Chapter 18

A great step towards peace may be made by admitting at once all ex-enemy States into the League of Nations. Among the States of European civilization millions of persons are unrepresented in the League of Nations: the United States, who has not wished to adhere to it after the Treaty of Versailles sanctioned violence; Russia, who has not been able to join owing to her difficult position; Germany, Hungary, Austria and Bulgaria, who have not been permitted to join; the Turks, etc. The League of Nations was a magnificent conception in which I have had faith, and which I have regarded with sympathy. But a formidable mistake has deprived it of all prestige. Clauses 5 and 10 of its originating constitution and the exclusion of the defeated have given it at once the character of a kind of Holy Alliance of the conquerors established to regulate the incredible relations which the treaties have created between conquerors and conquered. Wilson had already committed the mistake of founding the League of Nations without first defining the nations and leaving to chance the resources of the beaten peoples and their populations. The day, however, on which all the peoples are represented in the League, the United States, without approving the treaties of Versailles, St. Germain or Trianon, etc., will feel the need of abandoning their isolation, which is harmful for them and places them in a position of inferiority. And the day when all the peoples of the world are represented, and accept reciprocal pledges of international solidarity, a great step will have been taken.

As things stand, the organism of the Reparations Commission, established by Schedule 2 of Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles, is an absurd union of the conquerors (no longer allies, but reunited solely in a kind of bankruptcy procedure), who interpret the treaty in their own fashion, and can even modify the laws and regulations in the conquered countries. The existence of such an institution among civilized peoples ought to be an impossibility. Its powers must be transferred to the League of Nations in such a manner as to provide guarantees for the victors, but guarantees also for the conquered. The suppression of the Reparations Commission becomes, therefore, a fundamental necessity.

2.--THE REVISION OF THE TREATIES

When the public, and especially in the United States and Great Britain, become convinced that the spirit of peace can only prevail by means of an honest revision of the treaties the difficulties will be easily eliminated. But one cannot merely speak of a simple revision; it would be a cure worse than the evil. During the tempest one cannot abandon the storm-beaten ship and cross over to a safer vessel. It is necessary to return into harbour and make the transhipment where calm, or relative calm at any rate, reigns.

Inasmuch as Europe is out of equilibrium, a settlement, even of a bad kind, cannot be arrived at off-hand. To cast down the present political scaffolding without having built anything would be an error. Perhaps here the method that will prove most efficacious is to entrust the League of Nations with the task of arriving at a revision. When the League of Nations is charged with this work the various governments will send their best politicians, and the discussion will be able to assume a realizable character.

According to its constitution, the League of Nations may, in case of war or the menace of war (Clause 11), convoke its members, and take all the measures required to safeguard the peace of the nations. All the adhering States have recognized their obligation to submit all controversies to arbitration, and that in any case they have no right to resort to war before the expiration of a term of three months after the verdict of the arbiters or the report of the Council (Clause 12). Any member of the League of Nations resorting to war contrary to the undertakings of the treaty which constitutes the League is, _ipso facto_, considered as if he had committed an act of war against all the other members of the League (Clause 19).

But more important still is the fact that the Assembly of the League of Nations may invite its members to proceed to a fresh examination of treaties that become inapplicable as well as of international situations whose prolongation might imperil the peace of the world (Clause 19).

We may therefore revise the present treaties without violence and without destroying them.

What requires to be modified there is no necessity to say, inasmuch as all the matter of this book supplies the evidence and the proof. What is certain is that in Europe and America, except for an intransigent movement running strong in France, everyone is convinced of the necessity of revision.

It will be well that this revision should take place through the operations of the League of Nations after the representatives of all the States, conquerors, conquered and neutrals, have come to form part of it.

But in the constitution of the League of Nations there are two clauses which form its fundamental weakness, sections desired by France, whose gravity escaped Wilson.

Clause 5 declares that, save and excepting contrary dispositions, the decisions of the Assembly or of the Council are to be by the unanimous consent of the members represented at the meetings. It is difficult to imagine anything more absurd. If the modification of a territorial situation is being discussed, all the nations must agree as to the solution, including the interested nation. The League of Nations is convinced that the Danzig corridor is an absurdity, but if France is not of the same opinion no modification can be made. Without a change of this clause, every honest attempt at revision must necessarily break down.

