ii. 300), "ist nämlich keine eigene Vorstellung neben den anderen

(es gibt keine eigenen 'Gefühlsvorstellungen'), ja überhaupt gar keine Vorstellung." Professor Bain's view is different, but does not altogether prevent him from acknowledging the subjectivity of feeling: "Without intellectual images clearly recollected, we do not remember feelings; the reproduction of feeling is an intellectual fact, and the groundwork is intellectual imagery."--Emotions, p. 63.

[178] Cf. Green, Introduction to Hume, ii. § 7.

[179] Cf. Spinoza, Ethica, iii. 11, schol.; Hobbes, Leviathan, i. 6, p. 25; Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, p. 283. Professor Bain's statement is carefully guarded: "A very considerable number of the facts may be brought under the following principle--namely, that states of pleasure are connected with an increase, and states of pain with an abatement, of some, or all, of the vital functions."

[180] As Mr Spencer allows, Psychology, § 126, i. 284: "In the case of mankind, then, there has arisen, and must long continue, a deep and involved derangement of the natural connections between pleasures and beneficial actions, and between pains and detrimental actions."

[181] The Senses and the Intellect, p. 286. The Law of Conservation is incomplete, Mr Bain holds, and must be supplemented by the Law of Stimulation (p. 294).

[182] Spencer, Psychology, § 123, i. 277: "Generally speaking, then, pleasures are the concomitants of medium activities, where the activities are of kinds liable to be in excess or in defect; and where they are of kinds not liable to be excessive, pleasure increases as the activity increases, except where the activity is either constant or involuntary."

[183] Hamilton, Lectures, ii. 440: "Pleasure is the reflex of the spontaneous and unimpeded exertion of a power of whose energies we are conscious. Pain, a reflex of the overstrained or repressed exertion of such a power." Cf. Aristotle, Eth. N., vii. 12, p. 1153 a 14, x. 4, p. 1174 b 20.

[184] Théorie scientifique, p. 78.

[185] Cf. Wundt, Physiol. Psych., p. 470; Fechner, Vorschule der Aesthetik, ii. 243 f.

[186] Exam. of Hamilton's Philosophy, 5th ed., p. 559.

[187] See Fechner, _loc. cit._

[188] Social Statics, p. 79.

[189] Data of Ethics, p. 186.

[190] Mind, vi. 85.