Part 1

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Personal Recollections and Experiences

CONCERNING THE

Battle of Stone River.

A Paper Read by Request before the Illinois Commandery of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the U.S., at Chicago, Ill., Feb. 14, 1889.

BY

MILO S. HASCALL,

OF GOSHEN, INDIANA,

Formerly a Lieutenant in the U.S. Army, and Brigadier-General of Volunteers during the War of the Rebellion.

Times Publishing Company, Goshen,--Indiana. 1889.

Personal Recollections and Experiences Concerning the Battle of Stone River.

As will be perceived by the above caption to this paper, it is proposed to relate what happened to me, and what I observed during the battle alluded to, and might not inappropriately be styled "What I know about the battle of Stone River."

In doing so I shall not undertake to give a general account of the battle, but shall confine myself to that portion which came under my own observation, and to necessary inferences as to what happened elsewhere. In setting out it will be well to give a brief account of the history of the Army of the Cumberland, and its commanders, so far as I know, up to the time of the memorable battle which is the subject of this paper. My having been a cadet at West Point from June, 1848, to June, 1852, when I graduated in the same class with Sheridan, Stanly, Slocum, Crook, Bonaparte and others, whose names have since become so distinguished, and my service in the regular army subsequently till the fall of 1853, threw me in contact with, and was the means of my knowing personally, or by reputation, most, if not all the prominent characters on both sides, that were brought to the knowledge of the public by the War of the Rebellion.

This knowledge of the men in the army of those times served me well all through the war, as it was seldom I came in contact with an officer on the other side, but what I knew all his peculiar characteristics, and idiosyncrasies. For illustration of this idea, as we were approaching Atlanta, my division had the advance of the Army of the Ohio the morning we came in sight of the city. My advance guard captured a rebel picket post, and one of the men captured, had a morning paper from Atlanta, in which was Johnston's farewell order to his troops, and Hood's order assuming command. I had been three years at West Point with Hood, he having graduated in 1853, in Schofield's class. I knew Hood to be a great, large hearted, large sized man, noted a great deal more for his fine social and fighting qualities, than for any particular scholastic acquirements, and inferred, (correctly as the result showed) that Johnston had been removed because Davis, and his admirers, had had enough of the Fabian policy, and wanted a man that would take the offensive. I immediately sent word to Gen. Sherman, who, with his staff, was not far off, and when he came to the front, informed him of the news I had, and the construction I put upon it, and in consequence, an immediate concentration to resist an attack was made in the vicinity, where we were. It was none too soon, as Hood, upon taking command immediately moved out to Decatur with nearly his entire army, fell upon McPherson's corps, with the besom of destruction, killing the gallant McPherson early in the engagement, and with his vastly superior force, beating back the Army of the Tennessee so fast, that there is no telling what might have happened, had we not made the concentration we did, and been prepared to give them a tremendous enfilading fire as soon as they came opposite the flanks of the Army of the Ohio. It was my fortune to be stationed at Ft. Adams, Newport, Rhode Island, as soon as my furlough expired after graduating at the Military Academy, and there found Lieut. W.S. Rosecrans, (afterward the commanding general at Stone River), and from being stationed some ten months at the same post, became somewhat familiarly acquainted with him and his peculiarities. I had never met Gen. Don Carlos Buel, and knew but little of him, although he was a regular army man, until the fall of '61, upon my return from service in West Virginia, during the first summer of the war. I was then Colonel of the 17th Indiana, and was assigned to the command of a brigade in Nelson's Division of Buel's Army, which was then in and around Louisville, Ky., and whose purpose was a forward move against Nashville.

