Chapter 5

No better argument could have been offered in reply to those parties who clamored so unreasonably for war. Nor could the Pontiff have vindicated more eloquently the pacific character of that religion of which he is the Chief and Representative on earth. At the same time, he offered wise and authoritative counsel to the Italian nationalities. It was too late. The voice of friendly warning remained unheard amidst the din of strife and revolution. Need it be added—the cause of liberty perished for a time, victimized by its own excess.

The Socialist party had succeeded in gaining the populace of Rome, and they now constituted a power which prevailed in the city, whatever it might have been in the field. Skilfully managed by its leaders, it gave law to the Pontifical government. The Pope was not, however, powerless. A merely secular sovereign would have been crushed. He would have had no other resource than to abdicate. The Holy Father was not reduced to this extremity. He was still able to repel the unacceptable measures which the Socialists endeavoured to thrust upon him. They and their myrmidons vociferated for war with Austria. The Pope could still say there should be no war, and his people did not engage in the contest. A few among the Roman youth took the field. But, as effeminate as they were ardent, their courage cooled at the first sight of a _barbarian_ camp. They returned to their hearths, and there talked magniloquently of the tented fields which they had traversed, the savage hordes which they had encountered, and the dangers they had escaped. The party succeeded, however, in forcing a ministry on the reluctant Pontiff. Such a thing, when done through the representative body, however unreasonable, does not so much shock our idea of constitutional government. Neither can we approve the conduct of a faction which, whilst it was anything but constitutional, imposed a minister who held its principles, on the prince who had, of his own accord, become a constitutional monarch. Count Mamiani was one of those whom the clemency of Pius IX. had restored to their country, of all the parties thus favored, he alone refused to become bound in honor to the Holy Father never to abuse the favor, but to remain always a good and faithful subject. He was not without ability; was well informed, cool and resolute, but without any fixed principle in politics. He would as readily have set up a Red Republic as a constitutional monarchy. His political conduct was guided more by events and circumstances than by any well-conceived idea of what is right and fitting. He was one of those Italian Liberals who might be compared to the Necker of the French Revolution, whilst Mazzini and his followers were the ultra-radicals—the Robespierres of Roman politics. The Mamiani ministry necessarily arose out of the popular commotions, and was a protest of the excited masses against the Encyclical of 29th April. Its policy was no secret. In the days of popular turmoil they immediately preceded his nomination. Mamiani had declared distinctly in his harangues to the people that no priest should be appointed to any public office; that although Pius IX. should remain at the head of the government, they ought to obtain from him the revocation of his Encyclical of 29th April, and a declaration of war against Austria; that a new expedition should be speedily organized, and that an official bulletin of the war should be published daily. The warlike and revolutionary pronunciamentos, thus pompously made, could not fail to arouse the enthusiasm of the multitude, whose excitement was already so great. In matters of this nature, however, it is more easy to make fine speeches than to act. The popular Tribune was no sooner elevated to the ministry than he came to experience this difficulty. So it was convenient to forget the grand lessons which he had labored so vehemently to impress upon the people. He still, however, insisted, or appeared to insist, on the Austrian war. It may have been necessary for the new minister, in order to maintain his influence over the masses, to announce a war policy. Such policy, nevertheless, was chimerical. It was decidedly opposed by the legitimately-constituted powers of the State—the Sovereign on the one hand, who, by his name, his character, his virtues, his office, was still powerful; and on the other, the representative body. Accordingly, when this body came together in the beginning of June, there was an end to the government of the streets. But there arose new difficulties, and these difficulties the government of the Holy Father diligently studied to overcome. Cardinal Altieri delivered, on the part of the Sovereign Pontiff, an energetic and moving exhortation in support of unity and concord.

At the same time, he expressed his earnest hope that the newly-elected deputies would show their good will by concurring with the ministry in rendering the new adaptation of the constitution compatible with the Pontifical government.

This address, however ineffectual, possessed the merit of being thoroughly constitutional. The same praise cannot be awarded to Count Mamiani’s inaugural oration. Next day, which was the 9th of June, he ascended the Tribune, and there enunciated ideas which belonged more to the ministry in their individual capacity, than as the representatives of their Sovereign. This was supremely unconstitutional, and could only be the result of inexperience. What knowledge could those men have had of a free and national constitution? They ought, at least, to have been guided by the laws of honesty and honor. Who will say that they were so, when they gave out that the opinion which they expressed in favor of war was also that of the Pontiff? They endeavored thus to extend the sanction of a venerated name to designs that were subversive of Pontifical rule. Neither inexperience nor ignorance of constitutions presents any valid excuse, or even palliation of such a proceeding. No doubt they called it policy. It was the basest trickery.

