Part 4

Your Authour going on in his discourse of Imagination, says,[1] _That, as we have no Imagination, whereof we have not formerly had sense, in whole or in parts; so we have not Transition from one Imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our senses_. To which my answer is in short, that the Rational part of Matter in One composed figure, as in Man, or the like Creature, may make such figures, as the senses did never make in that composed Figure or Creature; And though your Authour reproves those that say,[2] _Imaginations rise of themselves_; yet, if the self-moving part of Matter, which I call Rational, makes Imaginations, they must needs rise of themselves; for the Rational part of matter being free and self-moving, depends upon nothing, neither Sense nor Object, I mean, so, as not to be able to work without them. Next, when your Author, defining _Understanding_, says that it is nothing else, but[3] _an Imagination raised by words or other voluntary signs_, My Answer is, that Understanding, and so Words and Signs are made by self-moving Matter, that is, Sense and Reason, and not Sense and Reason by Words and Signs; wherefore Thoughts are not like[4] _Water upon a plain Table, which is drawn and guided by the finger this or that way_, for every Part of self-moving matter is not alwayes forced, perswaded or directed, for if all the Parts of Sense and Reason were ruled by force or perswasion, not any wounded Creature would fail to be healed, or any disease to be cured by outward Applications, for outward Applications to Wounds and Diseases might have more force, then any Object to the Eye: But though there is great affinity and sympathy between parts, yet there is also great difference and antipathy betwixt them, which is the cause that many objects cannot with all their endeavours work such effects upon the Interiour parts, although they are closely press'd, for Impressions of objects do not always affect those parts they press. Wherefore, I am not of your Author's opinion, that all Parts of Matter press one another; It is true, _Madam_, there cannot be any part single, but yet this doth not prove, that parts must needs press each other: And as for his _Train of Thoughts_, I must confess, that Thoughts for the most part are made orderly, but yet they do not follow each other like Geese, for surely, man has sometimes very different thoughts; as for Example, a man sometime is very sad for the death of his Friend, and thinks of his own death, and immediately thinks of a wanton Mistress, which later thought, surely, the thought of Death did not draw in; wherefore, though some thought may be the Ring-leader of others, yet many are made without leaders. Again, your Author in his description of the Mind sayes, that _the discourse of the mind, when it is govern'd by design, is nothing but seeking, or the Faculty of Invention; a hunting out of the Causes of some Effects, present or past; or of the Effects of some present or past Cause. Sometimes a man seeks what he has lost, and from that Place and Time wherein he misses it, his mind runs back from place to place, and time to time, to find where and when he had it, that is to say, to find some certain and limited Time and Place, in which to begin a method of Seeking. And from thence his thoughts run over the same places and times to find what action or other occasion might make him lose it. This we call Remembrance or calling to mind. Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compass whereof he is to seek, and then his thoughts run over all the Parts thereof in the same manner as one would sweep a room to find a Jewel, or as a Spaniel ranges the field till he find a sent; or as a Man should run over the Alphabet to start a Rime._ Thus far your Author: In which discourse I do not perceive that he defineth what the Mind is, but I say, that if, according to his opinion, nothing moves it self, but one thing moves another, then the Mind must do nothing, but move backward and forward, nay, onely forward, and if all actions were thrusting or pressing of parts, it would be like a crowd of People, and there would be but little or no motion, for the crowd would make a stoppage, like water in a glass, the mouth of the Glass being turned downwards, no water can pass out, by reason the numerous drops are so closely press'd, as they cannot move exteriously. Next, I cannot conceive how the Mind can run back either to Time or Place, for as for Place, the mind is inclosed in the body, and the running about in the parts of the body or brain will not inform it of an Exterior place or object; besides, objects being the cause of the minds motion, it must return to its Cause, and so move until it come to the object, that moved it first, so that the mind must run out of the body to that object, which moved it to such a Thought, although that object were removed out of the World (as the phrase is:) But for the mind to move backward, to Time past, is more then it can do; Wherefore in my opinion, Remembrance, or the like, is onely a repetition of such Figures as were like to the Objects; and for Thoughts in Particular, they are several figures, made by the mind, which is the Rational Part of matter, in its own substance, either voluntarily, or by imitation, whereof you may see more in my Book of Philosophical Opinions. Hence I conclude, that Prudence is nothing else, but a comparing of Figures to Figures, and of the several actions of those Figures; as repeating former Figures, and comparing them to others of the like nature, qualities, proprieties, as also chances, fortunes, &c. Which figuring and repeating is done actually, in and by the Rational Matter, so that all the observation of the mind on outward Objects is onely an actual repetition of the mind, as moving in such or such figures and actions; and when the mind makes voluntary Figures with those repeated Figures, and compares them together, this comparing is Examination; and when several Figures agree and joyn, it is Conclusion or Judgment: likewise doth Experience proceed from repeating and comparing of several Figures in the Mind, and the more several Figures are repeated and compared, the greater the experience is. One thing more there is in the same Chapter, which I cannot let pass without examination; Your Authour says, That _things Present onely have a being in Nature, things Past onely a being in the Memory, but things to come have no being at all_; Which how it possibly can be, I am not able to conceive; for certainly, if nothing in nature is lost or annihilated, what is past, and what is to come, hath as well a being, as what is present; and, if that which is now, had its being before, why may it not also have its being hereafter? It might as well be said, that what is once forgot, cannot be remembred; for whatsoever is in Nature, has as much a being as the Mind, and there is not any action, or motion, or figure, in Nature, but may be repeated, that is, may return to its former Figure, When it is altered and dissolved; But by reason Nature delights in variety, repetitions are not so frequently made, especially of those things or creatures, which are composed by the sensitive corporeal motions in the inanimate part of Matter, because they are not so easily wrought, as the Rational matter can work upon its own parts, being more pliant in its self, then the Inanimate matter is; And this is the reason, that there are so many repetitions of one and the same Figure in the Rational matter, which is the Mind, but seldom any in the Gross and inanimate part of Matter, for Nature loves ease and freedom: But to conclude, _Madam_, I perceive your Author confines Sense onely to Animal-kind, and Reason onely to Man-kind: Truly, it is out of self-love, when one Creature prefers his own Excellency before another, for nature being endued with self-love, all Creatures have self-love too, because they are all Parts of Nature; and when Parts agree or disagree, it is out of Interest and Self-love; but Man herein exceeds all the rest, as having a supernatural Soul, whose actions also are supernatural; To which I leave him, and rest,

