Part 15

_Sensation in corporeal motion is first, and Perception follows_, sayes your _Author_:[1] to which opinion I give no assent, but do believe that Perception and Sensation are done both at one and the same time, as being one and the same thing without division, either in reason or sense, and are performed without any knocks, or jolts, or hitting against. But let me tell you, _Madam_, there arises a great mistake by many, from not distinguishing well, sensitive Motion, and rational Motion; for though all motions are in one onely matter, yet that matter doth not move always in the same manner, for then there could be no variety in Nature; and truly, if man, who is but a part of Nature, may move diversly, and put himself into numerous postures; Why may not Nature? But concerning Motions, and their variety, to avoid tedious repetitions, I must still referr you to my Book of _Philosophical Opinions_; I'le add onely this, that it is well to be observed, That all Motions are not Impressions, neither do all Impressions make such dents, as to disturb the adjoyning Parts: Wherefore those, in my opinion, understand _Nature_ best, which say, that Sensation and Perception are really one and the same; but they are out, that say, there can be no communication at a distance, unless by pressing and crowding; for the patterning of an outward object, may be done without any inforcement or disturbance, jogging or crowding, as I have declared heretofore; for the sensitive and rational motions in the sensitive and rational parts of matter in one creature, observing the exterior motions in outward objects, move accordingly, either regularly or irregularly in patterns; and if they have no exterior objects, as in dreams, they work by rote. And so to conclude, I am absolutely of their opinion, who believe, that there is nothing existent in Nature, but what is purely Corporeal, for this seems most probable in sense and reason to me,

Madam,

_Your Faithful Friend_

_and Servant._

[1] _In the Pref. of the Imm. of the Soul._

XVII.

_MADAM,_

Outward Objects, as I have told you before, do not make Sense and Reason, but Sense and Reason do perceive and judg of outward objects; For the Sun doth not make sight, nor doth sight make light; but sense and reason in a Man, or any other creature, do perceive and know there are such objects as Sun, and Light, or whatsoever objects are presented to them. Neither doth Dumbness, Deafness, Blindness, &c. cause an Insensibility, but Sense through irregular actions causes them; I say, through Irregular actions, because those effects do not properly belong to the nature of that kind of Creatures; for every Creature, if regularly made, hath particular motions proper to its figure; for natural Matters wisdom makes distinctions by her distinct corporeal motions, giving every particular Creature their due Portion and Proportion according to the nature of their figures, and to the rules of her actions, but not to the rules of Arts, Mathematical Compasses, Lines, Figures, and the like. And thus the Sun, Stars, Meteors, Air, Fire, Water, Earth, Minerals, Vegetables and Animals, may all have Sense and Reason, although it doth not move in one kind or sort of Creatures, or in one particular, as in another: For the corporeal motions differ not onely in kinds and sorts, but also in Particulars, as is perceivable by human sense and reason; Which is the cause, that Elements have elemental sense and knowledg, and Animals animal sense and knowledg, and so of Vegetables, Minerals, and the like. Wherefore the Sun and Stars may have as much sensitive and rational life and knowledg as other Creatures, but such as is according to the nature of their figures, and not animal, or vegetable, or mineral sense and knowledg. And so leaving them, I rest,

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend_

_and Servant._

XVIII.

