c. Stoic, is the chief subject of the section, namely the affectibility

of matter. Also, the allegoric interpretation of the myths, of the ithyphallic Hermes, and the Universal Mother, which are like the other Plotinic myths, of the double Hercules, Poros, Penia, and Koros. We find[422] the Stoic idea of passibility and impassibility, although not exactly that of passion and action. We find[423] connected the terms "nous" and "phronêsis," also "anastasis." The term hypostasis, though used undogmatically, as mere explanation of thought, is found.[424] Frequent[425] are the conceptual logoi of the divine Mind (the seminal logoi) which enter into matter to clothe themselves with it, to produce objects. We also have the Stoic category "heterotês,"[426] and the application of sex as explanation of the differences of the world.[427]

d. Aristotelian, are the "energeia" and "dunamis."[428]

e. Plotinic, are the latter ideas, for they are used in the same connection.[429] Also the myths of Poros, Penia and Koros, which are found elsewhere in similar relations.[430]

On the whole, therefore, the Plotinic authorship is much more strongly indicated than the Numenian.

The next treatment of matter in the Fourth Ennead, is semi-stoical.[431] The opposite aspects of the Universe appear again as "phronesis" and "phusis." We find here the Stoic doing and suffering, and[432] hypostasis. Nevertheless, the chief process illustrated is still the Platonic image reproduced less and less clearly in successively more degraded spheres of being. Plotinos seems to put himself out of the Numenian sphere of thought, referring to it in abstract historical manner, as belonging to the successors of Pythagoras and Pherecydes, who treated of matter as the element that distinguished objects in the intelligible world.

The last treatment of matter[433] seems to have reached the extreme distance of Numenianism. Instead of a dualism, with matter an original, positive principle, Plotinos closes his discussion by stating that perhaps form and matter may not come from the same origin, as there is some difference between them. He has just said that Being is common to both form and matter, as to quality, though not as to quantity. A little above this he insists that matter is not something original, as it is later than many earthly, and than all intelligible objects. As to the Numenian double name of the Divinity, Being and Essence, he had taken from Aristotelianism the conceptions of "energeia" and "dunamis," and added them as the supreme hypostasis, so as to form in theological dialect the triad he, following Numenius and Plato, had always asserted cosmologically (good, intellect, and soul): "The developed energy[434] assumes hypostasis, as if from a great, nay, as from the greatest hypostasis of all; and so it joins Essence and Being."

Reviewing these various treatments of matter we might call the first[435] Numenian; the next[436] Platonic (as most independent, and historically treated); the next[437] as Aristotelian; the Escorial Section as semi-Stoic;[438] as also another short notice.[439] The last treatment of matter, in vi. 3.7, is fully Stoic, in its denial of the evil of matter.

How then shall we explain these differences? Chiefly by studying the periods in which they are written, and which they therefore explain.

* * * * *

When we try to study the periods in Plotinos's thought, as shown in his books, we are met with great difficulties, which are chiefly due to Porphyry. Exactly following the contemporary methods of the compilers of the Bible, he undiscerningly confused the writings of the various periods, so as to make up an anthology, grouped by six groups of nine books each, according to subjects, consisting first of ethical disquisitions; second, of physical questions; third, of cosmic considerations; fourth, of psychological discussions; fifth, of transcendental lucubrations; and sixth, of metaphysics and theology.[440] As the reader might guess from the oversymmetrical grouping, and this pretty classification, the apparent order is only illusory, as he may have concluded from the fact that the discussions of matter analyzed above are scattered throughout the whole range of this anthology. The result of this Procrustean arrangement was the same as with the Bible: a confusion of mosaic, out of which pretty nearly anything could be proved, and into which almost everything has been read. Compare the outlines of the doctrines of Plotinos by Ritter, Zeller, Ueberweg, Chaignet, Mead, Guthrie, and Drews, and it will be seen that there is very little agreement between them, while none of them allow for the difference between the various parts of the Enneads.

How fearful the confusion is, will best be realized from the following two tables, made up from the indications given in Porphyry's Life of Plotinos.

Porphyry gives three lists of the works of the various periods. Identifying these in the present Ennead arrangement, they are to be found as follows:

The works of the Amelian period are now i. 6; iv. 7; iii. 1; iv. 2; v. 9; iv. 8; iv. 4; iv. 9; vi. 9; v. 1; v. 2; ii. 4; iii. 9; ii. 2; iii. 4; i. 9; ii. 6; v. 7; i. 2; i. 3; i. 8.

The works of the Porphyrian period are now vi. 5, 6; v. 6; ii. 5; iii. 6; iv. 3-5; iii. 8; v. 8; v. 5; ii. 9; vi. 6; ii. 8; i. 5; ii. 7; vi. 7; vi. 8; ii. 1; iv. 6; vi. 1-3; iii. 7.

The works of the latest or Eustochian period are: i. 4; iii. 2, 3; v. 3; iii. 5; i. 8; ii. 3; i. 1; i. 7. (For Eustochius, see Scholion to Enn. iv. 4.29, ii. 7.86, Creuz. 1, 301 Kirchhof.)

A more convenient table will be the converse arrangement. Following the present normal order of the books in Enneads, we will describe its period by a letter, referring to the Amelian period by A, to the Porphyrian by P, and the Eustochian by E. I: EAAEPAEAA. II: PAEAPAPPP. III: AEEAEAPPA. IV: AAPPPPAAA. V: AAEAPPAPA. VI: PPPPPPPPA.

This artificial arrangement into Enneads should therefore be abandoned, and in a new English translation that the writer has in mind, the books would appear in the order of their periods, while an index would allow easy reference by the old numbers. Then only will we be able to study the successive changes of Plotinos's thought, in their normal mutual relation; and it is not difficult to prophesy that important results would follow.

* * * * *

Having thus achieved internal proof of development of doctrines in Plotinos, by examination of his views about Matter, we may with some confidence state that the externally known facts of the life of no philosopher lend themselves to such a progress of opinions more readily than that of Plotinos. His biographer, Porphyry, as we have seen, had already given us a list of the works of three easily characterized periods in Plotinos's life: the period before Porphyry came to him, the period while Porphyry staid with him, and the later period when Plotinos was alone, and Porphyry was in retirement (or banishment?) in Sicily.

An external division into periods is therefore openly acknowledged; but it remains for us to recall its significance.

In the first place, the reader will ask himself, how does it come about that Plotinos is so dependent on Porphyry, and before him, on Amelius? The answer is that Plotinos himself was evidently somewhat deficient in the details of elementary education, however much proficiency in more general philosophical studies, and in independent thought, and personal magnetic touch with pupils he may have achieved. His pronunciation was defective, and in writing he was careless, so much so that he usually failed to affix proper headings or notice of definite authorship.[441] These peculiarities would to some extent put him in the power, and under the influence of his editors, and this explains why he was dependent on Porphyry later, and Amelius earlier.[442] These editors might easily have exerted potent, even if unconscious or merely suggestive influence; but we know that Porphyry did not scruple to add glosses of his own,[443] not to speak of hidden Stoic and Aristotelian pieces,[444] for he relied on Aristotle's "Metaphysics." Besides, Plotinos was so generally accused of pluming himself on writings of Numenius, falsely passed off as his own, that it became necessary for Amelius to write a book on the differences between Numenius and Plotinos, and for Porphyry to defend his master, as well as to quote a letter of Longinus on the subject;[445] but Porphyry does not deny that among the writings of the Platonists Kronius, Caius, and Attikus, and the Peripatetics Aspasius, Alexander and Adrastus, the writings of Numenius also were used as texts in the school of Plotinos (14).

Having thus shown the influence of the editors of Plotinos, we must examine who and what they were. Let us however first study the general trend of the Plotinic career.

His last period was Stoic practise, for so zealously did he practise austerities that his death was, at least, hastened thereby.[446] It is unlikely that he would have followed Stoic precepts without some sympathy for, or acquaintance with their philosophical doctrines; and as we saw above, Porphyry acknowledges Plotinos's writings contain hidden Stoic pieces.[447] Then, Plotinos spent the last period of his life in Rome, where ruled, in philosophical circles, the traditions of Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius.

That these Stoic practices became fatal to him is significant when we remember that this occurred during the final absence of Porphyry, who may, during his presence, have exerted a friendly restraint on the zealous master. At any rate, it was during Porphyry's regime that the chief works of Plotinos were written, including a bitter diatribe against the Gnostics, who remained the chief protagonists of dualism and belief in positive evil. Prophyry's work, "De Abstinentia," proves clearly enough his Stoic sympathies.

Such aggressive enmity is too positive to be accounted for by the mere removal to Rome from Alexandria, and suggests a break of some sort with former friends. Indications of such a break do exist, namely, the permanent departure to his earlier home, Apamea, of his former editor, Amelius. We hear[448] of an incident in which Amelius invited Plotinos to come and take part in the New Moon celebrations[449] of the mysteries. Plotinos, however, refused, on the grounds that "They must come to me, not I go to them." Then we hear[450] of bad blood between this Amelius and Porphyry, a long, bitter controversy, patched up, indeed, but which cannot have failed to leave its mark. Then this Amelius writes a book on the Differences between Plotinos and Numenius, which, in a long letter, he inscribes to Porphyry,[451] as if the latter were the chief one interested in these distinctions. Later, Amelius, who before this seems to have been the chief disciple and editor of Plotinos, departs, never to return, his place being taken by Porphyry. It is not necessary to possess a vivid imagination to read between the lines, especially when Plotinos, in the last work of this period, against the Gnostics, section 10, seems to refer to friends of his who still held to other doctrines.

Now in order to understand the nature of the period when Amelius was the chief disciple of Plotinos, we must recall who Amelius was. In the first place, he hailed from the home-town of Numenius, Apamea in Syria. He had adopted as son Hostilianus-Hesychius, who also hailed from Apamea. And it was to Apamea that Amelius withdrew, after he left Plotinos. We are therefore not surprised to learn that he had written out almost all the books of Numenius, that he had gathered them together, and learned most of them by heart.[452] Then we learn from Proclus (see Zeller's account) that Amelius taught the trine division of the divine creator, exactly as did Numenius. Is it any wonder, then, that he wrote a book on the differences between Plotinos and Numenius at a later date, when Porphyry had started a polemic with him? During his period as disciple of Plotinos, twenty-four years in duration, Plotinos would naturally have been under Numenian influence of some kind, and we cannot be very far wrong in thinking that this change of editors must have left some sort of impress on the dreamy thinker, Plotinos, ever seeking to experience an ecstasy.

* * * * *

In this account of the matter we have restrained ourselves from mentioning one of the strangest coincidences in literature, which would have emphasized the nature of the break of Amelius with Plotinos, for the reason that it may be no more than a chance pun; but that even as such it must have been present to the actors in that drama, there is no doubt. We read above that Amelius invited Plotinos to accompany him to attend personally the mystery-celebrations at the "noumênia," a time sacred to such celebrations.[453] But this was practically the name of Numenius, and the text might well have been translated that Amelius invited him to visit the celebrations as Numenius would have done; and indeed, from all we know of Numenius, with his initiation at Eleusis and in Egypt, that is just of what we might have supposed he would have approved. In other words, we would discover Amelius in the painful act of choice between the two great influences of his life, Numenius, and Plotinos. Moreover, that the incident was important is revealed by Porphyry's calling Plotinos's answer a "great word," which was much commented on, and long remembered.

* * * * *

In thus dividing the career of Plotinos in the Amelian, the Porphyrian, and Eustochian (98) we meet however one very interesting difficulty. The Plotinic writings by Porphyry assigned to the last or Eustochian period are those which internal criticism would lead us to assign to his very earliest philosophising; and in our study of the development of the Plotinic views about Matter, we have taken the liberty of considering them as the earliest. We are however consoled in our regret at having to be so radical, by noticing that Porphyry, to whom we are indebted for our knowledge of the periods of the works, has done the same thing. He says that he has assigned the earliest place in each Ennead to the easier and simpler discussions;[454] yet these latest-issued works of Plotinos are assigned to the very beginning of each Ennead, four going to the First Ennead, one to the Second, three to the Third, and one only to the Fifth. If these had been the crowning works of the Master's life, especially the treatise on the First God and Happiness, it would have been by him placed at the very end of all, and not at the beginning. Porphyry must therefore have possessed some external knowledge which would agree with the conclusions of our internal criticism, which follows.

These Eustochian works make the least use of Stoic, or even Aristotelian terms, most closely following even the actual words of Numenius. For instance, we may glance at the very first book of the First Ennead, which though of the latest period, is thoroughly Numenian.

The first important point is the First Divinity "hovering over" Being,[455] using the same word as Numenius.[456] This was suggested by Prof. Thedinga. However, he applied the words "he says" to Numenius; but this cannot be the case, as a Platonic quotation immediately.

The whole subject of the Book is the composite soul, and this is thoroughly Numenian.[457]

Then we have the giving without return.[458]

Then we find the pilot-simile as illustration for the relation of soul to body,[459] although in Numenius it appears of the Logos and the world.

We find the animal divided in two souls, the irrational and the rational,[460] which reminds us of Numenius's division into two souls.[461]

The soul consists of a peculiar kind of motion, which however is entirely different from that of other bodies, which is its own life.[462] This reminds us of Numenius's still-standing of the Supreme, which however is simultaneously innate motion.[463]

Referring to the problem, discussed elsewhere, that these Plotinic works of the latest or Eustochian period, are the most Numenian, which we would be most likely to attribute to his early or formative stage, rather than to the last or perfected period, it is interesting to notice that these works seem to imply other works of the Amelian or Porphyrian periods, by the words,[464] "It has been said," or treated of, referring evidently to several passages.[465] Still this need not necessarily refer to this later work, it may even refer to Plato, or even to Numenius's allegory of the Cave of the Nymphs,[470] where the descent of the souls is most definitely studied. Or it might even refer to Num. 35a, where birth or genesis is referred to as the wetting of the souls in the matter of bodies.

Moreover, they contain an acknowledgment, and a study of positive evil, something which would be very unlikely after his elaborate explaining away of evil in his treatise against the Gnostics, of the Porphyrian period, and his last treatment of Matter, where he is even willing to grant the possibility of matter possessing Being. The natural process for any thinker must ever be to begin with comparative imitation of his master, and then to progress to independent treatment of the subject. But for the process to be reversed is hardly likely.

Moreover, when we examine these Eustochian works in detail, they hardly seem to be such as would be the expressions of the last years of an ecstatic, suffering intense agony at times, his interest already directed heavenwards. The discussion of astrology must date from the earliest association with Gnostics, in Alexandria, who also might have inspired or demanded a special treatment of the nature of evil, which later he consistently denied. Then there is an amateurish treatment of anthropology in general, which the cumulatively-arranging Porphyry puts at the very beginning of the First Book. The treatise on the First Good and Happiness, is not unlike a beginner's first attempt at writing out his body of divinity, as George Herbert said, and Porphyry also puts it at the beginning. The Eros-article is only an amplification of Platonic myths, indeed making subtler distinctions, still not rising to the heights of pure, subjective speculation.

These general considerations may be supplemented by a few more definite indications. It is in the Eros-article that we find the Platonic myth of Poros and Penia. Yet these reappear in the earliest Amelian treatment of matter (ii. 4), as a sort of echo, mentioned only by the way, as if they had been earlier thoroughly threshed out. Here also we find only a stray, incidental use of the term "hypostasis," whereas the Stoic language in other Amelian and Porphyrian treatises has already been pointed out.

We are therefore driven to the following, very human and natural conclusion. Plotinos's first attempts at philosophical writing had consisted of chiefly Numenian disquisitions, which would be natural in Alexandria, where Numenius had probably resided, and had left friends and successors among the Gnostics. When Plotinos went to Rome, he took these writings with him, but was too absorbed in new original Amelian treatises to resurrect his youthful Numenian attempts, which he probably did not value highly, as being the least original, and because they taught doctrines he had left behind in his Aristotelian and Stoic progress. He laid them aside. Only when Porphyry had left him, and he felt the increasing feebleness due to old age and Stoic austerities, did his attendant Eustochius urge him to preserve these early works. Plotinos was willing, and sent them to Sicily where Porphyry had retired. And so it happened with Plotinos, as it has happened with many another writer, that the last things became first, and the first became last.

* * * * *

The idea of classifying the works of Plotinos chronologically, therefore, has so much external proof, as well as internal indications, to support it, that, no doubt, in the future no reference will be made to Plotinos without specifying to which period it refers; and we may expect that future editions of his works will undo the grievous confusion introduced by Porphyry, and thus render Plotinos's works comparatively accessible to rational study.

There are besides many other minor proofs of the chronological order of the writings of Plotinos, most of which are noticed at the heading of each succeeding book; but the most startling human references are those to Amelius's departure as a false friend;[466] to Porphyry's desire to suicide at his departure,[467] and to his own impending dissolution,[468] each of these occurring at the exact time of the event chronologically, but certainly not according to the traditional order.

II. PLATONISM: SIGNIFICANCE, PROGRESS AND RESULTS.

Of all fetishes which have misled humanity, perhaps none is responsible for more error than that of originality. As if anything could be new that was true, or true that was new! The only possible lines along which novelty or progress can lie are our reports, combinations, and expressions. Some people think they have done for a poet if they have shown that he made use of suitable materials in the construction of his poem! So Shakespeare has been shown to have used whole scenes from earlier writers. So Virgil, by Macrobius, has been shown to have laid under contribution every writer then known to be worth ransacking. Dante has also been shown to have re-edited contemporary apocalypses. So Homer, even, has been shown to re-tell stories gathered from many sources. The result is that people generally consider Shakespeare, Virgil, or Homer great in spite of their borrowings, when, on the contrary, the statement should be that they were great because of their rootage in the best of their period. In other words, they are great not because of their own personality (which in many cases has dropped out of the ken of history), but because they more faithfully, completely, and harmoniously represent their periods than other now forgotten writers. Therein alone lay their cosmic value, and their assurance of immortality. They are the voices of their ages, and we are interested in the significance of their age, not in them personally.

It is from this standpoint that we must approach Plato. Of his personality what details are known are of no soteriologic significance; and the reason why the world has not been able to get away from him, and probably never will, is that he sums up prior Greek philosophy in as coherent a form as is possible without doing too great Procrustean violence to the elements in question. This means that Plato did not fuse them all into one absolutely, rigid, coherent, consistent system, in which case his utility would have been very much curtailed. The very form of his writings, the dialogue, left each element in the natural living condition to survive on its merits, not as an authoritative oracle, or Platonic pronunciamento, or creed.

For details, the reader is referred to Zeller's fuller account of these pre-Platonic elements.[471] But we may summarize as follows: the physical elements to which the Hylicists had in turn attributed finality Plato united into Pythagorean matter, which remained as an element of Dualism. The world of nature became the becoming of Heraclitus. Above that he placed the Being of Parmenides, in which the concepts of Socrates found place as ideas. These he identified with the numbers and harmonies of Pythagoras, and united them in an Eleatic unity of many, as an intelligible world, or reason, which he owed to Anaxagoras. The chief idea, that of the Good, was Megaro-Socratic. His cosmology was that of Timaeus. His psychology was based on Anaxagoras, as mind; on Pythagoras, as immortal. His ethics are Socratic, his politics are Pythagorean. Who therefore would flout Plato, has all earlier Greek philosophy to combat; and whoever recognizes the achievements of the Hellenic mind will find something to praise in Plato. When, therefore, we are studying Platonism, we are only studying a blending of the rays of Greece, and we are chiefly interested in Greece as one of the latest, clearest, and most kindred expressions of human thought.

If however we should seek some one special Platonic element, it would be that genuineness of reflection, that sincerity of thought, that makes of his dialogues no cut and dried literary figments, but soul-tragedies, with living, breathing, interest and emotion. Plato thus practised his doctrine of the double self,[472] the higher and the lower selves, of which the higher might be described as "superior to oneself." In his later period, that of the Laws, he applied this double psychology to cosmology, thereby producing doubleness in the world-Soul: besides the good one, appears the evil one, which introduces even into heaven things that are not good.

It was only a step from this to the logical deduction of Xenocrates that these things in heaven were "spirits" or "guardians," both good and evil, assisting in the administration of human affairs.[473] Such is the result of doubleness introduced into anthropology; introduced into cosmology, it establishes Pythagorean indefinite duality as the principle opposing the unity of goodness.

The next step was taken by Plutarch. The evil demons, had, in Stoic phraseology, been called "physical;" and so, in regard to matter, they came to stand in the relation of soul to body. Original matter, therefore, became two-fold; matter itself, and its moving principle, "the soul of matter." This was identified with the worse World-soul by a development, or historical event, which was the ordering of the cosmos, or, creation.

This then was the state of affairs at the advent of Numenius. Although his chief interest lay in practical comparative religion, he tried, philosophically, to return to a mythical "original" Platonism or Pythagoreanism. What Plato did for earlier Greek speculation, Numenius did for post-Platonic development. He harked back to the latter Platonic stage, which taught the evil world-Soul. He included the achievements of Plutarch, the "soul of matter," and the trine division of a separate principle, such as Providence. To the achievement of Xenocrates he was drawn by two powerful interests, the Egyptian, Hermetic, Serapistic, in connection with the evil demons; and the Pythagorean, in connection with the Indefinite-duality. Thus Numenius's History of the Platonic Succession is not a delusion; Numenius really did sum up the positive Platonic progress, not omitting even Maximus of Tyre's philosophical hierarchic explanation of the emanative or participative streaming forth of the Divine. But Numenius was not merely a philosopher: of this gathering of Platonic achievements he made a religion. In this he was also following the footsteps of Pythagoras, who limited his doctrines to a group of students. But Numenius did not merely copy Pythagoras. Numenius modernized him, connecting up the Platonic doctrinal aggregate with the mystery-rites current in his own day. Nor did Numenius shirk any unpleasant responsibilities of a restorer of Platonism: he continued the traditional Academico-Stoical feud. Strange to say, the last great Stoic philosopher, Posidonius (A.D. 135-151) hailed from Numenius's home-town, Apamea, so that this Stoic feud may have been forced on Numenius from home personalities or conditions. It would seem that in Numenius and Posidonius we have a re-enactment of the tragedy of Greek philosophy on a Syrian theatre, where dogmatic Stoicism died, and Platonism admitted Oriental ideas.

Apamea, however, had not yet ended its role in the development of thought. Numenius's pupil, Amelius, had gathered, copied, and learned by heart his master's works. It was in Apamea that he adopted as son Hostilianius-Hesychius. After a twenty-four years' sojourn in Rome he returned to Apamea, and was dwelling there still at the time of the death of Plotinos, with whom he had spent that quarter of a century. Here then we have a historical basis for a connection between Numenius and Plotinos, which we have elsewhere endeavored to demonstrate from inner grounds.

It was however by Amelius that philosophy is drawn into the maelstrom of the world-city. Plotinos, in his early periods a Numenian Platonist, will later go over to Stoicism, and conduct a polemic with the Gnostics, the Alexandrian heirs of Platonic dualism, under the influence of the Stoic Porphyry. However, Plotinos will not publicly abandon Platonism; he will fuse the two streams of thought, and interpret in Stoic terms the fundamentals of Platonism, producing something which, when translated into Latin, he will leave as inheritance to all the ages. Not in vain, therefore, did Amelius transport the torch of philosophy to the Capital.

* * * * *

Let us in a few words dispose of the general outlines of the fate of the Platonic movement.

Plotinos was no religious leader; he was before everything else a philosopher, even if he centred his efforts on the practical aspects of the ecstatic union with God. Indeed, Porphyry relates to us the incident in which this matter was objectively exemplified. At the New Moon, Amelius invited him to join in a visit to the mystery celebrations. Plotinos refused, saying that "they would have to come to him, not he go over to them." This then is the chief difference between Numenius and Plotinos, and the result would be a recrudescence of pure philosophic contentions, as those of Plotinos against the Gnostics.

As to the general significance of Plotinos, we must here resume what we have elsewhere detailed: that with the change of editors, from Amelius to Porphyry, Plotinos changed from Numenian or Pythagorean dualism to Stoic monism, in which the philosophic feud was no longer with the Stoics, but with the Alexandrian descendants of Numenian dualism, the Gnostics. Even though Plotinos showed practical religious aspects in his studying and experiencing the ecstasy, there is no record of any of his pupils being encouraged to do so, and therefore Plotinos remains chiefly a philosopher.

The successors of Plotinos could not remain on this purely philosophic standpoint. Instead of practising the ecstasy, they followed the Gnostics in theorizing about practical religious reality in their cosmology and theology, which took on, more or less, the shape of magic, not inconsiderably aided by Stoic allegoric interpretations of myths, as in Porphyry's "Cave of the Nymphs."

What Plato did for early Greek philosophy, what Numenius did for post-Platonic thought, that Proclus Diadochus, the "Successor," did for Plotinos and his followers. For the first time since Numenius we find again a comparative method. By this time religion and philosophy have fused in magic, and so, instead of a comparative religion, we have a comparative philosophy. Proclus was the first genuine commentator, quoting authorities on all sides. He was sufficient of a philosopher to grasp Neoplatonism as a school of thought; and far from paying any attention to Ammonius, as recent philosophy has done, as source of Neoplatonism, he traces the movement as far as Plutarch, calling him the "father of us all," inasmuch as he introduced the conception of "hypostasis." Evidently, Proclus looked upon this as the centre of Neoplatonic development, and therefore we shall be justified in a closer study of this conception; and we may even say that its historic destiny was a continuation of the main stream of creative Greek philosophy; or, if you prefer, of Platonism, or Noumenianism, or even Plotinian thought.

Did Greek philosophy die with Proclus? The political changes of the time forced alteration of dialect and position; but the accumulations of mental achievements could not perish. This again we owe to Proclus. Besides being the first great commentator he precipitated his most valuable achievements in logical form, in analytic arrangement, in the form of crystal-clear propositions, theorems, demonstrations, and corollaries. Such a highly abstract form was inevitable, inasmuch as Numenius had turned away from Aristotelian observation of nature. Just like the Hebrew thinkers, who finally became commentators and abstract theorizers, nothing else was left for a philosophy without connection with experiment, when whittled down by the keenest intellects of the times.

This abstract method, still familiarly used by geometry, reappeared among the School-men, notably in Thomas Aquinas. Later it persisted with Spinoza and Descartes. However, rising experimentalism has gradually terminated it, its last form appearing in Kant and Hegel. Kant's "Ding in sich," reached after abstracting all qualities, is only a re-statement of Numenius and Plotinos's "subject," or, definition of matter; and Hegel's dialectic, beginning with Being and Not-being, more definitely proclaimed by Plotinos, goes as far back as the Eleatics and Heraclitus, not to mention Plato. However, Kant and Hegel are the great masters of modern thought; and although at one time the rising tide of materialism and cruder forms of evolution threatened to obscure it, Karl Pearson's "Grammar of Science," generous as it is in invective against Kant and Hegel, in modern terms clinches Berkeley's and Kant's demonstration of the reality of the super-sensual, thus vindicating Plotinos, and, before him, Numenius.

It must not be supposed that in thus tracing the springs of our modern thought we necessarily approve of all the thought of Plotinos, Numenius or Plato. On the contrary, they were far more likely to have committed logical errors than we are, because they were hypnotized by the glamor of the terms they used, which to us are mere laboratory tools. The best way to prove this will be to appraise at its logical value for us Plotinos's discussion of Matter, elsewhere studied in its value for us.

III. PLOTINOS'S VIEW OF MATTER.

We have elsewhere pointed out the hopelessness of escaping either aspect of the problem of the One and the Many; and that the attempt of the Stoics to avoid the Platonic dualism by a materialistic monism was merely a change of names, the substance of the dualism remaining as the opposition of the contraries, such as active and passive, male and female, the predominant elements,[474] etc. Plotinos, in his abandonment of Numenian dualism, and championing of Stoicism, undertaking the feud with the Gnostics, the successors of Numenius, must therefore have inherited the same difficulties of thought, and we shall see how in spite of his mental agility he is caught in the same traditional meshes, and that these irreducible difficulties occur in each one of his three periods of life, the Eustochian, the Amelian, and the Porphyrian.

In the Amelian, he teaches two matters, the physical and the intelligible, by which device he seeks to avoid the difficulties of dualism, crediting to intelligible matter any necessary form of Being, thus pushing physical matter into the outer darkness of non-being. So intelligible matter is still a form of Being, and we still hold to monism; as intelligible matter may participate in the good; while matter physical remains evil, being a deprivation of good, not possessing it. This, of course is dualism; and he thus has a convenient pun on the word matter, by which he can be monist or dualist, as the fancy takes him, or as exigencies demand. This participation, therefore, does not eliminate the dualism, while formally professing monism. Therefore Plotinos tries to choose between monism and dualism by surreptitiously accepting both.

In the Porphyrian period, he rejected the idea of intelligible matter.[475] Forced to fashion entirely new arguments, he seizes as tool the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality, or energy as dynamic accomplishment.[476] But no logical device can help a man to pull himself up by his boot-straps. If by Being you mean existence, then its opposite must be negative, and to speak of real non-being, as something that shares being, is an evasion. To say that matter remains non-being, while having the possibility of future Being, which however can never be actualized, is mere juggling with words. Even if matter is no more than a weak, confused image, it is not non-being. If it is a positive lie, it is not non-being. To talk of a higher degree of Non-being, that is real non-being, is simply to confuse the actuality intended with the thought of non-being, which of course is a thought as actually existing as any other. Moreover if matter is imperishable, it cannot be non-being; and if it possesses Being potentially, it certainly is not non-existence. The Aristotelian potentiality could help to create this evasion, but did not remove its real nature; it merely supplied Plotinos with an intellectual device to characterize something that would not be actually existing as still having the possibility of existence; but this is not non-existence. In another writing[477] of this period Plotinos continues his evasions about the origin and nature of matter. First, he grants that it is something that is not original, being later than many earthly, and all intelligible objects; although, if he had returned to the conception of intelligible matter, he would have been at liberty to assert the originality of the latter. Then he holds that Being is common to both form and matter, as to quality, but not as to quantity. Last, he closes the paragraph by saying that perhaps form and matter do not come from the same origin, as there is a difference between them.

In Plotinos's third, or Eustochian period, the same evasions occur. For instance[478] he limits Being to goodness. Then he acknowledges the existence of evil things, and derives their evil quality from a primary evil, the "image of essence," the Being of evil. That he is conscious of having strained a point is evident from the fact that he adds the clause, "if there can be a Being of evil." Likewise,[479] while discussing evil, which is generally recognized because in our daily lives there is positive pain, and sensations of pain, he defines evil as lack of qualities. To say that evil is not such as to form, but as to nature is opposite to form is nonsense, inasmuch as life is full of positive evils, as Numenius brought out in 16, and Plotinos acknowledged even in spite of his polemic against the Gnostics.

Finally Plotinos takes refuge in a miracle[480] as explanation of "unparticipating participation." This is commentary enough; it shows he realized the futility of any arguments. But Plotinos was not alone in despairing of establishing an ironclad system; before him Numenius had, just as pathetically, despaired of a logical dualism, and he acknowledged in fragment 16 that Pythagoras's arguments, however true, were "wonderful and opposed to the belief of a majority of humanity."

In other words, monism is as unsatisfactory to reason as dualism. This was the chief point of agreement between Pythagoras and the Stoics; and Pragmatism has in modern times attempted to show a way out by a higher sanction of another kind.

Perhaps the reader may be interested in a side-light on this subject. Drews is interested in Plotinos only because Plotinos's super-rational divinity furnishes a historical foundation for Edouard Hartmann's philosophy of the Unconscious. It would seem, however, to be a mistake to use the latter term, for it is true only as a doubtful corollary. If the Supreme is super-conscious, it is possible to describe this logically as unconscious. But generally, however, unconsciousness is a term used to denote the sub-conscious, rather than the super-conscious, and the use of that term must inevitably entail misunderstandings. It would be better then to follow Pragmatism into the super-conscious, rather than to sink with Hartmann into the sub-conscious. It was directly from Plotinos[481] that Hartmann took his expression "beyond good and evil."

Having watched Numenius, for Platonic dualism; and Plotinos for Stoic monism, both appeal to a miracle as court of last resort, we may now return to that result of Platonism which has left the most vital impress on our civilization, its conception of the divine.

IV. PLOTINOS'S CREATION OF THE TRINITY.

Elsewhere we have seen how Numenius waged the traditional Academic feud with the Stoics bravely, but uselessly, inasmuch as it was chiefly a difference of dialects that separated them. In the course of this struggle, Numenius had made certain distinctions within the divinity, which were followed by Amelius, but are difficult to trace in Plotinos because, as a matter of principle, Plotinos[482] was averse to thus "dividing the divinity." Why so? Because he was waging a struggle with the Gnostics, who had followed in the footsteps of the Hermetic writings (with their Demiurge and Seven Governors); Philo Judaeus (with his five Subordinate Powers); Numenius and Amelius (with their triply divided First and Second gods);--after which we come to Basilides (with his seven Powers); Saturninus (with his Seven Angels); and Valentinus (with his 33 Aeons).

This new feud between Plotinos and the Gnostics is however just as illusory as the earlier one between Numenius and the Stoics. It was merely a matter of dialects. Plotinos indeed found fault with the Gnostics for making divisions within the Divinity; but wherever he himself is considering the divinity minutely, he, just as much as the Gnostics, is compelled to draw distinctions, even though he avoided acknowledged divisions by borrowing from Plutarch a new, non-Platonic, non-Numenian, but Aristotelian, Stoic (Cornutus and Sextus) and still Alexandrian (Philo, Septuagint, Lucian) term "hypostasis."

The difference he pretended to find between the Gnostic distinctions within the Divinity and his new term hypostasis was that the former introduced manifoldness into the divinity, by splitting Him,[483] thus allowing the influence of matter to pervade the pure realm of Being. Hypostasis, on the contrary, wholly existed within the realm of pure Being, and was no more than a trend, a direction, a characterization, a function, a face, or orientation of activity of the unaffected unity of Being. Thus the divinity retained its unity, and still could be active in several directions, without admixture of what philosophy had till then recognized as constituting manifoldness. But reflection shows that this is a mere quibble, an evasion, a paralogism, a quaternio terminorum, a pun. How it came about we shall attempt to show below.

In thus achieving a manifoldness in the divinity without divisions, Plotinos did indeed keep out of the divinity the splitting influence of matter, which it was now possible to banish to the realm of unreality, as a negation, and a lie. Monism was thus achieved ... but at the cost of two errors: denial of the common-sense reality of the phenomenal world,[484] and that quibble about three hypostases without manifoldness, genuinely a "distinction without a difference."

This intellectual dishonesty must not however be foisted on Aristotle[485] or Plutarch. The latter, for instance,[486] adopted this term only to denote the primary and original characteristics (or distinctions within) existing things, from a comparative study of Aristotle's "de Anima," and Plato's "Phaedo."[487] These five hypostases were the divinity, mind, soul, forms immanent in inorganic nature, "hexis," in Stoic dialect, and to matter, as apart from these forms.

So important to Neoplatonism did this term seem to Proclus, that he did not hesitate to say that Plutarch, by the use thereof, became "our first forefather." He therefore develops it further. Among the hidden and intelligible gods are three hypostases. The first is characterized by the Good; it thinks the Good itself, and dwells with the paternal Monad. The second is characterized by knowledge, and resides in the first thought; while the third is characterized by beauty, and dwells with the most beautiful of the intelligible. They are the causes from which proceed three monads which are self-existent but under the form of a unity, and as in a germ, in their cause. Where they manifest, they take a distinct form: faith, truth, and love (Cousin's title: "Du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien"). This trinity pervades all the divine worlds.

In order to understand the attitude of Plotinos on the subject, we must try to put ourselves in his position. In the first place, on Porphyry's own admission, he had added to Platonism Peripatetic and Stoic views. From Aristotle his chief borrowings were the categories of form and matter, and the distinction between potentiality and actuality,[488] as well as the Aristotelian psychology of various souls. To the Stoics he was drawn by their monism, which led him to drop the traditional Academico-Stoic feud, or rather to take the side of the Stoics against Numenius the Platonist dualist and the dualistic successors, the Gnostics. But there was a difference between the Stoics and Plotinos. The Stoics assimilated spirit to matter, while Plotinos, reminiscent of Plato, preferred to assimilate matter to spirit. Still, he used their terminology, and categories, including the conception of a hypostasis, or form of existence. With this equipment, he held to the traditional Platonic trinity of the "Letters," the King, the intellect, and the soul. Philosophically, however, he had received from Numenius the inheritance of a double name of the Divinity, Being and Essence. As a thinker, he was therefore forced to accommodate Numenius to Plato, and by adding to Numenius's name of the divinity, to complete Numenius's theology by Numenius's own cosmology. This then he did by adding as third hypostasis the Aristotelian dynamic energy.

But as Intellect is permanent, how can Energy arise therefrom? Here this eternal puzzle is solved by distinguishing energy into indwelling and out-flowing. As indwelling, Energy constitutes Intellect; but its energetic nature could not be demonstrated except by out-flowing, which produces a distinction.

Similarly, there are two kinds of heat, that of the fire itself, and that emitted by the fire, so that the fire may remain itself while exerting its influence without. It is thus also there: in that it remains itself in its inmost being, and from its own inherent perfection, and energy, the developed energy assumes hypostasis, as if from a Dynamis that is great, nay, greatest; and so it joins the Essence and the Being. For that was beyond all Being, and that was the Dynamis of all things, and already was all things. If then it is all, it must be above all; consequently also above Being. "And if this is all, then the One is before all; not of an essence equal to all, and this must be above Being, as this is above intellect; for there is something above intellect."[489]

This is the most definite statement of Plotinos's solution of the problem; other references thereto are abundant. So we have a trinity of energy, being and essence,[490] and each of us, like the world-Soul has an Eros which is essence and hypostasis.[491] Reason is a hypostasis after the nous, and Aphrodite gains an hypostasis in the Ousia.[492] The One is intellect, the intelligible, and ousia; or, energy, being, and the intelligible (essence).[493] The soul is activity.[494] The soul is the third God,[495] we are the third rank proceeding from the upper undivided Nature,[496] the whole being God, nous, and essence. The Nous is activity, and the First essence. There are three stages of the Good: the King, the nous, and the soul.[497] We find energy,[498] thinking and being, then[499] the soul, the nous, and the One. We find Providence threefold (as in Plutarch)[500] and three ranks of Gods, demons and world-life.[501] Elsewhere, untheologically, or, rather, merely philosophically, he speaks of the hypostasis of wisdom.[502]

Chaignet's summary of this is[503] that[504] Plotinos holds that every force in the intelligible is both Being and Substance simultaneously; and reciprocally that no Being, could be conceived without hypostasis, or directed force. Again,[505] the world, the universe of things, contains three natures or divine hypostases, soul, mind and unity; which indeed are found in our own nature, and of which the divinest is unity or divinity.

Let us now try to understand the matter. Why should the word hypostasis, which unquestionably in earlier times meant "substance," have later come to mean "distinctions" within the divinity? For "substance," on the contrary, represents to our mind an unity, the underlying unity, and not individual forms of existence. How did the change occur?

Now Plotinos, as we remember, found fault with the Gnostics in that they taught distinctions within the divinity.[506] He would therefore be disposed to remove from within the divinity those distinctions of Plotinic, Plutarchian, Numenian, or Gnostic theology; although he himself in early times did not scruple to speak of a hypostasis of wisdom, or of Eros, or other matter he might be considering. Such terms of Numenius or Amelius as he seems to ignore are the various Demiurges; the three Plutarchian Providences he himself still uses. Still, all these terms he would be disposed to eradicate from within the divinity.

As a constructive metaphysician, however, he could not well get along without some titles for the different phases of the divinity; and even if he dispensed with the old names, there would still remain as their underlying support the reality or substance of the distinction. So he removed the offensive, aggressive, historically known and recognized terms, while leaving their underlying substances, or supports. Now "substance" had become "substances," and to differentiate these it was necessary to interpret them as differing forms of existence. The change was most definitely made by Athanasius, who at a synod in Alexandria, in A.D. 362,[507] fastened on the church, as synonymous with hypostasis the popular term "prosopon" or "face." That this was an innovation appears from the fact that the Nicene Council had stated that it was heretical to say that Christ was of a hypostasis different from that of the Father, in which case the word evidently meant still the original underlying (singular) substance. With this official definition in vogue, the original (singular) substance became forgotten, and it became possible to speak in the plural, of three faces, as indeed Plotinos had done.

In other words, so necessary were distinctions in the divinity, that the popular mind supplied other individual names to designate the distinctions Plotinos had successfully banished, for Demiurges and Providences no longer return. Thus more manifold differences re-entered into the divinity, than Plotinos had ever emptied out of it, although under a name which the poverty of the Latin language rendered as "persons," which represents to us individual consciousness of a far more distinctive kind than was ever implied in three phases of Providence, or of the Demiurge. Thus the translation into Latin clinched the illicit linguistic process, and the result of Plotinos's attempt to distinguish in the Divinity phases so subtle as not to demand or allow of manifoldness, resulted in the most pronounced differences of personality. This was finally clinched by Plotinos's illustration of the three faces around a single head,[508] which established the idea of three "persons" (masks, from "per-sonare") in one God.

Not only in the abstract realm of Metaphysics, therefore, is the world indebted to Greek thought; but even in the realm of religion a Stoic reinterpretation of Platonism, itself reinterpreted in a different language has given a lasting inheritance to the spiritual aspirations of the ages.

V. RESEMBLANCES TO CHRISTIANITY.

TRINITARIAN SIGNIFICANCE OF PLOTINOS.

Plotinos's date being about A.D. 262, he stands midway between the Christian writings of the New Testament, and the Council of Nicaea, A.D. 325. As a philosopher dealing with the kindred topics--the soul and its salvation,--and deriving terminology and inspiration from the same sources, Platonism and Stoicism, we would expect extensive parallelism and correspondence. Though Plotinos does not mention any contemporaneous writings, we will surely be able to detect indirect references to Old and New Testaments. But what will be of most vital interest will be his anticipations of Nicene formulations, or reflection of current expressions of Christian philosophic comment. While we cannot positively assert this Christian development was exclusively Plotinian, we are justified in saying that the development of Christian philosophy was not due exclusively to the Alexandrian catechetical school; that what later appears as Christian theology was only earlier current Neoplatonic metaphysics, without any exclusive dogmatic connection with the distinctively Christian biography. This avoids the flat assertion of Drews that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity was dependent on Plotinos, although it admits Bouillet's more cautious statement that Plotinos was the rationalizer of the doctrine of the Trinity.[509] This much is certain, that no other contemporaneous discussion of the trinity has survived, if any ever existed; and we must remember that it was not until the council of Constantinople in A.D. 381, that the Nicene Creed, by the addition of the Filioque clause, became trinitarian in a thoroughgoing way; and not until fifty years later that Augustine, again in the West, fully expressed a philosophy and psychology of the trinity.

To Plotinos therefore is due the historical position of protagonist of trinitarian philosophy.

NON-CHRISTIAN ORIGIN OF PARALELLISMS TO CHRISTIANITY.

Christian parallelisms in Plotinos have a historical origin in Christian parallelisms in his sources, namely, Stoicism, Numenius and Plato.

To Christian origins in Plato never has justice been done, not even by Bigg. His suggestion of the crucifixion of the just man, his reference to the son of God are only common-places, to which should be added many minor references.

The Christian origins in Numenius are quite explicit; mention of the Hebrews as among the races whose scriptures are important, of Moses among the great religious teachers, of the Spirit hovering over the waters, of the names of the Egyptian magicians which, together with Pliny, he hands down to posterity. He also was said to have told many stories about Jesus, in an allegorical manner.

The Christian origins in Stoicism have been widely discussed; for instance, by Chaignet. But it is likely that this influence affected Christianity indirectly through Plotinos, along with the other Christian ideas we shall later find. At any rate Plotinos is the philosopher who uses the term "spiritual body" most like the Christians.[510] The soul is a slave to the body,[511] and has a celestial body[512] as well as a spiritual body.[513] Within us are two men opposing each other,[514] the better part often being mastered by the worse part, as thought St. Paul,[515] in the struggle between the inner and outer man.[516]

With Plotinos the idea of "procession" is not only cosmic but psychological. In other words, when Plotinos speaks of the "procession" of the God-head, he is not, as in Christian doctrine, depicting something unique, which has no connection with the world. He is only referring to the cosmic aspect of an evolution which, in the soul, appears as educational development.[517] As the opposite of the soul's procession upwards, there is the soul's descent into hell,[518] or, in other words, the soul's descent and ascension.[519] This double aspect of man's fate upward or downward is referred to by Plotinos in the regular Christian term "sin," as consisting in missing one's aim.[520] The soul repents,[521] and its duty is conversion.[522] As a result of this conversion comes forgiveness.[523]

OLD TESTAMENT REFERENCES.

The famous "terrors of Jeremiah"[524] might have come mediately through the Gnostics, who indeed may have been the persons referred to as Christians.[525] More direct no doubt was God admiring his handiwork[526] and the soul breathing the spirit of life into animals.[527] God is called both the "I am what I am"[528] and "He is what He ought to be."[528] He sits above the world,[529] as the king of kings.[530]

NEW TESTAMENT REFERENCES.

Plotinos says that it would be a poor artist who would conceive of an animal as all covered with eyes. There is hardly such a reference outside of Revelations,[531] to which we must also look for a new heaven and a new earth.[532] Then we have practically a quotation of the Johannine prologue "In the beginning was the Logos," and by him were all things made.[533] Light was in the beginning.[534] We are told not to leave the world, but not to be of it.[535] The divinity prepares mansions in heaven for good souls.[536]

Pauline references seem to be that sin exists because of the law.[537] God is above all height or depth.[538] The vulgar who attend mystery-banquets only to gorge are condemned.[539] There are several heavens.[540] The beggarly principles and elements towards which some turn, are mentioned.[541] The genealogies of the Gnostics are held up to ridicule.[542] General references are numerous. Diseases are caused by evil spirits.[543] We must cut off any offending member.[544] Thus we are saved.[545] In him we breathe and move and have our being.[546] The higher divinity begets a Son, one among many brethren.[547] As the father of intelligence, God is the father of lights.[548]

However, the most interesting incident is that scriptural text which, to the reflecting, is always so much of a puzzle: "If the light that is in them be darkness," etc.[549] This is explained by the Platonic theory[550] that we see because of a special light that is within the eye.

THEOLOGICAL REFERENCES.

General theological references may be grouped under three heads: the soul's salvation, the procession of the divinity, and the trinity.

As to the soul's salvation, God is the opposite of the evil of beings,[551] which, when created in honor of the divinity[552] is the image of the Word, the interpreter of the One,[553] and is composed of several elements;[554] but it is a fall from God,[555] and its fate is connected with the "parousia."[556]

This going forth of the soul from God, when considered cosmically, becomes the "procession of the soul."[557] This is the "eternal generation,"[558] whereby the Son is begotten from eternity,[559] so that there could be no (Arian) "ên hote ouk ên," or, "time when he was not."[560] This is expressed as "light of light,"[561] and explained by the Athanasian light and ray simile.[562] We find even the Johannine and Philonic distinction between God and the Good.[563] The world is the first-begotten,[564] and the Intelligence is the logos of the first God,[565] as the hypostasis of wisdom is "ousia," or "being,"[566] and it is the "universal reason."[567]

As to the trinity, Plotinos is the first and chief rationalizer of the cosmic trinity, which he continuously and at length discusses.[568] God is father and son,[569] and they are "homoousian," or "consubstantial."[570] The human soul (as image of the cosmic divinity), is one nature in three powers.[571] Elsewhere we have discussed the history of the term "persons," but we may understand the result of that process best by Plotinos's simile of the trinity as one head with three faces,[572] in which the "persons" bear out their original meaning of masks, "personare." Henceforward the trinity was an objective idea.

NOTE

Although mentioned above, special attention should be given to the parable of the vine and the branches (iii. 3.7.--48, 1088 with Jno. xv. 1-8), and the divinity's begetting a Son (v. 8.12--31, 571). The significant aspect of this is that it is represented as being the content of the supreme ecstatic vision; what you might call the crown of Plotinos' message. "He tells us that he has seen the divinity beget an offspring of an incomparable beauty, producing everything in Himself, and without pain preserving within Himself what He has begotten.... His Son has manifested Himself externally. By Him, as by an image (Col. i. 15), you may judge of the greatness of His Father ... enjoying the privilege of being the image of His eternity."

VII. PLOTINOS'S INDEBTEDNESS TO NUMENIUS.

1. HISTORICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN NUMENIUS AND PLOTINOS.

We have, elsewhere, pointed out the historic connections between Numenius and Plotinos. Here, it may be sufficient to recall that Amelius, native of Numenius's home-town of Apamea, and who had copied and learned by heart all the works of Numenius, and who later returned to Apamea to spend his declining days, bequeathing his copy of Numenius's works to his adopted son Gentilianus Hesychius, was the companion and friend of Plotinos during his earliest period, editing all Plotinos's books, until displaced by Porphyry. We remember also that Porphyry was Amelius's disciple, before his spectacular quarrel with Amelius, later supplanting him as editor of the works of Plotinos. Plotinos also came from Alexandria, where Numenius had been carefully studied and quoted by Origen and Clement of Alexandria. Further, Porphyry records twice that accusations were popularly made against Plotinos, that he had plagiarized from Numenius. In view of all this historical background, we have the prima-facie right to consider Plotinos chiefly as a later re-stater of the views of Numenius, at least during his earlier or Amelian period. Such a conception of the state of affairs must have been in the mind of that monk who, in the Escoreal manuscript, substituted the name of Numenius for that of Plotinos on that fragment[573] about matter, which begins directly with Numenius's name of the divinity, "being and essence."[574]

2. NUMENIUS AS FATHER OF NEO-PLATONISM.

Let us compare with this historical evidence, that which supports the universally admitted dependence of Plotinos on his teacher Ammonius. We have only two witnesses: Hierocles and Nemesius; and the latter attributes the argument for the immateriality of the soul to Ammonius and Numenius jointly. No doubt, Ammonius may have taught Plotinos in his youth; but so no doubt did other teachers; and of Ammonius the only survivals are a few pages preserved by Nemesius. The testimony for Plotinos's dependence on Numenius is therefore much more historical, as well as significant, in view of Numenius having left written records that were widely quoted. The title of "Father of Neo-platonism," therefore, if it must at all be awarded, should go to Numenius, who had written a "History of the Platonic Succession," wherein he attempts to restore "original" Platonism. This fits the title "Neo-platonism," whereas the philosophy of Ammonius, would be better described as an eclectic synthesis of Platonism and Aristotelianism.

