Part 27

How could it ever be considered pious to claim that divine Providence does not extend to sense-objects, or at least interests itself only in some of them (the spiritual men, not the psychical)? Such an assertion must surely be illogical. The (Gnostics) claim that divine Providence interests itself only in them. Was this the case while they were living on high, or only since they live here below? In the first case, why did they descend onto this earth? In the second, why do they remain here below? Besides, why should the Divinity not be present here below also? Otherwise how could He know that the (Gnostics), who are here below, have not forgotten Him, and have not become perverse? If He know those that have not become perverse, He must also know those who have become perverse, to distinguish the former from the latter. He must therefore be present to all men, and to the entire world, in some manner or other. Thus the world will participate in the Divinity. If the Divinity deprived the world of His presence, He would deprive you also thereof, and you could not say anything of Him or of the beings below Him. The world certainly derives its existence from Him whether the divinity protect you by His providence or His help, and whatever be the name by which you refer to Him. The world never was deprived of the Divinity, and never will be. The world has a better right than any individuals to the attentions of Providence, and to participation in divine perfections. This is particularly true in respect to the universal Soul, as is proved by the existence and wise arrangement of the world. Which of these so proud individuals is as well arranged, and as wise as the universe, and could even enter into such a comparison without ridicule or absurdity? Indeed, unless made merely in the course of a discussion, such a comparison is really an impiety. To doubt such truths is really the characteristic of a blind and senseless man, without experience or reason, and who is so far removed from knowledge of the intelligible world that he does not even know the sense-world? Could any musician who had once grasped the intelligible harmonies hear that of sense-sounds without profound emotion? What skilful geometrician or arithmetician will fail to enjoy symmetry, order and proportion, in the objects that meet his view? Though their eyes behold the same objects as common people, experts see in them different things; when, for instance, with practiced glance, they examine some picture. When recognizing in sense-objects an image of intelligible (essence), they are disturbed and reminded of genuine beauty: that is the origin of love.[378] One rises to the intelligible by seeing a shining image of beauty glowing in a human face. Heavy and senseless must be that mind which could contemplate all the visible beauties, this harmony, and this imposing arrangement, this grand panoramic view furnished by the stars in spite of their distance, without being stirred to enthusiasm, and admiration of their splendor and magnificence. He who can fail to experience such feelings must have failed to observe sense-objects, or know even less the intelligible world.

GNOSTICS JUSTIFY THEIR HATE OF THE BODY BY PLATO; IN THIS CASE THEY SHOULD FOLLOW HIM ALSO IN ADMIRATION OF THE WORLD.

17. Some (Gnostics) object that they hate the body because Plato[379] complains much of it, as an obstacle to the soul, and as something far inferior to her. In this case, they should, making abstraction of the body of the world by thought, consider the rest; that is, the intelligible sphere which contains within it the form of the world, and then the incorporeal souls which, in perfect order, communicate greatness to matter by modeling it in space according to an intelligible model, so that what is begotten might, so far as possible, by its greatness, equal the indivisible nature of its model; for the greatness of sense-mass here below corresponds to the greatness of intelligible power. Let the (Gnostics) therefore consider the celestial sphere, whether they conceive of it as set in motion by the divine power that contains its principle, middle and end, or whether they imagine it as immovable, and not yet exerting its action on any of the things it governs by its revolution. In both ways they will attain a proper idea of the Soul that presides over this universe. Let them then conceive of this soul as united to a body, though remaining impassible, and still communicating to this body so far as the latter is capable of participating therein,[380] some of its perfections, for the divinity is incapable of jealousy.[381] Then they will form a proper idea of the world. They will understand how great is the power of the Soul, since she makes the body participate in her beauty to the limit of her receptivity. This body has no beauty by nature, but when (it is beautified by the Soul) it entrances divine souls.

GNOSTICS BOAST OF LACK OF APPRECIATION OF BEAUTY ALREADY RECOGNIZED.

