Part 5

The first-named alternative would, in our naturally poor land, excessively depress our natural vitality, and in a great degree prevent our progress as a cultured people keeping pace with greater and wealthier nations. The second would put us into a position to confine our military burdens within reasonable limits, and to expend the powers and resources of prosperity thus relieved, in means of promoting business, trade, science, and well-being of all kinds.

The clear-sighted friend of his country, who sees the population in ever-swelling numbers leaving their homes for a foreign shore, seeking a new fatherland, will surely not hesitate in his choice.

It will perhaps be said that such a choice does not now lie before us. There are two opinions about that. But in one thing we may all unite, namely, that a settled neutrality for Sweden is a thing to be aimed at. Here almost every interest of the fatherland converges.

But if such a neutralization is considered by many not a sufficient peace-protection under all circumstances, yet no one with reason can deny that it does form a security for our country against foreign powers.

Accepting this conclusion as correct, it follows that we should find some practicable means of realizing it; and if hindrances do meet us, we shall, on nearer inspection, find that they are not great, but with hearty goodwill and perseverance may be overcome.

This is my conviction.

In drawing attention to the subjoined, I would further bring to mind that the seat of war in Europe is limited in the proportion in which the number of neutralized States grows, a condition of things which may little by little in an essential degree impede or prevent the outbreak of war; that the peculiar situation of Sweden (greatly superior, for example, to Belgium or Switzerland) must naturally facilitate its neutralization; that, lastly, the neutrality proposed does not stand in the way of arranging our own defence, but that rather, in case Parliament rejects his Majesty's army bill, adapts itself powerfully to contribute to a right solution of the _Defence question_; and so much the more, as all suspicion that that old vexed question aims perhaps at something more and other than DEFENCE of the country would thereby disappear.

For this reason--and since we cannot expect that other powers should take the first step and offer us what we do not ask for--I respectfully propose:--

_That Parliament shall in writing express to the king its desire that it might please his Majesty to initiate, amongst the states with which Sweden has diplomatic relations, negotiations for bringing about a permanent guaranteed[26] neutrality of Sweden, in harmony with the principles of modern international law._

K.P. ARNOLDSON.

STOCKHOLM, _February, 1883_.

This motion was supported by--

S.A. HEDLUND, WILL. FARUP, J. ANDERSSON, Tenhuset, J.E. ERICSSON, Alberta, PER PERSSON, F.F. BORG, J. JONASSEN, Gullahs, C.J. SVEN'S, A. TH. WAYLEN'S, P.M. LARSON, LA, P.G. PETERSON, ARVID GUMOELIUS, J. JONASSEN, ERIC OLSSON, J.A. ERICSSON, LARS NILSSON, C.G. OTTERBORG.]

[Footnote 19: Taken from the following communication:

At a meeting, March 31st, 1883, of the Association of members of the Storting, a document was presented, being a motion in the Second Chamber, No. 97, respecting the Neutralization of Sweden; which document was sent to the president of the meeting by a Swedish M.P.

In consequence of this the following declaration and resolution was voted unanimously: Recognising that the neutralization of a single country is in the interest of universal peace; that being secured from foreign attack by stronger nations, gives ability to use its own resources and develop its institutions, including its defence, according to its special requirements; that the condition and situation of our country give equal opportunity for working for this object, and facilities for its attainment; and that the action taken in the Swedish Rigsdag upon the question, seriously calls our attention to it on the ground of the constitutional relation between the kingdoms and their union in war and in peace; a committee is requested to take into consideration, how the question may be subjected to further attention.

A. QUAM, Secretary of the Association.]

[Footnote 20: Protocol of the Second Chamber, No 33, April 28th, 1883.]

[Footnote 21: See on the dealing with the question in Parliament, "Riksdagstrycket" 1883. Motion in the Second Chamber, No. 97, pp. 1-8; First Chamber, protocol No. 33, pp. 3-4, etc., etc.]

[Footnote 22: Mr. Arnoldson's speech ran thus:--

"The second speaker on the Right propounded certain difficulties, amongst others, one referring to Sweden's union with Norway. Since Sweden and Norway have the same foreign policy, and the initiative in this question comes from Sweden, the Union King ought certainly to be able to act freely in the common interest of the two kingdoms. In any case, it is probable, as Mr. Hedlund remarked, that if the Riksdag takes the first step it will not be long before the Storting comes to meet us. It was chiefly on the ground of courtesy that I did not undertake to speak for Norway too in the Riksdag. We know that the Norse--and it does them honour--are tenacious of their right of deciding for themselves. I do not think it would be seemly for the mover of such a resolution as this to make himself their spokesman in the Swedish Riksdag--not to mention the positive incorrectness of the proceeding. This is why I limited the matter to Sweden in my proposition."]

