Part 14

_a._ “When either of these states has promised something to another, (as, for instance, assistance, or a relinquishment of certain territory, or subsidies and such like), the question may arise whether, in a case where the safety of the state thus bound depends on its evading the fulfilment of this promise, it can do so by maintaining a right to be regarded as a double person:—firstly, as sovereign and accountable to no one in the state of which that sovereign power is head; and, secondly, merely as the highest official in the service of that state, who is obliged to answer to the state for every action. And the result of this is that the state is acquitted in its second capacity of any obligation to which it has committed itself in the first.” But, if a nation or its sovereign proclaimed these maxims, the natural consequence would be that every other would flee from it, or unite with other states to oppose such pretensions. And this is a proof that politics, with all its cunning, defeats its own ends, if the test of making principles of action public, which we have indicated, be applied. Hence the maxim we have quoted must be wrong.

_b._ “If a state which has increased its power to a formidable extent (_potentia tremenda_) excites anxiety in its neighbours, is it right to assume that, since it has the means, it will also have the will to oppress others; and does that give less powerful states a right to unite and attack the greater nation without any definite cause of offence?” A state which would here answer openly in the affirmative would only bring the evil about more surely and speedily. For the greater power would forestall those smaller nations, and their union would be but a weak reed of defence against a state which knew how to apply the maxim, _divide et impera_. This maxim of political expediency then, when openly acknowledged, necessarily defeats the end at which it aims, and is therefore wrong.

_c._ “If a smaller state by its geographical position breaks up the territory of a greater, so as to prevent a unity necessary to the preservation of that state, is the latter not justified in subjugating its less powerful neighbour and uniting the territory in question with its own?” We can easily see that the greater state dare not publish such a maxim beforehand; for either all smaller states would without loss of time unite against it, or other powers would contend for this booty. Hence the impracticability of such a maxim becomes evident under the light of publicity. And this is a sign that it is wrong, and that in a very great degree; for, although the victim of an act of injustice may be of small account, that does not prevent the injustice done from being very great.

3.—=Cosmopolitan Law.= We may pass over this department of right in silence, for, owing to its analogy with international law, its maxims are easily specified and estimated.

* * * * *

In this principle of the incompatibility of the maxims of international law with their publicity, we have a good indication of the non-agreement between politics and morals, regarded as a science of right. Now we require to know under what conditions these maxims do agree with the law of nations. For we cannot conclude that the converse holds, and that all maxims which can bear publicity are therefore just. For anyone who has a decided supremacy has no need to make any secret about his maxims. The condition of a law of nations being possible at all is that, in the first place, there should be a law-governed state of things. If this is not so, there can be no public right, and all right which we can think of outside the law-governed state,—that is to say, in the state of nature,—is mere private right. Now we have seen above that something of the nature of a federation between nations, for the sole purpose of doing away with war, is the only rightful condition of things reconcilable with their individual freedom. Hence the agreement of politics and morals is only possible in a federative union, a union which is necessarily given _a priori_, according to the principles of right. And the lawful basis of all politics can only be the establishment of this union in its widest possible extent. Apart from this end, all political sophistry is folly and veiled injustice. Now this sham politics has a casuistry, not to be excelled in the best Jesuit school. It has its mental reservation (_reservatio mentalis_): as in the drawing up of a public treaty in such terms as we can, if we will, interpret when occasion serves to our advantage; for example, the distinction between the _status quo_ in fact (_de fait_) and in right (_de droit_). Secondly, it has its probabilism; when it pretends to discover evil intentions in another, or makes, the probability of their possible future ascendency a lawful reason for bringing about the destruction of other peaceful states. Finally, it has its philosophical sin (_peccatum philosophicum_, _peccatillum_, _baggatelle_) which is that of holding it a trifle easily pardoned that a smaller state should be swallowed up, if this be to the gain of a nation much more powerful; for such an increase in power is supposed to tend to the greater prosperity of the whole world.[154]

[154] We can find the voucher for maxims such as these in Herr Hofrichter Garve’s essay, _On the Connection of Morals with Politics_, 1788. This worthy scholar confesses at the very beginning that he is unable to give a satisfactory answer to this question. But his sanction of such maxims, even when coupled with the admission that he cannot altogether clear away the arguments raised against them, seems to be a greater concession in favour of those who shew considerable inclination to abuse them, than it might perhaps be wise to admit.