The (Gnostics) pretend that they have no appreciation for the beauty of the world, and that they make no distinction between beautiful and ugly bodies. In this case they should not distinguish good from bad taste, nor recognize beauty in the sciences, in contemplation, nor in the divinity itself; for sense-beings possess beauty only by participation in first principles. If they be not beautiful, neither could those first principles be such. Consequently sense-beings are beautiful, though less beautiful than intelligible beings. The scorn professed by (Gnostics) for sense-beauty is praiseworthy enough if it refer only to the beauty of women and of young boys, and if its only purpose be to lead to chastity. But you may be sure that they do not boast of scorning what is ugly, they only boast of scorning what they had at first recognized and loved as being beautiful.

EVEN EXTERIOR OR PARTIAL BEAUTY NEED NOT CONFLICT WITH THE BEAUTY OF THE UNIVERSE; AND IN ANY CASE THERE WOULD BE NO EVIL IN IT.

We must further observe that it is not the same beauty that is seen in the parts and in the whole, in individuals and in the universe; that there are beauties great enough in sense-objects and in individuals, for instance, in the guardians, to lead us to admire their creator, and to prove to us that they indeed are works of his. In this way we may attain a conception of the unspeakable beauty of the universal Soul, if we do not attach ourselves to sense-objects, and if, without scorning them, we know how to rise to intelligible entities. If the interior of a sense-being be beautiful, we shall judge that it is in harmony with its exterior beauty. If it be ugly we will consider that it is inferior to its principle. But it is impossible for a being really to be beautiful in its exterior while ugly within; for the exterior is beautiful only in so far as it is dominated by the interior.[382] Those who are called beautiful, but who are ugly within, are externally beautiful only deceptively. In contradiction to those who claim that there are men who possess a beautiful body and an ugly soul, I insist that such never existed, and that it was a mistake to consider them beautiful. If such men were ever seen, their interior ugliness was accidental, and also their soul was, by nature, beautiful; for we often meet here below obstacles which hinder us from reaching our goal. But the universe cannot by any obstacle be hindered from possessing interior beauty in the same way that it possesses exterior beauty. The beings to whom nature has not, from the beginning, given perfection, may indeed not attain their goal, and consequently may become perverted; but the universe never was a child, nor imperfect; it did not develop, and received no physical increase. Such a physical increase would have been impossible inasmuch as it already possessed everything. Nor could we admit that its Soul had ever, in the course of time, gained any increase. But even if this were granted to the (Gnostics), this could not constitute any evil.

RECOGNITION OF THE BEAUTY OF THE BODY NEED NOT IMPLY ATTACHMENT THERETO; IT IS COMPATIBLE WITH RESIGNATION.

18. (Gnostics) however might object that their doctrine inspired revulsion from, and hate for the body, while (that of Plotinos) really attached the soul to the body (by recognition of its beauty). Hardly. We may illustrate by two guests who dwelt together in a beautiful house. The first guest blamed the disposition of the plan, and the architect who constructed it, but nevertheless remained within it. The other guest, instead of blaming the architect, praised his skill, and awaited the time when he might leave this house, when he should no longer need it. The first guest would think himself wiser and better prepared to leave because he had learned to repeat that walls are composed of lifeless stones and beams, and that this house was far from truly representing the intelligible house. He would however not know that the only difference obtaining between him and his companion, is that he did not know how to support necessary things, while his companion (who did not blame the house) will be able to leave it without regret because he loved stone-buildings only very moderately. So long as we have a body we have to abide in these houses constructed by the (world) Soul, who is our beneficent sister, and who had the power to do such great things without any effort.[383]

GNOSTICS ACKNOWLEDGE KINSHIP WITH DEPRAVED MEN, BUT REFUSE IT TO THE BEAUTIFUL UNIVERSE, OF WHICH WE SHOULD BE FAR PROUDER.

