CHAPTER XIII.

HIPPIAS MAJOR--HIPPIAS MINOR.

[Side-note: Hippias Major--situation supposed--character of the dialogue. Sarcasm and mockery against Hippias.]

Both these two dialogues are carried on between Sokrates and the Eleian Sophist Hippias. The general conception of Hippias--described as accomplished, eloquent, and successful, yet made to say vain and silly things--is the same in both dialogues: in both also the polemics of Sokrates against him are conducted in a like spirit, of affected deference mingled with insulting sarcasm. Indeed the figure assigned to Hippias is so contemptible, that even an admiring critic like Stallbaum cannot avoid noticing the "petulans pene et proterva in Hippiam oratio," and intimating that Plato has handled Hippias more coarsely than any one else. Such petulance Stallbaum attempts to excuse by saying that the dialogue is a youthful composition of Plato:[1] while Schleiermacher numbers it among the reasons for suspecting the dialogue, and Ast, among the reasons for declaring positively that Plato is not the author.[2] This last conclusion I do not at all accept: nor even the hypothesis of Stallbaum, if it be tendered as an excuse for improprieties of tone: for I believe that the earliest of Plato's dialogues was composed after he was twenty-eight years of age--that is, after the death of Sokrates. It is however noway improbable, that both the Greater and Lesser Hippias may have been among Plato's earlier compositions. We see by the Memorabilia of Xenophon that there was repeated and acrimonious controversy between Sokrates and Hippias: so that we may probably suppose feelings of special dislike, determining Plato to compose two distinct dialogues, in which an imaginary Hippias is mocked and scourged by an imaginary Sokrates.

[Footnote 1: Stallbaum, Prolegg. in Hipp. Maj. p. 149-150; also Steinhart (Einleitung, p. 42-43), who says, after an outpouring of his usual invective against the Sophist: "Nevertheless the coarse jesting of the dialogue seems almost to exceed the admissible limit of comic effect," &c. Again, p. 50, Steinhart talks of the banter which Sokrates carries on with Hippias, in a way not less cruel (grausam) than purposeless, tormenting him with a string of successive new propositions about the definition of the Beautiful, which propositions, as fast as Hippias catches at them, he again withdraws of his own accord, and thus at last dismisses him (as he had dismissed Ion) uninstructed and unimproved, without even leaving behind in him the sting of anger, &c.

It requires a powerful hatred against the persons called Sophists, to make a critic take pleasure in a comedy wherein silly and ridiculous speeches are fastened upon the name of one of them, in his own day not merely honoured but acknowledged as deserving honour by remarkable and varied accomplishments--and to make the critic describe the historical Hippias (whom we only know from Plato and Xenophon--see Steinhart, note 7, p. 89; Socher, p. 221) as if he had really delivered these speeches, or something equally absurd.

How this comedy may be appreciated is doubtless a matter of individual taste. For my part, I agree with Ast in thinking it misplaced and unbecoming: and I am not surprised that he wishes to remove the dialogue from the Platonic canon, though I do not concur either in this inference, or in the general principle on which it proceeds, viz., that all objections against the composition of a dialogue are to be held as being also objections against its genuineness as a work of Plato. The Nubes of Aristophanes, greatly superior as a comedy to the Hippias of Plato, is turned to an abusive purpose when critics put it into court as evidence about the character of the real Sokrates.

K. F. Hermann, in my judgment, takes a more rational view of the Hippias Major (Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. p. 487-647). Instead of expatiating on the glory of Plato in deriding an accomplished contemporary, he dwells upon the logical mistakes and confusion which the dialogue brings to view; and he reminds us justly of the intellectual condition of the age, when even elementary distinctions in logic and grammar had been scarcely attended to.

Both K. F. Hermann and Socher consider the Hippias to be not a juvenile production of Plato, but to belong to his middle age.]

[Footnote 2: Schleierm. Einleitung. p. 401; Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, p. 457-459.]

[Side-note: Real debate between the historical Sokrates and Hippias in the Xenophontic Memorabilia--subject of that debate.]

