Part 2

M. Boeckh's words are:--"Es kommt nur darauf an, dass er ein Werk, eine Wirkung, hervorbringt oder zu einer Wirkung beiträgt, die ohne ihn nicht wäre: dann ist er durch seine Wirksamkeit ein Werkmeister der Sache, sey es auch ohne active Thätigkeit, durch bloss passiven Widerstand, der auch eine mächtige Kraft-äusserung ist. Die Erde ist Werkmeisterin der Nacht und des Tages, wie Martin (b. ii. p. 88) sehr treffend sagt 'par son énergique existence, c'est à dire, par son immobilité même:' denn sie setzt der täglichen Bewegung des Himmels beständig eine gleiche Kraft in entgegengesetzter Richtung entgegen. So _muss_ nach dem Zusammenhange ausgelegt werden: so meint es Platon klar und ohne Verhüllungen: denn wenige Zeilen vorher hat er gesagt, Nacht und Tag, das heisst ein Sterntag oder Zeittag, sei ein Umlauf des Kreises des Selbigen--_das ist, eine tägliche Umkreisung des Himmels von Osten nach Westen, wodurch also die Erde in Stillstand versetzt ist:_ und diese tägliche Bewegung des Himmels hat er im vorhergehenden immer und immer gelehrt." . . . . "Indem Platon die Erde nennt [Greek: ei(lome/nên], nicht [Greek: peri\ to\n e(autê=s po/lon], sondern [Greek: peri\ to\n dia\ panto\s po/lon tetame/non], setzt er also die tägliche Bewegung des Himmels voraus" (p. 70-71).[2]

[Footnote 2: "We are only required to show, that the Earth produces a work or an effect,--or contributes to an effect which would not exist without such help: the Earth is then, through such operation, an _Artificer_ of what is produced, even without any positive activity, by its simply passive resistance, which indeed is in itself a powerful exercise of force.** The Earth is Artificer of night and day, according to the striking expression of Martin, 'par son énergique existence, c'est-à-dire, par son immobilité même:' for the Earth opposes, to the diurnal movement of the Heavens, a constant and equal force in the opposite direction. This explanation _must_ be the true one required by the context: this is Plato's meaning, plainly and without disguise: for he has said, a few lines before, that Night and Day (that is, a sidereal day, or day of time) is a diurnal revolution of the Heaven from East to West, whereby accordingly the Earth is assumed as at rest: And this diurnal movement of the Heaven he has taught over and over again in the preceding part of his discourse."--"Since therefore Plato calls the Earth [Greek: ei(lome/nên], not [Greek: peri\ to\n e(autê=s po/lon], but [Greek: peri\ to\n dia\ panto\s po/lon tetame/non], he implies thereby the diurnal movement of the Heaven."]

I not only admit but put it in the front of my own case, that Plato in the Timæus assumes the diurnal movement of the celestial sphere; but I contend that he also assumes the diurnal rotation of the earth. M. Boeckh founds his contrary interpretation upon the unquestionable truth that these two assumptions are inconsistent; and upon the inference that because the two cannot stand together in fact, therefore they cannot have stood together in the mind of Plato. In that inference I have already stated that I cannot acquiesce.

But while M. Boeckh takes so much pains to vindicate Plato from one contradiction, he unconsciously involves Plato in another contradiction, for which, in my judgment, there is no foundation whatever. M. Boeckh affirms that the function of the earth (in the Platonic Timæus) is to put forth a great force of passive resistance--"to oppose constantly, against the diurnal movement of the heavens, an equal force in an opposite direction." Is it not plain, upon this supposition, that the kosmos would come to a standstill, and that its rotation would cease altogether? As the earth is packed close or fastened round the cosmical axis, so, if the axis endeavours to revolve with a given force, and the earth resists with equal force, the effect will be that the two forces will destroy one another, and that neither the earth nor the axis will move at all. There would be the same nullifying antagonism as if,--reverting to the analogous case of the spindle and the verticilli (already alluded to) in the tenth book of the Republic,--as if, while Ananké turned the spindle with a given force in one direction, Klotho (instead of lending assistance) were to apply her hand to the outermost verticillus with equal force of resistance in the opposite direction (see Reipubl. x. p. 617 D). It is plain that the spindle would never turn at all.

