i. 1, 5: "One of the chief sources of lax habits of thought is the

custom of using connotative terms without a distinctly ascertained connotation, and with no more precise notion of their meaning than can be loosely collected from observing what objects they are used to denote. It is in this manner that we all acquire, and inevitably so, our first knowledge of our vernacular language. A child learns the meaning of Man, White, &c., by hearing them applied to a number of individual objects, and finding out, by a process of generalisation of which he is but imperfectly conscious, what those different objects have in common. In many cases objects bear a general resemblance to each other, which leads to their being familiarly classed together under a common name, while it is not immediately apparent what are the particular attributes upon the possession of which in common by them all their general resemblance depends. In this manner names creep on from subject to subject until all traces of a common meaning sometimes disappear, and the word comes to denote a number of things not only independently of any common attribute, but which have actually no attribute in common, or none but what is shared by other things to which the name is capriciously refused. It would be well if this degeneracy of language took place only in the hands of the untaught vulgar; but some of the most remarkable instances are to be found in terms of art, and among technically educated persons, such as English lawyers. _Felony_, _e.g._, is a law-term with the sound of which all are familiar: _but there is no lawyer who would undertake to tell what a felony is, otherwise than by enumerating the various offences so called._ Originally the word _felony_ had a meaning; it denoted all offences, the penalty of which included forfeiture of lands or goods, but subsequent Acts of Parliament have declared various offences to be felonies without enjoining that penalty, and have taken away that penalty from others which continue nevertheless to be called felonies, insomuch that the acts so called have now no property whatever in common save that of being unlawful and punishable."]

[Footnote 38: Aristot. Topic, i. 106, a. 21. [Greek: Ta\ pollachô=s lego/mena--ta\ pleonachô=s lego/mena]--are perpetually noted and distinguished by Aristotle.]

[Side-note: Analogy between the explanations here ascribed to Sokrates, and those given by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the Memorabilia.]

We read in the Xenophontic Memorabilia a dialogue between Sokrates and Aristippus, on this same subject--What is the Beautiful, which affords a sort of contrast between the Dialogues of Search and those of Exposition. In the Hippias Major, we have the problem approached on several different sides, various suggestions being proposed, and each successively disallowed, on reasons shown, as failures: while in the Xenophontic dialogue, Sokrates declares an affirmative doctrine, and stands to it--but no pains are taken to bring out the objections against it and rebut them. The doctrine is, that the Beautiful is coincident with the Good, and that both of them are resolvable into the Useful: thus all beautiful objects, unlike as they may be to the eye or touch, bear that name because they have in common the attribute of conducing to one and the same purpose--the security, advantage, or gratification, of man, in some form or other. This is one of the three explanations broached by the Platonic Sokrates, and afterwards refuted by him, in the Hippias: while his declaration (which Hippias puts aside as unseemly)--that a pot and a wooden soup-ladle conveniently made are beautiful is perfectly in harmony with that of the Xenophontic Sokrates, that a basket for carrying dung is beautiful, if it performs its work well.[39] We must moreover remark, that the objections whereby the Platonic Sokrates, after proposing the doctrine and saying much in its favour, finds himself compelled at last to disallow it--these objections are not produced and refuted, but passed over without notice, in the Xenophontic dialogue, wherein Sokrates affirms it decidedly.[40] The affirming Sokrates, and the objecting Sokrates, are not on the stage at once.

[Footnote 39: Xen. Mem. iii. 6, 2, 7; iv. 6, 8.

Plato, Hipp. Maj. 288 D, 290 D.

I am obliged to translate the words [Greek: to\ Kalo/n] by the Beautiful or beauty, to avoid a tiresome periphrasis. But in reality the Greek words include more besides: they mean also the _fine_, the _honourable or that which is worthy of honour_, the _exalted_, &c. If we have difficulty in finding any common property connoted by the English word, the difficulty in the case of the Greek word is still greater.]

[Footnote 40: In regard to the question, Wherein consists [Greek: To\ Kalo/n]? and objections against the theory of the Xenophontic Sokrates, it is worth while to compare the views of modern philosophers. Dugald Stewart says (on the Beautiful, 'Philosophical Essays,' p. 214 seq.), "It has long been a favourite problem with philosophers to ascertain the common quality or qualities which entitle a thing to the denomination of Beautiful. But the success of their speculations has been so inconsiderable, that little can be inferred from them except the impossibility of the problem to which they have been directed. The speculations which have given occasion to these remarks have evidently originated in a prejudice which has descended to modern times from the scholastic ages. That when a word admits of a variety of significations, these different significations must all be species of the same genus, and must consequently include some essential idea common to every individual to which the generic term can be applied. Of this principle, which has been an abundant source of obscurity and mystery in the different sciences, it would be easy to expose the unsoundness and futility. Socrates, whose plain good sense appears, on this as on other occasions, to have fortified his understanding to a wonderful degree against the metaphysical subtleties which misled his successors, was evidently apprised fully of the justice of the foregoing remarks, if any reliance can be placed on the account given by Xenophon of his conversation with Aristippus about the Good and the Beautiful," &c.

Stewart then proceeds to translate a portion of the Xenophontic dialogue (Memorab. iii. 8). But unfortunately he does not translate the whole of it. If he had he would have seen that he has misconceived the opinion of Sokrates, who maintains the very doctrine here disallowed by Stewart, viz., That there is an essential idea common to all beautiful objects, the fact of being conducive to human security, comfort, or enjoyment. This is unquestionably an important common property, though the multifarious objects which possess it may be unlike in all other respects.

As to the general theory I think that Stewart is right: it is his compliment to Sokrates, on this occasion, which I consider misplaced. He certainly would not have agreed with Sokrates (nor should I agree with him) in calling by the epithet _beautiful_ a basket for carrying dung when well made for its own purpose, or a convenient boiling-pot, or a soup-ladle made of fig-tree wood, as the Platonic Sokrates affirms in the Hippias (288 D, 290 D). The Beautiful and the Useful sometimes coincide; more often or at least very often, they do not. Hippias is made to protest, in this dialogue, against the mention of such vulgar objects as the pot and the ladle; and this is apparently intended by Plato as a defective point in his character, denoting silly affectation and conceit, like his fine apparel. But Dugald Stewart would have agreed in the sentiment ascribed to Hippias--that vulgar and mean objects have no place in an inquiry into the Beautiful; and that they belong, when well-formed for their respective purposes, to the category of the Useful.

The Xenophontic Sokrates in the Memorabilia is mistaken in confounding the Beautiful with the Good and the Useful. But his remarks are valuable in another point of view, as they insist most forcibly on the essential relativity both of the Beautiful and the Good.

