Part 10

That all other animals, besides man, want reason, your _Author_ endeavours to prove in his _discourse of method_, where his chief argument is, That other animals cannot express their mind, thoughts or conceptions, either by speech or any other signs, as man can do: For, sayes he, _it is not for want of the organs belonging to the framing of words, as we may observe in Parrats and Pies, which are apt enough to express words they are taught, but understand nothing of them._ My answer is, That one man expressing his mind by speech or words to an other, doth not declare by it his excellency and supremacy above all other Creatures, but for the most part more folly, for a talking man is not so wise as a contemplating man. But by reason other Creatures cannot speak or discourse with each other as men, or make certain signs, whereby to express themselves as dumb and deaf men do, should we conclude, they have neither knowledge, sense, reason, or intelligence? Certainly, this is a very weak argument; for one part of a mans body, as one hand, is not less sensible then the other, nor the heel less sensible then the heart, nor the legg less sensible then the head, but each part hath its sense and reason, and so consequently its sensitive and rational knowledg; and although they cannot talk or give intelligence to each other by speech, nevertheless each hath its own peculiar and particular knowledge, just as each particular man has his own particular knowledge, for one man's knowledge is not another man's knowledge; and if there be such a peculiar and particular knowledg in every several part of one animal creature, as man, well may there be such in Creatures of different kinds and sorts: But this particular knowledg belonging to each creature, doth not prove that there is no intelligence at all betwixt them, no more then the want of humane Knowledg doth prove the want of Reason; for Reason is the rational part of matter, and makes perception, observation, and intelligence different in every creature, and every sort of creatures, according to their proper natures, but perception, observation and intelligence do not make reason, Reason being the cause, and they the effects. Wherefore though other Creatures have not the speech, nor Mathematical rules and demonstrations, with other Arts and Sciences, as Men; yet may their perceptions and observations be as wise as Men's, and they may have as much intelligence and commerce betwixt each other, after their own manner and way, as men have after theirs: To which I leave them, and Man to his conceited prerogative and excellence, resting,

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend,_

_and Servant._

XXXVII.

_MADAM,_

Concerning _Sense_ and _Perception_, your _Authors_ opinion is,[1] That it is made by a _motion or impression from the object upon the sensitive organ, which impression, by means of the nerves, is brought to the brain, and so to the mind or soul, which onely perceives in the brain_: Explaining it by the example[2] of a Man being blind, or walking in dark, who by the help of his stick can perceive when he touches a Stone, a Tree, Water, Sand, and the like; which example he brings to make a comparison with the perception of Light; _For_, says he, _Light in a shining body, is nothing else but a quick and lively motion or action, which through the air and other transparent bodies tends towards the eye, in the same manner as the motion or resistance of the bodies, the blind man meets withal, tends thorow the stick towards the hand; wherefore it is no wonder that the Sun can display its rays so far in an instant, seeing that the same action, whereby one end of the stick is moved, goes instantly also to the other end, and would do the same if the stick were as long as Heaven is distant from Earth._ To which I answer first, That it is not onely the Mind that perceives in the kernel of the Brain, but that there is a double perception, rational and sensitive, and that the mind perceives by the rational, but the body and the sensitive organs by the sensitive perception; and as there is a double perception, so there is also a double knowledg, rational and sensitive, one belonging to the mind, the other to the body; for I believe that the Eye, Ear, Nose, Tongue, and all the Body, have knowledg as well as the Mind, onely the rational matter, being subtil and pure, is not incumbred with the grosser part of matter, to work upon, or with it, but leaves that to the sensitive, and works or moves onely in its own substance, which makes a difference between thoughts, and exterior senses. Next I say, That it is not the Motion or Reaction of the bodies, the blind man meets withal, which makes the sensitive perception of these objects, but the sensitive corporeal motions in the hand do pattern out the figure of the Stick, Stone, Tree, Sand, and the like. And as for comparing the perception of the hand, when by the help of the stick it perceives the objects, with the perception of light, I confess that the sensitive perceptions do all resemble each other, because all sensitive parts of matter are of one degree, as being sensible parts, onely there is a difference according to the figures of the objects presented to the senses; and there is no better proof for perception being made by the sensitive motions in the body, or sensitive organs, but that all these sensitive perceptions are alike, and resemble one another; for if they were not made in the body of the sentient, but by the impression of exterior objects, there would be so much difference betwixt them, by reason of the diversity of objects, as they would have no resemblance at all. But for a further proof of my own opinion, did the perception proceed meerly from the motion, impression and resistance of the objects, the hand could not perceive those objects, unless they touched the hand it self, as the stick doth; for it is not probable, that the motions of the stone, water, sand, &c. should leave their bodies and enter into the stick, and so into the hand; for motion must be either something or nothing; if something, the stick and the hand would grow bigger, and the objects touched less, or else the touching and the touched must exchange their motions, which cannot be done so suddenly, especially between solid bodies; But if motion has no body, it is nothing, and how nothing can pass or enter or move some body, I cannot conceive. 'Tis true there is no part that can subsist singly by it self, without dependance upon each other, and so parts do always joyn and touch each other, which I am not against; but onely I say perception is not made by the exterior motions of exterior parts of objects, but by the interior motions of the parts of the body sentient. But I have discoursed hereof before, and so I take my leave, resting,