One considerable point in the Hippias Major appears to have a bearing on the debate between Sokrates and Hippias in the Xenophontic Memorabilia: in which debate, Hippias taunts Sokrates with always combating and deriding the opinions of others, while evading to give opinions of his own. It appears that some antecedent debates between the two had turned upon the definition of the Just, and that on these occasions Hippias had been the respondent, Sokrates the objector. Hippias professes to have reflected upon these debates, and to be now prepared with a definition which neither Sokrates nor any one else can successfully assail, but he will not say what the definition is, until Sokrates has laid down one of his own. In reply to this challenge, Sokrates declares the Just to be equivalent to the Lawful or Customary: he defends this against various objections of Hippias, who concludes by admitting it.[3] Probably this debate, as reported by Xenophon, or something very like it, really took place. If so, we remark with surprise the feebleness of the objections of Hippias, in a case where Sokrates, if he had been the objector, would have found such strong ones--and the feeble replies given by Sokrates, whose talent lay in starting and enforcing difficulties, not in solving them.[4] Among the remarks which Sokrates makes in illustration to Hippias, one is--that Lykurgus had ensured superiority to Sparta by creating in the Spartans a habit of implicit obedience to the laws.[5] Such is the character of the Xenophontic debate.

[Footnote 3: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 4, 12-25.]

[Footnote 4: Compare the puzzling questions which Alkibiades when a youth is reported to have addressed to Perikles, and which he must unquestionably have heard from Sokrates himself, respecting the meaning of the word [Greek: No/mos] (Xen. Mem. i. 2, 42). All the difficulties in determining the definition of [Greek: No/mos], occur also in determining that of [Greek: No/mimon], which includes both Jus Scriptum and Jus Moribus Receptum.]

[Footnote 5: Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 15.]

[Side-note: Opening of the Hippias Major--Hippias describes the successful circuit which he had made through Greece, and the renown as well as the gain acquired by his lectures.]

Here, in the beginning of the Hippias Major, the Platonic Sokrates remarks that Hippias has been long absent from Athens: which absence, the latter explains, by saying that he has visited many cities in Greece, giving lectures with great success, and receiving high pay: and that especially he has often visited Sparta, partly to give lectures, but partly also to transact diplomatic business for his countrymen the Eleians, who trusted him more than any one else for such duties. His lectures (he says) were eminently instructive and valuable for the training of youth: moreover they were so generally approved, that even from a small Sicilian town called Inykus, he obtained a considerable sum in fees.

[Side-note: Hippias had met with no success at Sparta. Why the Spartans did not admit his instructions--their law forbids.]

Upon this Sokrates asks--In which of the cities were your gains the largest: probably at Sparta? _Hip._--No; I received nothing at all at Sparta. _Sokr._--How? You amaze me! Were not your lectures calculated to improve the Spartan youth? or did not the Spartans desire to have their youth improved? or had they no money? _Hip._--Neither one nor the other. The Spartans, like others, desire the improvement of their youth: they also have plenty of money: moreover my lectures were very beneficial to them as well as to the rest.[6] _Sokr._--How could it happen then, that at Sparta, a city great and eminent for its good laws, your valuable instructions were left unrewarded; while you received so much at the inconsiderable town of Inykus? _Hip._--It is not the custom of the country, Sokrates, for the Spartans to change their laws, or to educate their sons in a way different from their ordinary routine. _Sokr._--How say you? It is not the custom of the country for the Spartans to do right, but to do wrong? _Hip._--I shall not say that, Sokrates. _Sokr._--But surely they would do right, in educating their children better and not worse? _Hip._--Yes, they would do right: but it is not lawful for them to admit a foreign mode of education. If any one could have obtained payment there for education, I should have obtained a great deal; for they listen to me with delight and applaud me: but, as I told you, their law forbids.

[Footnote 6: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 283-284.]

[Side-note: Question, What is law? The law-makers always aim at the Profitable, but sometimes fail to attain it. When they fail, they fail to attain law. The lawful is the Profitable: the Unprofitable is also unlawful.]

_Sokr._--Do you call law a hurt or benefit to the city? _Hip._--Law is enacted with a view to benefit: but it sometimes hurts if it be badly enacted.[7] _Sokr._--But what? Do not the enactors enact it as the maximum of good, without which the citizens cannot live a regulated life? _Hip._--Certainly: they do so. _Sokr._--Therefore, when those who try to enact laws miss the attainment of good, they also miss the lawful and law itself. How say you? _Hip._--They do so, if you speak with strict propriety: but such is not the language which men commonly use. _Sokr._--What men? the knowing? or the ignorant? _Hip._--The Many. _Sokr._--The Many; is it _they_ who know what truth is? _Hip._--Assuredly not. _Sokr._--But surely those who do know, account the profitable to be in truth more lawful than the unprofitable, to all men. Don't you admit this? _Hip._--Yes, I admit they account it so in truth. _Sokr._--Well, and it is so, too: the truth is as the knowing men account it. _Hip._--Most certainly. _Sokr._--Now you affirm, that it is more profitable to the Spartans to be educated according to your scheme, foreign as it is, than according to their own native scheme. _Hip._--I affirm it, and with truth too. _Sokr._--You affirm besides, that things more profitable are at the same time more lawful? _Hip._--I said so. _Sokr._--According to your reasoning, then, it is more lawful for the Spartan children to be educated by Hippias, and more unlawful for them to be educated by their fathers-- if in reality they will be more benefited by you? _Hip._--But they will be more benefited by me. _Sokr._--The Spartans therefore act unlawfully, when they refuse to give you money and to confide to you their sons? _Hip._--I admit that they do: indeed your reasoning seems to make in my favour, so that I am noway called upon to resist it. _Sokr._--We find then, after all, that the Spartans are enemies of law, and that too in the most important matters--though they are esteemed the most exemplary followers of law.[8]

