Chapter 9

Arctior vero colligatio est societatis propinquorum: ab illa enim immensa societate humani generis in exiguam angustumque concluditur.

_Cicero_.

§ 1. Degrees Of Blood-Relationship; The Ἀγχιστεία.

(M54) Such being the character of the burden of mutual responsibility borne by members of kindred blood, it remains, if possible, to obtain some idea of how this responsibility became narrowed and limited to the nearest relations, and what was the meaning underlying the distinction drawn between certain degrees of relationship.

When examining the more detailed structure of the organisation of the kindred, considerable light seems to be thrown upon survivals in Athens by comparison with the customs of other communities, which were undergoing earlier stages of the same process of crystallisation from the condition of semi-nomadic tribes into that of settled provinces or kingdoms.

(M55) In the Gortyn Laws we read:—

iv. 24. “The father shall have power over the children and the property to divide it amongst them.... As long as they (the parents) are alive, _there is no necessity for division_.... If a man or woman die their children, or grandchildren, or great-grandchildren, shall have the property....”

The headship of the οἶκος and the ownership of the property vested in the parent as long as he lived and wished to maintain his power. Even after his death, unless they wished it, the sons need not divide up amongst themselves, but could live on with joint ownership in the one οἶκος of their deceased father. The eldest son would probably take the house itself, _i.e._ the hearth, with the duties to the family altars which devolved upon him as head of the family.(128)

An example of this joint ownership occurs in the speech of Demosthenes against Leochares.(129) The two sons of Euthumachos after his death gave their sister in marriage (no doubt with her proper portion), and lived separately but _without dividing_ their inheritance (τὴν οὐσίαν ἀνέμητον). Even after the marriage of one brother, they still left the property undivided, each living on his share of the income, one in Athens, the other in Salamis.

The possibility of thus living in one οἶκος and on an undivided patrimony is implied in another passage in Demosthenes, where, however, the exact opposite is described as actually having taken place.(130)

Bouselos had five sons. He divided (διένειμεν τὴν οὐσίαν) his substance amongst them all as was fair and right, and they married wives and begat children and children’s children. Thus _five_ οἶκοι sprang up out of the one of Bouselos, and _each brother dwelt apart_, having his own οἶκος and bringing up his own offspring (ἔκγονοι) himself (χωρὶς ἕκαστος ᾤκει).

Whilst the parents were alive the family naturally held very closely together, and often probably lived in one patriarchal household like Priam’s at Troy.

Isaeus declares:—The law commands that we maintain (τρέφειν) our parents (γονεῖς): these are—parents, grandparents and _their parents_, if they are still alive:

“For they are the beginning (ἀρχή) of the family (γένος) and their estate descends to their offspring (ἔκγονοι): wherefore it is necessary to maintain them even if they leave nothing.”(131)

The duty of maintenance (τρέφειν) owed to the ancestor would follow the same relationship as the right of inheritance from him, and this common debt towards their living forebears could not help further consolidating the group of descendants already bound together by common rites at the tombs of the dead.

But granted this community of rights and debts, is it possible to formulate for the Greeks anything of the same limitations in the incidence of responsibility amongst blood-relations that is to be found elsewhere?

(M56) In western Europe, owing perhaps to the influence of Christianity, the rites of ancestor-worship have no prominence. Ecclesiastical influence however was unable to prevent an exceedingly complex subdivision of the kindred existing in Wales and elsewhere. Whether this subdivision finds its _raison d’être_ in the worship of ancestors or not, the groups thus formed serve as units for sustaining the responsibilities incident to tribal life, and being, as will be seen, governed by similar considerations to those existing among the Greeks, they afford very suitable material for comparison, and throw considerable light upon one another.

(M57) As the various departments affected by blood-relationship or purity of descent come under notice, it will be seen that the position of _great-grandson_ as at once limiting the immediate family of his parents and heading a new family of descendants is marked with peculiar emphasis.

(M58) In the ancient laws of Wales it rests with great-grandsons to make the final division of their inheritance and start new households.

Second cousins may demand redivision of the heritage descending (and perhaps already divided up in each generation between) from their great-grandfather. After second cousins no redivision or co-equation can be claimed.(132)

In the meanwhile the oldest living parents maintained their influence in family matters. In the story of Kilhwch and Olwen, in the _Mabinogion_, the father of Olwen, before betrothing her to Kilhwch, declares that “her four great-grandmothers and her four great-grandsires are yet alive; it is needful that I take counsel of them.”(133)

(M59) Even when feudalism refused to acknowledge other than an individual responsibility for a fief, it was unable to overcome the tribal theory of the indivisibility of the family, which maintained its unity in some places even under a feudal exterior. But as generations proceeded, and the relationships within the family diverged beyond the degree of second cousin, a natural breaking up seems to have taken place, though in the direction of subinfeudation under the feudal enforcement of the rule of primogeniture, instead of the practice, more in accordance with tribal instincts, of equal division and enfranchisement. It may however be surmised that the subdivision and subinfeudation of a holding in the occupation of such a group of kinsmen would be carried out by the formation of further similar groups.