Duplicity gives politics the advantage of using one branch or the other of morals, just as suits its own ends. The love of our fellowmen is a duty: so too is respect for their rights. But the former is only conditional: the latter, on the other hand, an unconditional, absolutely imperative duty; and anyone who would give himself up to the sweet consciousness of well-doing must be first perfectly assured that he has not transgressed its commands. Politics has no difficulty in agreeing with morals in the first sense of the term, as ethics, to secure that men should give to superiors their rights. But when it comes to morals, in its second aspect, as the science of right before which politics must bow the knee, the politician finds it prudent to have nothing to do with compacts and rather to deny all reality to morals in this sense, and reduce all duty to mere benevolence. Philosophy could easily frustrate the artifices of a politics like this, which shuns the light of criticism, by publishing its maxims, if only statesmen would have the courage to grant philosophers the right to ventilate their opinions.

With this end in view, I propose another principle of public right, which is at once transcendental and affirmative. Its formula would be as follows:—“All maxims which require publicity, in order that they may not fail to attain their end, are in agreement both with right and politics.”

For, if these maxims can only attain the end at which they aim by being published, they must be in harmony with the universal end of mankind, which is happiness; and to be in sympathy with this (to make the people contented with their lot) is the real business of politics. Now, if this end should be attainable only by publicity, or in other words, through the removal of all distrust of the maxims of politics, these must be in harmony with the right of the people; for a union of the ends of all is only possible in a harmony with this right.

I must postpone the further development and discussion of this principle till another opportunity. That it is a transcendental formula is quite evident from the fact that all the empirical conditions of a doctrine of happiness, or the _matter_ of law, are absent, and that it has regard only to the _form_ of universal conformity to law.

* * * * *

If it is our duty to realise a state of public right, if at the same time there are good grounds for hope that this ideal may be realised, although only by an approximation advancing _ad infinitum_, then perpetual peace, following hitherto falsely so-called conclusions of peace, which have been in reality mere cessations of hostilities, is no mere empty idea. But rather we have here a problem which gradually works out its own solution and, as the periods in which a given advance takes place towards the realisation of the ideal of perpetual peace will, we hope, become with the passing of time shorter and shorter, we must approach ever nearer to this goal.

INDEX

A

Absolutism; of Hobbes, 43, 44; of Schopenhauer, 43; according to Kant, 43, 44, 125-128; to Locke, 44.

Alexander I. of Russia; 80.

Alexander the Great; 31, 103.

Alsace-Lorraine; annexation of, 90, 92, 95.

Ambrose, Saint; 15.

Amphictyonic League; 16, 22.

Aquinas, Thomas; on fighting clergy, 18; on war, 18, 19.

Arbitration; as a substitute for war, 79, 81, 87; difficulties settled by, 80; where it is useless, 82, 83, 86.

Aristotle; on war, 7, 8; and rights of an enemy, _ib._; 31; on the relation between politics and ethics, 162.

Assyrians; war among the, 9.

Augustine, Saint; 16.

B

Balance of power; 26, 95.

Bentham, Jeremy; 26, 79, 92.

Bluntschli, J. K.; 41, 73, 74, 80.

C

Caird, Edward; 3, 51.

Calvin, John; 19.

Carnegie, Andrew; 100.

China; a danger to Europe, 92, 93, 140, 141.

Cicero; on the conduct of war, 22, 41.

Clement of Alexandria; 15.

Clergy, fighting; Origen on, 14, 15; Wycliffe, 18; Erasmus, _ib._; Aquinas, _ib._

Cobden, Richard; 64.

Corvinus, Matthias; 109.

Cowper, William; 5, 38, 123.

Crusades, wars of the; 16, 103.

D

Dante, Alighieri; on mediation, 46; on universal monarchy, 68, 69.

Disarmament; 88-93; Czar’s proposal of, 90; practicability of, 90-93.

Dubois, Cardinal; 36.

E

Empire; of Rome, 9, 20, 68; world-, spiritual, 23, 32, 69; of Alexander the Great, 31, 68; Frankish, 69; Holy Roman 69; of Napoleon I., 69.

Erasmus, Desiderius; and European peace, 17; on war, 18, 19; on fighting clergy, 18, 32.

