Part 5

In the first stage of speech, there are no inflections at all, separate words serving instead of them:--just as if, instead of saying _fathers_, we said _father many_, or _father father_; reduplication being one of the make-shifts (so to say) of this period. The languages allied to the Chinese belong to this class.

In the second stage, the separate words coalesce, but not so perfectly as to disfigure their originally separate character. The Hungarian persons have illustrated this. Language now becomes what is called _agglutinate_. The parts cohere, but the cohesion is imperfect. The majority of languages are agglutinate.

The Latin and Greek tongues illustrate the third stage. The parts originally separate, then agglutinate, now become so modified by contact as to look like secondary parts of a single word; these original separate substantive characters being a matter of inference rather than a patent and transparent fact. The _s_ in _fathers_ (which is also the _s_ in _patre-s_ and πάτερε-ς) is in this predicament.

Lastly, inflections are replaced by prepositions and auxiliary verbs, as is the case in the Italian and French when compared with the Latin.

Truly, then, may we say that the phenomena of speech are the phenomena of growth, evolution, or development; and as such must they be taught. A cell that grows,--not a crystal that is built up,--such is language.

But these well-devised selections of suggestive examples, whereby the student may rise from particulars to generals, &c., are not to be found in the ordinary grammars. Indeed, it is the very reverse of the present system; where there are twenty appeals to the memory in the shape of what is called a _rule_, for one appeal to the understanding in the shape of an illustrated process. So much the worse for the existing methods.

Moulds applied to growing trees--cookery-book receipts for making a natural juice--these are the parallels to the artificial systems of grammar _in their worst forms_. The _better_ can be excused, sometimes recommended; even as the Linnæan system of botanical teaching can, in certain cases, be used with safety, _provided always that its artificial character be explained beforehand, and insisted on throughout_.

To stand on the level of the Linnæan system, an artificial grammar must come under the following condition:--_It must leave the student nothing to unlearn when he comes to a natural one_.

How can this be done? It can be done, if the grammarian will be content to teach _forms_ only, leaving processes alone. Let him say (for instance) that the Latin for--

_I call_ is _voc_-o. _Thou callest_, _voc_-as. _Calling_, _voc_-ans. _I called_, _voc_-avi &c.

But do not let him say that active aorists are formed from futures, and passive ones from the third person singular of the perfect. His forms, his paradigms, will be right; his rules, in nine cases out of ten, wrong. I am satisfied that languages can be taught without rules and by paradigms only.

This recognition of what has been called _artificial_ grammar for the teaching of special languages, as opposed to the general grammar of the comparative philologist, should serve to anticipate an objection. 'Would you,' it may be asked, 'leave the details of languages like the Latin, Greek, French, German, &c.--languages of eminent practical utility--untaught until such time as the student shall have dipped into Chinese, touched upon Hungarian, and taken a general idea of the third stage of development from the Latin, and of the fourth from the French? If so, the period of life when the memory for words is strongest will have passed away before any language but his own mother-tongue has been acquired.'

The recognition of such a thing as artificial grammar answers this in the negative. If a special language be wanted, let it be taught by-times: only, if it cannot be taught in the most scientific manner, let it be taught in a manner as little unscientific as possible.

In this lies an argument against the ordinary teaching (I speak as an Englishman) of English. What do we learn by it?

In the ordinary teaching of what is called the grammar of the English language there are two elements. There is something professed to be taught which is not taught, but which, if taught, would be worth learning; and there is something which, from being already learned better than any man can teach it, requires no lessons. The one (the latter) is the use and practice of the English tongue. This the Englishman has already. The other is the principles of grammar. With existing text-books this is an impossibility. What then _is_ taught? Something (I am quoting from what I have written elsewhere) undoubtedly. The facts, that language is more or less regular; that there _is_ such a thing as grammar; that certain expressions should be avoided, are all matters worth knowing. And they are all taught even by the worst method of teaching. But are these the proper objects of _systematic_ teaching? Is the importance of their acquisition equivalent to the time, the trouble, and the displacement of more valuable subjects, which are involved in their explanation? I think not. Gross vulgarity of language is a fault to be prevented; but the proper prevention is to be got from habit--not rules. The proprieties of the English language are to be learned, like the proprieties of English manners, by conversation and intercourse; and a proper school for both, is the best society in which the learner is placed. If this be good, systematic teaching is superfluous; if bad, insufficient. There _are_ undoubted points where a young person may doubt as to the grammatical propriety of a certain expression. In this case let him ask some one older and more instructed. Grammar, as a _art_, is, undoubtedly, _the art of speaking and writing correctly_--but then, as an _art_, it is only required for _foreign_ languages. For our _own_ we have the necessary practice and familiarity.