(M60) In the _Coustumes du Pais de Normandie_ mention is made of such a method of land-holding, called _parage_. It consists of an undivided tenure of brothers and relations _within the degree of second cousins_.

The eldest does homage to the capital lord for all the _paragers_. The younger and their descendants hold of the eldest without homage, until the relationship comes to the _sixth degree inclusive_ (_i.e._ second cousins). When the lineage is beyond the sixth degree, the heirs of the cadets have to do homage to the heirs of the eldest or to whomsoever has acquired the fief. Then _parage_ ceases.(134)

The tenure then becomes one of subinfeudation. As long as the _parage_ continued, the share of a deceased _parager_ would be dealt with by redivision of rights, and no question would arise of finding heirs. But when it became a question of finding an heir to the group, failing heirs in the seventh degree inclusive, that is, son of second cousins—looked upon as son to the group—failing such an heir, the estate escheated to the lord.

(M61) There is an interesting passage in the Ancient Laws of Wales ordaining that the next-of-kin shall not inherit as heir to his deceased kinsman, but as heir to the ancestor, who, apart from himself, would be without direct heir, _i.e._ presumably their common ancestor.

“No person is to obtain the land of a _co-heir_, as of a brother, or of a cousin, or of a second cousin, by claiming it as heir to that one co-heir who shall have died without leaving an heir of his body: but by claiming it as heir _to one of his own parents_, who had been owner of that land until his death without heir, whether a father, or grandfather, or great-grandfather: that land he is to have, if he be the nearest of kin to the deceased.”(135)

This of course refers to inheritance within the group of co-heirs, the members of which held their position by virtue of their common relationship within certain degrees to the founder. And we may infer that emphasis was thus laid on the proof of relationship by _direct descent_, in order to prevent shares in the inheritance passing from hand to hand unnoticed, beyond the strict limit where subdivision could be claimed _per capita_ by the individual representatives of the diverging _stirpes_.

(M62) The kindred in the _Ordinances of Manu_ is divided into two groups:—

1. Sapindas, who owe the _funeral cake_ at the tomb.

2. Samānodakas, who pour the _water libation_ at the tomb.

“To _three ancestors_ the water libation must be made; for _three ancestors_ the funeral cake is prepared; the fourth (descendant or generation) is the giver (of the water and the cake); the _fifth has properly nothing to do_ (with either gift).”(136)

This may be put in tabular form:—

Receivers of water.

1. Great-grandfather’s great-grandfather. 2. Great-grandfather’s grandfather. 3. Great-grandfather’s father.

Receivers of cake.

1. Great-grandfather. 2. Grandfather. 3. Father. 4. Giver of cake and water 5. Excluded

Or inversely:—

Givers of cake or _Sapindas_.

Householder Brothers 1st cousins 2nd cousins

Pourers of water or _Samānodakas_.

3rd cousins 4th cousins 5th cousins

Within the _Sapinda_-ship of his mother, a “twice-born” man may not marry.(137) Outside the _Sapinda_-ship, a wife or widow, “commissioned” to bear children to the name of her husband, must not go.

“Now _Sapinda_-ship ceases with the seventh person, but the relationship of a Samānodaka (ends) with the ignorance of birth and name.”(138)

All are Sapindas who offer the cake to the same ancestors.

(M63) The head of the family would himself offer or share with all his descendants in the offering of the one cake to his great-grandfather, his grandfather, and his father. And if this passage is taken in conjunction with the one quoted just above, the number sharing in the cake-offering, limited as in the text at the seventh person from the first ancestor who receives the cake, is just sufficient to include the great-grandson of the head of the family, supposed to be making the offering.

The group, thus sharing the same cake-offering, would in the natural course be moving continually downwards, generation by generation as the head of the family died, thereby causing the great-grandfather to pass from the receivers of the cake-offering to the receivers of the water libation, and admitting the great-grandson’s son into the number of Sapindas who shared the cake-offering. And at no time would more than four generations have a share in the same cake offered to the three nearest ancestors of the head of the family.

(M64) The Samānodakas, or pourers of the water libation appear to have been similarly grouped.

“Ignorance of birth and name” was in Wales considered to be equivalent to _beyond fifth cousins_. According to the Gwentian Code, “there is no proper name in kin further than that”—_i.e._ fifth cousins.(139) And this tallies exactly with the previous quotation from Manu limiting the water libation to three generations of ancestors beyond those to whom the cake is due, which, as has been seen, includes fifth cousins.

And it must be borne in mind that fifth cousins are great-grandsons of the great-grandsons of their common ancestor, or two generations of groups of second cousins.

(M65) It was extremely improbable that a man would see further than his great-grandchildren born to him before his death. And it might also occasionally occur in times of war or invasion that a man’s sons and grandsons might go out to serve as soldiers, leaving the old man and his young great-grandchildren at home.

If the fighting members of the family were killed, the great-grandsons (who would be second cousins or nearer to each other) would have to inherit directly from their great-grandfather: and thus, especially in cases where the property was held undivided after the father’s death, we can easily see that second cousins (_i.e._ all who traced back to the common great-grandfather) might be looked upon as forming a natural limit to the immediate descendants in any one οἶκος, and as the furthest removed who could claim shares of the ancestral inheritance.

