CHAPTER VIII.

THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEAS OF JUSTICE AND MERCY, AND THEIR TRANSFER TO THE CHARACTER OF JEHOVAH.

Although holiness and justice convey to the mind ideas somewhat distinct from each other, yet the import of the one is shaded into that of the other. Holiness signifies the purity of the Divine nature from moral defilement; while justice signifies the relation which holiness causes God to sustain to men, as the subjects of the Divine government. In relation to God, one is subjective, declaring his freedom from sin; the other objective, declaring his opposition to sin, as the transgression of the Divine law. The Israelites might know that God was holy, and that he required of them clean hands and a clean heart in worship, and yet not understand the full demerit of transgressing the will of God, or the intensity of the Divine opposition to sin. God had given them the moral law, and they knew that he required them to obey it; but what, in the mind of God, was the proper desert of disobeying it, they did not know. They had been accustomed, like all idolaters, to consider the desert of moral transgression uncertain and unequal. Now they had to learn the immutable justice of the Supreme Being--that his holiness was not a passive quality, but an active attribute of his nature, and not only the opposite, but the antagonist principle to sin.

_In what manner, then, could a knowledge of the Divine justice, or of the demerit of sin in the sight of God, be conveyed to the minds of the Jews?_

There is but one way in which any being can manifest to other minds the opposition of his nature to sin. A lawgiver can manifest his views of the demerit of transgression in no other way than by the _penalty_ which he inflicts upon the transgressor. In all beings who have authority to make law for the obedience of others, the conscience is the standard which regulates the amount of punishment that should be inflicted upon the disobedient; and the measure of punishment which conscience dictates, is just in proportion to the opposition which the lawgiver feels to the transgression of his law; that is, the amount of regard which he has for his own law, will graduate the amount of opposition which he will feel to its transgression. The amount of opposition which any being feels to sin is in proportion to the holiness of that being, and conscience will sanction penalty up to the amount of opposition which he feels to crime.

If the father of a family felt no regard for the law of the sabbath, his conscience would not allow him to punish his children for violating, by folly or labour, a law which he did not himself respect. But a father who felt a sacred regard for the Divine law, would be required by his conscience to cause his children to respect the sabbath, and to punish them if they disobeyed. The penalty which one felt to be wrong, the other would feel to be right, because the disposition of the one towards the law was different from that of the other.

The principle, then, is manifest, that the more holy and just any being is, the more opposed he is to sin, and the higher penalty will his conscience sanction as the desert of transgressing the Divine law. Now God being infinitely holy, he is, therefore, infinitely opposed to sin; and the Divine conscience will enforce penalty accordingly.

This is the foundation of penalty in the Divine mind. The particular point of inquiry is, _How could the desert of sin, as it existed in the mind of God, be revealed to the Israelites?_

If the penalty inflicted is sanctioned by the conscience of the lawgiver, it follows, as has been shown, that the opposition of his nature to the crime is in exact proportion to the penalty which he inflicts upon the criminal. Penalty, therefore, inflicted upon the transgressor, is the only way by which the standard of justice, as it exists in the mind of God, could be revealed to men.

The truth of this principle may be made apparent by illustration. Suppose a father were to express his will in relation to the government of his family, and the regulations were no sooner made than some of his children should resist his authority and disobey his commands. Now, suppose the father should not punish the offenders, but treat them as he did his obedient children. By so doing he would encourage the disobedient, discourage the obedient, destroy his own authority, and make the impression upon the minds of all his children that he had no regard for the regulations which he had himself made. And further, if these regulations were for the general good of the family, by not maintaining them he would convince the obedient that he did not regard their best interests, but was the friend of the rebellious. And if he were to punish for the transgression but lightly, they would suppose that he estimated but lightly a breach of his commands, and they could not, from the constitution of their minds, suppose otherwise. But if the father, when one of the children transgressed, should punish him and exclude him from favour till he submitted to his authority, and acknowledged with a penitent spirit his offence, then the household would be convinced that the father's will was imperative, and that the only alternative presented to them was affectionate submission, or exclusion from the society of their father and his obedient children. Thus the amount of the father's regard for the law, his interest in the well-being of his obedient children, and the opposition of his nature to disobedience, would be graduated in every child's mind by the penalty which he inflicted for the transgression of his commands.

So in the case of an absolute lawgiver: his hostility to crime could be known only by the penalty which he inflicted upon the criminal. If, for the crime of theft, he were to punish the offender only by the imposition of a trifling fine, the impression would be made upon every mind that he did not, at heart, feel much hostility to the crime of larceny. If he had the power, and did not punish crime at all, he would thus reveal to the whole nation that he was in league with criminals, and himself a criminal at heart.

So in relation to murder, if he were to let the culprit go free, or inflict upon him but a slight penalty, he would thus show that his heart was tainted with guilt, and that there was no safety for good men under his government. But should he fix a penalty to transgression, declare it to all his subjects, and visit every criminal with punishment in proportion to his guilt, he would show to the world that he regarded the law, and was opposed directly and for ever to its transgression.

