Part 1

PHRENOLOGY EXAMINED.

PHRENOLOGY EXAMINED.

BY P. FLOURENS, MEMBER OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY, PERPETUAL SECRETARY OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (INSTITUTE OF FRANCE), MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SOCIETIES OF LONDON AND EDINBURG, OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF STOCKHOLM, OF MUNICH, AND OF TURIN, ETC. ETC. PROFESSOR OF COMPARATIVE PHYSIOLOGY AT THE NATURAL HISTORY MUSEUM AT PARIS.

“J’ai un sentiment clair de ma liberté.”

BOSSUET, TRAITÉ DU LIBRE ARBITRE.

Translated from the Second Edition of 1845, by CHARLES DE LUCENA MEIGS, M.D. MEMB. AMER. PHIL. SOC. ETC. ETC.

PHILADELPHIA: HOGAN & THOMPSON. 1846.

ENTERED ACCORDING TO ACT OF CONGRESS, IN THE YEAR 1845, BY CHARLES D. MEIGS, M. D. IN THE CLERK’S OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

TO DR. JAMES JACKSON, OF BOSTON.

MY DEAR SIR:

Perhaps I have taken too great a liberty in sending to you in this public manner, and in praying you to accept a copy of M. Flourens’ ingenious work. I have a very sincere desire that you should read the Inquiry; for I feel sure, that if you approve of it, the studious portion of our countrymen who may peruse it, will concur in the opinion of a gentleman so justly distinguished as yourself in every good word and work, and so capable of judging as to the salutary or evil tendency of the productions of our teeming press.

Inasmuch as many of our countrymen have heretofore felt, and many do now feel, desirous to know the truth as to the question of the multiple nature of the human mind, I have here translated the Examination, in order that they might have an opportunity to learn what is thought of Gall’s doctrines by one of the best and most precise thinkers in Europe.

Professor Flourens, by his writings on the brain and nervous system, by his courses of lectures at the Jardin des Plantes, by numerous writings on various scientific subjects, by his position in the Institute, has acquired a place among the literary and scientific celebrities of the present age. The amiable and elegant manners, and the fine disposition of this distinguished character, coincide with his acknowledged learning, and exactness, and zeal, to accumulate upon him the public respect and esteem. It is therefore with great confidence that I present to you this copy of his criticism upon Phrenology, since I suppose that every writing of so good a man might prove acceptable to you, and to the studious portion of our countrymen generally.

I invoke your approbation of what I cannot but deem a masterly criticism of the doctrines of Gall. So highly have I appreciated it, that I cannot readily suppose it possible to rise from its perusal, without being convinced that Gall was wholly mistaken in his views of the human mind; and of course, that all the cranioscopists, mesmerizers, and diviners, who have followed his track, or risen up on the basis of his opinions, are equally in error.

In order to have a just view of human responsibility, it is indispensable to entertain the justest notions of the nature of the human mind. If Phrenology _be an unsubstantial hypothesis_, no phrenologist is fit to be a juror, a judge, or a legislator: for since all human law—the whole social compact—and indeed all divine law, as relative to human propensities and actions—is founded on some real nature of the soul and mind, there is risk that manifestly erroneous conceptions of the freewill, of the conscience, of the judgment, and the perceptive powers, &c. may mislead the juror, the judge, and the legislator, in their vote, their opinion, and their notion of rights and wrongs.

If I am correct in entertaining these apprehensions as to the influence of false metaphysics on the public characters I have enumerated, there is abundant cause to rejoice when a blow is struck, like that pulverizing blow which is given in this work, to so considerable an error. There are thousands among the young and ardent and curious of our countrymen and countrywomen, whose minds may be likewise led astray from the truth; but if it be mischievous for the judge and the juror and the legislator to entertain erroneous views upon the nature of the understanding, the mind, or the soul, it is equally to be deprecated where the error is sown broadcast in the land.

Tares, if not in themselves poisonous, serve at best to choke up the useful or beautiful plants that ought to be cultivated in the fields of science or morals; but you will find that M. Flourens regards them as poisons.

Has not M. Flourens clearly refuted the phrenologists? and has he not, in doing so, performed a useful and an acceptable service?

I pray you to believe that I am, with the most grateful respect and the sincerest esteem,

Your obliged and faithful servant,

CHARLES D. MEIGS.

PHILADELPHIA, Dec. 10, 1845.

TO THE MEMORY OF DESCARTES.

AUTHOR’S PREFACE.

Having been a witness to the progress of phrenology, I was led to the composition of the following treatise.

Each succeeding age has a philosophy of its own.

The seventeenth century recovered from the philosophy of Descartes; the eighteenth recovered from that of Locke and Condillac: is the nineteenth to recover from that of Gall?

This is a really important question.

I propose, in this work, to examine phrenology as it appears in the writings of Gall, of Spurzheim, and of Broussais.