After the death of the great-grandfather or head of the house, his descendants would probably wish to divide up the estate and start new houses of their own. The eldest son was generally named after his father’s father,(140) and would carry on the name of the eldest branch of his great-grandfather’s house, and would be responsible for the proper maintenance of the rites on that ancestor’s tomb. He would also be guardian of any brotherless woman or minor amongst his cousins, each of whom would be equally responsible to him and to each other for all the duties and privileges entailed upon blood-relationship.

Thus seems naturally to spring up an inner group of blood-relations closely drawn together by ties which only indirectly reached other and outside members of the γένος.

(M66) In the fourth century B.C. this compact group limited to second cousins still survived at Athens, responsible to each other for succession, by inheritance or by marriage of a daughter; for vengeance and purification after injury received by any member, and for all duties shared by kindred blood.

This close relation was called ἀγχιστεία, and all its members were called ἀγχιστεῖς _i.e._ any one upon whom the claim upon the next-of-kin might at any time fall.

The speech of Demosthenes against Makartatos affords considerable information as to the constitution of the family-group or οἶκος. The five sons of Bouselos,(141) we are told, on his death divided his substance amongst them, and each started a new οἶκος and begat children and children’s children.(142) The action, which was the occasion of the speech, lay between the great-grandsons of two of these five founders of οἶκοι, Stratios and Hagnias, and had reference to the disposal of the estate of the grandson of the latter, which had come into the hands of the great-grandson of Stratios.

One might have supposed that the descendants of Bouselos, with their common burial ground(143) and so forth, would have ranked as all in the same οἶκος under their title of Bouselidai. But it is clear from this speech of Demosthenes, that too many generations had already passed to admit of Bouselos being considered as still head of an unbroken οἶκος, and that his _great_-great-grandsons were subdivided into separate οἶκοι under the names of their respective great-grandfathers, Stratios, Hagnias, &c. (οἵ εἰσιν ἐκ τοῦ Στρατίου οἴκου, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ Ἁγνίου οὐδεπώποτ᾽ ἐγένοντο).(144)

§ 2. Limitations In Respect Of Succession Outside The Direct Line Of Descent.

(M67) The Gortyn law quoted above in the previous section goes on:—

v. “If (a man or woman die and) they have no children, the deceased’s brothers and brother’s children or _grandchildren_ shall have the property. If there are none of these, the deceased’s sisters, their children or _grandchildren_. If there are none of these, to whom it descends of whatever grade they be, they shall inherit the property.”

This clause takes the evidence one step further, and it is noticeable how the right of inheritance is determined by the great-grandchild of the common ancestor. In the direct line, a man’s descendants down to his great-grandchildren inherited his estate. In dealing with inheritance through a brother of the deceased the heirship terminates with the _grandchild_ of the brother, who would be great-grandchild of the nearest common ancestor with the previous owner of the estate. If there is no brother, the child of the cousin limits the next branch, as will be seen.

(M68) Isaeus(145) describes the working of the then-existing (c. 350 B.C.) law of inheritance at Athens as follows:—

The law gives “brothers’ property” (i.e. property without lineal succession) to

1. _Brothers_ by the same father, or brother’s children, for these are related to the deceased in the nearest degree;

2. _Sisters_ by the same father, or sister’s children;

3. _First cousins_ by the father’s side as far as _cousin’s children_ (δίδωσι τὴν ἀγχιστείαν ἀνεψιοῖς πρὸς πατρὸς μέχρι _ἀνεψιῶν παίδων_).

Failing these, recourse is had back again into the family (εἰς τὸ γένος πάλιν ἐπανέρχεται) and the law makes those related through the _mother_ of the deceased, masters (κύριοι) of the family (and inheritance) in the same order as on the father’s side from the beginning.

That is to say, failing first cousins once removed, the inheritance goes back and begins again at the mother of the deceased, who however, being a woman, can only inherit on behalf of her issue, present or prospective.(146) If she has married again and has a son (half-brother to her deceased son) he would inherit. Failing her issue, her brother and so on to first cousin’s children of the deceased, through his mother, would have the inheritance.

Failing these, the nearest kinsman to be found on the father’s side, of whatsoever degree, is to inherit.

(M69) The law as stated by Demosthenes(147) coincides with this:—

“If there are no sons, brothers by the same father (shall inherit): and their true born children, if there are any, shall have the share of their father: if there are no brothers or brother’s children the issue of the latter in the same way shall partake: males and children of males shall have preference (over females) if they are born of the same (parents), even if they are further off by birth (γένει) [_i.e._ are a generation lower down]. If there are none on the father’s side as far as _cousin’s children_ (μέχρι ἀνεψιῶν παίδων), the relations on the mother’s side in the same way shall have possession (κυρίους εἶναι). But if there are none on either side _within these degrees_, the nearest of kin on the father’s side shall have possession.”