Clause 10, by which the members of the League of Nations pledge themselves to respect and preserve from external attacks the territorial integrity and the existing political independence of all the members of the League, must also be altered. This clause, which is profoundly immoral, consecrates and perpetuates the mistakes and faults of the treaties. No honest country can guarantee the territorial integrity of the States now existing after the monstrous parcelling out of entire groups of Germans and Magyars to other nations, arranged without scruples and without intelligence. No one can honestly guarantee the territorial integrity of Poland as it stands at present. If a new-risen Russia, a renewed Germany, and an unextinguished Austria desire in the future a revision of the treaties they will be making a most reasonable demand to which no civilized country may make objection. It is indeed Clauses 5 and 10 which have deprived the constitution of the League of Nations of all moral credit, which have transformed it into an instrument of oppression for the victors, which have caused the just and profound disapproval of the most enlightened men of the American Senate. A League of Nations with Clauses 5 and 10 and the prolonged exclusion of the vanquished cannot but accentuate the diffidence of all the democracies and the aversion of the masses.

But the League of Nations can be altered and can become indeed a great force for renovation if the problem of its functioning be clearly confronted and promptly resolved.

The League of Nations can become a great guarantee for peace on three conditions:

(a) That it include really and in the shortest space of time possible all the peoples, conquerors, conquered and neutrals.

(b) That clauses 5 and 10 be modified, and that after their modification a revision of the treaties be undertaken.

(c) That the Reparations Commission be abolished and its powers be conferred upon the League of Nations itself.

As it exists at present the League of Nations has neither prestige nor dignity; it is an expression of the violence of the conquering group of nations. But reconstituted and renovated it may become the greatest of peace factors in the relations between the peoples.

3.--THE SAFETY OF FRANCE AND THE MILITARY GUARANTEES

In the state of mind in which France exists at present there is a reasonable cause of worry for the future. Since the conclusion of the War the United States of America have withdrawn. They concern themselves with Europe no more, or only in a very limited form and with diffidence. The Monroe doctrine has come into its own again. Great Britain watches the decadence of the European continent, but, girt by the sea, has nothing to fear. She is a country of Europe, but she does not live the life of Europe; she stands apart from it. Italy, when she has overcome the difficulties of her economic situation, can be certain of her future. The very fact that she stands in direct opposition to no State, that she may have competition with various peoples but not long-nurtured hatreds, gives Italy a relative security. But France, who has been in less than forty-four years twice at war with Germany, has little security for her future. Germany and the Germanic races increase rapidly in number. France does not increase. France, notwithstanding the new territories, after her war losses, has probably no more inhabitants than in 1914. In her almost tormented anxiety to destroy Germany we see her dread for the future--more indeed than mere hatred. To occupy with numerous troops the left bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads is an act of vengeance; but in the vengeance there is also anxiety. There are many in France who think that neither now nor after fifteen years must the territory of the vanquished be abandoned. And so France maintains in effective force too large an army and nourishes too great a rancour. And for this reason she helps the Poles in their unjustifiable attempt in Upper Silesia, will not allow the Germans of Austria to live, and seeks to provoke and facilitate all movements and political actions which can tend towards the dismemberment of Germany. The British and the Italian viewpoints are essentially different. France, which knows it can no longer count on the co-operation of Great Britain, of the United States, or of Italy, keeps on foot her numerous army, has allied herself with Belgium and Poland, and tries to suffocate Germany in a ring of iron. The attempt is a vain one and destined to fail within a few years, inasmuch as France's allies have no capacity for resistance. Yet, all the same, her attempt derives from a feeling that is not only justifiable but just.

France had obtained at Paris, apart from the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine and all the military controls, two guaranteeing treaties from the United States and from Great Britain: in case of unprovoked aggression on the part of Germany, Great Britain and the United States pledged themselves to defend France. The British Parliament, as we have seen, approved the treaty provisionally on the similar approbation of the United States. But as the latter has not approved the Treaty of Versailles, and has not even discussed the guarantee treaty, France has now no guarantee treaty.

If we are anxious to realize a peace politic two things are necessary:

1. That France has security, and that for twenty years at least Great Britain and Italy pledge themselves to defend her in case of aggression.

2. That the measures for the disarmament of the conquered States be maintained, maybe with some tempering of their conditions, and that their execution and control be entrusted with the amplest powers to the League of Nations.

No one can think it unjust that the parties who provoked the War or those who have, if not the entire, at least the greatest share of responsibility, should be rendered for a certain time incapable. The fall of the military caste in Germany and the formation of a democratic society will derive much help from the abolition, for a not too brief period of time, of the permanent army, and this will render possible, at no distant date, an effective reduction of the armaments in the victorious countries.

