Chapter 14

Hence S. Denis assigns to the Angels circular motion in that they uniformly and unceasingly, without beginning or end, gaze upon God; just as circular motion, which has neither beginning nor end, is uniformly maintained round the same central point. But in the case of the human soul, its twofold lack of uniformity must be removed before it can attain to the above-mentioned uniformity. For there must first be removed that lack of uniformity which arises from the diversity of external things: that is, the soul must quit external things. And this S. Denis expresses first of all in his definition of the circular motion of the soul when he speaks of "the return of the soul upon itself as opposed to external things." And there must be removed in the second place that second lack of uniformity which arises from the discursive action of the reason. And this takes place when all the operations of the soul are reduced to the simple contemplation of intelligible truth. This forms the second part of S. Denis's definition of this circular motion--namely, when he speaks of the necessity of "a certain wrapping together of the powers of the soul," with the result that, when discursive action thus ceases, the soul's gaze is fixed on the contemplation of the one simple truth. And in this operation of the soul there is no room for error, just as there is no room for error in our understanding of first principles which we know by simple intuition.

Then, when these first two steps have been taken, S. Denis puts in the third place that uniformity, like to that of the Angels, by which the soul, laying aside all else, persists in the simple contemplation of God. And this he expresses when he says: "Then, as now made uniform, it, as a whole"--that is, as conformed (to God)--"is, with all its powers unified, led by the hand to the Beautiful and the Good."

But the _direct_ motion in the Angels cannot be understood in the sense that, by considering, they proceed from one point to another; but solely according to the order of their providential care for others--according, namely, as the superior Angels illumine the inferior through those who stand between. And this is what S. Denis means when he says that the _direct_ motion of an Angel is "according as he proceeds to the care of the things subject to him, taking in his course all things that are direct" following--that is, those things which are disposed in direct order. But to the human soul S. Denis assigns _direct_ motion in the sense that it proceeds from the exterior things of sense to the knowledge of intelligible things.

And he assigns _oblique_ motion to the Angels--a motion, that is, compounded of the _direct_ and the _circular_--inasmuch as an Angel, according to his contemplation of God, provides for those inferior to him. To the human soul, on the contrary, he assigns this same _oblique_ motion, similarly compounded of the _direct_ and the _circular_ motions, inasmuch as in its reasonings it makes use of the Divine illuminations.

3. Lastly, Richard of S. Victor[382] gives many other and different kinds of motion. For, following the analogy of the birds of the air, he says of these latter that "some at one time ascend on high, at another swoop down to earth, and they do this again and again; others turn now to the right, now to the left, and this repeatedly; others go in advance, others fall behind; some sail round and round in circles, now narrower and now wider; while others again remain almost immovably suspended in one place." From all which it would seem that there are not merely three movements in contemplation.

But all these diversities of motion which are expressed by, up and down, to right and left, backwards and forwards, and in varying circles, are reducible either to _direct_ or to _oblique_ motion, for they all signify the discursive action of the reason. For if this discursive action be from the genus to the species or from the whole to the part, it will be, as Richard of S. Victor himself explains, motion upwards and downwards. If, again, it means argumentation from one thing to its opposite, it will come under motion to right and left. Or if it be deduction from cause to effect, then it will be motion backwards and forwards. And finally, if it mean arguing from the accidents which surround a thing, whether nearly or remotely, it will be circuitous motion. But the discursive action of the reason arguing from the things of sense to intelligible things according to the orderly progress of the natural reason, belongs to _direct_ motion. When, however, it arises from Divine illuminations, it comes under _oblique_ motion, as we have already said (in the reply to the second argument). Lastly, only the immobility which he mentions will come under _circular_ motion.

Whence it appears that S. Denis has quite sufficiently, and with exceeding subtlety, described the movements of contemplation.

"For behold my witness is in Heaven, and He that knoweth my conscience is on high. For behold short years pass away, and I am walking in a path by which I shall not return."[383]

VII

Has Contemplation its Joys?

In Wisdom viii. 16 we read: _Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor Her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness._ And S. Gregory says[384]: "The contemplative life means a truly lovable sweetness."