Whenever this law is quoted the limit of relationship laid down therein for the immediate ἀγχιστεία is always that of ἀνεψιῶν παῖδες, or sons of first cousins, who inherit from their first cousins once removed (_oncle à la Brétagne_, or Welsh uncle as this relation has been called). Occasionally the patronymic form ἀνεψιαδοῖ is used, apparently with the same signification, though properly ἀνεψιαδοῖ would mean sons of two first cousins, _i.e._ second cousins.(148)

(M70) It appears from the evidence reviewed hitherto, that any great-grandson could inherit from any grandson of a common ancestor, and the conclusion also seems to be justified, that the group of great-grandsons were considered to divide up their right to inherit once for all, and that having done so, with respect to that inheritance they were considered to have begun a new succession. To put it differently, in case of the death of one of these second cousins, after the final division of their inheritance had taken place, the rest of the second cousins would have no right to a share in his portion; an heir would have to be found within his nearer relations. Thus, they share responsibilities towards any of their relations within the group and higher up in their families, and also stand shoulder to shoulder in sharing such burdens as pollution and so on, but are outside the immediate ἀγχιστεία with respect to each other’s succession. The reason for this will perhaps be more apparent as the argument proceeds.

That the grandson of a first cousin was outside the ἀγχιστεία is clear from the speech of Demosthenes already mentioned,(149) where the plaintiff, who originally stands in that relationship to the deceased whose inheritance is in dispute, is adopted as son of his grandfather (first cousin of the deceased), in order to come within the legal definition of ἀνεψιοῦ παῖς.

That the son of a second cousin was also without the pale is directly stated in several passages in Isaeus.

(M71) It must be remembered that by “inheritance” is meant the assumption of all the duties incumbent on the ἀγχιστεύς, and that the man who “inherited” took his place for the future as son of the deceased in the family pedigree, and reckoned his relationship to the rest of the γένος thenceforth from his new position, in the house into which he had come.(150)

(M72) Now if it is true that to the great-grandson was the lowest in degree to which property could directly descend without entering a new οἶκος, and if that great-grandson was also looked upon as beginning with his acquired property a new portion of the continuous line of descent; any one, who “inherited” from him and ranked in the scale of relationship as HIS SON, would necessarily fall outside the former group and would be considered as forming the nearest relative in the next succeeding group. This, it seems, is the meaning of the language of the law which limits the ἀγχιστεία to the children of first cousins who could inherit from their parent’s first cousins, and still _retain their relationship as great-grandsons_ of the same ancestor. Whereas any one taking the place of son to his second cousin would be one degree lower down in descent, and pass outside the limit of the four generations. The law makes the kinsmen therefore exhaust all possible relationships _within the group_ by reverting to the mother’s kindred with the same limitation before allowing the inheritance to pass outside or lower down.

(M73) In confirmation of this view the following passage may be quoted from _Plato’s Laws_:—

“He who in the sad disorder of his soul has a mind, justly or unjustly, to expel from his family a son whom he has begotten and brought up, shall not lightly or at once execute his purpose; but first of all he shall collect together his own kinsmen, extending to (_first_) _cousins_ (μέχρι ἀνεψιῶν), and in like manner his son’s kinsmen by the mother’s side,(151) and in their presence he shall accuse his son, setting forth that he deserves at the hands of them all to be dismissed from the family (γένος).”(152)

Before dishonouring one of the family and so bereaving it of a member owing duties which, by his disinheritance, may fall into abeyance or be neglected, the parent calls together all to whom his son might perhaps ultimately become the only living representative and heir, and who might at some future time be dependent on him for the performance of ancestral rites. That this was in Plato’s mind when he wrote is shown by the next sentence, in which he provides for the possibility of some relation already having need of the young man and being desirous to adopt him as his son, in which case he shall by no means be prevented. The concurrence of all relations in such a position was therefore necessary.

In other cases where Plato mentions similar gatherings of the kin but for different purposes, he extends the summons to _cousin’s children_. But here it can be seen they would have no place. They would be second cousins to the disgraced youth; they might have to share privilege or pollution with him, but had no claim on him for duties towards themselves. He would be “cousin’s son” to his father’s first cousins—the limit of such a claim in the ἀγχιστεία.

(M74) In the speech of Isaeus concerning the estate of Hagnias, a real second cousin is in possession of the estate. He won the case at the time and died in possession, and an action against his son Makartatos for the same property is the occasion of one of the speeches of Demosthenes. To fully understand the relationships referred to in these cases, the accompanying genealogical tree of the descendants of Bouselos may be of assistance. It will also serve as an example of how a kindred hung together, and how by intermarriage and adoption the name of the head of an οἶκος was carried on down a long line of male descendants.

