Part 5

Two sorts of motions, I find your _Author_[1] doth attribute to Animals, _viz. Vital and Animal, the Vital motions_, says he, _are begun in Generation, and continued without Interruption through their whole life, and those are the Course of the Blood, the Pulse, the Breathing, Conviction, Nutrition, Excretion, &c. to which motions there needs no help of Imaginations; But the animal Motions, otherwise called voluntary Motions, are to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds: And because going, speaking, and the like voluntary motions, depend always upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what, it is evident, that the Imagination is the first Internal beginning of all voluntary Motion_. Thus far your _Author_. Whereof in short I give you my opinion, first concerning Vital Motions, that it appears improbable if not impossible to me, that Generation should be the cause and beginning of Life, because Life must of necessity be the cause of Generation, life being the Generator of all things, for without life motion could not be, and without motion not any thing could be begun, increased, perfected, or dissolved. Next, that Imagination is not necessary to Vital Motions, it is probable it may not, but yet there is required Knowledg, which I name Reason; for if there were not Knowledg in all Generations or Productions, there could not any distinct Creature be made or produced, for then all Generations would be confusedly mixt, neither would there be any distinct kinds or sorts of Creatures, nor no different Faculties, Proprieties, and the like. Thirdly, concerning _Animal Motions_, which your _Author_ names _Voluntary Motions, as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds, and that they depend upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what, and that Imagination is the first Internal beginning of them_; I think, by your _Authors_ leave, it doth imply a contradiction, to call them Voluntary Motions, and yet to say they are caused and depend upon our Imagination; for if the Imagination draws them this way, or that way, how can they be voluntary motions, being in a manner forced and necessitated to move according to Fancy or Imagination? But when he goes on in the same place and treats of Endeavour, Appetite, Desire, Hunger, Thirst, Aversion, Love, Hate, and the like, he derives one from the other, and treats well as a Moral Philosopher; but whether it be according to the truth or probability of Natural Philosophy, I will leave to others to judge, for in my opinion Passions and Appetites are very different, Appetites being made by the motions of the sensitive Life, and Passions, as also Imagination, Memory, &c. by the motions of the rational Life, which is the cause that Appetites belong more to the actions of the Body then the Mind: 'Tis true, the Sensitive and Rational self-moving matter doth so much resemble each other in their actions, as it is difficult to distinguish them. But having treated hereof at large in my other Philosophical Work, to cut off repetitions, I will refer you to that, and desire you to compare our opinions together: But certainly there is so much variety in one and the same sort of Passions, and so of Appetites, as it cannot be easily express'd. To conclude, I do not perceive that your _Author_ tells or expresses what the cause is of such or such actions, onely he mentions their dependance, which is, as if a man should converse with a Nobleman's Friend or Servant, and not know the Lord himself. But leaving him for this time, it is sufficient to me, that I know your Ladyship, and your Ladyship knows me, that I am,

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend, and humble Servant._

[1] _Leviathan, part._ 1. _c._ 6.

XIII.

_Madam,_

Having obey'd your Commands in giving you my opinion of the First Part of the Book of that famous and learned _Author_ you sent me, I would go on; but seeing he treats in his following Parts of the Politicks, I was forced to stay my Pen, because of these following Reasons. First, That a Woman is not imployed in State Affairs, unless an absolute Queen. Next, That to study the Politicks, is but loss of Time, unless a man were sure to be a Favourite to an absolute Prince. Thirdly, That it is but a deceiving Profession, and requires more Craft then Wisdom. All which considered, I did not read that part of your _Author_: But as for his _Natural Philosophy_, I will send you my opinion so far as I understand it: For what belongs to Art, as to Geometry, being no Scholar, I shall not trouble my self withal. And so I'l take my leave of you, when I have in two or three words answered the Question you sent me last, which was, Whether Nature be the Art of God, Man the Art of Nature, and a Politick Government the Art of Man? To which I answer, 'Tis probable it may be so; onely I add this, That Nature doth not rule God, nor Man Nature, nor Politick Government Man; for the Effect cannot rule the Cause, but the Cause doth rule the Effect: Wherefore if men do not naturally agree, Art cannot make unity amongst them, or associate them into one Politick Body and so rule them; But man thinks he governs, when as it is Nature that doth it, for as nature doth unite or divide parts regularly or irregularly, and moves the several minds of men and the several parts of mens bodies, so war is made or peace kept: Thus it is not the artificial form that governs men in a Politick Government, but a natural power, for though natural motion can make artificial things, yet artificial things cannot make natural power; and we might as well say, nature is governed by the art of nature, as to say man is ruled by the art and invention of men. The truth is, Man rules an artificial Government, and not the Government Man, just like as a Watch-maker rules his Watch, and not the Watch the Watch-maker. And thus I conclude and rest,

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend_

_and Servant._

XIV.

