Chapter 17
Russia sooner or later will recover. It is an illusion to suppose that Great Britain, France and Italy can form an agreement to regulate the new State or new States that will arise in Russia. There are too many tendencies and diverse interests. Germany, too, will reconstruct herself after a series of sorrows and privations, and no one can say how the Germans will behave. Unless a policy of peace and social renovation be shaped and followed, our sons will witness scenes much more terrible than those which have horrified our generation and upset our minds even more than our interests.
Meanwhile, in spite of the frightful increase of scrofula, rickets and tuberculosis, from which the conquered peoples are principally suffering, the march of the nations will proceed according to the laws which have hitherto ruled them and on which our limited action can only for brief periods cause small modifications or alterations.
Demographic forecasts, like all forecasts of social events, have but a comparative value. It is true that demographic movements are especially biological manifestations, but it is also true that economic and social factors exercise a profound influence in limiting their regularity and can disturb them very considerably. It is better therefore not to make long prophecies.
What is certain is that the French population has increased almost imperceptibly while the population of Germany augmented very rapidly. The annual average of births in the five years before the War, 1908-13, was 762,000 in France and 176,000 in Belgium. In Germany it was 1,916,000. The average of deaths was 729,000 in France, 117,000 in Belgium, and 1,073,000 in Germany. Thus, per thousand, the excess of births in France was 0.9, in Belgium 7.7, in Germany 13. The War has terribly aggravated the situation in France, whose demographic structure is far from being a healthy one. From statistics published giving the first results of the French census of 1921--without the new territory of Alsace-Lorraine--France, in the interval between the two census periods, has decreased by 2,102,864; from 39,602,258 to 37,499,394 (1921). The deaths in the War do not represent a half of this decrease, when is deducted the losses among the coloured troops and those from French colonies who fought for France. The new territories annexed to France do not compensate for the War-mortality and the decrease in births.
We may presume that if normal conditions of life return, the population of Germany and German-Austria will be more than one hundred millions, that the population of Belgium altogether little less than fifty millions, that Italy will have a population much greater than that of France, of at least forty-five million inhabitants, and that Great Britain will have about sixty million inhabitants. In the case of the Germans we have mentioned one hundred million persons, taking into consideration Germany and German-Austria. But the Germans of Poland, of Czeko-Slovakia and the Baltic States will amount to at least twenty millions of inhabitants. No one can make forecasts, even of an approximate nature, on Russia, whose fecundity is always the highest in Europe, and whose losses are rapidly replaced by a high birth-rate even after the greatest catastrophes. And then there are the Germans spread about the world, great aggregations of populations as in the United States of America and in a lesser degree in Brazil. Up to now these people have been silent, not only because they were surrounded by hostile populations, but because the accusation of being sons of the Huns weighed down upon them more than any danger of the War. But the Treaty of Versailles, and more still the manner in which it has been applied, is to dissipate, and soon will entirely dissipate, the atmosphere of antipathy that existed against the Germans. In Great Britain the situation has changed profoundly in three years. The United States have made their separate peace and want no responsibility. In Italy there scarcely exists any hatred for the Germans, and apart from certain capitalists who paint in lurid colours the danger of German penetration in their papers because they want higher tariff protection and to be able to speculate on government orders, there is no one who does not desire peace with all peoples. The great majority of the Italian people only desire to reconstruct the economic and social life of the nation.
Certain tendencies in France's policy depend perhaps on her great anxiety for the future, an anxiety, in fact, not unjustified by the lessons of the past. Germany, notwithstanding her fallen state, her anguish and the torment she has to go through, is so strong and vital that everybody is certain of seeing her once again potent, indeed more potent and formidable than ever.
Everyone in France is convinced that the Treaty of Versailles has lost all foundation since the United States of America abandoned it, and since Great Britain and Italy, persuaded of the impossibility of putting certain clauses into effect, have shown by their attitude that they are not disposed to entertain coercive measures which are as useless as they are damaging.
In France the very authors of the Treaty of Versailles recognize that it is weakened by a series of successive attenuations. Tardieu has asserted that the Treaty of Versailles tends to be abandoned on all sides: "_Cette faillite a des causes allemandes, des causes alliés, des causes françaises_" (p. 489). The United States has asked itself, after the trouble that has followed the treaty, if wisdom did not lie in the old time isolation, in Washington's testament, in the Monroe doctrine: _Keep off_. But in America they have not understood, says Tardieu, that to assist Europe the same solidarity was necessary that existed during the War (p. 493).