In like manner, and in no other way, could God manifest to men his infinite justice and his regard for the laws of his kingdom. Did he punish for sin with but a slight penalty, the whole universe of mind would have good reason to believe that the God of heaven was but little opposed to sin. Did he punish it with the highest degree of penalty, it would be evidence to the universe that his nature was in the highest degree opposed to sin and attached to holiness.

Now, whatever may be said in relation to the application of these principles to future rewards and punishments, one thing will be apparent to all, which is all that the present argument requires to be admitted, that is--the mind of man would receive an idea of the amount of God's opposition to sin, only by the amount of penalty which he inflicted upon the sinner.

Having ascertained these premises, we return to the inquiry, _How could the demerit of sin in the sight of God, or the idea of God's attribute of justice, be conveyed to the minds of the Jews?_

The people had now, in a good degree, a knowledge of what sin is. In addition to the light of natural conscience, which might guide them to some extent in relation to their duties to each other, they had the moral law, with the commentary of Moses, defining its precepts, and applying them to the conduct of life. Their minds were thus enlightened in relation to sin in the following particulars. First, those acts which were a transgression of the positive precepts of the law; Second, omissions of duties enjoined in the law; and, Third, many acts which the spirit of the law would condemn, but which might not be defined in any particular precept, would now be noticed by enlightened conscience, as sin against Jehovah, their holy benefactor, and the giver of the law.

Having thus been taught what was sin of commission and omission, one obvious design of the institution of sacrifices,[19] and one which has been perceived and understood, both by the Jews and Gentiles, was to convey to the mind the just demerit and proper penalty of sin.

[19] The question whether the sacrifices, and the particular regulations concerning them, were of Divine origin, does not affect the argument. Whether they were originally instituted by Divine command, or whether Moses, acting under Divine guidance, modified an existing institution and adapted it to the Divine purposes, both the design, and the end accomplished, would be the same. There are good reasons, however, for the opinion, that sacrifices for sin were of Divine appointment.

There were three classes of sacrifices in the old dispensation in which death was inflicted. The first, which Gentiles as well as Jews were permitted to offer, was the holocaust, or whole burnt-offering, which was entirely consumed by fire. Sacrifices of this description seem to have been offered from the earliest ages. They were offered, as the best informed think, as an acknowledgment of, and atonement for, general sinfulness of life. They seem to have had reference to the fact that men constantly violate known duty, and do many things which the light of nature and conscience teaches them not to do.

After the whole burnt-offering, was the sin-offering, sacrificed for an atonement, when the individual had transgressed any specific precept of the moral law.

The trespass-offering differed only from the sin-offering, as the learned suppose, in this, that it was a sacrifice for sins of omission, or for the non-performance of duty, while the sin-offering was made for a violation of the specific precepts of the moral law. Whether the design of the different classes of sacrifices was as above specified or not, is not material, further than it shows how nicely the forms of the Levitical economy were adjusted to meet that varied consciousness of sin which the precepts of the law and an enlightened conscience would produce in the human soul. The material point to which attention is necessary, with reference to the present discussion, is that by which the death and destruction of the animal offered in sacrifice were made to represent the desert of the sinner.

When an individual brought a sacrifice, he delivered it to the priest to be slain. He then laid his hands upon its head, thereby, in a form well understood among the Jews, transferring to it his sins; and then the life of the sacrifice was taken as a substitute for his own life. He was thus taught that the transgression of the law, or any act of sin against God, was worthy of death; and that the sacrifice suffered that penalty in his stead.

Further: the Jews had been taught that the blood of the sacrifice was its life; or rather the principle upon which the life of the body depended. Upon this subject they had the following express instruction--'For the life of the flesh is the blood: and I have given it to you upon the altar to make an atonement for your souls; for it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul.'[20] Now, this blood, which the Jews were thus taught to believe was the life of the sacrifice, was repeatedly sprinkled by the priest upon the mercy-seat and towards the holy place; thus presenting the life of the sacrifice immediately in the presence of God (the ineffable light, or symbol of God's presence, rested over the mercy-seat between the cherubim); signifying--as plainly as forms, and shadows, and external types could signify, that life had been rendered up to God to make atonement for their souls.

[20] Lev. xvii. 11.

Thus the idea was conveyed to their minds through the senses, that the desert of sin in the sight of God was the death of the soul. And while they stood praying in the outer court of the tabernacle, and beheld the dark volume of smoke ascending from the fire that consumed the sacrifice which was _burning in their stead_, how awful must have been the impression of the desert of sin, made by that dark volume of ascending smoke! The idea was distinct and deeply impressed, that God's justice was a consuming fire to sinners, and that their souls escaped only through a vicarious atonement.

As a picture in a child's primer will convey an idea to the infant mind, long before it can be taught by abstract signs, so the Jews, in the infancy of their knowledge of God, and before there were any abstract signs to convey that knowledge, had thrown into their minds, through the senses, the two essential ideas of God's justice and mercy: His justice, in that the wages of sin is the death of the soul; and His mercy, in that God would pardon the sinner, if he confessed his sin, acknowledged the life of his soul forfeited, and offered the life of the sacrifice as his substitute.