[Footnote 23: "Revue de droit international et de Legislation comparée," 1888, 2.]

[Footnote 24: The most important provisions of the treaty are the following:--

Article 1. The Suez Canal shall always be free and open whether in time of war or peace, for both merchant and war-ships, whatever flag they carry. The treaty-powers therefore decide that the use of this canal shall not be limited either in time of peace or war. The canal can never be blockaded.

Article 4. No fortifications which can be used for military operations against the Suez Canal, may be erected at any point which would command or menace it. No points which command or menace its entrance or course may be occupied in a military sense.

Article 5 provides that, although the Suez Canal shall be open in war-time, no belligerent action shall take place in its vicinity or in its harbours, or within a distance from its area which shall be determined by the international committee that watches over the canal.

Article 6 is a continuation of the foregoing and runs thus: In time of war none of the belligerent powers are permitted to land, or to take on board, ammunition or other war material, either in the canal or in its harbours.

Article 8. The powers are not allowed to keep any warship in the waters of the canal. But they may lay up war-ships in the harbours of Port Said and Suez to a number not exceeding two of any nation.

Article 9. The representatives in Egypt of the powers who signed the treaty shall be charged with seeing to its fulfilment. In all cases where free passage through the canal may be menaced, they shall meet upon the summons of the senior member to investigate the facts. They shall acquaint the Khedive's Government with the danger anticipated, that it may take the measures needful to secure the safety and unimpeded use of the canal. They shall meet regularly once a year to ascertain that the treaty is properly observed. They shall most especially require the deposition of all works and dispersion of all collections of troops which on any part of the area of the canal might either design or cause a menace to the free passage or to the security thereof.

Article 10 treats of the obligations of the Egyptian Government and runs thus:--

The Egyptian Government shall, so far as its power by firman goes, take the measures necessary for enforcing the treaty. In case the Egyptian Government has not adequate means it shall apply to the Sublime Porte, which will then consult with the other signatories of the London treaty of March 17, and with them make provision in response to that application.

Article 14 sets forth: Beyond the duties expressed and stipulated for in the paragraphs of this treaty, the sovereign rights of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan are in no way curtailed, nor are the privileges and rights of his Highness the Khedive as defined by the firman.]

[Footnote 25: Nationaloekonomisk Tidsskrift, xxii. pp. 139-155. See also _Politiken_, 1890, March 31. Article "Oeresunds Fred," signed, Defensor Patriæ.]

[Footnote 26: The word "guaranteed" was inserted in the motion contrary to the opinion of the committee]

FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

In other ways the European powers have shown that, with a little willingness to do so, they can work together in the interests of peace.

We have an illustrative instance of this in the DANUBE COMMISSION, which, since 1856, has watched over the traffic in the Delta of the Danube, neutralized by the Treaty of Paris.

This commission, which is composed of members from all the great powers and Turkey and Roumania, and was originally appointed only for a short time, has, in consideration of its great value as an international institution, been renewed from year to year, and has had its power gradually extended. The commission possesses its own flag, its customs and pilotage, its police, its little fleet, and so on. It has for thirty years exercised an almost unlimited power over the mouths of the Danube, has made laws, raised a loan, carried out works, and in many other respects given evidence of the possibility of united co-operation amongst the powers under many changing and intricate international relations.

In the so-called EUROPEAN CONCERT is seen a commencement of an extended co-operation in a similar direction. The war between Servia and Bulgaria was confined within certain limits by the united will of the powers, and Greece was obliged to subdue her fierce military ardour.

Again, so far as concerns such coalitions as it is evident are not formed for the whole of Europe, but are said to aim at securing peace by accumulating forces, it could hardly be expected, from their very nature, that they would fulfil the alleged design in themselves. But, on the other side, it would be short-sighted to overlook their importance as a link in the gradually progressive development of the interests of various nations in the common concerns of Europe. One token in this direction is the proposal which was brought forward in the beginning of 1888 by a number of deputies in the Austrian Parliament, urging the Government, after procuring the consent of the Hungarian Government, to initiate negotiations with Germany for the purpose of getting a GERMANO-AUSTRIAN ALLIANCE adopted by the Parliaments of both realms, and constitutionally incorporated in the fundamental law of both States. This proposal may have hardly any practical result, but it is worth notice as one of the small rays of light which from time to time point the way to a common goal.

Thither point too, though indeed from afar, those propositions for DISARMAMENT which now and then crop up, but which, quite naturally, fade away as quickly as they come, so long as the principle of arbitration does not prevail in Europe.