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend_

_and Servant._

[1] _Philos. part._ 4. _a._ 189.

[2] _Diopt. c._ 1. _a._ 2, 3. & _c._ 4. _a._ 1.

XXXVIII.

_MADAM,_

I cannot conceive why your _Author_ is so much for little and insensible parts, out of which the Elements and all other bodies are made; for though Nature is divideable, yet she is also composeable; and I think there is no need to dissect every creature into such little parts, to know their nature, but we can do it by another way as well; for we may dissect or divide them into never so little parts, and yet gain never the more knowledg by it. But according to these principles he describing amongst the rest the nature of Water, says,[1] _That those little parts, out of which Water consists, are in figure somewhat long, light and slippery like little Eeles, which are never so closely joyned and entangled, but may easily be separated._ To which I answer, That I observe the nature and figure of water to be flowing, dilating, divideable and circular; for we may see, in Tides, overflowings, and breaking into parts, as in rain, it will always move in a round and circular figure; And I think, if its parts were long and entangled like a knot of Eeles, it could never be so easily contracted and denced into snow or ice. Neither do I think, That _Salt-water hath a mixture of somewhat grosser parts, not so apt to bend_;[2] for to my observation and reason, the nature of salt-water consists herein, that its circle-lines are pointed, which sharp and pointed figure makes it so penetrating; yet may those points be separated from the circle lines of water, as it is seen in the making of Salt. But I am not of your _Authors_ opinion, That those little points do stick so fast in flesh, as little nails, to keep it from putrefaction; for points do not always fasten; or else fire, which certainly is composed of sharp-pointed parts, would harden, and keep other bodies from dissolving, whereas on the contrary, it separates and divides them, although after several manners. But Putrefaction is onely a dissolving and separating of parts, after the manner of dilation; and the motion of salt is contracting as well as penetrating, for we may observe, what flesh soever is dry-salted, doth shrink and contract close together; I will not say, but the pointed parts of salt may fasten like nayls in some sorts of bodies, but not in all they work on. And this is the reason also, that Sea-water is of more weight then fresh-water, for being composed of points, those points stick within each other, and so become more strong; But yet do they not hinder the circular dilating motion of water, for the circle-lines are within, and the points without, but onely they make it more strong from being divided by other exterior bodies that swim upon it. And this is the cause that Salt-water is not so easily forced or turned to vapour, as Fresh, for the points piercing into each other, hold it more strongly together; but this is to be considered, that the points of salt are on the outside of the watery Circle, not on the inside, which causes it to be divideable from the watery Circles. I will conclude, when I have given the reason why water is so soon suckt up by sand, lime, and the like bodies, and say that it is the nature of all spongy, dry and porous bodies, meeting with liquid and pliable bodies as water, do draw and suck them up, like as animal Creatures being thirsty, do drink: And so I take my leave, and rest,

Madam,

_Your Faithful Friend_

_and Servant._

[1] _Of Meteor. c._ 1. _a._ 3.

[2] _C._ 3. _a._ 1.

XXXIX.