Great Britain, according to Tardieu, tends now also to stand aside. The English are inclined to say, "_N'en parlons plus_" (p. 493). No Frenchman will accept with calm the manner in which Lloyd George has conceived the execution of the peace treaty. The campaign for the revision of the treaties sprang up in lower spheres and from popular associations and workmen's groups, has surprised and saddened the French spirit (p. 495). In the new developments "_était-ce une autre Angleterre, était-ce un autre Lloyd George_?" (p. 496). Even in France herself Tardieu recognizes sadly the language has altered: "_les gouvernements français, qui se sont succédé au pouvoir depuis le_ 10 _janvier_, 1920," that is, after the fall of Clemenceau, accused in turn by Poincaré of being weak and feeble in asserting his demands, "_ont compromis les droits que leur prédecesseur avait fait reconnaître à la France_" (p. 503).
Taking into consideration Germany's financial downfall, which threatens to upset not only all the indemnity schemes but the entire economy of continental Europe, the state of mind which is prevalent is not much different from that which Tardieu indicates.
It is already more than a year ago since I left the direction of the Italian Government, and the French Press no longer accused me of being in perfect agreement with Lloyd George, yet Poincaré wrote on August 1, 1920:
_L'autre jour M. Asquith déclarait au parlement britannique: "Quelque forme de langage qu'on emploie, la conférence de Spa a bien été, en fait, une conférence pour la révision des conditions du traité." "Chut!" a répondu M. Lloyd George: "c'est là une déclaration très grave par l'effet qu'elle peut produire en France. Je ne puis la laisser passer sans la contredire." Contradiction de pure forme, faite pour courtoisie vis-à-vis de nous, mais qui malheureusement ne change rien au fond des choses. Chaque fois que le Conseil Suprême s'est réuni, il a laissé sur la table des delibérations quelques morceaux épars du traité_.
No kind of high-handedness, no combined effort, will ever be able to keep afloat absurdities like the dream of the vast indemnity, the Polish programme, the hope of annexing the Saar, etc. As things go there is almost more danger for the victors than for the vanquished. He who has lost all has nothing to lose. It is rather the victorious nations who risk all in this disorganized Europe of ours. The conquerors arm themselves in the ratio by which the vanquished disarm, and the worse the situation of our old enemies becomes, so much the worse become the exchanges and the credits of the victorious continental countries.
Yet, in some of the exaggerated ideas of France and other countries of the Entente, there is not only the rancour and anxiety for the future, but a sentiment of well-founded diffidence. After the War the European States belonging to the Entente have been embarrassed not only on account of the enormous internal debts, but also for the huge debts contracted abroad.
If Germany had not had to pay any indemnity and had not lost her colonies and mercantile marine we should have been confronted with the absurd paradox that the victorious nations would have issued from the War worn out, with their territories destroyed, and with a huge foreign debt; Germany would have had her territory quite intact, her industries ready to begin work again, herself anxious to start again her productive force, and in addition with no foreign debt, consequently ample credit abroad. In the mad struggle to break up Germany there has had part not only hatred, but also a quite reasonable anxiety which, after all, must be taken into consideration.
Even to-day, three years after the War, Great Britain has not paid her debt to America, and France and Italy have not paid their debts to America and Great Britain. Great Britain could pay with a great effort; France and Italy cannot pay anyhow.
According to the accounts of the American Treasury the Allies' War debt is 9,587 millions of dollars: 4,277 millions owing from Great Britain, 2,977 millions from France, 1,648 millions from Italy, 349 millions from Belgium, 187 millions from Russia, 61 millions from Czeko-Slovakia, 26 millions from Serbia, 25 millions from Rumania, and 15 millions from Greece. Up to last July Great Britain had paid back 110 millions of dollars. Since the spring of 1919 the payment of the interest on the amounts due to the American Treasury has been suspended by some European States. Between October and November, 1919, the amount of the capitalizing and unpaid interests of the European States came to 236 million dollars. The figure has considerably increased since then.
According to the _Statist_ (August 6, 1921) the Allies' debt to the United States on March 31, 1921, amounted to ten milliards and 959 million dollars, including the interests, in which sum Great Britain was interested to the sum of 4,775 million dollars and France for 3,351 million dollars. But the _Statist's_ figures, in variance to the official figures, include other debts than strictly war debts.
The debts of the various allied countries' to Great Britain on March 31, 1921, according to a schedule annexed to the financial statement for 1921-22, published by the British Treasury, came to £1,777,900,000, distributed as follows: France 557 millions, Italy 476 millions, Russia 561 millions, Belgium 94 millions, Serbia 22 millions, Portugal, Rumania, Greece and other Allies 66 millions. This sum represents War debts. But to it must be added the £9,900,000 given by Great Britain for the reconstruction of Belgium and the loans granted by her for relief to an amount of £16,000,000. So, altogether, Great Britain's credit to the Allies on March 31, 1921, was £1,803,600,000, and has since been increased by the interests. Great Britain had also at the same date a credit of £144,000,000 to her dominions.