There are two sources of pleasure in contemplation; for, firstly, there is the very act of contemplating, and everyone finds a certain pleasure in the performance of acts which are appropriate to his nature or to his habits. And the contemplation of truth is natural to man as a rational animal; hence it is that "all men naturally desire to know," and consequently find a pleasure in the knowledge of truth. And this pleasure is enhanced according as a man has habits of wisdom and knowledge which enable him to indulge in contemplation without difficulty.

Secondly, contemplation is pleasurable owing to the object which we contemplate, as when a man looks at something which he loves. And this holds good of even bodily vision, for not only is the mere exercise of the visual faculties pleasurable, but the seeing people whom we love is pleasurable.

Since, then, the contemplative life especially consists in the contemplation of God, to which contemplation we are moved by charity, it follows that the contemplative life is not merely pleasurable by reason of the simple act of contemplating, but also by reason of Divine Love Itself. And in both these respects the delights of contemplation exceed all other human delights. For on the one hand spiritual delights are superior to carnal delights; and on the other hand, the love of Divine charity wherewith we love God exceeds all other love; whence it is said in the Psalm: _Taste and see that the Lord is sweet._[385]

Some maintain, however, that contemplation is not pleasurable, thus:

1. Pleasure belongs to the appetitive powers, whereas contemplation is mainly in the intellect.

But while the contemplative life mainly consists in the intellect, it derives its principle from the affective powers, since a man is moved to contemplation by love of God. And since the end corresponds to the principle, it follows that the goal and term of the contemplative life is in the affective powers, in the sense, namely, that a man finds a pleasure in the sight of a thing which he loves, and this very pleasure stirs up in him a yet greater love. Hence S. Gregory says[386]: "When a man sees one whom he loves his love is yet more enkindled." And in this lies the full perfection of the contemplative life: that the Divine Truth should not only be seen but loved.

2. Again, strife and contention hinder delight. But in contemplation there is strife and contention, for S. Gregory says[387]: "The soul, when it strives after the contemplation of God, finds itself engaged in a species of combat; at one time it seems to prevail, for by understanding and by feeling it tastes somewhat of the Infinite Light; at other times it is overwhelmed, for when it has tasted it faints."

It is true indeed that contest and strife arising from the opposition presented by external things prevent us from finding pleasure in those same things. For no man finds a pleasure in the things against which he fights. But he does find a pleasure, other things being equal, in the actual attainment of a thing for which he has striven; thus S. Augustine says[388]: "The greater the danger in the battle, the greater the joy in the triumph." And in contemplation the strife and the combat do not arise from any opposition on the part of the truth which we contemplate, but from our deficient understanding and from the corruptible nature of our bodies which ever draw us down to things beneath us: _The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon many things._[389] Hence it is that when a man attains to the contemplation of truth he loves it still more ardently; but at the same time he more than ever hates his own defects and the sluggishness of his corruptible body, so that with the Apostle he cries out: _Unhappy man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?_[390] Hence, too, S. Gregory says: "When God is known by our desires and our understanding, He causes all pleasures of the flesh to wither up within us."[391]

3. But again, delight follows upon a perfect work.[392] But contemplation on this earth is imperfect, according to the words of the Apostle: _We see now through a glass in a dark manner._[393] Hence it would seem that the contemplative life does not afford delight.

It is indeed true that the contemplation of God during this life is imperfect compared with our contemplation of Him in our eternal home; and in the same way it is true that the delights of contemplation here on earth are imperfect compared with the delights of contemplation in that home, of which latter joys the Psalmist says: _Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure._[394] Yet, none the less, the contemplation of Divine things here on earth is, although imperfect, far more perfect than any other subject of contemplation howsoever perfect it may be, and this by reason of the excellence of what we contemplate. Whence the Philosopher says[395]: "It may indeed be the case that with regard to such noble existences and Divine substances we have to be content with insignificant theories, yet even though we but barely touch upon them, none the less so ennobling is such knowledge that it affords us greater delight than any other which is accessible to us." Hence, too, S. Gregory says: "The contemplative life has its most desirable sweetness which uplifts the soul above itself, opens the way to heavenly things, and makes spiritual things plain to the eyes of the soul."