_MADAM,_

Concerning the other Book of that learned Author _Hobbs_ you sent me, called _Elements of Philosophy_, I shall likewise according to your desire, give you my judgment and opinion of it as I have done of the former, not that I intend to prejudice him any ways thereby, but onely to mark those places wherein I seem to dissent from his opinions, which liberty, I hope, he will not deny me; And in order to this, I have read over the first Chapter of the mentioned Book, treating of Philosophy in General, wherein amongst the rest, discoursing of the Utility of Natural Philosophy, and relating the commodities and benefits which proceed from so many arts and sciences, he is pleased to say,[1] that they are _injoyed almost by all people of_ Europe, Asia, _and some of_ Africa, _onely the Americans, and those that live neer the Poles do want them: But why_, says he, _have they sharper wits then these? Have not all men one kind of soul, and the same faculties of mind?_ To which, give me leave, _Madam_, to add, That my opinion is, that there is a difference between the Divine and the Natural soul of man, and though the natural mind or soul is of one kind, yet being made of rational matter, it is divideable and composeable, by which division and composition, men may have more or less wit, or quicker and slower wit; the like for Judgments, Imaginations, Fancies, Opinions, &c. For were the natural rational mind individeable, all men would have the like degree of wit or understanding, all men would be Philosophers or fools, which by reason they are not, it proves the natural rational mind is divideable and composeable, making variations of its own several parts by self-motion; for it is not the several outward objects, or forreign instructions, that make the variety of the mind; neither is wit or ingenuity alike in all men; for some are natural Poets, Philosophers, and the like, without learning, and some are far more ingenious then others, although their breeding is obscure and mean, Neither will learning make all men Scholars, for some will continue Dunces all their life time; Neither doth much experience make all men wise, for some are not any ways advanced in their wisdom by much and long experiences; And as for Poetry, it is according to the common Proverb; a _Poet is born, not made_; Indeed learning doth rather hurt Fancy, for great Scholars are not always good Poets, nor all States-men Natural Philosophers, nor all Experienced Men Wise Men, nor all Judges Just, nor all Divines Pious, nor all Pleaders or Preachers Eloquent, nor all Moral Philosophers Vertuous; But all this is occasioned by the various Motions of the rational self-moving matter, which is the Natural Mind. And thus much for the present of the difference of wits and faculties of the mind; I add no more, but rest,

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend,_

_and Servant._

[1] _Art._ 7.

XV.

_MADAM,_

My Discourse for the present shall be of _Infinite_, and the question shall be first _Whether several Finite parts, how many soever there be, can make an Infinite._ Your Author says,[1] _that several Finite parts when they are all put together make a whole Finite_; which, if his meaning be of a certain determinate number, how big soever, of finite parts, I do willingly grant, for all what is determinate and limited, is not Infinite but Finite; neither is there any such thing, as Whole or All in Infinite; but if his meaning be, that no Infinite can be made of finite parts, though infinite in number, I deny it; Next he says _there can be no such thing as One in Infinite, because No thing can be said One, except there be another to compare it withal_; which in my opinion doth not follow, for there is but One God, who is Infinite, and hath none other to be compared withal, and so there may be but one Onely Infinite in Nature, which is Matter. But when he says, _there cannot be an Infinite and Eternal Division_, is very true, _viz._, in this sense, that one single part cannot be actually infinitely divided, for the Compositions hinder the Divisions in Nature, and the Divisions the Compositions, so that Nature, being Matter, cannot be composed so, as not to have parts, nor divided so, as that her parts should not be composed, but there are nevertheless infinite divided parts in Nature, and in this sense there may also be infinite divisions, as I have declared in my Book of Philosophy[2]. And thus there are Infinite divisions of Infinite parts in Nature, but not Infinite actual divisions of one single part; But though Infinite is without end, yet my discourse of it shall be but short and end here, though not my affection, which shall last and continue with the life of

Madam,

_Your Faithful Friend_

_and Humble Servant._

[1] _Elem. of Philos. c._ 7. _a._ 1 2.

[2] _P._ 1. _c._ 8.

XVI.