The Gnostics do not hesitate to call the most abandoned men their "brothers," but refuse this name to the sun, and the other deities of heaven, and to the very Soul of the world, fools that they are! Doubtless, to unite ourselves thus to the stars by the bonds of kindred, we must no longer be perverse, we must have become good, and instead of being bodies, we must be souls in these bodies; and, so far as possible, we must dwell within our bodies in the same manner as the universal Soul dwells within the body of the universe. To do this, one has to be firm, not allow oneself to be charmed by the pleasures of sight or hearing, and to remain untroubled by any reverse. The Soul of the world is not troubled by anything, because she is outside of the reach of all. We, however, who here below are exposed to the blows of fortune, must repel them by our virtue, weakening some, and foiling others by our constancy and greatness of soul.[384] When we shall thus have approached this power which is out of the reach (of all exigencies), having approached the Soul of the universe and of the stars, we shall try to become her image, and even to increase this resemblance to the assimilation of fusion. Then, having been well disposed by nature and exercised, we also will contemplate what these souls have been contemplating since the beginning. We must also remember that the boast of some men that they alone have the privilege of contemplating the intelligible world does not mean that they really contemplate this world any more than any other men.

GNOSTICS WHO BOAST SUPERIORITY TO THE DIVINITIES WHO CANNOT LEAVE THEIR BODIES ARE IN REALITY IGNORANT OF THE TRUE STATE OF AFFAIRS.

Vainly also do some (Gnostics) boast of having to leave their bodies when they will have ceased to live, while this is impossible to the divinities because they always fill the same function in heaven. They speak thus only because of their ignorance of what it is to be outside of the body, and of how the universal Soul in her entirety wisely governs what is inanimate.

THE JEALOUS DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SPIRITUAL, PSYCHIC AND MATERIAL IS DUE CHIEFLY TO IGNORANCE OF OTHER PEOPLE'S ATTAINMENTS.

We ourselves may very well not love the body, we may become pure, scorn death, and both recognize and follow spiritual things that are superior to earthly things. But on this account we should not be jealous of other men, who are not only capable of following the same goal, but who do constantly pursue it. Let us not insist that they are incapable of doing so. Let us not fall into the same error as those who deny the movement of the stars, because their senses show them to remain immovable. Let us not act as do the (Gnostics), who believe that the nature of the stars does not see what is external, because they themselves do not see that their own souls are outside.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] A Stoic term.

[2] As says Parmenides, verse 80.

[3] Cicero, Tusc. i. 16; Nat. Deor. i. 1; Maxim. Tyr. xvii. 5.

[4] As wastage, see 6.4, 10; as Numenius might have said in 12, 22.

[5] As said Numenius fr. 46.

[6] See Plato's Timaeus 37.

[7] Od. xvii. 486.

[8] See v. 3.5, 6.

[9] See v. 3.10.

[10] See v. 3.8, 9.

[11] See v. 3.12-17.

[12] See v. 5.13.

[13] See ii. 1.2.

[14] ii 1.1.

[15] Aristotle, Met. v. 4.

[16] Aristotle, Met. xii. 2.

[17] Aristotle, Met. vii. 8.

[18] Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 5.

[19] Aristotle, Met. xii. 5.

[20] Aristotle, Met. ix. 8.

[21] Aristotle, Met. ix. 5.

[22] That is, their producing potentiality, and not the potentiality of becoming these things, as thought Aristotle. Met. ix. 2.

[23] As thought Aristotle, Soul, iii. 7; Met. xii.

[24] By Plato in the Timaeus 52.

[25] See iv. 6. A polemic against Aristotle, de Anima ii. 5, and the Stoics, Cleanthes, Sextus Empiricus, adv. Math. vii. 288, and Chrysippus, Diog. Laert. vii. 50.

[26] As thought Chrysippus, Diog. Laert. vii. 111.

[27] See iv. 6.

[28] See vi. 6.16.

[29] See ii. 6.2.

[30] Plato, in his Phaedo 127.

[31] See i. 2.1.

[32] See i. 2.1, the Socratic definition.

[33] See i. 1.2.4.

[34] See ii. 5.2.

[35] See i. 2.4.

[36] A term of Stoic psychology.

[37] See i. 2.4.

[38] These are the so-called "passions" of the Stoic Chrysippus, Diog. Laert. vii. 111.

[39] Of the Stoic contention, Tert. de Anima, 5.

[40] See i. 1.13.