_MADAM,_

Concerning Vapour, Clouds, Wind and Rain, I am of your _Authors_ opinion,[1] That _Water is changed into Vapour, and Vapour into Air, and that dilated Vapours make Wind, and condensed Vapours, Clouds and Mists_; But I am not for his little particles, _whereof_, he says, _Vapours are made, by the motion of a rare and subtil matter in the pores of terrestrial bodies_; which certainly I should conceive to be loose atoms, did he not make them of several figures and magnitude: for, in my opinion, there are no such things in nature, which like little Flyes or Bees do fly up into the air; and although I grant, that in Nature are several parts, whereof some are more rare, others more dense, according to the several degrees of matter, yet they are not single, but all mixt together in one body, and the change of motions in those joyned parts, is the cause of all changes of figures whatever, without the assistance of any forreign parts: And thus Water of it self is changed to Snow, Ice, or Hail, by its inherent figurative Motions; that is, the circular dilation of Water by contraction, changes into the figure of Snow, Ice, or Hail or by rarifying motions it turns into the figure of Vapour, and this Vapour again by contracting motions into the figure of hoar frost; and when all these motions change again into the former, then the figure of Ice, Snow, Hail, Vapour and Frost, turns again into the figure of Water: And this in all sense and reason is the most facil and probable way of making Ice, Snow, Hail, &c. As for rarefaction and condensation, I will not say that they may be forced by forreign parts, but yet they are made by change and alteration of the inherent motions of their own parts, for though the motions of forreign parts, may be the occasion of them, yet they are not the immediate cause or actors thereof. And as for _Thunder_, that clouds of Ice and Snow, the uppermost being condensed by heat, and so made heavy, should fall upon another and produce the noise of thunder, is very improbable; for the breaking of a little small string, will make a greater noise then a huge shower of snow with falling, and as for Ice being hard, it may make a great noise, one part falling upon another, but then their weight would be as much as their noise, so that the clouds or roves of Ice would be as soon upon our heads, if not sooner, as the noise in our Eares; like as a bullet shot out of a Canon, we may feel the bullet as soon as we hear the noise. But to conclude, all densations are not made by heat, nor all noises by pressures, for sound is oftener made by division then pressure, and densation by cold then by heat: And this is all for the present, from,

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend,_

_and Servant._

[1] _Of Meteor., c._ 2, 4, 5, 6.

XL.

_MADAM,_

I cannot perceive the Rational Truth of your _Authors_ opinion, concerning _Colours_, made _by the agitation of little spherical bodies of an Æthereal matter, transmitting the action of Light_; for if colours were made after this manner, there would, in my opinion, not be any fixed or lasting colour, but one colour would be so various, and change faster then every minute; the truth is, there would be no certain or perfect colour at all: wherefore it seems altogether improbable, that such liquid, rare and disunited bodies should either keep or make inherent and fixed colours; for liquid and rare bodies, whose several parts are united into one considerable bulk of body, their colours are more apt to change then the colours of those bodies that are dry, solid and dense; the reason is, that rare and liquid bodies are more loose, slack, and agil, then solid and dry bodies, in so much, as in every alteration of motion their colours are apt to change: And if united rare and liquid bodies be so apt to alter and change, how is it probable, that those bodies, which are small and not united, should either keep or make inherent fixed colours? I will not say, but that such little bodies may range into such lines and figures, as make colours, but then they cannot last, being not united into a lasting body, that is, into a solid, substantial body, proper to make such figures as colours. But I desire you not to mistake me, _Madam_, for I do not mean, that the substance of colours is a gross thick substance, for the substance may be as thin and rare as flame or light, or in the next degree to it; for certainly the substance of light, and the substance of colours come in their degrees very neer each other; But according to the contraction of the figures, colours are paler or deeper, or more or less lasting. And as for the reason, why colours will change and rechange, it is according as the figures alter or recover their forms; for colours will be as animal Creatures, which sometimes are faint, pale, and sick, and yet recover; but when as a particular colour is, as I may say, quite dead, then there is no recovering of it. But colours may seem altered sometimes in our eyes, and yet not be altered in themselves; for our eyes, if perfect, see things as they are presented; and for proof, if any animal should be presented in an unusual posture or shape, we could not judg of it; also if a Picture, which must be viewed side-wards, should be looked upon forwards, we could not know what to make of it; so the figures of colours, if they be not placed rightly to the sight, but turned topsie-turvie as the Phrase is, or upside-down, or be moved too quick, and this quick motion do make a confusion with the lines of Light, we cannot possibly see the colour perfectly. Also several lights or shades may make colours appear otherwise then in themselves they are, for some sorts of lights and shades may fall upon the substantial figures of colours in solid bodies, in such lines and figures, as they may over-power the natural or artificial inherent colours in solid bodies, and for a time make other colours, and many times the lines of light or of shadows will meet and sympathize so with inherent colours, and place their lines so exactly, as they will make those inherent colours more splendorous then in their own nature they are, so that light and shadows will add or diminish or alter colours very much. Likewise some sorts of colours will be altered to our sight, not by all, but onely by some sorts of light, as for example, blew will seem green, and green blew by candle light, when as other colours will never appear changed, but shew constantly as they are; the reason is, because the lines of candle light fall in such figures upon the inherent colours, and so make them appear according to their own figures; Wherefore it is onely the alteration of the exterior figures of light and shadows, that make colours appear otherwise, and not a change of their own natures; And hence we may rationally conclude, that several lights and shadows by their spreading and dilating lines may alter the face or out-side of colours, but not suddenly change them, unless the power of heat, and continuance of time, or any other cause, do help and assist them in that work of metamorphosing or transforming of colours; but if the lines of light be onely, as the phrase is, Skin-deep; that is, but lightly spreading and not deeply penetrating, they may soon wear out or be rubbed off; for though they hurt, yet they do not kill the natural colour, but the colour may recover and reassume its former vigour and lustre: but time and other accidental causes will not onely alter, but destroy particular colours as well as other creatures, although not all after the same manner, for some will last longer then others. And thus, _Madam_, there are three sorts of Colours, Natural, Artificial, and Accidental; but I have discoursed of this subject more at large in my Philosophical Opinions, to which I refer you, and rest,