_MADAM,_

Your _Author_ denying that Fancy, Reason and Animadversion are seated in the Brain, and that the Brain is figured into this or that Conception:[1] _I demand_, says he, _in what knot, loop or interval thereof doth this faculty of free Fancy and active Reason reside?_ My answer is, that in my opinion, Fancy and Reason are not made in the Brain, as there is a Brain, but as there is sensitive and rational matter, which makes not onely the Brain, but all Thoughts, Conceptions, Imaginations, Fancy, Understanding, Memory, Remembrance, and whatsoever motions are in the Head, or Brain: neither doth this sensitive and rational matter remain or act in one place of the Brain, but in every part thereof; and not onely in every part of the Brain, but in every part of the Body; nay, not onely in every part of a Mans Body, but in every part of Nature. But, _Madam_, I would ask those, that say the Brain has neither sense, reason, nor self-motion, and therefore no Perception; but that all proceeds from an Immaterial Principle, as an Incorporeal Spirit, distinct from the body, which moveth and actuates corporeal matter; I would fain ask them, I say, where their Immaterial Ideas reside, in what part or place of the Body? and whether they be little or great? Also I would ask them, whether there can be many, or but one Idea of God? If they say many, then there must be several, distinct Deitical Ideas; if but one, Where doth this Idea reside? If they say in the head, then the heart is ignorant of God; if in the heart, then the head is ignorant thereof, and so for all parts of the body; but if they say, in every part, then that Idea may be disfigured by a lost member; if they say, it may dilate and contract, then I say it is not the Idea of God, for God can neither contract nor extend; nor can the Idea it self dilate and contract, being immaterial; for contraction and dilation belong onely to bodies, or material beings: Wherefore the comparisons betwixt Nature and a particular Creature, and between God and Nature, are improper; much more betwixt God and Natures particular motions and figures, which are various and changeable, although methodical. The same I may ask of the Mind of Man, as I do of the Idea in the Mind. Also I might ask them, what they conceive the natural mind of man to be, whether material or immaterial? If material, their opinion is rational, and so the mind is dividable and composable; if immaterial, then it is a Spirit; and if a Spirit, it cannot possibly dilate nor contract, having no dimension nor divisibility of parts, (although your _Author_ proves it by the example of Light; but I have exprest my meaning heretofore, that _light_ is divisible) and if it have no dimension, how can it be confined in a material body? Wherefore when your _Author_ says, the mind is a substance, it is to my reason very probable; but not when he says, it is an immaterial substance, which will never agree with my sense and reason; for it must be either something, or nothing, there being no _medium_ between, in Nature. But pray mistake me not, _Madam_, when I say Immaterial is nothing; for I mean nothing Natural, or so as to be a part of Nature; for God forbid, I should deny, that God is a Spiritual Immaterial substance, or Being; neither do I deny that we can have an Idea, notion, conception, or thought of the existence of God; for I am of your _Authors_ opinion, That there is no Man under the cope of Heaven, that doth not by the light of Nature, know, and believe there is a God; but that we should have such a perfect Idea of God, as of any thing else in the World, or as of our selves, as your _Author_ says, I cannot in sense and reason conceive to be true or possible. Neither am I against those Spirits, which the holy Scripture mentions, as Angels and Devils, and the divine Soul of Man; but I say onely, that no Immaterial Spirit belongs to Nature, so as to be a part thereof; for Nature is Material, or Corporeal; and whatsoever is not composed of matter or body, belongs not to Nature; nevertheless, Immaterial Spirits may be in Nature, although not parts of Nature. But there can neither be an Immaterial Nature, nor a Natural Immaterial; Nay, our very thoughts and conceptions of Immaterial are Material, as made of self-moving Matter. Wherefore to conclude, these opinions in Men proceed from a Vain-glory, as to have found out something that is not in Nature; to which I leave them, and their natural Immaterial Substances, like so many Hobgoblins to fright Children withal, resting in the mean time,

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend,_

_and Servant._

[1] _Antid. lib._ 1. _c._ 11.

XIX.

_MADAM,_

There are various opinions concerning the seat of Common Sense, as your _Author_ rehearseth them in his Treatise of the Immortality of the Soul;[1] But my opinion is, That common sense hath also a common place; for as there is not any part of the body that hath not sense and reason, so sense and reason is in all parts of the body, as it is observable by this, that every part is subject to pain and pleasure, and all parts are moveable, moving and moved; also appetites are in every part of the body: As for example, if any part itches, it hath an appetite to be scratched, and every part can pattern out several objects, and so several touches; and though the rational part of matter is mixt in all parts of the body, yet it hath more liberty to make variety of Motions in the head, heart, liver, spleen, stomack, bowels, and the like, then in the other parts of the body; nevertheless, it is in every part, together with the sensitive: but they do not move in every part alike, but differ in each part more or less, as it may be observed; and although every part hath some difference of knowledg, yet all have life and knowledg, sense and reason, some more, some less, and the whole body moves according to each part, and so do all the bodily Faculties and Proprieties, and not according to one single part; the rational Soul being in all parts of the body: for if one part of the body should have a dead Palsie, it is not, that the Soul is gone from that part, but that the sensitive and rational matter has altered its motion and figure from animal to some other kind; for certainly, the rational Soul, and so life, is in every part, as well in the Pores of the skin, as in the ventricles of the brain, and as well in the heel as in the head; and every part of the body knows its own office, what it ought to do, from whence follows an agreement of all the parts: And since there is difference of knowledg in every part of one body, well may there be difference between several kinds and sorts, and yet there is knowledg in all; for difference of knowledg is no argument to prove they have no knowledg at all. Wherefore I am not of the opinion, that that which moves the whole body, is as a Point, or some such thing in a little kernel or _Glandula_ of the Brain, as an Ostrich-egge is hung up to the roof of a Chamber; or that it is in the stomack like a single penny in a great Purse; neither is it in the midst of the heart, like a Lady in a Lobster; nor in the blood, like as a Menow, or Sprat in the Sea; nor in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain, as a lousie Souldier in a Watch-tower. But you may say, it is like a farthing Candle in a great Church: I answer, That Light will not enlighten the by Chappels of the Church, nor the Quest-house, nor the Belfrey; neither doth the Light move the Church, though it enlightens it: Wherefore the Soul after this manner doth not move the corporeal body, no more then the Candle moves the Church, or the Lady moves the Lobster, or the Sprat the Sea as to make it ebb and flow. But this I desire you to observe, _Madam_, that though all the body of man or any other Creature, hath sense and reason, which is life and knowledg, in all parts, yet these parts being all corporeal, and having their certain proportions, can have no more then what is belonging or proportionable to each figure: As for example; if a Man should feed, and not evacuate some ways or other, he could not live; and if he should evacuate and not feed, he could not subsist: wherefore in all Natures parts there is ingress and egress, although not always perceived by one creature, as Man; but all exterior objects do not enter into Man, or any other Creature, but are figured by the rational, and some by the sensitive parts or motions in the body; wherefore it is not rational to believe, that exterior objects take up any more room, then if there were none presented to the sensitive organs: Nor is there any thing which can better prove the mind to be corporeal, then that there may be several Figures in several parts of the body made at one time, as Sight, Hearing, Tasting, Smelling, and Touching, and all these in each several organ, as well at one, as at several times, either by patterns, or not; which figuring without Pattern, may be done as well by the sensitive motions in the organs, as by the rational in the mind, and is called remembrance. As for example: a Man may hear or see without an object; which is, that the sensitive and rational matter repeat such figurative actions, or make others in the sensitive organs, or in the mind: and Thoughts, Memory, Imagination, as also Passion, are no less corporeal actions then the motion of the hand or heel; neither hath the rational matter, being naturally wise, occasion to jumble and knock her parts together, by reason every part knows naturally their office what they ought to do, or what they may do. But I conclude, repeating onely what I have said oft before, that all Perceptions, Thoughts, and the like, are the Effects, and Life and Knowledg, the Nature and Essence of self-moving Matter. And so I rest,