3. CONTRAST BETWEEN THEM.

Of course we shall admit that there are differences between Plotinos and Numenius, at least during his Porphyrian period; this was inevitable while dismissing his Numenian secretary Amelius,[575] a friend "who had become imbued with" such doctrines before becoming the friend of Plotinos, who persevered in them, and wrote in justification thereof. We find that the book chronologically preceding this one is v. 5, on the very subject at issue between Amelius and Porphyry. Plotinos took his stand with the latter, and therefore against the former, and through him, against Numenius; and indeed we find him opposing several Gnostic opinions which can be substantiated in Numenius: the creation by illumination or emanation,[576] the threefoldness of the creator,[577] and the pilot's forgetting himself in his work.[578]

But, after all, these points are not as important as they might seem; for in a very little while we find Plotinos himself admitting the substance of all of these ideas, except the verbiage; he himself uses the light and ray simile, the "light of light;"[579] he himself distinguishes various phases of the allegedly single intelligence,[580] and the soul, as pilot of the body incarnates by the very forgetfulness by which the creator created.[581]

Further, as we shall show, during his last or Eustochian period after Porphyry had taken a trip to Sicily to avoid suicide, he himself was to return to Numenian standpoints. This may be shown in a general way as follows. Of the nine Eustochian essays[582] only two[583] betray no similarities to Numenian ideas, while seven[584] do. On the contrary, in the Amelio-Porphyrian period,[585] written immediately on Amelius's dismissal, only six[586] are Numenian, and six[587] are non-Numenian. In the succeeding wholly Porphyrian period,[588] we have the same equal number of Numenian[589] and non-Numenian[590] books. An explanation of this reversion to Numenian ideas has been attempted in the study of the development in Plotinos's views. On the whole, therefore, Plotinos's opposition to Numenius may be considered no more than episodic.

4. DIRECT INDEBTEDNESS OF PLOTINOS TO NUMENIUS.

As Plotinos was in the habit of not even putting his name to his own notes; as even in the times of Porphyry the actual authorship of much that he wrote was already disputed; as even Porphyry acknowledges principles and quotations were borrowed, we must discover Numenian passages by their content, rather than by any external indications. As the great majority of Numenius's works are irretrievably lost, we may never hope to arrive at a final solution of the matter; and we shall have to restrict ourselves to that which, in Plotinos, may be identified by what Numenian fragments remain. What little we can thus trace definitely will give us a right to draw the conclusion to much more, and to the opinion that, especially in his Amelian period, Plotinos was chiefly indebted to Numenian inspiration. We can consider[591] the mention of Pythagoreans who had treated of the intelligible as applying to Numenius, whose chief work was "On the Good," and on the "Immateriality of the Soul."

The first class of passages will be such as bear explicit reference to quotation from an ancient source. Of such we have five: "That is why the Pythagoreans were, among each other, accustomed to refer to this principle in a symbolic manner, calling him 'A-pollo,' which name means a denial of manifoldness."[592] "That is the reason of the saying, 'The ideas and numbers are born from the indefinite doubleness, and the One;' for this is intelligence."[593] "That is why the ancients said that ideas are essences and beings."[594] "Let us examine the (general) view that evils cannot be destroyed, but are necessary."[595] "The Divinity is above being."[596]

A sixth case is, "How manifoldness is derived from the First."[597] A seventh case is the whole passage on the triunity of the divinity, including the term "Father."[598]

Among doctrines said to be handed down from the ancient philosophers[599] are the ascents and descents of souls[600] and the migrations of souls into bodies other than human.[601] The soul is a number.[602]

Moreover, Plotinos wrote a book on the Incorruptibility of the soul,[603] as Numenius had done;[604] and both authors discuss the incorporeity of qualities.[605]

Besides these passages where there is a definite expression of dependence on earlier sources, there are two in which the verbal similarity[606] is striking enough to justify their being considered references: "Besides, no body could subsist without the power of the universal Soul." "Because bodies, according to their own nature, are changeable, inconstant, and infinitely divisible, and nothing unchangeable remains in them, there is evidently need of a principle that would lead them, gather them, and bind them fast together; and this we name soul."[607] This similarity is so striking that it had already been observed and noted by Bouillet. Compare "We consider that all things called essences are composite, and that not a single one of them is simple," with "Numenius, who believes that everything is thoroughly mingled together, and that nothing is simple."[608]

5. UNCERTAIN INDEBTEDNESS OF PLOTINOS.

As Plotinos does not give exact quotations and references, it is difficult always to give their undoubted source. As probably Platonic we may mention the passage about the universal Soul taking care of all that is inanimate;[609] and "When one has arrived at individuals, they must be abandoned to infinity."[610] Also other quotations.[611] The line "It might be said that virtues are actualizations,"[612] might be Aristotelian. We also find:[613] "Thus, according to the ancient maxim, 'Courage, temperance, all the virtues, even prudence, are but purifications.'" "That is the reason that it is right to say that the 'soul's welfare and beauty lie in assimilating herself to the divinity.'" This sounds Platonic, but might be Numenian.

In this connection it might not be uninteresting to note passages in Numenius which are attributed to Plato, but which are not to be identified: "O Men, the Mind which you dimly perceive is not the First Mind; but before this Mind is another one, which is older and diviner." "That the Good is One."[614]

We turn now to thoughts found identically in Plotinos and Numenius, although no textual identity is to be noted. We may group these according to the subject, the universe, and the soul.

6. PARTICULAR SIMILARITIES.

God is supreme king.[615] Eternity is now, but neither past nor future.[616] The King in heaven is surrounded by leisure.[617] The Good is above Being;[618] the divinity is the unity above the "Being and Essence;[619] and connected with this is the unitary interpretation of the name A-pollo,[620] following in the footsteps of Plutarch. Nevertheless, the inferior divinity traverses the heavens,[621] in a circular motion.[622] While Numenius does not specify this motion as circular,[623] it is implied, inasmuch as the creator's passing through the heavens must have followed their circular course. With this perfect motion is connected the peculiar Numenian doctrine of inexhaustible giving,[624] which gave a philosophical basis for the old simile of radiation of light,[625] so that irradiation is the method of creation,[626] and this is not far removed from emanationism. This process consists of the descent of the intelligible into the material, or, as Numenius puts it, that both the intelligible and the perceptible participate in the ideas.[627] Thus intelligence is the uniting principle that holds together the bodies whose tendency is to split up, and scatter,[628] making a leakage or waste,[629] which process invades even the divinity.[630] This uniting of scattering elements produces a mixture or mingling,[608] of matter and reason,[631] which, however, is limited to the energies of the existent, not to the existent itself.[632] All things are in a flow,[633] and the whole all is in all.[634] The divinity creates by glancing at the intelligence above,[635] as a pilot.[636] The divinity is split by over-attention to its charges.[637]

This leads us over to consideration of the soul. The chief effort of Numenius is a polemic against the materialism of the Stoics, and to it Plotinos devotes a whole book.[638] All souls, even the lowest, are immortal.[639] Even qualities are incorporeal.[640] The soul, therefore, remains incorporeal.[641] The soul, however, is divisible.[642] This explains the report that Numenius taught not various parts of the soul,[643] but two souls, which would be opposed by Plotinos in his polemic against the Stoics,[644] but taught in another place.[645] Such divisibility is indeed implied in the formation of presentation as a by-product,[646] or a "common part."[647] Moreover, the soul has to choose its own demon, or guardian divinity.[648] Salvation as a goal appears in Numenius,[649] but not in Plotinos, who opposes the Gnostic idea of the "saved souls,"[650] though elsewhere he speaks of the paths of the musician,[651] lover[652] and philosopher[653] in reaching ecstasy.[654] Still both Gnostics and Plotinos insisted on the need of a savior.[655] Memory is actualization of the soul.[656] In the highest ecstasy the soul is alone with the alone.[657]

7. SIMILARITIES APPLIED DIFFERENTLY.

This comparison of philosophy would have been much stronger had we added thereto the following points in which we find similar terms and ideas, but which are applied differently. The soul is indissolubly united to intelligence according to Plotinos, but to its source with Numenius.[658] Plotinos makes discord the result of their fall, while with Numenius it is its cause.[659] Guilt is the cause of the fall of souls, with Plotinos,[660] but with Numenius it is impulsive passion. The great evolution or world-process is by Plotinos called the "eternal procession," while with Numenius it is progress.[661] The simile of the pilot is by Plotinos applied to the soul within the body; while with Numenius, it refers to the logos, or creator in the universe,[662] while in both cases the cause,--of creation for the creator,[663] and incarnation for the soul[664]--is forgetfulness. There is practically no difference here, however. Doubleness is, by Plotinos, predicated of the sun and stars, but by Numenius, of the demiurge himself,[665] which Plotinos opposes as a Gnostic teaching.[666] The Philonic term "legislator" is, by Plotinos, applied to intelligence, while Numenius applies it to the third divinity, and not the second.[667] Plotinos extends immortality to animals, but Numenius even to the inorganic realm, including everything.[668] While Numenius seems to believe in the Serapistic and Gnostic demons,[669] Plotinos opposes them,[670] although in his biography[671] he is represented as taking part in the evocation of his guardian spirit in a temple of Isis.

We thus find a tolerably complete body of philosophy shared by Plotinos and Numenius, out of the few fragments of the latter that have come down to us. It would therefore be reasonable to suppose that if Numenius's complete works had survived we could make out a still far stronger case for Plotinos's dependence on Numenius. At any rate, the Dominican scribe at the Escoreal who inserted the name of Numenius in the place of that of Plotinos in the heading of[672] the fragment about matter, must have felt a strong confusion between the two authors.

8. PHILOSOPHICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN NUMENIUS AND PLOTINOS.

To begin with, we have the controversy with the Stoics, which, though it appears in the works of both, bears in each a different significance. While with Numenius it absorbed his chief controversial efforts,[673] with Plotinos[674] it occupied only one of his many spheres of interest; and indeed, he had borrowed from them many terms, such as "pneuma," the spiritual body, and others, set forth elsewhere. Notable, however, was the term "hexis," habituation, or form of inorganic objects,[675] and the "phantasia," or sense-presentation.[676] Like, them, the name A-pollo is interpreted as a denial of manifoldness.[677]

Next in importance, as a landmark, is Numenius's chief secret, the name of the divinity, as "being and essence," which reappears in Plotinos in numberless places.[678] Connected with this is the idea that essence is intelligence.[679]

9. PYTHAGOREAN SIMILARITIES.

It is a common-place that Numenius was a Pythagorean, or at least was known as such, for though he reverenced Pythagoras, he conceived of himself as a restorer of true Platonism. It will, therefore, be all the more interesting to observe what part numbers play in their system, especially in that of Plotinos, who made no special claim to be a Pythagorean disciple. First, we find that numbers and the divine ideas are closely related.[680] Numbers actually split the unity of the divinity.[681] The soul also is considered as a number,[682] and in connection with this we find the Pythagorean sacred "tetraktys."[683] Thus numbers split up the divinity,[684] though it is no more than fair to add that elsewhere Plotinos contradicts this, and states that the multiplicity of the divinity is not attained by division;[685] still, this is not the only case in which we will be forced to array Plotinos against himself.

The first effect of the splitting influence of numbers will be doubleness,[686] which, though present in intelligence,[687] nevertheless chiefly appears in matter,[688] as the Pythagorean "indefinite dyad."[689] Still, even the Supreme is double.[690] So we must not be surprised if He is constituted by a trinity,[691] in connection with which the Supreme appears as grandfather.[692]

If then both Numenius and Plotinos are really under the spell of Pythagoras, it is pretty sure they will not be materialist, they will believe in the incorporeality of the divinity,[693] of qualities;[694] and of the soul[695] which will be invisible[696] and possess no extension.[697] A result of this will be that the soul will not be located in the body, or in space, but rather the body in the soul.[698]

From this incorporeal existence,[699] there is only a short step to unchangeable existence,[700] or eternity.[701] This, to the soul, means immortality,[702] one theory of which is reincarnation.[703] To the universe, however, this means harmony.[704]

There are still other Pythagorean traces in common between Numenius and Plotinos. The cause that the indeterminate dyad split off from the divinity is "tolma," rashness, or boldness.[705] Everything outside of the divinity is in a continual state of flux.[706] Evil is then that which is opposed to good.[707] It also is therefore unavoidable, inasmuch as suppression of its cosmic function would entail cosmic collapse.[708] The world stands thus as an inseparable combination of intelligence and necessity, or chance.[709]

10. PLATONIC TRACES.

Platonic traces, there would naturally be; but it will be noticed that they are far less numerous than the Pythagorean. To begin with, we find the reverent spirit towards the divinities, which prays for their blessing at the inception of all tasks.[710] To us who live in these latter days, such a prayer seems out of place in philosophy; but that is only because we have divorced philosophy from theology; in other words, because our theology has left the realm of living thought, and, being fixed once for all, we are allowed to pursue any theory of existence we please as if it had nothing whatever to do with any reality; in other words, we are deceiving ourselves. On the contrary, in those days, every philosophical speculation was a genuine adventure in the spiritual world, a magical operation that might unexpectedly lead to the threshold of the cosmic sanctuary. Wise, indeed, therefore, was he who began it by prayer.

Of other technical Platonic terms there are quite a few. The lower is always the image of the higher.[711] So the world might be considered the statue of the Divinity.[712] The ideas are in a realm above the world.[713] The soul here below is as in a prison.[714] There is a divinity higher than the one generally known.[715] The divinity is in a stability resultant of firmness and perfect motion.[716] The perfect movement, therefore, is circular.[717] This inter-communion of the universe therefore results in matter appearing in the intelligible world as "intelligible matter."[718] By dialectics, also called "bastard reasoning,"[719] we abstract everything[720] till we reach the thing-in-itself,[721] or, in other words, matter as a substrate of the world.[722] Thus we metaphysically reach ineffable solitude.[723]

The same goal is reached psychologically, however, in the ecstasy.[724] This idea occurred in Plato only as a poetic expression of metaphysical attainment; and in the case of Plotinos at least may have been used as a practical experience chiefly to explain his epileptic attacks; and this would be all the more likely as this disease was generally called the "sacred disease." Whether Numenius also was an epileptic, we are not told; it is more likely he took the idea from Philo, or Philo's oriental sources; at least Numenius seems to claim no personal ecstatic experiences such as those of Plotinos.

We have entered the realm of psychology; and this teaches us that that in which Numenius and Plotinos differ from Plato and Philo is chiefly their psychological or experimental application of pure philosophy. No body could subsist without the soul to keep it together.[725] Various attempts are made to describe the nature of the soul; it is the extent or relation of circumference to circle.[726] Or it is like a line and its divergence.[727] In any case, the divinity and the soul move around the heavens,[728] and this may explain the otherwise problematical progress or evolution ("prosodos" or "stolos") of ours.[729]

11. VARIOUS SIMILARITIES.

There are many other unclassifiable Numenian traces in Plotinos. Two of them, however, are comparatively important. First, is a reaffirmation of the ancient Greek connection between generation, fertility of birth of souls and wetness,[730] which is later reaffirmed by Porphyry in his "Cave of the Nymphs." Plotinos, however, later denies this.[731] Then we come to a genuine innovation of Numenius's; his theory of divine or intelligible giving. Plato had, of course, in his genial, casual way, sketched out a whole organic system of divine creation and administration of this world. The conceptions he needed he had cheerfully borrowed from earlier Greek philosophy without any rigid systematization, so that he never noticed that the hinge on which all was supposed to turn was merely the makeshift of an assumption. This capital error was noticed by Numenius, who sought to supply it by a psychological observation, namely, that knowledge may be imparted without diminution. Plotinos, with his winning way of dispensing with quotation-marks, appropriated this,[732] as also the idea that life streams out upon the world in the glance of the divinity, and as quickly leaves it, when the Divinity turns away His glance.[733]

Other less important points of contact are: the Egyptian ship of souls;[734] the Philonic distinction between "the" God as supreme, and "god" as subordinate;[735] the hoary equivocation on "kosmos;"[736] and the illustration of the divine Logos as the pilot of the world.[737]

VALUE OF PLOTINOS.

IMPORTANCE IN THE PAST.

We must focus our observations on Plotinos as a philosopher. To begin with, we should review his successors, Porphyry, Jamblichus, Sallust, Proclus, Hierocles, Simplicius;[738] Macrobius;[739] Priscus; Olympicdorus and John Philoponus.[740]

Among the Arabian philosophers that follow in his steps are Maimonides and Ibn Gebirol.[741]

Of the Christian fathers we first have two who paraphrased, rather than quoted him.

St. Augustine by name quotes i. 6; iii. 2; iv. 3, and v. 1; he paraphrases parts of i. 2; ii. 1; iii. 6, 7; iv. 2, 7; vi. 5, 6.[742] St. Basil so closely paraphrases parts of Plotinos in his treatise on the Holy Spirit,[743] his letter on the Monastic Life,[744] and his Hexameron,[745] that Bouillet prints the passage in question in deadly parallel.

Other Christian Plotonic students were Gregory of Nyssa, Synesius, Dionysius the Areopagite, Theodorus, Aeneas of Gaza, Gennadius;[746] Victorinus;[747] Nicephorus Chumnus;[748] and Cassiodorus.[749]

Thomas Aquinas also was much indebted to Plotinos; and after him came Boethius, Fénélon, Bossnet and Leibnitz (all quoted in Bouillet's work).

We have frequently pointed out that Plotinos' "bastard reasoning" process of reaching the intelligible was practically paraphrased by Kant's dialectical path to the "thing-in-itself." This dialetic, of course, was capitalized by Hegel.

Drews has shown that Edouard von Hartmann used Plotinos' semi-devotional ecstasy as a metaphysical basis for his philosophy of the Unconscious.

It is, of course, among mystics that Plotinos has been accorded the greater honor. His practical influence descended through the visions and ecstasies of the saints down to Swedenborg, who attempted to write the theology of the ecstasy; and the relation between these two, Swedenborg and Plotinos should prove a fertile field for investigation.

CULTURAL IMPORTANCE.

Summarizing, he formed a bridge between the pagan world, with its Greco-Roman civilization, and the modern world, in three departments: Christianity, philosophy, and mysticism. So long as the traditional Platonico-Stoical feud persisted there was no hope of progress; because it kept apart two elements that were to fuse into the Christian philosophy. Numenius was the last Platonist, as Posidonius was the last Stoic combatant. However, if reports are to be trusted, Ammonius was an eclecticist, who prided himself on combining Plato with Aristotle. If Plotinos was indeed his disciple, it was the theory eclecticism that he took from his reputed teacher. Practically he was to accomplish it by his dependence on the Numenian Amelius, the Stoic Porphyry, and the negative Eustochius. It will be seen therefore that his chief importance was not in spite of his weakness, but most because of it. By repeatedly "boxing the compass" he thoroughly assimilated the best of the conflicting schools, and became of interest to a sufficiency of different groups (Christian, philosophical and mystical) to insure preservation, study and quotation. His habit of omitting credit to any but ancient thinkers left his own work, to the uninformed--who constituted all but a minimal number--as a body of original thought. Thus he remains to us the last light of Greece, speaking a language with which we are familiar, and leaving us quotations that are imperishable.

PERSONAL VALUE.

While therefore providentially Plotinos has ever been of great importance theologically, philosophically and mystically, we cannot leave him without honestly facing the question of his value as an original thinker. It is evident that his success was in inverse ratio to originality; but we can also see that he could not have held together those three spheres of interest without the momentum of a wonderful personality. This will be evident at a glance to any reader of his biography. But after all we are here concerned not so much with his personality as with his value as an original thinker. This question is mooted by, and cannot be laid aside because of its decisive influence on the problem of his dependence of Numenius. The greater part of the latter's works being irretrievably lost, we can judge only from what we have; and as to the rest, we must ask ourselves, was Plotinos the kind of a man who would have depended on some other man's thoughts? Is he likely to have sketched out a great scheme and filled it in; or rather, was he likely to depend on personal suggestion, and embroider on it, so to speak. Elsewhere we have demonstrated a development of his opinions, for instance, about matter. Was this due to progressiveness, or to indefiniteness? The reader must judge for himself.

PERSONAL LIMITATIONS.

His epilepsy naturally created an opportunity for, and need of a doctrine of ecstasy; which for normal people should be no more than a doctrine, or at least be limited to conscious experiences. Even his admirer, Porphyry, acknowledges that he spelled and pronounced incorrectly.[750] He acknowledged that without Porphyry's objections he would have nothing to say. He refrained from quoting his authorities, and Porphyry acknowledged that his writings contained many Stoic and Aristotelian doctrines. It was generally bruited around that his doctrines were borrowed from Numenius,[751] to the extent that his disciples held controversies, and wrote books on the subject. His style is enigmatic, and the difficulty of understanding him was discussed even in his own day. He was dependent on secretaries or editors; first on Amelius, later on Porphyry, who does not scruple to acknowledge he added many explanations.[752] Later, Plotinos sent his books to Porphyry in Sicily to edit. No doubt the defectiveness of his eyesight made both reading and writing difficult, and explains his failure to put titles to his works; though, as in the case of Virgil, such hesitation may have been the result of a secret consciousness of his indebtedness to others.

RELIANCE ON PUNNING.

Punning has of course a hoary antiquity, and even the revered Plato was an adept at it--as we see in his Cratylos. Moreover, not till a man's work is translated can we uncover all the unconscious cases of "undistributed middle." Nevertheless, in an inquiry as to the permanent objective validity of a train of reasoning, we are compelled to note extent and scope of his tendency. So he puns on aeons;[753] on science and knowledge;[754] on "agalmata";[755] on Aphrodite, as "delicate";[756] on Being;[757] on "koros," as creation or adornment";[758] on difference in others;[759] on idea;[760] on heaven, world, universe, animal and all;[761] on Vesta, and standing;[762] on Hexis;[763] on inclination;[764] on doxa;[765] on love and vision;[766] on "einai" and "henos;"[767] on "mous," "noêsis," and to "noêfon";[768] on paschein;[769] on Poros;[770] on Prometheus and Providence;[771] on reason and characteristic;[772] on "schesis" and "schema";[773] and "soma" and "sozesthai";"[774] on suffering;[775] on thinking, thinkable, and intellection;[776] on "timely" and "sovereign."[777] It will be noted that these puns refer to some of the most important conceptions, and are found in all periods of his life. We must therefore conclude that his was not a clear thinking ability; that he depended on accidental circumstances, and may not always have been fully conscious how far he was following others. This popular judgment that he was revamping Numenius's work may then not have been entirely unfounded, as we indeed have shown.

Nevertheless, he achieved some permanent work, that will never be forgotten; for instance:

1. His description of the ecstatic state.

2. His polemic against the Aristotelian and Stoic categories.

3. His establishment of his own categories.

4. His allegoric treatment of the birth of love, the several Eroses, Poros and Penia, and other myths.

5. His building of a Trinitarian philosophy.

6. His threefold spheres of existence, underlying Swedenborgian interpretation.

7. His aesthetic theories.

8. His ethical studies of virtues and happiness.

9. His restatement of Numenius's arguments for the immateriality of the soul.

SELECTED MAXIMS

The reader may be interested in a few maxims selected from Plotinos' works which may be of general interest.

1. We develop toward ecstasy by simplification of Soul.

2. We rise by the flight of the Single to the Single, face to face.

3. We contain something of the Supreme.

4. The Soul becomes what she remembers and sees.

5. Everything has a secret power.

6. The best men are those who have most intimacy with themselves.

7. The touch of the good man is the greatest thing in the world.

8. Every being is its best, not when great or numerous, but when it belongs to itself.

9. There are two men in us, the better and the worse.

10. The secret of life is to live simultaneously with others and yourself.

11. God is the author of liberty.

12. Concerning what would it be most worth while to speak, except the Soul? Let us therefore know ourselves.

13. Without virtue, God is but a name.

14. The object of virtue is to separate the soul from the body.

15. We can never become perfect, because he who thinks himself so has already forgotten the supreme divinity towards which he must hasten.

16. The world was created by a concurrence of intelligence and necessity.

17. The Soul is the image, word, and interpreter of the One.

18. The divinities though present to many human beings often reveal themselves only to some one person, because he alone is able to contemplate them.

19. To act without suffering is the sign of a great power.

20. Only virtue is independent.

21. We are beautiful when we know ourselves.

22. The Soul is the child of the universal Father.

23. True happiness is being wise, and exercising this within oneself.

24. To become again what one was originally is to live in the Superior world.

25. The desired goal is not to cease failing, but to grow divine.

26. Virtue demands preliminary purification.

27. Our effort at assimilation should be directed not at mere respectability, but at the gods themselves.

28. One should study mathematics in order to accustom oneself to think of incorporeal things, and to believe in their existence.

29. Soul is not in body, but body in Soul.

30. The Soul's higher part remains in heaven.

31. We should not leave the earth, but not be of it.

32. The object of life is not to avoid evil, or copy the good, but to become good.

33. Dying, to Eustochius: "I am awaiting you, in order to draw the divine in me to the divine in all."

FOOTNOTES:

[1] It is significant that the subject of the first treatise of Plotinos, after the departure of Porphyry, should treat of happiness as the object of life. These may have been the arguments he advanced to persuade Porphyry to abstain from suicide (to which he refers in sections 8, 16), and, rather, to take a trip to Sicily, the land of natural beauty. He also speaks of losing friends, in section 8. The next book, on Providence, may also have been inspired by reflections on this untoward and unexpected circumstance. We see also a change from abstract speculation to his more youthful fancy and comparative learning and culture.

[2] Diog. Laert. x.; Cicero, de Fin. i. 14, 46.

[3] Cicero, de Fin. 11, 26.

[4] See Arist. Nic. Eth. vii. 13; Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyp. Pyrrhon, iii. 180; Stob. Ecl. ii. 7.

[5] Arist. Nic. Eth. i. 10, 14.

[6] Stob. Floril. i. 76.

[7] See vi. 8.

[8] In Plutarch, of Wickedness, and in Seneca, de Tranquil, Animi, 14.

[9] De Providentia, 3.

[10] De Provid. 5.

[11] Aeschylus, Seven Against Thebes, 327.

[12] The vegetative soul, the power that presides over the nutrition and growth of the body; see iv. 3.23.

[13] See i. 8; also Numenius, 16.

[14] i. 2.4.

[15] Cicero, Tusculans. ii. 7.

[16] The animal; see i. 1.10.

[17] See i. 1.8, 10.

[18] See the Theataetus, p. 176. Carv. 84; the Phaedo. p. 69, Cary, 37; the Republic, vi. p. 509; Cary, 19; x. p. 613, Cary, 12; the Laws, iv. p. 716, Cary, 8; also Plotinos i. 2.1.

[19] See i. 9.

[20] A Stoic confutation of Epicurus and the Gnostics. As soon as Porphyry has left him, Plotinos harks back to Amelius, on whose leaving he had written against the Gnostics. He also returns to Numenian thoughts. Bouillet notices that here Plotinos founded himself on Chrysippus, Marcus Aurelius, and Epictetus, and was followed by Nemesius. This new foundation enabled him to assume a rather independent attitude. Against Plato, he taught that matter derived existence from God, and that the union of the soul and body is not necessarily evil. Against Aristotle, he taught that God is not only the final, but also the efficient cause of the universe. Against the Stoics, he taught that the human soul is free, and is a cause, independent of the World Soul from which she proceeded. Against the Gnostics, he insisted that the creator is good, the world is the best possible, and Providence extends to mundane affairs. Against the Manicheans, he taught that the evil is not positive, but negative, and is no efficient cause, so that there is no dualism.

[21] Diog. Laert. x. 133.

[22] See iv. 2.4; vi. 7; see Plato, Philebus, p. 30, Cary, 56; Philo, Leg. Alleg, vi. 7.

[23] Lactantius, de Ira Dei, 13.

[24] Ireneus, Ref. Her. ii. 3.

[25] As in vi. 7.1.

[26] Philo, de Creatione Mundi, 6.

[27] As the Gnostics taught; see ii. 9.1.

[28] As was held by the Gnostics, who within the divinity distinguished potentiality and actuality, as we see in ii. 9.1.

[29] See ii. 9.3. 8.

[30] Numenius, 32.

[31] Plato, Timaeus, p. 48, Cary, 21. Statesman, p. 273, Cary, 16; Laws, x. p. 904, Cary, 12.

[32] See ii. 9.2.

[33] From Aristotle, de Anima, 2.

[34] This is the Aristotelian psychological scheme.

[35] Clem. Al.; Strom. v. p. 712; Stobaeus, Ecl. Phys. i. p. 372, 446.

[36] iv. 8.12; Plato, Tim. p. 41. 69; Cary, 16, 44.

[37] Stob. Ecl. Eth. ii. 7.

[38] iii. 2.13.

[39] p. 253; Cary, 74.

[40] Sen. 526.

[41] According to Plato's Theaetetus, p. 176, Cary, 83; Numenius,16.

[42] Seneca, de Provid. 2.

[43] In his Republic, ix. p. 585, Cary, 10.

[44] See iii. 1.9.

[45] See iv. 3.12.

[46] See iv. 3.5.

[47] Gregory of Nyssa, Catech. Orat. 7.

[48] As thought Sallust, Consp. Cat. 52.

[49] Republic x. p. 620; Cary, 16; Numenius, 57.

[50] As said Sallust, Conspiration of Catiline, 52.

[51] As thought Epictetus, Manual, 31.

[52] In his Republic, vi. p. 488; Cary, 4.

[53] Marcus Aurelius. Thoughts, xi. 18.

[54] As thought Cicero, de Nat. Deor. iii. 63. 64.

[55] As thought Philo, de Prov. in Eus. Prep. Ev. viii. 14.

[56] According to Plato, in the Sophist and Protagoras, and the Stoics, as in Marcus Aurelius. Meditations, vii. 63.

[57] As did the writer of Revelation, iv. 6.

[58] In his Timaeus, p. 29e, Cary, 10.

[59] As said Chrysippus in Plutarch, de Comm. Not. adv. Stoicos, 13.

[60] Mentioned by Plato in his Phaedrus, p. 248, Cary, 59; Republ. v. p. 451, Cary, 2; and in the famous hymn of Cleanthes, Stobaeus Ecl. Phys. i. 3.

[61] Like the figure of the angel Mithra; see Franck, LaKabbale, p. 366.

[62] As Hierocles wondered, de Prov. p. 82, London Ed.

[63] In the words of Plato's Timaeus p. 48; Cary, 21; and Theaetetus, p. 176; Cary, 84; Numenius, 16.

[64] Almost the words of John i. 1.

[65] In the Laws, vii. p. 796, Cary, 6; p. 815, Cary, 18; and Philo, de Prov. in Eus. Prep. Ev. viii. 14.

[66] As thought Epictetus in his Manual, 2, 6.

[67] In his Philebus, p. 48, Cary, 106.

[68] As thought Epictetus in his Manual. 8.

[69] See iii. 8.

[70] Numenius, 32.

[71] Plato, Banquet, p. 187, Cary, 14.

[72] Marcus Aurelius, Medit. ii. 13.

[73] As thought Marcus Aurelius, in his Thoughts, xii. 42.

[74] See iv. 3.24.

[75] In his Manual, 37.

[76] See iv. 1.9-12.

[77] Marcus Aurelius, Medit. vii. 9; Seneca, Epist. 94.

[78] Numenius, iii. 7.

[79] This image was later adopted by Swedenborg in his "celestial man."

[80] In close proximity to note 45, another distinctly Johannine expression.

[81] Stoic ideas.

[82] As Plato said in his Phaedrus, p. 247, Cary, 56.

[83] See i. 8.2.

[84] See ii. 3.17.

[85] See ii. 3.13. Ficinus's translation.

[86] A Stoic term.

[87] Plato, Timaeus, p. 42, Cary, 17; see also Enn. ii. 3.10. 11, 15, 16.

[88] Timaeus, p. 42, 91, Cary, 17, 72, 73.

[89] See ii. 3.13.

[90] Alcinous, de Doctrina Platonica, 26.

[91] Gregory of Nyssa, Catech. Oratio, 7; Dionysius Areopagite, Divine Names, 4.

[92] See ii. 3.7.

[93] See iii. 2.6.

[94] Plato, Timaeus, p. 31c, Cary, 11.

[95] See Numenius. 14.

[96] Clem. Al. Strom. v. 689.

[97] In this book we no longer find detailed study of Plato, Aristotle and the Epicureans, as we did in the works of the Porphyrian period. Well indeed did Plotinos say that without Porphyry's objections he might have had little to say.

[98] Porphyry, Principles of the theory of the Intelligibles, 31.

[99] Olympiodorus, in Phaedonem, Cousin, Fragments, p. 404.

[100] Ib., p. 432.

[101] Ib., p. 418.

[102] Ib., p. 431.

[103] John Philoponus, Comm. in Arist., de Anima, i. 1.

[104] See iii. 6.1.

[105] By a triple pun, on "nous," "noêsis," and "to noêton."

[106] Porphyry, Principles, 32.

[107] By a pun.

[108] See John i. 4, 9.

[109] This anticipates Athanasius's explanations of the divine process.

[110] See v. 1.4.

[111] Porphyry, Principles, 26.

[112] The Eleusynian Mysteries, Hymn to Ceres, 279; see vi. 9.11.

[113] See v. 3.14.

[114] In this book Plotinos harks back to the first book he had written, i. 6, to Plato's Banquet and Cratylos. Porphyry later agreed with some of it. Like St. John, Plotinos returns to God as love, in his old age. His former book had also been a re-statement of earlier thoughts.

[115] See iii. 5.6.

[116] See i. 6.2, 3.

[117] See i. 6.3, 7.

[118] Plato, Banquet, p. 206-208, Cary, 31, 32.

[119] Plato, Banquet, p. 210, Cary, 34, sqq.

[120] Porphyry, Biography of Plotinos, 15.

[121] See i. 3.2.

[122] See sect. 5, 6.

[123] Plato, Banquet, p. 185, Cary, 12, 13.

[124] By Plato, in his Cratylus, p. 396, Cary, 29, 30; interpreted to mean "pure Intelligence."

[125] This is the principal power of the soul; see ii. 3.17.

[126] See v. 8.12, 13.

[127] Plotinos thus derives "eros" from "orasis," which, however far-fetched a derivation, is less so than that of Plato, from "esros," meaning to "flow into," Cratylos, p. 420, Cary, 79, 80.

[128] For this distinction, see ii. 3.17, 18.

[129] For the two Loves, see v. 8.13, and vi. 9.9.

[130] See iii. 4.

[131] See iv. 9.

[132] Plato, Banq. 203: Cary, 29.

[133] In his Isis and Osiris, p. 372, 374.

[134] See i. 1.

[135] Plato, Banquet, p. 202, Cary, 27, 28; Porphyry, de Abst. ii. 37, sqq.

[136] In section 4.

[137] Plato, Epinomis, p. 984, Cary, 8; Porphyry, de Abst. ii. 37-42.

[138] See ii. 4.3.

[139] See ii. 4.3.

[140] An expression often used by the Platonists; see the Lexicon Platonicum, by the grammarian Timaeus, sub voce "oistra."

[141] See Plato, Banquet, p. 203, Cary, 29.

[142] See iii. 4.6.

[143] See iii. 4.3.

[144] A Stoic distinction.

[145] P. 246, Cary, 56.

[146] P. 28, Cary, 50.

[147] Didymus, Etym. Magn. p. 179, Heidelb. p. 162, Lips.

[148] Timaeus Locrius, of the Soul of the World, p. 550, ed. Gale, Cary, 4.

[149] Origen, c. Cels., iv. p. 533.

[150] "logoi."

[151] Proclus, Theology of Plato, vi. 23.

[152] As the generation of the world, in Plato's Timaeus, p. 28, 29, Cary, 9; and the erecting into separate Gods various powers of the same divinity, as Proclus said, in his commentary thereon, in Parm. i. 30.

[153] ii. 3.17; ii. 9.2.

[154] Pun on "Poros" and "euporia."

[155] See ii. 4.16.

[156] See books ii. 3; ii. 9; iii. 1, 2, 3, 4, for the foundations on which this summary of Plotinos's doctrine of evil is contained. To do this, he was compelled to return to Plato, whose Theaetetus, Statesman, Timaeus and Laws he consulted. Aristotle seems to have been more interested in natural phenomena and human virtue than in the root-questions of the destiny of the universe, and the nature of the divinity; so Plotinos studies him little here. But it will be seen that here Plotinos entirely returns to the later Plato, through Numenius.

[157] As thought Empedocles, 318-320.

[158] i. 6.2.

[159] i. 8.7.

[160] i. 8.3.

[161] As thought Plato in his Laws, iv. p. 716; Cary, 7, 8.

[162] As thought Plato in his Philebus, p. 28; Cary 49, 50.

[163] See v. 1; vi. 9.2.

[164] Numenius, fr. 32.

[165] As said Plato, in his second Letter, 2.312.

[166] See iii. 8.9; iv. 7.14; vi. 4.2; vi. 9.2.

[167] As held by Plato in the Parmenides and First Alcibiades.

[168] See ii. 4.8-16.

[169] It is noteworthy that Plotinos in his old age here finally recognizes Evil in itself, just as Plato in his later work, the Laws (x. p. 897; Cary, 8) adds to the good World-soul, an evil one. This, for Plotinos, was harking back to Numenius's evil world-soul, fr. 16.

[170] In his First Alcibiades, p. 122; Cary, 37.

[171] See i. 1.12.

[172] This means created things, which are contingent and perishable; see ii. 4.5, 6.

[173] See ii. 4.10-12. This idea of irradiation is practically emanationism; and besides Plotinos's interest in orientalism (Porphyry Biography, 3), it harks back to Numenius, fr. 26.3; 27a.10.

[174] Held by Plato in his Theaetetus, p. 176; Cary, 84, 85; and Republic, ii. 279; Cary, 18, and of Numenius, fr. 16.

[175] See i. 2.1.

[176] In the Theaetetus, p. 176; Cary, 84, 85.

[177] Numenius, fr. 10; Plato, Rep. vi. p. 509b; Cary, 19.

[178] As Plato suggested in his Philebus, p. 23; Cary, 35-37.

[179] Numenius, fr. 17.

[180] Mentioned by Plato in the Timaeus, pp. 28, 30, 38; Cary, 9, 10, 14.

[181] From the Timaeus, p. 41; Cary, 16, 17.

[182] See i. 2.1; i. 6.8.

[183] That is, the relative inferiority of beings which, proceeding from each other, become more and more distant from the good; see ii. 5.5; ii. 9.8, 13; v. 1; Philo, Leg. Alleg. ii. p. 74.

[184] See i. 8.1.

[185] ii. 4.12.

[186] Numenius, fr. 26.3.

[187] Diog. Laertes vii.

[188] See ii. 6.

[189] ii. 4.13.

[190] i. 8.15.

[191] As thought Plato in his Banquet, p. 211; Cary, 35.

[192] As said Plato, Republic, vii. p. 534; Cary, 14.

[193] As Plato says in his Phaedrus, p. 246; Cary, 54, 56.

[194] As wrote Plato in his Banquet, p. 203; Cary, 28, 29, and see iii. 7.14 and iii. 5.9 as well as iii. 6.14.

[195] According to the interpretation of Ficinus.

[196] See ii. 4. This is an added confirmation of the chronological order; in the Enneadic order this book is later, not earlier.

[197] Again a term discussed by Numenius, fr. ii. 8, 13; and iii; see i. 1.9; iv. 3.3, 30, 31; i. 4.10.

[198] We notice how these latter studies of Plotinos do not take up any new problems, chiefly reviewing subjects touched on before. This accounts for Porphyry's attempt to group the Plotinic writings, systematically. This reminds us of the suggestion in the Biography, that except for the objections of Porphyry, Plotinos would have nothing to write. Notice also the system of the last Porphyrian treatises, contrasted with the more literary treatment of the later. All this supports Porphyry's table of chronological arrangement of the studies of Plotinos. This book is closely connected with the preceding studies of Fate and Providence, iii. 1-3; for he is here really opposing not the Gnostics he antagonized when dismissing Amelius, but the Stoic theories on Providence and Fate.

[199] See iii. 1.5, 6; iii. 6; iv. 4.30-44.

[200] Macrobins. In Somn. Scipionis.

[201] Cicero, de Divinatione, i. 39.

[202] Julius Firmicus Maternus, Astrol. ii. 23.

[203] With Ptolemy's Tetrabiblion, i. p. 17.

[204] See iv. 4.31.

[205] Discussed in par. 4.

[206] This incomprehensibility was no doubt due to Plotinos's advancing blindness and renal affection.

[207] Numenius, fr. 32.

[208] Cicero, de Nat. Deorum, ii. 46.

[209] See iv. 4.32.

[210] According to the Stoics: Alex. Aphrod. de Mixtione, p. 141; Cicero, de Nat. Deorum, ii. 32.

[211] See iii. 1.4, 7-10.

[212] See iii. 1.6.

[213] See iv. 4.33.

[214] See iv. 4.35; according to the Stoics, see Diogenes Laertes. vii. 140.

[215] See iv. 4.32.

[216] Seneca, Quest. Nat. i. 1.

[217] See iii. 4.2, 4.

[218] See ii. 3.13.

[219] See iii. 4.3.

[220] See iii. 1.8-10.

[221] The law of Adrastea; see iii. 4.2; iv. 4.4, 5.

[222] Plato, Phaedrus, p. 244-251; Cary, 47-66.

[223] See i. 8; ii. 11; iii. 1; vi. 8.

[224] Plato, Rep. x. p. 617; Cary, 14.

[225] p. 41-42; Cary, 16, 17.

[226] See i. 1.7-10.

[227] See ii. 1.5.

[228] Stoic terms.

[229] See ii. 1.8-10.

[230] See i. 2.1; vi. 8.

[231] See i. 1.7-12; iv. 3.19-23.

[232] This is the exact doctrine of Numenius, fr. 53; it logically agrees with the doubleness of matter, Num. 14; of the Creator, Num. 36; and the world-Soul, fr. 16. See note 71.

[233] See par. 18.

[234] Plato, Banquet, p. 202; Cary, 28; Timaeus, p. 90; Cary, 71.

[235] See iii. 1.2.

[236] That is, to share the passions of the bodies: see iii. 1.2.

[237] See iv. 4.38-40.

[238] Seneca, Nat. Quest. ii. 32.

[239] According to Aristotle, Met. xii. 3.

[240] See iii. 1.6.

[241] See Cicero, de Nat. Deor. ii. 34.

[242] See iv. 4.39, 40.

[243] Plato, Phaedrus, p. 248; Cary, 59.60.

[244] See iii. 1.8-10.

[245] See iv. 4.39.

[246] See iii. 4.3.

[247] See iii. 1.10.

[248] See iii. 1.5.

[249] Rep. x. p. 616; Cary, 14; Enn. iii. 4.

[250] See iv. 4.30, 40, 43, 44.

[251] See i. 4.

[252] See i. 2.5.

[253] In i. 1; proof of the chronological order.

[254] See ii. 9.12; iv. 3.9, 10; negatively.

[255] See iii. 3.1, 2; see Seneca, de Provid. 5.

[256] See ii. 3.17; iii. 8.

[257] See iv. 4.9-12.

[258] See ii. 4; Seneca, de Provid. 5.

[259] See ii. 9.2; iii. 2, 3. Seneca, de Provid. 5.

[260] Or generative reasons, a Stoic term, Seneca, Quest. Nat. iii. 29; see iii. 3.1, 2, 7.

[261] Plotinos is here harking back to his very earliest writing, 1.6, where, before his monistic adventure with Porphyry, he had, under the Numenian influence of Amelius, constructed his system out of a combination of the doctrines of Plato (about the ideas), Aristotle (the distinctions of form and matter and of potentiality and actualization), and the Stoic (the "reasons," "seminal reasons," action and passions, and "hexis," or "habit," the inorganic informing principle). Of these, Numenius seems to have lacked the Aristotelian doctrines, although he left Plato's single triple-functioned soul for Aristotle's combination of souls of various degrees (fr. 53). Plotinos, therefore, seems to have distinguished in every object two elements, matter and form (ii. 4.1; ii. 5.2). Matter inheres potentially in all beings (ii. 5.3, 4) and therefore is non-being, ugliness, and evil (i. 6.6). Form is the actualization (K. Steinhart's Melemata Plotiniana, p. 31; ii. 5.2); that is, the essence and power (vi. 4.9), which are inseparable. Form alone possesses real existence, beauty and goodness. Form has four degrees: idea, reason, nature and habit; which degrees are the same as those of thought and life (Porphyry, Principles 12, 13, 14). The idea is distinguished into "idea" or intelligible Form, or "eidos," principle of human intellectual life. Reason is 1, divine (theios logos, i. 6, 2; the reason that comes from the universal Soul, iv. 3.10), 2, human (principle of the rational life, see Ficinus on ii. 6.2); 3, the seminal or generative reason (principle of the life of sensation, which imparts to the body the sense-form, "morphé," 3.12-end; Bouillet, i. 365). Now reasons reside in the soul (ii. 4.12), and are simultaneously essences and powers (vi. 4.9), and as powers produce the nature, and as essences, the habits. Now nature ("physis") is the principle of the vegetative life, and habit, "hexis," Numenius, fr. 55, see ii. 4.16, is the principle of unity of inorganic things.

[262] As thought Aristotle, Met. xii, 3.

[263] See ii. 9.13.

[264] See iv. 4.9-13.

[265] See iii. 4.1.

[266] This is Numenius' doctrine, fr. 16.

[267] See iii. 3.5, 11.

[268] Plotinos here makes in the world-Soul a distinction analogous to that obtaining in the human one (where there is a reasonable soul, and its image, the vegetative soul, see i. 1.8-12; iv. 4. 13, 14). Here he asserts that there are two souls; the superior soul (the principal power of the soul, which receives the forms from Intelligence (see iv. 4.9-12, 35), and the inferior soul (nature, or the generative power), which transmits them to matter, so as to fashion it by seminal reasons (see iii. 4.13, 14, 22, 27). Bouillet, no doubt remembering Plotinos's own earlier invectives against those who divided the world-soul (ii. 9.6), evidently directed against Amelius and the Numenian influence, which till then he had followed--tries to minimize it, claiming that this does not mean two different hypostases, but only two functions of one and the same hypostasis. But he acknowledges that this gave the foundation for Plotinos's successors' distinction between the supermundane and the mundane souls (hyperkosmios, and egkosmios). Plotinos was therefore returning to Numenius's two world-souls (fr. 16), which was a necessary logical consequence of his belief in two human souls (fr. 53), as he himself had taught in iii. 8.5. Plotinos objectifies this doubleness of the soul in the myth of the two Hercules, in the next book, i. 1.12.

[269] See ii. 9.2.

[270] The subject announced in the preceding book, ii. 3.16; another proof of the chronological order. This is a very obscure book, depending on iv. 3 and 4: and vi. 7; on the theory of the three divine hypostases, on his psychology, the soul's relation to, and separation from the body, and metempsychosis. His doctrines of "self" and of the emotions are strikingly modern.

[271] See sect. 2.

[272] See sect. 3.

[273] See sect. 4.

[274] See sect. 7, 11.

[275] This most direct translation of "pathos," is defective in that it means rather an experience, a passive state, or modification of the soul. It is a Stoic term.

[276] "Dianoia" is derived from "dia nou," and indicates that the discursive thought is exercised "by means of the intelligence," receiving its notions, and developing them by ratiocination, see v. 3.3. It is the actualization of discursive reason "to dianoêtikon," or of the reasonable soul ("psychê logikê"), which conceives, judges, and reasons (dianoei, krínei, logizetai).

[277] "Noêsis" means intuitive thought, the actualization of intelligence.

[278] See sect. 7.

[279] See Porphyry, Faculties of the Soul, and Ficinus, commentary on this book.

[280] In Greek, "to zoon," "to syntheton," "to synamphoteron," "to koinon," "to eidôlon."

[281] See i. 2.5.

[282] According to the Stoics.

[283] According to Alexander of Aphrodisia.

[284] As thought Aristotle, de Anima 2.1; see 4.3.21, and Numenius, 32.

[285] A famous comparison, found in Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 1; Plato, Laws, x. p. 906; Cary, 14; and especially Numenius, 32.

[286] As Plotinos thinks.

[287] iv. 4.20.

[288] iv. 3.20.

[289] Arist., de Anim. 2.1.

[290] According to Aristotle.

[291] Phaedo, p. 87; Cary, 82.

[292] Similar to the modern James-Lange theory of bodily emotions.

[293] See iv. 4.20, 28.

[294] See sect. 7, 9, 10.

[295] See iv. 3.22, 23.

[296] Porphyry and Ammonius in Bouillet, i. Intr. p. 60, 63, 64, 75, 79, 93, 96, 98, and note on p. 362 to 377.

[297] Namely, intelligence and the reasonable soul.

[298] See Bouillet, i. p. 325, 332.

[299] Bouillet, Intr. p. lxxviii.

[300] See Bouillet, i., note, p. 327, 341.

[301] One of the three hypostases.

[302] See Bouillet, i. p. lxxiii. 344-352.

[303] Plato, Timaeus, p. 35; Cary, 12.

[304] These images of the universal Soul are the faculties of the soul, sense-power, vegetative power, generative power or nature; see iv. 4.13, 14.

[305] "Turning" means here to incline.

[306] See St. Paul, Rom. for phantasy, or imagination; vii. 7-25.

[307] See iv. 3.29-31, also i. 1.9; Numenius, fr. ii. 8, 19; iii. See section 10.

[308] See i. 2.5.

[309] iv. 3.19, 23.

[310] See ii. 9.3, 4, 11, 12.

[311] Fancy or representation, i. 4.10; iv. 3.3, 30, 31.

[312] See 4.3.19, 23; 6.7.6.7.

[313] Plato, Rep. x. p. 611; Cary, 11.

[314] For this see 4.3.12, 18; 4.8.

[315] Odyss. xi. 602, 5; see 4.3.27.

[316] We find here a reassertion of Numenius's doctrine of two souls in man, fr. 53.

[317] Bouillet observes that this book is only a feeble outline of some of the ideas developed in vi. 7, 8, and 9. The biographical significance of this might be as follows. As in the immediately preceding books Plotinos was harking back to Numenius's doctrines, he may have wished to reconcile the two divergent periods, the Porphyrian monism of vi. 7 and 8, with the earlier Amelian dualism of vi. 9. This was nothing derogatory to him; for it is well known that there was a difference between the eclectic monism of the young Plato of the Republic, and the more logical dualism of the older Plato of the Laws. This latter was represented by Numenius and Amelius; the former--combined with Aristotelian and Stoic elements--by Porphyry. Where Plato could not decide, why should we expect Plotinos to do so? And, as a matter of fact, the world also has never been able to decide, so long as it remained sincere, and did not deceive itself with sophistries, as did Hegel. Kant also had his "thing-in-itself"--indeed, he did little more than to develop the work of Plotinos.

[318] As the Stoics would say.

[319] Which is one of the three hypostases, ii. 9.1 and v. 1.

[320] We see here Plotinos feeling the approach of this impending dissolution.

[321] Arranged by Bouillet in the order of the Enneads they summarize.

[322] Passages in quotation marks are from the text of Plotinos.

[323] See i. 2.3.

[324] See i. 2.4.

[325] See i. 2.4.

[326] See i. 2.6.

[327] See i. 2.7.

[328] See i. 2.7.

[329] See i. 2.5.

[330] See i. 8.1.

[331] See 36.38.

[332] These are the three divine hypostases, i. 8.2; ii. 9.1.

[333] See ii. 2.2.

[334] See v. 3.6.

[335] See iii. 7.2.

[336] See iii. 7.2.

[337] A pun on "noein" and "nous."

[338] See v. 3.10-12.

[339] See v. 6.11, 12, 13.

[340] See v. 4.3, 2, 12.

[341] See v. 4.4, 9.

[342] See vi. 4.9.

[343] See vi. 4.16.

[344] See iii. 5.7-9. from Plato.

[345] See vi. 2; vi. 5.

[346] See vi. 5.1.