[Footnote 7: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 284 C-B.]

[Footnote 8: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 285.]

* * * * *

[Side-note: Comparison of the argument of the Platonic Sokrates with that of the Xenophontic Sokrates.]

Perhaps Plato intended the above argument as a derisory taunt against the Sophist Hippias, for being vain enough to think his own tuition better than that of the Spartan community. If such was his intention, the argument might have been retorted against Plato himself, for his propositions in the Republic and Leges: and we know that the enemies of Plato did taunt him with his inability to get these schemes adopted in any actual community. But the argument becomes interesting when we compare it with the debate before referred to in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, where Sokrates maintains against Hippias that the Just is equivalent to the Lawful. In that Xenophontic dialogue, all the difficulties which embarrass this explanation are kept out of sight, and Sokrates is represented as gaining an easy victory over Hippias. In this Platonic dialogue, the equivocal use of the word [Greek: no/mimon] is expressly adverted to, and Sokrates reduces Hippias to a supposed absurdity, by making him pronounce the Spartans to be enemies of law: [Greek: paranomou/s] bearing a double sense, and the proposition being true in one sense, false in the other. In the argument of the Platonic Sokrates, a law which does not attain its intended purpose of benefiting the community, is no law at all,--not lawful:[9] so that we are driven back again upon the objections of Alkibiades against Perikles (in the Xenophontic Memorabilia) in regard to what constitutes a law. In the argument of the Xenophontic Sokrates, law means a law actually established, by official authority or custom--and the Spartans are produced as eminent examples of a lawfully minded community. As far as we can assign positive opinion to the Platonic Sokrates in the Hippias Major, he declares that the profitable or useful (being that which men always aim at in making law) is The Lawful, whether actually established or not: and that the unprofitable or hurtful (being that which men always intend to escape) is The Unlawful, whether prescribed by any living authority or not. This (he says) is the opinion of the wise men who know: though the ignorant vulgar hold the contrary opinion. The explanation of [Greek: to\ di/kaion] given by the Xenophontic Sokrates ([Greek: to\ di/kaion = to\ no/mimon]), would be equivalent, if we construe [Greek: to\ no/mimon] in the sense of the Platonic Sokrates (in Hippias Major) as an affirmation that The Just was the generally useful--[Greek: To\ di/kaion = to\ koinê=| su/mphoron].

[Footnote 9: Compare a similar argument of Sokrates against Thrasymachus--Republic, i. 339.]

[Side-note: The Just or Good is the beneficial or profitable. This is the only explanation which Plato ever gives and to this he does not always adhere.]

There exists however in all this, a prevalent confusion between Law (or the Lawful) as actually established, and Law (or the Lawful) as it ought to be established, in the judgment of the critic, or of those whom he follows: that is (to use the phrase of Mr. Austin in his 'Province of Jurisprudence') Law as it would be, if it conformed to its assumed measure or test. In the first of these senses, [Greek: to\ no/mimon] is not one and the same, but variable according to place and time--one thing at Sparta, another thing elsewhere: accordingly it would not satisfy the demand of Plato's mind, when he asks for an explanation of [Greek: to\ di/kaion]. It is an explanation in the second of the two senses which Plato seeks--a common measure or test applicable universally, at all times and places. In so far as he ever finds one, it is that which I have mentioned above as delivered by the Platonic Sokrates in this dialogue: viz., the Just or Good, that which ought to be the measure or test of Law and Positive Morality, is, the beneficial or profitable. This (I repeat) is the only approach to a solution which we ever find in Plato. But this is seldom clearly enunciated, never systematically followed out, and sometimes, in appearance, even denied.

* * * * *

[Side-note: Lectures of Hippias at Sparta not upon geometry, or astronomy, &c., but upon the question--What pursuits are beautiful, fine, and honourable for youth.]

