CHAPTER IV.

TRAINING A COMPANY FOR OFFENSIVE ACTION.

_Instruction in Reconnaissance._

The instruction of officers and selected non-commissioned officers and men in the art of reconnaissance for night operations must be carefully carried out, and the following method has proved to be useful.

The Captain takes his class to the ground chosen, and, after explaining the tactical scheme, and pointing out the kind of information which is required, allows them a certain time to go over the ground and make their notes. At first the class should be allowed to move freely over the ground; but, as the instruction progresses, flags may be put out to mark the position of hostile posts and the class forbidden to approach them. When the notes are finished they should always be criticised on the actual ground.

When the class thoroughly understand what to observe and how to report it, they should be ordered to reconnoitre by night ground which they have already reported on by day. The two reports should be compared, and any differences noted, and then the Captain should go over the ground with them _by night_, so as to actually check on the spot the accuracy and sufficiency of their observations.

To make a reconnaissance suitable for the execution of night operations requires a great deal of practice, and it is only by constantly testing _in the dark_ the value of the reports sent in that one learns what are the points which it is essential to observe with accuracy.

_Night Marches._

In carrying out night marches, the company should be practised as an advanced guard to a column, and as a company acting alone.

In close country an advanced guard will consist of scouts, the point, and the main guard. The provision of a vanguard at night is undesirable—it lengthens the column without giving any practical advantage.

The scouts should be started two or three minutes ahead of the point, and should keep in the shadow on the side of the road. They will march at a quick pace, halting at cross-roads and suspicious places to listen, and will move on again when they hear the advanced guard approaching. They must be trained to use their ears as much, if not more than their eyes. If they discover the enemy, one of them will return to warn the advanced guard; the others will conceal themselves and watch. It must be impressed upon them that they are on no account to fire unless for the purpose of warning the column, and then only if there are no other means of doing so. It is useless to attempt to keep connection between the scouts and the point, as the distance between them will constantly vary.

The point may consist of one section, and will march on one or both sides of the road, covering itself in front by a file at about 30 paces distance.

The main guard will follow the point at a distance of from 50 to 100 paces, according to the light; it also should march on the sides of the road. If there is a main body it will follow the main guard at about double the distance which is kept between the latter and the point. Communication between the point and the main guard, and between the main guard and the main body, will be kept by means of connecting files, within clear view of each other.

A company marching alone on a road should move in the same formation as when forming an advanced guard, but will also cover its rear with a few scouts.

_Night Advances and Night Attacks._

The formations adopted in night advances and night attacks will vary with the ground, the nature of the operation, and the activity of the enemy; it is, therefore, necessary to train the company to move at night in all possible formations, both in double and single rank. The men should be constantly practised in forming company, platoon, and sections in single rank to either flank, when moving in file or single file. In a close country like England it is constantly necessary to move in fours or file, and it is essential that the company should be able to form up with rapidity and precision. When moving in line in double rank it is advisable that a distance of about five paces should be kept between ranks, otherwise if a front rank man stumbles his rear rank man will fall over him.

When a company is acting alone, even in open country, it is best to keep it fairly well concentrated until the position of deployment is reached, and in a close country, where fences have to be passed at intervals, it is generally necessary to move in fours or file.

The following formation has proved to be handy, and, if the men have been well trained, they will have no difficulty in forming up rapidly on the darkest night. Two platoons, each in single file, advance side by side, followed at about 20 paces distance by the other two platoons in the same formation. In the event of alarm, the platoons form up on the right and left respectively, and the company then stands in column of half companies in single rank at about 60 paces distance.

Whatever formation is used, the front, flanks and rear must be covered by scouts, whose distance away will vary with the light. Protection in rear is very important, yet is often neglected. I have on more than one occasion seen a night operation completely disorganised by a bold attack delivered against the rear of the column by a party of the enemy, who, in the absence of scouts, had approached unnoticed.

The Field Service Regulations direct that before the position of assembly is quitted the orders are to be clearly explained to all ranks, so that everyone may know:

1. The object in view and the direction of the objective.

2. The formation to be adopted at the position of deployment.

3. The part he has to play.

4. His action in case the enemy is not surprised; also that the warnings against firing, talking, striking matches, smoking, etc., are to be repeated two or three times.

In training a company the prohibitions here alluded to will, of course, be most rigidly enforced at all times. It must always be remembered that as men are trained in peace so will they act in war, and the officer who, from carelessness or good nature, allows his men to disregard these obvious precautions may inculcate habits of slackness calculated to have most serious results on service.

The situation of the position of deployment will depend on the strength of the attacking force, and the alertness of the enemy; the smaller the force the nearer to the enemy’s position will this point be fixed. A company can usually get within 300 yards of the enemy’s posts without difficulty.

