CHAPTER XXIV.

GORGIAS.

Persons who debate in the Gorgias. Celebrity of the historical Gorgias 317

Introductory circumstances of the dialogue. Polus and Kalliklês 318

Purpose of Sokrates in questioning. Conditions of a good definition _ib._

Questions about the definition of Rhetoric. It is the artisan of persuasion 319

The Rhetor produces belief without knowledge. Upon what matters is he competent to advise? 319

The Rhetor can persuade the people upon any matter, even against the opinion of the special expert. He appears to know, among the ignorant 320

Gorgias is now made to contradict himself. Polus takes up the debate with Sokrates 321

Polemical tone of Sokrates. At the instance of Polus he gives his own definition of rhetoric. It is no art, but an empirical knack of catering for the immediate pleasure of hearers, analogous to cookery. It is a branch under the general head flattery _ib._

Distinction between the true arts which aim at the good of the body and mind--and the counterfeit arts, which pretend to the same, but in reality aim at immediate pleasure 322

Questions of Polus. Sokrates denies that the Rhetors have any real power, because they do nothing which they really wish 323

All men wish for what is good for them. Despots and Rhetors, when they kill any one, do so because they think it good for them. If it be really not good, they do not do what they will, and therefore have no real power 324

Comparison of Archelaus, usurping despot of Macedonia--Polus affirms that Archelaus is happy, and that every one thinks so--Sokrates admits that every one thinks so, but nevertheless denies it 325

Sokrates maintains--1. That it is a greater evil to do wrong, than to suffer wrong. 2. That if a man has done wrong, it is better for him to be punished than to remain unpunished 326

Sokrates offers proof--Definition of Pulchrum and Turpe--Proof of the first point 327

Proof of the second point _ib._

The criminal labours under a mental distemper, which though not painful, is a capital evil. Punishment is the only cure for him. To be punished is best for him 328

Misery of the Despot who is never punished. If our friend has done wrong, we ought to get him punished: if our enemy, we ought to keep him unpunished 329

Argument of Sokrates paradoxical--Doubt expressed by Kalliklês whether he means it seriously 330

Principle laid down by Sokrates--That every one acts with a view to the attainment of happiness and avoidance of misery _ib._

Peculiar view taken by Plato of Good--Evil--Happiness 331

Contrast of the usual meaning of these words, with the Platonic meaning _ib._

Examination of the proof given by Sokrates--Inconsistency between the general answer of Polus and his previous declarations--Law and Nature 332

The definition of Pulchrum and Turpe, given by Sokrates, will not hold 334

Worse or better--for whom? The argument of Sokrates does not specify. If understood in the sense necessary for his inference, the definition would be inadmissible _ib._

Plato applies to every one a standard of happiness and misery peculiar to himself. His view about the conduct of Archelaus is just, but he does not give the true reasons for it 335

If the reasoning of Plato were true, the point of view in which punishment is considered would be reversed 336

Plato pushes too far the analogy between mental distemper and bodily distemper--Material difference between the two--Distemper must be felt by the distempered persons 337

Kalliklês begins to argue against Sokrates--he takes a distinction between Just by Law and Just by nature--Reply of Sokrates, that there is no variance between the two, properly understood 338

What Kalliklês says is not to be taken as a sample of the teachings of Athenian sophists. Kalliklês--rhetor and politician 339

Uncertainty of referring to Nature as an authority. It may be pleaded in favour of opposite theories. The theory of Kalliklês is made to appear repulsive by the language in which he expresses it 340

Sokrates maintains that self-command and moderation is requisite for the strong man as well as for others. Kalliklês defends the negative 343

Whether the largest measure of desires is good for a man, provided he has the means of satisfying them? Whether all varieties of desire are good? Whether the pleasurable and the good are identical? 344

Kalliklês maintains that pleasurable and good are identical. Sokrates refutes him. Some pleasures are good, others bad. A scientific adviser is required to discriminate them 345