I resume the thread of the Hippias Major. Sokrates asks Hippias what sort of lectures they were that he delivered with so much success at Sparta? The Spartans (Hippias replies) knew nothing and cared nothing about letters, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy: but they took delight in hearing tales about heroes, early ancestors, foundation-legends of cities, &c., which his mnemonic artifice enabled him to deliver.[10] The Spartans delight in you (observes Sokrates) as children delight in old women's tales. Yes (replies Hippias), but that is not all: I discoursed to them also, recently, about fine and honourable pursuits, much to their admiration: I supposed a conversation between Nestor and Neoptolemus, after the capture of Troy, in which the veteran, answering a question put by his youthful companion, enlarged upon those pursuits which it was fine, honourable, beautiful for a young man to engage in. My discourse is excellent, and obtained from the Spartans great applause. I am going to deliver it again here at Athens, in the school-room of Pheidostratus, and I invite you, Sokrates, to come and hear it, with as many friends as you can bring.[11]

[Footnote 10: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 285 E.]

[Footnote 11: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 286 A-B.]

[Side-note: Question put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in the background, who has just been puzzling him with it--What is the Beautiful?]

I shall come willingly (replied Sokrates). But first answer me one small question, which will rescue me from a present embarrassment. Just now, I was shamefully puzzled in conversation with a friend, to whom I had been praising some things as honourable and beautiful,--blaming other things as mean and ugly. He surprised me by the interrogation--How do you know, Sokrates, what things are beautiful, and what are ugly? Come now, can you tell me, What is the Beautiful? I, in my stupidity, was altogether puzzled, and could not answer the question. But after I had parted from him, I became mortified and angry with myself; and I vowed that the next time I met any wise man, like you, I would put the question to him, and learn how to answer it; so that I might be able to renew the conversation with my friend. Your coming here is most opportune. I entreat you to answer and explain to me clearly what the Beautiful is; in order that I may not again incur the like mortification. You can easily answer: it is a small matter for you, with your numerous attainments.

[Side-note: Hippias thinks the question easy to answer.]

Oh--yes--a small matter (replies Hippias); the question is easy to answer. I could teach you to answer many questions harder than that: so that no man shall be able to convict you in dialogue.[12]

[Footnote 12: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 286 C-D.]

Sokrates then proceeds to interrogate Hippias, in the name of the absentee, starting one difficulty after another as if suggested by this unknown prompter, and pretending to be himself under awe of so impracticable a disputant.

[Side-note: Justice, Wisdom, Beauty must each be something. What is Beauty, or the Beautiful?]

All persons are just, through Justice--wise, through Wisdom--good, through Goodness or the Good--beautiful, through Beauty or the Beautiful. Now Justice, Wisdom, Goodness, Beauty or the Beautiful, must each be _something_. Tell me what the Beautiful is?

[Side-note: Hippias does not understand the question. He answers by indicating one particularly beautiful object.]

Hippias does not conceive the question. Does the man want to know what is a beautiful thing? _Sokr._--No; he wants to know what is _The Beautiful_. _Hip._--I do not see the difference. I answer that a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing. No one can deny that.[13]

[Footnote 13: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 287 A.]

_Sokr._--My disputatious friend will not accept your answer. He wants you to tell him, What is the Self-Beautiful?--that Something through which all beautiful things become beautiful. Am I to tell him, it is because a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing? He will say--Is not a beautiful mare a beautiful thing also? and a beautiful lyre as well? _Hip._--Yes;--both of them are so. _Sokr._--Ay, and a beautiful pot, my friend will add, well moulded and rounded by a skilful potter, is a beautiful thing too. _Hip._--How, Sokrates? Who can your disputatious friend be? Some ill-taught man, surely; since he introduces such trivial names into a dignified debate. _Sokr._--Yes; that is his character: not polite, but vulgar, anxious for nothing else but the truth. _Hip._--A pot, if it be beautifully made, must certainly be called beautiful; yet still, all such objects are unworthy to be counted as beautiful, if compared with a maiden, a mare, or a lyre.

[Side-note: Cross-questioning by Sokrates--Other things also are beautiful; but each thing is beautiful only by comparison, or under some particular circumstances--it is sometimes beautiful, sometimes not beautiful.]