The Regulations advocate that when the position of deployment is reached the force should be formed in three lines, but with a company it is rarely advisable to have more than two. The company may be formed with two platoons in each line, or with three in the front line and one in the second, according to the extent of the position to be attacked; the front line, at any rate, should be in single rank. When deciding on the formation officers should remember that no more men should be put into the front line than are necessary for the object in view, and that the maintenance of a reserve to meet eventualities is of paramount importance.

_Guiding Troops Across Country at Night._

Instructions governing the guidance of troops at night in open country are to be found in the Field Service Regulations, and in the Manual of Map Reading and Field Sketching.

On a very dark night a modification of the system described in section 71 of the latter book may be employed with advantage. Half a dozen assistants, with luminous discs, both on their chests and backs, are provided, and, when the guide has determined on the line, these assistants are placed on it facing towards the guide and covering each other. As the force advances each assistant in turn moves to the far end of the line and covers again on the others. With well-trained assistants a rate of advance of about half to three-quarters of a mile per hour may be counted on.

In enclosed country if the fences run parallel to the line of advance they are a great help to the guide, otherwise they increase his difficulties. Fences, as a rule, must be passed at gateways or gaps, and this necessitates moving in a zig-zag direction. On a starlight night the following method has been used with success. A star to march on having been chosen, the company is halted, and an officer, with a couple of scouts, each provided with a pocket electric lamp, are sent on to find the best point of passage in the fence; when this point is found an electric light is shown, and the company marches on it. In broken ground it may sometimes be necessary to post one of the scouts with a light as an intermediate point. If the lamps are carefully handled there is but little risk of their being observed from the front. Provided that a suitable star is visible, the direction can be maintained without difficulty.

If there are no stars, and the fences do not run parallel, the only means of guiding a column is as follows:—

The company is halted while the guide moves on to the next fence by the method previously described for open country. On reaching the fence one assistant is posted to mark the spot, while the guide and the others search for the best point of passage. The company is then brought up to the selected spot, passed through the fence, and again halted. The guide then returns to the point at which the assistant was left, and from it lays out his line to the next fence. This is, of course, a very slow method, but it gives accurate results. Special care must be taken to see that the company is protected by scouts during the whole operation.

_The Assault._

If, after the position of deployment has been reached, the enemy opens fire, the company must continue its advance until near enough to charge; under no circumstances must the fire be replied to.

When the actual assault takes place the second line—and the third line, if there is one—will be halted to await developments; should their assistance be required they will act in prolongation of the first line, and strive to envelop the enemy.

If a force is formed in two lines only the commander must beware of allowing the second line to be drawn into the fight, unless it is absolutely necessary. The retention of some portion of the force intact and ready for instant action is quite as important at night as in the daytime. The commander himself must remain with his reserve.

Should the assault succeed, no attempt to pursue is to be permitted; the reserve must be at once disposed to meet the counter-attack, and the remainder reformed under its protection.

Whether the attackers should cheer at the moment of the assault or not is a moot question. The arguments in favour of it are:—

1. It encourages your own men.

2. It discourages the enemy.

3. It notifies the assault to neighbouring columns.

Against it:—

1. It gives warning to the enemy.

2. It gives an indication of the strength of the attacking force.

Personally, I am in favour of training men to deliver the assault at night in silence, for the following reason: Sudden outbursts of fire without any due cause occasionally occur in all armies, when the outposts are near those of the enemy, and it is quite possible that the enemy’s supports and reserves will not move until they have obtained information of what is happening. If, however, the assault is delivered with cheers they can be in no doubt as to what has occurred, and will, therefore, act at once.

TRAINING FOR DEFENSIVE ACTION.

_Outposts._

The first brunt of a night attack necessarily falls on the outposts, and unless they receive timely warning they will undoubtedly be overwhelmed; it is, therefore, a matter of supreme importance that the training in outpost duty should be thoroughly carried out.

In our Army outpost duty was for many years almost entirely neglected, and even now it is not treated with sufficient seriousness. At manœuvres, and at field operations lasting more than one day, an armistice is often declared at night, and it is but rarely that the infantry are practised in outpost duty under service conditions. It is true that this duty, if strictly performed is extremely harassing, but in view of its importance it is, I think, unwise to allow any opportunity of gaining experience to pass.

In carrying out the training of a company in outpost duty the strictest discipline should always be maintained, no irregularity, however trifling, should ever be passed over, and all duties carried out with great care and thoroughness.

With the weak companies which we often have it is sometimes difficult to find sufficient men for the complete service of outposts, and when this is so the position of piquets, and even of groups, may be marked with flags. The one service which should never be dispensed with is that of the reconnoitring patrols. It should be impressed upon all that the protection afforded by groups and piquets, unless supplemented by a regular system of reconnoitring patrols, is altogether inadequate, and every commander should invariably satisfy himself that the proportion of men told off for patrol duty is sufficient to carry out the work properly.

_Position of Piquets at Night._

Unless a piquet is protected by obstacles, its best means of defence at night lies in a resolute counter-attack, and to carry out this a clear space is necessary. The Regulations lay down that the first duty of outposts is to strengthen their position as much as possible, and in open country the usual course followed is to entrench the groups and piquets.

Now a shelter trench affords fair protection in the day time and may be useful at night if the ground immediately in front of it is illuminated by searchlights, but in the dark it loses a great deal of its value, and it is obviously a very bad place to receive a bayonet charge in. For this reason it is better at night to withdraw the piquets about 30 yards behind the trench; this latter will then form an obstacle likely to break the ranks of an assaulting enemy, and the defenders will have room for the counter-charge.

_Readiness for Action._

It cannot be too strongly insisted on that piquets must always be ready for action. The men should sleep with their rifles beside them, in the positions they will occupy in the ranks, and must not be allowed to cover their ears when lying down. Either the commander, or the next in command, together with a proportion of the piquet, must always remain awake, and when the commander lies down he should do so close to the sentry over the piquet.

This readiness for action is often neglected; it is, of course, necessary that officers and men on outpost duty should sleep, but arrangements must be made to ensure that some of the piquet are always alert.

At manœuvres I have often seen an entire piquet peacefully asleep, trusting to the protection afforded by one or two groups 200 or 300 yards away, and the single sentry over the piquet. Any one who has had experience of the heavy sleep which overtakes tired men will know the difficulty there would be in quickly rousing a piquet under these circumstances. I remember on one occasion witnessing a night attack on a piquet by a company of the enemy, which charged, with loud cheers, yet some minutes after the assault had been delivered, two or three members of the piquet were found to be still fast asleep, with their heads enveloped in their blankets.

_Cover for Groups._

When groups are posted in front of a piquet in open country, they should always have cover in rear to protect them from the fire of their comrades. Groups will remain out with much greater confidence if they feel that they are safe from the fire of their own side.

_Marking of Route to and from Piquets._

The route from the support to its piquets, and from the piquets to their groups, should always be clearly marked; scraps of paper, or even green sticks, with the bark peeled off, may be used.

_Sentries Challenging._

The Regulations provide that sentries shall challenge at night, but it is desirable to avoid any noise likely to disclose their position. It is easy to arrange a system of signals by which patrols, etc., can be recognised. The signal should be made by the sentry first and replied to by the patrol, but it must be an invariable rule that after the signal has been made one man, and one only, of the patrol shall advance up to the sentry to be recognised. If the signal is not replied to, the sentry will challenge, but in no louder tone than is absolutely necessary.

_Sentries Firing._

Sentries must be taught always to allow persons to approach fairly near to them before challenging, and never to fire, except when it is absolutely necessary to give an alarm, unless they can clearly distinguish the object they fire at and can be fairly certain of hitting it. Every officer who has been on service knows well that at the commencement of a campaign sentries are continually firing at nothing, but as they gain experience shots at night become rare; it is really a question of training, and the training should be given during peace.

In the French Army serving in Algeria there is a rule that any sentry who fires at night must produce a corpse, or, at any rate, be able to show by blood marks that he has hit the person he fired at, failing this the sentry is dealt with for giving a false alarm. This is an excellent rule, for unnecessary firing causes a great deal of fatigue and annoyance to the troops on outpost duty.

_Action of Outposts in a Night Attack._

If due warning of the enemy’s advance is received and searchlights are not available, the groups should be withdrawn, and the enemy allowed to approach without any indication that the defenders are aware of his movement being given. When he gets within 30 yards, or on dark nights even less, he should be received with one round from every rifle, followed immediately by a bayonet charge.

The round should be fired by word of command, like the old volley, and great pains must be taken to impress upon the men the necessity of aiming low. In the dark the natural tendency is to fire high, and the men must be trained to overcome it. Firing from the hip has been suggested as being likely to bring down the line of fire, but I have never seen it tried at night, and experiments conducted in daylight have not proved it to have any effect in that direction.

If adjoining bodies of the outposts are able to deliver an attack simultaneously against both the front and flanks of the enemy, it will probably be successful, as troops are quite as sensitive to flank attacks at night as in the day.

In defence, as in attack, it is imperative that a portion of the force should be held in reserve as long as possible.