F

Farrar, J. A.; 18.

Federation; Kant’s idea of, 60, 68, 69, 128-137; 88, 92, 93, 95, 97; probable results of, 98, 99, 100, 134.

Fichte, J. G.; 69, 99.

Finland; 92, 95.

Fischer, Kuno; 62, 67.

Fleury, Cardinal; 55.

Frederick the Great; 66, 126.

G

Gentilis, Albericus; 21, 32.

Golden Age; 3, 41.

Government; origin of, according to Plato, 5; according to Hume, 5, 52; to Cowper, 5, 6; to Hobbes, 40-42, 118, 119; to Kant, 51-54, 152-154; to Rousseau, 52; to Locke, 53; representative, 65-68, 120, 121, 124-128.

Greeks; their attitude to other nations, 7; to an enemy, _ib._; their Sacred Wars, 16; the Amphictyonic League, 16.

Grotius, Hugo; his _De Jure Belli et Pacis_, 24-27; and the _Jus Gentium_, 24, 25; and the Law of Nature, 25; on peace, 27, 32, 40, 131.

H

Hague Conference (1899); 86, 90.

Hegel, G. W. F.; 57; on war, 71, 72, 75.

Henry IV. of France; 30, 32, 33, 36.

Hobbes, Thomas; his theory of the state of nature and origin of government, 4, 40-42, 51, 118, 119, 133; 6, 26, 27, 28, 37; his influence on Kant, 40, 46; his views on revolution, 41, 188; of the relations between states, 43-46, 128, 131; on the conduct of war, 45, 89, 120, 124, 159.

Holls, Fred. W.; 86.

Hooker, Richard; 52; on the depravity of man, 173.

Hume, David; on the origin of government, 5, 52; on the state of nature, 40, 41; on the original contract, 52, 108, 109, 162.

I

International Law; the development of, 20-24; its connection with the Reformation, 21, 24; in Greece and Rome, 22, 23.

Intervention; 64, 93, 94, 112, 113.

J

Jews; war among the, 9-11; their dream of peace, 32.

Justin; 15.

K

Kant, Immanuel; 26, 37; his indebtedness to earlier political writers, 40, 46; his theory of human development, 47-49; and how this is possible, 49-51, 54; on the foundation of the state, 51-54, 152-154; the relations between states and individuals, 54, 55, 117-120, 128, 173, 174; the necessity for reform within the state, 55, 56, 168; the political and social conditions of his time, 57-59; his attitude to war, 58, 133, 135, 136, 137, 149-151; on the growing power of commerce, 59, 65, 142, 157; his idea of federation, 60, 68, 69, 128-137, 192; and ideal of perpetual peace, 61, 129, 196; the conditions of its realization, 62-69; on representative and other constitutions, 65-68, 120-128, 152, 153, 167; his opinion of the English constitution, 66; his disapproval of universal monarchy, 68, 69, 155, 156; 79, 83, 89, 100, 105; on the right of way, 137-142; on nature’s guarantee of a perpetual peace, 143-157; on the relation between politics and morals, 161-196; on revolution, 167, 168, 186-188.

L

Laveleye, Émile de; 81.

Lawrence, T. J.; 9, 78, 81.

Leibniz, Gottfried W.; 36; his criticism of St. Pierre, 37, 38, 58, 106.

Locke, John; and the golden age, 3, 4; on the original contract, 53; on revolution, 53, 188; 67, 133.

Lorimer, James; 34, 80.

Louis Philippe; 76.

Luther, Martin; on war, 19.

M

Machiavelli, Nicolo; 162.

Maine, Henry; on Grotius and the _Jus Gentium_, 24, 25.

Maistre, Joseph de; 71.

Martineau, James; 102.

Mennonites; and war, 14.

Military service; of Christians, 14, 16, 18, 19; compulsory, 89; voluntary, 111.

Mill, John Stuart; 80.

Moltke, Graf von; 71, 73-75.

Monarchy, universal; the ideal of Dante, 68, 69; disapproved by Kant, 68, 69, 155, 156; and Fichte, 69.

Montesquieu, Baron de; on self-preservation, 83; on armed peace, 88, 159.

More, Thomas; 32.

Morley, John; 3.

N

Napoleon Bonaparte; Empire of, 69, 71, 72, 76, 77.

Napoleon, Louis; 80.