In the hands of honest and judicious ministers the new constitution might have proved successful. So thought many persons who were well informed and competent to form an opinion in regard to so difficult a question. It had also many well-wishers. But for the war agitation, it would, to all appearance, have had a different fate. According to the exaggerated idea of Italian patriotism which prevailed, all true Italians were bound to fight for their country. On the Mamiani ministry devolved the very arduous task of reconciling this warlike spirit with the pacific character of the Pontificate. The Pope, like any other sovereign, had a right, no doubt, to defend himself. But both the theology which guided him and the traditions of his sovereignty forbade him to wage war on any people. Such was the difficulty which it fell to the lot of his ministry to solve. The arguments to which they had recourse, however well meant, were certainly very puerile. The Pope, as such, they insisted, might decide for peace, and condemn the shedding of blood, whilst, as temporal sovereign, he would authorize his ministers to act as should seem to them proper, and they would declare for war. This miserable sophistry only showed the weakness of the government which employed it. The Pontiff could not be expected to act as if he were two distinct persons. Nor whilst his ministers waged war, could he, whose representatives they were, be considered as neutral. For a few months that this ministry remained in office, the Pope continued to save his States by resisting the war-cry in opposition to their wishes. They were constantly at variance with him on this one great topic. His repugnance to war they could neither comprehend nor overcome. Popular demonstrations of the most threatening kind were often made, but to no purpose.

Justum et tenacem propositi virum, Non civium ardor prava jubentum mente quatit solida.

The Pontiff could not be moved from his firm resolve. The ministry, however, was shaken. With no better stay than sophistry and inconsistency, its weakness became apparent, and, as had been for some time clearly inevitable, it fell.

Before considering further the statesman-like efforts of Pius IX. in the cause of reform, it may not be out of place to review briefly the political opinion of the time. Although all men cannot be expected to accept, especially in many important matters, all the ideas of those distinguished writers, Gioberti, Balbo, D’Azeglio, it would be unjust, nevertheless, to deny them the credit of having imparted new vigor, if not its first impulse, to the cause of reform in Italy. They were not, like so many others, rash and inconsiderate. They desired not to hurry on recklessly to the wished-for goal. They thought it was unwise to aspire, all at once, to the greatest degree of liberty that might be attained. The end in view could be best reached, they conceived, by judicious and well-timed measures of reform, and by such institutions as might be developed at a later period, when the Italian people, unaccustomed as yet to a constitutional _regime_, should be capable of a greater degree of freedom. Nothing more wise can be supposed than this view of educating the people for liberty before bestowing on them the precious boon. Their idea of commencing the work of reform by waging war on Austria does not appear to be so commendable. It was not, surely, the part of prudence, when on the eve of a great and arduous undertaking, to stir up enemies on every side. And this was really what they sought to do by provoking Austrian hostility. The government at Vienna was not inclined to be hostile. It had joined with other powers in recommending reform to the late Pope. And now it would rather have been an ally than an enemy. But the “barbarian” Germans were entirely odious to the Italian people. The power of education ought to have been brought to bear on this same people, if only in order to disabuse their minds of this one noxious prejudice. It had become necessary at length to extend to them the benefits of a political education. And surely the eradication of illiberal ideas would have formed a profitable branch of study.

Pius IX., as has been already shown, was a practical reformer, and he had zealously undertaken the work of reform. Austria was not inclined to throw any impediments in the way of his patriotic labors. Only on one occasion did that powerful empire show a disposition to interfere. It was when Rome and the Sovereign Pontiff were threatened by popular commotions. Then, even on the representation of the Holy Father, Austria laid down her arms. With these constitutional reformers, if we except their insane idea of waging a needless war, very little fault can be found as politicians. So lately as the early part of the year 1848, their opinions were generally accepted throughout Italy. They were, at that time, also the most powerful party. Their numbers, authority and talent, gave them a decided superiority, whilst the Republicans were still a weak minority. In a few months, to all appearance, everything was completely changed. Talent, respectability, authority, and influence, were still on the side of the constitutional reformers. But, in the meantime, the Red Republic had gained the command of numbers. How this came to pass it may be well now to enquire.