Theopompos, in the speech of Isaeus, had taken possession of the estate of his second cousin Hagnias, as his next of kin and heir. Throughout the speech he is styled ἀνεψιοῦ παῖς so as to bring him within the phraseology of the law, and he successfully defends himself from the claims of the next generation below—viz., his brother’s son. But in the speech of Demosthenes against his son Makartatos, who had taken possession at his father’s death of the disputed property, it is represented that his father had got possession only by defeating another claimant, Phylomache II., by “surprise,” as it was called, by stating that her grandmother through whom she traced her claim was only half-sister to Hagnias’ father. But Phylomache’s husband, having caused their son Euboulides III. to be adopted as the son of Euboulides II.—his wife’s father and Hagnias’ first cousin, a quite regular course for the grandson inheriting through his heiress mother—proved that his wife’s grandmother was whole sister to Hagnias father, and brought the action under the guidance of Demosthenes against Makartatos. This Euboulides III. sued as true ἀνεψιοῦ παῖς and οἰκεῖος ἐκ τοῦ οἴκου of Hagnias.(153) He is described as having “one of the titles mentioned in the law _as far as which_ the law bids the ἀγχιστεία go, for he is _cousin’s son_ to Hagnias.”

On the other hand, Theopompos, father of Makartatos and second cousin of Hagnias, is mentioned(154) as “being of a different οἶκος altogether,” and not at all related in such a way as to be heir of Hagnias (μηδὲν προσηκόντων ὤστε κληρονομεῖν τῶν Ἁγνίου, ἀλλὰ γένει _ἀπωτέρω_ ὄντων), being too far off in the family (or by birth).

That the title of Theopompos (viz., second cousinship) was not valid, may be inferred partly by the ruses he adopted to get possession, but more especially by the fact(155) that none of the other second cousins on a par with him, and with whom he ought to have shared, seem to have believed in the validity of their titles, or at any rate taken the trouble to sue for part of the estate.

However this may be, there does not seem anything in these speeches other than confirmatory of the view stated above of the composition and limitation of the ἀγχιστεία.

§ 3. Division Amongst Heirs.

(M75) Succession to the inheritance of an estate was ordained by law in strict accordance with the ancient conception of the unity of the family. On the death of the head of a family, unless the paternal οἶκος was voluntarily continued unbroken by his descendants, the natural course was for each son ultimately to live apart and found a separate οἶκος consisting of himself and his offspring. Equal division amongst heirs was therefore the rule in Greece; equal division, that is to say, between all of equal grade.

(M76) The Gortyn Laws have already been referred to as enforcing the principle.(156) If a man died, his heirs were either his sons, or his grandsons, or his greatgrandsons. If he had no children, his brothers, and their children, or their grandchildren succeeded.

The Athenian law was conceived in the same spirit, but mentions a further point—viz., that in the division amongst sons, the οἶκος of any one of their number who had died before the division, could be represented by his sons or grandsons, who thus received their father’s share.

This system of representation probably existed also among the Gortynians, though no mention of it is made in their laws, for it is inconceivable that any of the grandsons could be deprived of all share in their grandfather’s estate by the mere death of the intermediate generation.

But the division _per stirpes_ was not maintained throughout. It is probable from the words of the Attic orators that equal division amongst all of the same grade, such as nephews or cousins, took place _per capita_, any deceased member of that grade being represented by his sons. Representation, of course, could not take place in the case of a division amongst cousins’ sons, owing to the strict limitation of the ἀγχιστεία to four generations from the common ancestor; any deceased relation in that degree therefore simply dropped out of the succession.

(M77) It has generally been assumed that grandsons inheriting directly from their grandfather, all the intermediate generation being already dead, inherited none the less the shares of their respective fathers _per stirpes_. But if the foregoing account of the unity of the οἶκος and its resemblance in its composition to the household of the Welsh tribal system be correct, it seems more reasonable to suppose that, all the intermediate generation being dead, the grandsons, in virtue of being all equally related to their grandfather, would inherit in equal shares _per capita_. Any dead grandson would of course be represented, as before, by his son or sons.

(M78) The evidence is not sufficient to justify more than a suggestion on either side with regard to divisions amongst lineal descendants. With regard to successions by relations outside of the direct line of descent, such as nephews or cousins, it is almost certain that all of the same degree took equal shares _per capita_.

Following the law for daughters, quoted by Demosthenes(157)—viz., that though all shared the inheritance of the property, only one need be dealt with in view of securing the succession—the assumption can be made that, when there were several heirs related in the same degree to the former owner of the estate, one of their number would be set apart to continue the household of their kinsman as his son, whilst the others merely took their shares of the property divided to continue their own οἶκοι respectively.

The equal division of inheritance amongst kinsmen of equal degree _per capita_, in combination with the system of representation above described, is entirely consistent with the tribal conception of the household as hanging closely together, its members always looking up to their venerable head, in whom the ownership of the property vested, until by the death of older generations and the consequent subdivision, each in his turn became head of an οἶκος and owner of its share in the ancestral property.

§ 4. Qualifications For The Recognition Of Tribal Blood.

(M79) It has been remarked above with what jealousy the purity of the blood of the community was guarded. No child was admitted into the kindred of its father until all concerned were fully convinced of the blamelessness of its pedigree. In such circumstances it was no easy matter to acquire the privileges attached to the possession of tribal or citizen blood. It seems to have been considered that however great otherwise the claims of a stranger might be, time alone could really render the qualifications of his family complete.

