Part 8

Up to now the German armies have been sustained, not only by reinforcements from Russia, but by the long rest of the Winter months; otherwise they could not have accomplished what they have done. These sources of strength are being rapidly exhausted. The human material--cannon food--is failing in quality. The field depots have been emptied of recruits. Men from the depots in Germany are rushed to the front. Cavalry officers are dismounted to fill gaps in the infantry. Men detached for special work are called back to their units, and still the war god is unsatisfied.

Incorporation of the 1920 class began in April and May. Miners and mechanics are again turned into the fighting ranks, ill as they can be spared from industry. It is probable that not a division has been left in the east that would be fit for the western front. Wounded men and invalids imperfectly cured are pressed back into service. And behind the armies thus replenished there is the nation, hungry, enfeebled, terrorized, uttering words of despair even in its letters to the front. Ludendorff may well hurry!

DEFENSE OF COURCELLES

A very brief diary of the battle at a single point will give an idea of its bitter violence. The small village of Courcelles lies across the chief road of the western wing of the offensive, only about two miles from its starting point with the Montdidier-Estrées railway, and the same distance behind it. For these reasons, and because it stands on a spur of the Mery Plateau, it was certain to be a hardly contested position.

On Sunday morning, June 9, taking advantage of the cover afforded by broad fields of well-grown wheat, the Germans came up the slope from Rollot and rushed the village. At 9:40 the French re-formed and retook it, capturing 200 men and four officers. Forty minutes later a new wave was brought up from the north, but was thrown back. Some storm troops, however, got around by the rear. These were in turn repulsed.

Several hours passed in which the three streets of broken houses were put in order for a siege. At 3 P. M. a fresh attack was repulsed. Later in the afternoon the German success at Mery and Belloy resulted in Courcelles being beset on three sides, only a narrow alley of communication to the west remaining open.

The defenders now had their blood up. The reserves would soon arrive. This western flank of the battle was of the utmost importance. It had become a point of honor that the village should not be lost.

At 4:40 A. M. on Monday, after a preparatory bombardment, the next blow fell. In ten minutes its failure was evident, though the fighting about the barbed wire continued for an hour. Three more assaults followed in the afternoon and evening. In the last of these some Germans got into the village, but they were at last driven out.

On Tuesday the heroes of this splendid defense reaped the only reward they desired. The great French counterattack definitely freed their little fortress.

TABLES TURNED

This time it was the turn of the French to win the benefits of initiative and surprise. Only a quarter of an hour was given to the French artillery for its preparation work. Tanks and infantry then went forward in alternate lines. An officer describes the advance of the tanks rolling over the green wheatfields, while shells burst around them, as having the appearance of a battle at sea.

The allied airmen, swooping above the moving line, not only sowed death in the enemy's ranks with their machine guns, but also raced forward and dropped bombs with effect on heavy batteries in the rear, killing their crews and putting the guns out of action.

In some enemy units during this battle the men fought well. In others there have been unmistakable signs of demoralization. Such inequalities are not surprising in this crisis. The total superiority of force which a few months ago was enough to have terrified us, and which is still sufficiently serious to require every effort that can be put forth, is ebbing away.

End of Fourth Phase--Two Expert Views

_All correspondents on June 14 united in the conclusion that the counterblows of the Allies and the brilliant reaction of the French from Courcelles to Mery ended the fourth phase of the great German offensive. Mr. Perris summed up the situation as follows on June 14:_

The front has subsided into actions of no more than local importance. The five days' battle west of the Oise has ended for the Germans, after an advance varying from two to six miles, in a very costly reverse, and for the Allies in a brilliant success of good generalship and indomitable spirit in the ranks.

Beside the losses of the enemy, the French loss of the Thiescourt hills and the wooded part of the valley opposite is of little importance. The offensive which was to give a decision against them is far from finished, but in relation to the resistance it encounters it shows a falling, not a rising, gamut of power.

The first push toward Amiens ended in ten days, having entailed upon the Allies the sacrifice of a tract forty miles deep and serious casualties. The following attack in the north lasted about as long, but with much slighter gains. The German success on the Chemin des Dames brought the Crown Prince's vanguard to the Marne, twenty-five miles from its starting point, but that it touched much less vital ground is proved by the transfer of its centre of pressure to the Ourcq Valley near Villers-Cotterets.

From these results to those of the present week's fighting there is a marked descent, and this failure occurs in what must be accounted one of the most critical directions the enemy can pursue. The ambitious character of his design is now clear. It is not merely to divide the British from the French army and then destroy one of them, but also by a single series of converging operations to destroy them both.