[41] As was taught by Cleanthes, Sext. Empir. adv. Math. vii. 288.

[42] See iii. 6.3.

[43] Or, "affections," as we shall in the future call them, in English.

[44] See i. 8.15.

[45] Or, blindly, see iii. 8.1-3; iv. 4.13, 14.

[46] See iii. 6.3, and i. 1.13.

[47] See iii. 6.6.

[48] See i. 4.8.

[49] Notice this Numenian name for the divinity used at the beginning of the Escoreal Numenius fragment.

[50] See iii. 8.9.

[51] As Plato asked in his Sophist 246; Cxi. 252.

[52] As thought Philo in Leg. Alleg. i.

[53] See ii. 4.15.

[54] See ii. 5.3-5.

[55] See vi. 2.

[56] See ii. 4.11.

[57] As thought Plato in the Timaeus 49-52.

[58] See ii. 5.5.

[59] de Gen. et Corr. ii. 2, 3.

[60] As objected Aristotle, in de Gen. et Corr. i. 7.

[61] See ii. 7.1.

[62] iii. 6.2.

[63] As asked Aristotle, de Gen. i. 7.

[64] In his Timaeus 50.

[65] See iii 6.12, 13.

[66] In his Timaeus 51.

[67] See ii. 4.11.

[68] In his Timaeus 51.

[69] In his Timaeus 49.

[70] See iii. 6.11.

[71] As said Plato, in his Timaeus 52.

[72] See ii. 8.14.

[73] See iii. 5.9.

[74] The myth of Pandora, see iv. 3.14.

[75] See iii. 6.4.

[76] See iii. 6.5, 6.

[77] By a "bastard" reasoning," see ii. 4.10.

[78] See ii. 4.9-12.

[79] See iii. 6.12.

[80] See ii. 7.2.

[81] See iii. 6.13.

[82] See ii. 4.8.

[83] See ii. 6.3.

[84] See ii. 4.5.

[85] See iii. 4.6.

[86] It would create the magnitude that exists in matter; that is, apparent magnitude.

[87] ii. 4.11; against Moderatus of Gades.

[88] See ii. 4.11.

[89] See iv. 6.3.

[90] See ii. 4.12.

[91] That is, intelligible "being."

[92] See iii. 6.8.

[93] See ii. 7.1.

[94] As was suggested by Plato in the Timaeus 49-52.

[95] As was suggested by Herodotus, ii. 51, and Cicero, de Nat. Deor. iii. 22.

[96] That is, Cybele, see v. 1.7.

[97] The Stoics.

[98] We have here another internal proof of the rightness of our present chronological order of Plotinos's Enneads. The myth of Pandora occurs in iv. 3.14, which follows this book.

[99] Against the Manicheans.

[100] See vi. 7.41.

[101] See i. 1.13.

[102] In that port of the Philebus, 29; C ii. 345.

[103] As thought Plato, in the Phaedrus, 246-248.

[104] As was taught by the Manicheans.

[105] As thought Cicero, Tusculans, i. 20; and Aristotle, de Anima, iii. 1-3.

[106] See ii. 9.18.

[107] 42; 69.

[108] 264; C vi. 48.

[109] Rep. x. C 287.

[110] See iv. 3.7.

[111] See iv. 3.6.

[112] See iv. 3.6.

[113] Generative.

[114] See iii. 2.16.

[115] In the sense that it has no limits.

[116] See iv. 3.15.

[117] As thought Xenocrates and Aristotle, de Coelo, i. 10.

[118] See iv. 3.10.

[119] Philo, de Sommis, M 648, de Monarchia, M 217.

[120] See iii. 6.16, 17.

[121] As said Numenius, fr. 32.

[122] As did Discord, in Homer's Iliad, iv. 443.

[123] See ii. 9.7.

[124] See v. 7.1.

[125] See ii. 3.7.

[126] Plato, Rep. x. C 617; C x. 286.

[127] See iv. 4, 24, 40, 43; iv. 9.3.

[128] As was taught by Himerius; see also Plutarch and Themistius.

[129] As Numenius said, fr. 26.3.