(M80) Under the ancient Laws of Wales no stranger’s family could acquire the full privileges of a Welsh tribesman or Cymro, as regards location on land, until after many generations. But if they married Welshwomen, and held land from generation to generation, the _greatgrandsons_ became fully privileged tribesmen.(158) Similarly if a stranger voluntarily assumed the position of serf to a Welshman, and his descendants did not choose to depart, but remained in that position to the descendants of the Welshman, the _greatgrandsons_ of the Welshman became proprietors of the greatgrandsons of the stranger.(159)

(M81) But for the stranger who merely resided in Wales and did not marry into any Welsh tribe the period of probation was _three times as long_—viz., the greatgrandson of the greatgrandson of his greatgrandson was the first to attain to full tribal privilege—

“Strangers and their progeny are adjudged to be aillts; also a reputed son who shall be denied and his progeny, and evildoers of federate country and their progeny, _unto the end of the ninth descent_.”(160)

_i.e._, the tenth man would no longer be reckoned an _aillt_ but a free Cymro.

The issue of a stranger obtains the privilege of a tribesman _in the fourth person_ by legitimate marriages.(161) But the aillt or stranger, who dwells in Cymru, does not attain until the _end of the ninth descent_.

So too inversely:—

The title to inherit by kin and descent in the tribal land and rights of his ancestors does not become extinct _till the ninth man_. The ninth man in descent from a banished tribesman coming home and finding his title as representative of his family seemingly extinguished, is to raise an outcry that from a proprietor he is becoming a nonproprietor, and the law will shelter him and adjudge him an equal share with the occupants he finds on the land. This is called the “outcry across the abyss.” The tenth man’s outcry cannot be heard. “Others say” that the ninth man is too late to raise the cry.(162)

This is exactly parallel to the case of the stranger resident in Cymru. For _nine_ generations he is a stranger, and in _the tenth_ a Cymro. Here for _nine_ generations is the Cymro abroad a tribesman, and in _the tenth_ he is a stranger.

(M82) From a passage in Deuteronomy it would appear that the qualifications for admission as a full tribesman amongst the Israelites were identical with those just mentioned.

The Israelites had purified themselves of the ancestor worship, that so long survived in Greece, and had, if one may say so, amalgamated all their minor deities and tribal superstitions in their one great monotheistic religion. Even then their tribal minds could not carry back their theology behind the known history of their own ancestors. Their God was the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and was in their conception the greatest of Gods—_i.e._, greater than the Gods of other peoples, the existence of which their own beliefs did not preclude. Thus where in Attic writers we have mention of the religious rites of the family (which a stranger or polluted man might not approach), and of the partaking therein as proof of the whole admission and pure blood of those present, so in Deuteronomy the expression “the Congregation of the Lord,” is used to denote that sacred precinct, forbidden to all save pure tribesmen of Israel.

It may be inferred from the following passage that if a stranger resided in Israel, and his family continued to do so for nine generations, the tenth generation would in any ordinary case be admitted to the Congregation of the Lord as full Israelites.

Deut. xxiii. 2 and 3. “A bastard, or an Ammonite, or Moabite shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord _even to their tenth generation_, for ever.”

(M83) In special cases (exactly as was the rule in Wales)—such as the Edomite who was partly akin already, and the Egyptian who was united to the Israelites by the mysterious bonds of hospitality—a shorter sojourn in the land was held to qualify for full tribal privilege.

Deut. xxiii. 7 and 8. “Thou shalt not abhor an Edomite, for he is thy brother: thou shalt not abhor an Egyptian, because thou wast a stranger in his land. The _children_ that are begotten of them shall enter into the congregation of the Lord _in their third generation_.”

The third generation of _children_ would be the _greatgrandchildren_ of the original settler, and this is just one third of the length of time implied as required from the ordinary stranger, who only attained the tribal privilege in the third succession of greatgrandchildren.

It is worth notice in this connection that the land of Canaan was divided up in the names of the _greatgrandchildren_ of Abraham, to whom the promise was made; Ephraim and Manasseh, the sons of Joseph, taking their place amongst the others by adoption as sons by their grandfather Jacob, on an equality with his other sons.(163)

(M84) These rules are not to be found with the same distinctness surviving at Athens, but there is a good deal of evidence showing how jealously the introduction of strangers to citizenship—which retained much that made it the later equivalent of the tribal bond—was regarded.

Strangers made citizens (formally, ceremoniously, and by public vote) by the Athenian people cannot hold office as archon or partake of a holy office (ἱεροσύνη); but their _children can_, if they are born from a citizen wife duly and lawfully betrothed.(164) That is to say, that the Athenians considered it necessary that there should be actually citizen blood in the veins of all who held office amongst them.(165)

(M85) The abhorrence in which the introduction of alien blood was held is illustrated by the Athenian law concerning marriage with aliens, quoted by Demosthenes in his speech against Neaera.

_Law_: “If an alien shall live as husband with an Athenian woman by any device or contrivance whatever, it shall be lawful for any of the Athenians who are possessed of such right, to indict him before the judges. And if he is convicted, he shall be sold for a slave and his property confiscated, and the third part shall belong to the person who has convicted him. And the like proceedings shall be taken if an alien woman live as wife with an Athenian citizen, and the citizen who lives as husband with an alien woman so convicted shall incur the penalty of 1,000 drachmæ.”