4. Lastly, bodily injuries are a hindrance to delight. But contemplation is productive of bodily injuries, for we read in Genesis[396] that Jacob, after saying _I have seen God face to face, ... halted on his foot ... because He touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank_. Whence it would seem that the contemplative life is not pleasurable.

But after that contemplation Jacob halted on one foot because, as S. Gregory says, "it must needs be that as the love of this world grows weaker, so a man grows stronger in his love of God," and consequently, "when once we have known the sweetness of God, one of our feet remains sound while the other halts; for a man who halts with one foot leans only on the one that is sound."[397]

"Tu esto nostrum gaudium Qui es futurus Præmium. Sit nostra in Te gloria Per cuncta semper sæcula!"

* * * * *

_S. Gregory:_ Between the delights of the body and those of the heart there is ever this difference that the delights of the body are wont, when we have them not, to beget a keen yearning for them; but when we have them and eat our fill, they straightway beget disgust for them, for we are sated therewith. Spiritual joys, on the contrary, when we have them not are a weariness, but when we have them we desire them still more, and the more we feed upon them the more we hunger after them. In the case of the former, the yearning for them was a pleasure, trial of them brought disgust. In the case of the latter, in desire we held them cheap, trial of them proved a source of pleasure. For spiritual joys increase the soul's desire of them even while they sate us, for the more their savour is perceived, the more we know what it is we ought eagerly to love. Whence it comes to pass that when we have them not we cannot love them, for their savour is unknown to us. For how can a man love what he is ignorant of? Wherefore the Psalmist admonishes us, saying: _O taste and see that the Lord is sweet!_[398] As though he would say to us in plain terms: You know not His sweetness if ye have never tasted it; touch, then, the Food of Life with the palate of your soul that so, making proof of Its sweetness, ye may be able to love It.

These joys man lost when he sinned in Paradise; he went out when he closed his mouth to the Food of Eternal Sweetness. Whence we too, who are born amidst the toils of this pilgrimage, come without relish to this Food; we know not what we ought to desire, and the sickness of our disgust grows the more the further our souls keep away from feeding upon that Sweetness; and less and less does our soul desire those interior joys the longer it has grown accustomed to do without them. We sicken, then, by reason of our very disgust, and we are wearied by the long-drawn sickness of our hunger (_Hom._ XXXVI., _On the Gospels_).

VIII

Is the Contemplative Life lasting?

The Lord said _Mary hath chosen the best part which shall not be taken away from her_[399] because, as S. Gregory says: "Contemplation begins here below that it may be perfected in our heavenly home."

A thing may be termed "lasting" in two ways: from its very nature, or as far as we are concerned. As far as its nature is concerned, the contemplative life is lasting in two ways: for first of all it is concerned with incorruptible and unchangeable things, and in the second place there is nothing which is its contrary: for, as Aristotle says[400]: "To the pleasure which is derived from thought there is no contrary."

And also as far as we are concerned the contemplative life is lasting; and this both because it comes under the action of the incorruptible portion of our soul--namely, our intellect--and so can last after this life; and also because in the work of the contemplative life there is no bodily toil, and we can consequently apply ourselves more continuously to such work, as also the Philosopher remarks.[401]

Some, however, argue that the contemplative life is not lasting, thus:

1. The contemplative life essentially concerns the intellect. But all the intellectual perfections of this life will be _made void_, as we read: _Whether prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge shall be destroyed._[402]

But the fashion of contemplation here and in our Father's home is not the same; and the contemplative life is said "to last" by reason of charity, which is both its principle and its end; wherefore S. Gregory says: "The contemplative life begins here below that it may be perfected in our heavenly home, for the fire of love which begins to burn here below, when it sees Him Whom it loves, burns yet more strongly with love of Him."