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend,_

_and Servant._

[1] _Leviathan, part._ 1. _c._ 3.

[2] _part._ 1. _c._ 2.

[3] _ibid. c._ 3.

[4] _ibid._

IX.

_MADAM,_

When your Author discourseth of the use of _Speech or Words and Names_, he is pleas'd to say,[1] _That their use is to serve for marks and notes of Remembrance_; Whereof to give you my opinion, I say, That Speech is natural to the shape of Man; and though sometimes it serves for marks or notes of remembrance, yet it doth not always, for all other Animals have Memory without the help of Speech, and so have deaf and dumb men, nay more then those that hear and speak: Wherefore, though Words are useful to the mind, and so to the memory, yet both can be without them, whereas Words cannot be without Memory; for take a Bird, and teach him to speak, if he had not Memory, before he heard the words, he could never learn them. You will ask me, _Madam_, What then, is Memory the Cause of Speech? I answer, Life and Knowledg, which is Sense and Reason, as it creates and makes all sorts of Creatures, so also amongst the rest it makes Words: And as I said before, that Memory may be without the help of Speech or Words, so I say also, that there is a possibility of reckoning of numbers, as also of magnitudes, of swiftness, of force, and other things without words, although your Author denies it: But some men are so much for Art, as they endeavour to make Art, which is onely a Drudgery-maid of Nature, the chief Mistress, and Nature her Servant, which is as much as to prefer Effects before the Cause, Nature before God, Discord before Unity and Concord.

Again, your _Author_, in his Chapter of Reason,[2] defines _Reason_ to be nothing else but _Reckoning_: I answer, That in my opinion Reckoning is not Reason it self, but onely an effect or action of Reason; for Reason, as it is the chiefest and purest degree of animate matter, works variously and in divers motions, by which it produces various and divers effects, which are several Perceptions, as Conception, Imagination, Fancy, Memory, Remembrance, Understanding, Judgment, Knowledg, and all the Passions, with many more: Wherefore this Reason is not in one undivided part, nor bound to one motion, for it is in every Creature more or less, and moves in its own parts variously; and in some Creatures, as for example, in some men, it moves more variously then in others, which is the cause that some men are more dull and stupid, then others; neither doth Reason always move in one Creature regularly, which is the cause, that some men are mad or foolish: And though all men are made by the direction of Reason, and endued with Reason, from the first time of their birth, yet all have not the like Capacities, Understandings, Imaginations, Wits, Fancies, Passions, &c. but some more, some less, and some regular, some irregular, according to the motions of Reason or Rational part of animate matter; and though some rational parts may make use of other rational Parts, as one man of another mans Conceptions, yet all these parts cannot associate together; as for example, all the Material parts of several objects, no not their species, cannot enter or touch the eye without danger of hurting or loosing it, nevertheless the eye makes use of the objects by patterning them out, and so doth the rational matter, by taking patterns from the sensitive; And thus knowledg or perception of objects, both sensitive and rational, is taken without the pressure of any other parts; for though parts joyn to parts, (for no part can be single) yet this joining doth not necessarily infer the pressure of objects upon the sensitive organs; Whereof I have already discoursed sufficiently heretofore, to which I refer you, and rest

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend_

_and Servant._

[1] _Leviathan, part._ 1. _c._ 4.