(M86) Citizenship was considered the highest of privileges, and was conferred only on persons worthy of great honour. Any citizen could bring an action against the newly-admitted stranger to test his real merits, and even after formal acceptance by the people of Athens, if he failed to justify his claims at such a trial, his new honours were stripped from him and he remained an alien. This being so, it cannot be expected in the comparison that he should rank with the ordinary resident in Cymru in the Welsh Laws, but rather as the chieftain whom the people wished to honour by admission to their tribe.

It is stated in the Welsh Laws that the _son_ of a stranger chief, to whom honour was to be given, entered the whole privilege of the tribe.

(M87) According to Aristotle,(166) candidates for archonship at Athens were asked their father’s name and his deme, their grandfather’s name and his deme, their mother’s and her father’s name and his deme;(167) whether the candidate had an Apollo Patroïos and Zeus Herkeios, and where these shrines were: also if he treated his parents well and paid his taxes.

In order to be perfectly sure that the candidate was of full and pure blood, they investigated the condition of both his grandparents, and, as further proof, assured themselves that he had a house and property of his own, and that too inherited from his ancestors. Furthermore, he must be guilty of no impiety towards his parents or the State.

If it were the case at Athens that the fourth generation from a stranger was considered as having attained to the rights of a citizen, it mattered little what a man’s _greatgrand_father was. He might have been an alien, yet if the intermediate ancestors were “in order,” the candidate would have acquired the full blood.(168)

(M88) In the _Oedipus Tyrannus_,(169) Sophocles apparently uses the expression “slave from the _third_ mother” as implying that three descents were considered to confirm the position of the fourth generation as slave or citizen, or whatever the case might be. Oedipus assures Jokasta that _her_ pedigree and status will remain unimpugned, even though the enquiry he is prosecuting establish him thrice-born a slave from slave mother, slave grandmother, and slave greatgrandmother.

In elections for sacred offices, which appear to have been about the last things laid open to the new citizen, the possession of three generations of privileged ancestors was in some places insisted on. There is an inscription to this effect belonging to Halikarnassos;(170) and some similar rule seems to have held good among the Jews.

“These sought their register among those that were reckoned by genealogy, but it was not found; therefore were they, as polluted, put from the priesthood (_ἠγχιστεύθησαν_ ἀπὸ τῆς ἱερατείας).”(171)

The book of Nehemiah closes with the triumphant verse: “Thus I cleansed them from all strangers.”

(M89) The rule in the _Ordinances of Manu_ for the recovery of Brahman caste is just halfway between the tenth and the fourth generations—namely, the seventh, or _greatgrandson of the greatgrandson_ of the first halfcaste. This is only the case when each generation marries a Brahman wife.

“If (the caste) produced from a Brahman by a Çudra woman keeps reproducing itself by nobler (marriage) this ignoble attains a noble family _at the seventh union_ (Yuga).”(172)

Thus:—

If (1) the halfcaste marries a Brahman woman and (2) his son do. (3) his grandson do. (4) his _greatgrandson_ do. (5) _his_ son do. (6) his grandson do. (7) his _greatgrandson_ do.—at last his family is restored to their lost high caste.

§ 5. Limitations Of Liability For Bloodshed.

(M90) The ἀγχιστεία, limited to relations within the same degrees as for other purposes, seems to be the unit in the case of pollution of the kindred by the death—violent or natural—of one of their number.

“Whosoever(173) being related to the deceased on the male or female side of those _within the cousinship_ (ἐντὸς ἀνεψιότητος), shall not prosecute the murderer when he ought and proclaim him outlaw, he shall take _upon himself_ the pollution and the hatred of the gods ... and he shall be in the power of any who is willing to avenge the dead....”(174)

“The pollution cannot be washed out until the homicidal soul which did the deed has given life for life and has propitiated and laid to sleep the wrath of the whole family” (ξυγγένεια).(175)

“If a brother wound a brother (ὁμόγονος) the parents (γεννῆται) and the kinsmen (συγγενεῖς) to _cousins’ children_ on male and female side shall meet and judge the case.”(176)

Ransom was forbidden; citizen was bound to citizen with ties that had inherited too much of the tribal sanctity to admit of any extenuation of the extreme penalty.

It was no doubt a wise policy on the part of the legislators, with the view to the preservation of respect for life and property, to make the responsibility for murder rest as widely as possible, and include as many relations and connections on both sides as might be. In order also that the wife, in case her husband was killed, and the daughter, in case her father was killed, might be fully protected and represented among the prosecuting kindred, the law of Draco seems to lay the necessity for action also on the father-in-law and the son-in-law. The _phratria_, being such a compact organisation and exacting such formal admission of its members, would naturally be concerned to see that justice was dealt to any of its number. Though we cannot include the _phratores_ amongst those directly responsible equally with the near kinsmen for crimes committed by one of their number, they would always have to take a certain part in whatever was necessary to bring him to justice, besides being generally concerned in all matters relating to kinship, which affected any member of their _phratria_.