While Buel's Army, the Army of the Cumberland, was concentrating in and about Louisville, preparing for the forward movement, Gov. Morton, of Indiana, was frequently in Louisville, consulting with Gen. Buel, and offering suggestions as to army movements etc., and these, after a time, came to be regarded by Gen. Buel as meddlesome, and uncalled for, so much so, that he finally intimated to Gov. Morton that it would be as well for him to attend to his duties as Governor of Indiana, while he would attend to his as Commanding General of the forces in the field. It is important to mention this circumstance here, as it will be seen further on, that this matter had an important bearing upon Gen. Buel's subsequent career. It will not be necessary, nor appropriate in this paper, to enter into a detailed account of the operations of the Army of the Cumberland in its march upon, and capture of Nashville--in its subsequent march to Shiloh, and the part it took in that most unfortunate, not to say (in many respects) disgraceful battle to our army--in its subsequent advance upon Corinth, and its operations there--in its subsequent march into northern Alabama and the vicinity of Chattanooga, and the forced march back to Louisville, made necessary by Bragg's advance upon that city through the Sequatchie Valley, from Chattanooga. All this is known to the public, and the public has arrived at its own conclusions as to the merits or demerits of these various operations. It is not too much to say, however, that those of us who accompanied Gen. Buel in this remarkable march and counter-march, and particularly those who had important commands during the same, had ample opportunity to arrive at intelligent conclusions as to the merits and demerits of the man. It may be inferred from what has already been said that, Gen. Buel was not particularly popular with political soldiers, newspaper correspondents, and others who were carrying on the war from safe distances in the rear. He was eminently and emphatically a soldier, with no ambition or expectations outside the line of his duty, and with honor and integrity so entirely above suspicion, that the camp follower and money getter did not presume to even enter into his presence. Notwithstanding all this, by the time of the return of the Army of the Cumberland to Louisville, though that army had then performed services that justly entitled it to the lasting gratitude of the country, and notwithstanding its eminent commander enjoyed, so far as I knew, the entire confidence of the officers and men in regard to his loyalty, patriotism and ability, yet there had sprung up a fire in the rear party that was constantly impugning his loyalty, his ability, and his fitness to command, and demanding his removal. In the light of what has already been said, it can now be seen whence, and from what source this hue and cry proceeded.

On account of a contemporaneous popularity that Gen. Rosecrans had achieved about that time, at the battle of Iuka, there arose a demand in the press that Gen. Buel be superseded in the command of the Army of the Cumberland by that officer. As I have said, my acquaintance with Gen. Rosecrans previous to his assuming command of the Army of the Cumberland, had been confined to the ten months I had been stationed with him at Newport, R.I., in '52-3.

My recollections of him were not such as to inspire me with confidence in him as the proper person to be placed in command of an army. At that time he seemed to be a great enthusiast in regard to the Catholic Church; seemed to want to think of nothing else, talk of nothing else, and in fact do nothing else, except to proselyte for it and attend upon its ministrations. No night was ever so dark and tempestuous, that he would not brave the boisterous seas of Newport Harbor to attend mass, and no occasion, however inappropriate, was ever lost sight of to advocate its cause; in fact, he was what would nowadays be called most emphatically a crank on that subject, and might not inappropriately be considered a one-ideaed man lacking in the breadth and poise, so necessary to success in the commander of an army in the field. While Buel's Army was in Louisville getting reinforcements and preparing to renew operations against Bragg, I obtained a few days leave of absence and had no end of inquiries on my way home and after arriving there, as to what I thought of the propriety and necessity of relieving Buel. I uniformly replied that as far as the Army was concerned there was not that I knew of, any want of confidence in Buel, but on the other hand, nothing but the most sincere confidence and respect. That the only reason that could be assigned was the want of confidence that the fire in the rear might have caused in the country at large, and that even if this was thought to be necessary, it would be very bad policy to substitute Rosecrans in his stead. How near correct I was in this estimate the public is now prepared to judge. Of course the possibility of Buel's removal dispirited him, and perhaps inspired some of the officers under him, that might by possibility be selected to succeed him, with a desire that such might be the case. At all events, shortly after the army again took the offensive, the notorious and disastrous affair at Perryville took place, in regard to which it was charged at the time by Gen. Buel, and believed by others, that it was brought on by Gen. A. McD. McCook separating himself more from the body of the army than his orders justified, and beyond supporting distance, in order that an engagement might be brought on, in which, if successful, he might claim the sole credit, and thereby supersede Buel in command. However this may be, this engagement was the culminating affair in Buel's career. The blame was (as I think) unjustly attached to him, and he was relieved of his command, and Gen. W.S. Rosecrans appointed in his place. After this battle, the Army resumed offensive operations against Bragg and in due time arrived in Nashville, when offensive operations were for a time suspended, in order to get supplies forward, and put the army in shape for active, and if possible, decisive operations. During the weeks that we thus lay encamped about Nashville I had frequent opportunities to see Gen. Rosecrans and observe his manner, characteristics and surroundings and had hoped to be enabled to form a more favorable opinion of the man and his fitness for the high position to which he had been called than I had theretofore entertained. I was sorry, however, to be forced to the conclusion that my estimate of the man had been even more favorable than the facts would justify. His head seemed to have been completely turned by the greatness of his promotion. Instead of the quiet dignity, orderly and business methods that had formerly obtained at the headquarters of the Army, the very reverse seemed to be the rule.