[2] _Ch._ 5.

X.

_MADAM,_

_Understanding_ says your Author,[1] _is nothing else but Conception caused by speech, and therefore, if speech be peculiar to man, (as, for ought I know, it is) then is understanding peculiar to him also._ Where he confineth Understanding onely to speech and to Mankind; But, by his leave, _Madam_, I surely believe, that there is more understanding in Nature, then that, which is in speech, for if there were not, I cannot conceive, how all the exact forms in Generations could be produced, or how there could be such distinct degrees of several sorts and kinds of Creatures, or distinctions of times and seasons, and so many exact motions and figures in Nature: Considering all this, my reason perswadeth me, that all Understanding, which is a part of Knowledg, is not caused by speech, for all the motions of the Celestial Orbs are not made by speech, neither is the knowledg or understanding which a man hath, when sick, as to know or understand he is sick, made by speech, nor by outward objects, especially in a disease he never heard, nor saw, nor smelt, nor tasted, nor touched; Wherefore all Perception, Sensation, Memory, Imagination, Appetite, Understanding, and the like, are not made nor caused by outward objects, nor by speech. And as for names of things, they are but different postures of the figures in our mind or thoughts, made by the Rational matter; But Reasoning is a comparing of the several figures with their several postures and actions in the Mind, which joyned with the several words, made by the sensitive motions, inform another distinct and separate part, as an other man, of their minds conceptions, understanding, opinions, and the like.

Concerning Addition and Subtraction, wherein your _Author_ sayes Reasoning consists, I grant, that it is an act of Reasoning, yet it doth not make Sense or Reason, which is Life and Knowledge, but Sense and Reason which is self-motion, makes addition and subtraction of several Parts of matter; for had matter not self-motion, it could not divide nor compose, nor make such varieties, without great and lingring retardments, if not confusion. Wherefore all, what is made in Nature, is made by self-moving matter, which self-moving matter doth not at all times move regularly, but often irregularly, which causes false Logick, false Arithmetick, and the like; and if there be not a certainty in these self-motions or actions of Nature, much less in Art, which is but a secundary action; and therefore, neither speech, words, nor exterior objects cause Understanding or Reason. And although many parts of the Rational and Sensitive Matter joyned into one, may be stronger by their association, and over-power other parts that are not so well knit and united, yet these are not the less pure; onely these Parts and Motions being not equal in several Creatures, make their Knowledge and Reason more or less: For, when a man hath more Rational Matter well regulated, and so more Wisdom then an other, that same man may chance to over-power the other, whose Rational Matter is more irregular, but yet not so much by strength of the united Parts, as by their subtilty; for the Rational Matter moving regularly, is more strong with subtilty, then the sensitive with force; so that Wisdom is stronger then Life, being more pure, and so more active; for in my opinion, there is a degree of difference between Life and Knowledge, as my Book of _Philosophical Opinions_ will inform you.

