CHAPTER VII

A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS

Why should we suspect Germany of evil intentions? 277 The German Fleet was a challenge to British security 278 Candour of German publicists 278 British Government finds comfort in official assurances of Berlin 279 Disregarded warnings 279 _First Warning_ 279 (1905-1906) Morocco incident 279 After which British naval programme was reduced 280 _Second Warning_ 281 (1908-1909) Secret acceleration and increase of German naval programme 281 Imperial Defence Conference 281 _Third Warning_ 282 (1910) German sincerity under suspicion 282 The Constitutional Conference 283 Secret de Polichinelle 283 Failure of British Government to trust the people 284 _Fourth Warning_ 285 (1911) The Agadir incident 285 Mr. Lloyd George's speech 285 Consequences of various kinds 286 _Fifth Warning_ 287 (1912) Lord Haldane's rebuff 287 Menacing nature of German proposals 288 Dangers of amateur diplomacy 289 German love of irregular missions 290 _Sixth Warning_ 294 (1913) German Army Bill and War Loan 294 British Government ignore the danger 295 Neglect military preparations 297 Shrink from speaking plainly to the people 298 Difficulties of Sir Edward Grey 298 Enemies in his own household 299 Radical attacks on Foreign Secretary and First Lord of Admiralty fomented by Germany 299 Attitude of a leaderless Cabinet 300 Parallelogram of fears determines drift of policy 301 Evil effects of failure to educate public opinion 302 Danger of breaking the Liberal party 303 Occasional efficacy of self-sacrifice 303 War not inevitable had England been prepared 304