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend_

_and Servant._

XLI.

_MADAM,_

My answer to your _Authors_ question, _Why flame ascends in a pointed figure?_[1] is, That the figure of fire consists in points, and being dilated into a flame, it ascends in lines of points slope-wayes from the fired fuel; like as if you should make two or more sticks stand upright and put the upper ends close together, but let the lower ends be asunder, in which posture they will support each other, which, if both their ends were close together, they could not do. The second question is, _Why fire doth not alwayes flame?_[2] I answer, Because all fuel is not flameable, some being so moist, as it doth oppose the fires dryness, and some so hard and retentive, as fire cannot so soon dissolve it; and in this contest, where one dissipates, and the other retains, a third figure is produced, _viz._ smoak, between the heat of one, and the moisture of the other; and this smoak is forced by the fire out of the fuel, and is nothing else but certain parts of fuel, raised to such a degree of rarefaction; and if fire come near, it forces the smoak into flame, the smoak changing it self by its figurative motions into flame; but when smoak is above the flame, the flame cannot force the smoak to fire or enkindle it self, for the flame cannot so well encounter it; which shews, as if smoak had a swifter motion then flame, although flame is more rarified then smoak; and if moisture predominate, there is onely smoak, if fire, then there is flame: But there are many figures, that do not flame, until they are quite dissolved, as Leather, and many other things. Neither can fire work upon all bodies alike, but according to their several natures, like as men cannot encounter several sorts of creatures after one and the same manner; for not any part in nature hath an absolute power, although it hath self-motion; and this is the reason, that wax by fire is melted, and clay hardened. The third question is, _Why some few drops of water sprinkled upon fire, do encrease its flame?_ I answer, by reason of their little quantity, which being over-powred by the greater quantity and force of fire, is by its self-motions converted into fire; for water being of a rare nature, and fire, for the most part, of a rarifying quality, it cannot suddenly convert it self into a more solid body then its nature is, but following its nature by force it turns into flame. The fourth question is, _Why the flame of spirit of Wine doth consume the Wine, and yet cannot burn or hurt a linnen cloth?_ I answer, The Wine is the fuel that feeds the flame, and upon what it feeds, it devoureth, and with the food, the feeder; but by reason Wine is a rarer body then Oyle, or Wood, or any other fuel, its flame is also weaker. And thus much of these questions, I rest,

Madam,

_Your Faithful Friend_

_and Servant._

[1] _P._ 4. _art._ 97.

[2] _Art._ 107.

XLII.

_MADAM,_

To conclude my discourse upon the Opinions of these two famous and learned Authors, which I have hitherto sent you in several Letters, I could not chuse but repeat the ground of my own opinions in this present; which I desire you to observe well, lest you mistake any thing, whereof I have formerly discoursed. First I am for self-moving matter, which I call the sensitive and rational matter, and the perceptive and architectonical part of nature, which is the life and knowledg of nature. Next I am of an opinion, That all Perception is made by corporeal, figuring self-motions, and that the perception of forreign objects is made by patterning them out: as for example, The sensitive perception of forreign objects is by making or taking copies from these objects, so as the sensitive corporeal motions in the eyes copy out the objects of sight, and the sensitive corporeal motions in the ears copy out the objects of sound; the sensitive corporeal motions in the nostrils, copy out the objects of sent; the sensitive corporeal motions in the tongue and mouth, copy out the objects of taste, and the sensitive corporeal motions in the flesh and skin of the body copy out the forreign objects of touch; for when you stand by the fire, it is not that the fire, or the heat of the fire enters your flesh, but that the sensitive motions copy out the objects of fire and heat. As for my Book of Philosophy, I must tell you, that it treats more of the production and architecture of Creatures then of their perceptions, and more of the causes then the effects, more in a general then peculiar way, which I thought necessary to inform you of, and so I remain,

Madam,

_Your faithful Friend_

_and Servant._

XLIII.

_MADAM,_