His approach to Amiens as the centre of their joint communications and to Hazebrouck as the door to the Channel ports has been followed by an approach along four converging lines to the region of Paris, the centre of French administrative life. In fact, the attainment of all these objectives would not end the war, for I am sure there is in France, and there probably is in the other countries concerned, a deadly resolution that it shall not be ended in any such way; that, if Paris should be destroyed--which heaven forfend--another capital shall be found, and that there shall be no surrender while there is an army on its legs.

This offensive has had two aims--to reach the crescent north and east of Paris, whence a general attack could be launched, and to draw down, disperse, and harry the allied reserves preparatory to the final "Kaiserschlacht," the crowning blow along the whole line. Its relative failure is a great encouragement.

PETAIN'S MASTERLY TACTICS

_Walter Duranty, in reviewing the fourth phase of the offensive, sent the following cable dispatch to_ THE NEW YORK TIMES _on June 13:_

It has been said that the secret of Pétain's rise in three years from the position of Colonel to Commander in Chief of the French armies is his knowledge of when to launch counterattacks. The ability to select the right place and time for a sudden stroke which nullifies the enemy's gains has been the attribute of great captains throughout history, and is one of the cardinal bases of successful strategy. In that one word, counterattacks, lies the explanation of the triumphant French resistance in the present battle against vastly superior numbers--that and the indomitable courage of the defenders.

The master tactician commanding the army whose sector has been assailed has so imbued his subordinates with his own principles that there is hardly a position in the whole range of operations that the Germans have not been forced to take two or three times over. For it is not only the counter-stroke on a grand scale, like that which has won back nearly all the Germans' gains on the left wing, which counts in a struggle of this kind, where the losses inflicted on the enemy are far more important than a hill or a village saved or abandoned. It is the unexpected change from defense to attack, at the psychological moment, that has maintained the spirit of the French troops and smashed their weakened assailants just as they were thinking their success was assured.

As the situation stands today [June 13] the Allies have won a great victory in one of the hardest fought battles of the war, and a carefully planned move in Hindenburg's desperate struggle against time has been met and nullified. The Germans have also learned to their cost that the American troops are already to be counted with. The enemy, whose morale is daily weakening under the strain of non-successes and never-ending calls upon his strength, has received a bitter reminder of the American menace, which more than any other factor is responsible for his convulsive striving after a speedy decision.

[M. Tardieu, in a cablegram June 18 to the French High Commission at Washington, stated that 80,000 Germans had been put out of action in the Noyon-Montdidier offensive, and that General von Hutier had failed completely to realize his objective--the capture of Compiègne.]

Austrians at Grips With Italians

By AUSTIN WEST

[SEE MAP OF ITALIAN FRONT, PAGE 15]

_An offensive was launched June 15, 1918, by the Austrians against the Italians with an army estimated to number 1,000,000 men. The attack was on a front from the Asiago Plateau to the sea, a distance of ninety-seven miles. The course of the struggle in the first four days indicated the failure of the drive. The details of the earlier stages of the battle are given herewith._

According to statements of prisoners, the Austrian objectives on the first day of the attack were Bassano, eight miles down the Brenta, and Treviso, eight miles west of the Piave. The attack along the Piave from the Venetian lagoons to Montello was aimed at possession of the main roads leading to Montebelluna, Treviso, and Mestre, five miles west of Venice, thereby cutting off Venice and thrusting toward the heart of the Venetian Plain.

In the meantime General Conrad von Hoetendorf's armies from Monte Grappa to Asiago were to sweep down upon Asolo and Bassano to prevent the retreat of the 3d Italian Army from the Piave and complete the march of invasion from the north.

Austria's hopes and aims are reflected very strikingly in an Order of the Day, dated June 14, compiled from Field Marshal Boroevic's proclamation and circulated among the troops of the 3d Regiment over Commander Mitteregger's signature. A copy has just fallen into Italian hands. It runs as follows:

From the Adige to the Adriatic the Austrian Army descends into the field against Italy. All the forces and all the material of the monarchy are for the first time massed against one single enemy as the outcome of preparations begun many months ago. Tomorrow the Italian command will learn this tremendous news from the mouths of our guns. The entire Italian front will be attacked, and to free himself from our iron grip, which will encircle his whole front, the enemy would be obliged to engage reserves far vaster than those at his disposal.

From trench warfare we shall pass to that of movement and shall occupy a country abounding in victuals and stores of every sort. Let us therefore press forward resolutely toward the City of Verona, where a century ago the august founder of our regiment stood victor against the combined armies of France and Italy.

Today, (June 17,) nevertheless, after forty-eight hours of fighting, the enemy still is held upon his first lines.