The doctrine of Dugald Stewart is supported by Mr. John Stuart Mill ('System of Logic,' iv. 4, 5, p. 220 seq.);** and Professor Bain has expounded the whole subject still more fully in a chapter (xiv. p. 225 seq., on the Æsthetic Emotions) of his work on the Emotions and the Will.]

The concluding observations of this dialogue, interchanged between Hippias and Sokrates, are interesting as bringing out the antithesis between rhetoric and dialectic--between the concrete and exemplifying, as contrasted with the abstract and analytical. Immediately after Sokrates has brought his own third suggestion to an inextricable embarrassment, Hippias remarks--

[Side-note: Concluding thrust exchanged between Hippias and Sokrates.]

"Well, Sokrates, what do you think now of all these reasonings of yours? They are what I declared them to be just now,--scrapings and parings of discourse, divided into minute fragments. But the really beautiful and precious acquirement is, to be able to set out well and finely a regular discourse before the Dikastery or the public assembly, to persuade your auditors, and to depart carrying with you not the least but the greatest of all prizes--safety for yourself, your property, and your friends. These are the real objects to strive for. Leave off your petty cavils, that you may not look like an extreme simpleton, handling silly trifles as you do at present."[41]

"My dear Hippias," (replies Sokrates) "you are a happy man, since you know what pursuits a man ought to follow, and have yourself followed them, as you say, with good success. But I, as it seems, am under the grasp of an unaccountable fortune: for I am always fluctuating and puzzling myself, and when I lay my puzzle before you wise men, I am requited by you with hard words. I am told just what you have now been telling me, that I busy myself about matters silly, petty, and worthless. When on the contrary, overborne by your authority, I declare as you do, that it is the finest thing possible to be able to set out well and beautifully a regular discourse before the public assembly, and bring it to successful conclusion--then there are other men at hand who heap upon me bitter reproaches: especially that one man, my nearest kinsman and inmate, who never omits to convict me. When on my return home he hears me repeat what you have told me, he asks, if I am not ashamed of my impudence in talking about beautiful (honourable) pursuits, when I am so manifestly convicted upon this subject, of not even knowing what the Beautiful (Honourable) is. How can you (he says), being ignorant what the Beautiful is, know _who_ has set out a discourse beautifully and _who_ has not--_who_ has performed a beautiful exploit and _who_ has not? Since you are in a condition so disgraceful, can you think life better for you than death? Such then is my fate--to hear disparagement and reproaches from you on the one side, and from him on the other. Necessity however perhaps requires that I should endure all these discomforts: for it will be nothing strange if I profit by them. Indeed I think that I have already profited both by your society, Hippias, and by his: for I now think that I know what the proverb means--Beautiful (Honourable) things are difficult."[42]

[Footnote 41: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 304 A.]

[Footnote 42: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 304 D-E.]

[Side-note: Rhetoric against Dialectic.]

Here is a suitable termination for one of the Dialogues of Search: "My mind has been embarrassed by contradictions as yet unreconciled, but this is a stage indispensable to future improvement". We have moreover an interesting passage of arms between Rhetoric and Dialectic: two contemporaneous and contending agencies, among the stirring minds of Athens, in the time of Plato and Isokrates. The Rhetor accuses the Dialectician of departing from the conditions of reality--of breaking up the integrity of those concretes, which occur in nature each as continuous and indivisible wholes. Each of the analogous particular cases forms a continuum or concrete by itself, which may be compared with the others, but cannot be taken to pieces, and studied in separate fragments.[43] The Dialectician on his side treats the Abstract ([Greek: to\ kalo\n]) as the real Integer, and the highest abstraction as the first of all integers, containing in itself and capable of evolving all the subordinate integers: the various accompaniments, which go along with each Abstract to make up a concrete, he disregards as shadowy and transient disguises.

[Footnote 43: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 301 B. [Greek: A)lla\ ga\r dê\ su/, ô)= Sô/krates, ta\ me\n o(/la tô=n pragma/tôn ou) skopei=s, ou)d' e)kei=noi, oi(=s su\ ei)/ôthas diale/gesthai, krou/ete de\ a)polamba/nontes to\ kalo\n kai\ e(/kaston tô=n o)/ntôn e)n toi=s lo/gois katate/mnontes; dia\ tau=ta ou(/tô mega/la u(ma=s lantha/nei kai\ _dianekê= sô/mata tê=s ou)si/as pephuko/ta_.] Compare 301 E.

The words [Greek: dianekê= sô/mata tê=s ou)si/as pephuko/ta] correspond as nearly as can be to the logical term _Concrete_, opposed to _Abstract_. Nature furnishes only Concreta, not Abstracta.]

[Side-note: Men who dealt with real life, contrasted with the speculative and analytical philosophers.]

Hippias accuses Sokrates of never taking into his view Wholes, and of confining his attention to separate parts and fragments, obtained by logical analysis and subdivision. Aristophanes, when he attacks the Dialectic of Sokrates, takes the same ground, employing numerous comic metaphors to illustrate the small and impalpable fragments handled, and the subtle transpositions which they underwent in the reasoning. Isokrates again deprecates the over-subtlety of dialectic debate, contrasting it with discussions (in his opinion) more useful; wherein entire situations, each with its full clothing and assemblage of circumstances, were reviewed and estimated.[44] All these are protests, by persons accustomed to deal with real life, and to talk to auditors both numerous and commonplace, against that conscious analysis and close attention to general and abstract terms, which Sokrates first insisted on and transmitted to his disciples. On the other side, we have the emphatic declaration made by the Platonic Sokrates (and made still earlier by the Xenophontic[45] or historical Sokrates)--That a man was not fit to talk about beautiful things in the concrete--that he had no right to affirm or deny that attribute, with respect to any given subject--that he was not** even fit to live unless he could explain what was meant by The Beautiful, or Beauty in the abstract. Here are two distinct and conflicting intellectual habits, the antithesis between which, indicated in this dialogue, is described at large and forcibly in the Theætêtus.[46]

[Footnote 44: Aristophan. Nubes, 130. [Greek: lo/gôn a)kribô=n schindala/mous--paipa/lê.] Nub. 261, Aves, 430. [Greek: leptota/tôn lê/rôn i(ereu=], Nub. 359. [Greek: gnô/mais leptais], Nub. 1404. [Greek: skariphismoi=si lê/rôn], Ran. 1497. [Greek: smileu/mata]--id. 819. Isokrates, [Greek: Pro\s Nikokle/a], s. 69, antithesis of the [Greek: lo/goi politikoi\] and [Greek: lo/goi e)ristikoi/--ma/lista me\n kai\ a)po\ tôn kairô=n theôrei=n sumbouleu/ontas, ei) de\ mê\, _kath' o(/lôn tô=n pragma/tôn_ le/gontas]--which is almost exactly the phrase ascribed to Hippias by Plato in this Hippias Major. Also Isokrates, Contra Sophistas, s. 24-25, where he contrasts the useless [Greek: logi/dia], debated by the contentious dialecticians (Sokrates and Plato being probably included in this designation), with his own [Greek: lo/goi politikoi/]. Compare also Isokrates, Or. xv. De Permutatione, s. 211-213-285-287.]