_MADAM,_

An _Accident_, says your _Author_,[1] _is nothing else, but the manner of our Conception of body, or that Faculty of any body, by which it works in us a Conception of it self_; To which I willingly consent; but yet I say, that these qualities cannot be separated from the body, for as impossible it is that the essence of Nature should be separable from Nature, as impossible is it that the various modes or alterations, either of Figures or Motions, should be separable from matter or body; Wherefore when he goes on, and says,[2] _An accident is not a body, but in a body, yet not so, as if any thing were contained therein, as if for example, redness were in blood in the same manner as blood is in a bloody cloth; but as magnitude is in that which is great, rest in that which resteth, motion in that which is moved_; I answer, that in my opinion, not any thing in Nature can be without a body, and that redness is as well in blood, as blood is in a bloody cloth, or any other colour in any thing else; for there is no colour without a body, but every colour hath as well a body as any thing else, and if Colour be a separable accident, I would fain know, how it can be separated from a subject, being bodiless, for that which is no body is nothing, and nothing cannot be taken away from any thing; Wherefore as for natural Colour it cannot be taken away from any creature, without the parts of its substance or body; and as for artificial Colours, when they are taken away, it is a separation of two bodies, which joyned together; and if Colour, or Hardness, or Softness do change, it is nothing else but an alteration of motions and not an annihilation, for all changes and alterations remain in the power of Corporeal motions, as I have said in other places; for we might as well say, life doth not remain in nature, when a body turns from an animal to some other figure, as believe that those, they name accidents, do not remain in Corporeal Motions; Wherefore I am not of your _Authors_ mind, when he says,[3] that _when a White thing is made black, the whiteness perishes_; for it cannot perish, although it is altered from white to black, being in the power of the same matter, to turn it again from black to white, so as it may make infinite Repetitions of the same thing; but by reason nature takes delight in variety, she seldom uses such repetitions; nevertheless that doth not take away the Power of self-moving matter, for it doth not, and it cannot, are two several things, and the latter doth not necessarily follow upon the former; Wherefore not any, the least thing, can perish in Nature, for if this were possible, the whole body of nature might perish also, for if so many Figures and Creatures should be annihilated and perish without any supply or new Creation, Nature would grow less, and at last become nothing; besides it is as difficult for Nature to turn something into nothing, as to Create something out of nothing; Wherefore as there is no annihilation or perishing in Nature, so there is neither any new Creation in Nature. But your _Author_ makes a difference between bodies and accidents, saying, _that bodies are things and not generated, but accidents are Generated and not things._ Truly, _Madam_, these accidents seem to me to be like _Van Helmont's_ Lights, Gases, Blazes and Ideas; and Dr _More's_ Immaterial Substances or Dæmons, onely in this Dr _More_ hath the better, that his Immaterial Substances, are beings, which subsist of themselves, whereas accidents do not, but their existence is in other bodies; But what they call Accidents, are in my opinion nothing else but Corporeal Motions, and if these accidents be generated, they must needs be bodies, for how nothing can be Generated in nature, is not conceivable, and yet your _Author_ denies,[4] that _Accidents are something, namely some part of a natural thing_; But as for Generations, they are onely various actions of self-moving matter, or a variety of Corporeal Motions, and so are all Accidents whatsoever, so that there is not any thing in nature, that can be made new, or destroyed, for whatsoever was and shall be, is in nature, though not always in act, yet in power, as in the nature and power of Corporeal motions, which is self-moving matter, And as there is no new Generation of Accidents, so there is neither a new Generation of Motions; wherefore when your _Author_ says,[5] _That, when the hand, being moved, moveth the pen, the motion doth not go out of the hand into the pen, for so the writing might be continued, though the hand stood still, but a new motion is generated in the pen, and is the pens motion_: I am of his opinion, that the motion doth not go out of the hand into the pen, and that the motion of the pen, is the pens own motion; but I deny, that after holding the hand a little while still, and beginning to write again, a new motion of the pen is generated; for it is onely a repetition, and not a new generation, for the Hand, Pen and Ink, repeat but the same motion or action of writing: Besides, Generation is made by Connexion or Conjunction of parts, moving by consent to such or such Figures, but the motion of the Hand or the Pen is always one and the same; wherefore it is but the variation and repetition in and of the same motion of the Hand, or Pen, which may be continued in that manner infinitely, just as the same Corporeal Motions can make infinite variations and repetitions of one and the same Figure, repeating it as oft as they please, as also making Copy of Copy; And although I do not deny, but there are Generations in Nature, yet not annihilations or perishings, for if any one motion or figure should perish, the matter must perish also; and if any one part of matter can perish, all the matter in nature may perish also; and if there can any new thing be made or created in nature, which hath not been before, there may also be a new Nature, and so by perishings and new Creations, this World would not have continued an age; But surely whatsoever is in Nature, hath been existent always. Wherefore to conclude, it is not the generation and perishing of an Accident that makes its subject to be changed, but the production and alteration of the Form, makes it said to be generated or destroyed, for matter will change its motions and figures without perishing or annihilating; and whether there were words or not, there would be such causes and effects; But having not the art of Logick to dispute with artificial words, nor the art of Geometry to demonstrate my opinions by Mathematical Figures, I fear they will not be so well received by the Learned; However, I leave them to any mans unprejudiced Reason and Judgment, and devote my self to your service, as becomes,