My wish is to be brief. There is, however, one great secret in the art of being brief: it is to be clear.

I frequently quote Descartes: I even go further; for I dedicate my work to his memory. I am writing in opposition to a bad philosophy, while I am endeavouring to recall a sound one.

CONTENTS.

I. Of Gall.—Of his doctrine in general 17

II. Of Gall.—Of the faculties 47

III. Of Gall.—The organs 59

IV. Of Spurzheim 96

V. Of Broussais 115

VI. Broussais’s Psycology 121

VII. Broussais’s Physiology 125

VIII. Of Gall 127

Note I. Anatomical relations supposed by Gall to exist between the organs of the external senses and the organs of the intellectual faculties 131

II. Difference between instinct and understanding 133

III. Gall as an observer 137

IV. The animal spirits 139

V. Exaggeration of Broussais, even in phrenology 140

VI. Contractility of Broussais 142

VII. Real labours of Gall as to the brain 143

I.

OF GALL.

OF HIS DOCTRINE IN GENERAL.

The great work in which Gall sets forth his doctrine is well known.[1] That work shall serve as the groundwork of my examination. I shall examine in succession each of the questions studied by the author; merely introducing some slight changes in the order in which they are arranged.

The entire doctrine of Gall is contained in two fundamental propositions, of which the first is, that understanding resides exclusively in the brain, and the second, that each particular faculty of the understanding is provided in the brain with an organ proper to itself.

Now, of these two propositions, there is certainly nothing new in the first one, and perhaps nothing true in the second one.

Let us commence our examination with the first proposition.

I say that in the first proposition, namely, that the brain is the exclusive seat of the understanding, there is nothing new. Gall himself admits this to be the case.

“For a long time,” says he, “both philosophers and physiologists, as well as physicians, have contended that the brain is the organ of the soul.”[2] The opinion that the brain, (as a whole, or such and such parts of the brain considered separately,) is the seat of the soul, is, in fact, as old as learning itself. Descartes placed the soul in the _pineal gland_, Willis in the _corpora striata_, Lapeyronie in the _corpus callosum_, &c. &c.

As to the more recent authorities, Gall quotes Sœmmerring, who says precisely that, “the brain is the exclusive instrument of all sensation, all thought, and all will,”[3] &c. He quotes Haller, who proves (proves is the very expression made use of by Gall himself,) that “sensation does not take place at the point where the object touches the nerve, the point where the impression is made, but in the brain.”[4] He might have quoted many other authorities to the same effect.

Were not Cabanis’s writings anterior to the time of Gall? and did not he say, “In order to obtain a just idea of those operations whose result is thought, the brain must be considered as a peculiar organ designed to produce it, just as the stomach and the bowels are designed to produce digestion, the liver to secrete the bile,” &c.?[5] a proposition so extravagant as to become almost ridiculous, but which is in truth the very proposition of Gall himself, except as to some exaggeration in the terms employed.

Antecedently to the time of Gall, both Sœmmerring and Cuvier, in the comparative anatomy of the various classes of animals, had investigated the ratio existing between the development of the encephalon and that of the intellectual power. The following remarkable phrase is from the pen of Cuvier: “The proportion of the brain to the medulla oblongata, a proportion which is greater in man than in all other animals, is a very good index of the perfection of the creature’s intelligence, because it is the best index of the preeminence of the organs of reflection above the organs of the external senses.”[6] And this other still more remarkable phrase: “In animals the intelligence appears to be greater in proportion as the volume of the hemispheres is greater.”[7]

Gall, in an especial manner, contends against the assertion of Bichat, who remarks that “The influence of the passions is exerted invariably upon the organic life, and not upon the animal life; all the signs that characterise them are referable to the former and not to the latter. Gestures, which are the mute exponents of the sentiments and the understanding, afford a remarkable proof of this truth. When we wish to signify something relative to the memory, the imagination, to our perception, to the judgment, &c. the hand moves involuntarily towards the head: if we wish to express love, joy, grief, hatred, it is directed towards the region of the heart, the stomach, or the bowels.”[8]

Doubtless, there is much that might be criticised in the foregoing words of Bichat; nevertheless, to say that the passions expend their influences upon the organic life, is not the same thing as to say that they reside or exist there. Bichat had already remarked, that “Every species of sensation has its centre in the brain, for sensation always supposes both impression and perception.”[9] Furthermore, regarding this distinction, (which as yet has not been drawn with sufficient clearness,) between the parts that are the seats of the passions, and the parts that are affected by their action, Gall might have found in Descartes the following remark, which is not less judicious than acute.