The British forces regained all the positions they held on the eve of the battle. The French contingents southeast of Asiago on Turcio Road recaptured Pennar in a bayonet charge and drove the Austrians back far beyond their starting point. Counterattacking at Cornone, our allies stopped effectually the enemy's dash toward Valstagna and took 500 prisoners. Fenilon and Moschin Mountains, overlooking the Brenta Valley, which the enemy overwhelmed in his first onrush, have also been retaken at the point of the bayonet, with 200 prisoners and forty machine guns.

Along the Piave enemy masses concentrated, chiefly on the eastern slopes on Montello and west of San Dona. In both districts passage across the river was facilitated by a heavy rain of tear shells and smoke bombs, and amid the smoke pontoons and rafts were taken down to the water's edge. Three divisions got across from Colfosco and Ilas, fronting Nervesa, but they were hemmed around at the foot of Montello, at Fagare and Zenson, where the Austrians had penetrated some way ahead. The Italians, after thrusting them from the latter place, encircled some detachments in the river bend.

Croce Village, west of San Dona, was rewon and lost twice over, and now rests in the possession of Italian bombardiers, Bersagliere, and cyclist corps. But the best stroke of luck on the Piave occurred in the Saletto sector. Taking advantage of numerous islets at this point, where the river is nearly two miles wide, one Hungarian battalion of the 96th Regiment had safely crossed, and was being quickly followed by another. Italian gunfire smashed its boats, flinging the occupants into the water. Many were carried away and drowned in the rapid currents, while over a thousand survivors, including a Lieutenant Colonel, a Major, and thirty other officers, out of the haul of 3,000 odd prisoners taken during the day, were made captives by the Italians at that spot.

The Austrians employed such a large amount of gases that the whole battleline was enveloped in dense, impenetrable clouds. Fortunately, a heavy rain fell in that region, which lessened to some extent the effects of the gases.

The Italians fought fiercely with great dash, glad to get at the enemy after so many months of forced inactivity and with an intense desire to regain the country desecrated by the enemy's invasion.

The Austrians kept the Italians under deadly fire, especially aiming at their second lines, to prevent the arrival of reinforcements. This bombardment has small effect in the mountains, as, owing to the limited number of men one can employ at one time, these are able to protect themselves in dugouts excavated in the solid rock.

Snow, which is still lying on the mountains, is heaped up into immense mounds by the bombardment. Italian troops, clothed in white overalls to prevent their being seen against the whiteness, slowly advanced to engage the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting.

Despite the rain, the work accomplished by the English and Italian aviators was above praise. Flying low over the enemy troops, they brought confusion and terror into their midst, intrepidly engaging the Austrians in aerial combats, and bringing down in twelve hours many enemy planes, while also collecting invaluable military information. The English and French contingents co-operated with the Italians in perfect accord and a splendid spirit of camaraderie.

Except for lack of secrecy, the Austrians organized this supreme effort of theirs better than might have been expected. It was well planned and resolutely delivered. The credit due the Italians is all the greater for repulsing it completely in many places, containing it in others, and nowhere allowing it to break through.

The sector on which the enemy gained most ground is on the Piave. There the Austrians made three principal crossings of the river and established three bridgeheads or salients into the original Italian line.

To make this possible they blinded the Italian artillery and airplanes by using great quantities of smoke shells which covered the river and the Italian trenches on its bank with a dense black fog. Thus hidden, the Austrian patrols hurried across the water in boats and on rafts under no more than a random fire from the defense.

Having reached the western bank they pulled pontoon bridges across and pushed reinforcements rapidly forward. The most notable of these crossings was the enemy's penetration in the Montello sector, the position which the British forces held all last Winter.

This sector is the hinge between the mountain and the Piave sectors; it stands at the angle where the Piave leaves the mountains and enters the Venetian Plain. It is an isolated hog's back, 700 feet high in the middle and seven and a half miles long, running almost east and west, with the foot of its northern and eastern slopes washed by the river, its surface undulating, dotted with farms and little woods--an unusual feature--crossed from north to south by no fewer than twenty-four roads. The value of Montello to the enemy would have been that it would dominate from the flank and rear all the Italian positions defending the line of the Piave in the dead flat plain to the south.

The British, after reconquering the advanced positions, momentarily abandoned on June 15 with a view of strengthening the line, not only resisted all Austrian attempts, but counterattacked in a fashion that caused an Italian superior officer to remark: "They are slamming the gates of Italy in the face of the invader."