[347] See vi. 4.4.

[348] See vi. 5.2.

[349] See vi. 5.3, 6.

[350] See vi. 5.4.

[351] See vi. 8.4.

[352] See vi. 5.12.

[353] See iv. 8.1.

[354] See iv. 8.1.

[355] See 23.

[356] Stobaeus, Ecl. Phys., i. 52, ed. Heeren.

[357] See iv. 3.23.

[358] In his book "On the Soul."

[359] See i. 1.12.

[360] See ii. 6.1.

[361] See Ennead, i. 1.

[362] Stobaeus, Ecl. Physicae, i. 52, p. 878.

[363] Of Human Nature, xv.

[364] de Anima, ii. 3.

[365] Stobaeus, Eclogae Physicae, i. 52. p. 894.

[366] On Human Nature, 2.

[367] See Plotinos, ii. 7.1; Porphyry, Principles, 17, 18, 21, 22, 36, 38.

[368] See iv. 3.20.

[369] See ii. 3.5.

[370] See iv. 3.20.

[371] In his treatise on Providence; Photius, Biblioteca, 127, 461.

[372] i. 1.8; Num. 10.

[373] i. 1.10.

[374] 25.4.a.

[375] 38; 53.

[376] i. 8.1; Num. 16.

[377] i. 8.2.

[378] in v. 5.1.

[379] Num. 27.a.8.

[380] 27.b.10.

[381] Num. 36,a.

[382] In i. 8.3.

[383] Num. 16.

[384] i. 8.4.

[385] 11.

[386] Num. 16.

[387] Num. 15.16.

[388] i. 8.6.

[389] 16.

[390] i. 8.7.

[391] 1.8.10.

[392] 18.

[393] ii. 9.

[394] ii. 4.1.

[395] ii. 4.5.

[396] ii. 4.6.

[397] ii. 4.7.

[398] Num. 32, 18.

[399] Num. 48.

[400] Num. 14.

[401] i. 8.7, with ii. 4.7.

[402] In ii. 4.15, 16.

[403] heterotês.

[404] ii. 5.

[405] In ii. 5.3.

[406] Num. 20.

[407] iii. 6.6 to end.

[408] iii. 6.12.

[409] iii. 6.11, 12.

[410] 33.

[411] iii. 8.13.

[412] iii. 6.19.

[413] iii. 6.11.

[414] iii. 6.9.

[415] iii. 6.7, 18; with Num. 12, 15, 17.

[416] iii. 6.6.

[417] iii. 6.13; Num. 12; 30.

[418] iii. 6.18; v. 1.1, etc.

[419] iii. 6.6, 13; see ii. 5.3, 5.

[420] iii. 6.14.

[421] iii. 6.11, as against Num. 14, 16.

[422] In iii. 6.6, 8, 10.

[423] In iii. 6.6.

[424] iii. 6.7, 13; see ii. 5.5.

[425] iii. 6.13, 6, 16, 17, 18.

[426] iii. 6.15.

[427] iii. 6.19.

[428] iii. 6.15.

[429] In ii. 5.5.

[430] v. 1.7; iii. 5.6.

[431] iv. 4.13.

[432] In iv. 4.15.

[433] vi. 3.7.

[434] v. 1.7.

[435] i. 8.

[436] ii. 4.

[437] ii. 5.

[438] iii. 6.

[439] In iv. 4.13.

[440] Life of Plotinos, 24, 25.

[441] Vit. Plot. 4, 5, 13, 17.

[442] Ib. 6.

[443] 26.

[444] 14.

[445] 17, 18, 21.

[446] 1, 2, 7.

[447] 14.

[448] 10.

[449] See Daremberg, s. v.

[450] 18.

[451] 17.

[452] 3.

[453] As may be seen in Daremberg's Dictionary of Antiquities, s. v.

[454] Ib. 24.

[455] In c. 8.

[456] c. 10.

[457] 48. Plot. i. 1.2, 12, etc.

[458] Enn. i. 1.2; Num. 29; i. 1.7.

[459] i. 1.3; see Num. 32.

[460] i. 1.7, 12.

[461] 53.

[462] i. 1.13.

[463] 30.21.

[464] i. 1.12.

[465] iv. 8, or even iv. 3.12-18.

[466] 2.9.10.

[467] 1.4.8, 16.

[468] 1.7.3.

[469] Porphyry, Biography 2.

[470] Cave of the Nymphs, 54.

[471] Plato, p. 147.

[472] Rep. iv. 9.

[473] Plut. Def. Or. 17.

[474] To hegemonikon. Enn. ii. 4.2.

[475] ii. 5.3.

[476] ii. 5.5.

[477] vi. 3.7.

[478] In i. 8.3.

[479] In i. 8.10.

[480] 3.6, 14.

[481] 1.8, 13.

[482] 2.9.2.

[483] Num. 26.

[484] Enn. iii. 6.6, 7.

[485] de Mund. iv. 21.

[486] Chaignet, H. Ps. d. G., v. 138.

[487] Proclus, in Parm. vi. 27.

[488] Energeia and dynamis.

[489] 5.1.7, 19.

[490] iii. 5.3.

[491] Ib. 4.7.

[492] Ib. 9.

[493] v. 3.5.

[494] i. 4.14.

[495] iii. 5.6.

[496] 1.1.8.

[497] i. 8.2.

[498] In i. 4.10.

[499] In ii. 9.1.

[500] iii. 3.4.

[501] iii. 2.11.

[502] i. 4.9.

[503] H. Ps. d. Gr. iv. 244.

[504] Enn. vi. 4.9.

[505] Chaignet, ib., iv. 337; Enn. v. 1.7, 10.

[506] ii. 9.1, 2.

[507] See McClintock and Strong, B. T. & E. Encyclopedia, s. v.

[508] Enn. vi, 5.7.

[509] vi. 2.8, 9.

[510] See iv. 4.26; vi. 7.12, 13.

[511] See i. 8.4.

[512] See iv. 2.15.

[513] See iv. 3.9.

[514] See vi. 4.14; vi. 5.6; i. 1.9.

[515] Rom. vii. 7.25.

[516] See v. 1.10.

[517] See iv. 8.5, 6, and iv. 7.13, 14, and iii. 6.14.

[518] See i. 8.13

[519] iv. 3.11.

[520] vi. 1.10.

[521] ii. 1.4.

[522] v. 1.1, v. 4.2, v. 8.11, i. 4.11, v. 1.7, vi. 8.4, iv. 8.4.

[523] i. 1.9 and 12.

[524] x. 2, Enn. ii. 9.13.

[525] Biography, 16.

[526] See v. 8.8.

[527] See viii. 5.12.

[528] See vi. 8.9.

[529] See vi. 7.17.

[530] See v. 5.3.

[531] Rev. iv. 6; see iii. 2.11.

[532] See ii. 9.5; Rev. xxi. 1.

[533] See iii. 2.15.

[534] See v. 3.8.

[535] See i. 8.6.

[536] See iv. 3.6; Jno. xiv. 2.

[537] See iii. 2.4, and Rom. iii. 20.

[538] See vi. 8.15, and Rom. viii. 39.

[539] See v. 5.11, and 1 Cor. xi. 22.

[540] See ii. 1.4, and 2 Cor. xii. 2.

[541] See vi. 2, and Gal. iv. 9.

[542] See ii. 9.6, and i. Tim. 1.4.

[543] See ii. 9.14, and Mark vi. 7.

[544] See v. 3.17, and Mk. ix. 43, 45.

[545] See v. 9.5, and Mt. xxiv. 13.

[546] See vi. 9.9; vi. 5.12, and Acts xvii. 28.

[547] See v. 8.12, and Heb. ii. 11-17

[548] See vi. 7.29, and Jas. i. 17.

[549] Luke xi. 13.

[550] See i. 6.9; ii. 4.5.

[551] v. 5.13.

[552] ii. 9.4.

[553] iv. 3.11.

[554] ii. 9.5.

[555] iv. 8.9.

[556] v. 9.4.

[557] See iii. 8.4; iv. 2.1; vi. 7.8.

[558] See ii. 4.5; v. 7.3; vi. 8.20.

[559] See vi. 6.11.

[560] See vi. 8.20.

[561] See iv. 3.17; vi. 4.9.

[562] See v. 3.15.

[563] See vi. 7.1.

[564] See v. 2.1.

[565] See v. 1.6.

[566] See i. 4.9.

[567] See iii. 8.3.

[568] See vi. 2.8, 9.

[569] See iii. 8.10; ii. 9.2.

[570] See iv. 7.10; v. 1.4; vi. 7.2.

[571] See ii. 9.2.

[572] See vi. 5.7.

[573] iii. 6.6 to end.

[574] N. 20.6.

[575] ii. 9.10.

[576] i. 8.4; ii. 9.2, 10; vi. 7.5, with N. 26.3.

[577] ii. 9.6, with N. 36.

[578] iv. 3.17, with N. 26.3.

[579] v. 3.9; v. 5.7; vi. 5.5.

[580] ii. 9.1; but see ii. 9.8; iv. 8.3, etc.

[581] iv. 3.17.

[582] 46-54.

[583] 49, 50; or, 22%.

[584] 46-48, 51-54; or, 88%.

[585] 22-33, 12 books.

[586] 23, 26, 27, 31, 32, 33; or, 50%.

[587] 22, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30; or, 50%.

[588] 33-45, 12 books.

[589] 34, 37, 38, 39, 43, 44.

[590] 35, 36, 40, 41, 42, 45.

[591] v. 1.9.

[592] v. 5.6; N. 42, 67.

[593] v. 4.2 and N. 15-17.

[594] v. 8.5; v. 9.3; vi. 6.9; and N. 20.

[595] i. 8.6; i. 4.11; iii. 3.7; and N. 16, 17.

[596] vi. 8.19; and N. 10; 32.

[597] v. 1.6; with N. 14.

[598] v. 1.9; with N. 36, 39.

[599] vi. 4.16; iv. 3.11.

[600] N. 54.

[601] N. 49a.

[602] vi. 5.9; and N. 46.

[603] iii. 6.

[604] N. 44.

[605] ii. 7.2; vi. 1.29; and N. 44.

[606] In meaning at least.

[607] iv. 7.2, 3; and N. 44.

[608] iv. 7.2, 3; v. 9.3; N. 40.

[609] Philebus, in iv. 3.1.

[610] vi. 2.21.

[611] i. 2.6; v. 3.17; iii. 4.

[612] vi. 3.16.

[613] i. 6.6.

[614] N. 31.22; 33.8.

[615] iv. 8.2; i. 8.2; v. 5.3; vi. 7.42; and N. 27a. 8.

[616] v. 1.4, and N. 19.

[617] v. 8.3; ii. 9.3, 8.

[618] i. 8.6 and N. 10.

[619] vi. 2.2 and N. 14.

[620] vi. 5.6 and N. 42, 67.

[621] v. 8.3; iii. 4.2; N. 27a. 8.

[622] iii. 8.8; iv. 3.1, 8; vi. 8.7; and N. 27b. 9.

[623] Still, see 30.

[624] iv. 8.2; vi. 9.9; N. 29.

[625] iii. 2.4; v. 1.6; v. 5.7; and N. 29.18.

[626] i. 8.4; ii. 9.2, 10; vi. 7.5 and N. 26.3; 27a. 10.

[627] vi. 5.6; and N. 37, 63.

[628] iv. 7.1; vi. 5.10; and N. 12.8.

[629] vi. 4.10; vi. 5.3; ii. 9.7; with N. 12, 22.

[630] v. 8.13; and N. 26.3.

[631] iii. 2.2; with N. 16, 17.

[632] iii. 1.22; iv. 2.1, 2; iv. 7.2; and N. 38.

[633] ii. 9.7; v. 6.6; vi. 5.3; and N. 12, 15, 22, 26.3.

[634] iv. 3.8; vi. 7.3; and N. 48.

[635] iv. 3.11; with N. 32.

[636] iv. 3.17, 21; with N. 32.

[637] iv. 3.17; with N. 26.3.

[638] iv. 7; and N. 44.

[639] N. 55.

[640] ii. 7.2; vi. 1.29; and N. 44.

[641] iv. 7.3; vi. 3.16; and N. 44.

[642] ii. 3.9; iii. 4.6; and N. 46, 52, 56.

[643] Still, see i. 1.9; iv. 3.31; vi. 4.15; and N. 53.

[644] i. 1.12; ii. 3.9; ii. 9.2; iv. 3.31; iv. 2.2; and N. 53.

[645] iv. 3.31; with N. 32.

[646] N. 52.

[647] i. 1.10; iv. 7.8; v. 8.3.

[648] iii. 4.4; and N. 15.

[649] N. 15.

[650] ii. 9.5.

[651] i. 3.1.

[652] i. 3.2.

[653] i. 3.3.

[654] v. 9.1.

[655] iv. 4.10; with N. 12.

[656] iv. 3.25; with N. 25.

[657] ii. 9.11; i. 6.7; vi. 7.34; vi. 9.11; with N. 10.

[658] iv. 8.8; and N. 51.

[659] iv. 8.1; and N. 62a.

[660] iv. 8.1; quoting Empedocles; N. 43.

[661] iv. 2.2; and N. 27b.

[662] iv. 3.21; and N. 32, 36, 16.

[663] N. 26.

[664] iv. 3.17.

[665] ii. 3.8; iii. 3.4; N. 36, 53.

[666] ii. 9.6.

[667] v. 9.5; and N. 28.

[668] iv. 7.14; and N. 55, 56.

[669] 61, 62a.

[670] ii. 9.14.

[671] 10.

[672] iii. 6.6 to end.

[673] 14, 15, 16, 17, 44.

[674] vi. 1, and passim.

[675] ii. 3.16; ii. 4.16; ii. 5.2; and N. 55.

[676] i. 8.15; i. 1.9; i. 4.10; iv. 3.3, 30.31; vi. 8.3; iv. 7.8; and N. 2, 3, 4.7 and 24.

[677] vi. 5.6; and N. 42, 67.

[678] All of ii. 6; iii. 6.6; iii. 7.5; iii. 8.9; iv. 3.9; iv. 3.24; v. 3.6, 15, 17; v. 4.1, 2; v. 5.10, 13, 55; v. 8.5, 6; v. 9.3; vi. 2.2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 13; vi. 3.6, 16; vi. 6.10, 13, 16; vi. 7.41; vi. 9.2, 3.

[679] v. 9.3; and N. 21, 22.

[680] v. 4.2; and N. 10; vi. 6.9; and N. 34.

[681] vi. 6.9; N. 10, 21.

[682] v. 1.5; vi. 5.9; vi. 6.16; and N. 46.

[683] vi. 6.16; and N. 60.

[684] vi. 2.9; and N. 26.

[685] vi. 4.2.

[686] ii. 4.5; iv. 8.7; v. 5.4; and N. 36b.

[687] iv. 3.1; v. 4.2; and N. 36c?

[688] ii. 5.3; and N. 14, 16, 26.

[689] v. 4.2; v. 5.4; and N. 14.

[690] ii. 9.1; and N. 25.

[691] iii. 8.9; iii. 9.1; v. 1.8; and N. 36, 39.

[692] v. 5.3; and N. 36, 39.

[693] i. 3.4; and N. 10, 13.

[694] ii. 4.9; ii. 7.2; vi. 1.29; vi. 3.16; and N. 44.

[695] iv. 9.4; and N. 44.

[696] iii. 4.1; and N. 44.

[697] iv. 6.7; and N. 44.

[698] iv. 3.20; and N. 12, 44.

[699] N. 20.

[700] N. 21.

[701] iii. 7.3, 5; and N. 19.

[702] N. 55, 56; 57.

[703] iii. 4.2; and N. 57.

[704] i. 8.2; iii. 2.16; iv. 7.14; vi. 6.16; vi. 7.6; and N. 32.

[705] v. 1.1; and N. 17, 26.

[706] vi. 5.3; vi. 7.31; and N. 11, 15, 16, 17, 12.7, 22, 26.

[707] i. 8.3; v. 5.13; and N. 15, 16, 49b.

[708] i. 4.11; i. 8.6, 7; ii. 3.18; iii. 2.5, 15; iii. 8.9; and N. 16, 17, 18.

[709] i. 8.7; iii. 2.2, N. 15, 17. Alexander of Aphrodisia taught this world was a mixture; ii. 7.1; iv. 7.13.

[710] iv. 9.4; v. 16; and N. 26.

[711] Plotinos passim; N. 25.

[712] vi. 1.23; and N. 18. Also vi. 9.10, 11.

[713] Passim; N. 10, 37, 63.

[714] v. 8.1; and N. 43.

[715] iii. 9.3; and N. 31.

[716] vi. 2.7; vi. 3.27; and N. 19.4, 20; 27a; 30.

[717] iii. 7.3; iv. 4.33; and N. 30.

[718] ii. 4.2-5; ii. 5.3; v. 4.2; and N. 26.

[719] ii. 4.12; etc.

[720] ii. 4.6; and N. 11, 18.

[721] ii. 6.2; and N. 12.8; 18.

[722] ii. 4.10; and N. 12, 16, 17.

[723] v. 1.6; vi. 9.10, 11; and N. 10.

[724] vi. 4.2; vi. 9.3; and N. 10.

[725] iv. 7.3; and N. 13, 27, 44.

[726] iv. 4.16; and N. 46.

[727] Might it mean an angle, and one of its sides?

[728] iii. 4.2; and N. 27.

[729] iv. 8.5, 6; and N. 27b.

[730] v. 9.6; and N. 23.

[731] v. 1.5.

[732] vi. 7.17, 36; vi. 9.9; and N. 29.

[733] iii. 4.2; iv. 3.11; v. 8.3; v. 1.2; and N. 27b.

[734] iii. 4.6; and N. 35a.

[735] vi. 7.1; and N. 27a, b.

[736] Creation or adornment, ii. 4.4, 6; iv. 3.14; and N. 14, 18.

[737] i. 1.3; iv. 3.17, 21; and N 32.

[738] Bouillet ii. 520.

[739] ib. ii. 584.

[740] ib. ii. 607.

[741] ib. ii. 597.

[742] ib. ii. 561.

[743] B. iii. 638-650.

[744] ib. 651-653.

[745] ib. 654-656.

[746] Bouillet ii. 520.

[747] ib. ii. 562.

[748] ib. ii. 585.

[749] ib. ii. 588.

[750] Biog. 8, 13.

[751] Biog. 17, 18.

[752] Biog. 24.

[753] iii. 7.1, 4.

[754] v. 8.4.

[755] v. 8.5, 6.

[756] iii. 5.8.

[757] vi. 3.8.

[758] i. 8.7; ii. 4.4; iii. 8.11; iv. 8.13; v. 9.8. 4.4; iii. 8.11; v. 8.13; v. 9.8. 1.11.

[762] v. 5.5.

[763] vi. 1.23.

[764] ii. 9.4.

[765] v. 5.1.

[766] iii. 5.3.

[767] v. 5.5.

[768] v. 3.5, 6.

[769] vi. 1.15.

[770] iii. 5.9, 10.

[771] iv. 3.14.

[772] iv. 7.4; ii. 6.2; iii. 2.17.

[773] iv. 4.29.

[774] v. 9.5.

[775] iv. 9.3.

[776] vi. 1.18.

[777] vi. 8.18.

CONCORDANCE TO PLOTINOS.

Of the two numbers in the parenthesis, the first is the chronological book number, the second is the reference's page in this translation.

A

Abandonment by Providence, even of the mediocre, impossible, iii. 2.9 (47-1058).

Ability or desire is the limit of man's union with the divinity, v. 8.11 (31-569).

Absolute Beauty is a formless shape, vi. 7.33 (38-754).

Absolute Evil is the goal of the degenerate soul, i. 8.15 (51-1163).

Absolute Existent is preceded by contingent, vi. 1.26 (42-881).

Abstraction is method of reaching divinity, vi. 8.21 (39-811).

Abstraction of qualities ends in thing-in-itself, ii. 4.10 (12-207).

Abstraction of the form produces thought of infinite, vi. 6.3 (34-646).

Abundance and Need, myth of, iii. 6.14 (26-375).

Abundance (Poros), myth of, iii. 5.2-10 (50-1125 to 1140).

Academy, vi. 1.14, 30 (42-863, 888).

Accidents are received by the soul from matter, v. 9.14 (5-117).

Accidents, is the fifth physical category of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 (44-937).

Accomplishments are only temporary crutches for development, i. 4.16 (46-1040).

Accretion, foreign, is the nature of ugliness, i. 6.5 (1-48).

Accretions to soul, and body, are removed from soul by philosophic "separation," i. 1.12 (53-1204).

Action and experience does not include prediction with its responsiveness, and is underlayed by transmission, reception, and relation, vi. 1.22 (42-874).

Action and experiencing, Aristotelian category, vi. 1.15 (42-863).

Action and passion iii. 3.2 (48-1078).

Action and reaction form but a single genus, vi. 1.19 (42-870).

Action and suffering cannot be separate categories, but are subsumed under movement, vi. 1.17 (42-866).

Action does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.16 (43-920).

Action is natural on both wholes and parts, iv. 4.31 (28-487).

Action, uniform, is exerted by body and varied by the soul, iv. 7.4 (2-62).

Actions, some appear imperfect when not joined to time, vi. 1.19 (42-868).

Actions do not control freedom of will and virtue, vi. 8.5 (39-779).

Active life predisposes to subjection to enchantments, iv. 4.43 (28-507).

Activity of soul is triple: thought, self-preservation and creation, iv. 8.3 (6-125).

Actors good and bad, are rewarded by the manager: so are souls, iii. 2.17 (47-1072).

Actual, everything is actual in the intelligible world, ii. 5.3 (25-346).

Actual matter cannot be anything, as it is non-being, ii. 5.2, 4 (25-343 to 347).

Actuality and potentiality, iii. 9.8 (13-225).

Actuality and potentiality are inapplicable to the divinity, ii. 9.1 (33-600).

Actualization, continuous, constitutes Intelligence, iv. 7.13 (18), (2-84); iv. 8.6, 7 (6-129, 130).

Actualization is a far better category than doing or acting, vi. 1.15 (42-863).

Actualization is prior to potentiality (devolution), iv. 7.8 (11), (2-74).

Actualization of soul in life, is the sole use of its existence, iv. 8.5 (6-127).

Actualization, single and simple, iv. 7.12 (17), (2-83).

Actualization when appearing is harmonized to its seminal reason, vi. 3.16 (44-960).

Actualizations are none of bodies that enter into a mixture, iv. 7.8 (10), (2-72).

Actualizations are the condition of Intelligence, because its thought is identical with its essence, v. 9.3 (5-104).

Actualizations, permanent, form the hypostasis, v. 3.12 (49-1111).

Actualizations, relative, are sensations, not experiences, iv. 6.2 (41-831).

Acuteness may destroy excessive ecstatic vision, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Administration by Jupiter does not imply memory, iv. 4.9 (28-453).

Admiration of his handiwork, by the Creator, refers to the world-model, v. 8.8 (31-564).

Admiration of the world, by Plato, supplements his hatred of the body, ii. 9.17 (33-633).

Adrastea, law of, is justice, ii. 3.8 (52-1173); iii. 2.4, 13 (47-1049 to 1062).

Adulteries not produced by planet-positions, ii. 3.6 (52-1171).

Adumbrations of superior principles, i. 6.8 (1-52).

Advantages resulting from ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Aeon Jesus, is unaccountable, ii. 9.1 (33-601).

Aeon, see eternity, throughout, iii. 7.1 sqq (45-985).

Aesthetic sense appreciates beauty, i. 6.2 (1-42).

Affection and weaknesses of man subject him to magic, iv. 4.44 (28-508).

"Affection of matter," definition of soul; if such, whence is she? iv. 7.3.d (2-59).

Affections are common to soul and body; not all are such, i. 1.5 (53-1197).

Affections caused by incorporeal's affective part, iii. 6.4 (26-357).

Affections, derivation of qualities from them is of no importance, vi. 1.11 (42-857).

Affections of soul, like a musician playing a lyre, iii. 6.4 (26-358).

Affections produced by "tension" in lyre-strings, iv. 7.8 (2-75).

Age, pun on "aeons," iii. 7.4 (45-992).

Aggregate, composite, see "combination," i. 1.1 (53-1191).

Aggregate individual, formed by uniting of soul and body, i. 1.6 (53-1197).

Aggregate of molecules could not possess life and intelligence, iv. 7.2, 3 (2-57).

Agriculture, v. 9.11 (5-114).

Aid to magnitude-perception, is color-difference, ii. 8.1 (35-681).

Air and fire, action of, not needed by Heaven, ii. 1.8 (40-826).

Air contained in intelligible world, vi. 7.11 (38-720).

Air not necessary, even for hearing, iv. 5.5 (29-523).

Air, relation to light, iv. 5.6 (29-524).

Air, useless as transmitting medium, iv. 5.3 (29-519).

Alexander of Aphrodisia's theory of mixture, iv. 7.2, 8 (2-58, 72); iii. 1.7 (3-96).

Alienation, v. 1.10 (10-190).

All in all, iii. 8.8 (30-543); iv. 3.8 (27-402).

All is intelligence, vi. 7.17 (38-729).

All things are united by a common source, vi. 7.12 (38-721).

All things, how the same principle can exist in them, vi. 4.6 (22-295).

All things, is the soul, iii. 4.3 (15-236).

All things, transcended by their principle, v. 2.1 (11-193).

Alone with the alone, i. 6.7 (1-50); vi. 7.34 (38-757); vi. 9.11 (9-172).

Aloneness of Supreme, v. 1.6 (10-182).

Alteration, definition of, vi. 3.22 (44-973).

Alteration, not constituted by composition and decomposition, vi. 3.25 (44-978).

Alteration of soul, Stoic conception, opposed, iii. 6.3 (26-355).

Alternate living in Intelligence and world, by soul, iv. 8.4 (6-126).

Alternate rising and falling of soul when in body, iii. 1.8 (3-97).

Amphibians, souls are, iv. 8.48 (6-126).

Analogy explains prediction, iii. 3.6 (48-1086).

Analogy only allows us to attribute physical qualities to the Supreme, vi. 8.8 (39-785).

Analysis, contingency is eliminated in, vi. 8.14 (39-798).

Analyze, object of myths, iii. 5.10 (50-1138).

Anger localized in the heart, iv. 3.23 (27-426); iv. 4.28 (28-481).

Anger-part of earth, iv. 4.28 (28-482).

Anger-part of soul explained, iii. 6.2 (26-354).

Anger-power, does not originate in body, iv. 4.28 (28-481).

Anger-trace of the soul, originates in growth and generative power, iv. 4.28 (28-481).

Animal, existing is intelligence (Plato) iii. 9.1 (13-220).

Animal nature formed by light of soul, i. 1-7 (53-1198).

Animal nature, how it is generated, i. 1.12,(53-1205).

Animal, relation of, to human nature, i. 1.7 (53-1199).

Animal, the living, i. 1.5 (53-1196).

Animal, what is it, i. 1.1 (53-1191).

Animals, all are born from essence, vi. 2.21 (43-929).

Animals, are they happy? i. 4.1 (46-1019).

Animals, distinction to the whole, i. 1.7 (53-1199).

Animals, do they possess right to living well, i. 4.2 (46-1020).

Animals, four kinds, seen in intelligence, iii. 9.1 (13-221).

Animals, individual and universal, exist later than number, vi. 6.15 (34-668).

Animals, irrational, must exist within intelligence, vi. 7.8 (38-713).

Animals, lower nature of, ridiculous to complain of, iii. 2.9 (47-1059).

Animals, many are not so irrational as different, vi. 7.9 (38-714).

Animals, their animating principle, i. 1.10 (53-1204).

Animated, universe was always, iv. 3.9 (27-404).

Animating principle of animals, i. 1.11 (53-1204).

Answers, how they come to prayers, iv. 4.41 (28-505).

Antechamber of good is intelligence, v. 9.2 (5-104).

Anterior things can be only in lower principles, iv. 4.16 (28-461).

Anteriority in intelligible, is order not time, iv. 4.1 (28-443).

Anxiety absent from rule of world by soul, iv. 8.2 (6-122).

Aphrodite, see Venus, pun on, iii. 5.8 (50-1137).

Apollo, name of Supreme, v. 5.6 (32-584).

Apostasy of soul from God, v. 1.1 (10-173).

Appearance, by it only does matter participate in the intelligible, iii. 6.11 (26-369).

Appearance, magnitude is only, iii. 6.18 (26-381).

Appearance, makes up unreal sense objects, iii. 6.12 (26-371).

Appearance of intelligence in the intelligible, v. 3.8 (49-1102).

Apperception-unity, iv. 4.1 (28-442).

Appetite is the actualization of lustful desire, iv. 8.8 (6-132).

Appetite keeps an affection, not memory, iv. 3.28 (27-435).

Appetite located in combination of body and soul, iv. 4.20 (28-468).

Appetite not simultaneous with desire, i. 1.5 (53-1197).

Appetite noticed only when perceived by reason or interior sense, iv. 8.8 (6-132).

Appetite, when swaying soul, leaves it passive, iii. 1.9 (3-98).

Apportionment of spirit, iv. 7.8 (2-68).

Appreciation of self, v. 1.1 (10-174).

Approach, how the body approaches the soul, vi. 4.15 (22-309).

Approach impossible in connection with non-spatial intelligible light, v. 5.8 (32-587).

Approach of soul to good, by simplification, i. 6.6 (1-50).

Approach to Supreme is sufficient talk of Him, v. 3.14 (49-1114).

Approach to the First, manner of, v. 5.10 (32-591).

Approach to the soul, which is lowest divine, v. 1.7 (10-186).

Approaching of soul's rejection of form, proves formlessness of the Supreme, vi. 7.34 (38-756).

Archetype of the world, the intelligible is, v. 1.4 (10-178).

Archetype, universal, contained by intelligence, v. 9.9 (5-112).

Archetypes, vi. 5.8 (23-322).

Aristotelian category of When? vi. 1.13 (42-860).

Aristotelian distinction, actuality and potentiality, ii. 5.1 (25-341).

Aristotle was wrong in considering rough, rare and dense qualities, vi. 1.11 (42-857).

Art intelligible, creates the artist and later nature, v. 8.1 (31-552).

Art makes a statue out of rough marble, v. 8.1 (31-552).

Artificial movements, vi. 3.26 (44-980).

Artist of the universe is the soul, iv. 7.13 (2-84).

Arts, auxiliary, which help the progress of nature, v. 9.11 (5-115).

Arts, dependent on the soul, v. 9.14 (5-118).

Arts, most achieve their own ends, iv. 4.31 (28-488).

Arts, some, merely earthly, others more intelligible, v. 9.11 (5-114).

Ascended soul, not even, need be divided, iv. 4.1 (28-442).

Ascension of sign, absurd, ii. 3.6 (52-1171).

Ascension of soul in ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170).

Ascension to Divinity, iv. 7.10 (2-79).

Ascension towards divinity, process of life, i. 6.7 (1-50).

Ascent cannot stop with the soul, why? v. 9.4 (5-106).

Ascent of life witnessed to disappearance of contingency, vi. 8.15 (39-801).

Ascent of the soul psychologically explained, vi. 4.16 (22-310).

Aspects and houses, absurdity, ii. 3.4 (52-1168).

Assimilation depends on taking a superior model, i. 2.7 (19-267).

Assimilation of matter, not complete in earthly defects, v. 9.12 (5-115).

Assimilation to divine, key of vision to ecstasy, i. 6.9 (1-53).

Assimilation to divinity, is flight from world, i. 2.5 (19-263).

Assimilation to divinity, is soul's welfare and beauty. i. 6.6 (1-49).

Assimilation to divinity results only in higher virtues, i. 2.1 (19-256).

Assimilation to Supreme, by homely virtues, indirectly, i. 2.3 (19-260).

Astrologers make cosmic deductions from prognostication, iii. 1.2 (3-89).

Astrological influence is merely an indication, iv. 4.34 (28-494).

Astrological influence, partly action, partly significance, iv. 4.34 (28-495).

Astrological power not due to physical soul, iv. 4.38 (28-501).

Astrological system of fate, iii. 1.5 (3-92).

Astrological theories absurd, ii. 3.6 (52-1171).

Astrological views of Venus, Jupiter and Mercury, ii. 3.5 (52-1169).

Astrologically, divine would be blamed for unjust acts, iii. 2.10 (47-1059).

Astrology confuted, leaves influence of world-soul, iv. 4.32 (28-490).

Astrology replaced by natural production of souls, iv. 4.38 (28-501).

Astrology replaced by radiation of good and characteristic figures, iv. 4.35 (28-498).

Astrology reveals teleology, ii 3.7 (52-1172).

Astrology, signs only concatenations from universal reason, iv. 4.3 (28-502).

Astrology, truth of, judgement of one part by another, ii. 3.7 (52-1173).

Athens, vi. 1.14 (42-863).

Atomism, does not demand a medium for vision, iv. 5.2 (29-516).

Atoms, iii. 1.2 (3-88).

Atoms do not explain matter, ii. 4.7 (12-204).

Atropos, ii. 3.15 (52-1182).

Attachment to centre constitutes divinity, vi. 9.8 (9-163).

Attention, condition of perception, v. 1.12 (10-191).

Attracting all things, does the power and beauty of essence, vi. 6.18 (34-678).

Attribute, fourth physical category of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 (44-937).

Attributing qualities to good, would degrade it, v. 5.13 (32-595).

Audacity not in higher soul, see boldness, i. 1.2 (53-1192).

Audacity the cause of human apostasy, v. 1.1 (10-173); v. 2.2 (11-195).

Author of this perfection must be above it, vi. 7.32 (38-752).

Autocracy of divinity, vi. 8.21 (39-810).

Aversion for ugliness, explains love of beauty, i. 6.5 (1-47).

Avoid magic enchantments, how to, iv. 4.44 (28-510).

Avoidance of passions, is task of philosophy, iii. 6.5 (26-358).

Bacchus, mirror of, iv. 3.12 (27-409).

Ballet, vi. 9.8 (9-165); vi. 2.11 (43-912).

Ballet dancer, iii. 2.17 (47-1071).

Bastard, reason goes beyond corporeity, ii. 4.12 (12-212).

Bastard reasoning, is abstraction reaching thing in itself, ii. 4.10, 12 (12-207, 212); i. 8.9, 10 (51-1156); vi. 8.8 (39-786).

Bath-tub, simile of, vi 9.8 (9-163).

Beauties, moral, more delightful than sense-beauties, i. 6.4 (1-46).

Beautification, by descent upon object of reason from divine, i. 6.2 (1-43).

Beautiful, inferior to good, v. 5.12 (32-593).

Beautiful, most things, such only by participation, i. 6.2 (1-43).

Beautiful, nothing more could be imagined than the world, ii. 9.4 (33-606).

Beautiful, the Supreme, of three ranks of existence, vi. 7.42 (38-770).

Beautiful, what is its principle, i. 6.1 (1-41).

Beauty, v. 1.11 (10-189).

Beauty absolute, is a formless shape, vi. 7.33 (38-754).

Beauty and good, identical, i. 6.6 (1-51).

Beauty and power of essence attracts all things, vi. 6.18 (34-678).

Beauty appreciated by an aesthetic sense, i. 6.3 (1-43).

Beauty belongs to men, when they belong to and know themselves, v. 8.13 (31-574).

Beauty classified along with the relatives, vi. 3.11 (44-952).

Beauty comes from form imparted by originator, v. 8.2 (31-553).

Beauty consists in kinship to the soul, i. 6.2 (1-42).

Beauty consists in participation in a form, i. 6.2 (1-43).

Beauty does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-920).

Beauty does not possess extension, iv. 7.8 (2-69).

Beauty, emotions of, caused by invincible soul, i. 6.5 (1-46).

Beauty essential is Supreme, the shapeless shaper, and the transcendent, vi. 7.33 (38-754).

Beauty external, appreciation of, depends on cognition of interior beauty, v. 8.2 (31-554).

Beauty external, partial, does not mar beauty of universe, ii. 9.17 (33-634).

Beauty, highest conceivable, is the model, v. 8.8 (31-564).

Beauty, if it is a genus, must be one of the posterior ones, vi. 2.18 (43-923).

Beauty inferior to good, i. 6.9 (1-54).

Beauty in last analysis is intelligible, v. 8.3 (31-555).

Beauty in nothing if not in God v. 8.8 (31-564).

Beauty intelligible, v. 8 (31).

Beauty intelligible, does not shine merely on surface, v. 8.10 (31-568).

Beauty interior, could not be appreciated, without interior model, i. 6.4 (1-45).

Beauty is creating principle of primary reason, v. 8.3 (31-555).

Beauty is immortal, iii. 5.1 (50-1124).

Beauty is inherent wisdom, v. 8.2 (31-554).

Beauty is symmetry, acc. to Stoics, opposed, i. 6.1 (1-41).

Beauty is unseen, in supreme fusion, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Beauty, love for, explained by aversion for opposite, i. 6.5 (1-47).

Beauty makes being desirable, v. 8.9 (31-565).

Beauty model, is intelligence, hence very beautiful, v. 8.13 (31-573).

Beauty not in physical characters, but in color form, v. 8.2 (31-553).

Beauty of body need not imply attachment thereto, ii. 9.17 (33-634).

Beauty of daily life reviewed, in sight, sound, science and morals, i. 6.1 (1-40).

Beauty of soul is as the matter to the soul, v. 8.3 (31-555); 6.6 (1-43).

Beauty of world, even added to, iv. 3.14 (27-412).

Beauty primary, chiefly revealed in virtuous soul, v. 8.3 (31-555).

Beauty, shining, highest appearance of vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10 (31-568).

Beauty that is perceivable is a form, beneath super beautiful, v. 8.8 (31-564).

Beauty transition from sense to intellectual, i. 6.2 (1-43).

Beauty visible, is effect and image of the intelligible, iii. 5.1 (50-1122).

Becoming, v. 1.9 (10-187).

Begetter of intelligence must be simpler than it, iii. 8.8 (30-542).

Begetter of intelligence reached by intuition, not reason, iii. 8.8 (30-543).

Begetting, eternal, is the world, ii. 9.3 (33-604).

Begetting, lower forms of, due to seminal reasons, iii. 8.7 (30-541).

Begetting Son, by Supreme, result of ecstasy, v. 8.12 (31-572).

Beginning, Heaven has none, proves its immortality, ii. 1.4 (40-818).

Begotten, nothing is in universal soul, vi. 4.14 (22-307).

Begotten what is, not seminal reason, contains order, iv. 4.16 (28-461).

Being, v. 1.5, 8 (10-181 and 186).

Being, above intelligent life, iii. 6.6 (25-360).

Being, actualized, less perfect than essence, ii. 6.1 (17-245).

Being and actualization, constitute self-existent principle, vi. 8.7 (39-784).

Being and essence identical with unity, vi. 9.2 (9-149).

Being and quiddity earlier than suchness, ii. 6.2 (17-248).

Being cannot be ascribed to matter, vi. 3.7 (44-944).

Being cannot precede such being, ii. 6.2 (17-248).

Being contains its cause, vi. 7.3 (38-704).

Being desirable because beautiful, v. 8.9 (31-566).

Being distinguished into four senses, vi. 1.2 (42-839).

Being, every one, is a specialized organ of the universe, iv. 4.45 (28-510).

Being in the intelligible is generation in the sense-world, vi. 3.1 (44-933).

Being is very wisdom, v. 8.4, 5 (31-559).

Being loves essence as entire, vi. 5.10 (23-325).

Being lower form of, possessed by evil, i. 8.3 (51-1145).

Being of a soul, iv. 1. (4-100).

Being of a thing displayed by its energy, iii. 1.1 (3-87).

Being physical, is that which is not in a subject, vi. 3.5 (44-941).

Being physical, principle of all other things, vi. 3.4 (44-940).

Being present everywhere entire, only solution of a puzzle, vi. 5.3 (23-317).

Being primary and secondary, divided by no substantial differences, vi. 3.9 (44-949).

Being supra lunar, is deity, in intelligible, iii. 5.6 (50-1132).

Being supreme, not dependent on it, therefore above it, vi. 8.19 (39-807).

Being the basis of judgment, in things participating in being, vi. 5.2 (23-315).

Being universal, description of, vi. 4.2 (23-286).

Being, universal, is undividable, vi. 4.3 (22-288).

Beings, all are contemplation, iii. 8.7 (30-542).

Beings, all contained by intelligence generatively, v. 9.6 (5-109).

Benefits are granted to men through the world-soul's mediation, iv. 4.30 (28-486).

Better nature of man, not dominant because of subconscious nature, iii. 3.4 (48-1081).

Bewitched, gnostics imagine intelligible entities can be, ii. 9.14 (33-627).

Beyond first, impossible to go, vi. 8.11 (39-791).

Bile, fulfils unique role in universe, ii. 3.5 (52-1171).

Birds, overweighted like sensual men, v. 9.1 (5-102).

Birth of subordinate deities, inhering in Supreme, v. 8.9 (31-566).

Birth of subordinate divinities does not affect power of Supreme, v. 8.9 (31-565).

Birth of time reveals nature, iii. 7.10 (45-1005).

Blamed for its imperfections, the world should not be, iii. 2.3 (47-1046).

Blank, mental, differs from impression of shapeless, ii. 4.10 (12-208).

Boast of kinship with divinities, while not being able to leave body, ridiculous, ii. 9.18 (33-637).

Bodies added, introduce conflicting motions, ii. 2.2 (14-231).

Bodies, classification of, vi. 3.9 (44-948).

Bodies classified, not only by forms and qualities and specific forms, vi. 3.10 (44-950).

Bodies could not subsist with power of universal Soul iv. 7.3 (2-60).

Bodies, different kinds of, why souls take on, iv. 3.12 (27-410).

Bodies, even simple, analyzed into form and matter, iv. 7.1 (2-56).

Bodies, human, more difficult to manage than world-body iv. 8.2 (6-121).

Bodies of souls, may be related differently, iv. 4.29 (28-485).

Bodies simple, could not exist, without world-soul iv. 7.3 (2-60).

Bodies, souls descend into, why and how? iv. 3.8 (27-401).

Body, activated only by incorporeal powers, iv. 7.8 (2-70).

Body alone visible, reason why soul is said to be in it, iv. 3.20 (27-419).

Body and soul, consequences of mixture, i. 1.4 (53-1194).

Body and soul forms fusion, iv. 4.18 (28-465).

Body and soul mixture impossible, i. 1.4 (53-1195).

Body and soul primitive relation between, i. 1.3 (53-1194).

Body and soul relation between iv. 3.19 (27-418).

Body, anger-power, does not originate in it, iv. 4.28 (28-480).

Body as rationalized matter, ii. 7.3 (37-696).

Body can lose parts, not the soul, iv. 7.5 (2-63).

Body cannot possess virtue, iv. 7.8 (2-69).

Body cannot think, iv. 7.8 (2-68).

Body contains one kind of desires, iv. 4.20 (28-468).

Body cosmic, perfect and self-sufficient, iv. 8.2 (6-122).

Body could not have sensation, if soul were corporeal, iv. 7.6 (2-65).

Body differs from real man, i. 1.10 (53-1202).

Body, does the anger-power originate in it? iv. 4.28 (28-480).

Body, even simple, composed of form and matter, iv. 7.1 (2-56).

Body exerts a uniform action; soul a varied one, iv. 7.4 (2-62).

Body, eyes of, to close them, method to achieve, i. 6.8 (1-52).

Body grows a little after departure of soul, iv. 4.29 (28-485).

Body has single motion, soul different ones, iv. 7.5 (2-62).

Body, how it approaches the soul, vi. 4.15 (22-309).

Body in soul, not soul in body, iii, 9.3 (13-222); iv. 3.22 (27-423).

Body is composite, therefore perishable, iv. 7.1 (2-56).

Body is instrument of the soul, iv. 7.1 (2-56).

Body is not us but ours, iv. 4.18 (28-465).

Body part of ourselves, i. 1.10 (53-1203); iv. 7.1 (2-56).

Body is proximate transition of the soul, iv. 3.20 (27-420).

Body is tool and matter of soul, iv. 7.1 (2-56).

Body is within soul, iv. 3.20 (27-419).

Body managed by reasoning hence imperfectly, iv. 8.8 (6-132).

Body management, only one phase of excursion of procession, iv. 8.7 (6-131).

Body needs soul for life, iv. 3.19 (27-418).

Body never entirely entered by the soul, iv. 8.8 (6-132).

Body not a vase for the soul, iv. 3.20 (27-420).

Body not constituted by matter exclusively, iv. 7.3 (2-60).

Body of demons is air or fire-like, iii. 5.6 (50-1133); ii. 1.6 (40-823).

Body of elements, common ground of, makes them kindred, ii. 1.7 (40-824).

Body penetrated by soul, but not by another body, iv. 7.8 (2-72).

Body relation to soul, is passage into world of life, vi. 4.12 (22-304);

Body, separation of soul from it, i. 1.3 (53-1193).

Body sick, soul devoted to it, iv. 3.4 (27-395).

Body, superior and inferior of soul, related in three ways, iv. 4.29 (28-485).

Body, the soul uses as tool, i. 1.3 (53-1193).

Body throughout all changes, soul powers remain the same, iv. 3.8 (27-402).

Body used for perception makes feeling, iv. 4.23 (28-475); iv. 7.8 (2-68).

Body, will of stars, do not sway earthly events, iv. 4.34 (28-494).

Body's composition demands the substrate, ii. 4.11 (12-209).

Body's elements cannot harmonize themselves, iv. 7.8 (2-75).

Body's size nothing to do with greatness of soul, vi. 4.5 (22-293).

Boldness, see Audacity; i. 1.2 (53-1192).

Bond of the universe is number, vi. 6.15 (34-670).

Born philosophers alone, reach the higher region, v. 9.2 (5-103).

Both men, we always should be, but are not, vi. 4.14 (22-308).

Boundary of intelligible, location of soul, iv. 8.7 (6-131).

Brains, seat of sensation, iv. 3.23 (27-425).

Brothers of Jupiter unissued yet, v. 8.12 (31-572).

Brutalization or divinization is fate of three men in us, vi. 7.6 (38-708).

Calypso, i. 6.8 (1-53).

Capacity, limits participation in the one, vi. 4.11 (22-302).

Care divine, exemption from certain classes, heartless, ii. 9.16 (33-631).

Care for individual things, draws soul into incarnation, iv. 8.4 (6-124).

Career of the soul, what hell means for it, vi. 4.16 (22-312);

Castration indicates sterility of unitary nature, iii. 6.19 (26-385). v. 8.13 (31-573).

Categories, v. 1.4 (10-180); v. 3.15 (49-1116).

Categories, Aristotelian and Stoic, vi. 1.1 (42-837).

Categories, Aristotelian neglect intelligible world, vi. 1.1 (42-831).

Categories cannot contain both power and lack of power, vi. 1.10 (42-852).

Categories cause one to produce manifoldness, v. 3.15 (49-1116).

Categories, four of Stoics, evaporate, leaving matter as basis, vi. 1.29 (42-885).

Categories, if where and place are different categories, many more may be added, vi. 1.14 (42-862).

Categories, movement and difference applied to intelligence, ii. 4.5 (12-202).

Categories of Plotinos do not together form quality, vi. 2-14 (43-918).

Categories of Plotinos, five, why none were added, vi. 2.9 (43-907).

Categories of Plotinos, six, ii. 4.5 (12-202); ii. 6.2 (17-248); v. 1.4 (10-180); vi. 2.1, 8, 9 (43-891, 904).

Categories of quality, various derivatives of, vi. 3.19 (44-967).

Categories of Stoics enumerated, vi. 1.25 (42-878).

Categories, physical, fourth and fifth, refer to the first three, vi. 3.6 (44-943).

Categories, physical, of Plotinos, enumerated, vi. 3.3 (44-937).

Categories, separate, action and suffering cannot be, vi. 1.17 (42-866).

Categories, single, could not include intelligible and sense being, vi. 1.2 (42-839).

Categories, six, from which all things are derived, v. 1.4 (10-180).

Categories, sources of characteristics, in intelligible, v. 9.10 (5-113).

Categories, unity is not one, arguments against, vi. 2.10 (43-910).

Categories far better than doing or acting actualization, vi. 1.15 (42-863).

Categories, having cannot be, because too various, vi. 1.23 (42-876).

Categories of something common is absurd, vi. 1.25 (42-878).

Categories, why movement is, vi. 3.21 (44-971).

Cause absent, in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563).

Cause coincides with nature in intelligible, vi. 7.19 (38-735).

Cause, everything has, iii. 1.1 (3-86).

Cause, is Supreme, of Heraclitus, iii. 1.2 (3-88).

Cause, of affections, though corporeal, iii. 6.4 (26-356).

Cause of procession of world from unity, v. 2.1 (11-193).

Cause, suitability of, puts Supreme beyond chance, vi. 8.18 (39-806).

Cause ultimate, is nature, iii 1.1 (3-87).

Cause why souls are divine, v. 1.2 (10-175).

Causeless origin, really is determinism, iii. 1.1 (3-86).

Causes, any thing due to several, ii. 3.14 (52-1180).

Causes for incarnation are twofold, iv. 8.1, 5 (6-119, 128).

Causes of deterioration, iii. 3.4 (48-1083).

Causes of things in the world, possible theories, iii. 1.1 (3-86).

Causes proximate are unsatisfactory, demanding the ultimate, iii. 1.2 (3-88).

Causes ulterior always sought by sages, iii. 1.2 (3-88).

Cave, Platonic simile of world, iv. 8.1, 4 (6-120, 126).

Celestial divinities, difference from inferior, v. 8.3 (31-556).

Celestial light not exposed to any wastage, ii. 1.8 (40-827).

Celestial things last longer than terrestrial things, ii. 1.5 (40-819).

Centre is father of the circumference and radii, vi. 8.18 (39-804).

Centre of soul and body, difference between, ii. 2.2 (14-230).

Ceres, myth of soul of earth, iv. 4.27 (28-480).

Certain, conception limiting objects, vi. 6.13 (34-663).

Chains bind soul in incarnation, iv. 8.4 (6-126).

Chains, golden, on captive, as beauty is on matter, i. 8.15 (51-1163).

Chains that hold down Saturn, v. 8.13 (31-573).

Chance, apparent, is really Providence, iii. 3.2 (48-1078).

Chance banished by form, limit and shape, vi. 8.10 (39-789).

Chance, cause of suitability and opportunity, puts them beyond it, vi. 8.17 (39-804).

Chance could not cause the centre of circular of intelligence, vi. 8.18 (39-804).

Chance does not produce supreme being, vi. 8.11 (39-792).

Chance is not the cause of the good being free, vi. 8.7 (39-783).

Chance, men escape by interior isolation, vi. 8.15 (39-800).

Chance, no room for in Supreme, assisted by intelligence, vi. 8.17 (39-804).

Chance, Supreme could not possibly be called by any one who had seen it, vi. 8.19 (39-807).

Change, how can it be out of time, if movement is in time, vi. 1.16 (42-864).

Change, is it anterior to movement? vi. 3.21 (44-972).

Change must inevitably exist in Heaven, ii. 1.1 (40-813).

Changeable, desires are, iv. 4.2 (28-469).

Changeableness, self-direction of thought is not, iv. 4.2 (28-444).

Changes of fortune, affect only the outer man, iii. 2.15 (47-1067).