The true claim of English grammar to form part and parcel of an English education stands or falls with the value of the philological knowledge to which grammatical studies may serve as an introduction, and with the value of scientific grammar as a _disciplinal_ study. I have no fear of being supposed to undervalue its importance in this respect. Indeed, in assuming that it is very great, I also assume that wherever grammar is studied as grammar, the language which the grammar so studied should represent, must be the mother-tongue of the student; _whatever that mother-tongue may be_--English for Englishmen, Welsh for Welshmen, French for Frenchmen, German for Germans, &c. The study is the study of a theory; and for this reason it should be complicated as little as possible by points of practice. For this reason a man's mother-tongue is the best medium for the elements of scientific philology, simply because it is the one which he knows best in practice.

Limit, then, the teaching of English, except so far as it is preparatory to the study of language in general; with which view, teach as scientifically as possible.

Go further. Except in special cases, limit the teaching of the classical tongues to one out of the two. _One_, for all _disciplinal_ purposes, is enough. In this, go far. Dead though the tongue be, and object of ridicule as the occupation is becoming, go to the length of writing verses, though only in a few of the commoner metres. Go far, and go in one direction only. There are reasons for this singleness of path. I fear that there is almost a necessity. As long as men believed that the ordinary Latin and Greek grammars were good things of themselves, and that, even if they did not carry the student far into the classics, they told him something of value respecting language in general, a _little learning_ in the dead languages was a good thing. But what if the grammars are _not_ good things? What if they are absolutely bad? In such a case, the classical tongues cease to be learnt except for themselves. Now, one of the few things that is more useless than a little Latin is a little Greek.

Am I wrong in saying that, with nine out of ten who learn _both_ Latin and Greek, the knowledge of the two tongues conjointly is not greater than the knowledge of one of them singly ought to be?

Am I wrong in believing that the tendencies of the age are in favour of decreasing rather than increasing the amount of time bestowed upon classical scholarship?

Unless I be so, the necessity for a limitation is apparent.

To curtail English--to eliminate one of the classical tongues--possibly that of Pericles, at any rate, either that of Pericles or of Cicero--to substitute for the ordinary elements of a so-called classical education illustrations from the Chinese, the Hungarian, or the Tumali--this is what I have recommended.

I cannot but feel that in so doing I may seem to some to have been false to my text, which was to eulogize things philological. They may say, _Call you this backing your friends?_ I do. It is not by glorifying one's own more peculiar studies that such studies gain credit. To show the permanent, rather than the accidental, elements of their value, is the best service that can be done for them. It is also good service to show that they can be taught with a less expenditure of time and labour than is usually bestowed on them. But the best service of all is to indicate their disciplinal value; and to show that, instead of displacing other branches of knowledge, they so exercise certain faculties of the mind as to prepare the way to them.

II.

LOGICA.

ON THE WORD _DISTRIBUTED_, AS USED IN LOGIC.

READ BEFORE THE PHILOLOGICAL SOCIETY.

DECEMBER THE 18TH 1857.

The present paper is an attempt to reconcile the logical and etymological meanings of the word _Distributed_.

Speaking roughly, _distributed_ means _universal_: "a term is said to be _distributed_ when it is taken universally, so as to stand for everything it is capable of being applied to."--_Whately_, i. § 5.

Speaking more closely, it means _universal in one premiss_; it being a rule in the ordinary logic that no conclusion is possible unless one premiss be, either negatively or affirmatively, universal.

Assuredly there is no etymological connexion between the two words. Hence De Morgan writes:--"By _distributed_ is here meant _universally spoken of_. I do not use this term in the present work, because I do not see why, in any deducible meaning of the word _distributed_, it can be applied to universal as distinguished from particular."--_Formal Logic_, chap. vii.

Neither can it be so applied. It is nevertheless an accurate term.

Let it mean _related to more than one class_, and the power of the prefix _dis-_, at least, becomes intelligible.

For _all_ the purposes of logic this is not enough; inasmuch as the particular character of the relation (all-important in the structure of the syllogism) is not, at present, given. It is enough, however, to give import to the syllable _dis-_.

In affirmative propositions this relation is connective on both sides, _i. e._ the middle term forms part of _both_ the others. In negative propositions this relation is connective on _one_ side, disjunctive on the _other_.

In-- All men are mortal, All heroes are men,

the middle term _men_ forms a part of the class called _mortal_, by being connected with it in the way that certain contents are connected with the case that contains them; whilst it also stands in connexion with the class of _heroes_ in the way that cases are connected with their contents. In--

No man is perfect, Heroes are men,

the same double relation occurs. The class _man_, however, though part of the class _hero_, is no part of the class _perfect_ but, on the contrary, expressly excluded from it. Now this expression of exclusion constitutes a relation--disjunctive indeed, but still a relation; and this is all that is wanted to give an import to the prefix _dis-_ in _distributed_.

Wherever there is distribution there is inference, no matter whether the distributed term be universal or not. If the ordinary rules for the structure of the syllogism tell us the contrary to this, they only tell the truth, so far as certain assumptions on which they rest are legitimate. These limit us to the use of three terms expressive of quantity,--_all_, _none_, and _some_; and it is quite true that, with this limitation, universality and distribution coincide.

Say that Some Y is X, Some Z is Y,

and the question will arise whether the Y that is X is also the Y that is Z. That _some_ Y belongs to both classes is clear; whether, however, it be the same Y is doubtful. Yet unless it be so, no conclusion can be drawn. And it may easily be different. Hence, as long as we use the word _some_, we have no assurance that there is any distribution of the middle term.

Instead, however, of _some_ write _all_, and it is obvious that some Y must be both X and Z; and when such is the case--

Some X must be Z, and Some Z must be X.

Universality, then, of the middle term in one premiss is, by no means, the _direct_ condition that gives us an inference, but only a _secondary_ one. The direct condition is the distribution. Of this, the universality of the middle term is only a _sign_, and it is the only sign we have, because _all_ and _some_ are the only words we have to choose from. If others were allowed, the appearance which the two words (_distributed_ and _universal_) have of being synonymous would disappear. And so they do when we abandon the limitations imposed upon us by the words _all_ and _some_. So they do in the numerically definite syllogism, exemplified in--

More than half Y is X, More than half Y is Z, Some Z is X.

So, also, they do when it is assumed that the Y's which are X and the Y's which are Z are identical.

Y is X, The same Y is Z, Some Z is X.

In each of these formulæ there is distribution without universality, _i. e._ there is distribution with a quality other than that of universality as its criterion. The following extract not only explains this, but gives a fresh proof, if fresh proof be needed, that _distributed_ and _universal_ are used synonymously. The "comparison of each of the two terms must be equally with the whole, or with the same part of the third term; and to secure this, (1) either the middle term must be distributed in one premiss at least, or (2) the two terms must be compared with the same specified part of the middle, or (3), in the two premises taken together, the middle must be distributed, and something more, though not distributed in either singly."--_Thompson, Outline of the Laws of Thought_, § 39.

Here _distributed_ means _universal_; Mr. Thompson's being the ordinary terminology. In the eyes of the present writer "distributed in one premiss" is a contradiction in terms.

Of the two terms, _distributed_ is the more general; yet it is not the usual one. That it has been avoided by De Morgan has been shown. It may be added, that from the Port Royal Logic it is wholly excluded.

The statement that, in negative propositions, the relation is connective on _one_ side, and disjunctive on the _other_, requires further notice. It is by no means a matter of indifference on which side the connexion or disjunction lies.

(_a._) It is the class denoted by the major, of which the middle term of a negative syllogism is expressly stated to form _no_ part, or from which it is disjoined. (_b._) It is the class denoted by the minor, of which the same middle term is expressly stated to form part, or with which it is connected.

No man is perfect--

here the proposition is a major, and the middle term _man_ is expressly separated from the class _perfect_.

All heroes are men--

here it is a minor, and the middle term _man_ is expressly connected with class _hero_.

A connective relation to the major, and a disjunctive relation to the minor are impossible in negative syllogisms. The exceptions to this are only apparent. The two most prominent are the formulæ _Camestres_ and _Camenes_, in both of which it is the minor premiss wherein the relation is disjunctive. But this is an accident; an accident arising out of the fact of the major and minor being convertible.

_Bokardo_ is in a different predicament. _Bokardo_, along with _Baroko_, is the only formula containing a particular negative as a premiss. Now the particular negatives are, for so many of the purposes of logic, particular affirmatives, that they may be neglected for the present; the object at present being to ascertain the rules for the structure of truly and unquestionably negative syllogisms. Of these we may predicate that--their minor proposition is always either actually affirmative or capable of becoming so by transposition.

To go further into the relations between the middle term and the minor, would be to travel beyond the field under present notice; the immediate object of the present paper being to explain the import of the word _distributed_. That it may, both logically and etymologically, mean _related to two classes_ is clear--clear as a matter of fact. Whether, however, _related to two classes_ be the meaning that the history of logic gives us, is a point upon which I abstain from giving an opinion. I only suggest that, in elementary treatises, the terms _universal_ and _distributed_ should be separated more widely than they are; one series of remarks upon--

_a._ Distribution as a condition of inference, being followed by another on--

_b._ Universality of the middle term in one premiss as a sign of distribution.

So much for the extent to which the present remarks suggest the purely practical question as to how the teaching of Aristotelian logic may be improved. There is another, however, beyond it; one of a more theoretical, indeed of an eminently theoretical, nature. It raises doubts as to the propriety of the word _all_ itself; doubts as to the propriety of the term _universal_.

The existence of such a word as _all_ in the premiss, although existing therein merely as a contrivance for reconciling the evidence of the distribution of the middle term with a certain amount of simplicity in the way of terminology, could scarcely fail, in conjunction with some of its other properties, to give it what is here considered an undue amount of importance. It made it look like the opposite to _none_. Yet this is what it is not. The opposite to _none_ is _not-none_, or _some_; the opposite to _all_ is _one_. In _one_ and _all_ we have the highest and lowest numbers of the individuals that constitute a class. In _none_ and _some_ we have the difference between existence and non-existence. That _all_ is a mere mode of _some_, has been insisted on by many logicians, denied by few or none. Between _all_ and _some_, there is, at best, but a difference of degree. Between _some_ and _none_, the difference is a difference of kind. _Some_ may, by strengthening, be converted into _all_. No strengthening may obliterate the difference between _all_ and _not-all_. From this it follows that the logic of _none_ and _some_, the logic of connexion and disjunction (the logic of _two_ signs), is much more widely different from the logic of _part_ and _whole_ (the logic of _three_ signs) than is usually admitted; the former being a logic of pure _quality_, the latter a logic of _quality_ and _quantity_ as well.

Has the admixture done good? I doubt whether it has. The logic of pure and simple Quality would, undoubtedly, have given but little; nothing but negative conclusions on one side, and possible particulars on the other. Nevertheless it would have given a logic of the Possible and Impossible.

Again, as at present constituted, the Quantitative logic, the logic of _all_ and _some_, embraces either too much or too little. _All_ is, as aforesaid, only a particular form of _more than none_. So is _most_. Now such syllogisms as--

Most men are fallible, Most men are rational, Some men are both frail and fallible;

_or_,

Some frail things are fallible,

are inadmissible in the Aristotelian paradigms. A claim, however, is set up for their admission. Grant it, and you may say instead of _most_--

Fifty-one per cent., &c.;

but this is only a particular instance. You may combine any two numbers in any way you like, provided only that the sum be greater than unity. Now this may be arithmetic, and it may be fact; but it is scarcely formal logic; at any rate it is anything but general.

It is the logic of _some_ and its modifications _one_, _all_, and _anything between one and all_, as opposed to the logic of the simple absolute _some_ (_some_ the opposite to _none_), and a little consideration will show that it is also the logic of the _probable_, with its modification the _proven_, (_proven_ is _probable_, as _all_ is _some_,) as opposed to the logic of the _possible_ and _impossible_. Let, in such a pair of propositions as--

Some of the men of the brigade were brave, Some of the men of the brigade were killed,

the number expressed by _some_, as well as the number of the men of the _brigade_, be known, and the question as to whether

Some brave men were killed,

is a problem in the doctrine of chances. One per cent. of each will make it very unlikely that the single brave man was also the single killed one. Forty-nine per cent. of each will make it highly probable that more than one good soldier met his fate. With fifty on one side, and fifty-one on the other, we have _one_ at least. With _all_ (either _killed_ or _brave_), we have the same; and that without knowing any numbers at all.

III.

GRAMMATICA.

ON THE RECIPROCAL PRONOUNS, AND ON THE RECIPROCAL POWER OF THE REFLECTIVE VERB.

READ BEFORE THE PHILOLOGICAL SOCIETY, MARCH 22. 1844.

The present paper is upon the reciprocal pronouns, and upon certain forms of the verb used in a reciprocal sense. It is considered that these points of language have not been put forwards with that prominence and care which their value in the solution of certain problems in philology requires. Too often the terms Reciprocal and Reflective have been made synonymous. How far this is true may be determined by the fact that the middle verbs in the Icelandic language have been called by so great a philologist as Rask _reciprocal_ instead of _reflective_. This is equivalent to treating sentences like _we strike ourselves_, and _we strike each other_, as identical. Yet the language with which Rask was dealing (the Icelandic) was the one of all others wherein the difference in question required to be accurately drawn, and fully pointed out. (See Anvisning till Isländskan, pp. 281, 283.)