France has credit of little less than nine milliard francs, of which 875 millions is from Italy, four milliards from Russia, 2,250 millions from Belgium, 500 millions from the Jugo-Slavs, and 1,250 millions from other Allies. Italy has only small credits of no account.
Now this situation, by reason of which the victorious countries of Europe are heavy debtors (France has a foreign debt of nearly 30 milliards, and Italy a debt of more than 20 milliards) in comparison with Germany, which came out of the War without any debt, has created a certain amount of bad feeling. Germany would have got on her feet again quicker than the victors if she had no indemnity to pay and had no foreign debts to settle.
France's anxieties in this matter are perfectly legitimate and must be most seriously considered without, however, producing the enormities of the Treaty of Versailles.
Assuming this, the situation may be stated in the following terms:
1. All the illusions as to the capacity of Germany being able to pay have fallen to pieces, and the indemnities, after the absurd demands which tended to consider as inadequate the figure of 350 milliards and an annual payment of from ten to fifteen milliards have become an anxious unknown quantity, as troublesome to the victors as to the vanquished. The German circulation has lost all control under the force of internal needs, and Germany is threatened with failure. The other debtors--Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria--have need of succour, and can pay nothing. Austria has need of the most indispensable objects of existence, and everything is lacking.
2. The indemnity which Germany can pay annually in her present condition cannot, calculating goods and cash payments altogether, represent more than two or three milliards at the most.
3. The victorious countries, such as France, have won immense territories and great benefits, yet they have not been able to pay the War debts contracted abroad, and not even the interests. France and Italy, being countries of good faith, have demonstrated that, if they cannot pay, it is absurd to demand the payment of much higher sums from countries like Germany, which has lost almost all her best resources: mercantile fleet, colonies and foreign organization, etc.
4. The danger exists that with the aggravation of the situation in the vanquished countries and the weakening of the economic structure of Europe, the vanquished countries will drag the victors down with them to ruin, while the Anglo-Saxon peoples, standing apart from Continental Europe, will detach themselves more and more from its policy.
5. The situation which has come about is a reason for everyone to be anxious, and threatens both the downfall of the vanquished and the almost inevitable ruin of the victors, unless a way is found of reconstructing the moral unity of Europe and the solidarity of economic life.
VI
EUROPE'S POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION AND PEACE POLICY
No right-thinking person has nowadays any doubt as to the profound injustice of the Treaty of Versailles and of all the treaties which derive from it. But this fact is of small importance, inasmuch as it is not justice or injustice which regulates the relations between nations, but their interests and sentiments. In the past we have seen Christian peoples, transplanted in America, maintain the necessity of slavery, and we have seen, and continue to see every day, methods of reasoning which, when used by the defeated enemy were declared to be fallacious and wrong, become in turn, when varied only in form, the ideas and the customary life of the conquerors in the War--ideas which then assume the quality of liberal expressions of democracy.
If appeals to the noblest human sentiments are not made in vain (and no effort of goodness or generosity is ever sterile), the conviction which is gradually forming itself, even in the least receptive minds, that the treaties of peace are inapplicable, as harmful to the conquerors as to the conquered, gains in force. For the treaties are at one and the same time a menace for the conquerors and a paralysis of all activity on the part of the conquered, since once the economic unity of Continental Europe is broken the resultant depression becomes inevitable.
If many errors have been committed, many errors were inevitable. What we must try to do now is to limit the consequences of these mistakes in a changed spirit. To reconstruct where we see only ruins is the most evident necessity. We must also try to diffuse among the nations which have won the War together and suffered together the least amount of diffidence possible. As it is, the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, all go their own way. France has obtained her maximum of concessions, including those of least use to her, but never before has the world seen her so alone in her attitude as after the treaties of Paris.
What is most urgently required at the moment is to change the prevalent war-mentality which still infects us and overcomes all generous sentiments, all hopes of unity. The statement that war makes men better or worse is, perhaps, an exaggerated one. War, which creates a state of exaltation, hypertrophies all the qualities, all the tendencies, be they for good or for evil. Ascetic souls, spirits naturally noble, being disposed toward sacrifice, develop a state of exaltation and true fervour. How many examples of nobility, of abnegation, of voluntary martyrdom has not the War given us? But in persons disposed to evil actions, in rude and violent spirits (and these are always in the majority), the spirit of violence increases. This spirit, which among the intellectuals takes the form of arrogance and concupiscence, and in politics expresses itself in a policy of conquest, assumes in the crowd the most violent forms of class war, continuous assaults upon the power of the State, and an unbalanced desire to gain as much as possible with the least possible work.