Great Britain has the moral duty to proffer a guarantee already spontaneously given. Italy also must give such a guarantee if she wishes truly to contribute towards the peace of Europe.

As long as Germany has no fleet, and cannot put together an artillery and an aviation corps, she cannot present a menace.

Great Britain and Italy can, however, only give their guarantees on the condition that they guarantee a proper state of things and not a continued condition of violence. The withdrawal of all the troops from the Rhine ought to coincide with a clear definition concerning the fate of the Germans of Austria and the Germans detached from Germany without motive. Such a retirement must coincide with the definition of the territory of the Saar, and the assigning, pure and simple, of Upper Silesia to Germany and the end of all the insupportable controls and the indemnity regulations.

Being myself contrary to any pledge binding Italy for too long a period, I am of opinion that it is perfectly right that Great Britain and Italy should make this sacrifice for the peace of Europe.

But no guarantee is possible, either for Great Britain or Italy, until the most essential problems be resolved in the justest manner by means of straightforward and explicit understandings.

Italy's tendency towards British policy on the continent of Europe depends on the fact that Great Britain has never wished or tolerated that any continental State should have a hegemony over others. And, therefore, she has found herself at different epochs ranged against France, Germany and Russia.

England is in the Mediterranean solely to secure her passage through it, not to dominate it. She continues to follow the grand policy by which she has transformed her colonies into dominions, and, in spite of errors, she has always shown the greatest respect for the liberty of other peoples.

But Europe will not have peace until the three progressive countries of the Continent, Germany, France and Italy, find a way of agreement which can reunite all their energies in one common force.

Russia has conceived the idea of having the hegemony of Europe; Germany has indeed had the illusion of such a hegemony. Now this illusion penetrates certain French elements. Can a people of forty million inhabitants, who are not increasing, who already find difficulties in dominating and controlling their immense colonies, aspire to hegemonic action, even taking count of their great political prestige? Can France lastingly dominate and menace a country like Germany, which at no distant date will have a population double that of France?

The future of European civilization requires that Germany, France and Italy, after so much disaster, find a common road to travel.

The first step to be taken is to give security of existence and of reconstruction to Germany; the second is to guarantee France from the perils of a not distant future; the third is to find at all costs a means of accord between Germany, France and Italy.

But only vast popular movements and great currents of thought and of life can work effectively in those cases where the labours of politicians have revealed themselves as characterized by uncertainty and as being too traditional. Europe is still under the dominion of old souls which often enough dwell in young bodies and, therefore, unite old errors with violence. A great movement can only come from the intellectuals of the countries most menaced and from fresh popular energies.

4.--REGULATING INTER-ALLIED DEBTS, GERMANY'S INDEMNITY AND THAT OF THE DEFEATED COUNTRIES

These two problems are closely connected.

The victorious countries demand an indemnity from the conquered countries which, except Germany, who has a great productive force even in her hour of difficulties, are in extreme depression and misery.

Great Britain is in debt to the United States, and France, Italy and minor nations are in their turn heavy debtors to the Americans and to Great Britain.

The experience of the last three years has shown that, even with the best will, none of the countries owing money to the Entente has been able to pay its debts or even the interest. With an effort Great Britain could pay; France and Italy will never be able to, and have, moreover, exchanges which constitute a real menace for the future of each.

The fact that France and Italy, although they came out of the war victoriously, have not been able to pay their debts or even the interest on them is the proof that Germany, whose best resources have been taken away from her, can only pay an indemnity very different from the fantastic figures put forward at the time of the Conference of Paris, when even important political men spoke of monstrous and ridiculous indemnities.

The problem of the inter-allied debts, as well as that of the indemnity, will be solved by a certain sacrifice on the part of all who participated in the War.

The credits of the United States amount to almost 48 milliards of lire or francs at par, and the credits of Great Britain to 44 milliards. Great Britain owes about 21 milliards to the United States and is in turn creditor for some 44 milliards. She has a bad debt owing from Russia for more than 14 milliards, but 13 milliards are owing from France, about 12 milliards from Italy, and almost 2-1/2 milliards from Belgium. That is to say, that Great Britain could well pay her debt to the United States, ceding the greater part of her credits towards France and Italy.

But the truth is that, while on the subject of the German indemnities, stolid illusions continue to be propagated (perhaps now with greater discretion), neither France nor Italy is in a position to pay its debts.

The most honest solution, which, intelligently enough, J.M. Keynes has seen from the first, is that each of the inter-allied countries should renounce its state credits towards countries that were allies or associates during the War. The United States of America are creditors only; Great Britain has lent the double of what she has borrowed. France has received on loan the triple of what she has lent to others.

