Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy

Part 11

Chapter 113,650 wordsPublic domain

I received your questions in your last: the first was, _Whether there be more body compact together in a heavy then in a light thing?_ I answer, That purity, rarity, little quantity, exteriour shape, as also motion cause lightnesse; and grossness of bulk, density, much quantity, exterior figure and motion cause heaviness, as it may be confirmed by many examples: but lightness and heaviness are onely conceptions of man, as also ascent and descent; and it may be questioned, whether there be such things really in nature; for change of motions of one and the same body will make lightness, and heaviness, as also rarity and density: besides, the several figures and compositions of bodies will cause them to ascend or descend, for Snow is a light body and yet descends from the clouds, and Water is a heavie body, and yet ascends in springs out of the Earth; Dust is a dense body and yet is apt to ascend, Rain or Dew is a rare body and yet is apt to descend; Also a Bird ascends by his shape, and a small worm although of less body and lighter will fall down; and there can be no other proof of light and heavy bodies but by their ascent and descent; But as really there is no such thing as heavie or light in nature more then words, and comparisons of different corporeal motions, so there is no such thing, as high or low, place or time, but onely words to make comparisons and to distinguish different corporeal motions. The second question was; _When a Bason with water is wasted into smoak, which fills up a whole Room, Whether the air in the room doth, as the sensitive motions of the eye, pattern out the figure of the smoak; or whether all the room is really fill'd with the vapour or smoak?_ I answer, If it be onely the pattern or figure of smoak or vapour, the extension and dilation is not so much as man imagines; but why may not the air, which in my opinion hath self-motion, pattern out the figure of smoak as well as the eye; for that the eye surely doth it, may be proved; because smoak, if it enter the eye, makes it not onely smart and water much, but blinds it quite for the present; wherefore smoak doth not enter the eye, when the eye seeth it, but the eye patterns out the figure of smoak, and this is perception; In the same manner may the air pattern out the figure of smoak. The third question was, _Whether all that they name qualities of bodies, as thickness, thinness, hardness, softness, gravity, levity, transparentness and the like, be substances?_ I answer, That all those, they call qualities, are nothing else but change of motion and figure of the same body, and several changes of motions are not several bodies, but several actions of one body; for change of motion doth not create new matter or multiply its quantity: for though corporeal motions may divide and compose, contract and dilate, yet they cannot create new matter, or make matter any otherwise then it is by nature, neither can they add or substract any thing from its nature. And therefore my opinion is, not that they are things subsisting by themselves without matter, but that there can no abstraction be made of motion and figure from matter, and that matter and motion being but one thing and inseparable, make but one substance. Wherefore density and rarity, gravity and levity, &c. being nothing else but change of motions, cannot be without matter, but a dense or rare, heavie or light matter is but one substance or body; And thus having obeyed your commands, I rest,

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend,_

_and Servant._

XLIV.

_MADAM,_

I am very ready to give you my opinion of those two questions you sent me, whereof the first was, _Whether that, which is rare and subtil, be not withal pure?_ To which I answer, That all rare bodies are not subtil, nor pure, and that all which is dense is not gross and dull: As for example, Puddle-water, or also clear water, is rarer then Quicksilver, and yet not so subtil and pure as Quicksilver; the like of Gold; for Quicksilver and Gold may be rarified to a transparentness, and yet be so dense, as not to be easily dissolved; and Quicksilver is very subtil and searching, so as to be able to force other bodies to divide as well as it can divide and compose its own parts. Wherefore my opinion is, that the purest and subtilest degree of matter in nature, is that degree of matter which can dilate and contract, compose and divide into any figure by corporeal self-motion. Your second question was, _Why a man's hand cannot break a little hard body, as a little nail, whereas yet it is bigger then the nail?_ I answer, It is not because the hand is softer then the nail, for one hard body will not break suddenly another hard body, and a man may easily break an iron nail with his hand, as I have bin informed; but it is some kind of motion which can easier do it, then another: for I have seen a strong cord wound about both a man's hands, who pulled his hands as hard and strongly asunder as he could, and yet was not able to break it; when as a Youth taking the same cord, and winding it about his hands as the former did, immediately broke it; the cause was, that he did it with another kind of motion or pulling, then the other did, which though he used as much force and strength, as he was able, yet could not break it, when the boy did break it with the greatest ease, and turning onely his hands a little, which shews, that many things may be done by a slight of motion, which otherwise a great strength and force cannot do. This is my answer and opinion concerning your proposed questions; if you have any more, I shall be ready to obey you, as,

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend_

_and humble Servant._

XLV.