Again, your _Author_ sayes, _That Man doth excel all other Animals in this faculty, that when he conceives any thing whatsoever, he is apt to enquire the Consequences of it, and what effects he can do with it: Besides this_ (sayes he) _Man hath an other degree of Excellence, that he can by Words reduce the Consequences he finds to General Rules called Theoremes or Aphorisms, that is, he can reason or reckon not onely in Number, but in all other things, whereof one may be added unto, or substracted from an other._ To which I answer, That according to my Reason I cannot perceive, but that all Creatures may do as much; but by reason they do it not after the same manner or way as Man, Man denies, they can do it at all; which is very hard; for what man knows, whether Fish do not Know more of the nature of Water, and ebbing and flowing, and the saltness of the Sea? or whether Birds do not know more of the nature and degrees of Air, or the cause of Tempests? or whether Worms do not know more of the nature of Earth, and how Plants are produced? or Bees of the several sorts of juices of Flowers, then Men? And whether they do not make there Aphorismes and Theoremes by their manner of Intelligence? For, though they have not the speech of Man, yet thence doth not follow, that they have no Intelligence at all. But the Ignorance of Men concerning other Creatures is the cause of despising other Creatures, imagining themselves as petty Gods in Nature, when as _Nature_ is not capable to make one God, much less so many as Mankind; and were it not for Mans supernatural Soul, Man would not be more Supreme, then other Creatures in Nature, _But_ (says your _Author_) _this Priviledge in Man is allay'd by another, which is, No living Creature is subject to absurdity, but onely Man._ Certainly, _Madam_, I believe the contrary, to wit, that all other Creatures do as often commit mistakes and absurdities as Man, and if it were not to avoid tediousness, I could present sufficient proofs to you: Wherefore I think, not onely Man but also other Creatures may be Philosophers and subject to absurdities as aptly as Men; for Man doth, nor cannot truly know the Faculties, and Abilities or Actions of all other Creatures, no not of his own Kind as Man-Kind, for if he do measure all men by himself he will be very much mistaken, for what he conceives to be true or wise, an other may conceive to be false and foolish. But Man may have one way of Knowledge in Philosophy and other Arts, and other Creatures another way, and yet other Creatures manner or way may be as Intelligible and Instructive to each other as Man's, I mean, in those things which are Natural. Wherefore I cannot consent to what your _Author_ says, _That Children are not endued with Reason at all, till they have attained to the use of Speech_; for Reason is in those Creatures which have not Speech, witness Horses, especially those which are taught in the manage, and many other Animals. And as for the weak understanding in Children, I have discoursed thereof in my Book of Philosophy; The rest of this discourse, lest I tire you too much at once, I shall reserve for the next, resting in the mean time,

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend,_

_and Servant._

[1] _Leviathan, part._ 1. _c._ 4.

XI.

_Madam,_

I sent you word in my last, that your _Author's_ opinion is, _That Children are not endued with Reason at all, until they have attained to the use of Speech,_ in the same Chapter[1] he speaks to the same purpose thus: _Reason is not as Sense and Memory born with us, nor gotten by experience onely, as Prudence is, but attained by industry._ To which I reply onely this, That it might as well be said, a Child when new born hath not flesh and blood, because by taking in nourishment or food, the Child grows to have more flesh and blood; or, that a Child is not born with two legs, because he cannot go, or with two arms and hands, because he cannot help himself; or that he is not born with a tongue, because he cannot speak: For although Reason doth not move in a Child as in a Man, in Infancy as in Youth, in Youth as in Age, yet that doth not prove that Children are without Reason, because they cannot run and prate: I grant, some other Creatures appear to have more Knowledg when new born then others; as for example, a young Foal has more knowledg than a young Child, because a Child cannot run and play; besides a Foal knows his own Dam, and can tell where to take his food, as to run and suck his Dam, when as an Infant cannot do so, nor all beasts, though most of them can, but yet this doth not prove, that a Child hath no reason at all; Neither can I perceive that man is a Monopoler of all Reason, or Animals of all Sense, but that Sense and Reason are in other Creatures as well as in Man and Animals; for example, Drugs, as Vegetables and Minerals, although they cannot slice, pound or infuse, as man can, yet they can work upon man more subtilly, wisely, and as sensibly either by purging, vomiting, spitting, or any other way, as man by mincing, pounding and infusing them, and Vegetables will as wisely nourish Men, as Men can nourish Vegetables; Also some Vegetables are as malicious and mischievous to Man, as Man is to one another, witness Hemlock, Nightshade, and many more; and a little Poppy will as soon, nay sooner cause a Man to sleep, though silently, then a Nurse a Child with singing and rocking; But because they do not act in such manner or way as Man, Man judgeth them to be without sense and reason; and because they do not prate and talk as Man, Man believes they have not so much wit as he hath; and because they cannot run and go, Man thinks they are not industrious; the like for Infants concerning Reason. But certainly, it is not local motion or speech that makes sense and reason, but sense and reason makes them; neither is sense and reason bound onely to the actions of Man, but it is free to the actions, forms, figures and proprieties of all Creatures; for if none but Man had reason, and none but Animals sense, the World could not be so exact, and so well in order as it is: but Nature is wiser then Man with all his Arts, for these are onely produced through the variety of Natures actions, and disputes through the superfluous varieties of Mans follies or ignorances, not knowing Natures powerful life and knowledg: But I wonder, _Madam_, your _Author_ says in this place, _That Reason is not born with Man_, when as in another place,[2] he says, _That every man brought Philosophy, that is Natural reason with him into the World_; Which how it agree, I will leave to others to judg, and to him to reconcile it, remaining in the meantime,

Madam,

_Your Constant Friend_

_and Faithful Servant._

[1] _Ch._ 4.

[2] In his _Elements of Philosophy, part._ 1. _c._ 1. _art._ 1.

XII.

_Madam,_