The credits of France are for almost two-thirds undemandable credits of Great Britain; more than 14 milliards being with Russia, they are for considerably more than one-third bad debts.

France and Italy would be benefited chiefly by this provision. Great Britain would scarcely either benefit or lose, or, rather, the benefit accruing to her would be less in so much as her chief credits are to Russia.

The United States would doubtless have to bear the largest burden. But when one thinks of the small sacrifice which the United States has made in comparison with the efforts of France and Italy (and Italy was not obliged to enter the War), the new sacrifice demanded does not seem excessive.

During the War the United States of America, who for three years furnished food, provisions and arms to the countries of the Entente, have absorbed the greater part of their available resources. Not only are the States of Europe debtors, but so are especially the private citizens who have contracted debts during or after the War. Great Britain during the War had to sell at least 25 milliards of her foreign values. The United States of America, on the contrary, have immensely increased their reserves.

But this very increase is harmful to them, inasmuch as the capacity for exchange of the States of Europe has been much reduced. The United States now risk seeing still further reduced, if not destroyed, this purchasing capacity of their best clients; and this finally constitutes for the U.S.A. infinitely greater damage than the renouncing of all their credits.

To reconstruct Germany, to intensify exchange of goods with the old countries of Austria-Hungary and Russia, to settle the situation of the exchange of goods with Italy and the Balkan countries is much more important for the United States and the prosperity of its people than to demand payment or not demand payment of those debts made for the common cause.

I will speak of the absurd situation which has come about. Czeko-Slovakia and Poland unwillingly indeed fought against the Entente, which has raised them to free and autonomous States; and not only have they no debts to pay, being now in the position of conquerors, or at least allies of the conquerors, but they have, in fact, scarcely any foreign debts.

The existence of enormous War debts is, then, everywhere a menace to financial stability. No one is anxious to repudiate his debts in order not to suffer in loss of dignity, but almost all know that they cannot pay. The end of the War, as Keynes has justly written, has brought about that all owe immense sums of money to one another. The holders of loan stock in every country are creditors for vast sums towards the State, and the State, in its turn, is creditor for enormous sums towards the taxpayers. The whole situation is highly artificial and irritating. We shall be unable to move unless we succeed in freeing ourselves from this chain of paper.

The work of reconstruction can begin by annulling the inter-allied debts.

If it is not thought desirable to proceed at once to annulment, there remains only the solution of including them in the indemnity which Germany must pay in the measure of 20 per cent., allocating a certain proportion to each country which has made loans to allied and associated governments on account of the War. In round figures the inter-allied loans come to 100 milliards. They can be reduced to 20, and then each creditor can renounce his respective credit towards allies or associates and participate proportionately in the new credit towards Germany. Such a credit, bearing no interest, could only be demanded after the payment of all the other indemnities, and would be considered in the complete total of the indemnities.

All the illusions concerning the indemnities are now fated to disappear. They have already vanished for the other countries; they are about to vanish in the case of Germany.

Nevertheless it is right that Germany should pay an indemnity. Yet, if the conquerors cannot meet their foreign debts, how can the vanquished clear the vast indemnity asked? Each passing day demonstrates more clearly the misunderstanding of the indemnity. The non-experts have not learned financial technics, but common sense tells them that the golden nimbus which has been trailed before their eyes is only a thick cloud of smoke that is slowly dissipating.

I have already said that the real damages to repair do not exceed 40 milliards of gold marks and that all the other figures are pure exaggerations.

If it be agreed that Germany accept 20 per cent. of the inter-allied debt, the indemnity may be raised to 60 milliards of francs at par, to be paid in gold marks.

But we must calculate for Germany's benefit all that she has already given in immediate marketable wealth. Apart from her colonies, Germany has given up all her mercantile marine fleet, her submarine cables, much railway material and war material, government property in ceded territory without any diminution of the amount of public debts, etc. Without taking account, then, of the colonies and her magnificent commercial organization abroad, Germany has parted with at least 20 milliards. If we were to calculate what Germany has ceded with the same criteria with which the conquering countries have calculated their losses, we should arrive at figures much surpassing these. We may agree in taxing Germany with an indemnity equivalent in gold marks to 60 milliards of francs at par--an indemnity to be paid in the following manner:

(a) Twenty milliards of francs to be considered as already paid in consideration of all that Germany has ceded in consequence of the treaties.

(b) Twenty milliards from the indemnity which Germany must pay to her conquerors, especially in coal and other materials, according to the proportions already established.