Here, then, is a grave contradiction attaching to the view of Boeckh and Martin as to the function of the earth. They have not, in my judgment, sufficiently investigated the manner in which Plato represents to himself the cosmical axis: nor have they fully appreciated what is affirmed or implied in the debated word [Greek: ei(lo/menon--ei(lou/menon--i)llo/menon]. That word has been explained partly by Ruhnken in his notes on Timæi Lexicon, but still more by Buttmann in his Lexilogus, so accurately and copiously as to leave nothing further wanting. I accept fully the explanation given by Buttmann, and have followed it throughout this article. After going over many other examples, Buttmann comes to consider this passage of the Platonic Timæus; and he explains the word [Greek: ei(lome/nên] or [Greek: i)llo/menên] as meaning--"_sich drängen oder gedrängt werden_ um die Axe: d. h. von allen Seiten her an die Axe. Auch lasse man sich das Praesens nicht irren: die Kräfte, welche den Weltbau machen und zusammen halten, sind als fortdauernd thätig gedacht. Die Erde drängt sich (ununterbrochen) an den Pol, _macht, bildet eine Kugel um ihn_. Welcher Gebrauch völlig entspricht dem wonach dasselbe Verbum ein _einwickeln_, _einhüllen_, bedeutet. Auch hier mengt sich in der Vorstellung einiges hinzu, was auf ein _biegen_ _winden_, und mitunter auf ein _drehen_ führt: was aber _überall nur ein durch die Sache selbst hinzutretender Begriff ist_," p. 151. And again, p. 154, he gives the result--that the word has only "die Bedeutung _drängen_, _befestigen_, nebst den davon ausgehenden--die von _drehen_, _winden_, aber ihm _gänzlich fremd_ sind, _und nur aus der Natur der Gegenstände in einigen Fällen als Nebengedanken hinzutreten_."[3]

[Footnote 3: "To _pack itself_, or to _be packed_, round the axis: that is, upon the axis from all sides. We must not be misled by the present tense: for the forces, which compose and hold together the structure of the universe, are conceived as continuously in active operation. The Earth _packs itself_, or _is packed_, on to the axis--_makes or forms a ball round the axis:_ which corresponds fully to that other usage of the word, in the sense of _wrapping up_ or _swathing round_. Here too there is a superadded something blended with the idea, which conducts us to _turning_, _winding_, and thus to _revolving_: but this is every where nothing more than an accessory notion, suggested by the circumstances of the case. The word has only the meaning, to _pack_, to _fasten_--the senses, to _wind_, to _revolve_, are altogether foreign to it, and can only be superadded as accessory ideas, in certain particular instances, by the special nature of the case."]

In these last words Buttmann has exactly distinguished the true, constant, and essential meaning of the word, from the casual accessories which become conjoined with it by the special circumstances of some peculiar cases. The constant and true meaning of the word is, _being packed or fastened close round_, _squeezing or grasping around_. The idea of _rotating_ or _revolving_ is quite foreign to this meaning, but may nevertheless become conjoined with it, in certain particular cases, by accidental circumstances.

Let us illustrate this. When I say that a body _A_ is [Greek: ei(lo/menon] or [Greek: i)llo/menon] (packed or fastened close round, squeezing or grasping around), another body _B_, I affirm nothing about revolution or rotation. This is an idea foreign to the proposition _per se_, yet capable of being annexed or implicated with it under some accidental circumstances. Whether in any particular case it be so implicated or not depends on the question "What is the nature of the body _B_, round which I affirm _A_ to be fastened?" 1. It may be an oak tree or a pillar, firmly planted and stationary. 2. It may be some other body, moving, but moving in a rectilinear direction. 3. Lastly, it may be a body rotating or intended to rotate, like a spindle, a spit, or the rolling cylinder of a machine. In the first supposition, all motion is excluded: in the second, rectilinear motion is implied, but rotatory motion is excluded: in the third, rotatory motion is implied as a certain adjunct. The body which is fastened round another, must share the motion or the rest of that other. If the body _B_ is a revolving cylinder, and if I affirm that _A_ is packed or fastened close round it, I introduce the idea of rotation; though only as an accessory and implied fact, in addition to that which the proposition affirms. The body _A_, being fastened round the cylinder _B_, must either revolve along with it and round it, or it must arrest the rotation of _B_. If the one revolves, so must the other; both must either revolve together, or stand still together. This is a new fact, distinct from what is affirmed in the proposition, yet implied in it or capable of being inferred from it through induction and experience.