[Footnote 45: Xen. Mem. i. 1, 16.]

[Footnote 46: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 173-174-175.]

[Side-note: Concrete Aggregates--abstract or logical Aggregates. Distinct aptitudes required by Aristotle for the Dialectician.]

When Hippias accuses Sokrates of neglecting to notice Wholes or Aggregates, this is true in the sense of Concrete Wholes--the phenomenal sequences and co-existences, perceived by sense or imagined. But the Universal (as Aristotle says)[47] is one kind of Whole: a Logical Whole, having logical parts. In the minds of Sokrates and Plato, the Logical Whole separable into its logical parts and into them only, were preponderant.

[Footnote 47: Aristot. Physic. i. 1. [Greek: to\ ga\r o(/lon kata\ tê\n ai)/sthêsin gnôrimô/teron, _to\ de\ katho/lou o(/lon ti e)sti; polla\ ga\r perilamba/nei ô(s me/rê to\ katho/lou_.] Compare Simplikius, Schol. Brandis ad loc. p. 324, a. 10-26.]

[Side-note: Antithesis of Absolute and Relative, here brought into debate by Plato, in regard to the Idea of Beauty.]

One other point deserves peculiar notice, in the dialogue under our review. The problem started is, What is the Beautiful--the Self-Beautiful, or Beauty _per se_: and it is assumed that this must be Something,[48] that from the accession of which, each particular beautiful thing becomes beautiful. But Sokrates presently comes to make a distinction between that which is really beautiful and that which appears to be beautiful. Some things (he says) appear beautiful, but are not so in reality: some are beautiful, but do not appear so. The problem, as he states it, is, to find, not what that is which makes objects appear beautiful, but what it is that makes them really beautiful. This distinction, as we find it in the language of Hippias, is one of degree only:[49] that _is_ beautiful which appears so to every one and at all times. But in the language of Sokrates, the distinction is radical: to _be_ beautiful is one thing, to _appear_ beautiful is another; whatever makes a thing appear beautiful without being so in reality, is a mere engine of deceit, and not what Sokrates is enquiring for.[50] The Self-Beautiful or real Beauty is so, whether any one perceives it to be beautiful or not: it is an Absolute, which exists _per se_, having no relation to any sentient or percipient subject.[51] At any rate, such is the manner in which Plato conceives it, when he starts here as a problem to enquire, What it is.

[Footnote 48: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 286 K. [Greek: au)to\ to\ kalo\n o(/, ti e)/stin.] Also 287 D, 289 D.]

[Footnote 49: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 291 D, 292 E.]

[Footnote 50: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 294 A-B, 299 A.]

[Footnote 51: Dr. Hutcheson, in his inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, observes (sect. i. and ii. p. 14-16):--

"Beauty is either original or comparative, or, if any like the terms better, absolute or relative; only let it be observed, that by _absolute_ or _original_, is not understood any quality supposed to be in the object, which should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any mind which perceives it. For Beauty, like other names of sensible ideas, properly denotes the perception of some mind. . . . . Our inquiry is only about the qualities which are beautiful to men, or about the foundation of their sense of beauty, for (as above hinted) Beauty has always relation to the sense of some mind; and when we afterwards show how generally the objects that occur to us are beautiful, we mean that such objects are agreeable to the sense of men, &c."

The same is repeated, sect. iv. p. 40; sect. vi. p. 72.]

Herein we note one of the material points of disagreement between Plato and his master: for Sokrates (in the Xenophontic Memorabilia) affirms distinctly that Beauty is altogether relative to human wants and appreciations. The Real and Absolute, on the one hand, wherein alone resides truth and beauty--as against the phenomenal and relative, on the other hand, the world of illusion and meanness--this is an antithesis which we shall find often reproduced in Plato. I shall take it up more at large, when I come to discuss his argument against Protagoras in the Theætêtus.

* * * * *

[Side-note: Hippias Minor--characters and situation supposed.]

I now come to the Lesser Hippias: in which (as we have already seen in the Greater) that Sophist is described by epithets, affirming varied and extensive accomplishments, as master of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, poetry (especially that of Homer), legendary lore, music, metrical and rhythmical diversities, &c. His memory was prodigious, and he had even invented for himself a technical scheme for assisting memory. He had composed poems, epic, lyric, and tragic, as well as many works in prose: he was, besides, a splendid lecturer on ethical and political subjects, and professed to answer any question which might be asked. Furthermore, he was skilful in many kinds of manual dexterity: having woven his own garments, plaited his own girdle, made his own shoes, engraved his own seal-ring, and fabricated for himself a curry-comb and oil-flask.[52] Lastly, he is described as wearing fine and showy apparel. What he is made to say is rather in harmony with this last point of character, than with the preceding. He talks with silliness and presumption, so as to invite and excuse the derisory sting of Sokrates, There is a third interlocutor, Eudikus: but he says very little, and other auditors are alluded to generally, who say nothing.[53]

[Footnote 52: Plato, Hipp. Minor, 368.]

[Footnote 53: Plato, Hipp. Minor, 369 D, 373 B.

Ast rejects both the dialogues called by the name of Hippias, as not composed by Plato. Schleiermacher doubts about both, and rejects the Hippias Minor (which he considers as perhaps worked up by a Platonic scholar from a genuine sketch by Plato himself) but will not pass the same sentence upon the Hippias Major (Schleierm. Einleit. vol. ii. pp. 293-296; vol. v. 399-403. Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp. 457-464).