Changes of the body, do not change soul powers, iv. 3.8 (27-402).

Changes, ours, world-souls unconscious of, iv. 4.7 (28-450).

Chaos, usual starting point, causes puzzle of origin of God, vi. 8.11 (39-792).

Character, human, result of former lives, iii. 3.4 (48-1083).

"Characteristic, certain," a spiritualization of terms, ii. 4.1 (12-197); v. 1.4 (10-180).

Characteristic, if anything at all, is a reason spiritual, v. 1.4 (10-180).

Chariot, God traverses heaven in one, iv. 3.7 (27-399).

Chastisement of souls psychologically explained, vi. 4.16 (22-310).

Chemical mixture described, iv. 7.8 (2-72).

Chief, the great Jupiter, third God, iii. 5.8 (50-1136).

Choir of virtues (Stoic), vi. 9.11 (9-170).

Choosing is essence of consciousness, iv. 4.37 (28-500).

Chorus, see Ballet, vi. 9.8 (9-165).

Circe, i. 6.8 (1-53).

Circle, iii. 8.7 (30-543); v. 1.7, 11 (10-184, 191).

Circular movement is that of soul, vi. 9.8 (9-162, 164); ii. 2.1 (14-227); iv. 4.16 (28-462).

Circular movement of heavens, ii. 2.2 (14-230).

Circulating around heavens, iii. 4.2 (15-234).

Cities haunted by divinities, vi. 5.12 (23-332).

Classification of purification, result of virtue, i. 2.4 (19-260).

Climate, a legitimate governing cause, iii. 1.5 (3-93).

Close eyes of body, method to achieve ecstasy, i. 6.8 (1-52).

Closeness to divinity, permanent result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Clotho, ii. 3.15 (52-1182).

Coelus, (Uranus), v. 8.13 (31-573).

Co-existence of unity and multiplicity demands organization in system, vi. 7.10 (38-716).

Cognition, how it operates, v. 5.1 (32-575).

Cognition of intelligible objects, admits no impression, iv. 6.2 (41-832).

Cold is not method of transforming breath into soul, iv. 7.8 (2-68).

Collective nouns prove independent existence, vi. 6.16 (34-672).

Combination begotten by the soul, its nature, vi. 7.5 (38-708).

Combination contains one kind of desires, iv. 4.20 (28-468).

Combination is a physical category, vi. 3.3 (44-937).

Combination of body and soul, appetites located in, iv. 4.20 (28-468).

Combination of soul and body as mixture, or as resulting product, i. 1.1 (53-1191).

Combination, see Aggregate, 1.11.

Combination, third physical category (53-1191). of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 (44-937).

Commands himself, Supreme does, vi. 8.20 (39-809).

Common element, growth in increase and generation, vi. 3.22 (44-975).

Common ground of the elements make them kindred, ii. 1.7 (40-824).

Common part, function of, i. 1.10 (53-1203).

Common to soul and body, not all affections are, i. 1.5 (53-1197).

Communion of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170).

Communion with the divine, as of Minos with Jupiter, vi. 9.7 (9-162).

Comparative method of studying time, iii. 7.6 (45-996).

Complaining of the world, instead of fit yourself to it, ii. 9.13 (33-625).

Complaint, grotesque to wisdom of creator, iii. 2.14 (47-1063).

Complaint of lower nature of animals ridiculous, iii. 2.9 (47-1059).

Complement of being called quality only by courtesy, vi. 2.14 (43-918).

Composite aggregate, see combination, i. 1.2 (53-1191).

Composite is body, therefore perishable, iv. 7.1 (2-56).

Composite of form and matter is everything, v. 9.3 (5-104).

Compositeness not denied by simplicity of the intelligent, vi. 7.13 (38-722).

Compositeness of knower not necessarily implied by knowledge, v. 3.1 (49-1090).

Composition and decomposition are not alterations, vi. 3.25 (44-979).

Composition and decomposition, explanation of, vi. 3.25 (44-978).

Comprising many souls makes soul infinite, vi. 4.4 (22-291).

Compulsory, memory is not, iv. 4.8 (28-451).

Concatenation from universal reason are astrological signs, iv. 4.38 (28-501).

Concatenation in all things is the universe, v. 2.2 (11-196).

Concatenation of causes is Chrysippus's fate, iii. 1.2, 7 (3-89, 96).

Conceiving principle is the world-soul, iii. 9.1 (13-221).

Concentricity of all existing things, v. 3.7 (49-1101); v. 5.9 (32-587).

Conception, true, is act of intuition, i. 1.9 (53-1202).

Conformity to the universal soul, implied they do not form part of her, iv. 3.2 (27-389).

Connection between sense and intelligible worlds is triple nature of man, vi. 7.7 (38-711).

Connection with infinite is Chrysippus's fate, iii. 1.2 (3-89).

Consciousness, iii. 9.9 (13-226).

Consciousness, constituted by timeless memory, iv. 3.25 (27-429).

Consciousness depends on choosing, iv. 4.37 (28-500).

Consciousness, etymologically, is sensation of manifoldness, v. 3.13 (49-1113).

Consciousness is not a pre-requisite of happiness or virtue and intelligence, i. 4.9, 10 (46-1033).

Consciousness is unitary, though containing the thinker, ii. 9.1 (33-601).

Consciousness, local and whole, relation between not applicable to soul, iv. 3.3 (27-392).

Consciousness of higher soul-part dimmed by predominance or disturbance of lower, iv. 8.8 (6-132).

Consciousness of self, lost in ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569).

Consciousness, unity limits principles to three, ii. 9.2 (33-602).

Consciousness would be withdrawn by differentiating reason, ii. 9.1 (33-602).

Contemplating intelligence, is horizon of divine approach, v. 5.7 (32-587).

Contemplating the divinity, a Gnostic precept, ii. 9.15 (33-630).

Contemplation, v. 1.2, 3 (10-175, 177); v. 3.10 (49-1106).

Contemplation, aspired to, by even plants, iii. 8.1 (30-531).

Contemplation, everything is, iii. 8 (30).

Contemplation, goal of all beings, iii. 8.7 (30-540).

Contemplation, immovable results in nature and reason, iii. 8.2 (30-533).

Contemplation includes nature and reason, iii. 8.2 (30-533).

Consequence of derivative goods of third rank, i. 8.2 (51-1144).

Consequences of mixture of soul and body, i. 1.4 (53-1194).

Constitution, of universe, hierarchical, vi. 2.1 (13-892).

Consubstantial, v. 1.4 (10-180).

Contemplation, constitution of even lower forms, iii. 8.1 (30-531).

Contemplation of intelligence, demands a higher transcending unity, v. 3.10 (49-1106).

Contemplation of itself made essence intelligence, v. 2.1 (11-193).

Contemplation only one phase of excursion of procession, iv. 8.7 (6-131).

Contemplation the goal of all kinds and grades of existence, iii. 8.6 (30-540).

Contemplation's preparation is practice, iii. 8.5 (30-538).

Contemporaneous is life of intelligence, iii. 7.2 (45-989).

Contemporary are matter and the informing principles, ii. 4.8 (12-206).

Contingence applicable to Supreme, under new definition only, vi. 8.8 (39-785).

Contingence not even applies to essence, let alone super-essence, vi. 8.9 (39-787).

Contingency, disappearance of, witnessed to by ascent of life, vi. 8.15 (39-801).

Contingency illuminated in analysis, vi. 8.14 (39-798).

Contingent existence, precedes absolute, vi. 1.26 (42-881).

Continuance need not interfere with fluctuation, ii. 1.3 (40-816).

Continuity between nature and elements, there is none, iv. 4.14 (28-459).

Continuous procession, necessary to Supreme, iv. 8.6 (6-129).

Contraries, are those things that lack resentments, vi. 3.20 (44-968).

Contraries passing into each other, Heraclitus, iv. 8.1 (6-119).

Contraries teach appreciation, iv. 8.7 (6-131).

Contrariness is not the greatest possible difference, vi. 3.20 (44-968).

Contrary contained in reason, constitute its unity, iii. 2.16 (47-1069).

Conversion effected by depreciation of the external and appreciation of herself, v. 1.1 (10-174); see v. 1.7.

Conversion of soul towards herself, only object of virtue, i. 4.11 (46-1035).

Conversion of souls, iv. 3.6, 7 (27-397, 399); iv. 8.4 (6-126).

Conversion of super-abundance, back towards one, v. 2.1 (11-194).

Conversion produced by purification, i. 2.4 (10-261).

Conversion to good and being in itself depends on intelligence, vi. 8.4 (39-778).

Conversion towards divinity, result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Co-ordination of universe, truth of astrology, ii. 3.7 (52-1173).

Corporeal, if soul is, body could not possess sensation, iv. 7.6 (2-65).

Corporeity is nonentity because of lack of unity, iii. 6.6 (26-362).

Corporeity not in matter of thing itself, ii. 4.12 (12-212).

Correspondence of sense-beauty, with its idea, i. 6.2 (1-43).

Cosmic intellect, relation with individual, i. 1.7 (53-1199).

Counterfeit implied by true good, vi. 7.26 (38-743).

Courage is no longer to fear death, i. 6.6 (1-49).

Courage of soul's anger part explained, iii. 6.2 (26-354).

Creation by divinity glancing at intelligence above, iv. 3.11 (27-408).

Creation by foresight, not result of reasoning, vi. 7.1 (38-699).

Creation by mere illumination, gnostic, opposed, ii. 9.11 (33-621).

Creation drama, the world-soul could not have gone through, ii. 9.4 (33-605).

Creation is effusion of super-abundance, v. 2.1 (11-194).

Creation limited to world-soul because nearest to intelligible world, iv. 3.6 (27-397).

Creation of sense-world, not by reflection, but self-necessity, iii. 2.2 (47-1044).

Creation of world, how it took place, v. 8.7 (31-562).

Creation, why denied human souls, iv. 3.6 (27-397).

Creative is the universal soul, not preservative, ii. 3.16 (52-1183).

Creative motives, ii. 9.4 (33-605).

Creator admires his handiwork, v. 8.8 (31-564).

Creator and preserver, is the good, vi. 7.23 (38-740).

Creator and world, are not evil, ii. 9 (33).

Creator is outside of time, iii. 7.5 (45-994).

Creator so wise that all complaints are grotesque, iii. 2.14 (47-1063).

Creator testified to, by the world, iii. 2.3 (47-1047).

Creator's universality, overcame all obstacles, v. 8.7 (31-562).

Creator's wisdom makes complaints grotesque, iii. 2.14 (47-1063).

Credence of intelligence in itself, v. 5.2 (32-578).

Crimes should not be attributed to the influence of sublunary divinities, iv. 4.31 (28-489).

Criticism of world is wrong, v. 8.8 (31-565).

Culmination, ii. 3.3 (52-1165).

Cup, cosmic, in Plato, iv. 8.4 (6-127).

Cupid and Psyche, vi. 9.9 (9-166).

Curative, the, is a prominent element of life, iii. 3.5 (48-1084).

Cutting off every thing else, is means of ecstasy, v. 3.7 (49-1121).

Cybele, iii. 6.19 (26-385).

Daemon helps to carry out chosen destiny, iii. 4.5 (15-239).

Daemon is next higher faculty of soul, iii. 4.3 (15-235).

Daemon is the love that unites a soul to matter, iii. 5.4 (50-1130).

Daemon may remain after death or be changed to Daemon superior to predominating power, iii. 4.6 (15-239).

Daemon of souls is their love, iii. 5.4 (50-1130).

Daemon's all, born of Need and Abundance, iii. 5.6 (50-1131).

Daemons and deities, difference between, iii. 5.6 (50-1131).

Daemons are individual, iii. 4 (15).

Daemons both related and independent of us, iii. 4.5 (15-239).

Daemons even in souls entering animal bodies, iii. 4.6 (15-240).

Daemons follow Supreme, v. 8.10 (31-567).

Daemon's guidance does not hinder responsibility, iii. 4.5 (15-238).

Daemons in charge of punishment of soul, iv. 8.5 (6-128).

Dance, prearranged, simile of star's motion, iv. 4.33 (28-492).

Darkness, existence of, must be related to the soul, ii. 9.12 (33-624).

Darkness, looking at, cause of evil of soul, i. 8.4 (51-1147).

Death, after, colleagues in government of world, iv. 8.4 (6-125).

Death, after, discursive reason not used, iv. 3.18 (27-416).

Death, after, judgment and expiation, iii. 4.6 (15-240).

Death, after, man becomes what he has lived, iii. 4.2 (15-234).

Death, after, memory may last, if trained, iii. 4.2 (15-234); iv. 4.5 (28-448).

Death, after, rank depends on state of death, i. 9 (16).

Death, after, recognition and memory, iv. 4.5 (28-447).

Death, after, soul goes to retribution, iii. 2.8 (47-1056).

Death, after, where does the soul go, iii. 4.6 (15-240); iii. 2.8 (47-1056).

Death, at, memories of former existences are reproduced, iv. 3.27 (27-433).

Death better than disharmony, iii. 2.8 (47-1057).

Death, how the soul splits up, iii. 4.6 (15-241).

Death is only separation of soul from body, i. 6.6 (1-50).

Declination, ii. 3.3 (52-1165).

Decomposible, soul is not, merely because it has three parts, iv. 7.14 (2-84).

Decomposition and composition are not alteration, vi. 3.25 (44-979).

Decomposition and composition, explanation of, vi. 3.25 (44-978).

Defects, not in intelligible world, v. 9.14 (5-117).

Defects such as limping, do not proceed from intelligence, v. 9.10 (5-113).

Degeneration of races, implied by determinism, ii. 3.16 (52-1184).

Degeneration of soul is promoted by looking at darkness, i. 8.4 (51-1147).

Degrees, admitted of, by quality, vi. 3.20 (44-970).

Degrees, different, of the same reality, are intelligence and life, vi. 7.18 (38-732).

Degrees of ecstasy, vi. 7.36 (38-760).

Deities and demons, difference between, iii. 5.6 (50-1131).

Deities, second rank, are all visible super-lunar deities, iii. 5.6 (50-1132).

Deliberating before making sense-man intelligence did not, vi. 7.1 (38-698).

Deliberation in creating of world, gnostic opposed, v. 8.7, 12 (31-561, 571).

Delphi, at middle of earth, vi. 1.14 (42-862).

Demiurge, how the gnostic created it, ii. 9.12 (33-623).

Demon, chief, in intelligible world is deity, iii. 5.6 (50-1132).

Demon is any being in intelligible world, iii. 5.6 (50-1133).

Demon is vestige of a soul descended into the world, iii. 5.6 (50-1132).

Demon, the great, Platonic, ii. 3.9 (52-1176).

Demoniacal possession, as explanation of disease wrong, ii. 9.14 (33-627).

Demons, among them, those are loves that exist by a soul's desire for good, iii. 5.6 (50-1132).

Demons have bodies of fire, ii. 1.6 (40-823); iii. 5.6 (50-1133).

Demons have no memories, and grant no prayers; in war life is saved by valor, not by prayers, iv. 4.30 (28-486).

Demons, no crimes should be attributed to, iv. 4.31 (28-489).

Demons not born of souls, generated by world-soul powers, iii. 5.6 (50-1133).

Demons, psychology of, iv. 4.43 (28-507).

Demons, why not all of them are loves, iii. 5.6 (50-1132).

Demons, why they are not free from matter, iii. 5.6 (50-1133).

Demonstration absent in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563).

Demonstration of divinity defies, i. 3.1 (20-269).

Depart from life by seeking beyond it, vi. 5.12 (23-331).

Deprivation, in soul, is evil, i. 8.11 (51-1158).

Deprivation is matter, and is without qualities, i. 8.11 (51-1158).

Derivatives of category of quality, vi. 3.19 (44-967).

Descartes, "Cogito, ergo sum," from Parmenides, v. 9.5 (5-108).

Descend, how souls come to, iv. 3.13 (27-410).

Descend, intelligible does not, sense-world rises, iii. 4.4 (15-237).

Descent from intelligible into heaven by souls leads to recognition, iv. 4.5 (28-447).

Descent from the intelligible world enables us to study time, iii. 7.6 (45-995).

Descent into body, does not injure eternity of soul, iv. 7.13 (2-83).

Descent of soul, causes, as given by Plato, iv. 8.1 (6-121).

Descent of soul into body, iii. 9.3 (13-222); iv. 8.1 (6-120).

Descent of the soul, is fall into matter, i. 8.14 (51-1161).

Descent of the soul, procedure, vi. 4.16 (22-311).

Descent of the soul, psychologically explained, vi. 4.16 (22-311).

Descent, souls not isolated from intelligence, during, iv. 3.12 (27-409).

Description of intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-557).

Description of universal being, vi. 4.2 (22-286).

Desirability of being in its beauty v. 8.10 (31-568).

Desirable in itself, is the good. vi. 8.7 (39-783).

Desire not simultaneous with appetite, i. 1.5 (53-1197).

Desire of soul, liver seat of, iv. 4.28 (28-480).

Desire or ability, only limit of union with divinity, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Desire to live, satisfaction of, is not happiness, i. 5.2 (36-684).

Desires are physical, because changeable with harmony of body, iv. 4.21 (28-469).

Desires, double, of body and of combination, iv. 4.20 (28-468).

Desires, function, relation of, to the vegetative power, iv. 4.22 (28-470).

Destiny chosen, helped by Daemon, iii. 4.5 (15-239).

Destiny conformed to character of soul, iii. 4.5 (15-238).

Destiny of man, gnostic, is demoralizing, ii. 9.15 (33-629).

Destiny of souls, depend on condition of birth of universe, ii. 3.15 (52-1182).

Destroyed would be the universe, if unity passed into the manifold, iii. 8.10 (30-547).

Destruction of soul elements, does it imply disappearance? iv. 4.29 (28-484).

Detachment as simplification of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170).

Detachment of soul at death, how arranged naturally, i. 9 (16).

Detachment of soul by death voluntary, forbidden, i. 9 (16).

Detailed fate not swayed by stars, iv. 4.31 (28-488).

Details, fault in, cannot change harmony in universe, ii. 3.16 (52-1185).

Determinate form, v. 1.7 (10-184); v. 5.6 (32-584).

Determinateness, impossible of one, v. 5.6 (32-584).

Determination demands a motive, iii. 1.1 (3-86).

Determination of future implied by prediction, iii. 1.3 (3-90).

Determinism implies degeneration of races, ii. 3.16 (52-1184).

Determinism, really, under causeless origin, iii. 1.1 (3-86).

Determinism supported by materialists, iii. 1.2 (3-88).

Deterioration, causes of, iii. 3.4 (48-1083).

Development natural of essence to create a soul, iv. 8.6 (6-129).

Deviltry confuted, leaves influence of world-soul, iv. 4.32 (28-490).

Devolution (Platonic world scheme, intelligence, soul, nature), iv. 7.8 (2-69).

Diagram of universe, iv. 4.16 (28-462).

Dialectics, i. 3 (20-269); ii, 4.10 (12-206); vi. 3.1 (44-934); i. 3.4 (20-272); i. 8.9 (51-1156).

Dialectics, crown of various branches of philosophy, i. 3.5 (20-273).

Dialectics, how to conceive infinite, vi. 6.2 (34-644).

Dialectics is concatenation of the world, i. 3.4 (20-272).

Dialectics neglects opinion and sense opinions, i. 3.4 (20-272).

Dialectics not merely instrument for philosophy (Aristotle), i. 3.5 (20-273).

Dialectics not speculation and abstract rules (Epicurean), i. 3.5 (20-273).

Dialectics science of (judging values, or) discovery, amount of real being in things, i. 3.4 (20-273).

Dialectics staying in intelligible, v. 1.1 (10-173).

Dialectics three paths, philosopher, musician and lover, i. 3.1 (20-269).

Dialectics two fold, first ascent to intelligible and then how to remain, i. 3.1 (20-269).

Dialectics without it, lower knowledge would be imperfect, i. 3.6 (20-274).

Differ, souls do, as the sensations, vi. 4.6 (22-294).

Difference and identity, implied by triune process of categories, vi. 2.8 (43-905).

Difference between celestial and inferior divinities, v. 8.3 (31-556).

Difference between human and cosmic incarnation, iv. 8.3 (6-123).

Difference, greatest possible, is not contrariness, vi. 3.20 (44-968).

Difference of Supreme from second, is profound, v. 5.3 (32-580).

Difference, or category, v. 1.4 (10-180).

Differences, minor, derived from matter, v. 9.12 (5-115).

Differences of color, aid to discriminate magnitudes, ii. 8.1 (35-681).

Differences of soul, retained on different levels, iv. 3.5 (27-396).

Differences of things, depend on their seminal reasons, v. 7.1 (18-252).

Differences, some are not qualities, vi. 3.18 (44-965).

Differentials of beings, are not genuine qualities, vi. 1.16 (42-853).

Difficulties of understanding, clear to intelligence, iv. 9.5 (8-146).

Dimension and number are so different as to suggest different classifications, vi. 2.13 (43-916).

Diminished, essence is not, though divisible, vi. 4.4 (22-290).

Dione, iii. 5.2 (50-1126).

Disappearance of form, implies that of size, ii. 8.1 (35-682).

Disappearance of soul parts, does it imply destruction, iv. 4.29 (28-484).

Discontent, divine, and transforms virtues, homely into higher, i. 2.7 (19-267).

Discontent, divine, supplement of homely virtues, i. 2.7 (19-267).

Discord, cause of incarnation, iv. 8.1 (6-119).

Discursive reason, v. 1.10, 11 (10-189); v. 3.14 (49-1115); v. 5.1 (32-575); v. 9.4 (5-106).

Discursive reason cannot turn upon itself, v. 3.2 (49-1091).

Discursive reason, its function, v. 3.1 (49-1090).

Discursive reason, why it belongs to soul, not to intelligence, v. 3.3 (49-1093).

Discursive reason's highest part, receives impressions from its intelligence, v. 3.3 (49-1092).

Disease, as demoniacal possession wrong, ii. 9.14 (33-627).

Disharmony, vice is, iii. 6.2 (26-352).

Disharmony with laws of universe, worse than death, iii. 2.8 (47-1057).

Displacement, movement is single, vi. 3.24 (44-977).

Disposition, difficulty of mastering these corporeal dispositions, i. 8.8 (51-1154).

Distance from a unity is multitude and an evil, vi. 6.1 (34-643).

Distance from the Supreme, imperfection, iii. 3.3 (48-1080).

Distinction between spiritual, psychic and material, due to ignorance of other people's attainments, ii. 9.18 (33-637).

Distinction in intelligibles, (good above beauty), i. 6.9 (1-53).

Distinguish, object of myths, iii. 5.10 (50-1138).

Distinction, Philonic, between the God, and God, vi. 7.1 (38-697).

Distinguishing of being, quality and differences absurd, vi. 3.18 (44-965).

Distraction by sensation, makes us unconscious of higher part, iv. 8.8 (6-132).

Divergence from Plato, forces Plotinos to demonstrate categories, vi. 2.1 (43-891).

Diversity from same parents depends on manner of generation, v. 7.2 (18-253).

Diversity of relations of all things connected with the first, v. 5.9 (32-589).

Divided, not even the ascended soul need be, iv. 4.1 (28-442).

Divided, time cannot be without soul's action, iv. 4.15 (28-460).

Divine sphere, limited by soul, downwards, v. 1.7 (10-186).

Diviner, duty of, is to read letter traced by nature, iii. 3.6 (48-1087).

Divinities begotten by actualization of intelligence, vi. 9.9 (9-168).

Divinities begotten by silent intercourse with the one, vi. 9.9 (9-166).

Divinities celestial and inferior, difference between, v. 8.3 (31-556).

Divinities contained in Supreme, dynamically, by birth, v. 8.9 (31-566).

Divinities haunt the cities, vi. 5.12 (23-332).

Divinities hidden and visible, v. 1.4 (10-178).

Divinity absent only, for non-successful in avoiding distraction, vi. 9.7 (9-161).

Divinity and also the soul is always one, iv. 3.8 (27-400).

Divinity constituted by attachment to centre, vi. 9.8 (9-163).

Divinity distinguished Philonically, the God, and God, vi. 7.1 (18-251).

Divinity, resemblance to, in soul's welfare, i. 6.6 (1-49).

Divinity within us, single and identical in all, vi. 5.1 (23-314).

Divinization, as Cupid and Psyche, vi. 9.9 (9-166).

Divinization of brutalization, is fate of three men in us, vi. 7.6 (38-708).

Divisible, all bodies are fully, iv. 7.8 (2-68).

Divisible and indivisible can soul be simultaneously, iv. 3.19 (27-417).

Divisible and indivisible is soul, iv. 2.2 (21-279).

Divisible beings, existence of, iv. 2.1 (21-276).

Divisible intelligence is not, v. 3.5 (49-1096).

Divisible is essence though not diminished, vi. 4.4 (22-290).

Divisible of soul, mixture and double, ii. 3.9 (52-1176).

Divisible soul is not unifying manifold, sensation, iv. 7.6 (2-65).

Divisibility, v. 1.7 (10-184).

Divisibility, goal of sense, growth and emotion, iv. 3.19 (27-418).

Divisibility of soul in vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10 (31-567).

Division, between universal soul and souls impossible, iv. 3.2 (27-390).

Division, characteristic of bodies not of soul, iv. 2.8 (21-276).

Dominant, better nature is not, because of sub-consciousness, iii. 3.4 (48-1081).

Double cause of incarnation, motive and deeds, iv. 8.4 (6-125).

Double, Hercules symbolizes the soul, i. 1.12 (53-1206).

Doubleness of everything, including man, vi. 3.4 (44-938).

Doubleness of soul, reasons and Providence, iv. 6.2 (41-832); iii. 3.4 (48-1081).

Doubleness of souls, suns, stars, ii. 3.9 (52-1175).

Doubleness of wisdom, i. 2.6 (19-265).

Doubleness of world soul, ii. 2.3 (14-233).

Doubleness, see "pair", or "dyad", of every man, ii. 3.9 (52-1176).

Doubt of existence of divinity, like dreamers who awake, to slumber again, v. 5.11 (32-592).

Drama as a whole, iii. 2.17 (47-1071).

Drama of life, parts played badly by the evil, iii. 2.17 (47-1072).

Drama, simile of, allows for good and evil within reason, iii. 2.17 (47-1070).

Dream of the good is form, vi. 7.28 (38-745).

Dream of the soul is sensation, from which we must wake, iii. 6.6 (26-363).

Dreamers who wake, only to return to dreams like doubters of divinity, v. 5.11 (32-593).

Driver and horses, simile of, Platonic, ii. 3.13 (52-1179).

Dualism breaks down just like monism, vi. 1.27 (42-883).

Duality (form and matter) in all things, iv. 7.1 (2-56).

Duality of every body, ii. 4.5 (12-200).

Duration has nothing to do with happiness, i. 5.1 (36-684).

Duration increases unhappiness, why not happiness? i. 5.6 (36-686).

Duration of happiness does not affect its quality, i. 5.5 (36-685).

Duration of time, as opportunity, is of importance to virtue, i. 5.10 (36-689).

Dyad, or doubleness, v. 5.4 (32-581).

Dyad, see "pair," vi. 2.11 (43-914).

Earth and fire contained in the stars, ii. 1.6 (40-822).

Earth can feel as well as the stars, iv. 4.22 (28-471).

Earth contains all the other elements, ii. 1.6 (40-823).

Earth exists in the intelligible, vi. 7.11 (38-718).

Earth feels and directs by sympathetic harmony, iv. 4.26 (28-477).

Earth, model of the new, gnostic, unreasonable, ii. 9.5 (33-608).

Earth, postulated by Plato, as being basis of life, ii. 1.7 (40-823).

Earth senses may be different from ours, iv. 4.26 (28-478).

Earth, what passions suitable to it, iv. 4.22 (28-471).

Earthly events, not to be attributed to stars, body or will, iv. 4.35 (28-495).

Earth's psychology, iv. 4.27 (28-479).

Ecliptic's inclination to equator, v. 8.7 (31-563).

Ecstasy as divine spectacle, vi. 9.11 (9-169).

Ecstasy as intellectual contact with sudden light, v. 3.17 (49-1120).

Ecstasy described, iv. 8.1 (6-119).

Ecstasy ends in a report of seeing God beget a Son, v. 8.12 (31-571).

Ecstasy ends in fusion with divinity, and becoming own object of contemplation, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Ecstasy ends in "rest" and "Saturnian realm," v. 8.11 (31-570).

Ecstasy ends in vision which is not chance, vi. 8.21 (39-807).

Ecstasy, experience of, i. 6.7 (1-50).

Ecstasy has two advantages following, self-consciousness and possession of all things, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Ecstasy illustrated by secrecy of mystery-rites, vi. 9.11 (9-169).

Ecstasy in soul does not think God, because she doesn't think, vi. 7.35 (38-759).

Ecstasy is possession by divinity, v. 8.10 (31-567).

Ecstasy, land-marks on path to, i. 6.9 (1-54).

Ecstasy, mechanism of, v. 8.11 (31-569).

Ecstasy, permanent results, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Ecstasy results in begotten son forming a new world, v. 8.12 (31-571).

Ecstasy, simplification, super beauty and virtue, vi. 9.11 (9-170).

Ecstasy, the degrees leading to God, vi. 736 (38-760).

Ecstasy trance (enthusiasm), vi. 9.11 (9-169).

Ecstasy, trap on way to, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Ecstasy, way to approach, first principle, v. 5.10, 11 (32-591).

Ecstasy, when experienced, leads to questions, iv. 8.1 (6-119).

Ecstasy's last stage, vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10 (31-568).

Ecstasy's method, is to close eyes of body, i. 6.8 (1-52).

Ecstatic vision of God, chief purpose of life, i. 6.7 (1-51).

Ecstatic, subsequent experiences, vi. 9.11 (9-190).

Education and training, memory needs, iv. 6.3 (41-835).

Effusion of super-abundance is reation, v. 2.1 (11-194).

Effects, differences in, limited to intelligibles, vi. 3.17 (44-964).

Egyptian hieroglyphics, v. 8.6 (31-560).

Elemental intermediary soul, also inadmissible, ii. 9.5 (33-607).

Elemental process demands substrate, ii, 4.6 (12-203).

Elements and nature, there is continuity between, iv. 4.14 (28-459).

Elements are also individual, ii. 1.6 (40-823).

Elements are kindred, through their common ground, the universe body, ii. 1.7 (40-824).

Elements, earth contains all, ii. 1.6 (40-821).

Elements, principles of physicists, iii. 1.3 (3-89).

Elements of body cannot harmonize themselves, iv. 7.8 (2-74).

Elements of essence can be said to be one only figuratively, vi. 2.10 (43-909).

Elements of universe, simultaneously principles and general, vi. 2.2 (43-893).

Elements terrestrial, do not degrade the heaven, ii. 1.6 (40-823).

Elevation of soul gradual, v. 3.9 (49-1106).

Eliminated, is contingency in analysis, vi. 8.14 (39-798).

Emanations of a single soul, are all souls, iv. 3 (27).

Emanations of light from sun, v. 3.12 (49-1112).

Emanations of universal soul, are individual souls, iv. 3.1 (27-388).

Emanations, sense and growth tend towards divisibility, iv. 3.19 (27-418).

Emigration of soul should not be forced, i. 9 (10).

Emotion at seeing God, sign of unification, vi. 9.4 (9-155).

Emotions, James Lange, theory of refuted, i. 1.5 (53-1196).

Emotions of beauty caused by invisible soul, i. 6.5 (1-46).

Enchantments, an active life, predisposes to subjection to, iv. 4.43 (28-507).

Enchantments, magic, how to avoid them, iv. 4.44 (28-509).

Enchantments, wise men escape all, iv. 4.43 (28-507).

End and principle, simultaneous in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563).

End of all other goods is the Supreme, i. 7.1 (54-1209).

Entelechy, soul is not, iv. 2.1; iv. 7.8 (21-276, 2-74-77).

Energy, displayed, constitutes a thing's being, iii. 1.1 (3-86).

Ennobled and intellectualized is soul, scorning even thought, vi. 7.35 (38-757).

Enthusiasm of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-169).

Entire essence loved by being, vi. 5.10 (23-325).

Entire everywhere is universal soul, vi. 4.9 (22-300).

Entire soul, fashioned whole and individuals, vi. 5.8 (23-322).

Entire soul is everywhere, iv. 7.5 (2-63).

Entities earthly, not all have ideas corresponding, v. 9.14 (5-117).

Entities incorporeal, impassibility, iii. 6.1 (26-351).

Enumeration of divine principles, vi. 7.25 (38-742).

Enumeration, successive, inevitable in describing the eternal, iv. 8.4 (6-127).

Epicurus, iv. 5.2 (29-516).

Epimetheus, iv. 3.14 (27-412).

Equator to Ecliptic, inclination, v. 8.7 (31-563).

Erechtheus, iv. 4.43 (28-508).

Eros, Platonic myth interpretation of, iii. 5.2 (50-1125).

Eros, son of Venus, iii. 5.2 (50-1125).

Escape all enchantments, how the wise men do, iv. 4.43 (28-507).

Escape, how to, from this world, i. 6.8 (1-52).

Escoreal fragment, introduction to, iii. 6.6 (26-360).

Essence alone, possesses self existence, vi. 6.18 (34-678).

Essence and being, distinction between, ii. 6.1 (17-245).

Essence and stability, distinction between. vi. 2.7 (43-903).

Essence and unity, genuine relations between, vi. 2.11 (43-911).

Essence, by it all things depend on the good, i. 7.2 (54-1209).

Essence cannot become a genus so long as it remains one, vi. 2.9 (43-909).

Essence derives its difference from other co-ordinate categories, vi. 2.19 (43-923).

Essence divisible if not thereby diminished, vi. 4.4 (22-290).

Essence elements can be said to be one only figuratively, vi. 2.10 (43-909).

Essence entire loved by being, vi. 5.10 (23-325).

Essence, ideas and intelligence, v. 9 (5-102).

Essence, indivisible and divisible mediated between by soul, iv. 2 (21-276).

Essence indivisible becomes divisible within bodies, iv. 2.1 (21-277).

Essence indivisible, description of, iv. 2.1 (21-277).

Essence intelligible, is both in and out of itself, vi. 5.3 (23-316).

Essence is not contingent let alone super-essence, vi. 8.9 (39-788).

Essence is the origin of all animals, vi. 2.21 (43-928).

Essence, location for the things yet to be produced, vi. 6.10 (34-657).

Essence made intelligible by addition of eternity, vi. 2.1 (43-892).

Essence more perfect than actualized being, ii. 6.1 (17-247).

Essence must be second in order to exist in ground of first, v. 2.1 (11-193).

Essence not stable though immovable, vi. 9.3 (9-153).

Essence not synonymous with unity, vi. 2.9 (43-908).

Essence, number follows and proceeds from, vi. 6.9 (34-655).

Essence of soul derives from its being, adding life to essence, vi. 2.6 (43-900).

Essence one and identical is everywhere, entirely present, vi. 4 (22-285).

Essence relation to being, v. 5.5 (32-583).

Essence unity must be sought for in it, vi. 5.1 (23-314).

Essence's power and beauty, is to attract all things, vi. 6.18 (34-678).

Essential number, vi. 6.9 (34-657).

Eternal being, cares not for inequality of riches. ii, 9.9 (33-616).

Eternal generation, iv. 8.4 (6-127); vi. 7.3 (38-703); vi. 8.20 (39-809).

Eternal must have been the necessity to illuminate darkness, ii. 9.12 (33-624).

Eternal revealed by sense objects, iv. 8.6 (6-130).

Eternally begotten, is the world, ii. 9.3 (33-603).

Eternity added to essence makes intelligible essence, vi. 2.1 (43-892).

Eternity and perpetuity, difference between, iii. 7.4 (45-991).

Eternity and time, iii. 7 (45-985).

Eternity as union of the five categories, iii, 7.2 (45-988).

Eternity at rest, error in this, iii. 7.1 (45-987).

Eternity exists perpetually, iii. 7. introd. (45-985).

Eternity, from, is providence the plan of the universe, vi. 8.17 (39-803).

Eternity has no future or past, v. 1.4 (10-179); iii. 7.4 (45-992).

Eternity is immutable in unity, iii. 7.5 (45-993).

Eternity is infinite, universal life, that cannot lose anything, iii, 7.4 (45-992).

Eternity is sempiternal existence, iii. 7.5 (45-993).

Eternity is the model of its image, time, iii. 7. introd. (45-985).

Eternity is to existence, as time is interior to the soul, iii. 7.10 (45-1008).

Eternity is to intelligence, what time is to the world-soul. iii. 7.10 (45-1007).

Eternity kin to beauty, iii. 5.1 (50-1124).

Eternity not an accident of the intelligible, but an intimate part of its nature, iii. 7.3 (45-989).

Eternity of soul, not affected by descent into body, iv. 7.13 (2-83).

Eternity of soul proved by thinking the eternal, iv. 7.10 (2-81).

Eternity, relation of, to intelligible being, iii. 7.1 (45-986).

Eternity replaces time, in intelligible world, v. 9.10 (5-113).

Eternity, see Aeon and pun on Aeon, iii. 7.1 (45-986).

Evaporation, explains a theory of mixture, ii. 7.2 (37-694).

Evaporation, both Stoic and Aristotelian refuted, ii, 7.2 (37-695).

Everything is composite of form and matter, v. 9.3 (5-105).

Everywhere and nowhere is Supreme, inclination and imminence, vi. 8.16 (39-801).

Evil, absolute, goal of degeneration of the soul, i. 8.15 (51-1163).

Evil, an evil is life without virtue, i. 7.3 (54-1210).

Evil are doers, who play their parts badly in drama of life, iii. 2.17 (47-1071).

Evil as an obstacle to the soul, i. 8.12 (51-1159).

Evil as infinite and formlessness as itself, i. 8.3 (51-1145).

Evil cannot be possessed within the soul, i. 8.11 (51-1158).

Evil constituted by indetermination, success and lack, i. 8.4 (51-1147).

Evil creator and world are not, ii. 9 (33-599).

Evil effects of suicide on soul itself, i. 9 (16-243).

Evil even is a multitude, vi. 6.1 (34-643).

Evil external and internal, relation between, i. 8.5 (51-1149).

Evil, how sense-objects are not, iii. 2.8 (47-1055).

Evil implied by good, because matter is necessary to the world, i. 8.7 (51-1152).

Evil in itself, i. 6.6 (1-49).

Evil in itself is the primary evil, i. 8.3 (51-1146).

Evil in the soul, explained by virtue as a harmony, iii. 6.2 (26-352).

Evil inseparable from good, iii. 3.7 (48-1088).

Evil is consequence of derivative goods of third rank, i. 8.2 (51-1144).

Evil is no one vice in particular, i. 8.5 (51-1148).

Evil is soul's rushing into region of diversity, i. 8.13 (51-1161).

Evil is the absence of good in the soul, i. 8.11 (51-1157).

Evil is weakness of the soul, i. 8.14 (51-1160).

Evil, its nature depends on that of good, i. 8.2 (51-1143).

Evil, lower form of good, iii. 2.7 (47-1053); vi. 7.10 (38-716).

Evil, nature of, i. 8.3 (51-1144).

Evil, necessary, is lowest degree of being, i. 8.7 (51-1152).

Evil, neutral, is matter, vi, 7.28 (38-746).

Evil, none unalloyed for the living people, i. 7.3 (54-1210).

Evil of the soul, explanation, i. 8.15 (51-1163).

Evil only figurative and antagonist of good, i. 8.6 (51-1150).

Evil possesses a lower form of being, i. 8.3 (51-1145).

Evil primary and secondary defined, i. 8.8 (51-1155).

Evil, primary and secondary, of soul, i. 8.5 (51-1148).

Evil primary, is evil in itself, i. 8.3 (51-1146).

Evil primary is lack of measure, (darkness), i. 8.8 (51-1154).

Evil secondary, is accidental formlessness (something obscured), i. 8.8 (51-1155).

Evil secondary, is matter, i. 8.4 (51-1146).

Evil triumphed over, in faculties not engaged in matter, i. 8.5 (51-1149).

Evil universal and unavoidable, i. 8.6 (51-1150).

Evil, victory of, accuses Providence, iii. 2.6 (47-1052).

Evils are necessary to the perfection of the universe, ii. 3.18 (52-1187).

Evils even if corporeal, caused by matter, i. 8.8 (51-1153).

Evil, nature and origin of, i. 8 (51-1142).

Evils, origin of, i. 1.9 (53-1201).

Evils, that the sage can support without disturbing happiness, i. 4.7 (46-1029).

Evolution impossible (from imperfect to perfect), iv. 7.8 (2-73).

Examination, for it only are parts of a manifold unity apart, vi. 2.3 (43-897).

Examination of self, i, 6.9 (1-54).

Examination of soul, body must first be dissociated, vi. 3.1 (44-934).

Excursion down and up, is procession of intelligence, iv. 8.7 (6-131).

Excursion yields the soul's two duties, body management and contemplation, iv. 8.7 (6-131).

Exemption of certain classes from divine care, heartless, ii. 9.16 (33-631).

Exile, gnostic idea of, opposed, ii. 9.6 (33-609).

Existence absolute precedes contingent, vi. 1.26 (42-881).

Existence, all kinds and grades of, aim at contemplation, iii. 8.6 (30-538).

Existence, category, v. 1.4 (10-180).

Existence, descending, graduations of, iv. 3.17 (27-415).

Existence, how infinite arrived to it, vi. 6.3 (34-645).

Existence in intelligible, before application to multiple beings, is reason, vi. 6.11 (34-659).

Existence of darkness may be related to the soul ii. 9.12 (33-625).

Existence of divisible things, iv. 2.1 (21-276).

Existence of first, necessary. v. 4.1 (7-134).

Existence of intelligence, proved, v. 9.3 (5-104).

Existence of manifoldness impossible, without something simple, ii. 4.3 (12-198).

Existence of memory alter death, and of heaven, iv. 4.5 (28-447).

Existence of matter is sure as that of good, i. 8.15 (51-1162).

Existence of object implies a previous model, vi. 6.10 (34-658).

Existence of other things not precluded by unity, vi. 4.4 (22-290).

Existence, primary, will contain thought, existence and life, ii. 4.6 (12-203); v. 6.6 (24-339).

Existence real possessed by right thoughts, iii. 5.7 (50-1136).

Existence sempiternal is eternity, iii. 7.5 (45-993).

Existence the first being supra-cogitative, does not know itself, v. 6.6 (24-340).

Existence thought and life contained in primary existence, v. 6.6 (24-338).

Existing animal of Plato differs from intelligence, iii. 9.1 (13-220).

Experience and action, underlying transmission, reception, and relation, vi. 1.22 (42-875).

Experience does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.16 (43-920).

Experience necessary to souls not strong enough to do without it, iv. 8.7 (6-131).

Experience of ecstasy leads to questions, iv. 8.1 (6-119).

Experience of evil yields knowledge of good, iv. 8.7 (6-131).

Experiences, sensations are not, but relative actualizations, iv. 6.2 (41-831).

Experiment proposed, ii. 9.17 (33-633).

Expiation is condition of soul in world, iv. 8.5 (6-128).

Expiations, time of, between incarnations, iii. 4.6 (15-240).

Extension is merely a sign of participation into the word of life, vi. 4.13 (22-306).

Extension, none in beauty or justice, iv. 7.8 (2-69).

Extension, none in soul or reason, iv. 7.5 (2-63).

Extensions, soul was capable of, before the existence of the body, vi. 4.1 (22-285).

External and internal relation of evil, i. 8.5 (51-1149).

External circumstances cause wealth, poverty and vice, ii. 3.8 (52-1174).

Exuberant fruitfulness of one, (see super-abundance), v. 3.15 (49-1116).

Eyes implanted in man by divine foresight, vi. 7.1 (38-697).

Eyes impure can see nothing, i. 6.9 (1-53).

Eyes of body, close them, is method to achieve ecstasy, i. 6.8 (1-52).

Face to face, vision of God, i. 6.7 (1-50).

Faces all around the head, simile of, vi. 5.7 (23-320).

Faculty, reawakening of, is the memory, not an image, iv. 6.3 (41-833).

Faith absent in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563).

Faith in intelligible, how achieved, vi. 9.5 (9-156).

Faith teaches Providence rules the world, iii. 2.7 (47-1054).

Fall into generation, due to division into number, iv. 8.4 (6-126).

Fall into generation may be partial and recovery from, possible, iv. 4.5 (28-448).

Fall not voluntary, but punishment of conduct, iv. 8.5 (6-127).

Fall of the soul as descent into matter, i. 8.14 (51-1161).

Fall of the soul due to both will and necessity, iv. 8.5 (6-128).

Fall of the soul due to guilt, (Pythagorean), iv. 8.1 (6-120).

Fate, according to Stoic Chrysippus, iii. 1.2 (3-89).

Fate detailed, does not sway stars, iv. 4.31 (28-489).

Fate, Heraclitian, constituted by action and passion, iii. 1.4 (3-91).

Fate is unpredictable circumstances, altering life currents, iii. 4.6 (15-242).

Fate, mastery of, victory over self, ii. 3.15 (52-1182).

Fate, may be mastered, ii. 3.15 (52-1182).

Fate, obeyed by the soul only when evil, iii, 1.10 (3-98).

Fate of the divisible human soul, iii. 4.6 (15-241).

Fate of three men in us, is brutalization or divinization. vi. 7.6 (38-708).

Fate, possible theories about it, iii. 1.1 (3-86).

Fate spindle, significance of, ii. 3.9 (52-1171).

Fate, the Heraclitian principle, iii. 1.2 (3-88).

Father, v. 1.8 (10-186); v. 5.3 (32-580).

Father, dwells in heaven, i. 6.8 (1-53).

Father of intelligence, name of first, v. 8.1 (31-551).

Fatherland, heaven, i. 6.8 (1-53).

Faults are reason's failure to dominate matter, v. 9.10 (5-113).

Faults come not from intelligence, but from the generation process, v. 9.10 (5-113).

Faults in the details cannot change harmony in universe, ii. 3.16 (52-1185).

Faults of the definition, that eternity is at rest while time is in motion, iii. 7.1 (45-987).

Faults of the soul, two possible, motive and deeds, iv. 8.5 (6-128).

Fear of death, overcoming of, is courage, i. 6.6 (1-49).

Feast, divinities seated at, meaning, iii. 5.10 (50-1139).

Feeler, the soul implied by sensation i. 1.6 (53-1198).

Feeler, who is the, v. 1.1 (53-1191).

Feeling is perception by use of body, iv. 4.23 (28-475).

Feelings, modes of passions, i. 1.1 (53-1191).

Fidelity, kinship to one's own nature, iii. 3.1 (48-1077).

Field of truth, intelligence evolves over, vi. 7.13 (38-723).

Figurative expressions, reasoning and foresight are only, vi. 7.1 (37-699).

Figure, spherical and intelligible is the primitive one, vi. 6.17 (34-675).

Figures have characteristic effects, iv. 4.35 (28-498).

Figures pre-exist in the intelligible, vi. 6.17 (34-675).

Fire and air, action of, not needed by heaven, ii. 1.8 (40-826).

Fire and earth contained in the stars, ii. 1.6 (40-821).

Fire, and light celestial, nature, ii. 1.7 (40-825).

Fire contained in intelligible world, vi. 7.11 (38-719).

Fire image of, latent and radiant, v. 1.3 (10-177).

Fire, though an apparent exception, conforms to this, ii. 1.3 (40-817).

First and other goods, 1.7 (54-1208).

First does not contain any thing to be known, v. 6.6 (24-339).

First does not know itself, being supra-cogitative, v. 6.6 (24-339).

First, existence of, necessary, v. 4.1 (7-134).

First impossible to go beyond it, vi. 8.11 (39-791).

First must be one exclusively, making the one supra-thinking, v. 6.3 (24-340).

First principle has no need of seeing itself, v. 3.10 (49-1106).

First principle has no principle, vi. 7.37 (38-762).

First principle has no thought, the first actualization of a hypostasis, vi. 7.40 (38-766).

First principle is above thought, v. 6.26 (24-338).

First principle may not even be said to exist, is super-existence, vi. 7.38 (38-763).

Fit itself, the soul must to its part in the skein, iii. 2.17 (47-1072).

Fit yourself and understand the world, instead of complaining of it, ii. 9.13 (33-625).

Five physical categories of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 (44-937).

Five Plotinic categories, why none more can be added, vi. 2.9 (43-907).

Fleeing from intelligence, rather than intelligence from soul, v. 5.10 (32-591).

Flight from evil, not by locality but virtue, i. 8.7 (51-1152).

Flight from here below, i. 2.6 (51-1150); ii. 3.9 (52-1175); i. 6.8 (1-52); iv. 8.5 (6-128).

Flight from here below, if prompt, leaves soul unharmed, iv. 8.5 (6-128).

Flight from world is assimilation to divinity, i. 2.5 (19-263).

Flight is simplification or detachment of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170).

Fluctuation need not interfere with continuance, ii. 1.3 (40-816).

Flux, heaven though in, perpetuates itself by form, ii. 1.1 (40-813).

Flux of all beauties here below, vi. 7.31 (38-751).

Followers of the king are universal stars, ii. 3.13 (52-1179).

Foreign accretion is ugliness, i. 6.5 (1-48).

Foreign sources, derived from modification, i. 1.9 (53-1202).

Foreknowledge of physician like plans of Providence, iii. 3.5 (48-1085).

Foresight and reasoning are only figurative expressions, vi. 7.1 (38-699).

Foresight by God of misfortunes, not cause of senses in man, vi. 7.1 (38-697).

Foresight, eyes implanted in man by it, vi. 7.1 (38-697).

Foresight of creation, not result of reason, vi. 7.1 (38-698).

Form and light, two methods of sight, v. 5.7 (32-586).

Form and matter in all things, iv. 7.1 (2-56).

Form and matter intermediary between, is sense-object, iii. 6.17 (26-381).

Form as model, for producing principle, v. 8.7 (31-562).

Form being unchangeable, so is matter, iii. 6.10 (26-368).

Form difference of matter, due to that of their intelligible sources, vi. 3.8 (44-946).

Form, disappearance of, implies that of size, ii. 8.2 (35-682).

Form exterior is the overshadowed, inactive parts of the soul, iii. 4.2 (15-235).

Form improves matter, vi. 7.28 (38-745).

Form in itself, none in the good, vi. 7.28 (38-746).

Form is not quality but a reason, ii. 6.2 (17-248).

Form is second physical category of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 (44-937).

Form is the dream of the good, vi. 7.28 (38-745).

Form of a thing is its good, vi. 7.27 (38-744).

Form of a thing is its whyness, vi. 7.2 (38-702).

Form of forms, vi. 7.17 (38-731).

Form of good borne by life, intelligence and idea, vi. 7.2 (38-732).

Form of good may exist at varying degrees, vi. 7.2 (38-732).

Form of the body is the soul, iv. 7.1, 2 (2-57).

Form of unity, is principle of numbers, v. 5.5 (32-583).

Form of universe, as soul is, would be matter, if a primary principle, iii. 6.18 (26-382).

Form only in the sense-world, proceeds from intelligence, v. 9.10 (5-113).

Form substantial, the soul must be as she is not simple matter, iv. 7.4 (2-61).

Former lives cause present character, iii. 3.4 (48-1083).