[130] In his Timaeus, 35.

[131] As said Numenius, fr. 32.

[132] See Aristotle, Plato's Critias, Numenius, 32, and Proclus.

[133] As thought Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 1.4.

[134] In his Timaeus, 34; 30.

[135] Plato does just the opposite.

[136] Being the power which directs the animal from above, see i. 1.7.

[137] As thought Plato in the Timaeus, 73.

[138] iv. 3.13.

[139] As thought Plato in the Menexenus, 248.

[140] As Aristotle asked, de Memoria et Remin. 1.

[141] See i. 1.11.

[142] Plato, Philebus, C ii. 359.

[143] As thought Plato, in the Philebus, C ii. 357.

[144] As thought Plato in his Philebus, C ii. 363.

[145] See i. 1.12; iv. 3.32; the irrational soul, which is an image of the rational soul, is plunged in the darkness of sense-life.

[146] As thought Plato in his Philebus, C ii. 359.

[147] In iv. 3.27.

[148] As thought Aristotle, de Mem. 1.

[149] As thought Aristotle.

[150] As thought Aristotle.

[151] See i. 4.10.

[152] As Numenius said, fr. 32.

[153] Another reading is: "All perceptions belong to forms which can reduce to all things." But this does not connect with the next sentence.

[154] According to Plato Phaedrus, 246; C vi. 40, and Philebus, 30; C ii. 347.

[155] Timaeus, 33.

[156] A pun on "schêma" and "schêsis."

[157] As thought Aristotle, de Gen. et Corr. ii. 2-8.

[158] Rep. x. 617; C x. 287; see 2.3.9.

[159] Rep. x.

[160] According to Aristotle.

[161] iv. 4.23.

[162] Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 7.

[163] See section 5.

[164] As thought Aristotle, de Anim. ii. 7.

[165] As Plato pointed out in his Meno, 80.

[166] As Plato teaches.

[167] A mistaken notion of Plato's, then common; see Matth. 6.23.

[168] Diog. Laert. vii. 157.

[169] Section 8.

[170] Section 2.

[171] Section 6.

[172] This Stoic theory is set forth by Diogenes Laertes in vii. 157.

[173] As thought Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 8.

[174] As Aristotle again thought.

[175] As thought Aristotle, de Gener. Anim. v. 1.

[176] See iv. 4.29.

[177] This book sounds more Numenian or Amelian, than the former three, which seem to have been written to answer questions of Porphyry's.

[178] See section 1-7.

[179] As thought Aristotle in his Physics, viii.

[180] iv. 3.10.

[181] See ii. 3.13.

[182] iii. 6.6.

[183] Children, whose minds are still weak, and cannot understand the theories of speculative sciences exhibited by Nic. Eth. x. 7.

[184] This upper part of the universal Soul is the principal power of the soul; see ii. 3.17.

[185] See ii. 3.18.

[186] In his Phaedrus, 272, Cary, 75.

[187] That is, the essence of the known object, a pun on "reason," as in ii. 6.2.

[188] see iv. 6.3.

[189] Which is the visible form; see iii. 8.1.

[190] As thought Plato, Banquet, Cary, 31, and Aristotle in Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 4.

[191] This sounds as if it were a quotation from Numenius, though it does not appear in the latter's fragments.

[192] See i. 8.2.

[193] See v. 1.4.

[194] See iii. 7.2.

[195] See iii. 7.10.

[196] Notice the connection between this thought and ii. 5, written in the same period of his life; see vi. 8.18.

[197] See iii. 3.7 and vi. 8.15.

[198] That is, the intelligible matter of ii. 4.3.

[199] As thought Aristotle, in Nic. Eth. i. 7; de Anima, ii. 1.

[200] See vi. 8.16.

[201] vi. 8.15.

[202] A pun on "koros," meaning both fulness and son.

[203] Another proof of the chronological order; see 3.8.9.

[204] Cicero, Orator 2; Seneca, Controversiae v. 36.

[205] ii. 8.1.

[206] See i. 6.8.

[207] i. 6.2.

[208] i. 6.9.

[209] i. 6.8.