In every great community there are many people who have no fixed principles in politics, and others, perhaps, not less numerous, who have no political principles at all. Both these classes of people depend entirety on other men for the sentiments and opinions by which, at any given moment, they shall be guided. Such people were sufficiently numerous at Rome and the other cities and provinces of Italy. Demagogues, therefore, who were not without ability and possessed fluency of speech, found it no very difficult task to fashion as they had a mind, for these classes of citizens, any amount of political principles and _programmes_. Those even who were fairly imbued with constitutional ideas, but whose minds were not wholly decided, the leaders of the Red Republic endeavored, and not without success, to gain to their side, by persuading them to compromise, as regarded certain points, to modify their opinions on others, change their designations, enter into coalitions, and adopt such ingenious arrangements as were proposed to them. Thus, by degrees, and as was only to be expected in such circumstances, the ultra-radicals succeeded but too well in causing the most extravagant political notions to prevail among the masses. As fate would have it, the revolution in France of February, 1848, which brought to an end the constitutional monarchy, afforded no slight aid and encouragement to the Red Republic of Italy. The men of this party might have understood, on reflection, to what extreme peril France became exposed, when she preferred brute force to constitutional proceeding, and tore down by violence a system which was, in many respects, good; and which, inasmuch as it was a constitution, could in due time have been extended and improved, receiving, as new wants arose, and wisdom and experience warranted, new developments, new adaptations, and daily increasing excellence. The constitutional element once removed, there was no medium between and safeguard against absolutism; on the one hand, and on the other anarchy, or the reign of violence and terror.

The extremists of Italy, however, beheld only in the too successful action of the Parisian populace a new step towards liberty. It became the duty of the Italian people, they declared, to march onward in the wake of enlightened France, and seize the prize that was at length presented for their acceptance. By such counsellors were the people abused and led astray. The moderate reform party were themselves excited by the enthusiasm which events had inspired, and heeded not the snares which the radical chiefs were laying for them. They were thus caught in the toils of those designing men, whilst they imagined that they were only working out their own idea. They supposed even that they were gaining Mazzini, whilst, in reality, Mazzini was making proselytes of them. Gioberti and his more immediate friends, who certainly were not without their faults, were abandoned by the crowd.