Having by this time surrounded himself, in addition to the usual staff and appliances ordinarily to be found at the headquarters of an army in the field, with a numerous coterie of newspaper correspondents, and Catholic priests, who seemed in his estimation to be vastly more important than anyone else about him, and laid in a good supply of crucifixes, holy water, _spiritus frumenti_, Chinese gongs, flambeaux, jobbing presses, printers' devils, javelins, white elephants, and other cabalistic emblems and evidences that a holy crusade was about to be entered upon, and having daily announced through his various newspaper correspondents, jobbing presses, and other means of reaching the public and the Confederate Army lying immediately in our front, exactly what was going on, one could but wonder at the sublime indifference of Bragg, and his Army remaining in the State of Tennessee, in the midst of preparations for their destruction such as these. As this magnificent and resplendent cavalcade of Holy, Oriental, and gorgeous splendor moved about from camp to camp during the weeks that we lay at Nashville making these gigantic and awe-inspiring preparations for the advance, every knee was bowed, and every tongue confessed, that Allah was great, and thrice illustriously great was this Savior that had been sent to us. All things though, however grand and glorious, must have an end, and it was finally announced during the last days of December, 1862, that the army was ready for a forward move. You will not be surprised to be informed after what has preceded, that it was my opinion that the Catholic officers having command in that army would fare well when the honors of the campaign came to be distributed. Accordingly, I made a prediction in writing that every one of these, consisting of Brig.-Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, Brig.-Gen. D.S. Stanly, Brig.-Gen. James S. Negley, and Capt. James St. Claire Morton, would all be promoted entirely regardless of what the fortunes of war might have in store for them. This I did without the slightest feeling of unkindness or jealousy towards these officers, but simply on account of my belief that the Commanding General was such a narrow-minded bigot in regard to Catholicism, that it was impossible for him not to allow considerations of this kind to control his estimate of men. We shall see how nearly correct I was in this estimate further on. At the time this campaign was entered upon the National Forces had not been divided into Army Corps and numbered. Each Army commander divided his army as to him seemed best. Rosecrans divided his into three grand divisions called the Right, Center, and Left, and each of these into three ordinary divisions of four brigades each, the Right, Center and Left commanded respectively by Generals A. McD. McCook, George H. Thomas and Thos. L. Crittenden.

At the time of this advance and for a long time previous thereto, I was commanding a brigade in Gen. Thos. J. Wood's division of the left wing. The advance movement all along the line finally commenced about the 26th day of December, 1862. The first day Palmer's division of the left wing had the advance and on the evening of that day, had reached the vicinity of Lavergne, having had some pretty sharp skirmishing in so doing. The next day by rotation Wood's division had the advance.

It was not the place of my brigade to lead the division that day, but I was specially requested to take the advance, however, as the progress made the day before had not been satisfactory. I consented to do so upon condition that the cavalry, which had been in advance the day before should be retired to the rear of my brigade ready to be brought into use should we succeed in routing the enemy, and should the topography of the country admit of the successful use of cavalry. I had seen so many disastrous results ensue from the use of squadrons of cavalry in advance of an army under such circumstances as we were advancing, that I did not want to run any such risks in addition to the ordinary and inevitable risks of such advances against an army in the field. The cavalry necessarily has to retire before any effective work can be done, and usually comes back pell mell with a lot of riderless horses, and creates infinitely more confusion, consternation, and even danger to the advancing army, than anything the enemy would be likely to do at that stage of the operations.