“Although,” says he, writing to Leroy, “the spirits that move the muscles come from the brain, we must, nevertheless, assign as seats of the passions, the places that are most considerably affected by them; hence, I say, the principal seat of the passions, as far as they relate to the body, is the heart, because it is the heart that is most sensibly affected by them; but their place is in the brain, in as far as they affect the soul, for the soul cannot suffer immediately, otherwise than through the brain.”[10]

As I am quoting Descartes, who, I ask, more clearly than Descartes has perceived that the soul can have only a very circumscribed seat in the economy, and that that circumscribed seat is the brain itself?

“We know,” says he, “that, properly speaking, it is not inasmuch as the soul is in the members that serve as organs to the exterior senses, that the soul feels, but inasmuch as she is in the brain, where she exercises the faculty denominated common sense.”[11]

He elsewhere observes: “Surprise is expressed because I do not recognise any other point of sensation except that which exists in the brain; but all physicians and surgeons will, I hope, assist me in proving this point, for they are aware of the common fact that a person who has been subjected to amputation of a limb, continues to feel pain in a part that he no longer possesses.”[12]

Here then, according to Descartes, we find that the soul is situated, that is to say, _feels_ in the brain, and only in the brain. The following passage shows with what precision he excluded even the external senses from any participation with the functions of the soul.

“I have shown,” says he, “that size, distance, and form are perceived only by the reason; and that, by deducing them the one from the other.”[13]

“I cannot agree with the assertion that this error (the error caused by the bent appearance of a stick partly plunged into water,) is not corrected by the understanding but by the touch; for, although the sense in question makes us judge that the stick is straight, yet that cannot correct the error of vision; but furthermore, it is requisite that reason should teach us to confide, in this case, rather to our judgment after touching, than to the judgment that we come to after using our eyes; but this reason cannot be attributed to the sense, but to the understanding alone; and in this very example, it is the understanding that corrects the error of the sense.”[14]

The brain, then, is the exclusive seat of the soul; and all sensation, even those operations that appear to depend upon the simple external sense, is function of the soul.

Gall falls back upon Condillac, who, much less rigorous in this particular than Descartes, says, that “all our faculties proceed from the senses.”[15] But when Condillac speaks thus, he evidently speaks by ellipsis, for he immediately adds these words: “The senses are only occasional causes. They do not feel; it is the soul that alone feels, through the medium of the organs.”[16]

Now, if it be the _soul_ only that feels, _à fortiori_, it is the soul only that _remembers_, that _judges_, that _imagines_, &c. _Memory_, _judgment_, _imagination_, &c., in a word, all our faculties, are therefore of the soul, and therefore come from the soul, and not from the senses.

There is no philosopher who has exaggerated more than Helvetius the influence of the senses upon the intelligence. But Helvetius says, “In whatsoever manner we interrogate experience, she always answers that any greater or lesser superiority of mind is independent of any greater or lesser perfection of the senses.”[17]

But I leave Helvetius and Condillac, and I return to Descartes, to Willis, to Lapeyronie, to Haller, Sœmmerring, Cuvier, &c. They all perceived and all asserted that the brain is the seat of the soul, and that it is so to the exclusion of the senses. Therefore, the proposition that the brain is the exclusive seat of the soul is not a new proposition, and hence does not originate with Gall. It belonged to science before it appeared in his Doctrine. The merit of Gall, and it is by no means a slender merit, consists in his having understood better than any of his predecessors the whole of its importance, and in having devoted himself to its demonstration. It existed in science before Gall appeared—it may be said to reign there ever since his appearance. Taking each particular sense, he excluded them all, one after another, from all immediate participation in the functions of the understanding.[18] Far from being developed in the direct ratio of the intellection, most of them are developed in an inverse ratio. Taste and smell are more developed in the quadruped than in man. Sight and hearing are more so in the bird than in the quadruped. The brain alone is in all classes developed in the ratio of the understanding. The loss of a sense does not lead to the loss of the intelligence. The understanding survives the loss of sight and hearing. It might survive the loss of all the senses. To interrupt the communication between the sense and the brain, is enough to insure the loss of the sense. The mere compression of the brain, which abolishes the intellection, abolishes all the senses. Far, therefore, from being organs of the intelligence, the organs of the senses are not even organs of the senses, they do not even exercise their functions as organs of the senses, except through the medium of the intelligence, and this intelligence resides only in the brain.

The brain alone, therefore, is the organ of the soul;—is it the whole brain—the brain taken _en masse_? Gall thought so, and Spurzheim followed Gall’s opinion; and all the phrenologists who have come after them have followed the examples of Gall and Spurzheim.

Yet, after all, it amounts to nothing. If we deprive an animal of its cerebellum, it loses only its locomotive action. If we deprive it of its tubercula quadrigemina, it loses its sight only; if we destroy its medulla oblongata, it loses its respiratory movements, and in consequence thereof, its life.[19] Neither of these parts, therefore, that is to say, the cerebellum, the tubercula quadrigemina, and the medulla oblongata, is the organ of the understanding.