(M91) “Proclamation shall be made against the murderer in the agora within [? his] cousinship and (the degree) of a first cousin, and prosecution shall be made jointly by cousins and _cousins’ children and descendants of cousins_, and sons-in-law and fathers-in-law and _phratores_.”

That Demosthenes here quotes a genuine law of Draco is proved by an inscription found at Athens belonging to the year 409 B.C., recording this sentence as part of the law of Draco about murder.(177)

In another place Demosthenes thus refers to the action of this law:—

“The law commands the relations to go forth and prosecute as far as descendants of cousins; and in the oath it is defined what the relationship actually is, etc.”(178)

The use of ἀνεψιαδοῖ in addition to ἀνεψιῶν παῖδες in Draco’s law above is emphatic as implying that as regards pollution the group of relations to second cousins were treated _en masse_ as under the stain; they had not yet, so to speak, reached the point where they could divide up their responsibility.

(M92) If the murder was committed within the narrow limits of the ἀγχιστεία itself, the double pollution of the bloodspilling and the blood spilled rested upon the whole group with overwhelming force.

Plato(179) treats of such a calamity and prescribes the remedy. If a man slay his wife, or she her husband, his children are orphans; their debt of maintenance to their parent is cancelled; he must flee; they possess his goods. If he is childless, his relations shall meet _to the children of his cousins_ on the male and female side (_i.e._ all his possible heirs) and shall elect not one of themselves, but a younger son of some other and pious family to bring in new blood with better fortune to counteract the curse, as heir to the house (κληρονόμος εἰς τὸν οἶκον), introducing him to the father of the banished (or deceased) man and to those further back in the family (τοῖς ἄνω τοῦ γένους), calling him their _son_, the continuer of their family (γεννήτωρ), their hearth-keeper (ἑστιοῦχος), and minister of their sacred rites.... But the guilty man they shall “let lie,” nameless, childless, portionless for ever.(180)

(M93) In the ancient Laws of Wales the blood-fine takes a very important position. But whereas all the relations of the murderer are liable to be called upon to pay the “Spearpenny,” as it is called, only the inner kindred within fixed degrees contribute proportionally to the payment of the price. The group upon which this responsibility falls is twice as large in the Welsh Laws as at Athens, and includes _fifth_ cousins, or the greatgrandchildren of greatgrandchildren of a common ancestor.

The Dimetian Code describes the relations who pay galanas as follows.(181) Those beyond only pay “spearpenny.”

Father and mother. Grandfather. Greatgrandfather. Brother and sister. First cousins. Second cousins. Third cousins. Fourth cousins. Fifth cousins.

According to the Gwentian Code, _fifth_ cousins share. “There is no proper share, no proper name in kin further than that.”(182)

The Venedotian Code states that galanas is paid by the kindred: two parts by the relations of the father, one part by the relations of the mother, to _sixth cousins_. All kindred after sixth cousins pay spearpenny.(183)

The sixth cousin is also called “kinsman son of a fifth cousin, and then _the father (i.e. the fifth cousin) pays it_, because his relationship can be fixed, _but the relationship of his son to the murderer cannot_.”

(M94) The defilement of carrying out a corpse and assisting at a funeral also covered the same area of relationship at Athens—_i.e._ the ἀγχιστεία. The house of the dead man was only to be entered by those naturally polluted.

“After the funeral no woman to enter the house save only _those defiled_; to wit—mother, wife, sisters, and daughters; beside these not more than five women and two girls, _daughters of first cousins_: beyond these, none.”(184)

Demosthenes quotes the law of Solon to the effect that—

“No woman under sixty years old to enter the house or follow the corpse except those within ἀνεψιαδοῖ (πλὴν ὅσαι ἐντὸς ἀνεψιαδῶν εἰσιν): no woman _at all_ may enter the house after the carrying out of the corpse except _those within_ ἀνεψιαδοῖ.”(185)

All those near of kin assist in the funeral.

The payment of the blood-fine by the whole family of the murderer was considered necessary to allay the vengeance and anger of the family of the murdered man within the same area of relationship. In Wales the members of the family who received the galanas, did so in proportion to the importance of their position in the transmission of the kindred blood, according to a classification identical with their proximity in relationship to the dead man, and their expectation of inheritance from him or succession to his place.

(M95) The inclusion of the mother’s relatives and their liability in these circumstances, in addition to the paternal relations, follow naturally enough in Wales as in Greece when once the transmission of inheritance through a woman, in default of male heirs, had become a recognised possibility. A woman’s sons might always be called upon under certain circumstances to take inheritance from _her_ father or next of kin. They therefore quite fairly shared in the claims as well as the privileges of their position. And _vice versa_, in exchange for the priceless guarantee of continuity provided by a woman’s offspring to her relations, they too would be prepared to undergo a part of the penalties incurred by any of those who might rank some day as their next of kin, or as their sons.

This view of the source of their recognition as members of the kindred responsible for the blood-fine in Wales is confirmed by a statement in the Venedotian Code.(186) Those women and clerks who can swear that they will never have children, and so are useless for the preservation of continuity in the families to which they belong, are specially exempted from contribution to the galanas, inasmuch as they have forsworn the privilege of attaining through posterity a share in the immortality on earth of their kindred.