_In a dispatch on June 19 Mr. West recorded the fact that the enemy, while maintaining pressure on the mountain front and Montello district, was redoubling his efforts on the Piave especially west of San Dona. The dispatch continues:_

The Austrian hold of the last-named vicinity, also in the Zenson bend and at Saint Andrea, southeast of Montello, is being considerably weakened by the Italian artillery fire and constant counterattacks.

Saint Andrea itself, with the adjacent villages of Giavera, Bavaria, and Sovilla, has changed hands ten times over. The railroad running thence toward Montebelluna is hidden under a litter of dead bodies for a length of several kilometers. The haul of prisoners has risen from 6,000 to 9,000, General Diaz announced last night--an almost unique fact in an offensive of this nature and undoubtedly the fruit of Italy's immediate readiness for an energetic reaction.

Stupendous acts of heroism are recorded. Gunners of an Alpine regiment stationed at the foot of Montello Hill, after being twice driven from their batteries, united themselves to some storm troops, fought the foe in a hand-to-hand encounter with daggers, and, recovering the cannon, readjusted the breechlocks, which they had taken away with them, and then fired pointblank into the adversary's ranks.

At Fagare two Hungarian battalions were annihilated amid the ruins of houses where they had taken refuge. At Candelu an enemy machine-gun corps, which had transformed the village into a fort, were killed by Italian mountain artillery, and in the neighboring sector of Salettuol the 3d Austrian Division lost 60 per cent. of its effectiveness.

Many of the prisoners at the moment of capture present the appearance of Bedouins, being clad merely in tattered shirts, with their rifles slung over their shoulders and a dagger in their hand. Nearly all carried postcard maps marking out their journey, with a program inscribed: "June 15, halt at Treviso. June 16, occupation of Venice." They also carried little packets of money coupons printed in Italian for spending in those cities.

A German View of Germany's Effort

The Recent Offensive

[BY THE COLOGNE GAZETTE EDITOR AT GERMAN HEADQUARTERS]

The task confronting us before the offensive seemed monstrous. What the combined and many times superior armies of the Napoleonic School and Kitchener's Army, young indeed but drawing its supplies from the resources of a world empire had failed to accomplish against a force of almost Frederickian inferiority in numbers, this task was to be performed by the German Army, which, even after the absorption of the eastern units, was scarcely equal in strength, much less superior to the enemy. The big hammer had failed to beat down the little hammer; it was now the turn of the little hammer to pit itself against the big hammer. The German hinterland, diminutive in comparison with the continents working for the coalition, was not only to hold its own, but also to help to conquer in battle against the raw materials and industries of half Europe, America, Africa, and Asia. The German victory at Cambrai, which in a sense represented a transition from the old to a new era in the history of the war in the west, had already illuminated the difficulties that a brave and numerically superior enemy could oppose to our attack.

In contrast with the victorious confidence of our veteran defense troops--a confidence that at times excited the amazement of their own leaders--the enemy continued to contemplate the German undertaking with inveterate skepticism. British and French prisoners captured during the Winter months indeed held out to us the prospect of achieving an initial success similar to that which their own offensive had achieved. But nowhere in the world did any one reckon upon more than the customary initial success for our enterprise.

The German High Command decided from the very outset not to fight a "battle of matériel," but to build up success upon a more ideal foundation. Numerical inferiority was to be compensated by the warlike and moral qualities peculiar to the German Army organism. The same virtues that had proved the essential cause of the enemy's defeat were to form the surest guarantees of German victory. To the undeniable bravery of the English and French storming troops was to be opposed the utmost bravery of the German tribes; the good quality of the enemy leaders was to be met by better leading on the German side, and the thorough preparation of our adversaries by one still more thorough.

As the Supreme Command could confidently reckon upon the two first as given quantities, there remained as the chief task the preparation of the attack. Unity of command and of forces, the latter non-German only in respect of a valuable group of Austrian batteries that had been placed in the line, facilitated the tremendous work. Frictions and impediments that are inherent even in the best organized coalition armies were spared us. It is impossible to picture what was accomplished in the map rooms of the German staffs by experienced specialists in defensive warfare, who worked in silence for months, at the highest nervous pressure, in the face of the confident expectation of the homeland and growing tension and impatience abroad. But it is certain that an altogether enormous expenditure of organizing energy was required in order to impart the method of attack; to ascertain and control the situation of the enemy; to supply the striking force with munitions and provisions; and finally to produce that masterpiece, the veiled march into line.

Addresses by the Kaiser

He Extols Militarism and Defines the Issues of the War

The German Kaiser in two telegrams acknowledging congratulations on the thirtieth anniversary of his accession to the throne made announcements of historic interest regarding the issues of the war and the uses of militarism. On June 17 he telegraphed to the German Chancellor, Count von Hertling: