Part 3

[Footnote 5: See "Svensk förfaltningssamling," 1869, No. 74, page 26, and "Lois Beiges," 1869, No. 36, § 24. In the Swedish-Siamese treaty, art. 25, it is stated: "Should any disagreement arise between the contracting parties which cannot be arranged by friendly diplomatic negotiation or correspondence, the question shall be referred for solution to a friendly neutral power, mutually chosen, whose decision the contracting powers shall accept as final." Similar agreements are to be concluded between Italy and Switzerland, Spain and Uruguay, Spain and Hawaii, and between France and Ecuador.]

[Footnote 6: The Treaty is given word for word in the _Herald of Peace_, July, 1883.]

[Footnote 7: In this treaty, which was concluded at Stockholm, Nov. 21st, 1855, the King of Norway and Sweden bound himself not to resign to Russia, or to barter with her, or otherwise allow her to possess, any portion of the territory of the united kingdoms, nor to grant to Russia right of pasture or fishery, or any similar rights, either on the coast of Norway or Sweden. Any Russian proposal which might be made under this head must be made directly to France or England, who then by sea and land must support us by their military power. A glorious contrast to the declaration of neutrality, Dec. 15th, 1853!]

[Footnote 8: Conquered Russia had to bind herself, at the conclusion of peace, not to keep war ships in the Black Sea, not to have any haven for war ships on her coasts. Stipulations which were perceived by all thinking men at the time to be untenable in the long run.]

[Footnote 9: £3,196,874 were received by Sec. Fish, Sept. 9th, 1873. See Haydn's "Dictionary of Dates."]

[Footnote 10: _The Arbitrator_, 1890, April.]

[Footnote 11: The Japanese Government demanded redress, which was at first refused by China. This led to a stormy correspondence, which at last became so bitter that both sides prepared for war. The Japanese troops had already taken possession of Formosa. During this dangerous juncture, the British minister in Pekin, Sir Thomas Wade, offered to mediate as an arbiter. The offer was accepted, and led to an agreement between the Chinese Government and the Japanese ambassador in Pekin, by which China was to pay Japan 50,000 taels, and the Japanese troops were to evacuate Formosa. When Lord Derby, who was at that time Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, received a telegram from Sir Thomas Wade respecting this happy result, he answered him: "It is a great pleasure to me to present to you the expression of the high esteem with which her Majesty's Government regards you for the service you have rendered in thus peaceably adjusting a dispute which otherwise might have had unhappy consequences, especially to the two countries concerned, but also for the interests of Great Britain and other parties to treaties." Sir Harry Parkes, the English minister in Japan, wrote to Lord Derby, that the Mikado, the Emperor of that land, had invited him to an interview for the purpose of expressing his satisfaction at the result, and through him to present his warm thanks for his brave and efficient service. The Japanese minister in London also called upon Lord Derby and expressed the thanks of his Government to Mr. Wade. "He could assure me," said Lord Derby, when he repeated the words of his excellency, "that the service which has thus been rendered will remain in grateful remembrance among his countrymen."]

[Footnote 12: This dispute had assumed quite a serious and menacing character when the ex-president Grant, on his journey round the world, came to China. When his arrival became known, the Chinese prince, Kung, submitted to him that he should use his great influence in mediating between the two countries. A specially interesting conversation followed: "We have," said Prince Kung, "studied international law as it is set forth by English and American authors, whose works are translated into Chinese. If any value is to be set upon principles of international right, as set forth by the authors of your nation, the doing away with the independence of the Liu Kiu Islands is an injustice." Grant reminded him that he was there only as a private individual, but added, "It would be a true joy to me if my advice or efforts could be the means of preserving peace, especially between two nations for whom I cherish such interest as for China and Japan." Immediately afterwards he returned to Tokio, the capital of Japan, called upon the Emperor and his Minister, and advocated a peaceable settlement of the dispute. He wrote to Prince Kung the result of his mediation, and produced a scheme for a Court of Arbitration.]

[Footnote 13: At the Peace of Utrecht, 1713, it was decided that the course of the river Maronis was the boundary. But that river divides itself into two branches which embrace a large tract of land, almost a fifth part of French Guiana. Neither France nor Holland had claimed that land until gold beds were discovered there, and it had to be decided which of the two arms of the river was to be considered as the Maronis, and which as a tributary.]

NEUTRALITY.

Side by side with the idea of arbitration, another pacific idea, already powerful, is pressing forward, and growing into an International Law, namely, the Law of Neutrality.

He is neutral, who neither takes part for, nor against, in a dispute. Neutrality is the impartial position which is not associated with either party. The State is called neutral which neither takes part in a war itself, nor in time of war sides with any of the warring parties.

In ancient times neutrality was not understood as a national right. Neither the Greek nor the Latin language has any word to express the idea. In the days when Roman policy was seeking to drag all the nations of the earth into its net, the Romans saw in other peoples only tributaries who had been subdued by their armies, subject nations who had submitted to the Roman yoke, allies who were compelled to join in their policy of conquest, or lastly enemies, who sooner or later would have to bow before their victorious legions. Neutral States there were none.

The centuries immediately following the dissolution of the Western Roman Empire were filled with constant strife. This continued long before the refining power which exists in the heart of Christianity began to show itself in the foreign relations of States.

The foundations of modern Europe were laid in war.

During the Crusades the whole of our continent was under arms. The struggle against the "infidel" was not simply a contest between one State and another, it was also a contest between Christian Europe and Mohammedan Asia. To be neutral in such a struggle would, according to the judgment of the time, have been equivalent to denying the faith. Within the European States, feudalism exerted no less a hindrance to the embodiment of the principle of neutrality. It would have been thought the gravest crime to loosen the bond of military service which compelled vassals to support with arms the cause of their feudal lords. It was only with the close of the age of feudalism, when Europe began to separate into three or four great monarchies, that neutrality in politics became a means of preserving the balance.

In later times increasing COMMUNICATION and TRADE have above all contributed to the development of neutral laws. Without the sanction of these, a naval war between two great nations would have made any maritime trade all but impossible. Down to the close of the last century, however, neutral rights were dependent either on national statutes or on special treaties concluded between one State and another. The law only gained certain international importance towards the close of the eighteenth century through the NEUTRAL ALLIANCES which from time to time were contracted between States.

In the period between 1780 and 1856 the subject gained an entrance by degrees among all maritime nations except England, who, independent of it, and always relying on her own strength, continuously sought to maintain unlimited domination at sea.

In 1854-56 begins, so far as neutrality is concerned, a new era of international law.

From this time the opposition which England raised to the practical application of neutrality in naval war may be regarded as having broken down. On the 30th of March, 1854, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Drouyn de Lhuys, published a communication, including, amongst other things, that the neutral flag during the then begun (Crimean) war, should be regarded as a protection for all neutral and hostile private property, except contraband of war. The same day the English Government gave forth in the _London Gazette_ a similar declaration, and on April 19th of the same year the Russian Government notified in the _Official Gazette_ of St. Petersburg that Russia would, during that war, act upon the same rules as the Allied powers.

The provisions, which thus the Western powers on one side, and Russia on the other, believed themselves bound to observe towards neutral states, were at the Peace of Paris, 1856, solemnly ratified as International Law in force for all time. The principles which the plenipotentiary signatories of the Peace Treaty of Paris agreed upon in a proclamation of April 16th, 1856, are as follows:--

1. Privateering is and shall be abolished. 2. The neutral flag shall protect property belonging to the enemy, with the exception of contraband of war. 3. Neutral goods, except contraband of war, may not be seized under the enemy's flag. 4. Blockades in order to be obligatory must be fully effectual; that is, shall be maintained with a strength really sufficient to prevent approach to the enemy's coast.

The Governments which signed the treaty bound themselves also, in this proclamation, to communicate the resolutions to the States which were not called to take part in the Paris Conference, and to invite them to agree in these decisions. All the European States except Spain, and a number of powers outside Europe, declared themselves ready to carry out in practice the entire resolutions of the proclamation.

Many wars since then have shaken Europe; but under all these misfortunes the warring States have not only conscientiously observed the principles laid down in 1856, but they have gone further, in certain points, in applying them, than they by it were bound to do. Thus the Austrian Government issued an order, during the war with France and Sardinia, with respect to maritime national law, in many points far beyond what hostile or neutral powers had any ground for requesting. The Imperial decree not only charged its military and civil officers to follow strictly the injunctions of the proclamation, but Sardinian and French vessels, which lay moored in Austrian waters, were also to be permitted to load freight and proceed to foreign seas, on condition that they took on board no contraband of war or prohibited goods of any description. Immediately on the outbreak of war, the same principles were adopted by France and Sardinia. These States, however, went a step further than Austria, inasmuch as they unreservedly declared that they would not regard coal as a contraband of war.

During the Dano-German War, in 1864, and the war between Austria and Prussia and Italy, in 1866, the international principles of maritime law received a similarly wide interpretation.

During the North American Civil War important questions came up, which more or less affected the principle of neutrality. The question, which became one of the greatest importance, arose in respect of the injury which the commerce and navigation of the Union suffered during the war from various privateers which were built in England on the Southerners' account.

The ALABAMA QUESTION took its name from the privateer which went out from Liverpool and occasioned the greatest devastation while the war lasted. Although the executive of the Union at Washington duly directed the attention of the English Government to the fact that allowing the pirate to leave the English port would be equivalent to a breach of the peace, yet the Government took no measures to prevent the vessel leaving. The American Government, who with reason regarded this omission as a violation of the laws of neutrality, claimed from England full compensation for the property which had been destroyed in the course of the civil war by the Southern privateer which came from an English port. I have previously given more particularly the constitution and functions of the Court of Arbitration appointed to settle the threatening dispute which arose on this occasion. The arbitration award had to be adjudicated in accordance with the three following fundamental principles of international law:--

A neutral Government is bound:--

1. To guard assiduously against any vessel being armed or equipped in its ports, which there is reason to believe would be employed for warlike purposes against a peaceful power, and with equal assiduity to prevent any vessel designed for privateering, or other hostility, from leaving the domain of the neutral State:

2. Not to allow any belligerent power to make use of its ports or harbours as the basis of its operations, or for strengthening or repairing its military strength, or for enlisting:

3. To use every care within its ports and harbours and over all persons within its domain, to prevent any violation of the obligations named.

The contracting parties to this treaty agreed to hold themselves responsible for the future, and to bring them before the notice of other Maritime powers, with the recommendation that they also should enter into them.

The historical facts here produced show that the mutual interest nations have in the inviolability of the seas has effectually contributed to the development of an accepted international law.

When the necessity of making the principles of neutrality binding at sea was once understood, it was not long before the value of adopting them on land became apparent.

In the documents, for instance, by which Belgium, Switzerland and Luxemburg are neutralized, it is distinctly stated that the permanent neutrality of these States is in full accord with the true interests of European policy.

According to the actual modern law of nations, there is a permanent neutrality guaranteed by international deeds of law and treaties, and one occasionally resting upon free decisions.[14]

As instances of permanent and guaranteed neutrality, we have: The NEUTRALIZATION OF SWITZERLAND. Ever since the unhappy Italian war in the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Swiss Confederation has endeavoured to assure to the country the security which neutrality gives.

This neutrality was recognised and guaranteed by the great European powers at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 (art. 84 and 92), and later was further solemnly confirmed by a special act of the powers at Paris, Nov. 20th of the same year, in which it was stated:

"The powers declare ... by a permanent act that the permanent neutrality and inviolability of Switzerland, as well as its independence of foreign influence, accords with the true interests of European policy."[15]

THE NEUTRALIZATION OF BELGIUM. In virtue of the Treaty of London, Nov. 15th, 1831 (art. vii.), further confirmed by the powers April 19th, 1839, a permanent neutrality was awarded to Belgium.

This country, which for centuries had served as a battle-ground for foreign powers, especially for France and Germany, was hereby secured against such dangers, and at the same time the field for European warfare was materially narrowed.

Article vii. of the London protocol runs thus: "Belgium shall, within the boundaries established in art. i. and iv., form an independent State. The kingdom is bound to observe the same neutrality towards all States."[16]

During the Franco-German war 1870-1, the neutralization of Belgium was threatened with violation by France, and further guarantees were given in new protocols arranged by England.

THE NEUTRALIZATION OF THE ARCHDUCHY OF LUXEMBURG resulted from the London protocol of May 11th, 1867.

As an evidence of the power and importance in our day of entering into agreements of neutrality, the following may be adduced:--

During the Franco-German war, 1870-1, the Prussian Government complained to the guaranteeing powers of conduct at variance with neutrality on the part of Luxemburg, and threatened no longer to respect the neutrality of the Archduchy. (Despatch of Prince Bismarck, Dec. 3rd, 1870.)

In consequence of this, Count Beust, the Austrian chancellor, in an opinion given Dec. 22nd of the same year, remarked, that upon the ground of the principle of European guarantee, it belonged to the powers who had signed the document of neutralization, to inquire into and to settle whether a violation had taken place on the part of the neutral State, and not to one of the belligerent powers.[17]

Besides the States named, a permanent neutrality has been secured to the IONIAN ISLANDS according to the treaties of London, 1863-64; and also to the SAMOAN ISLANDS, in virtue of the agreement between England, Germany, and the United States of North America, whereby, amongst other things, it was settled that in case of any difference of opinion arising; an appeal should be made to arbitration; and that a supreme tribunal should be created with a supreme judge, whom the King of Sweden and Norway has been empowered to name.

* * * * *

One general advantage which neutralization affords is the simplification with respect to foreign policy thereby obtained.

The attitude of a neutralized State can be reckoned on beforehand by all parties.

In proportion to its military importance and position, a neutral country constitutes in many ways a security to all the powers.

It is in close connection with neutralization that in these days an ever-growing need is becoming apparent to localize wars as much as possible; that is, to confine them to those who begin them.

As a result of the extraordinarily rapid development of world-wide trade and intercourse, and the consequent community of interests, a war between two States necessarily occasions more or less derangement to the rest.

In this increasing solidarity lies the surest guarantee that neutrality will be respected.

We may already be justified in drawing the conclusion that the security of neutral States will continually increase.

* * * * *

Supported upon these foundations of history and of international law, a discussion was raised on the neutralization of Sweden, in the First Chamber by Major C.A. Adelsköld, and by myself in the Second, in the hope thereby not only to oppose the King's bill for the extension of the war department, but also especially to open the way for a profitable solution of the tough, old, threadbare question of Defence.[18]

Before this resolution was brought into the Riksdag, I had read it to seventy members of the Riksdag, who unanimously accepted it, as did also, later on, in the main, a majority of the [Norwegian] Storting. [19]And as soon as the purport of the resolution became generally known through the press, there came in from popular meetings all over Sweden numerous congratulatory addresses to Major Adelsköld and myself.

But from its very commencement the proposition met with an unconquerable opposition from those in power.

With great unanimity efforts were made in this quarter to depreciate the value and the historical importance of the principle of neutrality. All possible means were used with this object, to touch the tenderest fibres of the national feelings. It would be a disgrace to us, it was said, to employ any other than military power in asserting our primeval freedom. We should thereby break off from our glorious history, and draw a black line over its brilliant warlike reminiscences. There were certainly neutral countries to be found, but their neutrality was not the result of their own desire, but proceeded from the great powers themselves. Should we then, they say further, be the first people to take such a step? Would it not be equivalent to begging peace of our neighbour, and declaring ourselves incapable before the whole world? The sensible thing would be to further develop and strengthen our army. The resolution was called a political demonstration of indigence; a disgusting nihilist plot, and so on. One member of the Riksdag proposed that it should be consigned to a committee charged with arranging for sending beasts abroad. Scoffs came thick as hail; and when it became known that the mover in the _Second Chamber_ was its author, the really guilty one, he was branded as a universal traitor,--just as the year before, when he raised a peaceable question about extended liberty of conscience.

In my defence of the resolution in the Riksdag, I sought to anticipate all objections to it which were worthy of notice.[20]

Amongst these I give special attention to the following five:--

1. "The powers will not enter into the neutralization of Sweden.

2. "But if, contrary to expectation, they did, the safety of the country would gain nothing by it.

3. "On the contrary, our independence would be diminished by a guaranteed neutrality.

4. "Without lessening our military burdens for defence.

5. "The proposition is untimely."

With regard to the first objection, _viz._, that the powers would not enter upon Sweden's neutralization, it appears to me that circumstances of great weight imply the contrary.

We may be quite sure that the powers will first and foremost consult their own interests. Scandinavia may be certainly regarded as specially valuable as a base of military operations to any of the great Baltic and Western States. But it would be quite a matter of consideration, whether these powers would not gain more by the reciprocal security of being all alike cut off from this base, than by the doubtful advantage of being possibly able to reckon upon Scandinavia as an ally.

A neutralized Scandinavia would be a Switzerland among the seas; a breakwater in the way between England and France on the one side, and Russia and Germany on the other. In case of a war between these great powers it would now be of considerable moment for any of them to get the powers along the coasts of the Sound and the Belts, upon its side. And how difficult it would be for the latter to preserve their neutrality during such a war, must be evident to everybody.

So the interests are seen to be equally great on all sides. It may therefore be deemed prudent to establish, in time, a permanent neutrality of the powers along the coast. Here, according to my view, lies a great problem for the foreign secretaries of the united kingdoms and Denmark.

My reason for speaking here of neutralizing the whole of Scandinavia is, that I am convinced that the brother-nations take entirely the same view as the Swedish. With respect to the general interests of European peace, the neutralization of Scandinavia would be more important than that of Switzerland and Belgium, because the interests of the great powers are greater and more equally balanced around the Scandinavian North than around those two small continental States.

We have old friends in the Western powers; we have gained a new friend in united Germany and by the neutralization of Scandinavia we shall not only make friendship with Russia, but Denmark will gain that of Germany, perhaps causing the last-named power to fulfil its duty to Denmark with respect to North Sleswick, seeing that it need no longer fear that its small neighbour would ever be forced into an alliance with a powerful enemy of Germany.

But it is not only the political interests of the powers which would be advanced by the neutralization of Scandinavia.