In this manner an idea of the desert of sin was conveyed to the minds of the Jews; God's law honoured, and the utter hostility of the Lawgiver to sin clearly manifested; and God's mercy was likewise revealed as stated in the preceding paragraph. Thus, in a manner accordant with the circumstances of the Jews, and by means adapted in their operation to the constitution of nature, was the knowledge of God's attribute of justice, and the relation which mercy sustains to that attribute, fully revealed in the world; and in view of the nature of things, it could have been revealed in no other way.[21]

[21] Inquiring readers of the Old Testament often find many things announced in the name of God, which must seem to them inconsistent with the majesty of the Divine nature, unless they view those requirements in the light of the inquiry, 'What impressions were they adapted to make upon the Jewish mind?' There are but few readers of the Old Testament who read on this subject intelligently. In this remark we do not refer to the historical or preceptive portions of these writings, but to the elements of the Mosaic institution. In order to see the design of many items of the system, we must consider those items as exhibitions to the senses, designed chiefly, perhaps only, to produce right ideas, or to correct erroneous ones then existing, in the minds of the Jews. The inquiry ought not to be, What impressions are they adapted to produce upon our minds concerning God? but, What impression would the particular revelation make upon _their_ minds? An instance or two will illustrate these remarks.

The adaptation to accomplish a necessary end is apparent in the scene at Sinai. The Israelites had been accustomed to an idolatry where the most common familiarities were practised with the idol gods. The idea of reverence and majesty which belongs to the character of God had been lost, by attaching the idea of divinity to the objects of sense. It was necessary, therefore, that the idea of God should now be clothed, in their minds, with that reverence and majesty which properly belong to it. The scene at Sinai was adapted to produce, and did produce for the time being, the right impression. The mountain was made to tremble to its base. A cloud of darkness covered its summit, from which the lightnings leaped out and thunders uttered their voices. In the words of a New Testament writer, there was 'blackness, and darkness, and tempest.' It was ordered that neither man nor beast should touch the mountain, lest they should be visited with death. The exhibition in all its forms was adapted to produce that sense of majesty and awe in view of the Divine character which the Israelites needed to feel. To minds subjected to the influence of other circumstances than those which affected the character of the Israelites in Egypt, such manifestations might not be necessary; but in the case of the Jews, accustomed as they had been to witness a besotting familiarity with idols, these manifestations were directly adapted to counteract low views of the Divine character, and to inspire the soul with suitable reverence in view of the infinite majesty and eternal power of the Being with whom they had to do.

The testimony of the Bible in relation to the design of the exhibition at Sinai corroborates the views that have been given. 'When the people saw it, they removed and stood afar off. And they said unto Moses, Speak thou with us, and we will hear: but let not God speak with us, lest we die. And Moses said unto the people, Fear not: for God is come to prove you, and that his fear may be before your faces, that ye sin not.'--Ex. xx. 18-20.

The scene which occurred afterwards, evinced the necessity of this exhibition, and developed the result of the proof [trial] that was made of their character. In the absence of Moses, they required an image of Jehovah to be made, and they feasted and 'played' (this last word having a licentious import) in its presence. Thus, after trial of the strongest exhibitions upon their mind, some of them proved themselves so incorrigibly attached to licentious idolatry, that they desired to worship Jehovah under the character of the Egyptian calf. They thus proved themselves unfit material, too corrupt for the end in view; and they were, in accordance with the reason of the case, destroyed.

Another conviction necessary to be lodged in the minds of the Israelites, and impressed deeply and frequently upon their hearts, was faith in the present and overruling God. This was the more necessary, as no visible image of Jehovah was allowed in the camp. There were but two methods possible by which their minds could be convinced of the immediate presence and power of God controlling all the events of their history. Either such exhibitions must be made that they would see certain ends accomplished without human instrumentality; or they must see human instrumentality clothed with a power which it is not possible in the nature of things it should in itself possess. The circumstances connected with the fall of Jericho will illustrate the case. The people were required to surround the city, by a silent procession during seven days, bearing the sacred ark, and blowing with rude instruments which they used for trumpets. On the seventh day, the people were to shout after they had compassed the city seven times; and when they shouted, according to a Divine promise, the walls of the city fell to the ground. Now, here was a process of means in which there was no adaptation to produce the external effect, in order that the INTERNAL effect, the great end of all revelation, might be produced--that they might be taught to recognise Jehovah as the present God of nature and providence, and rest their faith on him.

If the Israelites had, in this case, used the common instrumentalities to secure success--if they had destroyed the wall with instruments of war, or scaled its height with ladders, and thus overcome by the strength of their own arm, or the aid of their own devices, instead of being led to humble reliance upon God, and to recognise his agency in their behalf, they would have seen in the means which they had used a cause adequate to produce the effect, and they would have forgotten the First Cause, upon whose power they were dependent. Second causes were avoided in order that they might see the connection between the First Cause and the effect produced--human instrumentality stood in abeyance, in order that the Divine agency might be recognised. Thus they were taught to have faith in God, and to rely upon the presence and the power of the Invisible Jehovah.