Here we see exactly the position of Plato in regard to the rotation of the earth. He does not affirm it in express terms, but he affirms what implies it. For when he says that the earth is packed, or fastened close round the cosmical axis, he conveys to us by implication the knowledge of another and distinct fact--that the earth and the cosmical axis must either revolve together or remain stationary together--that the earth must either revolve along with the axis or arrest the revolutions of the axis. It is manifest that Plato does not mean the revolutions of the axis of the kosmos to be arrested: they are absolutely essential to the scheme of the Timæus--they are the grand motive-agency of the kosmos. He must, therefore, mean to imply that the earth revolves along with and around the cosmical axis. And thus the word [Greek: ei(lo/menon] or [Greek: i)llo/menon], according to Buttmann's doctrine, becomes accidentally conjoined, through the specialities of this case, with an accessory idea of rotation or revolution; though that idea is foreign to its constant and natural meaning.

Now if we turn to Aristotle, we shall find that he understood the word [Greek: ei(lo/menon] or [Greek: i)llo/menon], and the proposition of Plato, exactly in this sense. Here I am compelled to depart from Buttmann, who affirms (p. 152), with an expression of astonishment, that Aristotle misunderstood the proposition of Plato, and interpreted [Greek: ei(lo/menon] or [Greek: i)llo/menon] as if it meant directly as well as incontestably, _rotating_ or _revolving_. Proklus, in his Commentary on the Timæus, had before raised the same controversy with Aristotle--[Greek: i)llome/nên de\, tê\n sphiggome/nên dêloi= kai\ sunechome/nên ou) ga\r ô(s A)ristote/lês oi)/etai, tê\n kinoume/nên] (Procl. p. 681). Let us, therefore, examine the passages of Aristotle out of which this difficulty arises.

The passages are two, both of them in the second book De Coelo; one in cap. 13, the other in cap. 14 (p. 293 b. 30, 296 a. 25).

1. The first stands--[Greek: e)/nioi de\ kai\ keime/nên (tê\n gê=n) e)pi\ tou= ke/ntrou phasi\n au)tê\n i)/llesthai peri\ to\n dia\ panto\s tetame/non po/lon, ô(/sper e)n tô=| Timai/ô|** ge/graptai.** Such is the reading of Bekker in the Berlin edition: but he gives various readings of two different MSS.--the one having [Greek: i)/llesthai kai\ kinei=sthai]--the other ei(lei=sthai** kai\ kinei=sthai].

2. The second stands, beginning chap. 14--[Greek: ê(mei=s de\ le/gômen prô=ton po/teron] (the earth) [Greek: e)/chei ki/nêsin ê)\ me/nei; katha/per ga\r ei)/pomen, oi( me\n au)tê\n e(\n tô=n a)/strôn poiou=sin, oi( d' e)pi\** tou= me/sou the/ntes i)/llesthai kai\ kinei=shai/ phasi peri\ to\n po/lon me/son.]

Now, in the first of these two passages, where Aristotle simply brings the doctrine to view without any comment, he expressly refers to the Timæus, and therefore quotes the expression of that dialogue without any enlargement. He undoubtedly understands the affirmation of Plato--that the earth was fastened round the cosmical axis--as implying that it rotated along with the rotations of that axis. Aristotle thus construes [Greek: i)/llesthai], _in that particular proposition_ of the Timæus, as implying rotation. But he plainly did not construe [Greek: i)/llesthai] as naturally and constantly either denoting or implying rotation. This is proved by his language in the second passage, where he reproduces the very same doctrine with a view to discuss and confute it, and without special reference to the Platonic Timæus. Here we find that he is not satisfied to express the doctrine by the single word [Greek: i)/llesthai]. He subjoins another verb--[Greek: i)/llesthai kai\ kinei=sthai]: thus bringing into explicit enunciation the fact of rotatory movement, which, while [Greek: i)/llesthai] stood alone, was only known by implication and inference from the circumstances of the particular case. If he had supposed [Greek: i)/llesthai] by itself to signify _revolving_ the addition of [Greek: kinei=sthai] would have been useless, unmeaning, and even impertinent. Aristotle, as Boeckh remarks, is not given to multiply words unnecessarily.