_MADAM,_

I understand by your last, that you are very desirous to know, _Whether there be not in nature such animal creatures both for purity and size, as we are not capable to perceive by our sight._ Truly, _Madam_, in my opinion it is very probable there may be animal creatures of such rare bodies as are not subject to our exterior senses, as well, as there are elements which are not subject to all our exterior senses: as for example, fire is onely subject to our sight and feeling, and not to any other sense, water is subject to our sight, taste, touch and hearing, but not to smelling; and earth is subject to our sight, taste, touch and smelling, but not to our hearing; and vapour is onely subject to our sight, and wind onely to our hearing; but pure air is not subject to any of our senses, but onely known by its effects: and so there may likewise be animal creatures which are not subject to any of our senses both for their purity and life; as for example, I have seen pumpt out of a water pump small worms which could hardly be discerned but by a bright Sun-light, for they were smaller then the smallest hair, some of a pure scarlet colour and some white, but though they were the smallest creatures that ever I did see, yet they were more agil and fuller of life, then many a creature of a bigger size, and so small they were, as I am confident, they were neither subject to tast, smell, touch nor hearing, but onely to sight, and that neither without difficulty, requiring both a sharp sight and a clear light to perceive them; and I do verily believe that these small animal creatures may be great in comparison to others which may be in nature. But if it be probable that there may be such small animal creatures in nature, as are not subject to our exterior senses, by reason of their littleness; it is also probable, that there may be such great and big animal creatures in nature as are beyond the reach and knowledg of our exterior senses; for bigness and smallness are not to be judged by our exterior senses, onely; but as sense and reason inform us, that there are different degrees in Purity and Rarity, so also in shapes, figures and sizes in all natural creatures. Next you desired to know, _Whether there can be an artificial Life, or a Life made by Art?_ My answer is, Not; for although there is Life in all natures parts, yet not all the parts are life, for there is one part of natural matter which in its nature is inanimate or without life, and though natural Life doth produce Art, yet Art cannot produce natural Life, for though Art is the action of Life, yet it is not Life it self: not but that there is Life in Art, but not art in life, for Life is natural, and not artificial; and thus the several parts of a watch may have sense and reason according to the nature of their natural figure, which is steel, but not as they have an artificial shape, for Art cannot put Life into the watch, Life being onely natural, not artificial. Lastly your desire was to know, _Whether a part of matter may be so small, as it cannot be made less?_ I answer, there is no such thing in nature as biggest or least, nature being Infinite as well in her actions as in her substance; and I have mentioned in my book of Philosophy, and in a letter, I sent you heretofore concerning Infinite, that there are several sorts of Infinites, as Infinite in quantity or bulk, Infinite in number, Infinite in quality, as Infinite degrees of hardness, softness, thickness, thinness, swiftness, slowness, &c. as also Infinite compositions, divisions, creations, dissolutions, &c. in nature; and my meaning is, that all these Infinite actions do belong to the Infinite body of nature, which being infinite in substance must also of necessity be infinite in its actions; but although these Infinite actions are inherent in the power of the Infinite substance of nature, yet they are never put in act in her parts, by reason there being contraries in nature, and every one of the aforementioned actions having its opposite, they do hinder and obstruct each other so, that none can actually run into infinite; for the Infinite degrees of compositions hinder the infinite degrees of divisions; and the infinite degrees of rarity, softness, swiftness, &c. hinder the infinite degrees of density, hardness, slowness, &c. all which nature has ordered with great wisdom and Prudence to make an amiable combination between her parts; for if but one of these actions should run into infinite, it would cause a horrid confusion between natures parts, nay an utter destruction of the whole body of nature, if I may call it whole: as for example, if one part should have infinite compositions, without the hinderance or obstruction of division, it would at last mount and become equal to the Infinite body of nature, and so from a part change to a whole, from being finite to infinite, which is impossible; Wherefore, though nature hath an Infinite natural power, yet she doth not put this power in act in her particulars; and although she has an infinite force or strength, yet she doth not use this force or strength in her parts. Moreover when I speak of Infinite divisions and compositions, creations and dissolutions, &c. in nature, I do not mean so much the infinite degrees of compositions and divisions, as the actions themselves to be infinite in number; for there being infinite parts in nature, and every one having its compositions and divisions, creations and dissolutions, these actions must of necessity be infinite too, to wit, in number, according to the Infinite number of parts, for as there is an Infinite number of parts in nature, so there is also an infinite number and variety of motions which are natural actions. However let there be also infinite degrees of these natural actions, in the body or substance of infinite nature; yet, as I said, they are never put in act, by reason every action hath its contrary or opposite, which doth hinder and obstruct it from running actually into infinite. And thus I hope, you conceive cleerly now, what my opinion is, and that I do not contradict my self in my works, as some have falsly accused me, for they by misapprehending my meaning, judge not according to the truth of my sense, but according to their own false interpretation, which shews not onely a weakness in their understandings and passions, but a great injustice and injury to me, which I desire you to vindicate when ever you chance to hear such accusations and blemishes laid upon my works, by which you will Infinitely oblige,