National Debt; 63, 64, 111, 112.

O

Origen; on military service, 14, 15.

Original Contract; 40; as understood by Rousseau, 52; by Hobbes, 52, 53; by Hooker, 52; by Hume, _ib._; by Kant, _ib._; by Locke, 53.

P

Paris Congress (1856); 86.

Paulsen, Friedrich; 43, 52, 53, 66, 78.

Peace, perpetual; the dream of, 29-33; projects of, by Penn, 30; by Henry IV., 30, 33, 34; by St. Pierre, 30, 32, 34-37; Rousseau’s attitude to, 38-40, 106; for Kant an ideal, 61, 129; the articles of, 62-69, 107-142, 158-160; the guarantee of, 143-157.

Peace Societies; 70, 75, 78, 79, 80, 86, 87; and disarmament, 88, 96, 97, 100, 101, 102.

Penn, William; 30.

Plato; on the origin of the state, 5; on war, 8, 41; on the relation between ethics and politics, 162.

Poland; 92, 93, 95.

Politics; and morals, according to Kant, 161-196; to Plato, 162; to Aristotle, _ib._; to Hume, _ib._; sophistical maxims of, 170-172.

Pope, Alexander; 4, 127.

Puffendorf, Samuel; 27; on intervention, 64, 131.

Q

Quakers; and war, 14.

R

Reformation; and military service, 18; and international law, 21, 24.

Religion; Roman, and war, 9; Jewish, 9-11; Mohammedan, 10; Buddhist, and conversion, 12; Christian, and war, 12-20.

Revolution, right of; according to Hobbes, 41, 53; and Spinoza, 41; according to Locke, 53; to Rousseau, _ib._; to Kant, 167, 186-188.

Right of way; Vattel on, 65, 138; Kant on, 65, 137-142.

Ritchie, D. G.; on Rousseau, 3; on Locke and the golden age, _ib._, 52, 85, 98.

Robertson, William; 6, 17, 18, 19.

Romans; and war, 7, 8, 9, 22, 23; and international law, 22, 23.

Rousseau, J. J.; and the state of nature, 2, 3, 52; 26, 28; his criticism of St. Pierre, 38-40; his views on militarism, 39; on the original contract, 52; on revolution, 53, 188; 61, 67, 100, 132, 134; on democratic and republican governments, 153; on the depravity of man, 173.

Russia; Alexander I. of, 80; the Czar of, 90; the backward civilization of, 92, 93, 94, 95.

S

Schiller, Friedrich von; on war and peace, 71, 72, 73, 75.

Schopenhauer, Arthur; 43.

Spencer, Herbert; 76.

Spinoza, Benedict; on the state of nature, 41; and revolution, _ib._

Standing armies; 63, 64, 89, 110.

State of nature; according to Rousseau, 2, 3; and the golden age, 3; Hobbes’ theory of, 4, 40, 41, 118; according to Hume a philosophical fiction, 41; according to Kant, 117-120.

States; transference of, 63, 108, 109; marriage between, 109.

St. Pierre, Castel de; 30, 32, 33; his _Projet_, 34-37; and Leibniz, 37, 38; and Rousseau, 38-40; 61, 67, 79, 92, 106.

Sully, Duke of; 30, 32, 33.

T

Tennyson, Lord; 73, 74.

Tertullian; 14, 15.

Treaties of peace; in Greece, 7, 63, 64, 107, 108.

Treitschke, H. von; 75.

Trendelenburg, F. A.; 75.

V

Vattel, Emerich; his _Droit des Gens_, 28, 29; on intervention, 64, 113, 114; on the right of way, 65; of self-preservation, 83, 89, 103; on treaties, 108; 131.

Voltaire, François de; 33, 37, 38.

W

War; religious, 16; private, 17, 20, 29; dynastic, 38, 57, 123; Kant’s attitude to, 58, 133, 135, 136, 137, 149-151; its influence on progress, 70, 96, 103; views of Hegel on, 71, 72, 75; of Schiller, 71, 72, 73, 75; of Moltke, 71, 73, 74, 75; under altered conditions, 76, 77, 78; when just, 84, 85; future probable causes of, 94, 95; honorable conduct of, 114, 115.

Wycliffe, John; and fighting clergy, 18.

Z

Zwingli, Huldreich, 19.

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