Having thus arrived at the front and got the cavalry out of the way to the rear, I found the enemy securely lodged in the town of Lavergne, and masked from our view by the buildings, shrubbery and fences. My orders contemplated an immediate advance along the main pike toward Murfreesboro. Thus no opportunity was given for flanking them, and so compelling them to abandon the town. The country was open between my command and the town, and afforded no shelter whatever for the troops. I formed the brigade in two lines about 200 yards apart, with a strong line of skirmishers about the same distance in advance of the first line, with a section of artillery in the interval between the infantry lines. As these dispositions were about completed preparatory to ordering an advance of the line a heavy infantry fire was opened upon us from the buildings and cover the town afforded to the enemy, and their fire was taking effect even upon the first line of infantry back of the skirmish line. At this juncture I ordered the infantry to lie down, the artillery to open with shot and shell upon the town, and the heavy line of skirmishers to fix bayonets and on double quick to make the distance between them and the town; to be immediately followed by the main lines of infantry as soon as the skirmishers had reached the town. This movement was entirely successful; we soon had routed the enemy from the town, but had left some forty or fifty dead comrades behind us to be cared for by those in our rear.

As soon as we had driven the enemy beyond the town, we continued the same order with two regiments in line of battle about 200 yards apart to the left of the main pike, and two to the right in like manner, all preceded by a heavy line of skirmishers, and pushed forward with all possible dispatch. A heavy rain set in about the time we commenced the advance beyond the town, which continued all day, so the corn-fields and other plowed fields soon became ankle deep with mud. Nevertheless we pressed forward continuously. If we encountered the enemy in any considerable force, the skirmish line gradually slackened their progress until the main line came up with them. Artillery was brought forward and fired advancing along the road. In this manner we kept up an almost continuous advance, our dead and wounded being cared for by those in our rear. By night-fall we had made an advance of nearly eight miles, to Stewart's Creek. As we approached Stewart's Creek we discovered that the enemy had set the bridge over the same on fire. I immediately concentrated four pieces of artillery on a little eminence to the right of the road, and commenced shelling the enemy beyond the creek. Under the cover of this fire the infantry was ordered forward at double quick, and succeeded in subduing the flames before sufficient damage had been done to prevent the use of the bridge by our army. So rapid had been our advance that three companies of rebel cavalry that had been hovering on our left flank during the advance, were cut off before they reached the bridge, and were captured by us with all their horses and accoutrements. In the evening we were congratulated by all our superior officers for having accomplished a very satisfactory day's work.

This brought us up to the evening of the 27th of December. During the time between this and the afternoon of the 30th of the same month, all portions of our army had pressed forward along the different lines of march laid out for them, encountering the usual incidents of driving in the enemy's cavalry and outposts, until finally at that time our entire army had arrived along the left bank of Stone River, opposite the city of Murfreesboro, some two or three miles further on. Here we encountered the enemy in force and their fortifications were plainly visible all along opposite us on the right bank of the river, between it and the city of Murfreesboro, and here it was very evident Bragg intended to make his stand and accept the gauge of battle.

There was desultory firing all along the line during that memorable afternoon, but during that time our army was finally concentrated, McCook, with his three divisions on the right, Thomas, with his three in the center, and Crittenden, with his three on the left. The whole line, with the intervals for artillery and cavalry, occupying a distance of two or three miles, more or less. Crittenden's three divisions were formed, two divisions in line of battle, and one in reserve, as follows: Palmer's division on the right, Wood's on the left, and Van Cleve in reserve opposite the interval between Palmer's and Wood's, and each division consisting likewise of three brigades, were formed in like manner, two in line and one in reserve. In Wood's division Wagner's brigade was on the right, my own on the left, and Harker in reserve. This arrangement brought my brigade on the extreme left of the entire army. During that evening we were made acquainted with the plan of the attack which was to be made by our army under cover of the gray of the morning the following day, the memorable 31st day of December, 1862. This was for the left wing (Crittenden's) to cross Stone River--which was at that time fordable at all points for all arms of the service--and deliver a furious attack on the enemy's extreme right, this to be followed up by a wheel to the right by other portions of our army in case Crittenden was successful in his attack, until all portions of our army should become engaged and the battle become general all along the line.