Madam,

_Your humble and faithful Servant._

Sect. II.

I.

_MADAM,_

Being come now to the Perusal of the Works of that learned _Author_ Dr. _Moor_, I find that the onely design of his Book called _Antidote_, is _to prove the Existence_ of a God, and to refute, or rather convert Atheists; which I wonder very much at, considering, he says himself,[1] That _there is no man under the cope of Heaven but believes a God_; which if so, what needs there to make so many arguments to no purpose? unless it be to shew Learning and wit; In my opinion, it were better to convert Pagans to be Christians, or to reform irregular Christians to a more pious life, then to prove that, which all men believe, which is the way to bring it into question. For certainly, according to the natural Light of Reason, there is a God, and no man, I believe, doth doubt it; for though there may be many vain words, yet I think there is no such atheistical belief amongst man-kind, nay, not onely amongst men, but also, amongst all other creatures, for if nature believes a God, all her parts, especially the sensitive and rational, which are the living and knowing parts, and are in all natural creatures, do the like, and therefore all parts and creatures in nature do adore and worship God, for any thing man can know to the contrary; for no question, but natures soule adores and worships God as well as man's soule; and why may not God be worshipped by all sorts and kinds of creatures as well, as by one kind or sort? I will not say the same way, but I believe there is a general worship and adoration of God; for as God is an Infinite Deity, so certainly he has an Infinite Worship and Adoration, and there is not any part of nature, but adores and worships the only omnipotent God, to whom belongs Praise and Glory from and to all eternity: For it is very improbable, that God should be worshipped onely in part, and not in whole, and that all creatures were made to obey man, and not to worship God, onely for man's sake, and not for God's worship, for man's use, and not God's adoration, for mans spoil and not God's blessing. But this Presumption, Pride, Vain-glory and Ambition of man, proceeds from the irregularity of nature, who being a servant, is apt to commit errors; and cannot be so absolute and exact in her devotion, adoration and worship, as she ought, nor so well observant of God as God is observing her: Nevertheless, there is not any of her parts or creatures, that God is not acknowledged by, though not so perfectly as he ought, which is caused by the irregularities of nature, as I said before. And so God of his mercy have mercy upon all Creatures; To whose protection I commend your Ladiship, and rest,

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend_

_and Servant._

[1] _Antidote, Book_ I. _c._ 10. _a._ 5.

II.