"Europe's only salvation is a general disarmament," cries the illustrious Frenchman Jules Simon, and yet louder the Italian ex-minister, Bonghi. The latter a distinguished Conservative statesman, utters these powerful words in the _International Review_ (Rome).

"The ideas of peace, which I have just expressed and which are also entertained by the masses, sound almost like a jest in the menaces of war which we hear around us. And they are ridiculous if the policy which the Government follows is considered serious. The great thing is to be able to guess how long the ludicrous shall be regarded as serious, and the serious as ludicrous; and how long a proceeding so devoid of sound reason as that of the great European powers will be counted as sense. I, for my part, am persuaded that such a confusion as to the meaning of the words cannot endure continually, and that the present condition of things, whether people will or not, must soon cease. But we ought not to wait until the change is brought about by violence, nor indeed till it comes by violence from--below. Dynasties must give heed to this, and must hold me responsible for saying it--I, who am a royalist by conviction."

In the English House of Commons, Mr. A. Illingworth, May 30th, 1889, questioned the First Lord of the Treasury, Mr. W.H. Smith, "Whether the Government had recently made a proposal to the continental Governments that they should agree upon a considerable and early reduction of armaments? and with what result? And if not, whether Her Majesty's Government would without delay initiate such negotiations, having for their object to lessen the military burdens and the dangers which menace the peace of Europe."

In his answer the First Lord of the Treasury[27] said: "If any favourable opportunity manifested itself, the Government would have pleasure in using its influence in the direction indicated by the honourable member. But the questioner should bear in mind, that an interference in a question of this sort often does more harm than good to the object he wishes to attain. I can assure him that the Government is as deeply impressed with this question as himself, and it has often expressed its view in the House, that the present armed condition of Europe is a great misfortune and a danger to the peace of the world."

In the German Parliament, also, similar utterances may be heard; in the latest instance from one of the Centre, Reichensperger, who in the military debate, June 28th, 1890, expressed the wish that they could set in motion a general disarmament. The speaker had certainly spoken in favour of the Government bill for adding 18,000 men to the peace footing of the army. But he wished alongside of that to say, that as the decision of the Emperor in summoning a conference of working men from all parts of Europe had been greeted with applause, so would the civilized world, with still greater applause greet the tidings that William II. had advocated a general disarmament.

* * * * *

Many entertain the belief that the first condition of such a disarmament must be to absolve the rulers themselves from the dangerous power they possess in being able at their discretion to declare war, conclude peace, and make alliances one with another for warlike aims.

In our country many propositions have been brought forward for limiting this power especially with regard to the concluding of treaties without so much as consulting the whole Swedish Cabinet.

As is well known, even in the time of Gustavus Adolphus, the royal power did not extend beyond the king having to consult the Riksdag, and to obtain its consent, whether he were engaging in a war or entering into an alliance with foreign powers. The absolute monarchs seized upon greater power, and the law-makers of 1809 simply ratified this dangerous extension of it.

Now we are unceasingly told, when the subject of defence is on, about sacrifices. They declare to us that no sacrifice should be esteemed too great. The State has the right of enlisting soldiers by compulsion, fathers, husbands and sons, for the defence of the country; and not only when it is really a question of defence, but when it is a matter of preparation for defence, that is drill, even if this extend to years of barrack life in time of peace.

These are the sacrifices demanded from the people.

There are those who think, would it not be much better if the people, on their side, demanded a little security that the country should not be far too thoughtlessly plunged into war--war which can no longer be carried on by paid volunteers, but with members of families conscripted by force, by means of compulsory service?

Such security could be effected by changing the formulas of government §§ 12 and 13, and the constitutional law § 26, partly so that the conclusion of treaties should require the confirmation of a united meeting of the Swedo-Norse cabinet councils, and partly also, that certain treaties, namely such as include a greater political intricacy, should be subjected to the confirmation of the Riksdag and the Storting, as has been the case with certain treaties of commerce--bagatelles in comparison with the entanglement of the kingdoms in war.

It is simply an assertion, refuted by experience, that the king cannot make use of the law here treated of.

During the Crimean war, according to a treaty, we should have been entangled in the war, had not the Peace of Paris intervened. So also during the last Dano-German war, when interference on our part, as the result of a treaty, would have taken place, had not the death of King Frederic VII. occurred.

The same thing would have happened during the last Franco-German war, if the battle of Wörth had not thrown out the reckoning, according to a treaty which entailed our interference. Into all these treaties the king could enter without giving the whole Cabinet the opportunity of expressing its opinion.