_Sokr._--I understand. You follow the analogy suggested by Herakleitus in his dictum--That the most beautiful ape is ugly, if compared with the human race. So you say, the most beautiful pot is ugly, when compared with the race of maidens. _Hip_--Yes. That is my meaning. _Sokr._--Then my friend will ask you in return, whether the race of maidens is not as much inferior to the race of Gods, as the pot to the maiden? whether the most beautiful maiden will not appear ugly, when compared to a Goddess? whether the wisest of men will not appear an ape, when compared to the Gods, either in beauty or in wisdom.[14] _Hip._--No one can dispute it. _Sokr._--My friend will smile and say--You forget what was the question put. I asked you, What is the Beautiful?--the Self-Beautiful: and your answer gives me, as the Self-Beautiful, something which you yourself acknowledge to be no more beautiful than ugly? If I had asked you, from the first, what it was that was both beautiful and ugly, your answer would have been pertinent to the question. Can you still think that the Self-Beautiful,--that Something, by the presence of which all other things become beautiful,--is a maiden, or a mare, or a lyre?

[Footnote 14: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 289.]

[Side-note: Second answer of Hippias--_Gold_, is that by the presence of which all things become beautiful--scrutiny applied to the answer. Complaint by Hippias about vulgar analogies.]

_Hip._--I have another answer to which your friend can take no exception. That, by the presence of which all things become beautiful, is Gold. What was before ugly, will (we all know), when ornamented with gold, appear beautiful. _Sokr._--You little know what sort of man my friend is. He will laugh at your answer, and ask you--Do you think, then, that Pheidias did not know his profession as a sculptor? How came he not to make the statue of Athênê all gold, instead of making (as he has done) the face, hands, and feet of ivory, and the pupils of the eyes of a particular stone? Is not ivory also beautiful, and particular kinds of stone? _Hip._--Yes, each is beautiful, where it is becoming. _Sokr._--And ugly, where it is not becoming.[15] _Hip._--Doubtless. I admit that what is becoming or suitable, makes that to which it is applied appear beautiful: that which is not becoming or suitable, makes it appear ugly. _Sokr._--My friend will next ask you, when you are boiling the beautiful pot of which we spoke just now, full of beautiful soup, what sort of ladle will be suitable and becoming--one made of gold, or of fig-tree wood? Will not the golden ladle spoil the soup, and the wooden ladle turn it out good? Is not the wooden ladle, therefore, better than the golden? _Hip._--By Hêraklês, Sokrates! what a coarse and stupid fellow your friend is! I cannot continue to converse with a man who talks of such matters. _Sokr._--I am not surprised that you, with your fine attire and lofty reputation, are offended with these low allusions. But I have nothing to spoil by intercourse with this man; and I entreat you to persevere, as a favour to me. He will ask you whether a wooden soup-ladle is not more beautiful than a ladle of gold,--since it is more suitable and becoming? So that though you said--The Self-Beautiful is Gold--you are now obliged to acknowledge that gold is not more beautiful than fig-tree wood?

[Footnote 15: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 290.]

[Side-note: Third answer of Hippias--questions upon it--proof given that it fails of universal application.]

_Hip._--I acknowledge that it is so. But I have another answer ready which will silence your friend. I presume you wish me to indicate as The Beautiful, something which will never appear ugly to any one, at any time, or at any place.[16] _Sokr._--That is exactly what I desire. _Hip._--Well, I affirm, then, that to every man, always, and everywhere, the following is most beautiful. A man being healthy, rich, honoured by the Greeks, having come to old age and buried his own parents well, to be himself buried by his own sons well and magnificently. _Sokr._--Your answer sounds imposing; but my friend will laugh it to scorn, and will remind me again, that his question pointed to the Beautiful _itself_[17]--something which, being present as attribute in any subject, will make that subject (whether stone, wood, man, God, action, study, &c.) beautiful. Now that which you have asserted to be beautiful to every one everywhere, was not beautiful to Achilles, who accepted by preference the lot of dying before his father--nor is it so to the heroes, or to the sons of Gods, who do not survive or bury their fathers. To some, therefore, what you specify is beautiful--to others it is not beautiful but ugly: that is, it is both beautiful and ugly, like the maiden, the lyre, the pot, on which we have already remarked. _Hip._--I did not speak about the Gods or Heroes. Your friend is intolerable, for touching on such profanities.[18] _Sokr._--However, you cannot deny that what you have indicated is beautiful only for the sons of men, and not for the sons of Gods. My friend will thus make good his reproach against your answer. He will tell me, that all the answers, which we have as yet given, are too absurd. And he may perhaps at the same time himself suggest another, as he sometimes does in pity for my embarrassment.

[Footnote 16: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 291 C-D.]

[Footnote 17: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 292 D.]