_MADAM,_

Since I spake in my last of the adoration and worship of God, you would faine know, whether we can have an Idea of God? I answer, That naturally we may, and really have a knowledge of the existence of God, as I proved in my former letter, to wit, that there is a God, and, that he is the _Author_ of all things, who rules and governs all things, and is also the God of Nature: but I dare not think, that naturally we can have an Idea of the essence of God, so as to know what God is in his very nature and essence; for how can there be a finite Idea of an Infinite God? You may say, As well as of Infinite space. I answer, Space is relative, or has respect to body, but there is not any thing that can be compared to God; for the Idea of Infinite nature is material, as being a material creature of Infinite material Nature. You will say, How can a finite part have an Idea of infinite nature? I answer, Very well, by reason the Idea is part of Infinite Nature, and so of the same kind, as material; but God being an Eternal, Infinite, Immaterial, Individable Being, no natural creature can have an Idea of him. You will say, That the Idea of God in the mind is immaterial; I answer, I cannot conceive, that there can be any immaterial Idea in nature; but be it granted, yet that Immaterial is not a part of God, for God is individable, and hath no parts; wherefore the Mind cannot have an Idea of God, as it hath of Infinite nature, being a part of nature; for the Idea of God cannot be of the essence of God, as the Idea of nature is a corporeal part of nature: and though nature may be known in some parts, yet God being Incomprehensible, his Essence can by no wayes or means be naturally known; and this is constantly believed, by

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend,_

_and Servant._

III.

_MADAM,_

Although I mentioned in my last, that it is impossible to have an Idea of God, yet your _Author_ is pleased to say,[1] That _he will not stick to affirm, that the Idea or notion of God is as easie, as any notion else whatsoever, and that we may know as much of him as of any thing else in the world_. To which I answer, That in my opinion, God is not so easily to be known by any creature, as man may know himself; nor his attributes so well, as man can know his own natural proprieties: for Gods Infinite attributes are not conceivable, and cannot be comprehended by a finite knowledg and understanding, as a finite part of nature; for though nature's parts may be Infinite in number, and as they have a relation to the Infinite whole, if I may call it so, which is Infinite nature, yet no part is infinite in it self, and therefore it cannot know so much as whole nature: and God being an Infinite Deity, there is required an Infinite capacity to conceive him; nay, Nature her self although Infinite, yet cannot possibly have an exact notion of God, by reason of the disparity between God and her self; and therefore it is not probable, if the Infinite servant of God is not able to conceive him, that a finite part or creature of nature, of what kind or sort soever, whether Spiritual, as your _Author_ is pleased to name it, or Corporeal, should comprehend God. Concerning my belief of God, I submit wholly to the Church, and believe as I have bin informed out of the _Athanasian_ Creed, that the Father is Incomprehensible, the Sonne Incomprehensible, and the Holy Ghost Incomprehensible; and that there are not three, but one Incomprehensible God; Wherefore if any man can prove (as I do verily believe he cannot) that God is not Incomprehensible, he must of necessity be more knowing then the whole Church, however he must needs dissent from the Church. But perchance your _Author_ may say, I raise new and prejudicial opinions, in saying that matter is eternal. I answer, The Holy Writ doth not mention Matter to be created, but onely Particular Creatures, as this Visible World, with all its Parts, as the history or description of the Creation of the World in _Genesis_ plainly shews; For _God said, Let it be Light, and there was Light; Let there be a Firmament in the midst of the Waters, and let it divide the Waters from the Waters; and Let the Waters under the Heaven be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry Land appear; and let the Earth bring forth Grass, the Herb yielding Seed, and the Fruit-tree yielding Fruit after his kind; and let there be Lights in the Firmament of the Heaven, to divide the Day from the Night,_ &c. Which proves, that all creatures and figures were made and produced out of that rude and desolate heap or chaos which the Scripture mentions, which is nothing else but matter, by the powerful Word and Command of God, executed by his Eternal Servant, Nature; as I have heretofore declared it in a Letter I sent you in the beginning concerning Infinite Nature. But least I seem to encroach too much upon Divinity, I submit this Interpretation to the Church; However, I think it not against the ground of our Faith; for I am so far from maintaining any thing either against Church or State, as I am submitting to both in all duty, and shall do so as long as I live, and rest,

Madam,

_Your Faithful Friend_

_and Servant._

[1] _Of the Immortality of the Soul, pt._ 1., _c._ 4.

IV.

_MADAM,_