The danger of such a power begins to be increasingly felt, especially in England. In 1886, Henry Richard raised in the House of Commons the question of abolishing the right of the sovereign to declare war without the consent of Parliament. The proposition was certainly rejected, but with the large minority of 109 against 115 votes. That the proposition could gather round it such a minority may certainly be regarded as a remarkable sign of the times. In 1889, W.R. Cremer made a similar motion in the House. He proposed that a "parliamentary committee should be chosen to examine and arrange foreign matters, which were then to be laid before Parliament." This proposal fell through but progress was made, and Mr. Cremer still awaits a suitable occasion for renewing it.

A characteristic expedient is pointed out by the well-known Belgian professor of political economy, de Molinari, in an article published in the _Times_.

He shows, in the first place, how solidarity among the civilized States of the world has lately increased in a marvellous degree, for not long ago the foreign trade of a civilized nation and the capital invested in other States was of very small importance. Each country produced nearly all the requisites for its own consumption, and employed its capital in its own undertakings. In 1613, the whole of England's imports and exports amounted to only five million pounds sterling. A hundred years later, indeed, the united foreign trade of the whole of Europe did not amount to so much as the present foreign trade of little Belgium. Still more unimportant were the foreign loans. Holland was the only country whose capitalists lent to foreign Governments, and persons were hardly to be found who ventured to put their money into industrial undertakings in foreign lands, or even beyond the provinces in which they dwelt. Consequently at that time a neutral State suffered little or no injury when two States were at war. A quarrel between France and Spain or Germany then did no more harm to English interests than a war between China and Japan would do now.

At present it is quite otherwise. Trade and capital have in our day become international. While the foreign traffic of the civilized world two hundred years ago did not exceed one hundred millions sterling, it runs up now to about five thousand millions; and foreign loans have augmented in the same degree. In every country there is a constantly increasing portion of the population dependent for its subsistence upon relations with other peoples, either for the manufacture or exportation of goods, or for the importation of foreign necessaries. In France a tenth part of the population is dependent in this way upon foreign countries, a third in Belgium, and in England probably not far from a third.

So long as there is peace, this increasing community of interests is a source of well-being, and advances civilization; but if a war breaks out, that which was a blessing is turned into a common ill. For, not to mention the burden which preparations for defence impose upon the neutral nations, they suffer from the crisis which war causes in the money market, and from the cessation or curtailing of their trade with the belligerent powers.

From these facts, de Molinari deduces a principle of justice--NEUTRAL STATES HAVE THE RIGHT TO FORBID A WAR, as it greatly injures their own lawful interests.

If two duellists fight out their quarrel in a solitary place, where nobody can be injured by their balls or swords, they may be allowed without any great harm to exercise their right of killing. But if they set to work to shoot one another in a crowded street, no one can blame the police if they interfere, since their action exposes peacable passers-by to danger. It is the same with war between States. Neutral States would have small interest in hindering war, if war did not do them any particular harm; and under those circumstances their right to interfere might be disputed. But when, as is now the case, war cannot be carried on without menacing a great and constantly increasing portion of the interests of neutrals, yes, even their existence, their right to come in and maintain order is indisputable.

The worst is that, after all, the belligerent nation itself never decides its own fate. That is settled by a few politicians and military men, who have quite other interests than those of business. It is often done by a single man; and it may be said without exaggeration, that the world's peace depends upon the pleasure of three or four men, sovereigns or ministers, who can any day, at their discretion, let slip all the horrors of war. They can thereby bring measureless misery and ills upon the whole civilized world's peaceable industries, not excepting even those of neutral nations, with whom they have nothing to do. The most absolute despots of the rude old times had no such power.

Self-interests of purely political nature give the neutral States, especially the smaller ones, the right to do what they can to prevent war between other powers; because it is an old experience that war among the great powers readily spreads itself to the little ones.

De Molinari states further that the neutral States may so much the more easily ward off all this evil, as they have not only the right, but also the power, if they would set themselves to do it.

Thereupon he unfolds his proposition:--

"With England at the head, and with Holland, Belgium, Switzerland and Denmark as members, there might be formed a confederation, 'THE NEUTRAL LEAGUE,' for the purpose of attacking any of the other powers who should begin a war, and of helping the attacked. The States named have a united strength of 460,000 men, and can place on a war footing 1,200,000. To these may be added the fleets of England, Holland and Denmark, which together form the strongest naval power in the world."[28]

Suppose that a complication takes place between two great powers on the continent of Europe--Germany, France, Austria, or Russia--there can be no doubt that if the "League" united its strength with the threatened power, that power would become thereby so superior to its opponent that victory would be certain.

For this reason a peaceable interference on the part of the League before the war broke out, would make the most warlike amongst the powers consider.

But the fact that no State could stir up a war without meeting a crushing superior force would lead to a constant and lasting state of peace, and disarmament.