Reverting to what has been said already concerning Mazzini and his political doctrines, there need be no hesitation in pronouncing him the evil genius of modern Italy. In his book, “Italy in its Relations with Liberty and Moral Civilization,” which was published in France, where he was an exile, in 1847, he formally declared that “Young Italy” (the extreme Republicans) was the only party that could exercise any decisive influence on the destiny of Italy. At the same time, he treated with supreme contempt the ideas and hopes of the Reform party. In his mystic republic only was to be found, he affirmed, _the principle of unity, the ideal formula of actual progress_. This theory was the idol at whose shrine he offered sacrifice. His followers were also his fellow-worshippers, and he was their high priest. They were fascinated by his brilliant utopias. He was no longer a legislator, a politician, a philosopher only. He was a man of inspiration, a prophet, the Mahomet of a new hegira. His sayings were oracles. His doctrines were enunciated in sententious and poetical language; and from his place of exile they were disseminated over the Italian peninsula. It has been shown already how generously Pius IX. had recalled from banishment many subjects who had violated the laws of their country. These men were, at one time, no doubt, sincerely grateful, and showed how highly they appreciated the clemency of the Pontiff. It is not, however, surprising, if, as is usual in such circumstances, they began to consider more the severity which punished than the goodness which forgave them. Mazzini, among others, dissembled for a time. It may be—it has even been suggested that he was at first sincere, and had nobly resolved to sacrifice his favorite ideas to the cause of Italy. This opinion, however, was destined to be soon dispelled. It was not long till the newspaper _Italia del Popolo_, revealed the fact that he still held to extreme and revolutionary views. The minds of the people were poisoned by the ravings of this journal, and filled with mistrust. It became the instrument by which sects and parties were stirred up to work the ruin of the country. “_Unita e non unione. Assemblea del Popolo Italiano e non dieta._” “_Unity; not union. The assembly of the Italian people; not a federal diet._” Such was the watchword of Mazzini’s paper. And now the masses in the streets, under the guidance of the revolutionary leader, vociferated, “Live the Constituent Assembly!” with as much wild enthusiasm as they had formerly shouted for Pius IX. and reform. They had no distinct idea as to the meaning of the cry, but held it to be something extreme—a boundless measure of liberty. The populace wanted nothing better; and so they continued to shout, as they believed, for unity and Republican Government. Such a system was, from the very nature and position of the States of Italy, impracticable, and without pressure from without, foreign war—which the Mazzinians so much deprecated—could never have been established. How bring under the yoke of a general popular convention so many diverse peoples? They were all Italian, no doubt, but of different races, different nationalities, and each of them had for ages enjoyed its own national laws, customs, manners, prejudices, predilections, and antipathies. Nor had they common interests. What would be good and suitable in one State might, by no means, be adapted to the requirements of another; might even in some cases prove disastrous. The Grand Dukes had, by their mild and liberal rule, endeared themselves to the Tuscan people. Piedmont and Naples were alike devoted to their respective monarchies. The people of the Papal States, with the exception of the populace of Rome, were loyal to their government. That populace was greatly increased in 1848 by the influx of strangers—men holding Republican opinions, who were diligently culled from foreign nationalities. All but these abnormal masses were attached to the wise and clement rule of their Pontiff Sovereigns. Of late years many things had occurred to confirm their devoted loyalty. Above all, proof had been given that the sacred monarchy itself could, without any diminution of its real power and dignity, adopt such political reforms as were adapted to the wants of the time. All these monarchies, already so moderate and popular, were becoming every day more constitutional. Were they now to be overthrown? The Mazzinian idea aimed at nothing less. And yet, what would it not have cost? So many time-honored rights would never have been given up without a struggle—without bloodshed, if they were at all to be sacrificed. The torch of civil strife would have blazed from end to end of the Italian peninsula. And the ruin of the ancient monarchies—if, indeed, they had been destined at that time to fall—would probably have been succeeded by more despotic forms of kingly rule.

If, at the time in question, the people of the different States of Italy had acted in concert, uniting their influence, they would have assumed an imposing attitude, and might have obtained not only the forbearance but the aid even of their powerful neighbors in developing such of their institutions as already contained germs of liberty, in extending constitutional rights which had long existed in monarchies that were by no means absolute. In the place of political wisdom, however, a universal mania appeared to prevail. In the confusion of popular demonstrations, and the clamor of party cries, the “still small voice of reason” was unheard. The revolutionary chiefs harangued anew for war, and Italy, listening to their ill-omened counsels, took up arms against its sovereigns; and so gave the death-blow to its political existence.

The moderate Reform party conceived a plan which, if it had been carried into effect, would have been attended, no doubt, with great and happy results. They proposed to unite all the States of Italy by means of a Federal Parliament. They directed their efforts in the first place to promote union between the rulers and the people, recommending to the former moderation, to the latter a wise forbearance. They hoped thus to postpone the idea of absolute unity, and of the popular convention by which it was designed to establish and maintain it. The federal diet, an excellent idea of which was reduced to writing by the reverend and learned Abbate Rosmini, would have held the place of this assembly. According to this plan of confederation, the Pope, the King of Sardinia, the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the other Princes would have been united in an offensive and defensive league. Based on these principles, and provided that nothing were admitted in its details which could interfere with the sacred character and office of the Sovereign Pontiff, the proposed political arrangement would have found favor generally with all who held constitutional views. Eminent authors, at least, have written concerning it approvingly. M. Laboulaye, in his learned work on Count Balbo, says:

“It was necessary that the Princes should be induced to take an interest in the independence which concerned them so much, by forming a confederation like the _Zolverein_, which has so powerfully contributed to the union and the greatness of Germany. A confederation is undoubtedly that organization which is most suited to the character and the history of Italy, and it is also the best means of reviving Italian nationality and of checking Austria.”

Need it be added, that when there should have been question of restraining Austria, there would have been at hand an influence which Austria respected, and to which that mighty empire and its disciplined armies would have yielded more readily than to all Italy in arms. Without a confederation, or an arrangement equally good, there could be no better lot for Italy than civil war and national ruin.