It thus appears, when we examine the passages of Aristotle, that he understood [Greek: i)/llesthai] quite in conformity with Buttmann's explanation. Rotatory movement forms no part of the meaning of the word; yet it may accidentally, in a particular case, be implied as an adjunct of the meaning, by virtue of the special circumstances of that case. Aristotle describes the doctrine as held by _some persons_. He doubtless has in view various Platonists of his time, who adopted and defended what had been originally advanced by Plato in the Timæus.

M. Boeckh, in a discussion of some length (Untersuch. p. 76-84), maintains the opinion that the reading in the first passage of Aristotle is incorrect; that the two words [Greek: i)/llesthai kai\ kinei=sthai] ought to stand in the first as they do in the second,--as he thinks that they stood in the copy of Simplikius: that Aristotle only made reference to Plato with a view to the peculiar word [Greek: i)/llesthai], and not to the general doctrine of the rotation of the earth: that he comments upon this doctrine as held by others, but not by Plato--who (according to Boeckh) was known by everyone not to hold it. M. Boeckh gives this only as a conjecture, and I cannot regard his arguments in support of it as convincing. But even if he had convinced me that [Greek: i)/llesthai kai\ kinei=sthai] were the true reading in the first passage, as well as in the second, I should merely say that Aristotle had not thought himself precluded by the reference to the Timæus from bringing out into explicit enunciation what the Platonists whom he had in view knew to be implied and intended by the passage. This indeed is a loose mode of citation, which I shall not ascribe to Aristotle without good evidence. In the present case such evidence appears to me wanting.[4]

[Footnote 4: Exactness of citation is not always to be relied on among ancient commentators. Simplikius cites this very passage of the Timæus with more than one inaccuracy.--(ad Aristot. De Coelo, fol. 125.)]

M. Martin attributes to Aristotle something more than improper citation. He says (Êtudes sur le Timée, vol. ii. p. 87), "Si Aristote citait l'opinion de la rotation de la terre comme un titre de gloire pour Platon, je dirais--il est probable que la vérité l'y a forcé. Mais Aristote, qui admettait l'immobilité complète de la terre, attribue à Platon l'opinion contraire, _pour se donner le plaisir de la réfuter avec dédain_." A few lines before, M. Martin had said that the arguments whereby Aristotle combated this opinion ascribed to Plato were "very feeble." I am at a loss to imagine in which of Aristotle's phrases M. Martin finds any trace of disdain or contempt, either for the doctrine or for those who held it. For my part, I find none. The arguments of Aristotle against the doctrine, whatever be their probative force, are delivered in that brief, calm, dry manner which is usual with him, without a word of sentiment or rhetoric, or anything [Greek: e)/xô tou= pra/gmatos]. Indeed, among all philosophers who have written much, I know none who is less open to the reproach of mingling personal sentiment with argumentative debate than Aristotle. Plato indulges frequently in irony, or sneering, or rhetorical invective; Aristotle very rarely. Moreover, even apart from the question of contempt, the part which M. Martin here assumes Aristotle to be playing, is among the strangest anomalies in the history of philosophy. Aristotle holds, and is anxious to demonstrate, the doctrine of the earth's immobility; he knows (so we are required to believe) that Plato not only holds the same doctrine, but has expressly affirmed it in the Timæus: he might have produced Plato as an authority in his favour, and the passage of the Timæus as an express declaration; yet he prefers to pervert, knowingly and deliberately, the meaning of this passage, and to cite Plato as a hostile instead of a friendly authority--simply "to give himself the pleasure of contemptuously refuting Plato's opinion!" But this is not all. M. Martin tells us that the arguments which Aristotle produces against the doctrine are, after all, very feeble. But he farther tells us that there was one argument which might have been produced, and which, if Aristotle had produced it, would have convicted Plato of "an enormous contradiction" (p. 88) in affirming that the earth revolved round the cosmical axis. Aristotle might have said to Plato--"You have affirmed, and you assume perpetually throughout the Timæus, the diurnal revolution of the outer sidereal sphere; you now assert the diurnal revolution of the earth at the centre. Here is an enormous contradiction; the two cannot stand together."--Yet Aristotle, having this triumphant argument in his hands, says not a word about it, but contents himself with various other arguments which M. Martin pronounces to be very feeble.