Before the War the number of men ready to take the law into their own hands was relatively small; now there are many such individuals. The various nations, even those most advanced, cannot boast a moral progress comparable with their intellectual development. The explosion of sentiments of violence has created in the period after the War in most countries an atmosphere which one may call unbreathable. Peoples accustomed to be dominated and to serve have come to believe that, having become dominators in their turn, they have the right to use every kind of violence against their overlords of yesterday. Are not the injustices of the Poles against the Germans, and those of the Rumanians against the Magyars, a proof of this state of mind? Even in the most civilized countries many rules of order and discipline have gone by the board.
After all the great wars a condition of torpor, of unwillingness to work, together with a certain rudeness in social relations, has always been noticed.
The war of 1870 was a little war in comparison with the cataclysm let loose by the European War. Yet then the conquered country had its attempt at Bolshevism, which in those days was called the Commune, and the fall of its political regime. In the conquering country we witnessed, together with the rapid development of industrial groups, a quick growth in Socialism and the constitution of great parties like the Catholic Centre. _Mutatis mutandis_, the same situation has shown itself after the European War.
What is most urgently necessary, therefore, is to effect a return to peace sentiments, and in the manifestations of government to abandon those attitudes which in the peaces of Paris had their roots in hate.
I have tried, as Premier of Italy, as writer, and as politician, to regulate my actions by this principle. In the first months of 1920 I gave instructions to Italy's ambassador in Vienna, the Marquis della Torretta, to arrange a meeting between himself and Chancellor Renner, head of the Government of Vienna. So the chief of the conquered country came, together with his Ministers, to greet the head of the conquering country, and there was no word that could record in any way the past hatred and the ancient rancour. All the conversation was of the necessity for reconstruction and for the development of fresh currents of life and commercial activity. The Government of Italy helped the Government of Austria in so far as was possible. And in so acting, I felt I was working better for the greatness of my country than I could possibly have done by any kind of stolid persecution. I felt that over and beyond our competition there existed the human sorrow of nations for whom we must avoid fresh shedding of blood and fresh wars. Had I not left the Government, it was my intention not only to continue in this path, but also to intensify my efforts in this direction.
The banal idea that there exist in Europe two groups of nations, one of which stands for violence and barbarism--the Germans, the Magyars and the Bulgarians--while the other group of Anglo-Saxons and Latins represents civilization, must not continue to be repeated, because not only is it an outrage on truth but an outrage on honesty.
Always to repeat that the Germans are not adapted for a democratic regime is neither just nor true. Nor is it true that Germany is an essentially warlike country, and therefore different from all other lands. In the last three centuries France and England have fought many more wars than Germany. One must read the books of the Napoleonic period to see with what disdain pacificist Germany is referred to--that country of peasants, waiters and philosophers. It is sufficient to read the works of German writers, including Treitschke himself, to perceive for what a long period of time the German lands, anxious for peace, have considered France as the country always eager for war and conquest.
Not only am I of the opinion that Germany is a land suited for democratic institutions, but I believe that after the fall of the Empire democratic principles have a wider prevalence there than in any other country of Europe. The resistance offered to the peace of Versailles--that is, to disorganization--may be claimed as a merit for the democratic parties, which, if they are loyally assisted by the States of the Entente, can not only develop themselves but establish a great and noble democracy.
Germany has accustomed us in history to the most remarkable surprises. A century and a half ago she was considered as a pacificist nation without national spirit. She has since then become a warlike country with the most pronounced national spirit. Early in the seventeenth century there were in Germany more than one hundred territories and independent States. There was no true national conscience, and not even the violence of the Napoleonic wars, a century after, sufficed to awaken it. What was required was a regular effort of thought, a sustained programme of action on the part of men like Wolff, Fichte and Hegel to mould a national conscience. Fifty years earlier no one would have believed in the possibility of a Germany united and compact in her national sentiment. Germany passed from the widest decentralization to the greatest concentration and the intensest national life. Germany will also be a democratic country if the violence of her ancient enemies does not drive her into a state of exaltation which will tend to render minds and spirits favourable to a return to the old regime.
To arrive at peace we must first of all desire peace. We must no longer carry on conversations by means of military missions, but by means of ambassadors and diplomatic representatives.
1.--THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE PARTICIPATION OF THE VANQUISHED