Contradiction between Sokrates in the Gorgias, and Sokrates in the Protagoras _ib._

Views of critics about this contradiction 346

Comparison and appreciation of the reasoning of Sokrates in both dialogues _ib._

Distinct statement in the Protagoras. What are good and evil, and upon what principles the scientific adviser is to proceed in discriminating them. No such distinct statement in the Gorgias 347

Modern ethical theories. Intuition. Moral sense--not recognised by Plato in either of the dialogues 348

In both dialogues the doctrine of Sokrates is self-regarding as respects the agent: not considering the pleasures and pains of other persons, so far as affected by the agent 349

Points wherein the doctrine of the two dialogues is in substance the same, but differing in classification _ib._

Kalliklês, whom Sokrates refutes in the Gorgias, maintains a different argument from that which Sokrates combats in the Protagoras 350

The refutation of Kalliklês by Sokrates in the Gorgias, is unsuccessful--it is only so far successful as he adopts unintentionally the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras 351

Permanent elements--and transient elements--of human agency--how each of them is appreciated in the two dialogues 353

In the Protagoras _ib._

In the Gorgias 354

Character of the Gorgias generally--discrediting all the actualities of life 355

Argument of Sokrates resumed--multifarious arts of flattery, aiming at immediate pleasure 357

The Rhetors aim at only flattering the public--even the best past Rhetors have done nothing else--citation of the four great Rhetors by Kallikles 357

Necessity for temperance, regulation, order. This is the condition of virtue and happiness 358

Impossible to succeed in public life, unless a man be thoroughly akin to and in harmony with the ruling force 359

Danger of one who dissents from the public, either for better or for worse _ib._

Sokrates resolves upon a scheme of life for himself--to study permanent good, and not immediate satisfaction 360

Sokrates announces himself as almost the only man at Athens, who follows out the true political art. Danger of doing this 361

Mythe respecting Hades, and the treatment of deceased persons therein, according to their merits during life--the philosopher who stood aloof from public affairs, will then be rewarded _ib._

Peculiar ethical views of Sokrates--Rhetorical or dogmatical character of the Gorgias 362

He merges politics in Ethics--he conceives the rulers as spiritual teachers and trainers of the community _id._

_Idéal_ of Plato--a despotic lawgiver or man-trainer, on scientific principles, fashioning all characters pursuant to certain types of his own 363

Platonic analogy between mental goodness and bodily health--incomplete analogy--circumstances of difference _ib._

Sokrates in the Gorgias speaks like a dissenter among a community of fixed opinions and habits. Impossible that a dissenter, on important points, should acquire any public influence 364

Sokrates feels his own isolation from his countrymen. He is thrown upon individual speculation and dialectic 365

Antithesis between philosophy and rhetoric _ib._

Position of one who dissents, upon material points, from the fixed opinions and creed of his countrymen 366

Probable feelings of Plato on this subject--Claim put forward in the Gorgias of an independent _locus standi_ for philosophy, but without the indiscriminate cross-examination pursued by Sokrates 367

Importance of maintaining the utmost liberty of discussion. Tendency of all ruling orthodoxy towards intolerance 368

Issue between philosophy and rhetoric--not satisfactorily handled by Plato. Injustice done to rhetoric. Ignoble manner in which it is presented by Polus and Kalliklês 369

Perikles would have accepted the defence of rhetoric, as Plato has put it into the mouth of Gorgias 370

The Athenian people recognise a distinction between the pleasurable and the good: but not the same as that which Plato conceived 371

Rhetoric was employed at Athens in appealing to all the various established sentiments and opinions. Erroneous inferences raised by the Kalliklês of Plato 373

The Platonic Idéal exacts, as good, some order, system, discipline. But order may be directed to bad ends as well as to good. Divergent ideas about virtue 374

How to discriminate the right order from the wrong. Plato does not advise us 375

The Gorgias upholds the independence and dignity of the dissenting philosopher _ib._