2. Again, men but taste the sweetness of contemplation here, snatching at it, as it were, and in passing: whence S. Augustine says: "Thou introducest me to a most unwonted affection within me, to an unspeakable sweetness; yet I fall back again as though dragged down by a grievous weight!"[403] And S. Gregory, expounding those words of Job, _When a spirit passed before me_, says: "The mind does not long remain steadfastly occupied with the sweetness of intimate contemplation, for it is recalled to itself, stricken back by the immensity of that Light." The contemplative life, then, is not lasting.

It is true indeed that no action can remain long at the pitch of its intensity. And the goal of contemplation is to attain to the uniformity of Divine contemplation, as Denis the Areopagite says.[404] Hence, although in this sense contemplation cannot last long, yet it can last long as regards its other acts.

3. Lastly, what is not natural to a man cannot be lasting. "But the contemplative life," as the Philosopher says, "is beyond man."[405]

But the Philosopher says that the contemplative life is "beyond man" in the sense that it belongs to us according to what is Divine in us--namely, our intellect; for our intellect is incorruptible and impassible in itself, and consequently its action can be more lasting.

* * * * *

_S. Augustine:_ This day sets before us the great mystery of our eternal beatitude. For that life which this day signifies will not pass away as to-day is to pass away. Wherefore, brethren, we exhort and beseech you by the Name of our Lord Jesus Christ by Whom our sins are forgiven, by Him Who willed that His Blood should be our ransom, by Him Who has deigned that we who are not deserving to be called His slaves should yet be called His brethren--we beseech you that your entire aim, that which gives you your very name of "Christian," and by reason of which you bear His Name upon your foreheads and in your hearts, may be directed solely to that life which we are to share with the Angels; that life where is to be unending repose, everlasting joy, unfailing happiness, rest without disturbance, joy without sadness, no death. What that life is none can know save those who have made trial of it; and none can make trial of it save those who have faith (_Sermon_, CCLIX., _On Low Sunday_).

"And thou shalt say in that day: I will give thanks to Thee, O Lord, for Thou wast angry with me: Thy wrath is turned away, and Thou hast comforted me. Behold, God is my Saviour. I will deal confidently, and will not fear: because the Lord is my strength, and my praise, and He is become my salvation. You shall draw waters with joy out of the Saviour's fountains: And you shall say in that day: Praise ye the Lord, and call upon His Name: make His works known among the people: remember that His Name is high. Sing ye to the Lord, for He hath done great things: shew this forth in all the earth. Rejoice, and praise, O thou habitation of Sion: for great is He that is in the midst of thee, the holy One of Israel."[406]

FOOTNOTES:

[316] _Moralia in Job_, vi. 18.

[317] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.

[318] _Metaphysics_, ii. 3.

[319] _Moralia in Job_, vi. 18; and _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.

[320] _On Ezechiel, loc. cit._

[321] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.

[322] Isa. xxxiii. 13-17.

[323] Ps. xli. 1-6.

[324] _Moralia in Job_, vi. 18.

[325] _Ethics_, II., iv. 3.

[326] _Ibid._, X., viii. 1.

[327] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.

[328] Rom. xiii. 10.

[329] S. Matt. v. 8.

[330] Heb. xii. 14.

[331] Isa. xxxii. 17.

[332] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.

[333] Gen. xxix. 17.

[334] _De Officiis_, i. 43, 45, 46.

[335] Wisd. viii. 2.

[336] _Soliloquies_, i. 10.

[337] Jer. xiv. 8, 9.

[338] _Of the Divine Names_, vii. 2.

[339] _On Contemplation_, i. 3 and 4.

[340] _De Trinitate_, xiv. 7.

[341] _De Consideratione_, ii. 2.

[342] _De Anima_, II., i. 2.

[343] _Loc. cit._, i. 4.

[344] 2 Cor. iii. 18.

[345] _De Trinitate_, xv. 8.

[346] _De Consideratione_, v. 14.

[347] _De Fide Orthodoxa_, ii. 15.

[348] S. Luke x. 39.

[349] Wisd. vii. 7.

[350] 2 Cor. v. 6-7.

[351] Hab. ii. 4.