Madam,

_Your Faithful Friend_

_and Servant._

[1] _Lib._ 2. _c._ 4.

XX.

_MADAM,_

I am not able to conceive how the Mind of Man can be compared to a Table-book, in which nothing is writ;[1] nor how to a Musician, who being asleep, doth not so much as dream of any Musick, but being jogg'd and awakend by another, who tells him two or three words of a Song, and desires him to sing it, presently recovers himself, and sings upon so slight an Intimation: For such intimations are nothing else but outward objects, which the interior sense consents to, and obeys; for interior sense and reason doth often obey outward objects: and in my opinion there is no rest in Nature, and so neither in the Mind or natural Soul of Man, which is in a perpetual motion, and needs therefore no jogging to put it into any actual motion; for it hath actual motion and knowledg in it self, because it is a self-moving substance, actually knowing, and Material or Corporeal, not Immaterial, as your _Author_ thinks: and this material or corporeal Mind is nothing else but what I call the rational matter, and the corporeal life is the sensitive matter. But this is to be observed, that the motions of the corporeal Mind do often imitate the motions of the sensitive Life, and these again the motions of the mind: I say oftentimes; for they do it not always, but each one can move without taking any pattern from the other. And all this I understand of the Natural Soul of Man; not of the Divine Soul, and her powers and faculties, for I leave that to Divines to inform us of; onely this I say, that men not conceiving the distinction between this natural and divine Soul, make such a confusion betwixt those two Souls and their actions, which causes so many disputes and opinions. But if Nature hath power from God to produce all kinds of Vegetables, Minerals, Elements, Animals, and other sorts of Creatures, Why not also Man? Truly if all Creatures are natural Creatures, Man must be so too; and if Man is a natural Creature, he must needs have natural sense and reason, as well as other Creatures, being composed of the same matter they are of. Neither is it requisite, that all Creatures, being of the same matter, must have the same manner of sensitive and rational knowledg; which if so, it is not necessary for Corn to have Ears to hear the whistling or chirping of Birds, nor for Stones to have such a touch of feeling as animals have, and to suffer pain, as they do, when Carts go over them; as your _Author_ is pleased to argue out of _Æsopes_ Tales; or for the Heliotrope to have eyes to see the Sun: for what necessity is there that they should have humane sense and reason? which is, that the rational and sensitive matter should act and move in them as she doth in man or animals: Certainly if there must be any variety in nature, it is requisite she should not; wherefore all Vegetables, Minerals, Elements, and Animals, have their proper motions different from each others, not onely in their kinds and sorts, but also in their particulars. And though Stones have no progressive motion to withdraw themselves from the Carts going over them, which your _Author_ thinks they would do, if they had sense, to avoid pain: nevertheless they have motion, and consequently sense and reason, according to the nature and propriety of their figure, as well as man has according to his. But this is also to be observed, that not any humane Creature, which is accounted to have the perfectest sense and reason, is able always to avoid what is hurtful or painful, for it is subject to it by Nature: Nay, the Immaterial Soul it self, according to your _Author_,[2] cannot by her self-contracting faculty withdraw her self from pain. Wherefore there is no manner of consequence to conclude from the sense of Animals to the sense of Minerals, they being as much different as their Figures are; And saying this, I have said enough to express the opinion and mind of,

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend_

_and Servant._

[1] _Antid. Book_ 1. _c._ 5.

[2] _Append. to the Antid. ch._ 3.

XXI.

_MADAM,_

Your _Author_ endeavours very much to prove the existency of a _Natural Immaterial Spirit_, whom he defines to be an _Incorporeal substance, Indivisible, that can move it self, can penetrate, contract and dilate it self, and can also move and alter the matter._ Whereof, if you will have my opinion, I confess freely to you, that in my sense and reason I cannot conceive it to be possible, that these is any such thing in Nature; for all that is a substance in Nature, is a body, and what has a body, is corporeal; for though there be several degrees of matter, as in purity, rarity, subtilty, activity; yet there is no degree so pure, rare and subtil, that can go beyond its nature, and change from corporeal to incorporeal, except it could change from being something to nothing, which is impossible in Nature. Next, there is no substance in Nature that is not divisible; for all that is a body, or a bodily substance, hath extension, and all extension hath parts, and what has parts, is divisible. As for self-motion, contraction and dilation, these are actions onely of Natural Matter; for Matter by the Power of God is self-moving, and all sorts of motions, as contraction, dilation, alteration, penetration, &c. do properly belong to Matter; so that natural Matter stands in no need to have some Immaterial or Incorporeal substance to move, rule, guide and govern her; but she is able enough to do it all her self, by the free Gift of the Omnipotent God; for why should we trouble our selves to invent or frame other unconceivable substances, when there is no need for it, but Matter can act, and move as well without them and of it self? Is not God able to give such power to Matter, as to an other Incorporeal substance? But I suppose this opinion of natural Immaterial Spirits doth proceed from Chymistry, where the extracts are vulgarly called Spirits; and from that degree of Matter, which by reason of its purity, subtilty and activity, is not subject to our grosser senses; However, these are not Incorporeal, be they never so pure and subtil. And I wonder much that men endeavour to prove Immaterial Spirits by corporeal Arts, when as Art is not able to demonstrate Nature and her actions; for Art is but the effect of Nature, and expresses rather the variety, then the truth of natural motions; and if Art cannot do this, much less will it be able to express what is not in Nature, or what is beyond Nature; as to _trace the Visible_ (or rather Invisible) _footsteps of the divine Councel and Providence_,[1] or to demonstrate things supernatural, and which go beyond mans reach and capacity. But to return to Immaterial Spirits, that they should rule and govern infinite corporeal matter, like so many demy-Gods, by a dilating nod, and a contracting frown, and cause so many kinds and sorts of Corporeal Figures to arise, being Incorporeal themselves, is Impossible for me to conceive; for how can an Immaterial substance cause a Material corporeal substance, which has no motion in it self, to form so many several and various figures and creatures, and make so many alterations, and continue their kinds and sorts by perpetual successions of Particulars? But perchance the Immaterial substance gives corporeal matter motion. I answer, My sense and reason cannot understand, how it can give motion, unless motion be different, distinct and separable from it; nay, if it were, yet being no substance or body it self, according to your _Authors_ and others opinion, the question is, how it can be transmitted or given away to corporeal matter? Your _Author_ may say, That his Immaterial and Incorporeal spirit of Nature, having self-motion, doth form Matter into several Figures: I answer, Then that Immaterial substance must be transformed and metamorphosed into as many several figures as there are figures in Matter; or there must be as many spirits, as there are figures; but when the figures change, what doth become of the spirits? Neither can I imagine, that an Immaterial substance, being without body, can have such a great strength, as to grapple with gross, heavy, dull, and dead Matter; Certainly, in my opinion, no Angel, nor Devil, except God Impower him, would be able to move corporeal Matter, were it not self-moving, much less any Natural Spirit. But God is a Spirit, and Immovable; and if created natural Immaterial participate of that Nature, as they do of the Name, then they must be Immovable also. Your _Author, Madam_, may make many several degrees of Spirits; but certainly not I, nor I think any natural Creature else, will be able naturally to conceive them. He may say, perchance, There is such a close conjunction betwixt Body and Spirit, as I make betwixt rational, sensitive, and inanimate Matter. I answer, That these degrees are all but one Matter, and of one and the same Nature as meer Matter, different onely in degrees of purity, subtilty, and activity, whereas Spirit and Body are things of contrary Natures. In fine, I cannot conceive, how a Spirit should fill up a place or space, having no body, nor how it can have the effects of a body, being none it self; for the effects flow from the cause; and as the cause is, so are its effects: And so confessing my ignorance, I can say no more, but rest,

Madam,

_Your Faithful Friend_

_and Servant._

[1] _Antid. lib._ 2. _ch._ 2.

XXII.

_MADAM,_