Formless shape is absolute beauty, vi. 7.33 (38-754).

Formlessness in itself and infinite is evil, i. 8.3 (51-1145).

Formlessness of one, v. 5.6 (32-584).

Formlessness of the Supreme shown by approaching soul's rejection of form, vi. 7.34 (38-756).

Forms of governments, various, soul resembles, iv. 4.17 (28-464).

Forms rational sense and vegetative, iii. 4.2 (15-234).

Forms, though last degree of existence, are faint images, v. 3.7 (49-1102).

Fortune, changes of, affect only the outer man, iii. 2.15 (47-1067).

Freedom, for the soul, lies in following reason, iii. 1.9 (3-97).

Freedom of will, and virtue, are independent of actions, vi. 8.5 (39-775).

Freedom of will, on which psychological faculty is it based? vi. 8.2 (39-775).

Friends of Plotinos, formerly gnostic, ii. 9.10 (33-620).

Functions, if not localized, soul will not seem within us, iv. 3.20 (27-419).

Functions, none in the first principle, vi. 7.37 (38-762).

Fund of memory, partitioned between both souls, iv. 3.31 (27-439).

Fusion forms body and soul, iv. 4.18 (28-465).

Fusion with the divinity, result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569).

Future determined, according to prediction, iii. 1.3 (3-90).

Future necessary to begotten things not to the intelligible, iii. 7.3 (45-990).

Gad-fly, love is, iii. 5.7 (50-1134).

Galli, iii. 6.19 (26-385).

Garden of Jupiter is the reason that begets everything, iii. 5.9 (50-1137).

Garden of Jupiter, meaning of, iii. 5.10 (50-1138).

Genera and individuals are distinct, as being actualizations, vi. 2.2 (43-894).

Genera exist both in subordinate objects, and in themselves, vi. 2.12 (43-915).

Genera, first two, are being and movement, vi. 2.7 (43-902).

Genera of essence decided about by "one and many" puzzle, vi. 2.4 (43-898).

Genera of the physical are different from those of the intelligible, vi. 3.1 (44-933).

Genera, Plotinic five, are primary because nothing can be affirmed of them, vi. 2.9 (43-906).

General, simile of Providence, iii. 3.2 (48-1078).

Generation, common element with growth and increase, vi. 3.22 (44-975).

Generation eternal, iv. 8.4 (6-127); vi. 7.3 (38-703); vi. 8.20 (39-809).

Generation falling into, causes trouble, iii. 4.6 (15-241).

Generation in the sense-world, is what being is in the intelligible, vi. 3.2 (44-935).

Generation is like lighting fire from refraction, iii. 6.14 (26-376).

Generation is radiation of an image, v. 1.6 (10-182).

Generation of everything is regulated by a number, vi. 6.15 (34-670).

Generation of matter, consequences of anterior principles, iv. 4.16 (28-461).

Generation of the ungenerated, iii. 5.10 (50-1138).

Generation, from the good, is intelligence, v. 1.8 (10-186).

Generation's eternal residence is matter, iii. 6.13 (26-373).

Generatively, all things contained by intelligence, v. 9.6 (5-109).

Gentleness, sign of naturalness as of health and unconsciousness of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Genus, another, is stability, vi. 2.7 (43-903).

Genus divides in certain animals, iv. 7.5 (2-63).

Genus, there is more than one, vi. 2.2 (43-895)

Geometry, an intelligible art, v. 9.11 (5-115).

Geometry studies quantities, not qualities, vi. 3.15 (44-958).

Giving without loss (a Numenian idea), vi. 9.9 (9-165).

Gluttonous people who gorge themselves at the ceremonies and leave without mysteries, v. 5.1 (32-592).

Gnostic planning of the world by God, refuted, v. 8.7, 12 (31-561, 572).

God cannot be responsible for our ills, iv. 4.39 (28-503).

God not remembered by world-soul continuing to be seen, iv. 4.7 (28-449).

God's planning of the world (gnosticism) refuted, v. 8.7 (31-561).

God relation with individual and soul, i. 1.8 (53-1200).

Golden face of Justice, i. 6.4 (1-45).

Good absolute, permanence chief characteristic, i. 7.1 (54-1209).

Good, all things depend on by unity, essence and quality, i. 7.1 (54-1209).

Good and beauty identical, i. 6.6 (1-50).

Good and one, vi. 9 (9-147).

Good as consisting in intelligence, i. 4.3 (46-1024).

Good, as everything tends toward it, it tends toward the one, vi. 2.12 (43-914).

Good, as supra-cogitative, is also supra-active, v. 6.6 (24-340).

Good as supreme, neither needs nor possesses intellection, iii. 8.10 (30-548).

Good cannot be a desire of the soul, vi. 7.19 (38-734).

Good cannot be pleasure, which is changeable and restless, vi. 7.27 (38-754).

Good consists in illumination by the Supreme, vi. 7.22 (38-737).

Good contains no thought, vi. 7.40 (38-766).

Good does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-922).

Good, even if it thought, there would be need of something superior, vi. 7.40 (38-767).

Good, form of, borne by life, intelligence and idea, vi. 7.18 (38-731).

Good for the individual is illumination, vi. 7.24 (38-740).

Good has no need of beauty, while beauty has of the good, v. 5.12 (32-594).

Good, if it is a genus, must be one of the posterior ones, vi. 2.17 (43-921).

Good, implied by scorn of life, vi. 7.29 (38-748).

Good implies evil because matter is necessary to the world, i. 8.7 (51-1152).

Good, in what does it consist, iv. 1.

Good, inseparable from evil, iii. 3.7 (48-1088).

Good, intelligence and soul, are like light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 (24-337).

Good is a nature that possesses no kind of form in itself, vi. 7.28 (38-746).

Good is a simple perception of itself; a touch, vi. 7.39 (38-764).

Good is creator and preserver, vi. 7.23 (38-740).

Good is free, but not merely by chance, vi. 8.7 (39-783).

Good is not for itself, but for the natures below it, vi. 7.41 (38-769).

Good is intelligence and primary life, vi. 7.21 (38-737).

Good, is it a common label or a common quality? vi. 7.18 (38-733).

Good is not only cause, but intuition of being, vi. 7.16 (38-728).

Good is such, just because it has no attributes worthy of it, v. 5.13 (32-595).

Good is superior to all its possessions, as result of its being supreme, v. 5.12 (32-595).

Good is superior to beautiful and is cognized by mind, v. 5.12 (32-594).

Good is super-thinking, v. 6.5 (24-338).

Good is super-thought, iii. 9.9 (13-225).

Good is supreme, because of its supremacy, vi. 7.23 (38-739).

Good is desirable in itself, vi. 8.8 (39-783).

Good is the whole, though containing evil parts, iii. 2.17 (47-1070).

Good is lower form of evil, iii. 2.7 (47-1053).

Good leaves the soul serene, beauty troubles it, v. 5.12 (32-594).

Good may accompany the pleasure, but it is independent of it, vi. 7.27 (38-745).

Good may neglect natural laws that carry revolts, iii, 2.9 (47-1057).

Good, multitude of ideas of, vi. 7 (38-697).

Good must be superior to intelligence and life, v. 3.16 (49-1117).

Good not to be explained by Aristotelian intelligence, vi. 7.20 (38-736).

Good not to be explained by Pythagorean oppositions, vi. 7.20 (38-735).

Good not to be explained by Stoic characteristic virtue, vi. 7.20 (38-736).

Good of a thing is its intimacy with itself, vi. 7.27 (38-744).

Good only antagonistic and figurative of evil, i. 8.6 (51-1150).

Good, Platonic discussed, vi. 7.25 (38-741).

Good related to intelligence and soul as light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 (24-337).

Good, self-sufficient, does not need self consciousness, vi. 7.38 (38-763).

Good, slavery of, accuses Providence, iii. 2.6 (47-1052).

Good, study, vi. 7.15 sqq., (38-726).

Good superior to beauty, i. 6.9 (1-55).

Good supreme, Aristotelian, vi. 7.25 (38-742).

Good the first and other goods, i. 7 (54-1208).

Good, therefore also supra-active, v. 6.5 (24-338).

Good, true, implies counterfeit, vi. 7.26 (38-743).

Goods, all, can be described as a form, i. 8.1 (51-1142); i. 6.2 (1-43).

Goods, independence from pleasure is temperate man, vi. 7.29 (38-747).

Goods of three ranks, i. 8.2 (51-1144).

Goods, Plato's opinion interpreted in two ways, vi. 7.30 (38-749).

Goods, supreme as end of all other ones, i. 7.1 (54-1208).

Gorge with food, v. 5.11 (32-592).

Governing principle, Stoic, iii. 1.2, 4 (3-89, 91).

Governments, soul resembles all forms of, iv. 4.17 (28-464).

Gradations, descending of existence, iv. 3.7 (27-415).

Grades of thought and life, iii. 8.7 (30-540).

Grand Father supreme, v. 5.3 (32-581).

Grasp more perfect, increases happiness, i. 5.3 (36-685).

Gravitation, iv. 5.2 (29-517).

Greatness of soul, nothing to do with size of body, vi. 4.5 (22-293).

Grotto, Empedoclean simile of world, iv. 8.1 (6-120).

Group, v. 5.4 (32-581).

Group unites, all lower, adjusted to supreme unity, vi. 6.11 (34-660).

Groups-of-four, or tens, Pythagorean, vi. 6.5 (34-649).

Growth, common elements with increase and generation, vi. 3.22 (44-975).

Growth, localized in liver, iv. 3.23 (27-426).

Growth power, relation of to the desire function, iv. 4.22 (28-470).

Growth, sense and emotions, tend towards divisibility, iv. 3.19 (27-418).

Growth-soul derived from world-soul, not ours, iv. 9.3 (8-143).

Guidance of Daemon does not interfere with responsibility, iii. 4.5 (15-238).

Guilt cause of fall of souls, (Pythagorean), iv. 8.1 (6-120).

Guilt not incurred by soul in toleration, iii. 1.8 (3-97).

Gymnastics, v. 9.11 (5-114).

Habit intellectualizing, that liberates the soul, is virtue, vi. 8.5 (39-780).

Habit, Stoic, ii. 4.16 (12-218); iv. 7.8 (2-73).

Habit, Stoic, as start of evolution to soul, impossible, iv. 7.8 (2-73).

Habituation, ii. 5.2 (25-345).

Habituation, active, immediate, and remote, distinction between, vi. 1.8 (42-849),

Habituation or substantial act is hypostasis, vi. 1.6 (42-845).

Habituation, Stoic, must be posterior to reasons as archetypes, v. 9.5 (5-108).

Habituations are reasons which participate in form, vi. 1.9 (42-850).

Hades, chastisements, i. 7.3 (54-1210).

Hades, what it means for the career of the soul, vi. 4.16 (22-312).

Happiness according to Aristotle, i. 4.1 (46-1019).

Happiness as sensation, does not hinder search for higher, i. 4.2 (1021).

Happiness defined, i. 4.1, 3 (46-1019, 1023).

Happiness dependent upon interior characteristics, i. 4.3 (46-1023).

Happiness, does it increase with duration of time? 1.5 (36-684).

Happiness has nothing to do with duration, i. 5.1, 5 (36-684, 685).

Happiness has nothing to do with pleasure, i. 5.4 (36-685).

Happiness in goal of each part of their natures, i. 4.5 (46-1026).

Happiness increased would result only from more grasp, i. 5.3 (36-685).

Happiness is actualized wisdom, i. 4.9 (46-1033).

Happiness is desiring nothing further, i. 4.4 (46-1026).

Happiness is human (must be something), i. 4.4 (46-1025).

Happiness is not the satisfaction of desire to live, i. 5.2 (36-684).

Happiness, lack of blame on a soul that does not deserve it, iii. 2.5 (47-1050).

Happiness not increased by memories of the past, i. 5.9 (36-689).

Happiness of animals, i. 4.2 (46-1020).

Happiness of plants, i. 4.1 (46-1019).

Happiness of sage not diminished in adversity, i. 4.4 (46-1026).

Happiness, one should not consider oneself alone capable of achieving it, ii. 9.10 (33-619).

Harm, none can happen to the good, iii. 2.6 (47-1051).

Harmony as a single universe, ii. 3.5 (52-1170).

Harmony cannot be reproduced from badly tuned lyre, ii. 3.13 (52-1180).

Harmony is universe in spite of the faults in the details, ii. 3.16 (52-1185).

Harmony posterior to body, iv. 7.8 (2-74).

Harmony presupposes producing soul, iv. 7.8 (2-75).

Harmony (Pythagorean), soul is not, iv. 7.8 (2-74).

Harmony sympathetic, earth feels and directs by it, iv. 4.26 (28-477).

Hate of the body by Plato, supplemented by admiration of the world, ii. 9.17 (33-633).

Hate, virtue is a, iii. 6.2 (26-352).

Having as Aristotelian category, vi. 1.23 (42-876).

Having is too indefinite and various to be a category, vi. 1.23 (42-876).

Head, seat of reason, iv. 3.23 (27-425).

Head, with faces all round, simile of, vi. 5.7 (23-320).

Health is tempermanent of corporeal principles, iv. 7.8 (2-71).

Hearing and vision, process of, iv. 5 (29-514).

Heart, seat of anger, iv. 3.23 (27-426).

Heaven, ii. 1 (40-813).

Heaven, according to Heraclitus, opposed, ii. 1.2 (40-815).

Heaven, existence of, iv. 4.45 (28-512).

Heaven needs not the action of air or fire, ii. 1.8 (40-826).

Heaven possesses soul and body and supports Plotinos's view, ii. 1.2 (40-815).

Heaven, souls first go into it in intelligible, iv. 3.17 (27-415).

Heaven, there must inevitably be change, ii. 1.1 (40-813).

Heaven, though influx perpetuates itself by form, ii. 1.1 (40-813).

Heavens after death, is star harmonizing with their predominant moral power, iii. 4.6 (15-239).

Heavens do not remain still, ii. 1.1 (40-814).

Heaven's immortality also due to universal soul's spontaneous motion, ii. 1.4 (40-818).

Heaven's immortality due to its residence, ii. 1.4 (40-817).

Heaven's immortality proved by having no beginning, ii. 1.4 (40-819).

Helen, iii. 3.5 (48-1085).

Helena's beauty, whence it came, v. 8.2 (31-553).

Hell, descent into, by souls, i. 8.13 (51-1160).

Hell in mystery teachings, i. 6.6 (1-49).

Hell, what it means for the career of the soul, vi. 4.16 (22-312).

Hells, Platonic interincarnational judgment and expiation, iii. 4.6 (15-240).

Hell's torments are reformatory, iv. 4.45 (28-512).

Help for sub-divine natures is thought, vi. 7.41 (38-768).

Help from divinity, sought to solve difficulties, v. 1.6 (10-182).

Heraclidae, vi. 1.3 (42-840).

Hercules as double, symbolizes soul, i. 1.13 (53-1206).

Hercules, symbol of man, in the hells, i. 1.12 (53-1206); iv. 3.27, 31 (27-433, 440).

Heredity a legitimate cause, iii. 1.6 (3-94).

Heredity more important than star influence, iii. 1.6 (3-94).

Hermaphrodite, or castrated, iii. 6.19 (26-385); v. 8.13 (31-573).

Hermes, ithyphallic, iii. 6.19 (26-385).

Hierarchy in universe (see concatenation), v. 4.1 (7-135).

"Higher," or "somewhat," a particle that is prefixed to any Statement about the Supreme, vi. 8.13 (39-797).

Higher part of soul sees vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10 (31-569).

Higher region, reached only by born philosophers, v. 9.2 (5-103).

Higher stages of love, v. 9.2 (5-103).

Higher things from them the lower proceed, i. 8.1 (51-1142).

Highest, by it souls are united, vi 7.15 (38-726).

Highest self of soul is memory's basis, iv. 6.3 (41-832).

Homely virtues are the civil, Platonic four, i. 2.1 (19-257).

"Homonyms," or "labels," see references to puns; also, vi. 1.2, 10, 11, 23, 26; vi. 2.10; vi. 3.1, 5.

Honesty escapes magic, iv. 4.44 (28-509).

Honesty results from contemplation of the intelligible, iv. 4.44 (28-509).

Horizon of divine approach is contemplating intelligence, v. 5.8 (32-586); v. 8.10 (31-567).

Horoscopes do not account for simultaneous differences, iii. 1.5 (3-93).

Houses and aspects, absurdity of, ii. 3.4 (52-1168).

How to detach the soul from the body naturally, 1.9 (16-243).

Human beings add to the beauty of the world, iv. 3.14 (27-412).

Human life contains happiness, i. 4.4 (46-1025).

Human nature intermediate, iv. 4.45 (28-511).

Human nature relation to animal, i. 1.7 (53-1199).

Human organism studied to explain soul relation, iv. 3.3 (27-393).

Human soul and world-soul differences between, ii. 9.7 (33-611).

Hypostases that transmit knowledge (see the new title), v. 3 (49-1090).

Hypostasis, v. 1.4, 6 (10-180 to 184).

Hypostasis are permanent actualizations, v. 3.12 (49-1111).

Hypostasis as substantial act, iii. 4.1 (15-233).

Hypostasis is a substantial act or habituation, vi. 1.6 (42-845).

Hypostasis not in loves contrary to nature, iii. 5.7 (50-1134).

Hypostasis of love, iii. 5.2, 3, 7 (50-1125, 1127, 1133).

Hypostasis of ousia, v. 5.3 (32-581).

Hypostasis the first actualization of first principle has no thought, vi. 7.40 (38-766).

Hypostatic existence, vi. 6.9, 12 (34-655, 661); vi. 8.10, 12 (39-790, 793).

Hypostatic existence of matter proved, i. 8.15 (51-1162); ii. 4 (12-197).

Idea named existence and intelligence, v. 1.8 (10-186).

Ideas and numbers, identification of, vi. 6.9 (34-656).

Ideas, descent of, into individuals, vi. 5.6 (23-320).

Ideas, different, for twins, brothers or work of art, v. 7.1 (18-252).

Ideas imply form and substrate, ii. 4.4 (12-199).

Ideas, intelligence and essence, v. 9 (5-102).

Ideas, multitude of, of the good, vi. 7 (38-697).

Ideas not for all earthly entities, v. 9.14 (5-117).

Ideas of individuals, do they exist v. 7.1 (18-251).

Ideas of individuals, two possible hypotheses, v. 7.1 (18-251).

Ideas or reasons possessed by intellectual life, vi. 2.21 (43-927).

Ideas participated in by matter, vi. 5.8 (23-321).

Identification, unreflective, memory not as high, iv. 4.4 (28-445).

Identity and difference implied by triune process of categories, vi. 2.8 (43-905).

Identity, category, v. 1.4 (10-180).

Identity of thought and existence makes actualizations of intelligence, v. 9.5 (5-107).

Identity, substantial, inconsistent with logical distinctness, ii. 4.14 (12-214).

Ignorance of divinity, v. 1.1 (10-173).

Ignorance illusory because overnatural gentleness, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Ignores everything, does God, being above thought, vi. 7.38 (38-763).

Illumination, creation by mere gnostic, opposed, ii. 9.11 (33-622).

Illumination of darkness must have been eternal, ii. 9.12 (33-624).

Illumination, the good is, for the individual, vi. 7.24 (38-740).

Illustrations, see "Simile."

Image, v. 5.1 (10-174); v. 8.8 (31-564).

Image bound to model by radiation, vi. 4.10 (22-300).

Image formed by the universal beings, is magnitude, iii. 6.17 (26-380).

Image in mirror, iv. 5.7 (29-528).

Image of archetype is Jupiter, begotten by ecstasy, v. 8.12 (31-572).

Image of intelligence is only a sample that must be purified, v. 3.3 (31-555).

Image of its model eternity is time, iii. 1, introd. (45-985).

Image of one intelligence, v. 1.7 (10-184).

Images do not reach eye by influx, iv. 5.2 (29-516).

Images external produce passions, iii. 6.5 (26-358).

Imagination, iv. 3.25 (27-428).

Imagination, both kinds, implied by both kinds of memory, iv. 3.31 (27-483).

Imagination does not entirely preserve intellectual conceptions, iv. 3.30 (27-437).

Imagination is related to opinion, as matter to reason, iii. 6.15 (26-377).

Imagination, memory belongs to it, iv. 3.29 (27-436).

Imagination, of the two, one always overshadows the other, iv. 3.3 (27-438).

Imitation of the first, v. 4.1 (7-135).

Immaterial natures could not be affected, iii. 6.2 (26-354).

Immanence and inclination is the Supreme, vi. 8.16 (39-801).

Immortal, are we, all of us, or only parts? iv. 7.1 (2-56).

Immortal as the One from whom they proceed, are souls, vi. 4.10 (22-301).

Immortal soul, even on Stoic hypothesis, iv. 7.10 (2-80).

Immortality does not extend to sublunar sphere, ii. 1.5.

Immortality in souls of animals and plants, iv. 7.14 (2-84).

Immortality of heaven also due to universal soul's spontaneous motion, ii. 1.4 (40-818).

Immortality of heaven due to its residence there, ii. 1.4 (40-817).

Immortality of heaven proved by having no beginning, ii. 1.4 (40-819).

Immortality of soul, iv. 7 (2-56).

Immortality of soul proved historically, iv. 7.15 (2-85).

Immovability of Intelligence necessary to make it act as horizon, v. 5.7 (32-586).

Impassible, and punishable, soul is both, i. 1.12 (53-1204).

Impassible are world soul and stars, iv. 4.42 (28-506).

Impassible as the soul is, everything contrary is figurative, iii. 6.1 (26-351).

Impassible, how can the soul remain, though given up to emotion, iii. 6.1 (26-351).

Impassibility of incorporeal entities, iii. 6.1 (26-351).

Impassibility of matter depends on different senses of participation, iii. 6.9 (26-366).

Impassibility of the soul, iii. 6.1 (26-350).

Imperfection, cause of distance from the Supreme, iii. 3.3 (48-1080).

Imperfections are only lower forms of perfections, vi. 7.10 (38-716).

Imperfections of world should not be blamed on it, iii. 2.3 (47-1046).

Imperishable is world, so long as archetype subsists, v. 8.12 (31-572).

Imperishable, no way the soul could perish, iv. 7.12 (2-82).

Imperishable soul, even by infinite division, iv. 7.12 (2-83).

Importance to virtue, not, duration of time, i. 5.10 (36-689).

Impossible to go beyond First, vi. 8.11 (39-791).

Impression admits no cognition of intelligible objects, iv. 6.3 (41-832).

Impressions on seal of wax, sensations, iv. 7.6 (2-66).

Improvement of the low, destiny to become souls, iv. 8.7 (6-131).

Improvement of what is below her, one object of incarnation, iv. 8.5 (6-128).

Impure eye can see nothing, i. 6.9 (1-53).

Inadequacy of philosophical language, vi. 8.13 (39-797).

Inanimate entirely, nothing in universe is, iv. 4.36 (28-499).

Incarnation, difference between human and cosmic, iv. 8.3 (6-123).

Incarnation of soul; its object is perfection of universe, iv. 8.5 (6-129).

Incarnation of soul manner, iii. 9.3 (13-222).

Incarnation of soul not cause of possessing memory, iv. 3.26 (27-431).

Incarnation, study of, iv. 3.9 (27-403).

Incarnation unlikely, unless souls have disposition to suffer, ii. 3.10 (52-1177).

Incarnations, between, hell's judgment and expiation, iii. 4.6 (15-240).

Incarnation's purpose is, self-development and improvement, iv. 8.5 (6-127).

Inclination and immanence is the Supreme, vi. 8.16 (39-801).

Inclination of equator to ecliptic, v. 8.7 (31-563).

Incomprehensible unity approached only by a presence, vi. 9.4 (9-154).

Incorporeal entities alone activate body, iv. 7.8 (2-70).

Incorporeal entities, impossibility of, iii. 6.1 (26-350).

Incorporeal matter, ii. 4.2 (12-198).

Incorporeal objects limited to highest thoughts, iv. 7.8 (2-78).

Incorporeal, the soul remains, vi. 3.16 (44-962).

Incorporeal qualities, ii. 7.2 (37-695); vi. 1.29 (42-885).

Incorporeality of divinity, vi. 1.26 (42-880).

Incorporeality of intelligible entities, iv. 7.8 (2-78).

Incorporeality of matter and quantity, ii. 4.9 (12-206).

Incorporeality of soul must be studied, iv. 7.2, 8 (2-57, 68).

Incorporeality of soul proved by its penetrating body, iv. 7.8 (2-72).

Incorporeality of soul proved by kinship with Divine, iv. 7.10 (2-79).

Incorporeality of soul proved by priority of actualization, iv. 7.8 (2-71).

Incorporeality of virtue, not perishable, iv. 7.8 (2-69).

Incorruptible matter exists only potentially, ii. 5.5 (25-348).

Increase, common element, with growth and generation, vi. 3.22 (44-975).

Increased happiness would result only from more grasp, i. 5.3 (36-685).

Independent existence proved, by the use of collective nouns, vi. 6.16 (34-672).

Independent good from pleasure is temperate man, vi. 7.29 (38-747).

Independent principle, the human soul, iii. 1.8 (3-97).

Indeterminateness of soul not yet reached the good, iii. 5.7 (50-1133).

Indetermination of space leads to its measuring movement, iii. 7.12 (45-1011).

Indigence is necessarily evil, ii. 4.16 (12-218).

Indigence of soul from connection with matter, i. 8.14 (51-1160).

Indiscernibles, Leitnitz's doctrine of, v. 7.1 (18-254).

Individual aggregate formed by uniting soul and body, i. 1.6 (53-1197).

Individual relation with cosmic intellect, i. 1.8 (53-1200).

Individual relation with God and soul, i. 1.8 (53-1200).

Individuality in contemplation weakens soul, iv. 8.4 (6-125).

Individuality possessed by rational soul, iv. 8.3 (6-124).

Individuality, to which soul does it belong? ii. 3.9 (52-1175).

Individuals, descent of ideas into, vi. 5.6 (23-320).

Individuals distinct as being actualizations, vi. 2.2, (43-894).

Indivisible, v. 3.10 (49-1107).

Indivisible and divisible is the soul, iv. 2.2 (21-279).

Indivisible essence becomes divisible within bodies, iv. 2.1 (21-277).

Indivisible essence, description of, iv. 2.1 (21-277).

Indivisible is the universal being, vi. 4.3 (22-288).

Indivisibility, v. 1.7 (10-184).

Indumeneus, iii. 3.5 (48-1085).

Ineffable is the Supreme, v. 3.13 (49-1112).

Inequality of riches, no moment to an eternal being, ii. 9.9 (33-616).

Inertia of matter aired by influx of world soul, v. 1.2 (10-175).

Inexhaustible are stars, and need no refreshment, ii. 1.8 (40-827).

Inferior divinities, difference from celestial, v. 8.3 (31-556).

Inferior nature, how it can participate in the intelligible, vi. 5.11 (23-329).

Inferior natures are helped by souls descending to them, iv. 8.5 (6-127).

Inferiority of world to its model, highest criticism we may pass, v. 8.8 (31-565).

Influence of stars is their natural radiation of good, iv. 4.3 (28-497).

Influence of universe should be partial only, iv. 4.34 (28-494).

Influx movement as, vi. 3.26 (44-980).

Influx of world-soul, v. 1.2 (10-175).

Infinite and formlessness in itself is evil, i. 8.3, (51-1145).

Infinite contained by intelligence as simultaneous of one and many, vi. 7.14 (38-725).

Infinite explained as God entirely present everywhere, vi. 5.4 (23-318).

Infinite, how a number can be said to be, vi. 6.16 (34-673).

Infinite, how it arrived to existence, vi. 6.2, 3 (34-644, 645).

Infinite is conceived by the thoughts making abstraction of the firm, vi. 6.3 (34-646).

Infinite is soul, as comprising many souls, vi. 4.4 (22-291).

Infinite may be ideal or real, ii. 4.15 (12-217).

Infinite, what is its number, vi. 6.2 (34-644).

Infinity, how it can subsist in the intelligible world, vi. 6.2 (34-645).

Infinity of number, due to impossibility of increasing the greatest, vs. 6.18 (34-676).

Infinity of parts of the Supreme, v. 8.9 (31-566).

Infra-celestial vault of Theodore of Asine ("invisible place") v. 8.10 (31-567); ii. 4.1 (12-198).

Inhering in Supreme, is root of power of divinities, v. 8.9 (31-566).

Initiative should not be overshadowed by Providence, iii. 2.9 (47-1057).

Insanity even, does not justify suicide, i. 9 (16).

Inseparable from their beings are potentialities, vi. 4.9 (22-298).

Instances of correspondence of sense beauty with its idea, i. 6.3 (1-44).

Instrument of soul is body, iv. 7.1 (2-56).

Intellect, cosmic relation with individual, i. 1.8 (53-1200).

Intellect did not grasp object itself, i. 1.9 (53-1201).

Intellection neither needed nor possessed by good, iii. 8.11 (30-549).

Intellection would be movement or actualization on Aristotelian principles, vi. 1.18 (42-867).

Intellectual differences between world-soul and star-soul, iv. 4.17 (28-463).

Intellectualized, and ennobled is soul, scorning even thought, vi. 7.35 (38-757).

Intellectualizing habit that liberates the soul is virtue, vi. 8.5 (39-780).

Intellectual life possesses the reasons or ideas, vi. 2.21 (43-927).

Intelligence, always double as thinking subject and object thought, v. 3.5, 6 (49-1096); v. 4.2 (7-136); v. 6.1 (24-334).

Intelligence and life mus be transcended by good, v. 3.16 (49-1117).

Intelligence and life only different degrees of the same reality, vi. 7.18 (38-732).

Intelligence and soul contained in intelligible world, besides ideas, v. 9.13 (5-116).

Intelligence as a composite, is posterior to the categories, vi. 2.19 (43-924).

Intelligence as demiurgic creator, v. 1.8 (10-186).

Intelligence as matter of intelligible entities, v. 4.2 (7-136).

Intelligence as vision of one, v. 1.7 (10-185).

Intelligence assisting Supreme, has no room for chance, vi. 8.17 (39-804).

Intelligence begets world-souls and individual souls, vi. 2.22 (43-929).

Intelligence cannot be first, v. 4.1 (7-135).

Intelligence category, v. 1.4 (10-180).

Intelligence conceived of by stripping the soul of every non-intellectual part, v. 3.9 (49-1104).

Intelligence consists of intelligence and love, vi. 7.35 (38-758).

Intelligence contains all beings, generatively, v. 9.6 (5-109).

Intelligence contains all intelligible entities, by its very notion, v. 5.2 (32-578).

Intelligence contains all things conformed to the good, vi. 7.16 (38-727).

Intelligence contains the infinite as friendship, vi. 7.14 (38-725).

Intelligence contains the infinite as simultaneous of one and many, vi. 7.14 (38-725).

Intelligence contains the universal archetype, v. 9.9 (5-112).

Intelligence contains the whyness of its forms, vi. 7.2 (38-732).

Intelligence contemplating, is horizon of divine approach, v. 5.7 (32-586).

Intelligence could not have been the last degree of existence, ii. 9.8 (33-614).

Intelligence destroyed by theory that truth is external to it, v. 5.1 (32-576).

Intelligence develops manifoldness just like soul, iv. 3.5 (27-396).

Intelligence did not deliberate before making sense-man, vi. 7.1 (38-698).

Intelligence differentiated into universal and individual, vi. 7.17 (38-729).

Intelligence, divine nature of, i. 8.2 (51-1143).

Intelligence does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-921).

Intelligence dwelt in by pure incorporeal souls, iv. 3.24 (27-427).

Intelligence evolves over the field of truth, vi. 7.13 (38-723).

Intelligence, good and soul related by light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 (24-337).

Intelligence has conversion to good and being in itself, vi. 8.4 (39-778).

Intelligence, how it makes the world subsist, iii. 2.1 (47-1043).

Intelligence, how though one, produces particular things, vi. 2.21 (43-926).

Intelligence, ideas and essence, v. 9 (5-102).

Intelligence identical with thought, as far as existence, v. 3.5 (49-1096).

Intelligence, image of one, v. 1.7 (10-185).

Intelligence implies aspiration, as thought is aspiration to the good, iii. 8.11 (30-548).

Intelligence implies good, as thought is aspiration thereto, v. 6.5 (24-338).

Intelligence in actualization, because its thought is identical with its essence, v. 9.5 (5-107).

Intelligence in relation to good. i. 4.3 (46-1024).

Intelligence is all, vi. 7.17 (38-729).

Intelligence is goal of purification, i. 2.5 (19-263).

Intelligence is matter of intelligible entities, v. 4.2 (7-136).

Intelligence is the potentiality of the intelligences which are its actualizations, vi. 2.20 (43-925).

Intelligence itself is the substrate of the intelligible world, ii. 4.4 (12-199).

Intelligence, life of, is ever contemporaneous, iii. 7.2 (45-989).

Intelligence, like circle, is inseparably one and many, iii. 8.8 (30-543).

Intelligence may be denied liberty, if granted super-liberty, vi. 8.6 (39-782).

Intelligence, multiplicity of, implies their mutual differences, vi. 7.17 (38-730).

Intelligence must remain immovable to act as horizon, v. 5.7 (32-586).

Intelligence not a unity, but its manifold produced by a unity, iv. 4.1 (28-443).

Intelligence not constituted by things in it, v. 2.2 (11-196).

Intelligence not ours, but we, i. 1.13 (53-1206).

Intelligence passes from unity to duality by thinking, v. 6.1 (24-333).

Intelligence potential and actualized in the soul, vi. 6.15 (34-669).

Intelligence primary knows itself, v. 3.6 (49-1099).

Intelligence proof of its existence and nature, v. 9.3 (5-104).

Intelligence ranks all else, v. 4.2 (7-136).

Intelligence relation to intelligible, iii. 9.1 (13-220).

Intelligence's existence proved by identity of its thought and essence, v. 9.3 (5-104).

Intelligence shines down from the peak formed by united souls, vi. 7.15 (38-726).

Intelligence supreme, is king of kings, v. 5.3 (32-579).

Intelligence's working demands a supra-thinking principle, v. 6.2 (24-334).

Intelligence that aspires to form of good is not the supreme, iii. 8.11 (30-548).

Intelligence thinks things, because it possesses them, vi. 6.7 (34-653).

Intelligence unites, as it rises to the intelligible, iv. 4.1 (28-442).

Intelligence, which is free by itself, endows soul with liberty, vi. 8.7 (39-983).

Intelligence world, in it each being is accompanied by its whyness, vi. 7.2 (38-702).

Intelligent life beneath being, iii. 6.6 (26-361).

Intelligent animals are distinct from the creating image of them, vi. 7.8 (38-712).

Intelligible animals are pre-existing, vi. 7.8 (38-712).

Intelligible animals do not incline towards the sense-world, vi. 7.8 (38-712).

Intelligible beauty, v. 8 (31-551).

Intelligible believed in by those rising to the soul, vi. 9.5 (9-156).

Intelligible contains the earth, vi. 7.11 (38-718).

Intelligible does not descend; sense-world rises, iii. 4.4 (15-237).

Intelligible entities are not outside of the good, v. 5 (32-575).

Intelligible entities are veritable numbers, vi. 6.14 (34-668).

Intelligible entities contained by very motion of intelligence, v. 5.2 (32-578).

Intelligible entities do not exist apart from their matter, intelligence, v. 4.2 (7-138).

Intelligible entities eternal and immutable, not corporeal, iv. 7.8 (2-69).

Intelligible entities, gnostics think they can be bewitched, ii. 9.14 (33-627).

Intelligible entities higher and lower, first and second, v. 4.2 (7-135).

Intelligible entities must be both, identical with and different from intelligence, v. 3.10 (49-1108).

Intelligible entities not merely images, but potentialities for memory, iv. 4.4 (28-446).

Intelligible entities presence implied by knowledge of them, v. 5.1 (32-575).

Intelligible entities return not by memory, but by further vision, iv. 4.5 (28-447).

Intelligible entity what, and how it is it, vi. 6.8 (34-654).

Intelligible essence, both in and out of itself, vi. 5.3 (23-316).

Intelligible essence formed by adding eternity to essence, vi. 2.1 (43-892).

Intelligible eternity in not an accident of, but an intimate part of its nature, iii. 7.3 (45-989).

Intelligible has eternity as world-soul is to time, iii. 7.10 (45-1007).

Intelligible, how participated in by inferior nature, vi. 5.11 (23-329).

Intelligible in it, cause coincides with nature, vi. 7.19 (38-735).

Intelligible in it, stability does not imply stillness, vi. 3.27 (44-982).

Intelligible line exists in the intelligible, vi. 6.17 (34-674).

Intelligible line posterior to number, vi. 6.17 (34-674).

Intelligible man, scrutiny of, demanded by philosophy, vi. 7.4 (38-705).

Intelligible matter, ii. 4.1 2 (12-197, 198); iii., 8.11 (30-548).

Intelligible matter composite of form and matter, ii. 4.4 (12-200).

Intelligible matter is not potential, ii, 5.3 (25-345).

Intelligible matter is not shapeless, ii. 4.3 (12-198).

Intelligible matter is shaped real being, ii. 4.5 (12-201).

Intelligible matter, why it must be accepted, iii. 5.6 (50-1132).

Intelligible number infinite because unmeasured, vi. 6.18 (34-676).

Intelligible numbers, vi. 6.6 (34-651).

Intelligible parts of men unite in the intelligible, vi. 5.10 (23-327).

Intelligible Pythagorean numbers discussed, vi. 6.5 (34-649).

Intelligible relation to intelligence, iii. 9.1 (13-220).

Intelligible remains unmoved, yet penetrates the world, vi. 5.11 (23-328).

Intelligible, shared by highest parts of all men, vi. 7.15 (38-726).

Intelligible, spherical figure the primitive one, vi. 6.17 (34-675).

Intelligible terms, only verbal similarity to physical, vi. 3.5 (44-941).

Intelligible, to them is limited difference in effects, vi. 3.17 (44-964).

Intelligible unity and decad exist before all numbers, vi. 6.5 (34-650).

Intelligible, what is being in it is generation in the sense-world, vi. 3.2 (44-935).

Intelligible world and sense-world, connection between man's triple nature, vi. 7.7 (38-711).

Intelligible world archetype of ours, v. 1.4 (10-178).

Intelligible world contains air, vi. 7.11 (38-720).

Intelligible world contains beside ideas, soul and intelligence, v. 9.13 (5-116).

Intelligible world contains earth, vi. 7.11 (38-718).

Intelligible world contains fire, vi. 7.11 (38-719).

Intelligible world contains water, vi. 7.11 (38-720).

Intelligible world, could it contain vegetables or metals, vi. 7.11 (38-717).

Intelligible world is model of this universe, vi. 7.12 (38-720).

Intelligible world, description of, v. 8.4 (31-557).

Intelligible world has more unity than sense-world, vi. 5.10 (23-327).

Intelligible world, how infinity can subsist in, vi. 6.3 (34-645).

Intelligible world, in it everything is actual, ii. 5.3 (25-346).

Intelligible world is complete model of this universe, vi. 7.12 (38-720).

Intelligible world, man relation to, vi. 4.14 (22-308).

Intelligible world, stars influence is from contemplation of, iv. 4.35 (28-496).

Intelligible world, we must descend from it to study time, iii. 7.6 (45-995).

Interior characteristics necessary to happiness, i. 4.3 (46-1023).

Interior life, rather than exterior, is field of liberty, vi. 8.6 (39-781).

Interior man, v. 1.10 (10-189).

Interior model, cause of appreciation of interior beauty, i. 6.2 (1-45).

Interior vision, how trained, i. 6.9 (1-53).

Intermediary between form and matter, are sense-objects, iii. 6.17 (26-381).

Intermediary body not necessary for vision, iv. 5.1 (29-514, 515).

Intermediary elemental soul, also inadmissible, ii. 9.5 (33-607).

Intermediary of reason is the world-soul, iv. 3.11 (27-407).

Intermediary position of Saturn, between Uranus and Jupiter, v. 8.13 (31-573).

Intermediary sensation, demanded by conceptive thoughts, iv. 4.23 (28-472).

Intermediate is human nature, suffering with whole, but acting on it, iv. 4.45 (28-511).

Intermediate is the soul's nature, iv. 8.7 (6-130).

Intermediate sense shape on which depends sensation, iv. 4.23 (28-473).

Internal and external evil, relation between, i. 8.5 (51-1149).

Internecine war is objection to Providence, iii. 2.15 (47-1065).

Internecine warfare necessary, iii. 2.15 (47-1065).

Interpenetration of everything in intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-557).

Interpreter of reason is the world-soul, iv. 3.11 (27-407).

Interrelation of supreme and subordinate divinities dynamic (birth) or mere relation of parts and whole dynamic? v. 8.9 (31-566).

Intimacy of itself is the good of a thing, vi. 7.27 (38-744).

Intuition, omniscient, supersedes memory and reasonings, iv. 4.12 (28-457).

Intuitionally, the soul can reason, iv. 3.18 (27-417).

Intuition's act is true conception, i. 1.9 (53-1202).

Involuntariness to blame spontaneity, iii. 2.10 (47-1060).

Irascible part of earth, iv. 4.28 (28-481).

Irrational claims of astrologers, iii. 1.6 (3-95).

Isolated, pure soul would remain, iv. 4.23 (28-473).

James-Lange theory of emotions refuted, i. 1.5 (53-1196).

James-Lange theory taught, iv. 4.28 (28-480, 481).

Jar, residence or location of generation is matter, ii. 4.1 (12-197); iii. 6.14 (26-376); iv. 3.20 (27-420).

Jealousy does not exist in divine nature, iv. 8.6 (6-129).

Judgment and soul, passibility of, iii. 6.1 (26-350).

Judgment, mental, reduces multitude to unity, vi. 6.13 (34-664).

Judgment of one part by another, truth of astrology, ii. 3.7 (52-1172).

Judgment of soul and other things in purest condition only, iv. 7.10 (2-80).

Judgment of soul condemns her to reincarnation, iv. 8.5 (6-128).

Judgment, time of, between incarnations, iii. 4.6 (15-240).

Jupiter, v. 1.7 (10-185); v. 8.1 (31-552); v. 8.10 (31-568); iii. 5.2 (50-1126); v. 5.3 (32-580); v. 8.4 (31-558); iv. 3.12 (27-409); vi. 9.7 (9-162).

Jupiter, as demiurge, as world-soul, and as governor, iv. 4.10 (28-454).

Jupiter life's infinity destroys memory, iv. 4.9 (28-453).

Jupiter the greatest chief, or third God, is the soul, iii. 5.8 (50-1136).

Jupiter, two-fold, celestial and earthly, iii. 5.2 (50-1126).

Jupiter, Venus and Mercury, also considered astrologically, ii. 3.5 (52-1170).

Jupiter's administration above memory, iv. 4.9 (28-453).

Jupiter's garden is the reason begets everything, iii. 5.9 (50-1137).

Jupiter, two-fold, celestial and earthly, iii. 5.2 (50-1126).

Justice, v. 1.11 (10-190); v. 8.4, 10 (31-557, 567); i. 6.4 (1-61).

Justice, absolute, is indivisible, i. 2.6 (19-265).

Justice does not possess extension, iv. 7.8 (2-69).

Justice extends into past and future, iii. 2.13 (47-1062).

Justice, golden face of, vi. 6.6 (34-652); i, 6.4 (1-61).

Justice incarnate, is individual, i. 2.6 (19-265).

Justice is no true category, vi. 2.18 (41-923).

Justice, like intellectual statue, was born of itself, vi. 6.6 (34-652).

Justice not destroyed by superficiality of punishments, iii. 2.15 (47-1066).

Justice of God vindicated by philosophy, iv. 4.30, 37 (28-486, 500).

Justice seated beside Jupiter, v. 8.4 (31-558).

Juxtaposition, ii. 7.1 (37-691); iv. 7.3 (2-59).

Kinds of men, three, v. 9.1 (5-102).

King of kings, v. 5.3 (32-579).

Kings, men are, v. 3.4 (49-1094).

King, universal, stars followers of, ii. 3.13 (52-1179).

Kinship divine, recognition of, depends on self-knowledge, vi. 9.7 (9-161).

Kinship of human soul with divine, v. 1.1 (10-173).

Kinship to world-soul shown by fidelity to one's own nature, iii. 3.1 (48-1077).

Kinship with beautiful world scorned by gnostics, ii. 9.18 (33-635).

Kinship with depraved men accepted, ii. 9.18 (33-636).

Know thyself, iv. 3.1 (27-387); vi. 7.41 (38-769).

Knowledge of better things, cleared up by purification, iv. 7.10 (2-80).

Knowledge of good attained experience of evil, iv. 8.7 (6-131).

Knowledge of intelligible entities implies their presence, v. 5.1 (32-575).

Knowledge, true, shown not by unification, not revelation of divine power, ii. 9.9 (33-617).

Kronos, of Uranus, iii. 5.2 (50-1126).

Label, is good, a common quality or a common label, vi. 7.18 (38-733).

Lachesis, ii. 3.15 (52-1182).

Land marks on path to ecstasy, i. 6.9 (1-54).

Last degree of existence could not have been existence, ii. 9.8 (33-614).

Last stage of soul-elevation, is vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10 (31-567).

Law, natural directs soul. ii. 3.8 (52-1173).

Law of the order of the universe, why souls succumb to it, iv. 3.15 (27-413).

Laws, natural, which carry rewards, may be neglected by good, iii. 2.8 (47-1055).

Leakage (flow of or escape), ii. 1.6, 8 (40-822); v. 1.6 (10-182); vi. 5.10 (23-327); v. 1.6 (10-182).

Leakage, none in radiation of soul (see wastage), vi. 4.5, 10 (22-293, 301); vi. 5.3 (23-317).

Leakage, none with celestial light, ii. 1.8 (40-784).

Leave not world, but be not of it, i. 8.6 (51-1150).

Leibnitz, theory of indiscernibles, v. 7.2 (18-254).

Legislator, intelligence, v. 9.5 (5-108).

Leisure in life of celestial Gods, v. 8.3 (31-556).

Lethe, iv. 3.26 (27-432).

Letters in which to read nature, iii. 3.6 (48-1087).

Letters in which to read nature, are stars, ii. 3.7 (52-1172); iii. 1.6 (3-95).

Liberation of soul effected by virtue as intellectualizing habit, vi. 8.5 (39-779).

Liberty, vi. 8 (39-773).

Liberty depends on intelligence, vi. 8.3 (39-777).

Liberty, does it belong to God only, or to all others also? vi. 8.1 (39-773).

Liberty lies in following reason, iii. 1.9, 10 (3-97, 98).

Liberty may be denied to intelligence, if granted super-liberty, vi. 8.6 (39-781).

Liberty must be for men, if it is for the divinities, vi. 8.1 (39-782).

Liberty not for the depraved who follow images, vi. 8.3 (39-777).

Liberty refers to the interior life, rather than to the exterior, vi. 8.6 (39-781).

Liberty would be destroyed by astrology. iii. 1.7 (3-96).

Life and intelligence could not inhere in molecules, iv. 7.2 (2-58).

Life and thought, different grades of, iii 8.7 (30-540).

Life changed from an evil to a by virtue, i. 7.1 (54-1208).

Life, drama of, roles played badly by evil, iii. 2.17 (47-1071).

Life interpenetrates all, and knows no limits, vi. 5.12 (23-330).

Life is actualization of intelligence, vi. 9.9 (9-165).

Life is below good, iii. 9.9 (13-225).

Life is perfect when intelligible, i. 4.3 (46-1024).

Life is presence with divinity, vi. 9.9 (9-165).

Life of intelligence is ever contemporaneous, iii. 7.2 (45-989).

Life, thought and existence, contained in primary existence, ii. 4.6 (12-203); v. 6.6 (24-339).

Life's ascent, witness to, is disappearance of contingency, vi. 8.15 (39-801).

Light abandoned by source does not perish, but is no more there, iv. 4.29 (28-484); iv. 5.7 (29-526).

Light and fire celestial, nature of, ii. 1.7 (40-825).

Light and form, two methods of sight, v. 5.7 (32-586).

Light as actualization is incorporeal, iv. 5.7 (29-527).

Light celestial, not exposed to any wastage, ii. 1.8 (40-826).

Light emanates from sun, v. 3.12 (49-1112).

Light emitted by the soul forms animal nature, i. 1.7 (53-1198).

Light exists simultaneously within and without, vi. 4.7 (22-295).

Light from sun exists everywhere, vi. 4.6 (22-296).

Light in eye, v.7 (32-586); v. 6.1 (24-334); iv. 5.4 (29-500).

Light intelligible, v. 5.8 (32-587).

Light intelligible is not spatial, has no relation to place, v. 5.8 (32-587).

Light intermediary is unnecessary, being a hindrance, iv. 5.4 (29-521).

Light is composite of light in eye and light outside, v. 6.1 (24-334).

Light, is it destroyed when its source is withdrawn or does it follow it? iv. 5.7 (29-526).

Light, objective and visual, mutual relation of, iv. 5.4 (29-520).

Light, objective, does not transmit by relays, iv. 5.4 (29-522).

Light, relation to air, iv. 4.5, 6 (29-524).

Light, visual, not a medium, iv. 5.4 (29-522).

Lighting fire, from refraction, generation illustrates, iii. 6.14 (26-376).

Limit lower, of divine things, the soul, v. 1.7 (10-186).

Limit of union with divinity, desire or ability, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Limitless is supreme, vi. 7.32 (38-753).

Limits, none known by life, vi. 5.12 (23-330).

Line intelligible, posterior to number, vi. 6.17 (34-674).

Liver, location of growth, iv. 3.23 (27-426).

Liver, seat of soul's desire, iv. 4.28 (28-480).

Lives, former, cause human character, iii. 3.4 (48-1083).

Living being, no evil is unalloyed for it, i. 7.3 (54-1210).

Living well not explainable by reason, i. 4.2 (46-1022).

Living well not extended to all animals, i. 4.2 (46-1020).

Localization of soul open to metaphysical objections, iv. 3.20 (27-419).

Location does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.16 (43-919).

Location for the things yet to be produced is essence, vi. 6.10 (34-657).

Location of form (see residence), iii, 6.14 (26-376).

Location of soul is principle that is everywhere and nowhere, v. 2.2 (11-195).

Location of world is in soul and not soul in body, iv, 3.9 (27-405).

Logos, intermediary, also unaccountable, ii. 9.1 (33-601).

Logos, form of, character, role and reason, iii. 2.17 (47-1071).

Lost wings, has soul, in incarnation, i. 8.14 (51-1161).

Love as God, demon and passion, iii. 5.1 (50-1122).

Love as recognition of hidden affinity, iii. 5.1 (50-1122).

Love based on unity and sympathy of all things, iv. 9.3 (8-142).

Love causes, four, divine, innate notion, affinity and sentiment of beauty, iii. 5.1 (50-1123).

Love, celestial, must abide in intelligible with celestial soul, iii. 5.3 (50-1128).

Love, higher, is celestial, iii. 5.3 (50-1128).

Love, how transformed into progressively higher stages, v. 9.2 (5-103).

Love is a gad-fly, iii. 5.7 (50-1134).

Love is both material and a demon, iii. 5.10 (50-1140).

