one another, they saluted the Vitellians and addressed them as friends and comrades. As the Vitellians made an angry and fierce response, the Othonians were discouraged, while their opponents imagined that they intended to desert. This incident at the first onset caused some confusion among the troops of Otho: and, besides this, everything was in disorder, for the baggage train was entangled among the ranks, and the line was broken in many places by the ditches and trenches with which the ground was intersected, so that the soldiers, in trying to avoid these obstacles, were forced to attack in detail, and in disorganised crowds. Two[646] legions alone, that named "Rapax" on the side of Vitellius, and "Adjutrix" on that of Otho, were able to find a level plain, upon which they deployed into a regular line of battle and fought front to front for a long time. Otho's soldiers were active and brave, but had never been in action before, while those of Vitellius had fought many battles, but were somewhat elderly and past their prime. At the first charge the Othonians drove them back, and captured their eagle, killing almost every man in the front rank; but the Vitellians, filled with shame and rage, charged in their turn, slew Orfidius, the legate in command of the legion, and took many standards. The corps of gladiators, who were supposed to possess both courage and practice in close combat, were attacked by Alphenus Varus with the Batavians, who inhabit an island formed by the river Rhine, and who are the best horsemen in Germany. Few of the gladiators stood to receive their charge, but most of them fled towards the river, where they fell in with other bodies of the enemy, by whom they were entirely cut to pieces. The worst fight of all was made by the Prætorians, who did not even wait until the enemy reached them, but by their panic flight struck terror even into the unbroken troops through whose ranks they fled. Yet many of Otho's troops, after having conquered their immediate opponents, forced their way back through their victorious enemies to their own camp.

XIII. Of the generals, neither Proculus nor Paullinus dared to return with their men, but went off another way, fearing the soldiers, who already began to throw the blame of their defeat upon the generals. Annius Gallus assumed the command of the soldiers as they assembled in the town of Bedriacum, and encouraged them by assurances that the battle had been a drawn one, and that in many cases they had beaten the enemy. Marius Celsus called a meeting of the generals, and bade them take measures for the common good. He said that after so great a disaster and so much slaughter of their countrymen not even Otho himself, if he were a right-thinking man, would wish to make any further trial of fortune; since even Cato and Scipio, although they fought in defence of the liberty of Rome, were blamed for having wasted the lives of many brave men in Africa, by not yielding to Cæsar immediately after the battle of Pharsalia. All men, he urged, are equally liable to the caprices of fortune; but they have the advantage, even when defeated, of being able to form wise resolutions. By this reasoning Celsus convinced the generals: and when, on trying the temper of the soldiers, they found them desirous of peace, and Titianus himself bade them begin negotiations for agreement, Celsus and Gallus determined to go and discuss the matter with Cæcina and Valens. On their way they were met by some centurions, who informed them that Vitellius's army was already advancing, and that they had been sent on before by their generals to arrange terms of peace. Celsus spoke with approval of their mission, and bade them return and conduct him to Cæcina. It happened that when they drew near the army, Celsus was like to have lost his life: for the cavalry who formed the advance guard were the same who had been defeated in the ambuscade, and when they saw Celsus approaching, they set up a shout of rage and rode towards him. However the centurions stood before Celsus and kept them back; and as the other officers called to them to spare him Cæcina perceived that some disturbance was taking place and rode up. He quickly repressed the disorderly movement of the cavalry, greeted Celsus affectionately, and proceeded with him to Bedriacum. Meanwhile Titianus had repented of having sent the embassy. He manned the walls of the camp with those soldiers who had recovered their spirits, and was encouraging the rest to fight. However, when Cæcina rode up and held out his hand no one resisted him, but some of the soldiers greeted his troops from the walls, and others opened the gates, came out and mingled with the new-comers. No violence was done to any one, but they all fraternised and shook each other by the hand, swore fealty to Vitellius and joined his army.

XIV. The above is the account which most eye-witnesses give of the battle, though they themselves admit that they do not know all the details of it because of the confusion which prevailed and the irregularity of the ground. Some time afterwards when I was journeying across the battlefield, Mestrius Florus, a man of consular rank, who had fought under Otho not from choice but from necessity, showed me an ancient temple, and related that after the battle he came there and saw so huge a pile of corpses, that those on the top were level with the pinnacles of the roof. He said that he could not discover himself or learn from any one else the cause of this heap; for though a greater slaughter of the vanquished is made in civil wars than in any others, because no quarter is given, as no use can be made of prisoners, yet it was hard to imagine how such a mass of carcasses came to be piled together on that spot.

XV. Otho, as is usual in such cases, first heard only confused rumours of how the battle went. When however wounded men came from the scene of action bringing the news of the defeat, not only his friends, as might be expected, bade him keep up his spirits and not despair, but his soldiers were wonderfully affected. None of them left him, or deserted to the enemy, and no one consulted his own safety when his chief despaired of his. All of them alike repaired to his quarters, and called him their emperor. When he came out to them, they fell at his feet and caught hold of his hands with shouts, and prayers, and tears, beseeching him not to desert them, or betray them to the enemy, but to make use of them to fight for him, body and soul, until their last breath. While all besought him thus, one of the common soldiers drew his sword, and crying, "Cæsar, this is what we are all prepared to do for you," stabbed himself. Otho, unmoved by any of these entreaties, gazed round upon them all with a calm and composed countenance, and said: "My comrades, your noble conduct and your loyal devotion make this a happier day to me than that on which you elected me your emperor. Yet do not deprive me of the still greater happiness of dying for so many and such noble friends. If I am worthy to be an emperor of Rome, I ought not to grudge my life to my country. I am aware that our enemy's victory is not decisive or crushing. News has reached me that the Moesian legions have already reached the Adriatic, and are not many days' march distant. Asia, Syria, Egypt, and the army engaged with the Jews are all on our side, while we have in our power both the senate, and the wives and children of our enemy. But we are not defending Italy from Hannibal, or Pyrrhus, or the Cimbri, but Romans are fighting against Romans, and our native land will suffer equally whichever side is victorious, for she must lose what the conqueror gains. Believe me, I pray you, that it is more to my honour to die than to reign: for I cannot imagine that if victorious I could do anything which would benefit the Romans so much as I can by giving my life to obtain peace and concord, and to save Italy from seeing another day such as this."

XVI. After speaking thus, he tore himself away from the soldiers, who tried to hold him back and bade him take courage. He ordered his friends and such senators as were present to leave his camp: and to those who were not present he sent similar orders, and also rescripts to the magistrates of the cities through which they would have to pass, that they might accomplish their journey[647] with honour and in safety. He next sent for his nephew Cocceius, who was still a youth, and bade him be of good cheer and not fear Vitellius, whose mother, children, and wife he himself had protected as carefully as if they had been members of his own family. He had wished, he said, to adopt the boy as his heir, but had put off doing so till the end of the war, meaning to make him his colleague if he succeeded, but not wishing to involve him in his own destruction if he failed. "My last charge to you," he continued, "is that you neither forget altogether nor yet remember too well that you have had a Cæsar for your uncle." Shortly after this interview Otho heard a shouting and disturbance outside his quarters; for the senators were preparing to depart, and the soldiers were threatening to murder them if they did so, and reproached them with deserting their emperor. Otho, who feared for their lives, now came out a second time, no longer in a mild and supplicatory manner, but, frowning savagely, he cast so terrible a look upon the most turbulent of the rioters that they shrank away terrified and abashed.