[Footnote 18: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 293 B.]

[Side-note: Farther answers, suggested by Sokrates himself--1. The Suitable or Becoming--objections thereunto--it is rejected.]

Sokrates then mentions, as coming from hints of the absent friend, three or four different explanations of the Self-Beautiful: each of which, when first introduced, he approves, and Hippias approves also: but each of which he proceeds successively to test and condemn. It is to be remarked that all of them are general explanations: not consisting in conspicuous particular instances, like those which had come from Hippias. His explanations are the following:--

1. The suitable or becoming (which had before been glanced at). It is the suitable or becoming which constitutes the Beautiful.[19]

[Footnote 19: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 293 E.]

To this Sokrates objects: The suitable, or becoming, is what causes objects to _appear_ beautiful--not what causes them to _be really_ beautiful. Now the latter is that which we are seeking. The two conditions do not always go together. Those objects, institutions, and pursuits which _are really_ beautiful (fine, honourable) very often do not appear so, either to individuals or to cities collectively; so that there is perpetual dispute and fighting on the subject. The suitable or becoming, therefore, as it is certainly what makes objects appear beautiful, so it cannot be what makes them really beautiful.[20]

[Footnote 20: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 294 B-E.]

[Side-note: 2. The useful or profitable--objections--it will not hold.]

2. The useful or profitable.--We call objects beautiful, looking to the purpose which they are calculated or intended to serve: the human body, with a view to running, wrestling, and other exercises--a horse, an ox, a cock, looking to the service required from them--implements, vehicles on land and ships at sea, instruments for music and other arts all upon the same principle, looking to the end which they accomplish or help to accomplish. Laws and pursuits are characterised in the same way. In each of these, we give the name Beautiful to the useful, in so far as it is useful, when it is useful, and for the purpose to which it is useful. To that which is useless or hurtful, in the same manner, we give the name Ugly.[21]

[Footnote 21: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 295 C-D.]

Now that which is capable of accomplishing each end, is useful for such end: that which is incapable, is useless. It is therefore capacity, or power, which is beautiful: incapacity, or impotence, is ugly.[22]

[Footnote 22: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 295 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n to\ dunato\n e(/kaston a)perga/zesthai, ei)s o(/per dunato/n, ei)s tou=to kai\ chrê/simon; to\ de\ a)du/naton a)/chrêston? . . . . Du/namis me\n a)/ra kalo/n--a)dunami/a de\ ai)schro/n?]]

Most certainly (replies Hippias): this is especially true in our cities and communities, wherein political power is the finest thing possible, political impotence, the meanest.

Yet, on closer inspection (continues Sokrates), such a theory will not hold. Power is employed by all men, though unwillingly, for bad purposes: and each man, through such employment of his power, does much more harm than good, beginning with his childhood. Now power, which is useful for the doing of evil, can never be called beautiful.[23]

[Footnote 23: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 296 C-D.]

You cannot therefore say that Power, taken absolutely, is beautiful. You must add the qualification--Power used for the production of some good, is beautiful. This, then, would be the profitable--the cause or generator of good.[24] But the cause is different from its effect: the generator or father is different from the generated or son. The beautiful would, upon this view, be the cause of the good. But then the beautiful would be different from the good, and the good different from the beautiful? Who can admit this? It is obviously wrong: it is the most ridiculous theory which we have yet hit upon.[25]

[Footnote 24: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 297 B.]

[Footnote 25: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 297 D-E. [Greek: ei) oi(=o/n t' e)sti/n, e(kei/nôn ei)=nai (kinduneu/ei) geloio/teros tô=n prô/tôn.]]

[Side-note: 3. The Beautiful is a variety of the Pleasurable--that which is received through the eye and the ear.]

3. The Beautiful is a particular variety of the agreeable or pleasurable: that which characterises those things which cause pleasure to us through sight and hearing. Thus the men, the ornaments, the works of painting or sculpture, upon which we look with admiration,[26] are called beautiful: also songs, music, poetry, fable, discourse, in like manner; nay even laws, customs, pursuits, which we consider beautiful, might be brought under the same head.[27]

[Footnote 26: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 298 A-B.]

[Footnote 27: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 298 D.

Professor Bain observes:--"The eye and the ear are the great avenues to the mind for the æsthetic class of influences; the other senses are more or less in the monopolist interest. The blue sky, the green woods, and all the beauties of the landscape, can fill the vision of a countless throng of admirers. So with the pleasing sounds, &c." 'The Emotions and the Will.' ch. xiv. (The Æsthetic Emotions), sect. 2, p. 226, 3rd ed.]