Love is both needy and acquisitive, iii. 5.7 (50-1134).

Love is not identical with the world, iii. 5.5 (50-1130).

Love, like higher soul, inseparable from its source, iii. 5.2 (50-1126).

Love, lower, beauty, celestial, v. 8.13 (31-573).

Love, lower, corresponding to world-soul, iii. 5.3 (50-1128).

Love must exist because the soul does, iii. 5.10 (50-1139).

Love, myth of birth, significance, iii. 5.10 (50-1139).

Love of beauty explained by aversion for ugliness, i. 6.5 (1-47).

Love possesses divine being, iii. 5.3 (50-1127).

Love, working as sympathy, affects magic, iv. 4.40 (28-503).

Love or Eros, iii. 5 (50-1122).

Love that unites soul to good is deity, iii. 5.4 (50-1130).

Love that unites soul to matter is demon only, iii. 5.4 (50-1130).

Lover, divine, waits at the door, vi. 5.10 (23-325).

Lover, how he develops, v. 9.2 (5-103).

Lover, how he is attracted by beauty of single body, i. 3.2 (20-271).

Lover, how he uses to intelligible world, i. 3.2 (20-271).

Lover, simile of, in seeing God, vi. 9.4 (9-155).

Lovers are those who feel sentiments most keenly, i, 6.4 (1-46).

Lover's beauty in virtues transformed to intellectual, i. 3.2 (20-271).

Lover's beauty transformed into artistic and spiritual virtues, i. 3.2 (20-271).

Loves contrary to nature are passions of strayed souls, iii. 5.7 (50-1135).

Loves implanted by nature are all good, iii. 5.7 (50-1136).

Loves in the evil charged down by false opinions, iii. 5.7 (50-1136).

Lower form of being possessed by evil, i. 8.3 (51-1145).

Lower forms of contemplation, iii. 8.1 (30-531).

Lower natures, good is for them, not for itself, vi. 7.4 (38-706).

Lower things follow higher, i. 8.1 (51-1142).

Lowest degree of being is evil, hence necessary, i. 8.7 (51-1146).

Lyceum, vi. 1.14, 30 (42-862, 888).

Lynceus, whose keen eyes pierce all, symbol of intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-558).

Lyre, badly tuned, cannot produce harmony, vi. 3.13 (44-961); ii. 3.13 (52-1180).

Lyre played by musician, like affections of the soul, iii. 6.4 (26-358).

Lyre, simile of striking single cord, vi, 5.10 (23-326).

Made himself, divinity has, does not cause priority, vi. 8.20 (39-808).

Magic, based on sympathy, iv. 9.3 (8-142).

Magic enchantments described, iv. 9.3 (8-142).

Magic, escaped by honesty, iv. 4.44 (28-509).

Magic occurs by love, working as sympathy, iv. 4.40 (28-503).

Magic power over honesty, iv. 4.44 (28-509).

Magic power over man by its affections and weakness, iv. 4.44 (28-508).

Magnanimity interpreted as purifications, i. 6.6 (1-49).

Magnitude an aid to differences of color, ii. 8.1 (35-681).

Magnitude is an image formed by reflection of universal beings, iii. 6.17 (26-380).

Magnitude is only appearance, iii. 6.18 (26-381).

Magnitude of matter derived from seminal reasons, iii. 6.15 (26-377).

Magnitude, why could the soul have none, if it filled all space, vi. 4.1 (22-285).

Magnitudes and numbers are of different kind of quality, vi. 1.4 (42-843).

Man as soul subsisting in a special reason, vi. 7.5 (38-707).

Man in himself, vi. 7.4 (38-706).

Man is defined as reasonable soul, vi. 7.4 (38-706).

Man is perfected through his evils, ii. 3.18 (52-1187).

Man produces seminal reason, ii. 3.12 (52-1178).

Man, relation of, to the intelligible world, vi. 4.14 (22-308).

Man's triple nature is connection between sense and intelligible world, vi. 7.7 (38-711).

Management of body by reasoning, of world by intelligence, iv. 8.8 (6-132).

Manager, rewards and punishes, good and bad actors, iii. 2.17 (47-1071).

Managing part of soul, discredited, iv. 2.2 (21-280).

Manicheans, wine divided in jars theory of reflected, iv. 3.2, 20 (27-390).

Manifold contains unity of manner of existence, vi. 4.8 (22-296).

Manifold could not exist without something simple, v. 6.3 (24-336).

Manifold, how intelligence became, v. 3.11 (49-1108).

Manifold, how it arises from the one Intelligence, vi. 2.21 (43-926).

Manifold, if it passed into unity, would destroy universe, iii. 8.10 (30-547).

Manifold is unity of apperception, iv. 4.1 (28-442).

Manifold not explained by supreme unity, v. 9.14 (5-1116).

Manifold, nothing, could exist without something simple, v. 6.3 (12-336).

Manifold of intelligence produced by unity, iv. 4.1 (28-443).

Manifold unity, only for examination are its parts apart, vi. 2.3 (43-897).

Manifoldness, v. 3.16 (49-1118).

Manifoldness contained by universal essence, vi. 9.2 (9-149).

Manifoldness developed by soul, as by intelligence, iv. 3.6 (27-398).

Manifoldness must pre-exist, vi. 2.2 (43-894).

Manifoldness of any kind cannot exist within the first, v. 3.12 (49-1110).

Manifoldness of unity, vi. 5.6 (23-321).

Manifoldness produced by one because of categories, v. 3.15 (49-1116).

Manifoldness, why it proceeded from unity, v. 2.1 (11-193).

Manner of existence determines how unity is manifold, vi. 4.8 (22-296).

Many and one inseparably, is intelligence, iii. 8.8 (30-543).

Many and one, puzzle of decides genera of essence, vi. 2.4 (43-898).

Marriages, presided over by lower love, iii. 5.3 (50-1129).

Mars, relations to Saturn illogical, ii. 3.5 (52-1169).

Mass is source of ugliness, v. 8.2 (31-554).

Master, even beyond it, is the Supreme, vi. 8.12 (39-793).

Master of himself power is the Supreme, vi. 8.10 (39-790).

Masters of ourselves are even we, how much more Supreme, vi. 8.12 (39-793).

Mastery of these corporeal dispositions is not easy, i. 8.8 (51-1154).

Material, gnostic distinction of men, ii. 9.18 (33-637).

Materialism, polemic against, iv. 7 (2-56).

Materialists cannot understand solid things near nonentity, iii. 6.6 (26-361).

Materialists support determination, iii. 1.2 (3-88).

Mathematical parts not applicable to soul. iv. 3.2 (27-389).

Matter acc. to Empedocles and Anaximander, ii. 4.7 (12-204).

Matter alone could not endow itself with life, iv. 7.3 (2-60).

Matter an empty mirror that reflects everything, iii. 6.7 (26-363).

Matter and form in all things, iv. 7.1 (2-56).

Matter and form intermediary between is sense object, iii. 6.17 (26-381).

Matter as deprivation still without qualities, i. 8.11 (51-1157).

Matter as mirror, not affected by the object reflected, iii. 6.7 (26-363).

Matter as mother, nurse, residence and other nature, iii. 6.19 (26-384).

Matter as residence of generation. iii. 6.13 (26-373).

Matter as substrate and residence of forms, ii. 4.1 (12-197).

Matter as the infinite in itself, ii. 4.15 (12-216).

Matter, born of world-soul, shapeless, begetting principle, iii. 4.1 (15-233).

Matter, both kinds, relation of, to essence, ii. 4.16 (12-219).

Matter cannot be affected, as cannot be destroyed, iii. 6.8 (26-365).

Matter cannot be credited with being, vi. 3.7 (44-944).

Matter cannot be the primary principle, vi. 1.26 (42-881).

Matter contained in the soul from her looking at darkness, i. 8.4 (51-1147).

Matter contemporarily with the informing principle, ii. 4.8 (12-206).

Matter, corporeal and incorporeal, ii. 4.1 (12-198).

Matter, cult of implies ignoring soul and intelligence, vi. 1.29 (42-887).

Matter derives its being from intelligibles, vi. 3.7 (44-944).

Matter, descent into, is fall of the soul, i. 8.14 (51-1161).

Matter, difference from form, due to that of intelligible sources, vi. 3.8 (44-946).

Matter existed from all eternity, iv. 8.6 (6-130).

Matter, first physical category of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 (44-937).

Matter, how to see the formless, a thing of itself, i. 8.9 (51-1156).

Matter (hypostatic), existence as undeniable as that of good, i. 8.15 (51-1162).

Matter, if primary, would be form of the universe, iii. 6.18 (26-382).

Matter, impassible, because of different senses of participation, iii. 6.9 (26-366).

Matter, incorporeal (Pyth. Plato, Arist.), ii. 4.1 (12-198).

Matter, incorruptible, exists only potentially, ii. 5.5 (25-348).

Matter, intelligible, ii. 4.3 (12-198); ii. 5.3 (25-345); iii. 5.7 (50-1134).

Matter, intelligible, entities to reach sense-matter, iii. 5.7 (50-1154).

Matter, intelligible, is not potential, ii. 5.3 (25-345).

Matter, intelligible, why it must be accepted, iii. 5.6, 7 (50-1133).

Matter is born shapeless, receives form while turning to, ii. 4.3 (12-198).

Matter is both without qualities and evil, i. 8.10 (51-1156).

Matter is bottom of everything, ii. 4.5 (12-201).

Matter is cause of evils, even if corporeal, i. 8.8 (51-1153).

Matter is disposition to become something else, ii. 4.13 (12-214).

Matter is improved by form, vi. 7.28 (38-745).

Matter is incorporeal, ii. 4.9 (12-206).

Matter is nonentity, i. 8.5 (51-1148).

Matter is non-essential otherness, ii. 4.16 (12-218).

Matter is not a body without quality, but with magnitude, vi. 1.26 (42-880).

Matter is not being and cannot be anything actual, ii. 5.4 (25-347).

Matter is not composite, but simple in one, ii. 4.8 (12-205).

Matter is not wickedness, but neutral evil, vi. 7.28 (38-746).

Matter is nothing actually, ii. 5.2 (25-343).

Matter is physical category, vi. 3.3 (44-937).

Matter is real potentially, ii. 5.5 (25-348).

Matter is relative darkness, ii. 4.5 (12-201).

Matter is secondary evil, i. 8.4 (51-1155).

Matter is unchangeable because form is such, iii. 6.10 (26-368).

Matter left alone as basis after Stoic categories evaporate, vi. 1.29 (42-886).

Matter magnitude derived from seminal reason, iii. 6.15 (26-377).

Matter may exist yet be evil, i. 8.11 (51-1158).

Matter, modified, is Stoic God, vi. 12.7 (42-881).

Matter must be possible because its qualities change, iii. 6.8 (26-366).

Matter necessary to the world; hence good implies evil, i. 8.7 (51-1152).

Matter not in intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-557).

Matter nothing real actually, ii. 5.4 (25-347).

Matter of demons is not corporeal, iii. 5.7 (50-1135).

Matter participates in existence, without participating it, iii. 6.14 (26-376)

Matter participates in the intelligible, by appearance, iii. 6.11 (26-369).

Matter, participation of, in ideas, vi. 5.8 (23-321)

Matter possesses no quality, ii. 4.8 (12-205); iv. 7.3 (2-59).

Matter qualified as seminal reasons, vi. 1.29

Matter rationalized is body, ii. 7.3 (37-696).

Matter received forms until hidden by them, v. 8.7 (31-562).

Matter, relation of, to reason, illustrates that of opinion to imagination, iii. 6.15 (26-377).

Matter, since cannot be destroyed, cannot be affected, iii. 6.8 (26-365).

Matter things mingled, contain no perfection, iii. 2.7 (47-1053).

Matter's generation, consequence of anterior principles, iv. 8.6 (6-130).

Matter's primitive impotence before generation, iv. 8.6 (6-130).

Mechanism of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569).

Medicine, v. 9.11 (5-114).

Mediocre, evil men even, never abandoned by Providence, iii. 2.9 (47-1058).

Mediation of soul between indivisible and divisible essence, iv. 2 (21-276).

Mediation of world-souls, through it, benefits are granted to men, vi. 4.12, 30 (28-457, 486).

Medium cosmologically necessary, but affects sight only slightly, iv. 5.2 (29-517).

Medium needed in Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, iv. 5.2 (29-516).

Medium not needed in Atomism and Epicurianism, iv. 5.2 (29-516).

Medium of sight, Aristotle's unnecessary iv. 5.1 (29-515).

Medium, though possible, hinders organs of sight, iv. 5.1 (29-514).

Medium, untroubled, is the world-soul, iv. 8.7 (6-130).

Medium's absence would only destroy sympathy, iv. 5.3 (29-519).

Medium's affection does not interfere with vision, iv. 5.3 (29-520).

Memories not needed, unconscious prayer answered by Stars, iv. 4.42 (28-505).

Memories of the past do not increase happiness, i. 5.9 (36-689).

Memory, iv. (27-428).

Memory and reasoning, not implied by world-soul's wisdom, iv. 4.12 (28-457).

Memory and reasoning suspended by omniscient intuition, iv. 4.12 (28-457).

Memory and sensation iv. 6 (41-829).

Memory and sensation, Stoic doctrines of, hang together, iv. 6.1 (41-829).

Memory acts through the sympathy of the soul's highest self, iv. 6.3 (41-832).

Memory, actualization of the soul, iv. 3.25 (27-429).

Memory belongs to divine soul, and to that derived from world-soul, iv. 3.27 (27-433).

Memory belongs to imagination, iv. 3.29 (27-433).

Memory belongs to the soul alone, iv. 3.26 (27-432).

Memory, both kinds, implies both kinds of imagination, iv. 3.31 (27-438).

Memory definition depends on whether it is animal or human, iv. 3.25 (27-429).

Memory does not belong to appetite, iv. 3.28 (27-434).

Memory does not belong to the power of perception, iv. 3.29 (27-435).

Memory does not belongs to the stars, iv. 4.30 (28-441).

Memory impossible to world-souls to whom there is no time but a single day, iv. 4.7 (28-450).

Memory inapplicable to any but time limited beings, iv. 3.25 (27-428).

Memory is not identical with feeling or reasoning, iv. 3.29 (27-436).

Memory limited to souls that change their condition, iv. 4.6 (28-448).

Memory may be reduced to sensation, iv. 3.28 (27-434).

Memory needs training and education, iv. 6.3 (41-835).

Memory, none in stars, because uniformly blissful, iv. 4.8 (28-452).

Memory not an image but a reawakening of a faculty, iv. 6.3 (41-833).

Memory not as high as unreflective identification, iv. 4.4 (28-445).

Memory not, but an affection, is kept by appetite, iv. 3.28 (27-434).

Memory not compulsory, iv. 4.8 (28-451).

Memory not exercised by world-souls and stars' souls, iv. 4.6 (28-449).

Memory not intelligible because of simultaneity, iv. 4.1 (28-441).

Memory of soul in intelligible world, iv. 4.1 (28-441).

Memory peculiar to soul and body, iv. 3.2 (27-430).

Memory, possession of, not caused by incarnation of soul, iv. 3.26 (27-431).

Memory problems depend on definition, iv. 3.25 (27-429).

Memory, timeless, constitutes self-consciousness, iv. 3.25 (27-429).

Memory when beyond, helped by training here below, iv. 4.5 (28-447).

Memory would be hindered if soul's impressions were corporeal, iv. 7.6 (2-66).

Men are kings, v. 3.4 (49-1094).

Men both, we are not always as we should be, vi. 4.14 (22-308).

Men escape chance by interior isolation, vi. 8.15 (39-800).

Men non-virtuous, do good when not hindered by passions, iii. 1.10 (3-98).

Men of three kinds, sensual, moral and spiritual, v. 9.1 (5-102).

Men seek action when too weak for contemplation, iii. 8.4 (30-536).

Men sense and intelligible, difference between, vi. 7.4 (38-705).

Men, three in each of us, vi. 7.6 (38-708).

Men, three in us, fate of them is, brutalization or divinization, vi. 7.6 (38-709).

Men, three kinds of, v. 9.1 (5-102).

Mercury, Jupiter and Venus, also considered astrologically, ii. 3.5 (52-1169).

Metal is to statue as body to soul, iv. 7.8 (2-76).

Messengers of divinities are souls incarnated, iv. 3.12, 13 (27-409); iv. 8.5 (6-127).

Metaphorical is all language about the Supreme, vi. 8.13 (39-795).

Method of creation, ii. 3.17 (52-1186).

Method of ecstasy is to close eyes of body, i. 6.8 (1-52).

Methods of dialectic differ with individuals, i. 3.1 (20-269).

Methods of participation in good, i. 7.1 (54-1208).

Metis or prudence (myth of), iii. 5.5 (50-1130).

Microcosm, iv. 3.10 (27-406).

Migrating of soul psychologically explained, vi. 4.16 (22-310).

Minerva, vi. 5.7 (23-321).

Minos, vi. 9.7 (9-162).

Miracle, matter participates in existence, while not participating in it, iii. 6.14 (26-376).

Mire, unruly, soul falls into, when plunging down, i. 8.13 (51-1160).

Mirror, iv. 3.30 (27-437); iv. 5.7 (29-528).

Mirror empty, reflects everything like matter, iii. 6.7 (26-363).

Mirror, simile of, i. 4.10 (46-1034).

Misfortune and punishment, significance of, iv. 3.16 (27-414).

Misfortune, experience of, does not give senses to man, vi. 7.1 (38-697).

Misfortune foreseen by God, not cause of human senses, vi. 7.1 (38-697).

Misfortune none too great to be conquered by virtues, i. 4.8 (46-1031).

Misfortune to the good only apparent, iii. 2.6 (47-1051).

Mithra, simile of, used, iii. 2.14 (47-1064).

Mixture, consequences of soul and body, i. 1.4 (53-1195).

Mixture, elements are not, but arise from a common system, ii. 1.7 (40-824).

Mixture explained by evaporation (Stoic), ii. 7.2 (37-694).

Mixture limited to energies of the existent, iv. 7.2, 8 (2-58, 68).

Mixture of intelligence and necessity, i. 8.7 (51-1152).

Mixture of soul and body impossible, i. 1.4 (53-1194).

Mixture of soul divisible, ii. 3.9 (52-1176).

Mixture of unequal qualities, ii. 7.1 (37-693).

Mixture that occupies more space than elements, ii. 7.1 (37-693).

Mixture, theory of, of Alexander of Aphrodisia, ii. 7.1 (37-691); iv. 7.2 (2-58).

Mixture to the point of total penetration, ii. 7 (37-691).

Modality, should not occupy even third rank of existence, vi. 1.30 (42-887).

Model, v. 8.8 (31-564).

Model for producing principle, is form, v. 8.7 (31-561).

Model, image bound to it by radiation, vi. 4.10 (22-300).

Model, interior, cause of appreciation of interior beauties, i. 6.4 (1-45).

Model of reason, is the universal soul, iv. 3.11 (27-407).

Model of the old earth, gnostic, ii. 9.5 (33-607).

Model of the universe is intelligible world, vi. 7.12 (38-720).

Model, previous, object's existence implies, vi. 6.10 (34-658).

Model, superior, method of producing assimilation, i. 2.7 (19-267, 268).

Modesty is part of goodness, ii. 9.9. (33-616).

Modification derived from foreign sources, i. 1.9 (53-1202).

Modified matter, is Stoic God, vi. 1.27 (42-881).

Molecules could not possess life and intelligence, iv. 7.2 (2-57).

Monism of the Stoics breaks down just like dualism, v. 1.27 (42-883).

Moon, limit of world-sphere, ii. 1.5 (40-820).

Moon, sun and light universe like, v. 6.4 (24-337).

Moral beauties, more delightful than sense-beauties, i. 6.4 (1-45).

Moral men, v. 9.1 (5-102).

Moral men become superficial, v. 9.1 (2-102).

Moralization, iv. 4.17 (28-464).

Moralization decides government of soul, iv. 4.17 (28-464).

Mortal, either whole or part of us, iv. 7.1 (2-56).

Mother, nurse, residence and other nature is matter, iii. 6.18 (26-384).

Motion, how imparted to lower existences, ii. 2.2 (14-231).

Motion is below the One, iii. 9.7 (13-225).

Motion of fire, is straight, ii. 2.1 (14-228).

Motion of soul is circular, ii. 2.1 (14-229).

Motion, single, effected by body, and different ones by soul, iv. 7.4 (2-62).

Motion spontaneous, of universal soul, immortalizes heaven, ii. 1.4 (40-818).

Motions, conflicting, due to presence of bodies, ii. 2.2 (14-231).

Motions, different, caused by soul, iv. 7.5 (2-62).

Motive, essential to determination, iii. 1.1 (3-87).

Motives of creation ii. 9.4 (33-605).

Movement, v. 1.4 (10-180).

Movement and rest, destruction also inapplicable, ii. 9.1 (33-600).

Movement and stability exist because thought by intelligence, vi. 2.8 (43-904).

Movement another kind of stability, vi. 2.7 (43-903).

Movement cannot be reduced to any higher genus, vi. 3.21 (44-971).

Movement, circular of the soul, iv. 4.16 (28-462).

Movement divided in natural, artificial and voluntary, vi. 3.26 (44-980).

Movement does not beget time, but indicates it, iii. 7.11 (45-1009).

Movement for sense objects, vi. 3.23 (44-976).

Movement, how can it be in time if changes are out of time, vi. 1.16 (42-864).

Movement is a form of power, vi. 3.22 (44-973).

Movement is active for, and is the cause of other forms, vi. 3.22 (44-974).

Movement, is change anterior to it? vi. 3.21 (44-972).

Movement measured by space because of its indetermination, iii. 7.11 (45-1011).

Movement measures time, and is measured by it, iii. 7.12 (45-1011).

Movement of combination, vi. 3.25 (44-978).

Movement of displacement is single, vi. 3.24 (44-927).

Movement, of its image time, is eternity, iii. 7, int. (45-985).

Movement of the heavens, ii. 2 (14-227).

Movement of the soul is attributed to the primary movement, iii. 7.12 (45-985).

Movement, persistent, and its interval, are not time, but are within it, iii. 7.7 (45-999).

Movement, three kinds, ii. 2.1 (14-227).

Movement, under it, action and suffering may be subsumed, vi. 1.17 (42-866).

Movement, why it is a category, vi. 3.20 (44-971).

Multiple unity, iv. 9.1 (8-139).

Multiple unity, radiation of, v. 3.15 (49-1115).

Multiplicity could not be contained in the first, vi. 7.17 (38-729).

Multiplicity demands organization in system, vi. 7.10 (38-716).

Multiplicity of intelligences implies their natural differences, vi. 7.17 (38-730).

Multitude, how it precedes from the One, v. 9.14 (5-116); vi. 7 (38-697).

Multitude is distance from an unity, and is an evil, vi. 6.1 (34-643).

Multitude of ideas of the good, vi. 7 (38-697).

Muses, v. 8.10 (31-569); iii. 7.10 (45-1005).

Music makes the musician, v. 8.1 (31-552).

Musician educated by recognizing truths he already possesses, i. 3.1 (20-270).

Musician, how he rises to intelligible world, i. 3.1 (20-270).

Musician led up by beauty, i. 3.1 (20-270).

Mutilation of Saturn typifies splitting of unity, v. 8.13 (31-573).

Mysteries, v. 3.17 (49-1120).

Mysteries, ancient, their spiritual truth, vi. 9.11 (9-169).

Mysteries purify and lead to nakedness in sanctuary, i. 6.6 (1-50).

Mystery of derivation of Second from First, v. 1.6 (10-181).

Mystery rites explain secrecy of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-169).

Mystery teachings of hell, i. 6.6 (1-49).

Myths explained by body's approach to the soul, iii. 5.10 (50-1138).

Myths, object of, is to analyze and distinguish, iii. 5.10 (50-1139).

Myths of ithyphallic Hermes, iii. 6.19 (26-385).

Myths of Need and Abundance, iii. 6.14 (26-375).

Myths, see Abundance, Need of, iii. 6.14 (26-375).

Nakedness follows purification in mysteries, i. 6.6 (1-50).

Names of Supreme approximations, v. 5.6 (32-584).

Narcissus, i. 6.8 (1-52); v. 8.2 (31-554).

Narcissus followed vain shapes, i. 6.8 (1-52).

Natural characteristics, derived from categories in intelligible, v. 9.10 (5-113).

Natural law, by it all prayers are answered, even of evil, iv. 4.42 (28-505).

Natural movements, vi. 3.26 (44-980).

Nature and elements, there is continuity between, iv. 4.14 (28-459).

Nature, and origin of evils, i. 8 (51-1142).

Nature as weaker contemplation, iii. 8.4 (30-535).

Nature betrayed, but not affected by stars, iii. 1.6 (3-95).

Nature, capable of perfection as much as we, ii. 9.5 (33-607).

Nature, cause coincides with it in intelligible, vi. 7.19 (38-735).

Nature contemplation in unity, iii. 8 (30-542).

Nature, contrary to loves, are passions of strayed souls, iii. 5.7 (50-1135).

Nature dominates in plants, but not in man, iii. 4.1 (15-233).

Nature first actualization of universal soul, v. 2.1 (11-194).

Nature is immovable as a fall, but not as compound of matter and form, iii. 8.2 (30-533).

Nature is ultimate cause, iii. 1.1 (3-87).

Nature law directs soul, ii. 3.8 (52-1173).

Nature, lowest in the world-soul's wisdom, iv. 4.13 (28-458).

Nature of divine intelligence, i. 8.2 (51-1143).

Nature of evil, i. 8.3 (51-1144).

Nature of intelligence proved, v. 9.3 (5-104).

Nature of soul is intermediate, iv. 8.7 (6-130).

Nature of Supreme, i. 8.2 (51-1144).

Nature of universal soul, i. 8.2 (51-1144).

Nature posterior to intelligence, iv. 7.8 (2-78).

Nature reason is result of immovable contemplation, iii. 8.2 (30-533).

Nature, relation of animal to human, i. 1.7 (53-1199).

Nature sterility indicated by castration, iii. 6.19 (26-384).

Nature, Stoic name for generative power in seeds, v. 9.6 (5-110).

Nature, to what part belongs emotions? i. 1.1 (53-1191).

Nature's mother is universal reason and father the formal reasons, iii. 8.4 (30-535).

Nature's progress aided by auxiliary arts, v. 9.11 (5-114).

Necessary, begetting of Second by First, v. 4.1 (7-135).

Necessary things are those whose possession is unconscious, i. 4.6 (46-1027).

Necessity, characteristic of intelligence, v. 3.6 (49-1100).

Necessity does not include voluntariness, iv. 8.5 (6-127).

Necessity, Heraclitian, iii. 1.4 (3-91).

Necessity mingled with reason, iii. 3.6 (48-1080).

Necessity of continuous procession to Supreme, iv. 8.5 (6-129).

Necessity of existence of the First, v. 4.1 (7-134).

Necessity of illumination of darkness must have been eternal, ii. 9.12 (33-623).

Necessity, spindle of, Platonic, iii. 4.6 (15-242); ii. 3.9 (52-1171).

Nectar, iii. 5.7 (50-1133).

Nectar is memory of vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10 (31-569).

Need and Abundance, myth of, iii. 6.14 (26-375).

Need, or Poros, iii. 5.2, 5, 6, 7, 10 (50-1125 to 1135).

Negative necessary to a definition, v. 5.6 (32-584).

Neutral evil is matter, vi. 7.28 (38-746).

New things, unnoticed, their perception not forced, iv. 4.8 (28-450).

New world arises out of Jupiter begotten by result of ecstasy, v. 8.12 (31-572).

Night objects prove uselessness of sight medium, iv. 5.3 (29-519).

Non-being is matter, cannot be anything actual, ii. 5.4 (25-347).

Nonentity has intelligent life beneath being, iii. 6.6 (26-360).

Nonentity is matter, i. 8.5 (51-1150).

Normative element of life, is Providence, iii. 3.5 (48-1084).

Noses, pug, and Roman, due to matter, v. 9.12 (5-115).

Nothing is contained in One; reason why everything can issue from it, v. 2.1 (11-193).

Notions, scientific, are both prior and posterior, v. 9.7 (5-110).

Nowhere and everywhere is Supreme, inclination and imminence, vi. 8.16 (39-801).

Number and unity proceed from the One and many beings, vi. 6.10 (34-659).

Number as universal bond of universe, vi. 6.15 (34-670).

Number can be said to be infinite, vi. 6.19 (34-674).

Number, category, v. 1.4 (10-180).

Number exists for every animal and the universal animal, vi. 6.15 (34-668).

Number follows and proceeds from essence, vi. 6.9 (34-655).

Number is not in quantity, vi. 1.4 (42-842).

Number, posterior to, is intelligible line, vi. 6.17 (34-674).

Number, what is it to infinite? vi. 6.2 (34-644).

Number within is the number, constituted with our being, vi. 6.16 (34-673).

Numbers, vi. 6 (34-651).

Numbers and dimensions are so different as to demand different classification, vi. 2.13 (43-916).

Numbers and ideas, identification of, vi. 6.9 (34-656).

Numbers and magnitudes, are of different kinds of quantity, vi. 1.4 (42-843).

Numbers are not quantity in themselves, vi. 1.4 (42-842).

Numbers form part of the intelligible world, vi. 6.4 (34-647).

Numbers, intelligible, are identical with thought, v. 5.4 (32-582).

Numbers intelligible, difficulties connected with, vi. 6.16 (34-671).

Numbers must exist in the primary essence, vi. 6.8 (34-654).

Numbers participated in by objects, vi. 6.14 (34-667).

Numbers, principle is unity's form, v. 5.5 (32-583).

Numbers, Pythagorean, intelligible discussed, vi. 6.5 (34-649).

Numbers, quantitative, v. 5.4 (32-583).

Numbers, regulated generation of everything, vi. 6.15 (34-670).

Numbers, soul as v. 1.5 (10-187); vi. 5.9 (23-324).

Numbers split the unity into plurality, vi. 6.9 (34-656).

Numbers, two kinds, essential and unitary, vi. 6.9 (34-657).

Numbers, veritable, are intelligible entities, vi. 6.14 (34-668).

Numenian name of Divinity, Essence and Being, v. 9.3 (5-104); v. 8.5 (31-560); vi. 6.9 (34-656).

Numerals, veritable, of the man in himself, are essential, vi. 6.16 (34-672).

Nurse, mother, residence and other nature is matter, iii. 6.19 (26-384).

Object itself did not grasp intellect, i. 1.9 (53-1201).

Objective justice and beauty to which we are united, v. 1.11 (10-190).

Objective world subsists even when we are distracted, v. 1.12 (10-191).

Objects existence implies a previous model, vi. 6.10 (34-658).

Objects outside have unitary existence, vi. 6.12 (34-662).

Objects participate in numbers, vi. 6.14 (34-667).

Obstacle to divinity is failure to abstract from Him, vi. 8.21 (39-811).

Obstacle to the soul is evil, i. 8.12 (51-1159).

Obstacles lacking to creator, because of his universality, v. 8.7 (31-562).

Omnipresence explained by possession of all things, without being possessed by them, v. 5.9 (32-589).

One, v. 4; v. 4.2 (7-134, 136).

One and Good, vi. 9 (1-47).

One and many, like circle, is intelligence, iii. 8.8 (30-543).

One and many, puzzle of, decides genera of essence, vi. 2.4 (43-898).

One for Supreme, is mere negation of manifold, v. 5.6 (32-585).

One, independent of the one outside, vi. 6.12 (34-661).

One is all things, but none of them, v. 2.1 (11-193).

One is everywhere by its power, iii. 9.4 (13-224).

One is formless, v. 5.6 (32-585).

One is nowhere, iii. 9.4 (13-224).

One is super-rest and super-motion, iii. 9.7 (13-225).

One not absolute, but essentially related to one examined, vi. 2.3 (43-896).

One not thinker, but thought, itself, vi. 9.6 (9-160).

One present without approach, everywhere though nowhere, v. 5.8 (32-587).

One related in some genera, but not in others, vi. 2.3 (43-896).

One so far above genera is not to be counted, vi. 2.3 (43-895).

One, the soul, like divinity, always is, iv. 3.8 (27-402).

One within us, independent of the one outside, vi, 6.12 (34-661).

Opinion as sensation, v. 5.1 (32-576).

Opinion, in relation to imagination, illustrates that of matter to reason, iii. 6.15 (26-377).

Opinions, false, are daughters of involuntary passions, i. 8.4 (51-1147).

Opportunity and suitability, cause of, put them beyond change, vi. 8.18 (39-806).

Opposition, ii. 3.4 (52-1168).

Opposition among inanimate beings (animals and matter), iii. 2.4 (47-1048),

Optimism right, v. 5.2 (32-579).

Order, cosmic, is natural, iv. 3.9 (27-404).

Order exists only in begotten, not in seminal reason, iv. 4.16 (28-461).

Order in the hierarchy of nature, ours cannot be questioned, iii. 3.3 (48-1079).

Order is anteriority in the intelligible, iv. 4.1 (28-443).

Order, priority of, implies conception of time, iv. 4.16 (28-461).

Organ, the universe, every being is, iv. 4.45 (28-510).

Organs alone, could be affected, iii. 6.2 (26-354).

Origin and nature of evils, i. 8 (51-1142).

Origin, causeless, really is determinism, iii. 1.1 (3-86).

Origin of God, puzzling, by our starting from chaos, vi. 8.11 (39-792).

Origins of evil, sins and errors, i. 1.9 (53-1201).

Otherness is characteristic of matter, ii. 4.13 (12-214).

Ours is not intelligence, but we, i. 1.13 (53-1206).

Ours, why discursive reason is, v. 3.3 (49-1093).

Outer man, only, affected by changes of fortune, iii 2.15 (47-1067).

Pair, vi. 7.8; vi. 2.11; v. 1.5; vi. 7.39.

Pair or dyad, v. 5.4 (32-582).

Pandora, iii. 6.14 (26-375); iv. 3.14 (27-412).

Panegyrists, who degrade what they wrongly praise, v. 5.13 (32-596).

Pangs of childbirth, v. 5.6 (32-585).

Paris, iii. 3.5 (48-1085).

Part in scheme, soul must fit itself to, iii, 2.17 (47-1071).

Partake of the one according to their capacities, vi. 4.11 (22-302).

Partial only should be the influence of universe, iv. 4.34 (28-494).

Participation by matter in the intelligible, only by appearance, iii. 6.11 (26-369).

Participation can be only in the intelligible, vi. 4.13 (22-306).

Participation in good, two methods of, i. 7.1 (54-1208).

Participation in sense-objects by unity is intelligible, vi. 6.13 (34-664).

Participation in the world of life is merely a sign of extension, vi. 4.13 (22-306).

Participation, method of, inferior in intelligible, vi. 5.12 (23-329).

Participation of matter in existence and opposite, iii. 6.4 (26-357).

Participation of matter in ideas, proves simile of head with faces, vi. 5.8 (23-321).

Participations, difference of senses of, allows matter to remain impassible, iii. 6.9 (26-366).

Partition of fund of memory between the two souls, iv. 3.31 (27-439).

Parts, actual division in, would be denial of the whole, iv. 3.12 (27-390).

Parts can be lost by body, not by soul, iv. 7.5 (2-63).

Parts divisible and indivisible, in the whole of a soul, iv. 3.19 (27-419).

Parts, in incorporeal things, have several senses, iv. 3.2 (27-390).

Parts, as wine in jars, Manichean theory, rejected, iv. 3.20 (27-421).

Parts, mathematical, not applicable as a soul, iv. 3.2 (27-390).

Parts of a manifold unity are a part only, for examination, vi. 2.3 (43-897).

Parts of Supreme, mere, subordinate divinities, denied, v. 8.9 (31-566).

Parts, physical, term limited, iv. 3.2 (27-389).

Passage into world of life is body's relation to the soul, vi. 4.12 (22-304).

Passibility of judgment and of soul, iii. 6.1 (26-350).

Passing of intelligence from unity to duality, by thinking, v. 6.1 (24-333).

Passion as category (see action), vi. 1.17 (42-866).

Passional changes in body, not in passional part of soul, iii. 6.3 (26-356).

Passional love elevating, though open to misleading temptations, iii. 5.1 (50-1124).

Passionate love twofold, sensual and beautiful, iii. 5.1 (50-1122).

Passions affect soul differently from virtue and vice, iii. 6.3 (26-356).

Passions arise from seminal reasons, ii. 3.16 (52-1184).

Passions felt by soul, without experiencing them, iv. 4.19 (28-466).

Passions, how they penetrate from the body into the soul, i. 1.3 (53-1194).

Passions involuntary are mothers of false opinions, i. 8.4 (51-1147).

Passions, modes of feeling, i. 1.1 (53-1191).

Passions not caused by soul, ii. 3.16 (52-1184).

Passions of strayed souls are loves contrary to nature, iii. 5.7 (50-1135).

Passions of universe produced by body of stars, ii. 3.10 (52-1177).

Passions reduced external images, iii. 6.5 (26-358).

Passions, Stoic theory of, opposed, iii. 6.3 (26-355)

Passions, their avoidance, task of philosophy, iii. 6.5 (26-358).

Passions, what suitable to earth, iv. 4.22 (28-471).

Passive, really, is soul, when swayed by appetites, iii. 1.9 (3-98).

Path of simplification to unity, vi. 9.3 (9-152).

Path to ecstasy, land marks, i. 6.9 (1-54)

Penetration into inner sanctuary, yields possession of all things, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Penetration of body by soul, but not by another body, iv. 7.8 (2-72).

Penetration of body by soul proves the latter's incorporeality, iv. 7.8 (2-72).

Penetration, total, impossible in mixture of bodies, iv. 7.8 (2-72).

Penetration, total, mixture, to the point of, ii. 7 (37-691).

Penia, or need, myth of, iii. 5.25 (50-1130)

Perception of new things, not forced, iv. 4.8 (28-450).

Perception of the Supreme, its manner, v. 5.10 (32-591).

Perfect happiness attained when nothing more is desired, i. 4.4 (46-1026).

Perfect is primary nature (Plotinic); not goal of evolution (Stoic), iv. 7.8 (2-73).

Perfect life consists in intelligence, i. 4.3 (46-1024).

Perfect life, its possession, i. 4.6 (46-1027).

Perfection not to be sought in, material things, iii. 2.7 (47-1053).

Perfection of a picture make shadows necessary, iii. 2.11 (47-1060).

Perfection of the universe, evils are necessary, ii. 3.18 (52-1187).

Perfection of universe, object of incarnation, iv. 8.5 (6-128).

Perfection's author must be above it, vi. 7.32 (38-752).

Perishable is body, because composite, iv. 7.1 (2-56).

Permanence, the characteristic of absolute good, i. 7.1 (54-1209).

Perpetuates itself by form, does heaven, through influx, ii. 1.1 (40-813).

Perpetuity and eternity, difference between, iii. 7.4 (45-991).

Persistence of changeable, iv. 7.9 (2-78).

Perspective, ii. 8 (35-680).

Perspective, various theories of, ii. 8.1 (35-680).

Persuasion, characteristic of soul, v. 3.6 (49-1099).

Perversity of soul induces judgment and punishment, iv. 8.5 (6-128)

Pessimism wrong, v. 5.2 (32-579).

Phidias sculpts Jupiter not from sense imitation, v. 8.1 (31-552).

Philonic distinction between God, and the God, vi. 7.1 (38-697).

Philosopher, being already virtuous, needs only promotion, i. 3.3 (20-272).

Philosopher, how he rises to intelligible world, i. 3.3 (20-271).

Philosopher is already disengaged and needs only a guide, i. 3.3 (20-271).

Philosophers born, alone reach the higher region, v. 9.2 (5-103).

Philosophers, how they develop, v. 9.2 (5-103).

Philosophers justify justice of God, iv. 4.30 (28-486).

Philosopher's mathematics followed by pure dialectics as method of progress, i. 3.3 (20-272).

Philosopher's method of disengagement is mathematics as incorporeal science, i. 3.3 (20-271).

Philosopher's opinions about time to be studied, iii. 7.6 (45-995).

Philosophy contains physics, ethics, i. 3.5 (20-273).

Philosophy exact root of psychology, ii. 3.16 (52-1183).

Philosophy lower part of dialectic, i. 3.5 (20-273).

Philosophy separates soul from her image, vi. 4.16 (22-310).

Philosophy's task is avoidance of passions, iii. 6.5 (26-358).

Phoebus inspires men to interior vision, v. 8.10 (31-569).

Physical categories are matter, form, combination, attributes and accidents, vi. 3.3 (44-938).

Physical categories of Plotinos, vi. 3 (44-933).

Physical genera of, are different from those of the intelligible, iv. 3.1 (27-387).

Physical life, can it exist without the soul? iv. 4.29 (28-485).

Physical, not mental being, affected by stars, iii. 1.6 (3-95).

Physical powers do not form a secondary quality, vi. 1.11 (42-856).

Physical qualities applied to Supreme only by analogy, vi. 8.8 (39-785).

Physical soul, production due to, not astrological power, iv. 4.38 (28-501).

Physical souls, various, how they affect production, iv. 4.37 (28-500).

Physical terms, only verbal similarity to intelligible, vi. 3.5 (44-941).

Physical theories, absurd, iii. 1.3 (3-89).

Physically begun, spiritual becomes love, vi. 7.33 (38-755).

Physician's fore-knowledge, simile of Providence, iii. 3.5 (48-1085).

Picture of the structure of the universe, ii. 3.18 (52-1187).

Picture, perfection of, demands shadow, iii. 2.11 (47-1060).

Picture that pictures itself is universe, ii. 3.18 (52-1188).

Pilgrim soul is in the world, ii. 9.18 (33-635).

Pilot governs the ship, relation of soul to body, i. 1.3 (53-1194); iv. 3.21 (27-422).

Place has no contrary, vi. 3.12 (44-954).

Place or time do not figure among true categories, vi. 2.16 (43-919).

Place or where is Aristotelian category, vi. 1.14 (42-862).

Planet calculations, ii. 3.6 (52-1171).

Plant positions producing adulteries, absurd, ii. 3.6 (52-1171).

Planning of the world by God, refuted, v. 8.7 (31-561, 563).

Plants, do they admit of happiness, i. 4.1, 2 (46-1019 to 1021).

Plants even aspire to contemplation, iii. 8.1 (30-531).

Plato departed from, in categories, vi. 2.1 (43-891).

Plato not only hates body, but admires world, ii. 9.17 (33-633).

Plato uncertain about time, iii. 7.12 (45-1012).

Platonic basis of anti-gnostic controversy, v. 8.7 (31-561).

Plato's authority, restored, v. 1.8 (10-186).

Plato's language doubtful, iii. 6.12 (26-372); vi. 7.30 (38-749).

Pleasure an accessory to all goods of the soul, vi. 7.30 (38-749).

Pleasure, because changeable and restless, cannot be the good, vi. 7.27 (38-745)

Pleasure, good's independence from, is temperate man, vi. 7.29 (38-747).

Pleasure may accompany the good, but is independent thereof, vi. 7.27 (38-745).

Pleasure strictly, has nothing to do with happiness, i. 5.4 (36-685).

Pleasures of virtuous men are of higher kinds, i. 4.12 (46-1036).

Plotinos forced to demonstration of categories by divergence from Plato, vi. 2.1 (43-891).

Plotinos's genera of sensual existence, iv. 3 (27-387).

Poros or Abundance, myth of, iii. 5.2, 5 (50-1125 to 1131).

Possession by divinity is last stage of ecstasy, v. 8.10 (31-569).

Possession of perfect life, i. 4.4 (46-1026).

Possession of things causes intelligence to think them, vi. 6.7 (34-653).

Potential, intelligible matter is not, ii. 5.3 (25-345).

Potentialities are inseparable from their beings, vi. 4.9 (22-298).

Potentiality and actuality not applicable to divinity, ii. 9.1 (33-599).

Potentiality, definition of, ii. 5.1 (25-341).

Potentiality exists only in corruptable matter, ii. 5.5 (25-348).

Potentiality explains miracle of seeds containing manifolds, iv. 9.5 (8-146).

Potentiality producing, not becoming, is the soul, ii. 5.3 (25-345).

Poverty caused by external circumstances, ii. 3.8 (52-1174).

Power and beauty of essence attracts all things, vi. 6.18 (34-678).

Power, lack of, cannot fall under same categories as power, vi. 1.10 (42-852).

Power, master of himself, really is the Supreme, vi. 8.10 (39-788).

Power of divinities lies in their inhering in the Supreme, v. 8.9 (31-565).

Powers though secret, in everything, iv. 4.37 (28-500).

Practice is only a preparation for contemplation, iii. 8.6 (30-538).

Prayed to, sun as well as stars may be, iv. 4.30 (28-486).

Prayers, all made in accordance with natural law, answered, iv. 4.42 (28-506).

Prayers answered by stars unconsciously, iv. 4.42 (28-505).

Prayers, how they are answered, iv. 4.41 (28-505).

Prayers of even the evil are answered, iv. 4.42 (28-506).

Predict, stars do, because of souls imperfection, ii. 3.10 (52-1177).

Prediction implies that future is determined, iii. 1.3 (3-90).

Prediction, not by works, but by analogy, iii. 3.6 (48-1080).

Prediction, with its responsiveness, do not fall under action and experience, vi. 1.22 (42-875).

Predisposition of active life subjection to enchantments, iv. 4.43 (28-508).

Predisposition to magic by affections and weaknesses, iv. 4.44 (28-508).

Predominant soul part active while others sleep and (see managing soul) appear exterior, iv. 2.2 (21-279); iii. 4.2 (15-234).

Predominating part, Stoic, iii. 3.2 (48-1078).

Predominating principle directs universe, ii. 3.8 (52-1173).

Preparation for contemplation is practice, iii. 8.6 (30-538).

Preponderance spiritual method of becoming wise, i. 4.14 (46-1037).

Presence of God, everywhere entire, explained as infinite, vi. 5.4 (23-318).

Presence of intelligible entities implied by knowledge of them, v. 5.1 (32-575).

Presence the one identical essence everywhere, entirely, vi. 4 (22-285).

Presences, different kinds of, vi. 4.11 (22-302).

Present, eternal, v. 1.4 (10-179).

Preservative not, is universal soul, but creative. ii. 3.16 (52-1183).

Preserver and creator is the good, vi. 7.23 (38-740).

Preserving, begotten Son, as result of ecstasy, v. 8.12 (31-571).

Priam, misfortunes of, i. 4.5 (46-1027).

Pride is folly, ii. 9.9 (33-618).

Primary essence, numbers must exist in it, vi. 6.8 (34-654).

Primary evil is evil in itself, i. 8.3 (51-1146).

Primary evil is lack of measure, i. 8.8 (51-1155).

Primary evil of soul, i. 8.5 (51-1148).

Primary existence will contain thought, existence and life, ii. 4.6 (12-203); v. 6.6 (24-339).

Primary movement said to underlie movement of soul, iii. 7.12 (45-1013).

Primitive one is a spherical figure and intelligible, vi. 6.17 (34-675).

Primitive relation between soul and body, i. 1.3 (53-1194).

Principle, a supra-thinking, necessary to the working of intelligence, v. 6.2 (24-334).

Principle and end simultaneous in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563).

Principle, independent, is human soul, iii. 1.8 (3-97).

Principle of all, though not limited thereby, is the one, v. 3.11 (49-1109).

Principle of beauty, what is it? i. 6.1 (1-40).

Principle one self-existent constituted by being an actualization, vi. 8.7 (39-784).

Principle, primary, matter cannot be, vi. 1.26 (42-879.)

Principle, simultaneous, above intelligence and existence, iii. 7.2 (45-989).

Principle, super-essential, does not think, v. 6.1 (24-333).

Principle, the first, must be one exclusively, which would make thought impossible, v. 6.1 (24-335).

Principle, the first, thinking, is the second principle, v. 6.1 (24-335).

Principle, the second, the first thinking principle, is, v. 6.1 (24-335).

Principles, divine, enumerated, vi. 7.25 (38-741).

Principles limited to three, ii. 9.2 (33-602).

Principles, lower, contain only anterior things, iv. 4.16 (28-461).

Principles, single, of universe, ii. 3.6 (52-1171).

Priority not applied in the divinity because he made himself, vi. 8.20 (39-808).

Prison of soul, is body, iv. 8.11 (6-120).

Priority of soul to body, iv. 7.2 (2-58).

Privation is nonentity, adds no conceit, ii. 4.14 (12-215).

Privation of form of matter, ii. 4.13 (12-213).

Privation of qualities; not a quality, ii. 4.13 (12-213).

Privation relative is impossible, i. 8.12 (51-1158).

Process, vi. 3.1 (44-933); iv. 8.6 (6-129).

Process from unity to duality, v. 6.1 (24-338).

Process, natural, only affected by starvation, ii. 3.12 (52-1178).

Process of purification of soul and its separation from body, iii. 6.5 (26-359).

Process of soul elevation, v. 3.9 (49-1106).

Process of unification, v. 5.4 (32-581).

Process of vision and hearing, iv. 5 (29-514).

Process of wakening to reality, v. 5.11 (32-592).

Process, triune, also implies identity and difference, vi. 9.8 (43-905).

Processes of ecstasy by purification, i. 6.6, 8, 9 (1-49).

Procession by it, soul connects indivisible and divisible essence, iv. 2.1 (21-276).

Procession, continuous, necessary to the Supreme, iv. 8.6 (6-129).

Procession from one of what is after it, v. 4 (7-134).

Procession is effusion of super-abundance, v. 2.1 (11-194).

Procession is universal, from first to last, v. 2.2 (11-195).

Procession of intelligence is an excursion down and up, iv. 8.7 (6-131).

Procession of soul, iv. 8.5 (6-128).

Procession of the world-soul, iii. 8.5 (30-537).

Procession of world from unity, cause. v. 2.1 (11-193).

Procreation, he not desiring it, aspires to higher beauty, iii. 5.1 (50-1123).

Procreativeness inherent (see radiation, exuberant, super-abundant), v. 4.1 (7-135).

Prodigal, return, i. 6.8 (1-53).

Prodigal son, v. 1.1 (10-173).

Produced by stars, which is and what is not, ii. 3.13 (52-1178).

Producing potentiality, not becoming, is the soul, ii. 5.3 (25-346).

Production due to some physical soul not astrological power, iv. 4.38 (28-501).

Production of the things located is essence, vi. 6.10 (34-657).

Progress possible, argument against suicide, i. 9 (16-243).

Progressively higher stages of love, v. 9.2 (5-103).

Progressively, world-soul informs all things, iv. 3.10 (27-406).

Prometheus, iv. 3.14 (27-412).

Prometheus of flight leaves soul unharmed from incarnation, iv. 8.5 (6-128).

Proofs for existence and nature of intelligence, v. 9.3 (5-104).

Proportion, Stoic principle of beauty, not ultimate, but derivative, i. 6.1 (1-41).

Providence accused by slavery of good and victory of evil, iii. 2.6 (47-1052).

Providence, chief of all, iii. 3.2 (48-1079).

Providence consists of appointed times in life, should be observed, i. 9 (16-243).

Providence does not abandon even the mediocre, iii. 2.9 (47-1058).

Providence does not explain prediction but analogy, iii. 3.6 (48-1086).

Providence, double, particular and universal, iii. 3.4 (48-1081).