The brain, properly so called, is so, and it alone. If we remove from an animal the brain, properly so called, or the hemispheres, it immediately loses its understanding, and loses nothing but its understanding.[20]

The brain, en masse, the _encephalon_, is then a multiple organ; and this multiple organ consists of four particular organs: the cerebellum, the seat of the principle that regulates the movements of locomotion; the tubercula quadrigemina, seats of the principle that regulates the sense of sight; the medulla oblongata, in which resides the principle that determines the respiratory motions; and the brain proper, the seat, and the exclusive seat of the intelligence.[21]

Therefore, when the phrenologists promiscuously place the intellectual and moral faculties in the brain, considered en masse, they deceive themselves. Neither the cerebellum, the quadrigeminal tubercles, nor the medulla oblongata can be regarded as seats of these faculties. All these faculties dwell solely in the brain, properly so called, or the hemispheres.

The question as to the precise seat of the intelligence, has undergone a great change since the time of Gall. Gall believed that the intelligence was seated indifferently in the whole encephalon, and it has been proved that it resides only in the hemispheres.

Further, it is not the encephalon taken en masse that is developed in the ratio of the intelligence of the creature, but the hemispheres. The mammifera are the animals most highly endowed with intelligence; they have, other things being equal, the most voluminous hemispheres. Birds are the animals most highly endowed with power of motion; their cerebellum is, other things being equal, the largest. Reptiles are the most torpid and apathetic of animals; they have the smallest brain, &c.

Every thing concurs then to prove, that the encephalon, in mass, is a multiple organ with multiple functions, consisting of different parts, of which some are destined to subserve the locomotive motions, others the motions of the respiration, &c., while one single one, the brain proper, is designed for the purposes of the intellection.

This being conceded, it is evident that the entire brain cannot be divided, as the phrenologists divide it, into a number of small organs, each of which is the seat of a distinct intellectual faculty; for the entire brain does not serve the purposes of what is called the intelligence. The hemispheres alone are the seats of the intellectual power; and consequently, the question as to whether the organ, the seat of the intelligence may be divided into several distinct organs, is a question relative solely to the uses and powers of the hemispheres.

Gall avers, and this is the second fundamental proposition of his doctrine, that the brain is divided into several organs, each one of which lodges a particular faculty of the soul. By the word _brain_, he understood the _whole brain_, and he thus deceived himself. Let us reduce the application of his proposition to the hemispheres alone, and we shall see that he has deceived himself again.

It has been shown by my late experiments, that we may cut away, either in front, or behind, or above, or on one side, a very considerable slice of the hemisphere of the brain, without destroying the intelligence. Hence it appears, that quite a restricted portion of the hemispheres may suffice for the purposes of intellection in an animal.[22]

On the other hand, in proportion as these reductions by slicing away the hemispheres are continued, the intelligence becomes enfeebled, and grows gradually less; and certain limits being passed, is wholly extinguished. Hence it appears, that the cerebral hemispheres concur, by their whole mass, in the full and entire exercise of the intelligence.[23]

In fine, as soon as one sensation is lost, all sensation is lost; when one faculty disappears, all the faculties disappear. There are not, therefore, different seats for the different faculties, nor for the different sensations. The faculty of feeling, of judging, of willing any thing, resides in the same place as the faculty of feeling, judging, or willing any other thing, and consequently this faculty, essentially a unit, resides essentially in a single organ.[24]

The understanding is, therefore, a unit.

According to Gall, there are as many particular kinds of intellect as there are distinct faculties of the mind. According to him, each faculty has its perception, its memory, its judgment, will, &c., that is to say, all the attributes of the understanding, properly so called.[25]

“All the intellectual faculties,” says he, “are endowed with the perceptive faculty, with attention, recollection, memory, judgment, and imagination.”[26]

Thus each faculty perceives, remembers, judges, imagines, compares, creates; but these are trifles—for each faculty _reasons_. “Whenever,” says Gall, “a faculty compares and judges of the relations of analogous or different ideas, there is an act of comparison, there is an act of judgment: a sequence of comparisons and judgments constitutes reasoning,” &c.[27]

Therefore, each and every faculty is an understanding by itself, and Gall says so expressly. “There are,” says he, “as many different kinds of intellect or understanding as there are distinct faculties.”[28] “Each distinct faculty,” says he, further, “is intellect or understanding—each _individual intelligence_ (the words are precise) has its proper organ.”[29]

But, admitting all these _kinds of intellects_, all these _individual understandings_, where are we to seek for the General Intelligence, the understanding, properly so called? It must, as you may please, be either an _attribute_ of each faculty,[30] or the _collective expression_ of all the faculties, or even the mere simple _result_ of their common and simultaneous action;[31] in one word, it cannot be that positive and single faculty which we understand, conceive of, and feel in ourselves, when we pronounce the word _soul_ or _understanding_.