[Side-note: Objections to this last--What property is there common to both sight and hearing, which confers upon the pleasures of these two senses the exclusive privilege of being beautiful?]

The objector, however, must now be dealt with. He will ask us--Upon what ground do you make so marked a distinction between the pleasures of sight and hearing, and other pleasures? Do you deny that these others (those of taste, smell, eating, drinking, sex) are really pleasures? No, surely (we shall reply); we admit them to be pleasures,--but no one will tolerate us in calling them beautiful: especially the pleasures of sex, which as pleasures are the greatest of all, but which are ugly and disgraceful to behold. He will answer--I understand you: you are ashamed to call these pleasures beautiful, because they do not seem so to the multitude: but I did not ask you, what _seems_ beautiful to the multitude--I asked you, what _is_ beautiful.[28] You mean to affirm, that all pleasures which do not belong to sight and hearing, are not beautiful: Do you mean, all which do not belong to both? or all which do not belong to one or the other? We shall reply--To either one of the two--or to both the two. Well! but, why (he will ask) do you single out these pleasures of sight and hearing, as beautiful exclusively? What is there peculiar in them, which gives them a title to such distinction? All pleasures are alike, so far forth as pleasures, differing only in the more or less. Next, the pleasures of sight cannot be considered as beautiful by reason of their coming through sight--for that reason would not apply to the pleasures of hearing: nor again can the pleasures of hearing be considered as beautiful by reason of their coming through hearing.[29] We must find something possessed as well by sight as by hearing, common to both, and peculiar to them,--which confers beauty upon the pleasures of both and of each. Any attribute of one, which does not also belong to the other, will not be sufficient for our purpose.[30] Beauty must depend upon some essential characteristic which both have in common.[31] We must therefore look out for some such characteristic, which belongs to both as well as to each separately.

[Footnote 28: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 298 E, 299 A.

[Greek: Mantha/nô, a)\n i)/sôs phai/ê, kai\ e)gô/, o(/ti pa/lai ai)schu/nesthe tau/tas ta\s ê(dona\s pha/nai kala\s ei)=nai, o(/ti ou) dokei= toi=s a)nthrô/pois; a)ll' e)gô\ ou) tou=to ê)rô/tôn, _o(\ dokei= toi=s polloi=s kalo\n ei)=nai_, a)ll' o(\, _ti e)/stin_.]]

[Footnote 29: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 299 D-E.]

[Footnote 30: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 300 B. A separate argument between Sokrates and Hippias is here as it were interpolated; Hippias affirms that he does not see how any predicate can be true of both which is not true of either separately. Sokrates points out that two men are Both, even in number, while each is One, an odd number. You cannot say of the two that they are one, nor can you say of either that he is Both. There are two classes of predicates; some which are true of either but not true of the two together, or _vice versâ_; some again which are true of the two and true also of each one--such as just, wise, handsome, &c. p. 301-303 B.]

[Footnote 31: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 302 C. [Greek: tê=| ou)si/a| tê=| e)p' a)mpho/tera e(pome/nê| ô)=|mên, ei)/per a)mpho/tera/ e)sti kala/, tau/tê| dei=n au)ta\ kala\ ei)=nai, tê=| de\ kata\ ta\ e(/tera a)poleipome/nê| mê/. kai\ e(/ti nu=n oi)=omai.]]

[Side-note: Answer--There is, belonging to each and to both in common, the property of being innocuous and profitable pleasures--upon this ground they are called beautiful.]

Now there is one characteristic which may perhaps serve. The pleasures of sight and hearing, both and each, are distinguished from other pleasures by being the most innocuous and the best.[32] It is for this reason that we call them beautiful. The Beautiful, then, is profitable pleasure--or pleasure producing good--for the profitable is, that which produces good.[33]

[Footnote 32: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E. [Greek: o(/ti a)sine/statai au(=tai tô=n ê(donô=n ei)si kai\ be/ltistai, kai\ a)mpho/terai kai\ e(kate/ra.]]

[Footnote 33: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E. [Greek: le/gete dê\ to\ kalo\n ei)=nai, _ê(donê\n ô)phe/limon_.]]

[Side-note: This will not hold--the Profitable is the cause of Good, and is therefore different from Good--to say that the beautiful is the Profitable, is to say that it is different from Good but this has been already declared inadmissible.]