Perhaps M. Martin might say--"The contradiction exists; but Aristotle was not sharpsighted enough to perceive it; otherwise he would have advanced it." I am quite of this opinion. If Aristotle had perceived the contradiction, he would have brought it forward as the strongest point in his controversy. His silence is to me a proof that he did not perceive it. But this is a part of my case against M. Martin. I believe that Plato admitted both the two contradictory doctrines without perceiving the contradiction; and it is a strong presumption in favour of this view that Aristotle equally failed to perceive it--though in a case where, according to M. Martin, he did not scruple to resort to dishonest artifice.

It appears to me that the difficulties and anomalies, in which we are involved from supposing that Aristotle either misunderstood or perverted the meaning of Plato--are far graver than those which would arise from admitting that Plato advanced a complicated theory involving two contradictory propositions, in the same dialogue, without perceiving the contradiction; more especially when the like failure of perception is indisputably ascribable to Aristotle--upon every view of the case.

M. Cousin maintains the same interpretation of the Platonic passage as Boeckh and Martin, and defends it by a note on his translation of the Timæus (p. 339). The five arguments which he produces are considered both by himself and by Martin to be unanswerable. As he puts them with great neatness and terseness, I here bestow upon them a separate examination.

1. "Platon a toujours été considéré dans l'antiquité comme partisan de l'immobilité absolue de la terre." M. Cousin had before said, "Aristote se fonde sur ce passage pour établir que Platon a fait tourner la terre sur elle-même: mais Aristote est, dans l'antiquité, le seul qui soutienne cette opinion."

My reply is, that Aristotle is himself a portion and member of antiquity, and that the various Platonists, whom he undertakes to refute, are portions of it also. If M. Cousin appeals to the authority of antiquity, it must be to antiquity, not merely _minus_ Aristotle and these contemporary Platonists, but _against_ them. Now these are just the witnesses who had the best means of knowledge. Besides which, Aristotle himself, adopting and anxious to demonstrate the immobility of the earth, had every motive to cite Plato as a supporter, if Plato was such--and every motive to avoid citing Plato as an opponent, unless the truth of the case compelled him to do so. I must here add, that M. Cousin represents Aristotle as ascribing to Plato the doctrine that "la terre tourne sur elle-même." This is not strictly exact. Aristotle understands the Platonic Timæus as saying, "That the earth is packed and moved _round the axis of the kosmos_"--a different proposition.

2. "Dans plusieurs endroits de ses ouvrages où Platon parle de l'équilibre de la terre, il ne dit pas un mot de sa rotation."

I know of only _one_ such passage--Phædon, p. 108--where undoubtedly Plato does not speak of the rotation of the earth; but neither does he speak of the rotation of the sidereal sphere and of the kosmos--nor of the axis of the kosmos. It is the figure and properties of the earth, considered in reference to mankind who inhabit it, that Plato sketches in the Phædon; he takes little notice of its cosmical relations, and gives no general theory about the kosmos. M. Cousin has not adverted to the tenth Book of the Republic, where Plato does propound a cosmical theory, expressly symbolising the axis of the kosmos with its rotatory functions.

3. "Si la _terre suit le mouvement de l'axe du monde_, le mouvement de la huitième sphère, qui est Le Même, devient nul par rapport à elle, et les étoiles fixes, qui appartiennent à elle, demeurent en apparence dans une immobilité absolue: ce qui est contraire à _l'expérience et au sens commun_, et à l'opinion de Platon, exprimée dans ce même passage."

This third argument of M. Cousin is the same as that which I have already examined in remarking upon M. Boeckh. The diurnal rotation of the earth cannot stand in the same astronomical system with the diurnal rotation of the sidereal sphere. Incontestably true (I have already said) as a point of science. But the question here is, not what opinions are scientifically consistent, but what opinions were held by Plato, and whether he detected the inconsistency between the two. I have shown grounds for believing that he did not--and not he alone, but many others along with him, Aristotle among the number. How, indeed, can this be denied, when we find M. Boeckh announcing that he is the _first_ among all the critics on the Timæus, who has brought forward the inconsistency as a special ground for determining what Plato's opinion was--that no other critic before him had noticed it?