Stallbaum defends both the dialogues as genuine works of Plato, and in my judgment with good reason (Prolegg. ad Hipp. Maj. vol. iv. pp. 145-150; ad Hipp. Minor, pp. 227-235). Steinhart (Einleit. p. 99) and Socher (Ueber Platon, p. 144 seq., 215 seq.) maintain the same opinion on these dialogues as Stallbaum. It is to be remarked that Schleiermacher states the reasons both for and against the genuineness of the dialogues; and I think that even in his own statement the reasons _for_ preponderate. The reasons which both Schleiermacher and Ast produce as proving the spuriousness, are in my view quite insufficient to sustain their conclusion. There is bad taste, sophistry, an overdose of banter and derision (they say very truly), in the part assigned to Sokrates: there are also differences of view, as compared with Sokrates in other dialogues; various other affirmations (they tell us) are _not_ Platonic. I admit much of this, but I still do not accept their conclusion. These critics cannot bear to admit any Platonic work as genuine unless it affords to them ground for superlative admiration and glorification of the author. This postulate I altogether contest; and I think that differences of view, as between Sokrates in one dialogue and Sokrates in another, are both naturally to be expected and actually manifested (witness the Protagoras and Gorgias). Moreover Ast designates (p. 404) a doctrine as "durchaus unsokratisch" which Stallbaum justly remarks (p. 233) to have been actually affirmed by Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia. Stallbaum thinks that both the two dialogues (Socher, that the Hippias Minor only) were composed by Plato among his earlier works, and this may probably be true. The citation and refutation of the Hippias Minor by Aristotle (Metaphys. [Greek: D]. 1025, a. 6) counts with me as a strong corroborative proof that the dialogue is Plato's work. Schleiermacher and Ast set this evidence aside because Aristotle does not name Plato as the author. But if the dialogue had been composed by any one less celebrated than Plato, Aristotle would have named the author. Mention by Aristotle, though without Plato's name, is of greater value to support the genuineness than the purely internal grounds stated by Ast and Schleiermacher against it.]

[Side-note: Hippias has just delivered a lecture, in which he extols Achilles as better than Odysseus--the veracious and straightforward hero better than the mendacious and crafty.]

In the Hippias Minor, that Sophist appears as having just concluded a lecture upon Homer, in which he had extolled Achilles as better than Odysseus: Achilles being depicted as veracious and straightforward, Odysseus as mendacious and full of tricks. Sokrates, who had been among the auditors, cross-examines Hippias upon the subject of this affirmation.

Homer (says Hippias) considers veracious men, and mendacious men, to be not merely different, but opposite: and I agree with him. Permit me (Sokrates remarks) to ask some questions about the meaning of this from you, since I cannot ask any from Homer himself. You will answer both for yourself and him.[54]

[Footnote 54: Plat. Hipp. Minor, 365 C-D.

The remark here made by Sokrates--"The poet is not here to answer for himself, so that you cannot put any questions to him" is a point of view familiar to Plato: insisted upon forcibly in the Protagoras (347 E), and farther generalised in the Phædrus, so as to apply to all written matter compared with personal converse (Phædrus, p. 275 D).

This ought to count, so far as it goes, as a fragment of proof that the Hippias Minor is a genuine work of Plato, instead of which Schleiermacher treats it (p. 295) as evincing a poor copy, made by some imitator of Plato, from the Protagoras.]

Mendacious men (answers Hippias, to a string of questions, somewhat prolix) are capable, intelligent, wise: they are not incapable or ignorant. If a man be incapable of speaking falsely, or ignorant, he is not mendacious. Now the capable man is one who can make sure of doing what he wishes to do, at the time and occasion when he does wish it, without let or hindrance.[55]

[Footnote 55: Plat. Hipp. Minor, 366 B-C.]

[Side-note: This is contested by Sokrates. The veracious man and the mendacious man are one and the same--the only man who can answer truly if he chooses, is he who can also answer falsely if he chooses, _i.e._ the knowing man--the ignorant man cannot make sure of doing either the one or the other.]

You, Hippias (says Sokrates), are expert on matters of arithmetic: you can make sure of answering truly any question put to you on the subject. You are _better_ on the subject than the ignorant man, who cannot make sure of doing the same. But as you can make sure of answering truly, so likewise you can make sure of answering falsely, whenever you choose to do so. Now the ignorant man cannot make sure of answering falsely. He may, by reason of his ignorance, when he wishes to answer falsely, answer truly without intending it. You, therefore, the intelligent man and the good in arithmetic, are better than the ignorant and the bad for both purposes--for speaking falsely, and for speaking truly.[56]

[Footnote 56: Plato, Hippias Minor, 366 E. [Greek: Po/teron su\ a)\n ma/lista pseu/doio kai\ a)ei\ kata\ tau)ta\ pseudê= le/gois peri\ tou/tôn, boulo/menos pseu/desthai kai\ mêde/pote a)lêthê= a)pokri/nesthai? ê)/ o( a)mathê\s ei)s logismou\s du/nait' a)\n sou= ma=llon pseu/desthai boulome/nou? ê)\ o( me\n a)mathê\s polla/kis a)\n boulo/menos pseudê= le/gein ta)lêthê= a)\n ei)/poi a)/kôn, ei) tu/choi, dia\ to\ mê\ ei)de/nai--su\ de\ o( sopho/s, ei)/per bou/loio pseu/desthai, a)ei\ a)\n kata\ ta\ au)ta\ pseu/doio?]]

[Side-note: Analogy of special arts--it is only the arithmetician who can speak falsely on a question of arithmetic when he chooses.]

What is true about arithmetic, is true in other departments also. The only man who can speak falsely whenever he chooses is the man who can speak truly whenever he chooses. Now, the mendacious man, as we agreed, is the man who can speak falsely whenever he chooses. Accordingly, the mendacious man, and the veracious man, are the same. They are not different, still less opposite: nay, the two epithets belong only to one and the same person. The veracious man is not better than the mendacious--seeing that he is one and the same.[57]

[Footnote 57: Plato, Hipp. Minor, 367 C, 368 E, 369 A-B.]

You see, therefore, Hippias, that the distinction, which you drew and which you said that Homer drew, between Achilles and Odysseus, will not hold. You called Achilles veracious, and Odysseus, mendacious: but if one of the two epithets belongs to either of them, the other must belong to him also.[58]

[Footnote 58: Plat. Hipp. Minor, 360 B.]

[Side-note: View of Sokrates respecting Achilles in the Iliad. He thinks that Achilles speaks falsehood cleverly. Hippias maintains that if Achilles ever speaks falsehood, it is with an innocent purpose, whereas Odysseus does the like with fraudulent purpose.]

Sokrates then tries to make out that Achilles speaks falsehood in the Iliad, and speaks it very cleverly, because he does so in a way to escape detection from Odysseus himself. To this Hippias replies, that if Achilles ever speaks falsehood, he does it innocently, without any purpose of cheating or injuring any one; whereas the falsehoods of Odysseus are delivered with fraudulent and wicked intent.[59] It is impossible (he contends) that men who deceive and do wrong wilfully and intentionally, should be better than those who do so unwillingly and without design. The laws deal much more severely with the former than with the latter.[60]

[Footnote 59: Plat. Hipp. Minor, 370 E.]

[Footnote 60: Plat. Hipp. Minor, 372 A.]

[Side-note: Issue here taken--Sokrates contends that those who hurt, or cheat, or lie wilfully, are better than those who do the like unwillingly--he entreats Hippias to enlighten him and answer his questions.]