Nevertheless the objector will not be satisfied even with this. He will tell us--You declare the Beautiful to be Pleasure producing good. But we before agreed, that the producing agent or cause is different from what is produced or the effect. Accordingly, the Beautiful is different from the good: or, in other words, the Beautiful is not good, nor is the Good beautiful--if each of them is a different thing.[34] Now these propositions we have already pronounced to be inadmissible, so that your present explanation will not stand better than the preceding.

[Footnote 34: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E--304 A. [Greek: Ou)/koun ô)phe/limon, phê/sei, to\ poiou=n ta)gatho/n, to\ de\ poiou=n kai\ to\ poiou/menon, e(/teron nu=n dê\ e)pha/nê, kai\ ei)s to\n pro/teron lo/gon ê(/kei u(mi=n o( lo/gos? _ou)/te ga\r to\ a)gatho\n a)\n ei)/ê kalo\n ou)/te to\ kalo\n a)gatho/n, ei)/per a)/llo au)tô=n e(ka/tero/n e)stin_.]

These last words deserve attention, because they coincide with the doctrine ascribed to Antisthenes, which has caused so many hard words to be applied to him (as well as to Stilpon) by critics, from Kolôtes downwards. The general principle here laid down by Plato is--A is something different from B, therefore A is not B and B is not A. In other words, A cannot be predicated of B nor B of A. Antisthenes said in like manner--[Greek: A)/nthrôpos] and [Greek: A)gatho\s] are different from each other, therefore you cannot say [Greek: A)/nthrôpos e)stin a)gatho/s]. You can only say [Greek: A)/nthrôpos e)stin A)/nthrôpos]--A)gatho/s e)stin a)gatho/s].

I have touched farther upon this point in my chapter upon Antisthenes and the other Viri Sokratici.]

* * * * *

[Side-note: Remarks upon the Dialogue--the explanations ascribed to Hippias are special conspicuous examples: those ascribed to Sokrates are attempts to assign some general concept.]

Thus finish the three distinct explanations of [Greek: To\ kalo\n], which Plato in this dialogue causes to be first suggested by Sokrates, successively accepted by Hippias, and successively refuted by Sokrates. In comparing them with the three explanations which he puts into the mouth of Hippias, we note this distinction: That the explanations proposed by Hippias are conspicuous particular exemplifications of the Beautiful, substituted in place of the general concept: as we remarked, in the Dialogue Euthyphron, that the explanations of the Holy given by Euthyphron in reply to Sokrates, were of the same exemplifying character. On the contrary, those suggested by Sokrates keep in the region of abstractions, and seek to discover some more general concept, of which the Beautiful is only a derivative or a modification, so as to render a definition of it practicable. To illustrate this difference by the language of Dr. Whewell respecting many of the classifications in Natural History, we may say--That according to the views here represented by Hippias, the group of objects called beautiful is given by Type, not by Definition:[35] while Sokrates proceeds like one convinced that some common characteristic attribute may be found, on which to rest a Definition. To search for Definitions of general words, was (as Aristotle remarks) a novelty, and a valuable novelty, introduced by Sokrates. His contemporaries, the Sophists among them, were not accustomed to it: and here the Sophist Hippias (according to Plato's frequent manner) is derided as talking nonsense,[36] because, when asked for an explanation of The Self-Beautiful, he answers by citing special instances of beautiful objects. But we must remember, first, that Sokrates, who is introduced as trying several general explanations of the Self-Beautiful, does not find one which will stand: next, that even if one such could be found, particular instances can never be dispensed with, in the way of illustration; lastly, that there are many general terms (the Beautiful being one of them) of which no definitions can be provided, and which can only be imperfectly explained, by enumerating a variety of objects to which the term in question is applied.[37] Plato thought himself entitled to objectivise every general term, or to assume a substantive Ens, called a Form or Idea, corresponding to it. This was a logical mistake quite as serious as any which we know to have been committed by Hippias or any other Sophist. The assumption that wherever there is a general term, there must also be a generic attribute corresponding to it--is one which Aristotle takes much pains to negative: he recognises terms of transitional analogy, as well as terms equivocal: while he also especially numbers the Beautiful among equivocal terms.[38]

[Footnote 35: See Dr. Whewell's 'History of the Inductive Sciences,' ii. 120 seq.; and Mr. John Stuart Mill's 'System of Logic,' iv. 8, 3.

I shall illustrate this subject farther when I come to the dialogue called Lysis.]

[Footnote 36: Stallbaum, in his notes, bursts into exclamations of wonder at the incredible stupidity of Hippias--"En hominis stuporem prorsus admirabilem," p. 289 E.]

[Footnote 37: Mr. John Stuart Mill observes in his System of Logic,