v. 75:--

ei)/ ge ge/noit', ou)k e)/st'; ou)d' ei)/ po/te me/llei e)/sesthai; tô=s ge/nesis me\n a)pe/sbestai, kai\ a)/pistos o)/lethros.]]

[Footnote 64: Aristotel. De Coelo, iii. 1. [Greek: Oi( me\n ga\r au)tô=n o(/lôs a)nei=lon ge/nesin kai\ phthora/n; ou)the\n ga\r ou)/te gi/gnesthai/ phasin ou)/te phthei/resthai tô=n o)/ntôn, _a)lla\ mo/non dokei=n ê(mi=n_; oi)=on oi( peri\ Me/lisson kai\ Parmeni/dên], &c.]

[Footnote 65: Parm. Frag. v. 77.

[Greek: Ou)de\ diai/reto/n e)stin, e)pei\ pa=n e)sti\n o(/moion, ou)de/ ti tê=| ma=llon to/ ken ei)/rgoi min xune/chesthai, ou)de/ ti cheiro/teron; pa=n de\ ple/on e)sti\n e)o/ntos; tô=| xuneche\s pa=n e)sti/n; e)o\n ga\r e)o/nti pela/zei].

Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 5, p. 986, b. 29, with the Scholia, and Physic. i. 2, 3. Simplikius Comm. in Physic. Aristot. (apud Tennemann Geschichte der Philos. b. i. s. 4, vol. i. p. 170) [Greek: pa/nta ga/r phêsi (Parmeni/dês) ta\ o)/nta, katho\ o)/nta, e(n e)sti/n]. This chapter, in which Tennemann gives an account of the Eleatic philosophy, appears to me one of the best and most instructive in his work.]

[Footnote 66: "To make parts,--or to part or divide, Space or Time,--is nothing else but to consider one and another within the same: so that if any man divide space or time, the diverse conceptions he has are more, by one, than the parts which he makes. For his first conception is of that which is to be divided--then, of some part of it--and again of some other part of it: and so forwards, as long as he goes in dividing. But it is to be noted, that here, by _division_, I do not mean the severing or pulling asunder of one space or time from another (for does any man think that one hemisphere may be separated from the other hemisphere, or the first hour from the second?), but _diversity of consideration_: so that division is not made by the operation of the hands, but of the mind."--Hobbes, First Grounds of Philosophy, chap. vii. 5, vol. i. p. 96, ed. Molesworth.

"Expansion and duration have this farther agreement, that though they are both considered by us as having parts, yet their parts are not separable one from another, not even in thought; though the parts of bodies from which we take our measure of the one--and the parts of motion, from which we may take the measure of the other--may be interrupted or separated."--Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding,