Part 2

The curious part of this matter is that I do not remember that I ever had occasion to mention this incident in public until the year 1888, when I was Department Commander of the G. A. R. in New Jersey, and at a Camp Fire in Freehold in the Opera House before a very large audience and an attentive one, I related it. Upon stating just as I have now, and saying that I turned those colors over finally to the rallying regiment, a tall, white-haired man with a long, drooping white moustache rising from the centre of the audience said: "That is exactly true, I am the man, and here is the wound," and drawing aside his moustache he showed that his lips had been almost entirely cut off which was the wound of which I have spoken and he was the color bearer of our Second Regiment, who had turned the colors over to me at the Battle of Gaines' Mills. An account of this curious incident was published in the Freehold papers the following day.

As the brigade retreated from the woods we saw a melancholy sight of our guns of the artillery of our division being captured, and we also had a glimpse of the rushing to and fro of a small body of cavalry which is known to be Rush's Lancers, Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry. Twenty-one of those guns were lost right there, and I wish to say that our brigade was not at any time placed in support of these guns directly.

The last I saw of the Union Coffee Mills guns they were in a mass together in a little rise of the ground about two hundred yards back of our line and this was when we were retreating. I have always understood here that Sergeant Dalzell, who was the color bearer of the Third Regiment, was with these guns at that time.

After returning the colors to a group of the Second Regiment which was the nucleus of the new line and which line was forming very rapidly, for the men were not running away in a panic at all, and after Gen. Taylor got in front of them and called them to rally, they did rally and at once. It was then getting quite dusk and on the right of our brigade there came up a brigade from the direction of the Chickahominy and this I found to be Gen. Meagher's Irish Brigade. This brigade went into position of the right of our line, and I want to say that our line was formed before that brigade came up, and of this I am positive.

While our line was forming, men came in from the front and took position, regardless of what regiment they belonged and in that line there were a great many men of other regiments besides the Jersey Regiments. Gen. Taylor told me to go to the left and help anybody form the line down to the river, and this I did. Assisting several general officers whose names I did not know, and about dark there was quite a good line formed. The left of which extended almost to the river if not quite there. There were a few pieces of artillery in this line on the left and some few cavalry. The enemy came out of the woods immediately after the brigade retreated through the woods, a very solid, good formation, but after taking the guns which I have spoken of, for some extraordinary reason they did not come on any farther, and why I have never been able to ascertain from any account of this battle that I have ever read. There was no military reason that any one can see why a charge by the enemy along the line, or at any part of it, after Gen. Porter's line of battle was broken should not have been entirely and absolutely successful.

There is no question that our brigade and others would have fought on that last line, but I think that it would have been a forlorn hope. The battle was totally lost and every man knew it.

The enemy did not advance, and after dark the troops commenced to retire across the bridges in our rear. These bridges were small, frail things not much wider than four men could march abreast.

In the rear of the entire left of the new line of which I spoke, there was only one of them. The orders to withdraw our brigade came to General Taylor about quarter of nine o'clock. The enemy had been firing slowly with artillery and undoubtedly endeavoring to strike the bridges and many of their shot came close to the bridge heads, but I do not think that any of them struck the bridge itself.

Just at nine o'clock as the Third Regiment was going over the bridge and the General and myself were riding with it, just before we came to the bridge head Lieutenant Howell of Company I, of the Third Regiment, who was one of my dearest personal friends, came out of the ranks and shook hands with me saying how glad he was that we were both alive. He walked a few paces and turned there to say something else to me or to some of his company, and a round shot that was fired by the enemy's gun struck him full in the breast and literally tore him to pieces.

The brigade crossed the bridge and returned to its camp which they left in the morning not far from the Fair Oaks battlefield which it reached about ten o'clock that night. This was one of the most sorrowful nights that I ever remember. We had lost a great battle, which every man and officer knew should never have been fought in that way, and at that place, and every one of us lost dear friends and companions and what was worse their mangled bodies were at the tender mercy of the enemy. Only a few wounded men escaped and what few we did get away were taken to the field hospital at Savage Station and fell into the hands of the enemy there. This battle was a stupendous military error from beginning to end. History shows now and our military leaders should have known then, that, after the battle of Mechanicsville, the day before, in which the enemy suffered severe repulse, the right wing of our army should have been withdrawn that night to the south of the Chickahominy River, and under no circumstances should have been allowed to wait, in that false position in which they met the fierce assault of the forty thousand fresh troops of Stonewall Jackson, who was then coming through the valley, and was known to be coming, and who struck us hard in the place where we were without entrenchments and without support, on the afternoon of the 27th of June. Any one who reads history cannot fail to see that General McClellan's fatal mistake in his Chickahominy campaign was that he did not advance with his whole force on Richmond after he had practically won the battle of Fair Oaks.

The next morning the sorrowful duty of burying the knap-sacks of the Fourth Regiment to which I have alluded, was performed, and I was detailed to see that this was done, and I did so and I think I can find the place, although I have never tried to. The next day the brigade moved to Savage Station and after a short halt moved on towards White Oak Swamp. During this halt at Savage Station many of us visited the field hospitals in which were the wounded whom we had been able to bring from the Gaines' Mills fight, and many wounded men who had been in that battle were in tents scattered around the ground of the station house, and here I paid a last farewell to many a dear friend, among them Lieutenant Wm. Evans of Company B of the Third Regiment, one of the most devoted friends of my life, who was shot through the upper part of the left lung and died within twenty-four hours after we left him. I pushed into his jacket as I said good-bye, all the money I had, not more than six or seven dollars except one silver ten cent piece, and this also I parted with near Malvern Hill as I shall relate.

When the brigade reached the first bridge from the White Oak Swamp it was halted and General Taylor was told by an aid of General Slocum's that we were to be the rear division of the army, and that he must keep himself in touch with Division Headquarters wherever they were. This order caused me to ride a great many miles, for I had two horses and they were both kept pretty busy. As we reached the bridge head, of course it was a very small bridge, there was a very heavy cannonade apparently across our front about half a mile away. I was sent to see what it was and found that the enemy had opened a battery or several batteries on a pack of our wagons which had in some way become exposed to them. The hill country was covered thickly with trees and underbrush. There were very few clearings and scarcely any high ground, and it was very difficult to see what was going on. I could see, however, that there was a great panic among the teamsters and that the wagons were being deserted, and the wagoners riding off on the mules and horses of the teams. Presently our line of skirmishers appeared facing the southwest and at that time the head of our column was facing the east, so the position was very much mixed. The skirmishers advanced towards the Rebel batteries very rapidly, and while I was looking on the batteries withdrew. I went back and reported to General Taylor and drew a diagram of what I had seen and gave it to him, and told him I was utterly unable to understand the positions, but that these were facts. An aid of General Slocum's came up with orders to cross the bridge and turn sharply to the right which would cause us to march about due south. This we did for probably a mile or more and then came to a fairly good bridge across White Oak Creek and this the brigade crossed. After crossing, the creek here ran through a ravine the sides of which were quite precipitous, the road down to the bridge on one side and up on the other being very steep. An aid of General Slocum's told General Taylor that our brigade was now the rear of the army, that there was a piece of our artillery on the north side of the creek, that he expected General Taylor to look after it when the pickets and skirmishers were withdrawn. After awhile, probably half an hour, some of the pickets commenced to come across the bridge, and having nothing to do I thought I would go across the bridge and see where that piece of artillery was. I found it on top of the hill about five hundred yards from the bridge in good position commanding the road. The officer in charge was a lieutenant of Williston's battery whom I knew very well. He asked me if I had any orders for him, when I said no, he said he would like to have an order.

So after a little while I went back to the brigade. The pickets and skirmishers were coming across the bridge and after a while a few of our cavalry came across and after that the pioneers commenced to destroy the bridge by hewing through the timbers. We were lying down and resting on the top of the hill on the south side of the ravine when I saw the pioneers commence to cut the bridge to pieces. I said to General Taylor: "Why that gun is over on the other side." He said, "How do you know it is?" I said: "Why I saw it half an hour ago." He used a very strong expression, pulling his moustache and told me to tell our lieutenant to "get out of that as quick as the Lord would let him." So I ran down and stopped the men from cutting the bridge, ran up the other side and told the officer of the gun what the general had said. They were all ready and sitting on their horses but had had no order to move. The enemy's skirmishers who were coming on had fired several shots at them, and I must say that I never saw a gun go down a hill more rapidly than that did. To make a long story short they got the gun over all right, and the enemy's skirmishers shot at our pioneers while they were cutting the bridge. This was a curious, but as it turned out, a very fortunate occurrence, for history shows that these were Stonewall Jackson's men, and that Jackson with a heavy force was behind them. They reported that this bridge was held strongly with artillery and infantry, and this report made such an impression upon Jackson that he did not attempt to force the passage of the creek at that place. Why he did not cross the creek at a ford about a mile further up of which he should have known, historians on both sides have never discovered; but that Jackson's delay on that occasion, at that spot and his counter march gave McClellan the opportunity to withdraw his armies successfully to Malvern Hill, is the opinion of all authorities whom I have read upon the subject.

This was about two o'clock in the afternoon, it must be remembered that this was when the days were long and also very hot. In half an hour we received orders to march and move south along the White Oak road towards Charles City crossroads. After marching about two miles we were halted and the men were directed to rest along the east side of the road which was well wooded on the east side, and on the west side were several quite large clearings. I am sure that General Taylor was not informed that we were occupying the line of battle, and I am sure that General Torbert, who was then colonel of the First Regiment, did not know this until several years after, but it is a fact that we were a part of the line and an exceedingly important part. While we were lying down along the edge of the road an aid of General Slocum's rode by and told General Taylor that General Slocum's headquarters were in the field on the left or east side of the road about five hundred yards ahead of us, and that was all he said to him, for I heard it, and he then rode away. In about fifteen minutes the enemy opened with about sixty pieces of artillery, firing across the road in front of us and gradually increasing the rapidity of the firing until it was the most tremendous cannonade I had ever heard. No enemy was visible to us anywhere, the smoke of those guns came over the edge of the woods probably eight hundred yards from the road, and a few hundred yards further along the right of the brigade. None of those shells came across where we were. While the cannonade was at its height, and of course such a cannonade as this is always the precursor of a charge of a line of battle, General Taylor said that he must have some orders from General Slocum's headquarters as he did not know what was wanted of him, so he said: "Grubb, ride to General Slocum's headquarters and ask him what he wants me to do." I had then one of the most terrible experiences that I ever had under artillery fire, and what is more, I had two of them, for I rode down that road across that line of firing, and I think I came nearer being killed by the flying pieces of fence rails and pieces of trees than by the shells. I found the oak tree, but I did not find General Slocum, and I came back to General Taylor, really very much bewildered by the terrible fire, and told him that General Slocum was not where he said. He merely said: "Go back and find him." And I had to do what I should have done, of course, at first. It must be remembered that I was only a little over nineteen years of age. I finally did find General Slocum more than half a mile from where I was told he would be, and a very heavy infantry fight going on in front of him. I told him what General Taylor had said. He did not even look at me but simply said: "When I want him I will let him know." Which I had the pleasure of repeating to General Taylor word for word. The last time I came down the road the cannonade had almost died out, and the infantry fighting about opposite to where I had seen General Slocum was very severe. The corps engaged, it turned out, was the Third Corps and the division on its left which was of course next to our right because we were right in front in column and had been marching south when we halted, was General Phil. Kearney's division and commanded by General Phil. Kearney in person. Now it will be seen that our brigade being in column of four right in front under the old tactics to have formed a line of battle the order would have been given front, and all the men would have turned to the left which would have brought their backs to the enemy, as the enemy was on our right or west side. To have formed the line of battle we would have had to have faced by the rear rank, and while that did not make much difference in merely forming the line, only so far as the file closers were concerned, any subsequent manoeuvers from that formation would become exceedingly complicated; and I doubt whether any of the regiments of the First Brigade at that time could have successfully performed those manoeuvers. These were some of the difficulties which the Upton's tactics subsequently adopted, aimed to obviate and did so.

General Kearney was the idol and hero of our brigade from the time we first saw him. He and all his staff were well known to every man and officer of us; and when Captain Moore of Kearney's staff came riding down the road waving his hat and calling out that General Kearney had lost a battery, and wanted the Jersey Brigade to help him get it back, it seemed to me that the whole brigade heard him because I am sure that no orders were given to do that which occurred, and I had barely time to scramble on my horse and join in the rushing throng. General Taylor called to me as I passed him: "Keep ahead of them and keep them from going too far. The enemy's line is in the woods right in front of our guns." Captain Moore, who was talking to him, had probably told him this. The guns that had been captured were not more than three hundred yards from us, a little advanced to the west of the road. I had noticed that they were not gone when I passed along on my ride to General Slocum's but the melee was so confused that I have not and never had a very clear idea of it. When I got to where the guns were the road was somewhat sunken and as the bank was so steep that I could not ride my horse up, I jumped off and scrambled up. There were a good many men among the guns before I got there, and the guns were being re-captured. But I do know that when I passed near a gun, a sergeant of the First Regiment, whose name was either Hollins or Hollister, had a Rebel prisoner by the neck. The man, though captured, had not surrendered, and as I passed him in carrying out the order which I had, to stop the men from going beyond the guns, he thrust at our sergeant with his bayonet, missed him, and gave me a prod, the scar of which I carry to this day. Though it did not disable me then or now, as it was on the inside of the thigh. I passed the order to halt to several of the officers of our brigade. It is my impression that there were lots of Kearney's men from his own division who were there almost instantly; but I do not think they were there when we first came up.

I expected that we would receive a withering volley from the woods which were only across a small field in which the General had told me the enemy would be. For some blessed reason that volley never came; and in a few minutes our men were recalled to the road and continued our march, and towards night fall we went into line of battle along the side of the road not more than twenty yards from the road side. On the west side our skirmishers were thrown out perhaps fifty yards more and we engaged with the Rebel skirmishers until dark. There was a good deal of artillery firing along the roads which intersected the road on which we were marching; but most of the shots went through the tree tops and only a few of our men were injured. The line we were holding and which we held there from dark until twelve o'clock that night was the gap in the line into which the enemy had charged and captured Major General McCall and a large part of his division.

About nine o'clock that night I, having been constantly engaged under General Taylor's orders, in passing along our skirmisher line and getting reports from the officers, came up to where the General was in a fence corner, and found him utterly exhausted. Neither he nor I had had any nourishment, except a cup of coffee for breakfast, since the night before and that coffee had been given to us by some of the men of our headquarters. The wagon with all our rations was with the train and we did not see it for thirty-six hours afterwards.