Providence embraces everything below, iii. 2.7 (47-1054).

Providence, fore knowledge of, like unto a physician, iii. 3.5 (48-1085).

Providence is normative element of life, iii. 3.5 (48-1084).

Providence is not particular, because world had no beginning, iii. 2.1 (47-1043).

Providence is prevision and reasoning, iii, 2.1 (47-1042).

Providence is unpredictable circumstance changing life, iii. 4.6 (15-242).

Providence may appear as chance, iii. 3.2 (48-1078).

Providence, objection to by internecine war, iii. 2.15 (47-1064).

Providence problems solved by derivation of reason from intelligence, iii. 2.16 (47-1068).

Providence should not overshadow initiative, iii. 2.9 (47-1057).

Providence, the plan of the universe is from eternity, vi. 8.17 (39-803).

Providence, twofold, exerted by twofold soul, iv. 8.2 (6-122).

Prudence interpreted as purification, i. 6.6 (1-49).

Prudence or Metis, myth of, iii. 5.5 (50-1130).

Psychic, gnostic distinction of men, ii. 9.18 (33-635).

Psychologic elements, sensation, faculties of generation and increase, and creative power, i. 1.8 (53-1200).

Psychologic elements, soul gives life to, i. 1.8 (53-1200).

Psychological effect of vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10 (31-568).

Psychological faculty, on which is the freedom of will based, vi. 8.2 (39-775).

Psychological questions, iv. 3 (27-387).

Psychological study of, outline, iv. 2.1 (21-276).

Psychological theory of quality, vi. 1.12 (42-858).

Psychology, common part, its function, i. 1.10 (53-1203).

Psychology, does ratiocination belong to same principles as passions, i. 1.1 (53-1191).

Psychology (every man double), composite animal, real man or reasonable soul, ii. 3.9 (52-1176).

Psychology, exact root of philosophy, ii. 3.16 (52-1183).

Psychology, explanation of anger parts, courage, iii. 6.2 (26-354).

Psychology, inquiring principle, i. 1.1 (53-1191).

Psychology obeys the precept "Know thyself," iv, 3.1 (27-387).

Psychology of demons, iv. 4.43 (28-507).

Psychology of earth, iv. 4.27 (28-479).

Psychology of sensation, iv. 3.26 (27-430).

Psychology of vegetative part of soul, iv. 4.28 (28-481).

Psychology thought, its nature and classification, i. 1.1 (53-1191).

Pun between science and knowledge, v. 8.4 (31-559).

Pun on aeon, as age or eternity, iii. 7.1 (45-986).

Pun on "agalmata," v. 8.5, 6 (31-560).

Pun on Aphrodite, as delicate, iii. 5.8 (50-1137).

Pun on being, intelligible, vi. 3.8 (44-947).

Pun on creation and adornment, ii. 4.4 (12-214); i. 8.7 (51-1152).

Pun on difference in others, ii. 4.13 (12-214).

Pun on "dii" and "diken," v. 8.4 (31-558).

Pun on "doxa," v. 5.1 (32-578).

Pun on Egyptian hieroglyphics and statues (see "agalmata").

Pun on "eidos" and "idea," v. 9.8 (5-111); vi 9.2 (9-149).

Pun on "einai" and "henos," v. 5.5 (32-584).

Pun on forms and statues, v. 8.5 (31-560).

Pun on heaven, world, universe, animal and all, ii. 1.1 (40-814).

Pun on Hestia, and standing, v. 5.5 (32-584).

Pun on Hesis, vi. 1.23 (42-877).

Pun on "idea" and "eidos," see "eidos."

Pun on inclination, ii. 9.4 (33-605).

Pun on "koros," iii. 8.11 (30-550); v. 8.13 (31-573); v. 9.8 (5-111); iv. 3.14 (27-412); i. 8.7 (51-1152).

Pun on love and vision, iii. 5.3 (50-1128).

Pun on "nous," "noesis," and "to noeton," v. 3.5 (49-1096 to 1099).

Pun on "paschein," experiencing, suffering, reacting, and passion, vi. 1.15 (42-864).

Pun on Poros, iii. 5.9, 10 (50-1140).

Pun on Prometheus and Providence, iv. 3.14 (27-412).

Pun on reason and characteristic, iii. 6.2 (17-248); iv. 7.4 (2-61).

Pun on "schesis" and "schema," iv. 4.29 (28-484).

Pun on "Soma" and "sozesthai," v. 9.5 (5-109).

Pun on suffering, iv. 9.3 (8-143).

Pun on thinking, thinkable and intellection, vi. 1.18 (42-868).

Pun on timely and sovereign, vi. 8.18 (39-806).

Pun on unadorned and created, see "koros," i. 8.7 (51-1152).

Pun on Vesta and Hestia, v. 5.5 (32-584).

Punishable and impassible, soul is both. i. 1.12 (53-1204).

Punishment follows perversity of soul, iv. 8.5 (6-128).

Punishments and misfortunes, significance of, iv. 3.15 (27-414).

Pure thoughts is that part of the soul which most resembles intelligence, v. 3.8 (49-1102).

Purification clears up mental knowledge, iv. 7.10 (2-80).

Purification, content of virtues, i. 6.6 (1-49).

Purification in mysteries, leads to nakedness, i. 6.6 (1-50).

Purification of soul like man washing off mud, i. 6.5 (1-48).

Purification produces conversion, and is used by virtue, i. 2.4 (19-261).

Purification of soul process involved, iii. 6.5 (26-359).

Purification's goal is second divinity intelligence, i. 2.6 (19-264).

Purification limit is that of the soul self-control, i. 2.5 (19-263).

Purity, condition of remaining in unity with the divinity, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Purpose of life, supreme, vision of God, i. 6.7 (1-50).

Puzzle of one and many decides of the genera of essence, vi. 2.4 (43-898).

Puzzle of origin of God due to chaos being starting point, vi. 8.11 (39-792).

Puzzle of soul being one, yet in all, iv. 3.4 (27-394).

Quadrature, ii. 3.4 (52-1168).

Qualities, sqq. vi. 1.10 (42-852).

Qualities admit of degrees, vi. 3.20 (44-970).

Qualities are accidental shapes of being, ii. 6.3 (17-250).

Qualities are acts of being, ii. 6.2 (17-249).

Qualities are incorporeal, vi. 1.29 (42-885).

Qualities, because they change, matter must be passible, iii. 6.8 (26-366).

Qualities classified as body and of soul, vi. 3.17 (44-963).

Qualities, distinction between qualities and complements of being, ii. 6.1 (17-245).

Qualities, genuine, are not differential beings, vi. 1.10 (42-853).

Qualities, modal and essential, distinctions between, ii. 6.1 (17-246).

Qualities more essential than quantity, ii. 8.1 (35-680).

Qualities not all are reasons, vi. 1.10 (42-854).

Qualities not formed by union of four Plotinic categories, vi. 2.15 (43-918).

Qualities of sense, among them belong many other conceptions, vi. 3.16 (44-961).

Qualities, some are differences, vi. 3.18 (44-965).

Qualities, some differences are not, vi. 3.18 (44-966).

Qualities, their derivation from affection is of no importance, vi. 1.11 (42-857).

Qualities, ugly, are imperfect reasons, vi. 1.10 (42-855).

Quality, ii. 6 (17-245); iv. 7.5, 9, 10 (2-62 to 80).

Quality and matter form body, according to Stoics, iv. 7.3 (2-59).

Quality and thing qualified, relation between, vi. 1.12 (42-858).

Quality, by it all things depend on the good, i. 7.2 (54-1209).

Quality, by it, being differences are distinguished, vi. 3.17 (44-963).

Quality, category, various derivatives of, vi. 3.19 (44-967).

Quality consists of a non-essential character, vi. 1.10 (42-855).

Quality differences cannot be distinguished by sensation, vi. 3.17 (44-963).

Quality, intelligible and sense, difference between, ii. 6.3 (17-249).

Quality is good, a common label or common quality, vi. 7.18 (38-733).

Quality is not a power but disposition, form and character, vi. 1.10 (42-854).

Quality is only figurative name for complement of being, vi. 2.14 (43-918).

Quality none in matter, ii. 4.7 (12-204); iv. 7.3 (2-59).

Quality none in matter which is deprivation, i. 8.11 (51-1157).

Quality not a primary genus, because posterior to being, vi. 2.14 (43-917).

Quality not in matter is an accident, i. 8.10 (51-1157).

Quality, one, partaken of by capacity and disposition, vi. 1.11 (42-856).

Quality, physical need of supreme only by analogy, vi. 9.8 (9-164).

Quality, psychological theory of, vi. 1.12 (42-858).

Quality, secondary, not formed by physical powers, vi. 1.11 (42-856).

Quality, shape is not, vi. 1.11 (42-857).

Quality, according to the Stoics, vi. 1.29 (42-885).

Quality, there is only one kind, vi. 1.11 (42-856).

Quality, various terms expressing it, vi. 3.16 (44-960).

Quality, whether it alone can be called similar or dissimilar, vi. 3.15 (44-959).

Quality-less thing in itself, reached by abstraction, ii. 4.10 (12-207).

Quantity, vi. 1.4 (42-841).

Quantity a secondary genus, therefore not a first, vi. 2.13 (43-915).

Quantity admits of contraries, vi. 3.11 (44-953).

Quantity, Aristotelian criticized, vi. 1.4 (42-841).

Quantity, as equal and unequal, does not refer to the objects, vi. 1.5 (42-845).

Quantity category, v. 1.4 (10-180).

Quantity, continuous and definite, have nothing in common. vi. 1.4 (42-841).

Quantity, definition of, includes large and small, vi. 3.11 (44-952).

Quantity, different kinds of, in magnitudes and numbers, vi. 1.4 (42-843).

Quantity, discrete, different from continuous, vi. 3.13 (44-955).

Quantity, elements of continuous, vi. 3.14 (44-955).

Quantity, if time is, why a separate category, vi. 1.13 (42-861).

Quantity in number, but not number in quantity, vi. 1.4 (42-842).

Quantity in quantative number, v. 5.4 (32-582).

Quantity is incorporeal, ii. 4.9 (12-207).

Quantity is speech, 1.5 (42-844).

Quantity less essential than quality, ii. 8.1 (35-680).

Quantity not qualities studied by geometry, vi. 3.15 (44-958).

Quantity, time is not, vi. 1-5 (42-844).

Question, not to be asked by our order in nature, iii. 3.3 (48-1079).

Quiddity and being earlier than suchness, ii. 6.2 (17-248).

Quintessence, ii. 1.2 (40-815); ii. 5.3 (25-346).

Radiation joins image to its model, vi. 4.10 (22-300).

Radiation of an image is generation, v. 1.6 (10-182).

Radiation of good is creative power, vi. 7.37 (38-761).

Radiation of light, v. 5.7 (32-586).

Radiation of multiple unity, v. 3.15 (49-1115).

Radiation of stars for good, explains their influence, iv. 4.35 (28-497).

Radii centering, to explain, soul unifying sensations, iv. 7.6 (2-65).

Rank, v. 4.2 (7-136); v. 5.4 (32-581).

Rank after death, depends on state at death, hence progress must be achieved, i. 9 (16-243).

Rank of souls, iv. 3.6 (27-397).

Rank, souls of the second, universal rank, are men, ii. 3.13 (52-1180).

Rank third, of existence, should not be occupied by modality, vi. 1.30 (42-887).

Rank third of souls, ii. 1.8 (55-1200).

Ranks in the Universe reasonable for souls to be assigned thereto, iii. 2.12 (47-1061).

Ranks of existence, three, ii. 9.13 (33-626); iii. 3.3 (48-1079); iii. 5.9 (50-1138); vi. 4.11 (22-302); vi. 5.4 (23-318).

Ranks of existence beneath the beautiful, vi. 7.42 (38-770).

Ratiocination, has no place even in the world-soul, iv. 4.11 (28-455).

Ratiocination, souls can reason intuitionally without, iv. 3.18 (27-416).

Rationalized matter, body as, ii. 7.3 (37-696).

Reaction or suffering, definition of, vi. 1.21 (43-872).

Reactions, need not be passive, but may be active, vi. 1.21 (42-870).

Real man and we, distinctions between, i. 1.10 (53-1202).

Real man differs from body, i. 1.10 (53-1203).

Reality, same different degrees of, are intelligence and life, vi. 7.18 (38-732).

Reason and form possessed by everything, ii. 7.3 (37-696).

Reason as a whole, vi. 5.10 (23-326).

Reason as derived from intelligence, iii. 2.16 (47-1068).

Reason cannot be deduced from atoms, iii. 1.2 (3-88).

Reason, differentiated, would deprive the soul of consciousness, ii. 9.1 (33-602).

Reason discursive is not used during discarnation, iv. 3.18 (27-416).

Reason divine is to blame, iv. 2.10 (47-1059).

Reason followed, is secret of freedom, iii. 1.9 (3-97).

Reason has no extension, iv. 7.5 (2-64).

Reason in head, not in brain, iv. 3.23 (27-425).

Reason, its influence is only suggestive, i. 2.5 (19-264).

Reason no explanation of living well, i. 4.2 (46-1022).

Reason not resulted in foresight of creation, vi. 7.1 (38-697).

Reason not sufficient explanation of living well, i. 4.2 (46-1022).

Reason or ideas possessed by intellectual life, vi. 2.21 (43-927).

Reason, seminal iv. 7.2 (2-58).

Reason, seminal, produces man, ii. 3.12 (52-1178).

Reason that begets everything is Jupiter's garden, iii. 5.9 (50-1137).

Reason, total of the universe, ii. 3.13 (52-1178).

Reason unites the soul divided by bodies, iv. 9.3 (8-142).

Reason, universal, is both soul and nature, iii. 8.3 (30-533).

Reason used only while hindered by obstacles of body, iv. 3.18 (27-416).

Reasonable for souls to be assigned to different ranks, iii. 2.12 (47-1061).

Reasoning absent in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563).

Reasoning and foresight are only figurative expressions, vi. 7.1 (38-699).

Reasoning and memory not implied by world-soul, wisdom, iv. 4-12 (28-457).

Reasoning and memory superseded by world-soul's wisdom, iv. 4.12 (28-456).

Reasons are the actualization of the soul that begets the animal, vi. 7.5 (38-707).

Reasons, double, iii. 3.4 (48-1081).

Reasons, not all are qualities, vi. 1.10 (42-854).

Reasons, unity constituted by contained contraries, iii. 2.16 (47-1069).

Reception, transmission, relation, underlies action and experience, vi. 1.22 (42-874).

Receptivity accounts for divinity's seeing by individuals, vi. 5.12 (23-330).

Receptivity determines participation in the one, vi. 4.11 (22-331).

Receptivity is limit of participation in divine, iv. 8.6 (6-129).

Reciprocal nature of all things, iii. 3.6 (48-1080).

Recognition of divine kinship depends of self knowledge, vi. 9.7 (9-163).

Recognition of each other by souls, descending from intelligibles into heaven, iv. 4.5 (28-447).

Redemption of world by world-soul, v. 1.2 (10-175).

Reduction to unity, v. 3.6 (49-1099).

Reflection, not, but self-necessity, cause of creation of sense-world, iii. 2.2 (47-1044).

Reflects everything, does the empty mirror of matter, iii. 6.7 (26-363).

Reformatory, are hell's torments, iv. 4.45 (28-511).

Refraction, lighting fire from, illustrates generation, iii. 6.14 (26-376).

Refreshment not needed by stars, which are inexhaustible, ii. 1.8 (40-827).

Refutation of James Lange theory, i. 1.5 (53-1196).

Reincarnation is result of soul-judgments, iv. 8.5 (6-128).

Rejection of form of approaching souls proves formlessness of the Supreme, vi. 7.34 (38-756).

Relation, vi. 1.6 (42-845).

Relation between external and internal, i. 8.5 (51-1149).

Relation is a habit or manner of being, vi. 3.27 (44-981).

Relation is an appendage existing only among definite objects, vi. 2.16 (43-919).

Relation of good, intelligence and soul like light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 (24-337).

Relation primitive between soul and body, i. 1.3 (53-1194).

Relation, Stoic, category confuses the new with the anterior, vi. 1.31 (42-888).

Relations are simultaneous existences, vi. 1.7 (42-848).

Relations, are they subjective of objective? vi. 1.7 (42-847).

Relay of sensation from organ to directing principle, impossible, iv. 7.7 (2-67).

Relay transmission, iv. 2.2 (21-280); iv. 5.4 (29-522).

Relays in spreading light, v. 3.9 (49-1105).

Remember itself, the soul does not even, iv. 4.2 (28-443).

Remembers, soul becomes that which she does, iv. 4.3 (28-445).

Reminiscences of intelligible entities, v. 9.5 (5-107).

Repentances of gnostics, opposed, ii. 9.6 (33-608).

Repugnance natural to study of unity, vi. 9.3 (9-15).

Resemblance lacking, makes contraries, vi. 3.20 (44-970).

Resemblance of intelligible to earthly based on the converse (Platonic), v. 8.6 (31-561).

Resemblance to divinity is soul's welfare, i. 6.6 (1-49).

Resemblance to divinity, result of homely virtues, i. 2.1 (19-257).

Resemblance, two kinds, effect and cause or simultaneous effects, i. 2.2 (19-258).

Residence and substrate of forms to matter, ii. 4.1 (12-197).

Residence demanded by forms, against Moderatus of Gades, ii. 4.12 (12-211).

Residence, mother, nurse or other nature is matter, iii. 6.18 (26-382).

Residence of eternal generation is matter, iii. 6.13 (26-373).

Residence of form is matter as image of extension, ii. 4.11 (12-210).

Residence of universal soul is heaven, immortalizing it, ii. 1.4 (40-817).

Responsible for our ills, Gods are not, iv. 4.37 (28-500).

Responsible, spontaneity not affected by involuntariness, iii. 2.10 (47-1060).

Responsibility depends solely on involuntariness, vi. 8.1 (39-774).

Responsibility not injured by guidance of Daemon, iii. 4.5 (15-238).

Responsibility not to be shifted from responsible reason, iii. 2.15 (47-1065).

Rest, v. 1.4 (10-178); v. 3.7 (49-1101).

Rest and motion below one, iii. 9.7 (13-225).

Rest and movement distinction also inapplicable, ii. 9.1 (33-600).

Rest, as category, iii. 7.1 (45-987); vi. 2.7 (43-903).

Rest consists of change, iv. 8.1 (6-119).

Rest, intelligible, the form by which all consists, v. 1.7 (10-184).

Rest of Heraclitus, description of ecstatic goal, vi. 9.8 (9-165); vi. 9.11 (9-170).

Resultance of causes is anything, ii. 3.14 (52-1181).

Results of ecstasy, remaining close to divinity, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Retirement of soul is to superior power, v. 2.2 (11-195).

Retribution divine, all are led to it by secret road, iv. 4.45 (28-511).

Return of prodigal, i. 6.8 (1-52).

Return of soul to intelligible by three paths, i. 3.1 (20-270).

Return of soul to its principle on destruction of body, v. 2.2 (11-195).

Revealers of the eternal, are sense-objects, iv. 8.6 (6-130).

Revelation of divine power expresses true knowledge, ii. 9.9 (33-617).

Rewards may be neglected by good, iii. 2.8 (47-1055).

Rhea, iii. 6.19 (26-385); v. 1.7 (10-185).

Riches, inequality of no moment to an eternal being, ii. 9.9 (33-616).

Ridiculous to complain of lower nature of animals, iii. 2.9 (47-1059).

Ridiculous to expect perfections, but deny it to nature, ii. 9.5 (33-607).

Right of leaving world reserved by wise men, i. 4.16 (46-1039).

Rises to the good, does the soul, by scorning all things below, vi. 7.31 (38-750).

Roads, secret, leads all to retribution, iv. 4.45 (27-511).

Rocks have greatest nonentity, iii. 6.6 (26-361).

Rush of soul towards the one, v. 3.17 (49-1120).

Same principle, how can it exist in all things? vi. 4.6 (22-295).

Same principle, how various things can participate, vi. 4.12 (22-303).

Same thing not seen in the Supreme by different persons, v. 8.12 (31-571).

Sample is only thing we can examine, v. 8.3 (33-555).

Sample that must be purified, is image of intelligence, v. 8.3 (31-555).

Sanative element of life, is Providence, iii. 3.5 (48-1084).

Sanctuary, inner, penetrations into, resulting advantage of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569).

Sanctuary of ecstasy, i. 6.8 (1-52); i. 8.7 (51-1152); v. 8.4 (31-557); vi. 9.11 (9-169).

Sanctuary of mysteries, i. 6.6 (1-50).

Satiety does not produce scorn, in the intelligible, v. 8.4 (31-558).

Satisfaction of desire to live is not happiness, i. 5.2 (36-684).

Saturn, v. 1.7 (10-185); v. 8.13 (31-573); iv. 4.31 (28-489).

Saturn and Mars, relations are quite illogical, ii 3.5 (52-1169).

Saturn held down by chains, v. 8.13 (31-573).

Saturnian realm, vi. 1.4 (10-178).

Scheme, part in it soul must fit itself to, iii. 2.17 (47-1071).

Science does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-920).

Science is either a movement or something composite, vi. 2.18 (43-923).

Science is present in the whole, potentially at least, v. 9.8 (5-111).

Science is the actualization of the notions that are potential science, vi. 2.20 (43-925).

Science, part and whole in it not applicable to soul, iv. 3.2 (27-390).

Science's, greatest is touched with the good, vi. 7.3 (38-760).

Scorn not produced by satiety in the intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-558).

Scorn of life implies good, vi. 7.29 (38-748).

Scorn of this world no guarantee of goodness, ii. 9.16 (33-630).

Scorning all things below, soul rises to the good, vi. 7.31 (38-750).

Sculptor, v. 9.3 (5-104).

Seal of wax, impressions on, are sensations, iv. 7.6 (2-66).

Second must be perfect, v. 4.1 (7-136).

Second necessarily begotten by first, v. 4.1 (7-135).

Second rank of universe, souls of men, ii. 3.13 (52-1180).

Secondary evil is accidental formlessness, i. 8.8 (51-1154).

Secondary evil is matter, i. 8.4 (51-1146).

Secondary evil of soul, i. 8.5 (51-1148).

Secrecy of mystery-rites explains ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-171).

Secret powers in everything, iv. 4.37 (28-500).

Secret road, leads all to divine retribution, iv. 4.45 (28-511).

Seeing God without emotion, sign of lack of unification, vi. 9.4 (9-155).

Seeking anything beyond life, departs from it, vi. 5.12 (23-331).

Seeming to be beautiful satisfies, but only being good satisfies, v. 5.12 (32-594).

Seems as if the begotten was a universal soul, vi. 4.14 (22-307).

Seen the Supreme, no one who has calls him chance, vi. 8.19 (39-807).

Self autocracy, vi. 8.21 (39-807).

Self-consciousness can exist in a simple principle, v. 3.1 (49-1090).

Self-consciousness consists of becoming intelligence, v. 3.4 (49-1096).

Self-consciousness is not needed by self-sufficient good, vi. 7.38 (38-763).

Self-consciousness is more perfect in intelligence than in the soul, v. 3.6 (49-1098).

Self-consciousness result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Self-control is assimilation to divinity, i. 2.5 (19-263).

Self-control limited by soul's purification, v. 2.5 (19-263).

Self-development, one object of incarnation, v. 8.5 (31-559).

Self-esteem, proper, v. 1.1 (10-173).

Self-existence possessed by essence, vi. 6.18 (34-678).

Self-glorified, image of a trap on way to ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569).

Self is the soul, iv. 7.1 (2-57).

Self-luminous statues in intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-558).

Self-sufficiency of supreme, v. 3.17 (49-1120).

Self-victory over, mastery of fate, ii. 3.15 (52-1182).

Seminal reason, ii. 6.1 (17-246); iii. 1.8 (3-97).

Seminal reason does not contain order, iv. 4.16 (28-461).

Seminal reason harmonizes with its appearing actualization, vi. 3.16 (44-960).

Seminal reason produces man, ii. 3.12 (52-1178).

Seminal reasons, v. 8.2 (31-553); v. 7.1 (18-252).

Seminal reasons, as qualified matter would be composite and secondary, vi. 1.29 (42-886).

Seminal reasons, cause of difference of things, v. 7.1 (18-251).

Seminal reasons cause the soul, ii. 3.16 (52-1184).

Seminal reasons may be contrary to soul's nature, but not to soul, vi. 7.7 (38-710).

Sensation, v. 1.7 (10-184).

Sensation and memory, iv. 6 (41-829).

Sensation and memory, Stoic doctrines of, hang together, iv. 6.1 (41-829).

Sensation as dream of the soul, from which we must wake, iii. 6.6 (26-363).

Sensation cannot distinguish quality differences, vi. 3.17 (44-963).

Sensation cannot reach truth, v. 5.1 (32-576).

Sensations cause of emotion, iv. 4.28 (28-482).

Sensation equivalent to good, i. 4.2 (46-1021).

Sensation depends on sense-shape, iv. 4.23 (28-473).

Sensation, external and internal, i. 1-7 (53-1199).

Sensation implies the feeling soul, i. 1.6 (53-1198).

Sensation, intermediary, demands conceptive thought, iv. 4.23 (28-472).

Sensation is limited to the common integral parts of the universe, iv. 5.8 (29-529).

Sensation must first be examined, iv. 4.22 (28-472).

Sensation not a soul distraction, iv. 4.25 (28-477).

Sensation not in head, but in brain, iv. 3.23 (27-425).

Sensation, psychology of, iv. 3.26 (27-430).

Sensation relayed from organ to directing principle impossible, iv. 7.7 (2-67).

Sensation taken as their guide, Stoic's fault, vi. 1.28 (42-884).

Sensations are actualizations, not only in sight, but in all senses, iv. 6.3 (41-835).

Sensations are not experiences but relative actualizations, iv. 6.2 (41-831).

Sensations as impressions on seal of wax, iv. 7.5 (2-66).

Sensations distract from thought, iv. 8.8 (6-132).

Sense beauties, less delightful than moral, i. 6.4 (1-44).

Sense beauty, transition to intellectual, i. 6.3 (1-45).

Sense being, common element, in matter form and combination, vi. 3.4 (44-940).

Sense growth and emotions lead to divisibility, iv. 3.19 (27-418).

Sense objects are intermediate between form and matter, iii. 6.17 (26-381).

Sense objects, how are not evil, iii. 2.8 (47-1055).

Sense objects, men, v. 9.1 (9-148).

Sense objects, motion for, vi. 3.23 (44-976).

Sense objects reveal eternal, iv. 8.6 (6-130).

Sense objects unreal, made up of appearance, iii. 6.12 (26-371).

Sense organs, sense better without medium however passible, iv. 5.1 (29-515).

Sense power of soul deals only with external things, v. 3.2 (49-1091).

Sense qualities, many other conceptions belong among them, vi. 3.16 (44-961).

Sense shape, like tools, is intermediate, iv. 4.23 (28-473).

Sense world created not by reflection but self-necessity, iii. 2.2 (47-1044).

Sense world has less unity than intelligible world, vi. 5.10 (23-322).

Sense world, the generation in it, is what being is in the intelligible, iv. 3.3 (27-392).

Senses, not given only for utility, iv. 4.24 (28-475).

Senses not given to man, from experience of misfortune, vi. 7.1 (38-697).

Senses of earth may be different from ours, iv. 4.26 (28-478).

Sentiments, most keenly felt, constitute people lovers, i. 6.4 (1-46).

Separation of soul from body, enables soul to use it, i. 1.3 (53-1193).

Separation of soul from body is death, i. 6.6 (1-49).

Separation of soul from body, process involved, iii. 6.5 (26-359).

Separation refers not only to body but accretions, i. 1.12 (53-1204).

Sex alone would not account for differences of things, v. 7.2 (18-252).

Shadows necessary to the perfection of a picture, iii. 2.11 (47-1060).

Shape is not a quality, but a specific appearance of reason, vi. 1.11 (42-857).

Shape is the actualization, thought the form of being, v. 9.8 (5-111).

Shape received from elsewhere, v. 9.5 (5-107).

Shapeless impressions of, differ from mental blank, ii. 4.10 (12-207).

Shapeless shaper, essential beauty and the transcendent to Supreme, vi. 7.33 (38-754).

Sight, ii. 8 (35-680).

Sight, actualize as thought, v. 1.5 (10-181).

Sight and thought form but one, v. 1.5 (10-181).

Sight, sense of, does not possess the image seen within it, iv. 6.1 (41-829).

Sight, two methods of, form and light, v. 5.7 (32-586).

Significance of punishments and misfortunes, iv. 3.16 (27-414).

Silence, v. 1.2 (10-175).

Simile from lighting fire from refraction, iii. 6.14 (26-376).

Simile of abstraction, triangles, circles, iv. 7.8 (2-69).

Simile of badly tuned lyre cannot produce harmony, ii. 3.13 (52-1180).

Simile of captive in golden chains--matter, i. 8.15 (51-1163).

Simile of cave and grotto, iv. 8.1 (6-120).

Simile of center and circular intelligence, vi. 8.18 (39-804).

Simile of choral ballet, vi. 9.8 (9-165).

Simile of circles, v. 8.7 (31-563); iv. 4.16 (28-462).

Simile of clear gold, admitting its real nature, iv. 7.10 (2-81).

Simile of cosmic choric ballet, vi. 9.8 (9-165).

Simile of Cupid and Psyche, vi. 9.9 (9-167).

Simile of drama of life, allows for good and bad, iii. 2.18 (47-1072).

Simile of face in several mirrors, i. 1.8 (53-1200).

Simile of foreknowledge of physician to explain Providence, iii. 3.5 (48-1085).

Simile of guest and architect of house, ii. 9.18 (33-635).

Simile of head with three faces all round, vi. 5.7 (23-320).

Simile of light in air, as soul is present in body, iv. 3.22 (27-423).

Simile of light remaining on high, while shining down, iv. 8.3 (6-124).

Simile of light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 (24-337).

Simile of love that watches at door of the beloved, vi. 5.10 (23-325).

Simile of man fallen in mud, needing washing, i. 6.5 (1-48).

Simile of man with feet in bath tub, vi. 9.8 (9-163).

Simile of mirror, i. 4.10 (46-1034).

Simile of mob in assembly, vi. 4.15 (22-310).

Simile of net in the sea for universe in soul, iv. 3.9 (27-405).

Simile of opinion and imagination illustrates relation between matter and reason, iii. 6.15 (26-377).

Simile of overweighted birds, sensual man, v. 9.1 (5-102).

Simile of peak, formed by uniting of souls, vi. 7.15 (38-726).

Simile of pilot governing the ship, i. 1.3 (53-1194).

Simile of platonic vision theory to explain simultaneity of unity and duality, v. 6.1 (24-333).

Simile of prearranged dance as star's motion, iv. 4.33 (28-492).

Simile of radii around centre, iv. 2.1 (21-277).

Simile of radii centering, to explain unifying sensations, iv. 7.4 (2-277).

Simile of radii meeting in centre, i. 7.1 (54-1209).

Simile of ray from centre to circumference, iv. 1 (4-100).

Simile of science explains whole and part, iii. 9.3 (13-222); iv. 9.5 (8-145).

Simile of seal on wax, iv. 9.4 (8-144).

Simile of seed to explain unity of essence in many souls, iv. 9.5 (8-145).

Simile of spring of water, iii. 8.1 (30-547).

Simile of striking cord of a lyre, vi. 5.10 (23-326).

Simile of sun and light, vi. 5.5 (23-319).

Simile of the sun's rays, vi. 5.5 (23-319).

Simile of the tree of the universe, iii. 8.10 (30-547).

Simile of vine and branches, v. 3.7 (48-1088).

Simile, Platonic, of drivers of horses, ii. 3.13 (52-1179).

Simple and not compound is the Supreme, ii. 9.1 (33-599).

Simple bodies, their existence demands that of world-soul, iv. 7.2 (2-57).

Simple is the soul; composite the body, iv. 7.3 (2-59).

Simple nothing is, v. 9.3 (5-104).

Simple, without something simple nothing manifold could exist, ii. 4.3 (12-199).

Simple's existence necessary to that of one, v. 6.3 (24-336).

Simplification, approach of soul to good, i. 6.6 (1-50).

Simplification as path to unity, vi. 9.3 (9-152).

Simplification of ecstasy, super beauty and super virtue, vi. 9.11 (9-170).

Simplicity of principle, insures its freedom of action, vi. 8.4 (39-779).

Simplicity the intelligent, does not deny compositeness, vi. 7.13 (38-722).

Simplicity the intelligible, implies height of source, vi. 7.13 (38-722).

Simultaneity of end and principle in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563).

Simultaneity of everything in the intelligible world, iv. 4.1 (28-441).

Simultaneity of the intelligible permits no memory, iv. 4.1 (28-441).

Simultaneous giving and receiving by world-soul, iv. 8.7 (6-132).

Simultaneous of one and many, intelligence contains the infinite as vi. 7.14 (38-725).

Simultaneous unity and duality of thought, v. 6.1 (24-333).

Simultaneous within and without is vi. 4.7 (22-295).

Sin and justice, not destroyed by superficiality of misfortunes, iii. 2.16 (47-1067).

Sister beneficent, is world-soul to our soul, ii. 9.17 (33-633).

Situation, as Aristotelian category, vi. 1.24 (42-877).

Slavery of good, accuses Providence, iii. 2.6 (47-1062).

Socrates, i. 8.7; iii. 2.15; iv. 3.5; ii. 5.2; vi. 2.1; vi. 3.6, 15.

Socrates (as representative man), v. 1.4 (10-179); v. 7.1 (18-251).

Solid things, nearest nonentity, iii. 6.6 (26-361).

Solution of puzzle is that being is everywhere present, vi. 5.3 (23-317).

"Somewhat," a particle to modify, any statement about the supreme, vi. 8.13 (39-797).

Son, begotten by supreme, report of ecstasy, see pun on "koros," iii. 8.11 (30-550); v. 8.12 (31-571).

Soul, after reaching yonder does not stay; reasons why, vi. 9.10 (9-168).

Soul alone possesses memory, iv. 3.26 (7-432).

Soul and body consequences of mixture, i. 1.4 (53-1194).

Soul and body form fusion, iv. 4.18 (28-465).

Soul and body mixture impossible, i. 1.4 (53-1195).

Soul and body, primitive relation between, i. 1.3 (53-1194).

Soul and body, relation between, vi. 3.19 (27-418).

Soul and intelligence, besides ideas, contained in intelligible world, v. 9.13 (5-116).

Soul and judgment, passibility of, iii. 6.1 (26-350).

Soul and relation with God and individual, i. 1.8 (53-1200).

Soul and soul essence, distinction between, i. 1.2 (53-1192).

Soul and we, the relation between, i. 1.13 (53-1206).

Soul as divisible and indivisible, iv. 2.2 (21-279).

Soul as hypostatic actualization of intelligence, v. 1.3 (10-177).

Soul as number, v. 1.5 (10-180).

Soul becomes what she remembers, iv. 4.3 (28-445).

Soul begets her combination, its nature, vi. 7.5 (38-708).

Soul begets many because incorporeal, iv. 7.4 (8-144).

Soul being impassable, everything contrary is figurative, iii. 6.2 (26-354).

Soul both divisible and indivisible, iv. 1 (4-100).

Soul can penetrate body, iv. 7.8 (2-72).

Soul cannot be corporeal, iv. 7.8 (2-70).

Soul cannot be entirely dragged down, ii. 9.2 (33-603).

Soul cannot lose parts, ii. 7.5 (2-63).

Soul cannot possess evil within herself, i. 8.11 (51-1158).

Soul capable of extension, vi. 4.1 (22-286).

Soul celestial of world, iii. 5.3 (50-1128).

Soul, circular movement of, iv. 4.16 (28-462).

Soul, combination as mixture or resultant product, i, 1.1 (53-1191).

Soul conforms destiny to her character, iii. 4.5 (15-238).

Soul contains body, iv. 8.20 (27-421).

Soul-difference between individual universal, iv. 3.7 (27-399).

Soul directed by natural law, ii. 3.8 (52-1173).

Soul divisible, mixed and double, ii. 3.9 (52-1176).

Soul does not entirely enter into body, iv. 8.8 (6-132).

Soul does not even remember herself, iv. 4.2 (28-443).

Soul double, iii. 3.4 (48-1081); iv. 3.31 (27-438).

Soul descended into world vestige of, is Daemon, iii. 5.6 (50-1132).

Soul distraction, sensation is not, iv. 4.25 (28-477); iii. 4.6 (15-241).

Soul divisible, how she divides at death, iv. 1 (4-100).

Soul entire, fashioned whole and individuals, vi. 5.8 (23-322).

Soul essence derives from her being, vi. 2.6 (43-900).

Soul exerts a varied action, iv. 7.4 (2-62).

Soul feeling implied by sensation, i. 1.6 (53-1198).

Soul feels passions without experiencing them, iv. 4.19 (28-466).

Soul gives life to psychologic elements, i. 1.8 (53-1200).

Soul, good and intelligence related to light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 (24-337).

Soul governs body as pilot the ship, i. 1.3 (53-1194).

Soul, greatness of, nothing to do with size of body, vi. 4.5 (22-293).

Soul has double aspect, to body and to intelligence, iv. 8.7 (6-131).

Soul has no corporeal possibility, hence incorporeal, iv. 7.2 (2-57).

Soul has to exist in twofold sphere, iv. 8.7 (6-130).

Soul has various motions, iv. 7.5 (2-62).

Soul, healthy, can work, iv. 3.4 (27-395).

Soul, herself, body-user and combination of both, i. 1.1 (53-1191).

Soul, how can she remain impassible, though given up to emotion, iii. 6.1 (26-350).

Soul, how she comes to know vice, i. 8.9 (51-1155).

Soul human, as independent principle, iii. 1.8 (3-97).

Soul human, when in body, has possibilities up or down, iv. 8.7 (6-131).

Soul, if she were corporeal body, would have no sensation, iv. 7.6 (2-64).

Soul, immortal, i. 1.2 (53-1192).

Soul, impassibility of, iii. 6.1 (26-350).

Soul imperishable, iv. 7.12 (2-82).

Soul in body as form is in matter, iv. 3.20 (27-421).

Soul in body as whole in a part, iv. 3.20 (27-421).

Soul in the body as light in the air, iv. 3.22 (27-423).

Soul, individual, born of intelligence, vi. 2.22 (43-929).

Soul intelligence, good are like light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 (24-337).

Soul, intermediary elemental, also inadmissible, ii. 9.5 (33-607).

Soul invisible, cause of these emotions, i. 6.5 (1-46).

Soul is a definite essence, as particular being, vi. 2.5 (43-900).

Soul is a number, vi. 5.9 (23-324); v. 1.5 (10-180).

Soul is a simple actualization, whose essence is life, iv. 7.12 (2-83).

Soul is a simple (substance) the man himself, iv. 7.3 (2-59).

Soul is a whole of distinct divisible and indivisible parts, iv. 3.19 (27-419).

Soul is all things, iii. 4.3 (15-236).

Soul is artist of the universe, iv. 7.13 (2-84).

Soul is both being and life, vi. 2.6 (43-901).

Soul is both punishable and impassible, i. 1.12 (53-1204).

Soul is double (see Hercules), iv. 3.31 (27-438).

Soul is everywhere entire, iv. 7.5 (2-63).

Soul is free by intelligence, which is free by itself, vi. 8.7 (39-783).

Soul is formed governing the body (Aristotle), i. 1.4 (53-1195).

Soul is formed inseparable from body (Alexander of Aphrodisia), i. 1.4 (53-1195).

Soul is in body as pilot is in ship, iv. 3.21 (27-422); i. 1.3 (53-1194).

Soul is individuality, and is form and workman of body, iv. 7.1 (2-57).

Soul is infinite as comprising many souls, vi. 4.4 (22-296).

Soul is located, not in body, but body in soul, iv. 3.20 (27-423).

Soul is matter of intelligence (form), v. 1.3 (10-178).

Soul is neither harmony nor entelechy, iv. 7.8 (2-74).

Soul is partly mingled and separated from body, i. 1.3 (53-1193).

Soul is prior to body, iv. 7.8 (2-74).

Soul is substantial from one being, simple matter, iv. 7.4 (2-61).

Soul is the potentiality of producing, not of becoming, ii. 5.3 (25-346).

Soul, its being, iv. 1 (4-100).

Soul leaving body, leaves trace of life, iv. 4.29 (28-483).

Soul light forms animal nature, i. 1.7 (53-1198).

Soul, like divinity, is always one, iv. 3.8 (27-402).

Soul like face in several mirrors, i. 1.8 (53-1200).

Soul may be said to come and go, iii. 9.3 (13-223).

Soul may have two faults, iv. 8.5 (6-128).

Soul must be one and manifold, even on Stoic hypotheses, iv. 2.2 (21-281).

Soul must be stripped of form to shine in primary nature, vi. 9.7 (9-161).

Soul must first be dissected from body to examine her, vi. 3.1 (44-934).

Soul must fit herself to her part in the scheme, iii. 2.1, 7 (47-1071).

Soul necessary to unify manifold sensations, iv. 7.6 (2-65).

Soul needed by body for life, iv. 3.19 (27-418).

Soul not decomposable, iv. 7.1, 4 (2-84).

Soul not evil by herself but by degeneration, i. 8.4 (51).

Soul not in body as part in a whole, iv. 3.20 (27-421).

Soul not in body as quality in a substrate, iii. 9.3 (13-222).

Soul not in body, but body in soul, iv. 4.15 (28-460).

Soul not in time, though her actions and reactions are, v. 9.4 (5-106).

Soul not the limit of one ascent, why? v. 9.4 (5-106).

Soul obeys fate only when evil, iii. 1.10 (47-1060).

Soul of the unity, proves that of the Supreme, vi. 5.9 (23-323).

Soul originates movements, but is not altered, iii. 6.3 (26-355).

Soul power everywhere, localized in special organ, iv. 3.23 (27-424).

Soul power revealed in simultaneity of control over world, v. 1.2 (10-176).

Soul powers remain the same throughout all changes of body, iv. 3.8 (27-402).

Soul pristine, precious, v. 1.2 (10-176).

Soul, psychological distinctions in, i. 1.1 (53-1191).

Soul pure, would remain isolated, iv. 4.23 (28-473).

Soul puzzle of her being one, yet in all, iv. 3.4 (27-394).

Soul, rational, if separated what would she remember? iv. 3.27 (27-433).

Soul receives her form from intelligence, iii. 9.5 (15-224).

Soul related to it might have been darkness, ii. 9.12 (33-625).

Soul remains incorporeal, vi. 7.31 (38-750).

Soul rises to the good by scorning all things below, iv. 3.20 (27-422).

Soul said to be in body because body alone is visible, vi. 7.35 (38-757).

Soul scorns even thought, she is intellectualized and ennobled, iv. 3.4 (27-395).

Soul, sick, devoted to her body, iv. 4.1 (28-441).

Soul, speech in the intelligible world, ii. 9.2 (33-603).

Soul split into three, intelligible, intermediary and sense-world.

Soul symbolizes double Hercules, i. 1.13 (53-1206).

Soul, the two between them, partition the fund of memory, iv. 3.31 (27-439).

Soul, three principles, reason, imagination and sensation, ii. 3.9 (52-1175).

Soul, to which of ours does individuality belong, ii. 9.2 (33-603).

Soul, triune, one nature for three powers, iv. 9.5 (51-1163).

Soul unharmed, if her flight from here below is prompt enough, i. 7.26 (1-50).

Soul unity does not resemble reason unity, as it includes plurality, vi. 2.6 (43-901).

Soul, universal, is everywhere entire, vi. 4.9 (22-300).

Soul uses the body as tool, i. 1.3 (53-1193).

Soul unconscious of her higher part, if distracted by sense, iv. 8.8 (6-132).

Soul will not seem entirely within us, if functions are not localized, iv. 3.20 (27-419).

Soul's action divided by division of time, iv. 4.15 (28-460).

Soul's activity is triple: thinking, self-preservation and creation, iv. 8.3 (6-125).

Soul's affection compared to lyre, iii. 6.4 (26-357).

Souls all are one in the world soul, but are different, iv. 9.1 (8-139).

Souls all have their demon which is their love. iii. 5.4 (50-1129).

Souls are as immortal as the one from whom they proceed, vi. 4.10 (22-301).

Souls are plural unity of seminal reasons, vi. 2.5 (43-899).

Souls are united by their highest, vi. 9.15 (38-726).

Souls as amphibious, iv. 8.4 (6-126).

Soul's ascension to eligible world, ii. 9.2 (13-222).

Soul's bodies may be related differently, iv. 4.29 (28-485).

Souls can reason intuitionally without ratiocination, iv. 3.18 (27-417).

Souls cannot lose parts, iv. 7.5 (2-63).

Soul's condition in higher regions, iii. 4.6 (15-240).

Soul conforms destiny to her character, iii. 4.5 (15-238).

Soul's conformity to universal, proves they are not parts of her, iv. 3.2 (27-389).

Soul's descent into body, iii. 9.3 (13-222).

Soul's desire, liver seat of, iv. 4.28 (28-480).

Soul's destiny depends on condition of birth of universe, ii. 3.14 (52-1181).

Souls develop manifoldness as intelligence does, iv. 3.5 (27-396).

Souls differ as do the sensations, vi. 4.6 (22-294).

Souls, difference between, iv. 3.8 (27-400).

Souls, do all form a single one, iv. 9 (8-139).

Soul's dream is sensation, iii. 6.6 (26-363).

Souls first go in Heaven in the intelligible world, iv. 3.17 (27-415).

Souls form a genetic but not numeric unity, iv. 9.1 (8-146).

Souls that enter into this world generate a love demon, iii. 5.6 (50-1132).

Soul's highest part always remains above body. v. 2.1 (11-194).

Soul's highest part, even whole, sees vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10 (31-568).

Souls, how they come to descend, iv. 3.13 (27-410).

Soul's immortality, iv. 7 (2-56).

Soul's incarnation is for perfection of universe, iv. 8.5 (6-127).

Souls incorporeal dwell within intelligence, iv. 3.24 (27-427).

Souls, individual, are the emanations of the universal, iv. 3.1 (27-388).

Soul's instrument is the body, iv. 7.1 (2-56).

Soul's lower part, in sense world, fashions body, v. 1.10 (10-190).

Souls may be unified without being identical, iv. 9.2 (8-140).

Soul's mediation between indivisible and divisible essence, iv. 2 (21-279).

Soul's memory in intelligible world, iv. 4.1 (28-441).

Soul's mixture of reason and indetermination, iii. 5.7 (50-1133).

Soul's multiplicity, based on their unity, iv. 9.4 (7-843).

Soul's nature is intermediate, iv. 8.7 (6-130).

Souls not isolated from intelligence during descent, iv. 3.12 (27-409).

Souls of stars and incarnate humans govern worlds untroubledly, iv. 8.2 (6-123).

Souls of the second universal rank are men, ii. 3.13 (52-1180).

Soul's powers differ and thence do not act everywhere, iv. 9.3 (8-143).

Soul's primary and secondary evil, iii. 8.5 (30-538).

Souls prognosticate but do not cause event, ii. 3.6 (52-1171).

Soul's purification and separation, iii. 6.5 (26-359).

Soul's relation to body is that of statue and metal, iv. 7.8 (2-176).

Soul's relation to intelligence is that of matter to form, v. 1.3 (10-178).

Souls resemble various forms of governments, iv. 4.17 (28-464).

Souls retain unity and differences, on different levels, iv. 3.5 (27-396).

Soul's separation from body enables her to use the body as tool, i. 1.3 (53-1193).

Souls show kinship to world by fidelity to their own nature, iii. 3.1 (48-1077).

Soul's superior and inferior bodies related in three ways, iv. 4.29 (28-485).

Souls that change their condition alone have memory, iv. 4.6 (28-448).

Souls united, intelligence shined down from the peak formed by them, vi. 7.15 (38-726).

Souls united to world-souls by functions, iv. 3.2 (27-392).

Souls weakened by individual contemplation, iv. 8.4 (6-125).

Soul's welfare is resemblance to divinity, i. 6.6 (1-49).

Souls, why they take different kinds of bodies, iv. 3.12 (27-410).

Source, common, by it all things are united, vi. 7.12 (38-721).

Source, height of, implied by simplicity of the intelligible, vi. 7.13 (38-722).

Sowing of soul in stars and matter, iv. 8.45 (6-127).

Space, 5.1, 10.

Space, corporeal, iv. 3.20 (27-420).

Space has nothing to do with intelligible light, which is non-spatial, v. 5.7 (29-526).

Space, result of procession of the universal soul, iii. 7.10 (45-1006).

Space said to measure movement because of its determination, iii. 7.11 (45-1011).

Species destroyed by fundamental unity, vi. 2.2 (43-894).

Spectacle Divine in ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170).

Spectator of vision becomes participator, v. 8.10 (31-569).

Speech is a quantity, vi. 3.12 (44-954).

Speech is a quantity, classification of, vi. 3.12 (44-954).

Speech of soul in the intelligible world, iv. 4.1 (28-441).

Spherical figure, intelligible is the primitive one, vi. 6.17 (34-675).

Spindle of fate (significance), ii. 3.9 (52-1174); iii. 4.6 (15-242).

Spirit and its apportionment, iv. 7.8 (2-69).

Spirits inanimate, i. 4.7 (2-56).

Spiritual becomes love, begun physically, vi. 7.33 (38-755).

Spiritual body, ii. 2.2 (14-231).

Spiritual gnostic distinction of men, ii. 9.18 (33-637).

Spiritual men, v. 9.1 (5-102).

Splendor, last view of revelation, v. 8.10 (31-567).

Splitting of intelligible principle, ii. 4.5 (12-202).

Splitting of unity typified by mutilation of Saturn, v. 8.13 (31-573).

Splitting up of soul at death, iii. 4.6 (15-241).

Spontaneity not affected by irresponsible, iii. 2.10 (47-1060).

Stability and essence, distinction between, vi. 2.7 (43-903).

Stability and movement exist because thought by intelligence, vi. 2.8 (43-904).

Stability another kind of movement, vi. 2.7 (43-903).

Stability, distinction from, vi. 3.27 (44-980).

Stability does not imply stillness in the intelligible, vi. 3.27 (44-982).

Stability of essence only accidental, vi. 9.3 (9-153).

Standard human cannot measure world soul, ii. 9.7 (33-612).

Star action mingled only affects already natural process, ii. 3.12 (52-1166).

Star-soul and world-soul intellectual differences, iv. 4.17 (28-463).

Stars affect physical, not essential being, iii. 1.6 (3-95).

Stars and world-soul are impassable, iv. 4.42 (28-506).

Stars answer prayers unconsciously, iv. 4.42 (28-505).

Stars are inexhaustible and need no refreshment, ii. 1.8 (40-827).

Stars are they animate?

Stars are they inanimate?

Stars, as well as sun, may be prayed to, iv. 4.30 (28-486).

Stars, body or will do not sway earthly events, iv. 4.35 (28-495).

Stars by their body produce only passions of universe, ii. 3.10 (52-1177).

Stars contain not only fire but earth, ii. 1.6 (40-821).

Stars do not need memories to answer prayers, iv. 4.42 (28-505).

Stars follow the universal kind, ii. 3.13 (52-1179).