Upon this point, Hippias (says Sokrates), I dissent from you entirely. I am, unhappily, a stupid person, who cannot find out the reality of things: and this appears plainly enough when I come to talk with wise men like you, for I always find myself differing from you. My only salvation consists in my earnest anxiety to put questions and learn from you, and in my gratitude for your answers and teaching. I think that those who hurt mankind, or cheat, or lie, or do wrong, _wilfully_--are better than those who do the same _unwillingly_. Sometimes, indeed, from my stupidity, the opposite view presents itself to me, and I become confused: but now, after talking with you, the fit of confidence has come round upon me again, to pronounce and characterise the persons who do wrong _unwillingly_, as worse than those who do wrong _wilfully_. I entreat you to heal this disorder of my mind. You will do me much more good than if you cured my body of a distemper. But it will be useless for you to give me one of your long discourses: for I warn you that I cannot follow it. The only way to confer upon me real service, will be to answer my questions again, as you have hitherto done. Assist me, Eudikus, in persuading Hippias to do so.

Assistance from me (says Eudikus) will hardly be needed, for Hippias professed himself ready to answer any man's questions.

Yes--I did so (replies Hippias)--but Sokrates always brings trouble into the debate, and proceeds like one disposed to do mischief.

Eudikus repeats his request, and Hippias, in deference to him, consents to resume the task of answering.[61]

[Footnote 61: Plat. Hipp. Min. 373 B.]

[Side-note: Questions of Sokrates--multiplied analogies of the special arts. The unskilful artist, who runs, wrestles, or sings badly, whether he will or not, is worse than the skilful, who can sing well when he chooses, but can also sing badly when he chooses.]

Sokrates then produces a string of questions, with a view to show that those who do wrong wilfully, are better than those who do wrong unwillingly. He appeals to various analogies. In running, the good runner is he who runs quickly, the bad runner is he who runs slowly. What is evil and base in running is, to run slowly. It is the good runner who does this evil wilfully: it is the bad runner who does it unwillingly.[62] The like is true about wrestling and other bodily exercises. He that is good in the body, can work either strongly or feebly,--can do either what is honourable or what is base; so that when he does what is base, he does it wilfully. But he that is bad in the body does what is base unwillingly, not being able to help it.[63]

[Footnote 62: Plat. Hipp. Min. 373 D-E.]

[Footnote 63: Plat. Hipp. Min. 374 B.]

What is true about the bodily movements depending upon strength, is not less true about those depending on grace and elegance. To be wilfully ungraceful, belongs only to the well-constituted body: none but the badly-constituted body is ungraceful without wishing it. The same, also, about the feet, voice, eyes, ears, nose: of these organs, those which act badly through will and intention, are preferable to those which act badly without will or intention. Lameness of feet is a misfortune and disgrace: feet which go lame only by intention are much to be preferred.[64]

[Footnote 64: Plat. Hipp. Min. 374 C-D.]

Again, in the instruments which we use, a rudder or a bow,--or the animals about us, horses or dogs,--those are better with which we work badly when we choose; those are worse, with which we work badly without design, and contrary to our own wishes.

[Side-note: It is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his mark only by design, than that of one who misses even when he intends to hit.]

It is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his mark by design, than that of one who misses when he tries to hit. The like about all other arts--the physician, the harper, the flute-player. In each of these artists, _that_ mind is better, which goes wrong only wilfully--_that_ mind is worse, which goes wrong unwillingly, while wishing to go right. In regard to the minds of our slaves, we should all prefer those which go wrong only when they choose, to those which go wrong without their own choice.[65]

[Footnote 65: Plat. Hipp. Min. 376 B-D.]

Having carried his examination through this string of analogous particulars, and having obtained from Hippias successive answers--"Yes--true in that particular case," Sokrates proceeds to sum up the result:--

_Sokr._--Well! should we not wish to have our own minds as good as possible? _Hip._--Yes. _Sokr._--We have seen that they will be better if they do mischief and go wrong wilfully, than if they do so unwillingly? _Hip._--But it will be dreadful, Sokrates, if the willing wrong-doers are to pass for better men than the unwilling.

[Side-note: Dissent and repugnance of Hippias.]

_Sokr._--Nevertheless--it seems so: from what we have said. _Hip._--It does not seem so to me. _Sokr._--I thought that it would have seemed so to you, as it does to me. However, answer me once more--Is not justice either a certain mental capacity? or else knowledge? or both together?[66] _Hip._--Yes! it is. _Sokr._--If justice be a capacity of the mind, the more capable mind will also be the juster: and we have already seen that the more capable soul is the better. _Hip._--We have. _Sokr._--If it be knowledge, the more knowing or wiser mind will of course be the juster: if it be a combination of both capacity and knowledge, that mind which is more capable as well as more knowing,--will be the juster that which is less capable and less knowing, will be the more unjust. _Hip._--So it appears. _Sokr._--Now we have shown that the more capable and knowing mind is at once the better mind, and more competent to exert itself both ways--to do what is honourable as well as what is base--in every employment. _Hip._--Yes. _Sokr._--When, therefore, such a mind does what is base, it does so wilfully, through its capacity or intelligence, which we have seen to be of the nature of justice? _Hip._--It seems so. _Sokr._--Doing base things, is acting unjustly: doing honourable things, is acting justly. Accordingly, when this more capable and better mind acts unjustly, it will do so wilfully; while the less capable and worse mind will do so without willing it? _Hip._--Apparently.

[Footnote 66: Plat. Hipp. Min. 375 D. [Greek: ê( dikaiosu/nê ou)chi ê)\ du/nami/s ti/s e)stin, ê)\ e)pistê/mê, ê)\ a)mpho/tera?]]

[Side-note: Conclusion--That none but the good man can do evil wilfully: the bad man does evil unwillingly. Hippias cannot resist the reasoning, but will not accept the conclusion--Sokrates confesses his perplexity.]

_Sokr._--Now the good man is he that has the good mind: the bad man is he that has the bad mind. It belongs therefore to the good man to do wrong wilfully, to the bad man, to do wrong without wishing it--that is, if the good man be he that has the good mind? _Hip._--But that is unquestionable--that he has it. _Sokr._--Accordingly, he that goes wrong and does base and unjust things wilfully, if there be any such character--can be no other than the good man. _Hip._--I do not know how to concede _that_ to you, Sokrates.[67] _Sokr._--Nor I, how to concede it to myself, Hippias: yet so it must appear to us, now at least, from the past debate. As I told you long ago, I waver hither and thither upon this matter; my conclusions never remain the same. No wonder indeed that I and other vulgar men waver; but if you wise men waver also, that becomes a fearful mischief even to us, since we cannot even by coming to you escape from our embarrassment.[68]

[Footnote 67: Plat. Hipp. Min. 375 E, 376 B.]