Madam,

_Your Ladiships_

_humble and faithful Servant._

[1] _Elem. of Philos. c._ 8. _art._ 2.

[2] _Art._ 3.

[3] _Art._ 20.

[4] _Art._ 2.

[5] _Art._ 21.

XVII.

_MADAM,_

Your _Author_ concerning Place and Magnitude says,[1], that _Place is nothing out of the mind, nor Magnitude any thing within it; for Place is a meer Phantasme of a body of such quantity and figure, and Magnitude a peculiar accident of the body_; but this doth not well agree with my reason, for I believe that Place, Magnitude and Body are but one thing, and that Place is as true an extension as Magnitude, and not a feigned one; Neither am I of his opinion, _that Place is Immoveable_, but that place moves, according as the body moveth, for not any body wants place, because place and body is but one thing, and wheresoever is body, there is also place, and wheresoever is place, there is body, as being one and the same; Wherefore _Motion cannot be a relinquishing of one place and acquiring another_,[2] for there is no such thing as place different from body, but what is called change of place, is nothing but change of corporeal motions; for, say an house stands in such a place, if the house be gone, the place is gone also, as being impossible that the place of the house should remain, when the house is taken away; like as a man when he is gone out of his chamber, his place is gone too; 'Tis true, if the ground or foundation do yet remain, one may say, there stood such an house heretofore, but yet the place of the house is not there really at that present, unless the same house be built up again as it was before, and then it hath its place as before; Nevertheless the house being not there, it cannot be said that either place or house are annihilated, _viz._, when the materials are dissolved, no not when transformed into millions of several other figures, for the house remains still in the power of all those several parts of matter; and as for _space_, it is onely a distance betwixt some parts or bodies; But an _Empty place_ signifies to my opinion Nothing, for if place and body are one and the same, and empty is as much as nothing; then certainly these two words cannot consist together, but are destructive to one another. Concerning, that your _Author_ says,[3] _Two bodies cannot be together in the same place, nor one body in two places at the same time_, is very true, for there are no more places then bodies, nor more bodies then places, and this is to be understood as well of the grosser, as the purest parts of nature, of the mind as well as of the body, of the rational and sensitive animate matter as well as of the inanimate, for there is no matter, how pure and subtil soever, but is imbodied, and all that hath body hath place. Likewise I am of his opinion,[4] _That one body hath always one and the same magnitude_; for, in my opinion, magnitude, place and body do not differ, and as place, so magnitude can never be separated from body. But when he speaks of _Rest_, I cannot believe there is any such thing truly in Nature, for it is impossible to prove, that any thing is without Motion, either consistent, or composing, or dissolving, or transforming motions, or the like, although not altogether perceptible by our senses, for all the Matter is either moving or moved, and although the moved parts are not capable to receive the nature of self-motion from the self-moving parts, yet these self-moving parts, being joyned and mixt with all other parts of the moved matter, do always move the same; for the Moved or Inanimate part of Matter, although it is a Part of it self, yet it is so intermixt with the self-moving Animate Matter, as they make but one Body; and though some parts of the Inanimate may be as pure as the Sensitive Animate Matter, yet they are never so subtil as to be self-moving; Wherefore the Sensitive moves in the Inanimate, and the Rational in the Sensitive, but often the Rational moves in it self. And, although there is no rest in nature, nevertheless Matter could have been without Motion, when as it is impossible that Matter could be without place or magnitude, no more then Variety can be without motion; And thus much at this present: I conclude, and rest,

Madam,

_Your Faithful Friend_

_and Servant._

[1] _Part._ 2. _c._ 8. _a._ 5.

[2] _Art._ 10.

[3] _Art._ 8.

[4] _Art._ 5.

XVIII.

_MADAM,_