[352] Ps. cxliii. 15.

[353] 1 Tim. i. 5.

[354] Ps. lxxii. 21-28.

[355] _Moralia in Job_, vi. 28.

[356] _On the Trinity_, i. 8.

[357] _Ethics_, X., vii. 2.

[358] Rom. i. 20.

[359] _De Vera Religione_, xxix.

[360] Ps. cxlii. 5, 6.

[361] _De Consideratione_, v. 14.

[362] _Of Contemplation_, i. 6.

[363] 1 John iii. 2.

[364] Ps. xxvi. 4.

[365] Ps. xxxv. 9, 10.

[366] Phil. iv. 7; Rom. viii. 26.

[367] Isa. xxv. 8, 9.

[368] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.

[369] _De Genesi ad Litt._, xii. 27.

[370] Gen. xxxii. 30.

[371] _Epistola I., to Caius the Monk._

[372] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.

[373] The _Glossa Ordinaria_, taken from S. Gregory's _Moralia in Job_, xxiv. 5.

[374] _Moralia_, vi. 27.

[375] _De Anima_, III., vii. 3.

[376] _Dialogues_, ii. 35.

[377] Isa. xxvi. 3, 4, 8, 9.

[378] _Of the Divine Names_, IV., i. 7.

[379] _De Anima_, III., vii. 1 and 2.

[380] _Physica_, VIII., vii. 2.

[381] viii. 16.

[382] _Of Contemplation_, i. 5.

[383] Job xvi. 20, 23.

[384] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.

[385] Ps. xxxiii. 9.

[386] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.

[387] _Ibid._

[388] _Conf._, viii. 3.

[389] Wisd. ix. 15.

[390] Rom. vii. 24.

[391] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.

[392] _Ethics_, X., iv. 6.

[393] 1 Cor. xiii, 12.

[394] Ps. xxxv. 9.

[395] _De Partibus Animalium_, i. 5.

[396] xxxii. 30-32.

[397] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.

[398] Ps. xxxiii. 9.

[399] S. Luke x. 42.

[400] _Topics_, I., xiii. 5.

[401] _Ethics_, X., vii. 2.

[402] 1 Cor. xiii. 8.

[403] _Conf._, x. 40.

[404] _Of the Divine Names_, IV., i. 7; and _Of the Heavenly Hierarchy_, iii.

[405] _Ethics_, X., vii. 8.

[406] Isa. xii. 1-6.

QUESTION CLXXXI

OF THE ACTIVE LIFE

I. Do all Acts of the Moral Virtues come under the Active Life? II. Does Prudence pertain to the Active Life? III. Does Teaching belong to the Active or to the Contemplative Life? IV. Does the Active Life continue after this Life?

I

Do all Acts of the Moral Virtues come under the Active Life?

S. Isidore says[407]: "In the active life all the vices are first of all to be removed by the practice of good works, so that in the contemplative life a man may, with now purified mental gaze, pass to the contemplation of the Divine Light." But all the vices can only be removed by the acts of the moral virtues. Consequently the acts of the moral virtues belong to the active life.

As we have said already,[408] the active and the contemplative lives are distinguished by the different occupations of men who are aiming at different ends, one being the consideration of Truth--the goal of the contemplative life; the other external works with which the active life is occupied. But it is clear that the moral virtues are not especially concerned with the contemplation of truth but with action; thus the Philosopher says[409]: "For virtue, knowledge is of little or no avail." It is therefore manifest that the moral virtues essentially belong to the active life; and in accordance with this the Philosopher[410] refers the moral virtues to active happiness.

Some, however, maintain that all the acts of the moral virtues do not belong to the active life, thus:

1. The active life seems to consist solely in those things which have to do with our neighbour; for S. Gregory says[411]: "The active life means breaking bread to the hungry;" and at the close, after enumerating many things which have to do with our neighbour, he adds: "And to provide for each according as they have need." But not by all the acts of the moral virtues are we brought into contact with others, but only by justice and its divisions. Consequently all the acts of the moral virtues do not belong to the active life.