[210] i. 6.2.

[211] i. 6.6.

[212] i. 6.5.

[213] iii. 5.6.

[214] As thought Plato, in Phaedrus, Cary, 58.

[215] Phaedrus, Cary, 59, 62; Numenius, 32.

[216] See ii. 2.1.

[217] In Sophocles Oedipus Coloneus, 1375; a pun on "dü" and "dikên."

[218] A pun between "science" and "knowledge."

[219] In his Phaedrus; Cary, 58.

[220] See v. 1.8.

[221] See iv. 4.11, 12.

[222] A pun on the word meaning "forms" and "statues," mentioned above.

[223] Such as Numenius fr. 20.

[224] Pun on "agalmata," which has already done duty for "statues" and "forms."

[225] Here Plotinos refers to the hieratic writing, which differed from both the hieroglyphic and demotic.

[226] See iii. 2 and 3.

[227] See ii. 9.12; iii. 2.1.

[228] In his Phaedrus, 246; Cary, 55.

[229] As was taught by Cleomedes, Meteora viii, and Ptolemy, Almagest i, Geogr. i. 7; vii. 5.

[230] See i. 6.9.

[231] In his Timaeus, 37; Cary, c. 14.

[232] See i. 3.2; i. 6.8.

[233] Referring to the Gnostics; see ii. 9.17; this is another proof of the chronological order.

[234] As proposed in ii. 9.17.

[235] See i. 8.15.

[236] As thought Plato in his Phaedrus; Cary, 56.

[237] The "infra-celestial vault," of Theodor of Asine.

[238] As said Plato, in his Phaedrus; Cary, 59.

[239] See v. 1.6.

[240] Gnostics.

[241] Pun on "koros," fulness, or son.

[242] Or, being satiated with good things.

[243] See Life of Plotinos, 18. Notice how well the chronological order works out. The former book (31) and the next (33) treat of the Gnostics, while this book treats of the philosophical principle of their practical aspect. Besides, it explains the Amelio-Porphyrian quarrel. Like all other difficulties of the time, it was about Gnosticism, and Amelius's dismissal meant that Plotinos rejected Egyptian Gnosticism, and Numenius's true position as a dualist stands revealed; but after Porphyry's departure, Plotinos harked back to it.

[244] We see here an assertion of the standpoint later asserted by Berkeley, Kant and Hegel that the mind cannot go outside itself, and that consequently it is the measure of all things. Kant's "thing-in-itself," a deduction from this, was already discovered by Plotinos in the result of the "bastard reasoning" process, which Hegel called "dialectic."

[245] See iii. 6.1.

[246] The Kantian "thing-in-itself." See Porphyry, Principles of Intelligibles, 33.

[247] See iii. 6.1.

[248] Here is a pun based on "doxa."

[249] "Paradechomenê."

[250] "Doxa," which is derived from "dechesthai," to receive.

[251] We would, in other words, become pessimists.

[252] This is Philo's secondary divinity, p. 27, Guthrie's "Message of Philo Judaeus."

[253] That is, of the Intelligence and of the intelligible entities.

[254] Who is the Unity; a Numenian conception, fr. 36.

[255] A term reminiscent of the famous Christian Nicene formulation.

[256] That is we will form a "pair." Numenius, 14, also taught the Pythagorean "pair or doubleness."

[257] See vi. 6.16.

[258] Pun between essences, "einai," and one, or "henos."

[259] "Ousia."

[260] Notice the two words for "essence." Plato Cratylus, 424; Cary, 87.

[261] As Plato in his Cratylus suggests.

[262] Or, essence.

[263] Or, essence, to be.

[264] Being.

[265] The goddess Hestia in Greek, or Vesta in Latin; but "hestia" also meant a "stand." P. 401, Cratylus, Cary, 40.

[266] See Numenius, 67, 42.

[267] See ii. 9.1; iii. 9.9.

[268] Such as Numenius, 42, and Plutarch, de Isis et Osiris, Fr. Tr. 381.

[269] From "a-polus."

[270] See i. 6.4; iii. 5.1.

[271] See v. 5.1.