[Footnote 68: Plato, Hipp. Min. 376 C.]

* * * * *

I will here again remind the reader, that in this, as in the other dialogues, the real speaker is Plato throughout: and that it is he alone who prefixes the different names to words determined by himself.

[Side-note: Remarks on the dialogue. If the parts had been inverted, the dialogue would have been cited by critics as a specimen of the sophistry and corruption of the Sophists.]

Now, if the dialogue just concluded had come down to us with the parts inverted, and with the reasoning of Sokrates assigned to Hippias, most critics would probably have produced it as a tissue of sophistry justifying the harsh epithets which they bestow upon the Athenian Sophists--as persons who considered truth and falsehood to be on a par--subverters of morality--and corruptors of the youth of Athens.[69] But as we read it, all that, which in the mouth of Hippias would have passed for sophistry, is here put forward by Sokrates; while Hippias not only resists his conclusions, and adheres to the received ethical sentiment tenaciously, even when he is unable to defend it, but hates the propositions forced upon him, protests against the perverse captiousness of Sokrates, and requires much pressing to induce him to continue the debate. Upon the views adopted by the critics, Hippias ought to receive credit for this conduct, as a friend of virtue and morality. To me, such reluctance to debate appears a defect rather than a merit; but I cite the dialogue as illustrating what I have already said in another place--that Sokrates and Plato threw out more startling novelties in ethical doctrine, than either Hippias or Protagoras, or any of the other persons denounced as Sophists.

[Footnote 69: Accordingly one of the Platonic critics, Schwalbe (Oeuvres de Platon, p. 116), explains Plato's purpose in the Hippias Minor by saying, that Sokrates here serves out to the Sophists a specimen of their own procedure, and gives them an example of sophistical dialectic, by defending a sophistical thesis in a sophistical manner: That he chooses and demonstrates at length the thesis--the liar is not different from the truth-teller--as an exposure of the sophistical art of proving the contrary of any given proposition, and for the purpose of deriding and unmasking the false morality of Hippias, who in this dialogue talks reasonably enough.

Schwalbe, while he affirms that this is the purpose of Plato, admits that the part here assigned to Sokrates is unworthy of him; and Steinhart maintains that Plato never could have had any such purpose, "however frequently" (Steinhart says), "sophistical artifices may occur in this conversation of Sokrates, which artifices Sokrates no more disdained to employ than any other philosopher or rhetorician of that day" ("so häufig auch in seinen Erörterungen sophistische Kunstgriffe vorkommen mögen, die Sokrates eben so wenig verschmaht hat, als irgend ein Philosoph oder Redekünstler dieser Zeit"). Steinhart, Einleitung zum Hipp. Minor, p. 109.

I do not admit the purpose here ascribed to Plato by Schwalbe, but I refer to the passage as illustrating what Platonic critics think of the reasoning assigned to Sokrates in the Hippias Minor, and the hypotheses which they introduce to colour it.

The passage cited from Steinhart also--that Sokrates no more disdained to employ sophistical artifices than any other philosopher or rhetorician of the age--is worthy of note, as coming from one who is so very bitter in his invectives against the sophistry of the persons called Sophists, of which we have no specimens left.]

[Side-note: Polemical purpose of the dialogue--Hippias humiliated by Sokrates.]

That Plato intended to represent this accomplished Sophist as humiliated by Sokrates, is evident enough: and the words put into his mouth are suited to this purpose. The eloquent lecturer, so soon as his admiring crowd of auditors has retired, proves unable to parry the questions of a single expert dialectician who remains behind, upon a matter which appears to him almost self-evident, and upon which every one (from Homer downward) agrees with him. Besides this, however, Plato is not satisfied without making him say very simple and absurd things. All this is the personal, polemical, comic scope of the dialogue. It lends (whether well-placed or not) a certain animation and variety, which the author naturally looked out for, in an aggregate of dialogues all handling analogous matters about man and society.

But though the polemical purpose of the dialogue is thus plain, its philosophical purpose perplexes the critics considerably. They do not like to see Sokrates employing sophistry against the Sophists: that is, as they think, casting out devils by the help of Beelzebub. And certainly, upon the theory which they adopt, respecting the relation between Plato and Sokrates on one side, and the Sophists on the other, I think this dialogue is very difficult to explain. But I do not think it is difficult, upon a true theory of the Platonic writings.

[Side-note: Philosophical purpose of the dialogue--theory of the Dialogues of Search generally, and of Knowledge as understood by Plato.]

In a former chapter, I tried to elucidate the general character and purpose of those Dialogues of Search, which occupy more than half the Thrasyllean Canon, and of which we have already reviewed two or three specimens--Euthyphron, Alkibiadês, &c. We have seen that they are distinguished by the absence of any affirmative conclusion: that they prove nothing, but only, at the most, disprove one or more supposable solutions: that they are not processes in which one man who knows communicates his knowledge to ignorant hearers, but in which all are alike ignorant, and all are employed, either in groping, or guessing, or testing the guesses of the rest. We have farther seen that the value of these Dialogues depends upon the Platonic theory about knowledge; that Plato did not consider any one to know, who could not explain to others all that he knew, reply to the cross-examination of a Sokratic Elenchus, and cross-examine others to test their knowledge: that knowledge in this sense could not be attained by hearing, or reading, or committing to memory a theorem, together with the steps of reasoning which directly conducted to it:--but that there was required, besides, an acquaintance with many counter-theorems, each having more or less appearance of truth; as well as with various embarrassing aspects and plausible delusions on the subject, which an expert cross-examiner would not fail to urge. Unless you are practised in meeting all the difficulties which he can devise, you cannot be said _to know_. Moreover, it is in this last portion of the conditions of knowledge, that most aspirants are found wanting.

[Side-note: The Hippias is an exemplification of this theory--Sokrates sets forth a case of confusion, and avows his inability to clear it up. Confusion shown up in the Lesser Hippias--Error in the Greater.]

Now the Greater and Lesser Hippias are peculiar specimens of these Dialogues of Search, and each serves the purpose above indicated. The Greater Hippias enumerates a string of tentatives, each one of which ends in acknowledged failure: the Lesser Hippias enunciates a thesis, which Sokrates proceeds to demonstrate, by plausible arguments such as Hippias is forced to admit. But though Hippias admits each successive step, he still mistrusts the conclusion, and suspects that he has been misled--a feeling which Plato[70] describes elsewhere as being frequent among the respondents of Sokrates. Nay, Sokrates himself shares in the mistrust--presents himself as an unwilling propounder of arguments which force themselves upon him,[71] and complains of his own mental embarrassment. Now you may call this sophistry, if you please; and you may silence its propounders by calling them hard names. But such ethical prudery--hiding all the uncomfortable logical puzzles which start up when you begin to analyse an established sentiment, and treating them as non-existent because you refuse to look at them--is not the way, to attain what Plato calls knowledge. If there be any argument, the process of which seems indisputable, while yet its conclusion contradicts, or seems to contradict, what is known, upon other evidence--the full and patient analysis of that argument is indispensable, before you can become master of the truth and able to defend it. Until you have gone through such analysis, your mind must remain in that state of confusion which is indicated by Sokrates at the end of the Lesser Hippias. As it is a part of the process of Search, to travel in the path of the Greater Hippias--that is, to go through a string of erroneous solutions, each of which can be proved, by reasons shown, to _be_ erroneous: so it is an equally important part of the same process, to travel in the path of the Lesser Hippias--that is, to acquaint ourselves with all those arguments, bearing on the case, in which two contrary conclusions appear to be both of them plausibly demonstrated, and in which therefore we cannot as yet determine which of them is erroneous--or whether both are not erroneous. The Greater Hippias exhibits errors,--the Lesser Hippias puts before us confusion. With both these enemies the Searcher for truth must contend: and Bacon tells us, that confusion is the worst enemy of the two--"Citius emergit veritas ex errore, quam ex confusione". Plato, in the Lesser Hippias, having in hand a genuine Sokratic thesis, does not disdain to invest Sokrates with the task (sophistical, as some call it, yet not the less useful and instructive) of setting forth at large this case of confusion, and avowing his inability to clear it up. It is enough for Sokrates that he brings home the painful sense of confusion to the feelings of his hearer as well as to his own. In that painful sentiment lies the stimulus provocative of farther intellectual effort.[72] The dialogue ends but the process of search, far from ending along with it, is emphatically declared to be unfinished, and, to be in a condition not merely unsatisfactory but intolerable, not to be relieved except by farther investigation, which thus becomes a necessary sequel.

[Footnote 70: Plato, Republ. vi. 487 B.

[Greek: Kai\ o( A)dei/mantos, Ô)= Sô/krates, e)/phê, pro\s me\n tau=ta/ soi ou)dei\s a)\n oi(=os t' ei)/ê a)nteipei=n; a)lla\ ga\r toio/nde ti pa/schousin oi( a)kou/ontes e)ka/stote a)\ nu=n le/geis; ê(gou=ntai di' a)peiri/an tou= e)rôta=|n kai\ a)pokri/nesthai u(po\ tou= lo/gou par' e(/kaston to\ e)rô/têma smikro\n parago/menoi, a)throisthe/ntôn tô=n smikrô=n e)pi\ teleutê=s tô=n lo/gôn, me/ga to\ spha/lma kai\ e)nanti/on toi=s prô/tois a)naphai/nesthai . . . e)pei to/ ge a)lêthe\s ou)de/n ti ma=llon tau/tê| e)/chein.]

This passage, attesting the effect of the Sokratic examination upon the minds of auditors, ought to be laid to heart by those Platonic critics who denounce the Sophists for generating scepticism and uncertainty.]

[Footnote 71: Plato, Hipp. Minor, 373 B; also the last sentence of the dialogue.]

[Footnote 72: See the passage in Republic, vii. 523-524, where the [Greek: to\ paraklêtiko\n kai\ e)gertiko\n tê=s noê/seôs] is declared to arise from the pain of a felt contradiction.]

There are two circumstances which lend particular interest to this dialogue--Hippias Minor. 1. That the thesis out of which the confusion arises, is one which we know to have been laid down by the historical Sokrates himself. 2. That Aristotle expressly notices this thesis, as well as the dialogue in which it is contained, and combats it.

[Side-note: The thesis maintained here by Sokrates, is also affirmed by the historical Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia.]

Sokrates in his conversation with the youthful Euthydemus (in the Xenophontic Memorabilia) maintains, that of two persons, each of whom deceives his friends in a manner to produce mischief, the one who does so wilfully is not so unjust as the one who does so unwillingly.[73] Euthydemus (like Hippias in this dialogue) maintains the opposite, but is refuted by Sokrates; who argues that justice is a matter to be learnt and known like letters; that the lettered man, who has learnt and knows letters, can write wrongly when he chooses, but never writes wrongly unless he chooses--while it is only the unlettered man who writes wrongly unwillingly and without intending it: that in like manner the just man, he that has learnt and knows justice, never commits injustice unless when he intends it--while the unjust man, who has not learnt and does not know justice, commits injustice whether he will or not. It is the just man therefore, and none but the just man (Sokrates maintains), who commits injustice knowingly and wilfully: it is the unjust man who commits injustice without wishing or intending it.[74]

[Footnote 73: Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 19. [Greek: tô=n de\ dê\ tou\s phi/lous e)xapatô/ntôn e)pi\ blabê=| (i(/na mêde\ tou=to paralei/pômen a)/skepton) po/teros a)dikô/tero/s e)stin, o( e(kô\n ê)\ o( a)/kôn?]

The natural meaning of [Greek: e)pi\ blabê=|] would be, "for the purpose of mischief"; and Schneider, in his Index, gives "nocendi causâ". But in that meaning the question would involve an impossibility, for the words [Greek: o( a)/kôn] exclude any such purpose.]

[Footnote 74: Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 19-22.]

This is the same view which is worked out by the Platonic Sokrates in the Hippias Minor: beginning with the antithesis between the veracious and mendacious man (as Sokrates begins in Xenophon); and concluding with the general result--that it belongs to the good man to do wrong wilfully, to the bad man to do wrong unwillingly.

[Side-note: Aristotle combats the thesis. Arguments against it.]

Aristotle,[75] in commenting upon this doctrine of the Hippias Minor, remarks justly, that Plato understands the epithets _veracious_ and _mendacious_ in a sense different from that which they usually bear. Plato understands the words as designating one who _can_ tell the truth if he chooses--one who _can_ speak falsely if he chooses: and in this sense he argues plausibly that the two epithets go together, and that no man can be mendacious unless he be also veracious. Aristotle points out that the epithets in their received meaning are applied, not to the power itself, but to the habitual and intentional use of that power. The power itself is doubtless presupposed or implied as one condition to the applicability of the epithets, and is one common condition to the applicability of both epithets: but the distinction, which they are intended to draw, regards the intentions and dispositions with which the power is employed. So also Aristotle observes that Plato's conclusion--"He that does wrong wilfully is a better man than he that does wrong unwillingly," is falsely collected from induction or analogy. The analogy of the special arts and accomplishments, upon which the argument is built, is not applicable. _Better_ has reference, not to the amount of intelligence but to the dispositions and habitual intentions; though it presupposes a certain state and amount of intelligence as indispensable.

[Footnote 75: Aristotel. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1025, a. 8; compare Ethic. Nikomach. iv. p. 1127, b. 16.]

[Side-note: Mistake of Sokrates and Plato in dwelling too exclusively on the intellectual conditions of human conduct.]

Both Sokrates and Plato (in many of his dialogues) commit the error of which the above is one particular manifestation--that of dwelling exclusively on the intellectual conditions of human conduct,[76] and omitting to give proper attention to the emotional and volitional, as essentially co-operating or preponderating in the complex meaning of ethical attributes. The reasoning ascribed to the Platonic Sokrates in the Hippias Minor exemplifies this one-sided view. What he says is true, but it is only a part of the truth. When he speaks of a person "who does wrong unwillingly," he seems to have in view one who does wrong without knowing that he does so: one whose intelligence is so defective that he does not know when he speaks truth and when he speaks falsehood. Now a person thus unhappily circumstanced must be regarded as half-witted or imbecile, coming under the head which the Xenophontic Sokrates called _madness_:[77] unfit to perform any part in society, and requiring to be placed under tutelage. Compared with such a person, the opinion of the Platonic Sokrates may be defended--that the mendacious person, who _can_ tell truth when he chooses, is the better of the two in the sense of less mischievous or dangerous. But he is the object of a very different sentiment; moreover, this is not the comparison present to our minds when we call one man veracious, another man mendacious. We always assume, in every one, a measure of intelligence equal or superior to the admissible minimum; under such assumption, we compare two persons, one of whom speaks to the best of his knowledge and belief, the other, contrary to his knowledge and belief. We approve the former and disapprove the latter, according to the different intention and purpose of each (as Aristotle observes); that is, looking at them under the point of view of emotion and volition--which is logically distinguishable from the intelligence, though always acting in conjunction with it.

[Footnote 76: Aristotle has very just observations on these views of Sokrates, and on the incompleteness of his views when he resolved all virtue into knowledge, all vice into ignorance. See, among other passages, Aristot. Ethica Magna, i. 1182, a. 16; 1183, b. 9; 1190, b. 28; Ethic. Eudem. i. 1216, b, 4. The remarks of Aristotle upon Sokrates and Plato evince a real progress in ethical theory.]

[Footnote 77: Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 7. [Greek: tou\s diêmartêko/tas, ô(=n oi( polloi\ gignô/skousi, mainome/nous kalei=n], &c.]

[Side-note: They rely too much on the analogy of the special arts--They take no note of the tacit assumptions underlying the epithets of praise and blame.]

Again, the analogy of the special arts, upon which the Platonic Sokrates dwells in the Hippias Minor, fails in sustaining his inference. By a good runner, wrestler, harper, singer, speaker, &c., we undoubtedly mean one who can, if he pleases, perform some one of these operations well; although he can also, if he pleases, perform them badly. But the epithets _good_ or _bad_, in this case, consider exclusively that element which was left out, and leave out that element which was exclusively considered, in the former case. The good singer is declared to stand distinguished from the bad singer, or from the [Greek: i)diô/tês], who, if he sings at all, will certainly sing badly, by an attribute belonging to his intelligence and vocal organs. To sing well is a special accomplishment, which is possessed only by a few, and which no man is blamed for not possessing. The distinction between such special accomplishments, and justice or rectitude of behaviour, is well brought out in the speech which Plato puts into the mouth of the Sophist Protagoras.[78] "The special artists (he says) are few in number: one of them is sufficient for many private citizens. But every citizen, without exception, must possess justice and a sense of shame: if he does not, he must be put away as a nuisance--otherwise, society could not be maintained." The special artist is a citizen also; and as such, must be subject to the obligations binding on all citizens universally. In predicating of him that he is _good_ or _bad_ as a citizen, we merely assume him to possess the average intelligence, of the community; and the epithet declares whether his emotional and volitional attributes exceed, or fall short of, the minimum required in the application of that intelligence to his social obligations. It is thus that the words _good_ or _bad_ when applied to him as a citizen, have a totally different bearing from that which the same words have when applied to him in his character of special artist.

[Footnote 78: Plato, Protagoras, 322.]

[Side-note: Value of a Dialogue of Search, that it shall be suggestive, and that it shall bring before us different aspects of the question under review.]

The value of these debates in the Platonic dialogues consists in their raising questions like the preceding, for the reflection of the reader--whether the Platonic Sokrates may or may not be represented as taking what we think the right view of the question. For a Dialogue of Search, the great merit is, that it should be suggestive; that it should bring before our attention the conditions requisite for a right and proper use of these common ethical epithets, and the state of circumstances which is tacitly implied whenever any one uses them. No man ever learns to reflect upon the meaning of such familiar epithets, which he has been using all his life--unless the process be forced upon his attention by some special conversation which brings home to him an uncomfortable sentiment of perplexity and contradiction. If a man intends to acquire any grasp of ethical or political theory, he must render himself master, not only of the sound arguments and the guiding analogies but also of the unsound arguments and the misleading analogies, which bear upon each portion of it.

[Side-note: Antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic.]

There is one other point of similitude deserving notice, between the Greater and Lesser Hippias. In both of them, Hippias makes special complaint of Sokrates, for breaking the question in pieces and picking out the minute puzzling fragments--instead of keeping it together as a whole, and applying to it the predicates which it merits when so considered.[79] Here is the standing antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic: between those unconsciously acquired mental combinations which are poured out in eloquent, impressive, unconditional, and undistinguishing generalities--and the logical analysis which resolves the generality into its specialities, bringing to view inconsistencies, contradictions, limits, qualifications, &c. I have already touched upon this at the close of the Greater Hippias.

[Footnote 79: Plato, Hipp. Min. 369 B-C. [Greek: Ô)= Sô/krates, a)ei\ su/ tinas toiou/tous ple/keis lo/gous, kai\ a)polamba/nôn o(/ a)\n ê)=| duschere/staton tou= lo/gou, tou/tou e)/chei kata\ smikro\n e)phapto/menos, kai\ ou)ch o(/lô a)gôni/zei tô=| pra/gmati, peri\ o(/tou a)\n o( lo/gos ê)=|], &c.

A remark of Aristotle (Topica, viii. 164, b. 2) illustrates this dissecting function of the Dialectician.

[Greek: e)/sti ga/r, ô(s a(plô=s ei)pei=n, dialektiko\s o( protatiko\s kai\ e)nstatiko/s; e)/sti de\ to\ me\n protei/nesthai, e(\n poiei=n ta\ plei/ô (dei= ga\r e(\n o(/lô| lêphthê=nai pro\s o(\ o( lo/gos), to\ d' e)ni/stasthai, to\ e(n polla/; ê)\ ga\r diairei=, ê)\ a)nairei=, to\ me\n didou/s, to\ de\ ou)/, tô=n proteinome/nôn.]]