Stars have no memory, because uniformly blissful, iv. 4.42 (28-505).

Stars influence is from contemplation of intelligible world, iv. 4.35 (28-496).

Stars motion compared to a prearranged dance, iv. 4.33 (28-492).

Stars natural radiation of good, explains their influence, iv. 4.35 (28-497).

Stars predict because of soul's accidents, ii. 3.10 (52-1177).

Stars serve as letters in which to read nature, iii. 1.6 (3-95).

Stars, souls govern worlds untroubled by, iv. 8.2 (6-123).

Stars sway general but not detailed fate, iv. 4.31 (28-487).

Stars, what is and what is not produced by them, ii. 3.13 (52-1178).

Statue, art makes out of rough marble, v. 8.1 (31-551).

Statue, composite of form and matter, v. 9.3 (5-504).

Statue, essential beings as statues, v. 8.4 (31-558).

Statue, heating of statue by metal only indirect, vi. 1.21 (42-874).

Statue, justice as self born intellectual statue, vi. 6 (34-653).

Statue, metal is not potentiality of statue, ii. 5.1 (25-342).

Statue, purified cleans within herself divine statues, v. 7.10 (2-81).

Statue, shining in front rank is unity, v. 1.6 (10-182).

Statue, soul is to body as metal is to statue, iv. 7.8 (2-76).

Statues at entrance of temples left behind, vi. 9.9 (9-170).

Statues of palace of divinity, vi. 7.35 (38-758).

Sterility of nature indicated by castration, iii. 6.19 (26-385).

Still, why the heavens do not remain, ii. 9.1 (40-814).

Stillness, not implied by stability in the intelligible, vi. 3.27 (44-980).

Stoic explanation of beauty, symmetry, opposed, i. 6.1 (1-41).

Stoic four categories evaporate, leaving matter as basis, vi. 1.29 (42-886).

Stoic God is only modified matter, vi. 1.27 (45-881).

Stoic relation category confuses new with anterior, vi. 1.31 (42-888).

Stoics, v. 9.4 (5-106).

Stoics' fault is to have taken sensation as their guide, vi. 1.28 (42-884).

Stones growing while in earth, iv. 4.27 (28-479); vi. 7.11 (38-718).

Straight line represents sensation, while the soul is like a circle, v. 1.7 (10-184).

Straight movement, vi. 4.2 (22-288); ii. 2.12 (14-231).

Studied world must be just as one would analyze the voice, vi. 3.1 (44-933).

Study of time makes us descend from the intelligible, iii. 7.6 (45-995).

Sub-conscious nature hinders dominance of better-self, iii. 3.4 (48-1081).

Subdivision infinite of bodies, leads to destruction, iv. 7.1 (2-56).

Subject, one's notion does not come from subject itself, vi. 6.13 (34-663).

Sublunar sphere, immortality does not extend to it, ii. 1.5 (40-820).

Sublunary divinities, crimes should not be attributed to, iv. 4.31 (28-489).

Substance as Stoic category would be split up, vi. 1.25 (42-878).

Substantial act or habitation is hypostasis, vi. 1.6 (42-845).

Substrate, iii. 3.6 (48-1087).

Substrate and residence of forms, is matter, ii. 4.1 (12-197).

Substrate demanded by process of elements, ii. 4.6 (12-203).

Substrate needed by composition of the body, ii. 4.11 (12-209).

Substrate not common to all elements, being indeterminate, ii. 4.13 (12-213).

Subsumed under being in essence not everything can, vi. 2.2 (43-893).

Successive enumeration inevitable in describing the eternal, iv. 8.6 (6-129).

Succumb to the law of the universe, why many souls do, iv. 3.15 (27-413).

Suchness, ii. 7.2 (37-701). (Whatness.)

Suchness later than being and quiddity, ii. 6.2 (17-248).

Suffering and action cannot be separate categories, vi. 1.17 (42-866).

Suffering of most men physical, virtuous man suffers least because most suffering is physical, i. 4.13 (46-1036).

Suffering part of virtuous man is the higher, i. 4.13 (46-1036).

Suggestive is influence of reason, i. 2.5 (19-264).

Suicide, i. 9 (16-243).

Suicide breaks up the appointed time of life, i. 9 (16-244).

Suicide unavailable even to avoid insanity, i. 9 (16-244).

Suitability and opportunity, cause of, puts them beyond chance, vi. 8.18 (39-806).

Sun and ray, simile of, v. 5.7 (32-587); v. 3.9 (49-1105).

Sun as well as stars, may be prayed to, iv. 4.30 (28-486).

Sunlight exists everywhere, vi. 4.7 (22-296).

Sunrise only image for divine approach, v. 5.8 (32-588).

Superabundance, manner in which all things issue from one, v. 2.1 (11-194).

Super-beauty and super-virtue, vi. 9.11 (9-170).

Super-beauty of the Supreme, v. 8.8 (31-564).

Super-being achieved in ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170).

Super-essential principle does not think, v. 6.1 (24-333).

Super-essentiality and super-existence of Supreme, v. 3.17 (49-1119).

Super-existence and super-essentiality of Supreme, v. 3.17 (49-1119); v. 4.2 (7-137).

Super-existence of first principle, vi. 7.38 (38-763).

Super-form is uniform unity, vi. 9.3 (9-152).

Super-goodness is Supreme, vi. 9.6 (9-160).

Superior principle not always utilized, i. 1.10 (53-1203).

Superior would be needed if the good thought, vi. 7.40 (38-767).

Super-liberty may be attributed to intelligence, vi. 8.6 (39-782).

Super-master of himself is the Supreme, vi. 8.10 (39-790).

Super-rest, super-motion, super-thought is the one super-consciousness and super-life, iii. 9.7, 9 (13-226).

Super-virtue, soul meets absolute beauty, vi. 9.11 (9-170).

Supra active, the good is, as supra-cogitative, v. 6.6 (24-338).

Supra cogitative, the good as, is also supra-active, v. 6.6 (24-338).

Supra-thinking principle does not think, necessary to working of intelligence, v. 6.2 (24-334).

Supremacy is the cause of the good, vi. 7.23 (38-739).

Supremacy of good implies its supremacy over all its possessions, v. 5.13 (32-595).

Supreme admits of no reasoning, demonstration, faith or cause, v. 8.7 (31-563).

Supreme, all language about it is metaphorical, vi. 8.13 (39-795).

Supreme as a spring of water, iii. 8.10 (30-547).

Supreme as being as being and essence, v. 3.17 (49-1119); v. 9.2 (7-149); v. 4.2 (7-138); v. 5.5 (32-584); v. 5.5 (32-585).

Supreme, assisted by intelligence would have no room for chance, vi. 8.17 (39-804).

Supreme banishes all chance, vi. 8.10 (39-789).

Supreme being not produced by chance, vi. 8.11 (39-793).

Supreme beyond chance because of suitability, vi. 8.17 (39-806).

Supreme can be approached sufficiently to be spoken of, v. 3.14 (49-1114).

Supreme can be attributed contingence only under new definition, vi. 8.9 (39-787).

Supreme can be attributed physical qualities only by analogy, vi. 8.8 (39-785).

Supreme cannot aspire higher, being super-goodness, vi. 9.6 (9-159).

Supreme commands himself, vi. 8.20 (39-809).

Supreme consists with himself, vi. 8.15 (39-800).

Supreme could not be called chance by any one who had seen him, vi. 8.19 (39-807).

Supreme, every term should be limited by some what or higher, vi. 8.13 (39-797).

Supreme formlessness shown by approaching soul's rejection of form, vi. 7.34 (38-756).

Supreme inevitable for intelligence that is intelligible, iii. 8.9 (30-544).

Supreme intelligence is king of kings, v. 15.3 (32-580).

Supreme intelligence, nature of, i. 8.2. (51-1144).

Supreme is both being and whyness, ii. 7.2 (37-707).

Supreme is entirely one, does not explain origin of manifold, v. 9.14 (5-116).

Supreme is essential beauty, the shapeless shaper and the transcendent, vi. 7.33 (38-754).

Supreme is everywhere and nowhere, is inclination and imminence, vi. 8.16 (39-801).

Supreme is ineffable, v. 3.13 (49-1113).

Supreme is limitless, v. 7.32 (38-753).

Supreme is potentiality of all things, above all actualization, iii. 8.10 (30-546).

Supreme is super-being, because not dependent on it, vi. 8.19 (39-807).

Supreme is the good, because of its supremacy, vi. 7.23 (38-739).

Supreme is the power, really master of himself, vi. 8.9 (39-788); vi. 8.10 (39-790).

Supreme is will being and actualization, vi. 8.13 (39-795).

Supreme must be free, as chance is escaped by interior isolation, vi. 8.13 (39-795); vi. 8.15 (39-800).

Supreme must be simple and not compound, ii. 9.1 (33-599).

Supreme named Apollo, v. 5.6 (32-584).

Supreme not intelligence that aspires to form of good, iii. 8.10 (30-548).

Supreme of three ranks of existence is the beautiful, vi. 7.42 (38-770).

Supreme one only figuratively, vi. 9.5 (9-157).

Supreme principles must then be unity, intelligence and soul, ii. 9.1 (33-600).

Supreme, proven by the unity of the soul, vi. 5.9 (23-323).

Supreme super-master of himself, vi. 8.12 (39-793).

Supreme unity adjusts all lower group unities, vi. 6.11 (34-660).

Supreme would wish to be what he is, is such as he would wish to be, vi. 8.13 (39-796); vi. 8.15 (39-800).

Swine, simile of the impure, i. 6.6 (1-49).

Sympathy between individual and universal soul due to common origin, iv. 3.8 (48-1088); v. 8.12 (31-571).

Syllables a quantity, vi. 3.12 (44-954).

Symmetry, earthly, contemplates universal symmetry, v. 9.11 (5-114).

Symmetry, Stoic definition of beauty, opposed, i. 6.1 (1-41).

Sympathetic harmony, earth feels and directs by it, iv. 4.26 (28-477).

Sympathy, cosmic, ii. 1.7 (40-824).

Sympathy, does not force identity of sensation, iv. 9.3 (8-142).

Sympathy implies unity of all beings in lower magic enchantment, iv. 9.3 (8-152).

Sympathy, love working as, effects magic, iv. 4.40 (28-503).

Sympathy of soul and body, iv. 4.23 (28-473).

Sympathy of soul's highest self, basis of memory, iv. 6.3 (41-832).

Sympathy or community of affection, Stoic, iv. 7.3 (2-59).

System, co-existence of unity and multiplicity, demands organization in, vi. 7.10 (38-716).

Taming of body, i. 4.14 (46-1037).

Theology revealed by astrology, ii. 3.7 (52-1172).

Telescoping, of intelligible entities, v. 9.10 (5-113).

Temperament of corporeal principles, is health, iv. 7.8 (2-71).

Temperament, soul as mixture, iv. 7.2 (2-58).

Temperance, gate of ecstasy, i. 6.9 (1-53).

Temperance interpreted as purification, i. 6.6 (1-49).

Temperance is not real category, vi. 2.18 (43-923).

Temperate man is good's independence from pleasure, vi. 7.29 (38-747).

Temples of divinity, explained by psychology, iv. 3.1 (27-387).

Temporal conceptions implied by priority of order, iv. 4.16 (28-461).

Tending towards the good, all things tend towards the one, vi. 2.12 (43-914).

Tension, Stoic, iv. 7.13 (2-83); iv. 5.4 (29-522).

Terrestrial things do not last so long as celestial ones, ii. 1.5 (40-819).

Testimony, to its creator by world, iii. 2.3 (47-1047).

The living animal, i. 1.5 (53-1126).

Theodore, from P1ato's Theatetus, i. 8.6 (51-1150).

Theodore of Asine, his infra celestial vault (invisible place), v. 8.10 (31-567); ii. 4.1 (12-198).

Theory of happiness consisting in reasonable life, i. 4.2 (46-1022).

Thing in itself, differs from nonentity, ii. 4.10 (12-207).

Thing in itself, qualityless, found by abstraction, ii. 4.10 (12-207).

Things good is their form, vi. 7.27 (38-744).

Think, body cannot, iv. 7.8 (2-68).

Thinking in conformity with intelligence, two ways, v. 3.4 (49-1094).

Thinking is perception without help of the body, iv. 7.8 (2-68).

Thinking ourselves, is thinking an intellectual nature, iii. 9.6 (13-224).

Thinking principle, the first, is the general second, v. 6.2 (24-335).

Thinking principles--which is the first, and which is the second? v. 6.1 (24-335).

Third principle is soul, iii. 9.1 (13-221).

Third rank of existence should not be occupied by modality, vi. 1.30 (42-887).

Thought and life, different grades of, iii. 8.7 (30-540).

Thought actualization of light, v. 1.5 (10-181).

Thought as first actualization of a hypostasis is not in first principle, vi 7.40 (38-766).

Thought as touch of the good leads to ecstasy, vi. 7.36 (38-760).

Thought below one and Supreme, iii. 9.7, 9 (13-226).

Thought beneath the super essential principle, v. 6 (24-339).

Thought distracted from by sensation, iv. 8.8 (6-132).

Thought implies simultaneous unity and duality, v. 6.1 (24-333).

Thought in first principle would imply attributes, and that manifoldness, v. 6.2 (24-336).

Thought is actualized intelligence, v. 3.5 (49-1097).

Thought is beneath the first so intelligence implies the latter, v. 6.5 (24-338); v. 6.2, 6 (24-339).

Thought is inspiration for good, v. 6.5 (24-338).

Thought is integral part of intelligence, v. 5.2 (32-579).

Thought is seeing the intelligible, v. 4.2 (7-138).

Thought is the form; shape the actualization of being, v. 9.8 (5-111).

Thought, life and existence, contained in primary existence, v. 6.6 (24-339).

Thought made impossible only by the first principle being one exclusively, v. 6.3 (24-335).

Thought, one with sight, v. 1.5 (10-181).

Thought, self direction of, is not changeableness, iv. 4.2 (28-444).

Thought, the means by which intelligence passes from unity to duality, v. 6.1 (24-333).

Thoughts, conceptive, demand intermediary sensation, iv. 4.23 (28-472).

Thoughts, contrary to rights, possess real existence, iii. 5.7 (50-1136).

Thoughts, highest, have incorporeal objects, iv. 7.8 (2-68).

Three kinds of men, v. 9.1 (5-102).

Three men in each of us, vi. 7.6 (38-708).

Three principles, v. 6.2 (24-334 to 337); v. 1.10 (10-189).

Three ranks of existence, vi. 4.11 (22-302); v. 1.10 (10-189); v. 6.2 (24-335); iii. 3.3 (48-1077); iii. 5.9 (50-1138); vi. 1.30 (43-887); vi. 7.6 (38-708).

Three spheres, v. 1.8 (10-186).

Threefold activity of soul, thought, self-preservation and creation, iv. 8.3 (6-125).

Time and eternity, iii. 7 (45-985).

Time arose as measurement of the activity of the universal soul, iii. 7.10 (45-1005).

Time as motion, errors in, iii. 7.1 (45-987).

Time becomes, iii. 7, int. (45-985).

Time can be increased, why not happiness, i. 5.7 (36-687).

Time cannot be divided without implying soul's action, iv. 4.15 (28-460).

Time, considered as motion, as moveable or as something of motion, iii. 7.6 (45-996).

Time, if it is a quantity, why a separate category? vi. 1.13 (42-861).

Time included action and reaction of soul, not soul itself, iv. 4.15 (28-460).

Time is also within us, iii. 7.12 (45-1014).

Time is as interior to the soul as eternity is to existence, iii. 7.10 (45-1008).

Time is measured by movement and is measure of movement, iii. 7.12 (45-1011).

Time is no interval of movement (Stoic Zeno), iii. 7.7 (45-999).

Time is not a numbered number (Aristotle), iii. 7.8 (45-1000).

Time is not a quantity, vi. 1.5 (42-844).

Time is not an accident or consequence of movement, iii. 7.9 (45-1004).

Time is not begotten by movement but only indicated thereby, iii. 7.11 (45-1009).

Time is not motion and rest (Strato), iii. 7.7 (45-1000).

Time is not movement, iii. 7.7 (45-997).

Time is not the number and measure of movement (Aristotle), iii. 7.8 (45-1000).

Time is present everywhere, as against Antiphanes and Critolaus, iii. 7.12 (45-1013).

Time is the length of the life of the universal soul, iii. 7.11 (45-1008).

Time is the life of the soul, considered in the movement by which she passes from one actualization to another, iii. 7.10 (45-1005).

Time is the model of its image eternity, iii. 7 int. (45-985).

Time is the universe, iii. 7.1 (45-986).

Time is to the world-soul, what eternity is to intelligence, iii. 7.10 (45-1007).

Time joined to actions to make them perfect, vi. 1.19 (42-868).

Time must be studied comparatively among the philosophers, iii. 7.6 (45-996).

Time none, only a single day for world-souls, iv. 4.7 (28-450).

Time or place do not figure among the categories, vi. 2.16 (43-919).

Time, Plato uncertain about it, iii. 7.12 (45-1012).

Time replaced by eternity in intelligible world, v. 9.10 (5-113).

Time's nature will be revealed by its birth, iii. 7.10 (45-1005).

Toleration by soul, without guilt, iii. 1.8 (3-97).

Tomb of soul is body, iv. 8.1, 4 (6-126).

Tool, body uses the soul as, i. 1.2 (55-1194); iv. 7.1 (2-57).

Tools are intermediate, like sense shape, iv. 4.23 (28-473).

Torments of hell are reformatory, iv. 4.45 (28-448).

Total reason of universe, ii. 3.13 (52-1179).

Touch, the good is a simple perception of itself, vi. 7.39 (38-764).

Touched with the good is the greatest of sciences, vi. 7.36 (38-760).

Trace of life, left by soul when leaving body, iv. 4.29 (28-483).

Trace of the One, is the being of souls, v. v. 5 (32-583).

Traditions of divinity contained by the world, ii. 9.9 (33-616).

Training and education, memory needs, iv. 6.3 (41-835).

Training here below help souls to remember when beyond, iv. 4.5 (28-448).

Training of interior vision, i. 6.9 (1-53).

Trance of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-169).

Transcendence of good over intelligence and life, v. 3.16 (49-1117).

Transcendent, v. 3 (49-1090).

Transcendent shapeless shaper and essential beauty is supreme, vi. 7.33 (38-754).

Transcending unity demanded by contemplation of intelligence, v. 3.10 (49-1106).

Transition of sense-beauty to intellectual, i. 6.3 (1-45).

Transmigration, animals into animals, plants, birds, eagles and soaring birds and bee, iii. 4.2 (15-235).

Transmigration, two kinds, into human or animal bodies, iv. 3.9 (27-403).

Transmission, reception, relation underlies action and experience, vi. 1.22 (42-874).

Transparency of everything in intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-558).

Trap on way to ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569).

Traverse heaven, without leaving rest (celestial divinities), v. 8.3 (31-556).

Tree of the universe, simile of, iii. 8.10 (30-547).

Triad is limit of differentiation, ii. 9.2 (33-602).

Triangles equal to two, iii. 5.7 (50-1136).

Triangles, material and immaterial, explain trine relations, vi. 5.11 (23-330).

Trinity, compared to light, sun and moon, i. 8.2 (51-1144); vi. 7.6 (38-708); vi. 7.7 (38-711); iv. 8.4 (6-125); vi. 7.42 (38-770); vi. 2.8 (43-905); iv. 7.13 (2-84); iii. 4.2 (15-234).

Triune, v. 6.4 (24-337).

Triune, soul, one nature in three powers, ii. 3.4 (52); v. 1 (10-173); ii. 9.2 (33-602).

Triune play implies also identity and difference, vi. 2.8 (43-905).

True good, implies counterfeit, vi. 7.26 (38-743).

Truth external to intelligence, a theory that destroys intelligence, v. 5.1 (32-576).

Truth, field of, intelligence evolves, vi. 7.13 (38-723).

Truth self-probative; nothing truer, v. 5.2 (32-579).

Two-fold soul exerts two-fold providence, iv. 8.2 (6-122).

Two-fold sphere in which soul has to exist, iv. 8.7 (6-130).

Two, not addition to one, but a change, vi. 6.14 (34-666).

Ugliness, aversion for, explains love for beauty, i. 6.5 (1-47).

Ugliness consists of formlessness, i. 6.2 (1-43).

Ugliness is a foreign accretion, i. 6.5 (1-48).

Ugliness is form's failure to dominate matter, i. 8.9 (51-1156).

Ugliness is predominance of matter, v. 7.2 (18-253).

Ugliness of men due to lowering themselves to lower natures, and ignoring themselves, v. 8.13 (31-574).

Ulysses, i. 6.8 (1-52).

Unalloyed is no evil for the living people, i. 7.3 (54-1210).

Unattached, condition o wise man, i. 4.1, 7 (46-1029).

Unavoidable and universal evils are, i. 8.6 (51-1149).

Uncertainty in location of good and beauty, i. 6.9 (1-53).

Unchangeableness of form and matter, iii. 6.10 (26-368).

Unconsciously do stars answer prayers, iv. 4.4 (28-505); iv. 4.2 (28-505).

Unconsciousness does not hinder virtue, handsomeness or health, i. 4.9 (46-1033).

Unconsciousness of oneself in ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Unconsciousness of soul intelligence and one does not detract from their existence, v. 1.12 (10-191).

Undefinability of unity (referred to by feelings), vi. 9.3 (9-151).

Understand and fit yourself to the world instead of complaining of it, ii. 9.13 (33-625).

Undisturbed is the world-soul by the things of sense, iv. 8.7 (6-131).

Unhappiness increased by duration, why not happiness? i. 5.6 (36-686).

Unharmed is the soul by incarnation, if prompt in flight, iv. 8.5 (6-128).

Unification does not reveal true knowledge, ii. 9.9 (33-617).

Unification process, v. 1.5 (10-180); v. 5.4 (32-581).

Unification with divinity result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Uniform action, exerted by body, iv. 7.4 (2-62).

Uniform in itself is unity and super-form, vi. 9.3 (9-152).

Unincarnate souls govern world untroubledly, iv. 8.2 (6-123).

Unique (Monad), v. 5.4 (32-581); v. 5.13 (32-595).

Unissued brothers of Jupiter, vi. 8.12 (31-572).

Unitary are intelligibles, but not absolute unity, vi. 5.4 (32-581).

Unitary is consciousness, though containing thinker, ii. 9.1 (33-601).

Unitary number, vi. 6.9 (34-656).

United are all things by a common source, vi. 7.12 (38-721).

United are souls, by their highest, vi. 7.15 (38-726).

United souls, intelligence shines down from the peak formed by them, vi. 7.15 (38-726).

Unities, different kinds of, v. 5.4 (32-582).

Uniting of highest parts of men in intelligible, vi. 5.10 (23-327).

Uniting of intelligence, as it rises to the intelligible, iv. 4.1 (28-442).

Uniting soul and body forms individual aggregate, i. 1.6 (53-1197).

Unity, v. 1.6 (10-182); v. 5.4 (32-581).

Unity above all; intelligence and essence. vi. 9.2 (9-149).

Unity absolute, is first, while intelligence is not, vi. 9.2 (9-150).

Unity, abstruse, because soul has repugnances to such researches, vi. 9.3 (9-151).

Unity an accident amongst sense things, something more in the intelligible, vi. 6.14 (34-666).

Unity and essence, genuine relations between, vi. 2.11 (43-911).

Unity and number precede the one and many beings, vi. 6.10 (34-659).

Unity as indivisible and infinite, vi. 9.6 (9-158).

Unity is the self-uniform and formless super form, vi. 9.3 (9-152).

Unity, by it all things depend on the good, i. 7.2 (54-1209).

Unity, by thinking intelligence passes to duality, v. 6.1 (24-333).

Unity, co-existence of, demands organization in system, vi. 7.10 (38-716).

Unity, contained in sense objects, is not unity itself, vi. 6.16 (34-671).

Unity, contemplation in nature, iii. 8 (30-531).

Unity does not even need itself, vi. 9.6 (9-159).

Unity, everything tends toward it as it tends toward the good, vi. 2.12 (43-914).

Unity, fundamental of genera, would destroy species, vi. 2.2 (43-894).

Unity, greater in intelligible than in physical world, vi. 5.10 (23-327).

Unity, if passed into the manifold, would destroy universe, iii. 8.10 (30-547).

Unity, imparted by soul is not pure, vi. 9.1 (9-147).

Unity, incomprehensible, vi. 9.4 (9-154).

Unity in manifoldness, vi. 5.6 (23-320).

Unity into plurality split by numbers, vi. 6.9 (34-656).

Unity is in the manifold by a manner of existence, vi. 4.8 (22-296).

Unity is intelligible, though participated in by sense-objects, vi. 6.13 (34-664).

Unity is not intelligence, its manifold produced by a unity, iv. 4.1 (28-443).

Unity, lack of, causes corporeity to be nonentity, iii. 6.6 (26-362).

Unity, multiple, radiation of, v. 3.15 (49-1115).

Unity must be sought for in essence, vi. 5.1 (23-342).

Unity must exist in the intelligible before being applied to mutable beings, vi. 6.11 (34-659).

Unity necessary to existence of all beings, especially collective nouns, vi. 9.1 (9-147).

Unity not category, are arguments against, vi. 2.10 (43-910).

Unity not mere numbering, but existence, vi. 9.2 (9-149).

Unity not synonymous with essence, vi. 2.9 (43-908).

Unity of apperception, iv. 4.1 (28-442).

Unity of being does not exclude unity of other beings, vi. 4.4 (22-290).

Unity of reason constituted by contained contraries, iii. 2.16 (47-1069).

Unity of soul, does not resemble reason unity because it includes plurality, vi. 2.6 (43-901).

Unity of soul not effected by plurality of powers, iv. 9.4 (8-143).

Unity of soul retained on different levels, iv. 3.5 (27-396).

Unity of souls based on their multiplicity, iv. 9.4 (8-143).

Unity of Supreme entailed by its being a principle, v. 4.1 (7-134).

Unity of Supreme only figurative, vi. 9.5 (9-157).

Unity of the soul proves that of the Supreme, vi. 5.9 (23-323).

Unity of will, being an actualization, is the Supreme, vi. 8.13 (39-795).

Unity only for its examination are its parts apart, vi. 2.3 (43-897).

Unity passing into manifold would destroy universe, iii. 8.10 (30-547).

Unity reigns still more in the good, vi. 2.11 (43-912).

Unity self-sufficient, needing no establishment, vi, 9.6 (9-159).

Unity indefinable, referred to by feeling, vi. 9.3 (9-154).

Unity, why world proceeded from it, v. 2.1 (11-193).

Unity's form is principle of numbers, v. 5.5 (32-583).

Universal and unavoidable evils are, i. 8.6 (51-1149).

Universal being, description of, vi. 4.2 (22-286).

Universal being is indivisible, vi. 4.3 (22-288).

Universal being, stars followers of, ii. 3.13 (52-1179).

Universal, second rank, souls of men, ii. 3.13 (52-1180).

Universal soul, first actualization of essence and intelligence, v. 2.2 (11-194).

Universal soul is everywhere entire, vi. 4.9 (22-300).

Universal soul may not be judged by human standards, ii. 9.7 (33-611).

Universal soul's motion, immortalized heaven, ii. 1.4 (40-817).

Universality of creator overcame all obstacles, v. 8.7 (31-562).

Universe, ii. 1 (40-813).

Universe and deity if include separable soul, ii. 3.9 (52-1176).

Universe animated by world-soul, iv. 3.9 (27-404).

Universe as a single harmony, ii. 3.5 (52-1170).

Universe, birth of, destiny of souls depend on, ii. 3.15 (52-1182).

Universe depends on single principle, ii. 3.7 (52-1117).

Universe, diagram of, iv. 4.16 (28-462).

Universe, hierarchical constitution, vi. 2.2 (43-892).

Universe is harmony in spite of the faults in the details, ii. 3.16 (52-1185).

Universe like light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 (24-337).

Universe moves in circle, and stands still simultaneously, ii. 2.3 (14-230).

Universe, nothing in it inanimate, iv. 4.36 (28-499).

Universe passions produced by body of stars, ii. 3.13 (52-1178).

Universe, perfection of, evils are necessary, ii. 3.18 (52-1187).

Universe picture, that pictures itself, ii. 3.18 (52-1188).

Universe, plan of, is from eternity, Providence, vi. 8.17 (39-803).

Universe specialized, organ of, every being is, iv. 4.45 (28-510).

Universe would be destroyed if unity passed into the manifold, iii. 8.10 (30-547).

Universe's influence should be partial only, iv. 4.34 (28-494).

Universe's total reason, ii. 3.13 (52-1178).

Unjust acts unastrological theory blame divine reason, iii. 2.10 (47-1059).

Unmeasured, is intelligible number infinite, vi. 6.18 (34-676).

Unnoticed are many new things, iv. 4.8 (28-450).

Unreflective identification not as high as memory, iv. 4.4 (28-445).

Unseen is beauty in supreme fusion, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Uranus, see Kronos, iii. 5.2 (50-1127).

Uranus (Coleus), v. 8.13 (31-573).

Utility not the only deciding factor with the senses, iv. 4.24 (28-475).

Utilized, superior principle not always, i. 1.10 (53-1203).

Varied action, exerted by soul, iv. 7.4 (2-62).

Variety may depend on latency of part of seminal reason, v. 7.1 (18-253).

Variety of world-soul's life makes variety of time, iii. 7.10 (45-1005).

Vase for form, see residence, see jar, iv. 3.20 (27-420).

Vase is the body, iv. 3.7 (27-399).

Vase of creation of Timaeus, iv. 3.7 (27-399).

Vault, Theodore of Asine's infra celestial, ii. 4.1 (12-198); v. 8.10 (31-567).

Vegetables not irrational and rooted in the intelligible, vi. 7.11 (38-717).

Venus, iv. 3.14 (27-412); iii. 5.18 (50-1136); ii. 3.5, 6 (52-1170).

Venus as subordinate nature of world-soul, v. 8.13 (31-573).

Venus beauty, whence it came, v. 8.2 (31-553).

Venus is world-soul, iii. 5.5 (50-1131).

Venus, Jupiter and Mercury also considered astrologically, ii. 3.5 (52-1170).

Venus, mother of Eros, iii. 5.2 (50-1125).

Venus, or the soul is the individual of Jupiter, iii. 5.8 (50-1137).

Venus Urania, vi. 9.9 (9-167).

Vesta, pun on, represents intelligence, v. 5.5 (32-583).

Vesta represents earth, iv. 4.27 (28-480).

Vestige of soul descended into world is demon, iii. 5.6 (50-1132).

Vice as disharmony, iii. 6.2 (26-352).

Vice caused by external circumstances, i. 8.8 (51-1154); ii. 3.8 (52-1174); iii. 1 (3-86); vi. 8 (39-773).

Vice, how soul comes to know it, i. 8.9 (51-1155).

Vice is deprivation in soul, i. 8.11 (51-1157).

Vice not absolute but derived evil, i. 8.8 (51-1155).

Vices, intemperance and cowardliness comes from matter, i. 8.4 (51-1147).

Victory over self is mastery of fate, ii. 3.15 (52-1182).

Vindication, God's justice by philosophy, iv. 4.30 (28-487).

Vine and branches, simile of, iii. 3.7 (48-1088).

Violence, proof of, unnaturalness, as of sickness, v. 8.11 (31-570).

Virtue affects the soul differently from other passions, iii. 6.3 (26-356).

Virtue an intellectualizing habit that liberates the soul, vi. 8.5 (39-780).

Virtue as a harmony, iii. 6.2 (26-352).

Virtue as harmony explains evil in soul, iii. 6.2 (26-352).

Virtue belongs to soul, not to intelligence of super-intelligence, i. 2.2 (19-259).

Virtue can conquer any misfortune, i. 4.8 (46-1031).

Virtue changes life from evil to good, i. 7.3 (54-1210).

Virtue considered a good, because participation in good, i. 8.12 (51-1158).

Virtue consists not in conversion but in its result, i. 2.4 (19-261).

Virtue consists of doing good when not under trials, iii. 1.10 (3-98).

Virtue derived from primitive nature of soul, ii. 3.8 (52-1174).

Virtue does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-920).

Virtue independent of action, vi. 8.5 (39-779).

Virtue is good, not absolute, but participating, i. 8.8 (51-1155).

Virtue is soul's tendency to unity of faculties, vi. 9.1 (9-1147).

Virtue not corporeal, iv. 7.8 (2-69).

Virtue not possessed by body, iv. 7.8 (2-69).

Virtue of appetite explained, iii. 6.2 (26-354).

Virtue the road to escape evils, i. 2.1 (19-256).

Virtue, without which, God is a mere word ignored by gnostics, ii. 9.15 (33-629).

Virtues, i. 2.

Virtue's achievement makes this the best of all possible worlds, ii. 9.8 (33-615).

Virtues are only purifications, i. 6.6 (1-49).

Virtues are symmetrical in development, i. 2.7 (19-267).

Virtues, Aristotelian, rational, i. 3.6 (20-274).

Virtues, by shaping man, increase divine element in him, i. 2.2 (19-259).

Virtues cannot be ascribed to divinity, i. 2.1 (19-256).

Virtue, choir of, Stoic, vi. 9.11 (9-170).

Virtues, discussion of, is characteristic of genuine philosophy, ii. 9.15 (33-621).

Virtues exist through incorporeality of soul, iv. 7.8 (2-70).

Virtues, higher, are continuations upward of the homely, i. 2.6 (19-265).

Virtues, higher, imply lower but not conversely, i. 3.7 (19-266).

Virtues, higher, merge into wisdom, i. 2.6 (19-265).

Virtues, homely, assimilate us to divinity only partially, i. 2.3 (19-260).

Virtues, homely (civil, prudence, courage, temperance, justice), i. 2.1 (19-257).

Virtues, homely, produce in man a measure and proportion, i. 2.2 (19-259).

Virtues, homely, to be supplemented by divine discontent, i. 2.7 (19-267).

Virtues, homely, yield resemblance to divinity, i. 2.1 (19-256).

Virtues, how they purify, i. 2.4 (19-261).

Virtues, lower, are mutually related, i. 2.7 (19-266).

Virtues must be supplemented by divine discontent, i. 2.7 (19-267).

Virtues, natural, yield only to perfect views, need correction of philosophy, i. 3.6 (20-275).

Virtues, Platonic, homely and higher, distinguished, i. 2.3 (19-260).

Virtuous actions derived from self, are free, iii. 1.10 (3-99).

Virtuous man can suffer only in the lower part, i. 4.13 (46-1023).

Virtuous man is fully happy, i. 4.4 (46-1026).

Virtuous man is he whose highest principle is active, iii. 4.6 (15-239).

Virtuous men do right at all times, even under trials, iii. 1.10 (3-99).

Virtuous will only object conversion of soul towards herself, i. 4.11 (46-1035).

Vision and hearing, process of, iv. 5 (29-523).

Vision does not need intermediary body, iv. 5.1 (29-514).

Vision further, recall intelligible entities not memory, iv. 4.5 (28-447).

Vision interior, how trained, i. 6.9 (1-53).

Vision not dependent on medium's vision, iv. 5.3 (29-520).

Vision of God, ecstatic supreme purpose of life, i. 6.6 (1-49).

Vision of intelligible wisdom, last stage of soul progress, v. 8.10 (31-568).

Vision, theory of, ii. 8 (35-680); iv. 7.6 (2-65); v. 5.7 (32-586); v. 6.1 (24-334); vi. 1.20 (42-872).

Visual angle theory of Aristotle refuted, ii. 8.2 (35-682).

Voice as one would analyze it, so must the world be studied, vi. 3.1 (44-933).

Voice used by demons and other inhabitants of air, iv. 3.18 (27-417).

Voluntariness not excluded by necessity, iv. 8.5 (6-127).

Voluntariness, the basis of responsibility, vi. 8.1 (39-774).

Voluntary movements, vi. 3.26 (44-980).

Voluntary soul detachment forbidden, i. 9 (16-245).

Vulcan, iii. 2.14 (47-1064).

Wakening to true reality content of approach to Him, v. 5.11 (32-592).

Warfare, internecine, necessary, iii. 2.1, 5 (47-1064).

Washing of man fallen in mud, simile of purification, i. 6.5 (1-48).

Wastage, none in heaven, ii. 1.4 (40-818).

Wastage of physical body, and matter, ii. 1.4 (40-819).

Wastage, see leakage, vi. 5.10 (23-327).

Wastage, see leakage, none in celestial light, ii. 1.8 (40-826).

Water, contained in the intelligible world, vi. 7.11 (38-720).

Way to conceive of first principle, v. 5.10, 11 (32-592).

Wax seal, impressions are sensations, Stoic, iv. 7.6 (2-66); iii. 6.9 (26-366); iv. 6.1 (41-829).

We and ours, psychological names of soul, v. 3.3 (49-1094).

We and ours, psychological terms, i. 1.7 (53-1199).

We and the real man, distinctions between, i. 1.10 (53-1202).

We and the soul, relation between, ii. 1.3 (53-1194).

We, not ours, is intelligible, i. 1.7 (53-1199).

Weakening of incarnate souls due to individual contemplation, iv. 8.4 (6-125).

Weakness and affection of man, subject him to magic, iv. 4.44 (28-509).

Weakness of soul consists of falling into matter, i. 8.14 (51-1160).

Weakness of soul is evil, i. 8.4 (51-1147).

Wealth caused by external circumstances, ii. 3.8 (52-1174).

Weaning of the soul from the body, iii. 6.5 (26-359).

Welfare of soul is resemblance to divinity, i. 6.6 (1-49).

Whatness, vi. 7.19 (38-735).

Whatness and affections (quiddity) of being distinguishes between, ii. 6.2 (17-248).

Where or place is Aristotelian category, vi. 1.1, 4 (42-862).

Whole and individuals fashioned by entire soul, vi. 5.8 (23-322).

Whole is good, though continued mingled parts, iii. 2.17 (47-1070).

Whole of divisible and indivisible parts, human soul is, iv. 3.19 (27-419).

Whole, reason is a, vi. 5.10 (23-326).

Whyness is form, vi. 7.19 (38-735); vi. 7.2 (38-732).

Whyness of its forms contained by its intelligence, ii. 7.2 (38-732).

Will be, not are in one, all things, v. 2.1 (11-193).

Will, freedom of, on what is it based, vi. 8.2 (39-775).

Will of the one, vi. 8 (39-773).

Wings of souls lost, iv. 3.7 (27-399).

Wings, souls lose them when falling, iv. 8.1 (6-120); i. 8.14 (51-1161).

Wisdom and prudence, first are types; become virtues by contemplation of soul, i. 2.7 (19-267).

Wisdom derived from intelligence, and ultimately from good, v. 9.2 (5-104).

Wisdom does not imply reasoning and memory, iv. 4.12 (28-456).

Wisdom, established by spiritual preponderance, i. 4.14 (46-1037).

Wisdom, highest, nature lowest in world-soul's wisdom, iv. 4.12 (28-458).

Wisdom, intelligible, last stage of soul-progress, v. 8.10 (31-567).

Wisdom is very being, v. 8.5 (31-559).

Wisdom none the less happy for being unconscious, i. 4.9 (46-1032).

Wisdom of creator makes complaints grotesque, iii. 2.14 (47-1063).

Wisdom of soul alone has virtue, i. 2.6 (19-265).

Wisdom seen in divine, v. 8.10 (31-568).

Wisdom, two kinds, of soul and of intelligence, i. 2.6 (19-265).

Wisdom universal, permanent because timeless, iv. 4.11 (28-456).

Wise man, description of his methods, i. 4.14 (46-1137).

Wise man, how he escapes all enchantments, iv. 4.43 (28-507).

Wise man remains unattached, i. 4.16 (46-1039).

Wise man uses instruments only as temporary means of development, i. 4.16 (46-1040).

Wise men, two will be equally happy though in different fortunes, i. 4.15 (46-1038).

Withdrawal within yourself, i. 6.9 (1-54).

Wonderful is relation of one (qv.) to us, v. 5.8 (32-588).

Word prophoric and innate, v. 1.3 (10-177).

Word, soul as and actualization of intelligence, v. 1.3 (10-177).

Workman of the body, instrument is the soul, iv. 7.1 (2-56).

World and creator are not evil, ii. 9 (33-599).

World as eternally begotten, ii. 9.2 (33-603).

World body, why the world-soul is everywhere present in it, vi. 4.1 (22-285).

World contains traditions of divinity, ii. 9.9 (33-616).

World imperishable, so long as archetype subsists, v. 8.12 (31-572).

World intelligible, everything is actual, ii. 5.3 (25-346).

World is deity of third rank, iii. 5.6 (50-1132).

World must be studied, just as one would analyze the voice, vi. 3.1 (44-933).

World not evil because of our sufferings, ii. 9.4 (33-606).

World not to be blamed for imperfections, iii. 2.3 (47-1046).

World, nothing more beautiful could be imagined, ii. 9.4 (33-606).

World, objective, subsists, even when we are distracted, v. 1.12 (10-191).

World, outside our world would not be visible, iv. 5.8 (29-529).

World penetrating by intelligence that remains unmoved, vi. 5.11 (23-328).

World planned by God, refuted, v. 8.7 (31-561).

World sense and intelligible, are they separate or classifiable together, vi. 1.12 (42-860).

World-soul activity, when measured is time, iii. 7.10 (45-1005).

World-soul and human soul, differences between, ii. 9.7 (33-612).

World-soul and individual souls born from intelligence, vi. 2.22 (43-929).

World-soul and star soul, intellectual differences, iv. 4.17 (28-463).

World-soul and stars are impassible, iv. 4.42 (28-506).

World-soul animated by universe, iv. 3.9 (27-404).

World-soul basis of existence of bodies, iv. 7.3 (2-60).

World-soul begotten from intelligence by unity and universality, v. 1.2 (10-175).

World-soul creates, because nearest the intelligible, iv. 3.6 (27-397).

World-soul creative, not preservative, ii. 3.16 (52-1183).

World-soul contains universe as sea the net, iv. 3.9 (27-405).

World-soul could not have gone through creation drama, ii. 9.4 (33-605).

World-soul does not remember God, continuing to see him, iv. 4.7 (28-449).

World-soul, earth can feel as well as stars, iv. 4.22 (28-471).

World-soul exerts influence apart from astrology and deviltry, iv. 4.32 (28-490).

World-soul glorifies man as life transfigures matter, v. 1.2 (10-176).

World-soul has no ratiocination, iv. 4.11 (28-455).

World-soul, how idea of it is reached, ii. 9.17 (33-633).

World-soul, in it, wisdom is the lowest and nature the highest, iv. 4.12 (28-458).

World-soul inferior, ii. 2.3 (14-233).

World-soul informs all things progressively, iv. 3.10 (27-406).

World-soul is to time what intelligence is to eternity, iii. 7.10 (45-1007).

World-soul, length of its life is time, iii. 7.11 (45-1008).

World-soul mediation, through it are benefits granted to men, iv. 4.30 (28-486).

World-soul, nature of, i. 8.2 (51-1144).

World-soul participates to create world only by contemplation, and is undisturbed thereby, iv. 8.7 (6-131).

World-soul, Plato is in doubt about its being like the stars, iv. 4.22 (28-470).

World-soul procession, iii. 8.5 (30-537).

World-soul procession results in space, iii. 7.10 (45-1006).

World-soul remains in the intelligible, iii. 9.3 (13-223).

World-soul simultaneously gives and receives as untroubled medium, iv. 8.7 (6-131).

World-soul unconscious of our changes, iv. 4.7 (28-450).

World-soul unconscious of what goes on in it, iii. 4.4 (15-237).

World-soul, why it is everywhere entirely in the world body, vi. 4 (22-285).

World-souls and individual souls inseparable, because of functions, iv. 3.2 (27-392).

World-soul's creation of world is cause of divinity of souls, v. 1.2 (10-175).

World-soul's existence, basis of that of simple bodies, iv. 7.2 (2-57).

World, this is the best of all possible, because we can achieve virtue, ii. 9.8 (33-615).

World, to be in it but not of it, i. 8.6 (51-1150).

World's testimony to its creator, iii. 2.3 (47-1047).

Zodiac, ii. 3.3 (52-1165).

Plotinos, his Life, Times and Philosophy

By _Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie_, _A. M._, Harvard, _Ph. D._, Tulane.

This is a lucid, scholarly systematization of the views of Plotinos, giving translation of important and useful passages. It is preceded by a careful indication and exposition of his formative influences, and a full biography dealing with his supposed obligations to Christianity. Accurate references are given for every statement and quotation. The exposition of, and references on Hermetic philosophy are by themselves worth the price of the book.

Dr _Harris_, U.S. Commissioner of Education has written about it in the highest terms. Dr. _Paul Carus_, Editor of the _Open Court_, devoted half a page of the July 1897 issue to an appreciative and commendatory Review of it. Among the many other strong commendations of the work are the following:

From _G. R. S. Mead_, Editor _The Theosophical Review_, London:

It may be stated, on the basis of a fairly wide knowledge of the subject, that the summary of our anonymous author is the CLEAREST and MOST INTELLIGENT which has as yet appeared. The writer bases himself upon the original text, and his happy phrasing of Platonic terms and his deep sympathy with Platonic thought proclaim the presence of a capable translator of Plotinos amongst us....

To make so lucid and capable a compendium of the works of so great a giant of philosophy as Plotinos, the author must have spent much time in analysing the text and satisfying himself as to the meaning of many obscure passages; to test his absolute accuracy would require the verification of every reference among the hundreds given in the tables at the end of the pamphlet, and we have only had time to verify one or two of the more striking. These are as accurate as anything in a digest can rightly be expected to be. In addition to the detailed chapters on the seven realms of the Plotinic philosophy, on reincarnation, ethics, and æsthetics, we have introductory chapters on Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and Emanationism, and on the relationship of Plotinos to Christianity and Paganism.

Those who desire to enter into the Plotinian precincts of the temple of Greek philosophy by the most expeditious path CANNOT do BETTER than take this little pamphlet for their guide; it is of course not perfect, but it is undeniably THE BEST which has yet appeared. We have recommended the T.P.S. to procure a supply of this pamphlet, for to our Platonic friends and colleagues we say not only YOU SHOULD, but YOU MUST read it.

HUMAN BROTHERHOOD, NOV. 1897, in a very extended and most commendatory review, says: TOO GREAT PRAISE COULD HARDLY BE BESTOWED upon this scholarly contribution to Platonic literature.

_Net price, cloth bound, post-paid, $1.31._

Transcriber's Notes:

Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this four-volume set; otherwise they were not changed.

Simple typographical errors were corrected. Inconsistent capitalization has not been changed.

Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.

Infrequent spelling of "Plotinus" changed to the predominant "Plotinos."

Several opening or closing parentheses and quotation marks are unmatched; Transcriber has not attempted to determine where they belong.

Page 1030: The opening parenthesis in "(Nor would he be troubled if the members" either has no match or shares one with a subordinate phrase. Such "sharing" occurs elsewhere in this four-volume set.

Page 1059: "(the former for their ferocity," has no matching closing parenthesis.

Page 1188, footnote 268 (originally 71): The opening parenthesis in "(the principal power of the soul," has no match, or shares one with a subordinate phrase.

Page 1218: The opening quotation mark just before 'He who possesses the virtues' has no matching closing quotation mark.

Page 1262: The opening quotation mark just before 'The intelligible is of a nature' has no matching closing quotation mark.

Page 1265: The opening quotation mark just before 'be in relation with a place,' has no matching closing quotation mark.

Page 1318: The opening quotation mark just before 'Being and Essence;' has no matching closing quotation mark.

Page 1327: The first few lines were misprinted, with the sub-heading "IMPORTANCE IN THE PAST." in the middle of the first paragraph and part of a word missing from that paragraph. This eBook attempts to correct that.

Concordance Issues:

Entries in the Concordance have not been systematically checked for accuracy; some errors have been corrected, but others probably remain. Detected errors are noted below.

Page ii: "Alone with the alone... 1-550" corrected to 1-50.

Page v: "Beauty consists in kinship to the soul... 1.42." corrected to 1-42.

Page vi: "Being and actualization... 30-784" corrected to 39-784.

Page viii: "Castration", second reference, "v. 8.13 (31-573)." does not belong here.

Page xvii: "Effusion", last word "reation" could be "reaction" or "reason".

Page xxix: "Incorporeality of soul proved by its... 2.72." corrected to 2-72.

Page xxxii: "Intelligence's existence proved... 50-104." corrected to 5-104.

Page xxxiv: "Judgment of one part by another... 52-472." corrected to 52-1172.

Page lviii: ""Somewhat," a particle to modify... 31-797" corrected to 39-797.

Page lviii: "Soul and relation with God", reference to "i." was misprinted as "ii."

Page lviii: "Soul conforms destiny to her character... 53-238." corrected to 15-238.

Page lx: "Soul split into three" has no reference.

Page lxii: "Spectator of vision becomes participator... 34-569" corrected to 31-569.

Page lxii: "Stars are they animate?" has no reference.

Page lxii: "Stars are they inanimate?" has no reference.

Page lxiv: "Supreme intelligence, nature of... 51-144." corrected to 51-1144.

Page lxviii: "Unity, contained in sense objects... 24-671" corrected to 34-671.

Page lxxii: "We and ours, psychological names of soul" was missing part of reference; reconstructed by Transcriber based on page reference.

Footnote Issues:

In these notes, "anchor" means the reference to a footnote, and "footnote" means the information to which the anchor refers. Anchors occur within the main text, while footnotes are grouped in sequence at the end of this eBook. The structure of the original book required some exceptions to this, as explained below.

The original text used chapter endnotes. In this eBook, they have been combined into a single, ascending sequence based on the sequence in which the footnotes (not the anchors) occurred in the original book, and placed at the end of the main text, just before the Concordance.

Four kinds of irregularities occurred in the footnotes:

1. Some footnotes are referenced by more than one anchor, so two or more anchors may refer to the same footnote.

2. Some anchors were out of sequence, apparently because they were added afterwards or because they are share a footnote with another anchor. They have been renumbered to match the numbers of the footnotes to which they refer.

3. Some footnotes have no anchors. These are noted below.

4. One footnote was misprinted beyond repair, and the next three footnotes were missing. These are noted below.

Page 1076: Footnote 61 (originally 42) has no anchor; the missing anchor would be in page range 1062-1064.

Page 1121: Footnote 100 (originally 4) has no anchor; the missing anchor would be in page range 1091-1093.

Page 1121: Footnote 103 (originally 7) has no anchor; the missing anchor would be in page range 1094-1097. Anchor 99 (originally 3) on page 1094 could be the missing anchor, as that number also is used on page 1091.

Page 1188: Footnote 210 (originally 13) has no anchor; the missing anchor would be on page 1171 or 1172.

Page 1189: Footnote 226 (originally 29) has no anchor; the missing anchor would be on page 1174 or 1175.

Page 1253: Footnote 329 (originally 9) has no anchor; the missing anchor would be in page range 1219-1226.

Page 1287: Footnote 469 (originally 98) has no anchor; the missing anchor would be on page 1287.

Page 1313: Chapter number is "VII." but there is no earlier "VI."

Page 1333: Footnote 758 (originally 21) appears to be misprinted, and the next three footnotes 759-761 (originally 22-24) are missing.